The price of victory. Soviet and German tank aces

During the Second World War, it became almost impossible to declare the destruction of an enemy aircraft simply in words. In the Luftwaffe, for example, confirmation of this fact required either the testimony of a machine gun, or the testimony of other pilots who took part in the battle, or both. In the Soviet Air Force, this process was even more complex: the fact of the destruction of an enemy aircraft had to be confirmed by ground forces. If the air battle took place over enemy territory, then the German plane shot down by the Soviet pilot was not counted at all. Machine guns in Soviet aviation for a long time there wasn't. They appeared only in the middle of the war on part of Lend-Lease aircraft. On domestic cars(and even then not on all of them) they began to be installed only at the end of the war. At the same time, one piece of evidence ground forces it wasn't enough. A technical group from the unit in which the pilot who shot him down served went to the crash site of the enemy plane and finally recorded the fact of destruction. As a result, the score kept by the pilot could differ from the official one, and significantly. However, it was the official numbers that were made public and to this day are known to us, which, as a rule, are not questioned. For example, the Soviet ace A.I. Pokryshkin, according to official data, shot down 59 enemy aircraft, while at the same time his personal account is about one and a half times more.

Perhaps the only thing that made it easier to count downed enemy aircraft was that the fighter was still an individual weapon. Even in two-seater vehicles of this class, the same person piloted the aircraft and fired at the enemy. So it was more or less clear who should be given the title of ace. A certain ethical problem arises here only with the follower. Fighters, as you know, always fly in pairs. In the Soviet Air Force, until the end of 1942, a flight generally consisted of three vehicles. Any pilot knows well how much air combat depends on the slave. But at the same time, it is mainly the leader who knocks down, and the follower remains in his shadow. Everyone knows, for example, the most successful Soviet pilot of the Great Patriotic War Three times Hero of the Soviet Union I.N. Kozhedub, but few people know who his wingman was.

There was another concept in fighter aviation - group combat. When it was impossible to find out which pilot specifically shot down an enemy plane, they acted simply: the victory was credited to the group commander.

The reader may wonder why such a lengthy “aviation” introduction was needed to a book dedicated to the most successful tank crews? It is necessary to understand both the generality of the topic and the very significant differences between aviation aces and tank aces.

Soviet tanker Dashinsky. Commander of the KV-1 tank. Destroyed 6 German tanks and self-propelled guns, 18 guns. Soviet tank aces

The very concept of “tank ace” appeared only at the beginning of World War II. The Germans were the first to count destroyed enemy tanks, and until 1941 they were the only ones doing this. For others, this problem was irrelevant, either due to complete absence in their armies of tanks, or due to their small numbers. Compete with the Germans in initial period The Second World War could only have been fought by French tank crews if France had not suffered such a rapid defeat. Aces do not appear on the lists of personnel of the tank forces of Great Britain and the United States. Both had enough tanks and tank crews, but the limited use of tank forces, both in time and place, did not allow the tank crews of these countries to express themselves. In addition, neither the Americans nor the British were particularly keen to conduct tank duels with the Germans. Since the greatest scope tank battles reached on the Eastern Front, it eventually turned out that tank aces are only available in the ranks of the Panzerwaffe and Soviet tank forces.

The Germans counted their victories and their aces most scrupulously, one might even say with love. This was done not only with the aim of paying tribute to the most effective and skilled soldiers and officers, but also with a completely understandable propaganda purpose. This work continued after the end of World War II. In the West, many books on this topic were published in the post-war years. Some of them are now published in Russian. All of them are characterized by a certain bias in the coverage of facts, and sometimes simply bias. The biographies of German tank heroes alone, written by Franz Kurowski, are worth it. You read and are surprised - not people, but some kind of hunchbacked horses, slaying enemies with Siegfried’s magic sword! Nevertheless, these books do their job: the name of “the most effective tanker of all time” Michael Wittmann is known to many, but let’s say who Lavrinenko is is known only to a narrow circle of people interested in this topic.

However, in reality it turns out that Whitman is not at all the best. According to recent Western studies, the top ten most effective German tankers are as follows:

sergeant major K. Knispel - 168 tanks;

Lieutenant O. Karius - 150 tanks;

Chief Lieutenant G. Belter - 144 tanks;

SS Hauptsturmführer M. Witmann - 138 tanks (according to other sources, 120 or even 147);

SS Oberscharführer P. Eger - 113 tanks;

Oberfenrich Rondorf - 106 tanks;

non-commissioned officer Belokh - 103 tanks;

sergeant major Gartner - 101 tank;

sergeant major Kerscher - 100 tanks;

SS Obersturmführer K. Kerner - 100 tanks.

When studying this list, attention is drawn to the fact that all of these tankers, starting around mid-1943 (and many earlier), fought as part of the heavy tank battalions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. That is, they achieved most of their victories on heavy tanks “Tiger” and “Royal Tiger”, which were significantly superior in firepower to most combat vehicles of the countries anti-Hitler coalition. This circumstance is well illustrated by the following example. For six months of 1941, fighting in assault gun StuG III, M. Vitman managed to destroy 25 Soviet tanks, and in two weeks of fighting on the Kursk Bulge, already fighting on the “Tiger” - 30!

The effectiveness of tankers directly depended on the nature of combat operations and their tactics. It is clear that the tactics used in the German heavy tank battalions allowed the crews of combat vehicles to achieve a high percentage of hits. The nature of the fighting also contributed to this: at the final stage of World War II, the Wehrmacht fought mainly defensive battles. However, it should be recognized that these factors were not decisive. The reason for the high performance of German tank crews and the effective actions of tank forces in general lies elsewhere. In 11 years, just over 50 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns were manufactured in Germany, while in the USSR during the Second World War alone - 109,100 tanks and self-propelled guns, in the USA - 135,100, in Great Britain - 24,800. Having produced tanks and self-propelled guns five times smaller than its main opponents, Germany was able to create such tank forces that throughout all the years of the war, right up to its last days, were able to deliver powerful blows. In this regard, it is enough to recall the counter-offensive of German troops in the Ardennes in December 1944 and in the area of ​​Lake Balaton in the winter of 1945. In both cases, having absolutely no superiority in tanks (as well as in other forces and means) either on the Western or Eastern Front, the Germans managed to achieve it in the directions of the main attacks, which were repulsed by the colossal strain of forces as Western allies, and the Red Army.

All this indicates high level combat training of privates and officers of the German tank forces, as well as reliability armored vehicles which allowed long time operate tanks and self-propelled guns without their failure for technical reasons. German designers managed to achieve good combat characteristics of their armored vehicles. Good weapons, excellent optics and communications, reliable engines and chassis, comfortable working conditions for the crew - all this, coupled with the already mentioned excellent combat training of tank crews, allowed the Germans throughout the war to make do with fewer tanks and self-propelled guns than their opponents, and inflict very significant losses on them. To confirm this fact, it is enough to mention that during the Second World War, Soviet tanks went on the attack three times on average, German tanks - 11 times, and for one damaged Panther, the Americans “paid”, as a rule, with five Shermans! The loss ratio on the Eastern Front was no better.

By the way, the most effective German tanker who fought on the Panther is considered to be SS Oberscharführer E. Barkman, who accounted for 80 destroyed tanks. The commander of the Panther, non-commissioned officer of the Greater Germany division, R. Larsen, chalked up 66 tanks. However, the Panther as an anti-tank weapon was not much inferior to the Tiger. The successes of German tank crews who fought on other types of combat vehicles were more modest and therefore less known.

Despite all of the above, there are reasons to doubt the reliability of German statistics. The fact is that even during the Second World War, even the German high command did not really trust the information coming from the front-line units. As a rule, the data they reported about destroyed Soviet tanks was halved after rechecking. But it’s worth asking: if this concerned information about Soviet losses in general, then shouldn’t the same yardstick be applied to the performance indicators of specific German tankers? Apparently, it's worth doing. The information given in Western literature should be subject to certain adjustments.

So, for example, all data on the combat activities of the first ten German tank aces are taken from the so-called descriptions battle path heavy tank battalions, but simply from combat logs. Despite all the external solidity of these publications, their content, especially upon careful study and comparison of facts, sometimes begins to cause bewilderment, to say the least. What, say, is worth a record like: “At 12 noon, three “tigers” of such and such a platoon destroyed 19 T-34 tanks from a distance of 2000 m.” At the same time, a little earlier, a report on the meteorological conditions of the day reported: “Blizzard.” Look, they burned 19 tanks in a snowstorm from a distance of 2000 m, and even determined the exact type? Yes, even a laser sight wouldn’t help here! Or maybe these weren’t “thirty-fours” at all, but T-70s? And not 19, but nine? And not from 2000 m? And they didn’t destroy it, but just fired at it? Moreover, it was near Rostov in the winter of 1943, the Germans were defending themselves and the battlefield remained with our troops. So the Germans could not clarify what kind of tanks they were, how many and what damage they suffered. Nevertheless, a confident entry of victory was made in the combat log!

One more fact cannot but cause surprise. Entries in the combat logs of German heavy tank battalions (and not only them) are replete with reports of destroyed T-34 and KV tanks. Tanks of other types are found much less frequently. It seems that the tank fleet of the Red Army consisted of only two types of combat vehicles. However, this was far from the case. In the tank brigade of the Red Army, according to the staff, operating since July 1942, it was supposed to have 32 T-34 tanks and 21 T-60 or T-70 tanks. In a separate tank regiment of a mechanized brigade there are 23 T-34s and 16 T-60s or T-70s. Thus, at the moment the “tigers” appeared on the Eastern Front, the lungs combat vehicles constituted at least 40% of the Red Army's tank fleet. A similar picture was observed until the end of 1943, since the staff of the tank brigade, according to which it became homogeneous and consisted of 65 T-34 tanks, was introduced only in November 1943. Nevertheless, it seems that in 1942–1943 German tank crews fought almost exclusively with T-34 tanks. There is very little mention of Soviet light tanks, for example, in the combat log of the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion. The tanker of this battalion, Otto Karius, does not even see them in his memories. But the 502nd battalion fought near Leningrad, where there were even more Soviet light tanks than in other sectors of the Eastern Front. Light tanks of outdated designs - T-26 and BT - continued to be used here. For example, even in January 1944, on the eve of the operation to lift the blockade of Leningrad, the 1st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front had 35 T-34, 32 T-26, 21 T-60 and four SU-76 self-propelled guns. A similar picture was observed in the 220th Tank Brigade - 34 T-34, 32 T-26, 18 T-60 and 7 T-70. It is quite obvious that knocking out a T-70, and even more so a T-60, which did not pose any real danger to the Tiger, is much easier than a T-34 or KV. As for the T-26, it could have been disabled by fragments of an 88-mm shell! But, apparently, the German tank crews considered it beneath their dignity to chalk up victories over light tanks and simply classified them all as T-34s! Therefore, honest records like “16 Russian tanks were knocked out - 11 T-60 and 5 T-34” are rare.

In addition, it should be taken into account that at a long distance, and even in conditions of not very good visibility, it is quite problematic to distinguish a T-34 from a T-70, and it is almost impossible to distinguish a T-34-85 from an IS-2. But, as a rule, there are no doubts about this in German combat logs. If before 1944 only “thirty-fours” crawled towards the Germans, then later it was almost entirely IS-2s! After all, the same Otto Carius announced the destruction of 17 IS-2 and 5 T-34 near Daugavpils. However, the report of the headquarters of the 502nd heavy tank battalion and Soviet documents contain information about 5 IS-2s and 17 T-34s (besides, not all of them were shot down by Carius’ company). So you don’t know what Karius suffered from - sclerosis or myopia? Although, most likely, sclerosis - after all, he attributed to his company there, near Daugavpils, 28 destroyed Soviet tanks! A fact that is not confirmed by anything other than the memories of Karius himself.

It is not entirely clear how tanks knocked out in a group battle were taken into account, and how they could be taken into account at all. For example, it is reported that on July 12, 1943, near Prokhorovka, the company commander of the 1st SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,” Obersturmführer von Ribbentrop, using a Pz.IV tank, knocked out 14 Soviet tanks, again exclusively T-34s. I wonder if von Ribbentrop pumped paint into his shells, like paintballs? Otherwise, how can you, constantly changing your position and firing at constantly maneuvering Soviet tanks, accurately record hits, much less claim that it was you, and no one else, who destroyed this or that enemy tank. And this was in the conditions of the battle near Prokhorovka, when not only all the tanks of the Leibstandarte division, but also all of its artillery - both anti-tank and divisional - fired at the two attacking Soviet tank corps. And in addition, part of the tanks and artillery of the SS divisions “Reich” and “Totenkopf”, and almost all of the direct fire artillery of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps! In such a situation, it is possible to indicate the number of tanks knocked out by one or another crew very approximately. More or less firmly we can only speak about total number damaged enemy vehicles, especially if the situation allows them to be counted after the battle. But even here there are possible overlaps.

For example, the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion, which has already been mentioned more than once, stands out in terms of the number of its victories compared to other units and subunits equipped with “tigers.” According to German data, during the entire time it was at the front from 1942 to 1945, the tank crews of this battalion destroyed 1,400 Soviet tanks! At the same time, their own losses amounted to 105 "tigers" and eight " royal tigers" The ratio is approximately 1:12! True, German sources are modestly silent about how many Pz.III tanks were lost, which were part of the battalion until May 1943, as well as about how many of these 1,400 tanks were knocked out by “troikas”. However, upon careful study, you involuntarily pay attention to one significant detail. The fact is that both in the memoirs of German tank crews and in the combat logs of heavy tank battalions published in the West, the concepts of “destroyed” and “knocked out” are mixed (wittingly or unwittingly). Moreover, regardless of what language this or that book is written in. Both in German and English these concepts are clearly different! Take, for example, the data on the 502nd battalion: the Germans report irretrievable losses about themselves (which is understandable - they eventually destroyed the entire battalion), but about us? A very “precise” number with two zeros at the end - is it still destroyed or knocked out? The difference is significant: if destroyed, then this is an irretrievable loss, if knocked out, then the tank can be repaired and returned to service. And how can you determine whether an enemy tank is destroyed or knocked out, especially if the battlefield is not behind you, but you were shooting at it from a distance of 1.5 km? During World War II, permanent losses typically accounted for 30–40% of total losses. This means that in the end we arrive at an approximate number of 490 Soviet tanks destroyed by the 502nd battalion. It must be compared with the German irretrievable losses. The ratio in this case is already different - 1:5, which is really close to the truth and coincides with the ratio of losses on the Western Front.

However, there is little comfort in all this. It becomes clear what price our soldiers paid for victory in the Great Patriotic War. As for the performance of individual German tankers, even if their victories are indiscriminately halved, it will still be significantly higher than ours.

There are several reasons for this, and they are all closely interconnected. The fact that the level of combat training of German tank crews was very high does not need proof. Both the Wehrmacht and the SS troops paid attention to this issue great attention, as well as the issue of crew coordination. Moreover, the latter, apparently, even more so - after all, a tank, whatever one may say, is a collective weapon. The hard-working crew was groomed and cherished. After recovery, the wounded tanker in the vast majority of cases returned not just to his unit, but to his crew, whose members, as a result, understood each other not only at a glance, but at a glance.

In the Red Army, things were much worse with both. This is what V.P. recalled about this. Bryukhov, who graduated from the Stalingrad Tank School in 1942 and had by that time been evacuated to Kurgan: “It must be said that the training base was very weak. After the war, I looked at the German training complex in Austria. Of course he was much better. For example, our targets for firing from guns were stationary, targets for firing from machine guns were appearing. What does appearing mean? A telephone was brought into the trench in which the soldier was sitting, through which he was commanded: “Show me!” Lower!“ The target is supposed to appear for 5–6 seconds, and one will hold longer, the other less. The Germans installed a system of blocks at the training ground, controlled by one large wheel, operating both gun and machine-gun targets. The wheel was turned by hand, and the duration of the appearance of the target depended on the speed of rotation of this wheel. The German tank crews were better prepared, and it was very dangerous to meet them in battle. After all, after graduating from college, I fired three shells and a machine-gun disc. Is this preparation? They taught us a little driving on the BT-5. They taught us the basics - starting from a stop, driving in a straight line. There were classes in tactics, but mostly “on foot like a tank.” And only at the end there was a show of “tank platoon on the offensive.” All! Our preparation was very poor, although, of course, we knew the material part of the T-34 quite well.” And this is training at an officer school! What can we say about the training of the rank and file. Driver mechanics were trained for three months, radio operators and loaders - for a month. After receiving the tanks at the factory, some time was spent putting together crews and combat units. For the crew of A.M. Fadina, for example, this cobbling together boiled down to the following: “We received brand new tanks at the factory. We marched on them to our training ground. They quickly deployed into battle formation and carried out an attack on the move with live fire. In the assembly area, they put themselves in order and, stretching out in a marching column, began to move to the railway station to load for the journey to the front.” And that's all...

Upon arrival in the active army, the crews “put together” in this way often disintegrated even before they entered into battle. In the units where reinforcements arrived, there were so-called “horseless” tankers who had already been in battle. They replaced unfired commanders and driver mechanics on the arriving tanks. In the future, the crew was also not a “constant quantity” - the command did not care about this at all. In the vast majority of cases, wounded tank crews did not return to their unit and crew after hospitalization. Moreover, they did not always return even to tank forces. A good illustration of this approach is the front-line biography of R.N. Ulanova. Before being wounded in January 1943, he was transporting a 120-mm regimental mortar on a trailer to a GAZ-AA lorry. Then he ended up in the 15th training self-propelled artillery regiment, where he became a mechanic-driver of the SU-76. According to his recollections, the training program provided for 18 hours of driving, but in reality no more than three were obtained. When I got to the front in September, I fought for about two months - my car was hit. Ulanov was again transferred to a lorry to transport the wounded, then the regiment liaison officer. In December, his truck was blown up by a mine, again a hospital, then a security company at the headquarters of the 13th Army, where he was put on a captured Pz.IV tank, and then on a BA-64 armored car. In May 1944, the self-propelled gun driver was sent to a course for junior lieutenants of the 13th Army, which trained commanders of rifle and machine-gun platoons! R.N. courses Ulanov graduated in August 1944, but he did not have to fight in the infantry. Chance brought him back to self-propelled artillery.

In addition to training tankers and crews, so to speak, the lower level, the Wehrmacht paid great attention to establishing clear interaction in battle between tank units, as well as interaction with other branches of the military: infantry, artillery, aviation. I must say that the Germans succeeded in this. The interaction mechanism worked clearly and flawlessly from the first to last day war. The organization of tank units and formations also contributed to this. For example, a well-developed, characteristic method of conducting combat operations was the formation of so-called “combat groups.” Such a group was a temporary connection from various parts of divisional subordination. The core of the combat group was a tank or motorized rifle regiment, to which artillery, anti-tank, sapper and other units were attached. Often, corps reinforcements were also included in the battle group. The combat group was headed by the commander of the regiment or brigade. Within a division, one or two combat groups could be formed. The result was a formation that was quite compact, easily controlled, devoid of rear services and convoys, with excellent interaction various genera troops. Orders to the artillerymen and sappers were given by the commander of the combat group, without asking the division commander. After the first clashes with Soviet T-34 and KB tanks, battle groups of tank divisions began to include a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. From the memories of our tank crews it follows that almost immediately after the collision with German tanks, our tanks came under fire from 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. There was a feeling that these guns were moving directly in the battle formations of German tank units. In fact, this was the case; the organization of the battle group made it possible. At the same time, in the hands of the division commander there was always a reserve of a couple of motorized rifle battalions and several artillery, and then self-propelled artillery divisions, mainly 150-mm howitzers and 105-mm cannons, with which one or the other group could always be reinforced.

In turn, the Soviet tank forces in the initial period of the war were not distinguished by either organizational perfection or well-established interaction with other branches of the military. In this regard, it makes sense to cite the point of view of the former German general von Mellenthin, who from the end of 1942 to September 1944 was on the Eastern Front as chief of staff of first a tank corps and then a tank army.

“In 1941 and 1942, the tactical use of tanks by the Russians was not flexible, and tank units were scattered throughout the vast front. In the summer of 1942, the Russian command, taking into account the experience of the battles, began to create entire tank armies, consisting of tank and mechanized corps. The task of the tank corps, which had relatively few motorized infantry and artillery, was to assist the rifle divisions that were making the breakthrough. The mechanized corps had to develop a breakthrough in depth and pursue the enemy. Based on the nature of the tasks performed, the mechanized corps had an equal number of tanks with the tank corps, but they did not have heavy vehicles. In addition to this, in its own way staff organization they had a large number motorized infantry, artillery and engineering troops. The success of the Russian armored forces is due to this reorganization; by 1944 they had become the most formidable offensive weapon of World War II.

At first, the Russian tank armies had to pay dearly for their lack of combat experience. Junior and mid-level commanders showed a particularly poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and insufficient skill. They lacked courage, tactical foresight, and the ability to accept quick solutions. The first operations of the tank armies ended in complete failure. The tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the German defense front; uncertainty and the absence of any plan were felt in their movement. They interfered with each other, ran into our anti-tank guns, and if our positions were broken through, they stopped advancing and stopped, instead of building on their success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns were most effective: sometimes one gun damaged and disabled over 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created a tool that they would never learn to use, but already in the winter of 1942/43 the first signs of improvement appeared in their tactics.

1943 was still a learning period for the Russian armored forces. The severe defeats suffered by the German army on the Eastern Front were not due to the best tactical leadership of the Russians, but to serious strategic mistakes of the German high command and the significant superiority of the enemy in numbers of troops and equipment. It was only in 1944 that large Russian tank and mechanized formations acquired high mobility and power and became very formidable weapons in the hands of brave and capable commanders. Even the junior officers had changed and now showed great skill, determination and initiative. The defeat of our Army Group "Center" and the rapid advance of Marshal Rotmistrov's tanks from the Dnieper to the Vistula marked new stage in the history of the Red Army and were a formidable warning for the West. Later, in the major Russian offensive in January 1945, we also saw the rapid and decisive action of Russian tanks.”

It is difficult to disagree with the opinion of the German general, especially since, although with certain reservations, he is right in the main thing.

Figuratively speaking, there are two components of combat operations, which can be conventionally represented by the concepts of “impulse” and “maneuver”. In the actions of our tank, and not only tank, troops in the first two years of the war, “impulse” clearly prevailed. “Rush” is when “For the Motherland!” For Stalin! Do as I do!” - and forward to the attack! And a “maneuver” is when an anti-tank gun well camouflaged in the bushes nipping the “impulse” in the bud. The predominance of “maneuver” over “impulse” in the actions of Soviet tank forces on a large scale was evident during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and immediately brought results. However, despite the positive changes, the “impulse” made itself felt from time to time. So, for example, the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army near Prokhorovka is a pronounced “impulse.” A “maneuver” was needed, but the command chose a “rush” and actually destroyed the army. Examples of “impulse”, and with obvious pressure from above (the troops had long ago realized with their own skin that “maneuver” was better), can be found even in 1945. Here is one such egregious case, cited in the magazine “Military Historical Archive” by retired colonel V.M. Safirom: “This story was told to me by Lieutenant Colonel N., a participant Berlin operation. So, again about tanks, or rather, about how the command of the 1st Belorussian Front used them in urban conditions (so that no one would be surprised where the “Chechen-Grozny experience” suddenly came from).

1945 Berlin. The beginning of the alley "Frankfurter Tor" (Frankfurt Gate). In the direction of the city center, our tank brigade. Ahead, all the way to the center, is a broken street, in the ruins of whose houses, in the basements, snotty boys with faustpatrons have settled down. Almost the same as we sometimes see on TV the separate starts of skiers at the World Championships, when after thirty seconds, according to the squeak of the “Longin” system, the starter commands - “go”, in the same way, almost at the same interval, with the same command - “go” “, the tanks of my unfortunate brigade, which had fought through bloody path to the fascist capital. It would seem that everything is behind us - here it is, Victory. But no, it doesn’t happen that easily with us... Each vehicle jumped 400–600 meters, after which the end was the same for everyone - the tank was shot at point-blank range with faust cartridges, and, taking into account the extremely destructive armored effect of this new ammunition for us, few of the members the crew had the opportunity to escape. Having done this arithmetic, I easily calculated that I had about six minutes to live. But, apparently, luck was on my side - when there were only two vehicles left in front of my tank, this senseless massacre was stopped. I don’t know who made the decision, and there was no time to find out...”

Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Fedorovich Lavrinenko with his crew, fought on the T-3476 tank, destroyed 52 German tanks and self-propelled guns, several guns. Died in 1941. The best tank ace of the Soviet Union. Soviet tank aces.

What can I say, with such an organization of combat operations it is hardly possible to demand high performance from Soviet tank crews. The order of the People's Commissar of Defense (that is, I.V. Stalin) No. 0728 of September 19, 1942 “On the introduction into combat practice tank troops firing from tanks on the move." This order, in particular, said: “The experience of the Patriotic War shows that our tank crews do not use the full firepower of tanks in battle, do not conduct intense artillery and machine-gun fire on the enemy while moving, but are limited to aimed shooting only from guns, and even then from short stops.

The tank attacks practiced by our troops without sufficiently intense fire from all tank firepower create favorable conditions for the unpunished work of enemy artillery gun crews.

This incorrect practice significantly reduces the fire and moral impact of our tanks on the enemy and leads to large losses in tanks from enemy artillery fire.

I order:

Tank units active army from the moment your infantry approaches the battle formations, begin attacking the enemy with powerful fire, moving from everything tank weapons both from guns and from machine guns, without fear that the shooting will not always be aimed. Firing from tanks on the move should be the main type of fire impact of our tanks on the enemy, and above all on his manpower.

Increase the ammunition load in tanks, bringing it to 114 rounds on the KB tank, up to 100 rounds on the T-34 tank, and up to 90 rounds on the T-70 tank.

Tank brigades and regiments must have three ammunition loads, one of which can be carried in tanks.”

The motivation for such an order is quite clear. The tank troops of the Red Army were primarily intended to fight enemy infantry; the fight against his tanks was to be carried out anti-tank artillery. This is how Stalin himself formulated his point of view in a conversation with M.E. Katukov September 17, 1942. During the conversation, Stalin asked:

Do tankers shoot on the move?

I replied that no, they don’t shoot.

Why? - The Supreme looked at me intently.

Accuracy on the move is poor, and we regret the shells,” I answered. - After all, our requests for ammunition are not fully satisfied.

Stalin stopped, looked at me point-blank and spoke clearly, separating each word with pauses:

Tell me, Comrade Katukov, please, is it necessary to hit the German batteries during the attack? Necessary. And who first? Of course, tankers who are prevented from moving forward by enemy guns. Even if your shells do not hit the enemy’s guns directly, but explode nearby. How will the Germans shoot in this situation?

Of course, the enemy’s fire accuracy will decrease.

This is what is needed,” Stalin picked up. - Shoot on the move, we’ll give you shells, now we’ll have shells.

In general, everything is clear and everything seems logical. But reality too often made its own adjustments, and in the meantime the order still had to be carried out. So the tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank Army performed it, attacking the 2nd tank corps SS. The Germans hit them from the spot, with precision, while ours hit them on the move, wasting shells.

There was another reason that allowed the Germans to emerge victorious from tank duels more often. It lies in the design of the tanks. Yes, yes, precisely in a design that has nothing to do with the declared tactical and technical characteristics. According to the latter, our tanks were no worse than German ones. In some ways they were inferior, but in others they were superior, and in the first year of the war the superiority in tactical and technical characteristics was clear. But that’s not what we’re talking about now. We are talking about how well the crew of a particular tank manages to realize these characteristics, and not on the training ground, but in battle. It is with regret that we have to admit that German tanks were much better suited for combat. A simple example. Almost all German tank crews note in their memoirs that Russian tanks were late in returning fire, and sometimes simply could not determine for a long time where they were being fired from. No wonder! Insufficient quantity, poor quality, as well as poor placement of observation devices simply did not allow the crew of the T-34 tank, for example, to detect the target in time. In addition, this tank did not have a commander in battle, not by position, but by duties. Acting as a gunner, he saw only what he could see through the telescopic sight. The appearance of a commander's cupola on the T-34 in 1943, contrary to popular belief, changed little. In battle, the commander-gunner still could not use it. It is enough to look at the arrangement of the few observation devices on the T-34 to understand that the rest of the crew could hardly help him. It was only possible to change the situation with the T-34-85.

The commander of the KB-1 tank was not in a much better position. With a crew of five people, he could not be distracted by other functions, but could fully concentrate on controlling the battle. But that was not the case: its location in the tank did not allow this. The commander of the KV-1 tank was located to the right of the gun; to monitor the terrain, he had at his disposal the PTK-5 commander’s panorama, which ideally allowed for all-round observation. But only ideally. The tank commander himself could not rotate 360°, so it turned out that the real observation sector of the KB commander was approximately 120° in the front and right hemispheres. What was happening to the left and behind the tank remained a sealed secret for him.

It is no coincidence that so much attention is paid to monitoring from a tank. Much, if not everything, depended on who was the first to discover the enemy in battle. In this matter, German tanks with a clear functional division of duties among the five-man crew had a clear advantage. It was also provided with technical support for the commander with surveillance equipment - a commander's cupola.

However, one should not think that everything came down only to observation devices. The Germans were better off, for example, with means of communication, both external and internal. In any case, German tank commanders did not have to control the actions of the driver with the help of their legs placed on his shoulders, as was widely practiced in the T-34.

Superiority on the battlefield could also be achieved due to many other, sometimes hidden, reasons that do not lie on the surface at first glance. This can be illustrated by comparing two light tanks, the German Pz.II and the Soviet T-60. Both tanks occupied a prominent place in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

Analyzing the data of these vehicles, we can say that Soviet tank builders managed to achieve almost the same level of protection as the German tank, which, with a smaller weight and dimensions, significantly increased the invulnerability of the T-60. The dynamic characteristics of both cars were almost similar. Despite the high specific power, the Pz.II was not faster than the sixty. Formally, the weapon parameters were also the same: both tanks were equipped with 20-mm cannons with similar ballistic characteristics. Initial speed the armor-piercing projectile of the Pz.II gun was 780 m/s, that of the T-60 was 815 m/s, which theoretically allowed them to hit the same targets. In reality, everything was not so simple: soviet gun The TNSh-20 could not fire single shots, but the German KwK 30, as well as the KwK 38, could, which significantly increased the accuracy of fire.

“Dvoyka” turned out to be more effective on the battlefield due to the size of the crew, which consisted of three people and also had much best review from a tank than the T-60 crew.

An important advantage was the presence of a radio station. As a result, Pz.II as a vehicle leading edge significantly exceeded the “sixty”. This advantage was felt even more when using tanks for reconnaissance, where the stealthy, but “blind” and “mute” T-60 was practically useless.

The purpose of this book is not a detailed comparison of Soviet and German tanks. I would just like to draw the reader’s attention to this issue in order to understand how difficult it was to achieve victories using the equipment in the hands of our tankers. Especially in the initial period of the war. And yet, they achieved them.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to present the reader with an exact list of Soviet tank aces. In general, there was practically no accounting of personal victories in the Soviet tank forces. More or less such records were kept within the framework of one tank unit or formation. You can give, for example, a list of the most effective tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade:

senior lieutenant D. Lavrinenko - 52 tanks;

senior lieutenant K. Samokhin - over 30 tanks;

senior lieutenant A. Burda - over 30 tanks;

captain A. Raftopullo - 20 tanks;

senior sergeant I. Lyubushkin - 20 tanks.

How the Red Army kept records of destroyed enemy tanks can be judged by the example of Senior Lieutenant V. Bryukhov from the 170th Tank Brigade. According to his calculations, he knocked out 28 enemy tanks, nine of them with his T-34-85, in 15 days Iasi-Kishinev operation. It was for them, apparently, that he received the money that was due for the destroyed German tanks. It is possible that the underestimation of victories was caused precisely by this payment system adopted in the Red Army. For each destroyed German tank, the crews of Soviet tanks received the following: cash rewards: tank commander, gun (turret) commander and driver - 500 rubles each, loader and radio operator - 200 rubles each. If the crew died, the money was transferred to the defense fund. Moreover, each destroyed German tank could be chalked up not only by tank crews, but also by infantrymen, artillerymen, sappers, etc. For example, the gunner of an anti-tank rifle also received 500 rubles for a knocked out tank, and the second number - 250 rubles. The same applied to artillery commanders and gunners. They were also paid 500 rubles, the rest of the gun crews - 200 rubles. For each enemy tank destroyed using individual means of combat, a bonus of 1,000 rubles was awarded, and if a group of soldiers participated in the destruction of the tank, then the bonus amount reached 1,500 rubles. Therefore, to exclude additions and to avoid excessive payments, the number of victories was underestimated, and sometimes unreasonably. This is how V. Bryukhov himself describes this process: “But in order to get money, you had to prove that you knocked it out, you need to have eyewitnesses. There was a special commission, which, if it was not lazy, went and checked. For example, if a plane is shot down, the pilots take credit for it, the anti-aircraft gunners take it for themselves, the infantry take it for themselves - they still shoot. One day the commander of an anti-aircraft company comes running:

Vasily Pavlovich, did you see that the plane was shot down?!

We shot it down. Sign that you were an eyewitness.

In the end, it turned out that not one plane was shot down, but three or four. When the war ended, we were ordered to sum up the fighting for all operations. They drew maps, the brigade commander held a meeting, at the end of which the chief of staff made a report on the losses of the enemy and his own. It was very difficult to count our losses. How many tanks were lost was not always accurately accounted for. And according to our reports, the enemy’s losses could be easily calculated. And here the chief of staff says: “If I had taken all the reports from the battalion commanders Bryukhov, Sarkesyan, Otroshchenkov and Moskovchenko, then we would have ended the war six months earlier, having destroyed all German army. Therefore, I divided all their reports in half and sent them to corps headquarters.” I think that the corps headquarters divided all these reports in half and sent them to the army and so on. Then, perhaps, there was some kind of authenticity in them. And how we wrote reports for the day: they were advancing in such and such a place. We covered so many kilometers, on such and such a front. We reached such and such a milestone. Enemy losses: so many tanks (we counted the tanks well - they pay money for them), mortars, guns, personnel - who counted them? Nobody. Well, you can write about fifty people. And when they sat on the defensive. They shot and shot: - well, write two guns and one mortar ... "

Returning to the question of recording victories, it would be interesting to provide a list of the most effective tankers of the 10th Guards Ural Volunteer Tank Corps:

Guard Lieutenant M. Kuchenkov - 32 victories;

guard captain N. Dyachenko - 31 victories;

guard sergeant major N. Novitsky - 29 victories;

guard junior lieutenant M. Razumovsky - 25 victories;

Guard Lieutenant D. Makeshin - 24 victories;

guard captain V. Markov - 23 victories;

guard senior sergeant V. Kupriyanov -23 victories;

guard sergeant major S. Shopov - 21 victories;

Guard Lieutenant N. Bulitsky - 21 victories;

guard sergeant major M. Pimenov - 20 victories;

Guard Lieutenant V. Mocheny - 20 victories;

Guard Sergeant V. Tkachenko - 20 victories.

Comparing this list with the list of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, it seems possible to compile a certain list of ace tankers. But it is quite obvious that it will be far from complete. After all, there were tank snipers in other tank formations of the Red Army. More or less reliable information is available from the results of individual tank battles or from the results of battles over a certain period. But they are also very contradictory, since they are taken from completely different sources, from documents from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense to articles from the war years in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. Judging by the latest, as well as by the reports of the Sovinformburo, the Red Army was supposed to destroy the entire German tank fleet sometime by September 1941. There is sometimes completely unrealistic information about the type of destroyed German tanks. Starting from Battle of Kursk, every second destroyed German tank is definitely a Tiger! The situation is even worse with the Ferdinands. Judging by the memoirs, there was not a fighter in the Red Army who did not knock out or, in extreme cases, did not participate in the battle with the Ferdinands. They crawled towards our positions on all fronts every day and hourly from 1943 (and sometimes even earlier) until the end of the war. The number of “damaged” Ferdinands is approaching several thousand (as is known, only 90 vehicles were produced). This is partly due to the fact that any German self-propelled gun the Red Army soldiers called him “Ferdinand”, which, however, indicates how great his “popularity” was among our soldiers.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to double-check the data, both on the number of destroyed enemy vehicles and on their type. For lack of anything better, we have to rely on extracts from award lists, combat reports and memories of eyewitnesses and military leaders.

Concluding the conversation about the most effective tankers, I would like to dwell on one more aspect, the moral one. A tank, as you know, is a collective weapon; the battle is conducted not only by its commander, but also by the entire crew, on whose coordination success in battle depends. However, the names and surnames of the crew members of the ace tankers are much less known. This is especially true for the gunners; in fact, they were the ones who fired. M. Vitman, for example, owes most of his victories to his gunner Balthasar Vol. For our tankers, at least for those who fought on the T-34, T-70 or other types of light tanks, the situation is simpler. As already mentioned, the vehicle commanders were also gunners. So D. Lavrinenko shot himself. It’s more difficult with the T-34-85 or IS-2. For example, the first winner of the “Royal Tiger”, commander of the T-34-85 tank, junior lieutenant A. Oskin, is widely known. But the one who fired in that memorable battle on the Sandomierz bridgehead was his gunner (by position, gun commander) A. Merkhaidarov, who, by the way, received only the Order of Lenin for the “Royal Tiger”. So, speaking about ace tankers, let us not, if possible, forget about their crew members.

This book does not claim to be the ultimate authority when covering the issue of Soviet tank aces. This is just an attempt, against the background of numerous publications telling about the heroes of the Panzerwaffe, to give the interested reader at least initial and very incomplete information about the heroes of the tank forces of the Red Army.

Soviet tank aces

Dmitry Lavrinenko

Tankman No. 1 in the Red Army is considered to be the company commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of the Guard, Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Fedorovich Lavrinenko.

He was born on October 14, 1914 in the village of Besstrashnaya, Otradnensky district. Krasnodar region in a peasant family. Member of the CPSU(b) since 1941. In 1931 he graduated from the peasant youth school in the village of Voznesenskaya, then teacher courses in the city of Armavir. In 1932–1933 he worked as a teacher at a school in the Sladky farm, Armavir region, in 1933–1934 as a statistician at the main office of the state farm, then as a cashier of the savings bank in the village of Novokubinskoye. In 1934, he volunteered for the Red Army and was sent to the cavalry. A year later he entered the Ulyanovsk Armored School, from which he graduated in May 1938. Junior Lieutenant Lavrinenko took part in the campaign in Western Ukraine in 1939, and in June 1940 in the campaign in Bessarabia.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant Lavrinenko met as a platoon commander of the 15th Tank Division, which was stationed in the city of Stanislav, on the territory Western Ukraine. He failed to distinguish himself in the first battles, as his tank was damaged. During the retreat, the young officer showed character and flatly refused to destroy his faulty tank. Only after the remaining personnel of the division were sent for reorganization did Lavrinenko hand over his vehicle for repairs.

In September 1941, in the Stalingrad region, based on the personnel of the 15th and 20th tank divisions, the 4th tank brigade was formed, the commander of which was appointed Colonel M.E. Katukov. At the beginning of October the brigade entered heavy fighting near Mtsensk with units of the 2nd German tank group Colonel General Heinz Guderian.

On October 6, during a battle near the village of Pervy Voin, the brigade’s positions were attacked by superior forces of German tanks and motorized infantry. Enemy tanks suppressed anti-tank guns and began to iron the motorized rifle trenches. To the aid of the infantrymen M.E. Katukov sent a group of four T-34 tanks under the command of Senior Lieutenant Lavrinenko. "Thirty-fours" jumped out of the forest across the enemy tanks and opened hurricane fire. The Germans never expected the appearance of Soviet tanks. From the brigade's OP it was clearly visible how several enemy vehicles burst into flames, how the rest stopped and then, snarling with fire, retreated in confusion. Lavrinenko’s tanks disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared, but a few minutes later they appeared to the left, from behind a hillock. And again flames flashed from their cannons. As a result of several rapid attacks, 15 German vehicles remained on the battlefield, engulfed in orange flames. Soldiers motorized rifle battalion began to gather around their tanks. Having received the order to withdraw, Lavrinenko put the wounded on the armor and returned to the ambush site - to the edge of the forest. In this battle, Lavrinenko opened his combat account by knocking out four enemy tanks.

By October 11, the brave tanker already had seven tanks, anti-tank gun and up to two platoons of German infantry. The mechanic-driver of his tank, senior sergeant Ponomarenko, described one of the combat episodes of those days: “Lavrinenko told us this: “You won’t come back alive, but mortar company help out. It's clear? Forward!"

We jump out onto a hillock, and there are German tanks scurrying around like dogs. I stopped.

Lavrinenko - blow! On a heavy tank. Then we see a German BT between our two burning light tanks medium tank- they broke him too. We see another tank - it runs away. Shot! Flame... There are three tanks. Their crews are scattering.

300 meters away I see another tank, I show it to Lavrinenko, and he is a real sniper. The second shell also smashed this one, the fourth in a row. And Kapotov is a great guy: he also got three German tanks. And Polyansky killed one. So the mortar company was saved. And you yourself - without a single loss! It should be clarified that the tankman Kapotov and Polyansky mentioned in the story are tank commanders from the platoon commanded by Lavrinenko. The heavy tank we're talking about we're talking about, is not at all a tanker’s invention - until 1943, according to the German classification, the Pz.IV tank was considered heavy.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General D.D. Lelyushenko, in his book “Dawn of Victory,” talked about one of the techniques that Lavrinenko used in the battles near Mtsensk: “I remember how Lieutenant Dmitry Lavrinenko, having carefully camouflaged his tanks, installed logs in position that looked like the barrels of tank guns. And not without success: the Nazis opened fire on false targets. Having let the Nazis get to an advantageous distance, Lavrinenko rained down destructive fire on them from ambushes and destroyed 9 tanks, 2 guns and many Nazis.”

However, there is still no exact data on the number of German tanks destroyed by D. Lavrinenko’s crew in the battles for Mtsensk. In the book by Ya.L. Livshits’ “1st Guards Tank Brigade in the Battles for Moscow,” published in 1948, states that Lavrinenko had seven tanks. General armies D, D. Lelyushenko claims that only during the defense of the railway bridge over the Zusha River in the Mtsensk region, Lavrinenko’s crew destroyed six German tanks (by the way, the KB crew of senior political instructor Ivan Lakomov, who also participated in the defense of this bridge, knocked out four enemy tanks). Other sources report that the “thirty-fours” of Lieutenant Lavrinenko and Senior Sergeant Kapotov came to the aid of the tank of their battalion commander, Captain Vasily Gusev, who was covering the retreat of the 4th Tank Brigade across the bridge. During the battle, the crews of Lavrinenko and Kapotov managed to destroy only one tank each, after which the enemy stopped their attacks. There is also a statement that in the battles near Mtsensk, Dmitry Lavrinenko destroyed 19 German tanks. Finally, in the military-historical essay “Soviet Tank Forces 1941–1945” it is reported that in the battles of Orel and Mtsensk over the course of four days, Lavrinenko’s crew destroyed 16 enemy tanks. Here is a typical example of how at that time records were kept of destroyed enemy vehicles, even within the same brigade.

However, there are absolutely reliable facts. These include an episode related to the defense of Serpukhov. The fact is that on October 16, 1941, the 4th Tank Brigade received an order to redeploy to the area of ​​the village of Kubinka, Moscow Region, and then to the area of ​​Chismena station, which is 105 km from Moscow along the Volokolamsk Highway. It was then that it turned out that Lavrinenko’s tank was missing. Katukov left him at the request of the command of the 50th Army to protect its headquarters. The army command promised the brigade commander not to detain Lavrinenko for long. But four days have passed since that day. M.E. Katukov and the head of the political department, senior battalion commissar I.G. Derevyankin rushed to call everywhere, but they could not find any trace of Lavrinenko. An emergency was brewing.

At noon on October 20, a “thirty-four” rolled up to the brigade headquarters, its tracks clanking, followed by a German staff bus. The turret hatch opened, and Lavrinenko climbed out as if nothing had happened, followed by members of his crew - loader Private Fedotov and gunner-radio operator Sergeant Borzykh. The driver-mechanic, Senior Sergeant Bedny, was driving the staff bus.

The enraged head of the political department, Derevyankin, attacked Lavrinenko, demanding an explanation of the reasons for the delay of the lieutenant and his crew members who had been in the unknown location all this time. Instead of answering, Lavrinenko took a piece of paper from the breast pocket of his tunic and handed it to the head of the political department. The paper said the following:

“Colonel Comrade Katukov. The commander of the vehicle, Dmitry Fedorovich Lavrinenko, was detained by me. He was given the task of stopping the enemy who had broken through and helping restore the situation at the front and in the area of ​​the city of Serpukhov. He not only completed this task with honor, but also showed himself heroically. For the exemplary performance of the combat mission, the Army Military Council expressed gratitude to all crew personnel and presented them with a government award. Commandant of the city of Serpukhov, brigade commander Firsov.”

This is what it turned out to be. The headquarters of the 50th Army released Lavrinenko’s tank literally after the departing tank brigade. But the road turned out to be clogged with vehicles and, no matter how much Lavrinenko hurried, he was unable to catch up with the brigade. Arriving in Serpukhov, the crew decided to shave at the barbershop. As soon as Lavrinenko sat down in a chair, a out of breath Red Army soldier suddenly ran into the hall and told the lieutenant to urgently come to the city commandant, brigade commander Firsov.

Appearing to Firsov, Lavrinenko learned that a battalion-sized German column was marching along the highway from Maloyaroslavets to Serpukhov. The commandant did not have any forces at hand to defend the city. Units for the defense of Serpukhov were about to arrive, and before that all Firsov’s hope remained in a single Lavrinenko tank.

In the grove, near Vysokinichi, Lavrinenko’s T-34 was ambushed. The road in both directions was clearly visible. A few minutes later a German column appeared on the highway. Motorcycles rumbled ahead, then came a headquarters vehicle, three trucks with infantry and anti-tank guns. The Germans behaved extremely self-confidently and did not send reconnaissance ahead. Having brought the column within 150 meters, Lavrinenko shot it point blank. Two guns were immediately destroyed, the German artillerymen tried to deploy the third, but Lavrinenko’s tank jumped onto the highway and crashed into trucks with infantry, and then crushed the gun. Soon an infantry unit approached and finished off the stunned and confused enemy.

Lavrinenko’s crew handed over 13 machine guns, 6 mortars, 10 motorcycles with sidecars and an anti-tank gun with full ammunition to the commandant of Serpukhov. Firsov allowed the staff car to be taken to the brigade. It was the mechanic-driver Bedny, who had transferred from the “thirty-four”, who drove it under his own power. The bus contained important documents and maps, which Katukov immediately sent to Moscow.

From the end of October, the 4th Tank Brigade fought on the outskirts of the capital, in the Volokolamsk direction as part of the 16th Army. November 10, 1941 M.E. Katukov was awarded the rank of major general, and the next day the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 337 was issued on the transformation of the 4th Tank Brigade into the 1st Guards Tank Brigade.

In the November battles in the Volokolamsk direction, senior lieutenant Lavrinenko again distinguished himself. On November 17, 1941, near the village of Lystsevo, his tank group, consisting of three T-34 tanks and three BT-7 tanks, was allocated to support the 1073rd Infantry Regiment of the 316th Infantry Division of Major General I.V. Panfilova.

Having agreed with the commander of the rifle regiment on cooperation, Senior Lieutenant Lavrinenko decided to build his group in two echelons. The first was BT-7 under the command of Zaika, Pyatachkov and Malikov. In the second echelon are the “thirty-fours” of Lavrinenko, Tomilin and Frolov.

There was about half a kilometer left before Lystsev when Malikov noticed German tanks at the edge of the forest near the village. We counted - eighteen! The German soldiers, who had previously been crowding at the edge of the forest, ran to their cars: they noticed our tanks going on the attack.

A battle began between six Soviet tanks and eighteen German ones. It lasted, as it turned out later, exactly eight minutes. But what were these minutes worth! The Germans set fire to the cars of Zaika and Pyatachkov, and knocked out the T-34s of Tomilin and Frolov. However, our tankers also inflicted great damage on the enemy. Seven German vehicles were burning, engulfed in flames and soot. The rest avoided further combat and went deeper into the forest. The assertiveness and well-aimed fire of the Soviet tank crews caused confusion in the enemy's ranks, which our two surviving tanks immediately took advantage of. Lavrinenko, and behind him Malikov high speed broke into the village of Lystsevo. Following them, our infantrymen entered there. Only German machine gunners remained in the village. Hiding in stone buildings, they tried to resist, but tankers and riflemen quickly eliminated pockets of enemy defense.

Having occupied Lystsevo, the infantrymen, without wasting time, began to dig in on the outskirts of the village.

Lavrinenko reported by radio to the headquarters of General Panfilov that the tank group had completed the task assigned to it. But there was no time for that at headquarters. While Lavrinenko and his comrades were fighting for Lystsevo, the Germans, who had occupied the village of Shishkino, made a new breakthrough on the right flank of Panfilov’s division. Developing their success, they went to the rear of the 1073rd Infantry Regiment. Moreover, with a deep enveloping maneuver, the Nazis threatened to cover other parts of the division. From short negotiations with headquarters, Lavrinenko learned that an enemy tank column was already moving behind the division’s combat formations.

What to do? There was essentially nothing left of the tank group. There are only two tanks in service. In such conditions, the only way out of the situation is to use the favorite method of combat operations in the 1st Guards Tank Brigade - to stand in an ambush. Lavrinenko secretly led his T-34 through ravines and copses towards the Nazi tank column. In the crew with him, as always, were his comrades Bedny, Fedotov, Sharov.

The "thirty-four" stopped not far from the road. Lavrinenko opened the hatch and looked around. There are no convenient shelters. But he immediately realized that virgin snow was good for a tank painted in white, can serve as a good shelter. In the snow-whitened expanses of the field, the Germans would not immediately notice his tank, and he would attack the enemy with cannon and machine-gun fire before the Germans realized anything.

The German column soon crawled onto the road. Dmitry Fedorovich calculated that there were 18 tanks in the column. There were 18 near Lystsev, and now there are the same number. True, the balance of forces has changed, but again not in favor of Lavrinenko. Then there was one tank to three, and now the guards crew had to fight alone with 18 enemy vehicles. Without losing his composure, Lavrinenko opened fire on the sides of the leading German tanks, transferred fire to the rear ones, and then, without allowing the enemy to come to his senses, fired several cannon shots at the center of the column. Three medium and three light enemy vehicles were knocked out by the guards crew, and he himself, unnoticed, again through ravines and copses, escaped pursuit. Lavrinenko’s crew managed to stop the further advance of German tanks and help our units systematically withdraw to new positions, freeing them from encirclement.