Katyusha - Weapon of Victory

The history of the creation of Katyusha dates back to pre-Petrine times. In Rus', the first rockets appeared in the 15th century. By the end of the 16th century, Russia was well aware of the design, manufacturing methods and combat use rockets. This is convincingly evidenced by the “Charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science", written in 1607-1621 by Onisim Mikhailov. Since 1680, a special rocket establishment already existed in Russia. In the 19th century, missiles designed to destroy enemy personnel and materiel were created by Major General Alexander Dmitrievich Zasyadko. Zasyadko began work on creating rockets in 1815 on his own initiative at own funds. By 1817, he managed to create a high-explosive and incendiary combat rocket based on a lighting rocket.
At the end of August 1828, a guards corps arrived from St. Petersburg under the besieged Turkish fortress of Varna. Together with the corps, the first Russian missile company arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Vnukov. The company was formed on the initiative of Major General Zasyadko. The rocket company received its first baptism of fire near Varna on August 31, 1828 during an attack on a Turkish redoubt located by the sea south of Varna. Cannonballs and bombs from field and naval guns, as well as rocket explosions, forced the defenders of the redoubt to take cover in holes made in the ditch. Therefore, when the hunters (volunteers) of the Simbirsk regiment rushed to the redoubt, the Turks did not have time to take their places and provide effective resistance to the attackers.

On March 5, 1850, Colonel Konstantin Ivanovich Konstantinov was appointed commander of the Rocket Establishment - illegitimate son Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich from his relationship with actress Clara Anna Lawrence. During his tenure in this position, 2-, 2.5- and 4-inch missiles of the Konstantinov system were adopted by the Russian army. The weight of combat missiles depended on the type of warhead and was characterized by the following data: a 2-inch missile weighed from 2.9 to 5 kg; 2.5-inch - from 6 to 14 kg and 4-inch - from 18.4 to 32 kg.

The firing ranges of the Konstantinov system missiles, created by him in 1850-1853, were very significant for that time. Thus, a 4-inch rocket equipped with 10-pound (4.095 kg) grenades had a maximum firing range of 4150 m, and a 4-inch incendiary rocket - 4260 m, while a quarter-pound mountain unicorn mod. 1838 had a maximum firing range of only 1810 meters. Konstantinov's dream was to create an aerial rocket launcher that would fire missiles from hot air balloon. The experiments carried out proved the long range of missiles fired from a tethered balloon. However, it was not possible to achieve acceptable accuracy.
After the death of K.I. Konstantinov in 1871, rocketry in the Russian army fell into decline. Combat missiles were used sporadically and in small quantities in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Missiles were used more successfully during the conquest of Central Asia in the 70-80s of the 19th century. They played a decisive role in the capture of Tashkent. The last time Konstantinov missiles were used in Turkestan was in the 90s of the 19th century. And in 1898, combat missiles were officially removed from service with the Russian army.
New impetus for development missile weapons was given during the First World War: in 1916, Professor Ivan Platonovich Grave created gelatin gunpowder, improving the smokeless gunpowder of the French inventor Paul Viel. In 1921, developers N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev from the gas dynamic laboratory began developing rockets based on this gunpowder.

At first, the gas-dynamic laboratory, where rocket weapons were created, had more difficulties and failures than successes. However, enthusiastic engineers N.I. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev, and then G.E. Langemak and B.S. Petropavlovsky persistently improved their “brainchild,” firmly believing in the success of the business. Extensive theoretical development and countless experiments were required, which ultimately led to the creation of an 82-mm fragmentation weapon at the end of 1927. rocket with a powder engine, and after it a more powerful one, with a caliber of 132 mm. Test firing conducted near Leningrad in March 1928 was encouraging - the range was already 5-6 km, although dispersion was still large. For many years it could not be significantly reduced: the original concept assumed a projectile with tails that did not exceed its caliber. After all, a pipe served as a guide for it - simple, light, convenient for installation.

In 1933, engineer I.T. Kleimenov proposed making a more developed tail, more than twice the caliber of the projectile in scope. The accuracy of fire increased, and the flight range also increased, but it was necessary to design new open - in particular, rail - guides for projectiles. And again, years of experiments, searches...
By 1938, the main difficulties in creating a mobile rocket artillery were overcome. Employees of the Moscow RNII Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, F. N. Poyda, L. E. Schwartz and others developed 82-mm fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and thermite shells (PC) with a solid propellant (powder) engine, which was started by a remote electric igniter.

The baptism of fire of the RS-82, mounted on the I-16 and I-153 fighter aircraft, took place on August 20, 1939 on the Khalkhin Gol River. This event is described in detail here.

At the same time, for firing at ground targets, the designers proposed several options for mobile multi-charge launchers volley fire(by area). Engineers V.N. Galkovsky, I.I. Gvai, A.P. Pavlenko, A.S. Popov took part in their creation under the leadership of A.G. Kostikov.
The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single unit by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles weighing 42.5 kg each were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided the ability to change the angle of elevation and azimuth rotation. Aiming at the target was carried out through the sight by rotating the handles of the lifting and rotating mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a ZiS-5 truck, and in the first version, relatively short guides were located across the vehicle that received common name MU-1 (mechanized installation). This decision was unsuccessful - when firing, the vehicle swayed, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the battle.

M-13 shells, containing 4.9 kg of explosive, provided a radius of continuous damage by fragments of 8-10 meters (when the fuse was set to “O” - fragmentation) and an actual damage radius of 25-30 meters. In soil of medium hardness, when the fuse was set to “3” (slowdown), a funnel with a diameter of 2-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 meter was created.
In September 1939, the MU-2 rocket system was created on the ZIS-6 three-axle truck, which was more suitable for this purpose. The car was an off-road truck with dual-slope tires on the rear axles. Its length with a 4980 mm wheelbase was 6600 mm, and its width was 2235 mm. The car was equipped with the same in-line six-cylinder water-cooled carburetor engine that was installed on the ZiS-5. Its cylinder diameter was 101.6 mm and its piston stroke was 114.3 mm. Thus, its working volume was equal to 5560 cubic centimeters, so that the volume indicated in most sources is 5555 cubic centimeters. cm is the result of someone’s mistake, which was subsequently replicated by many serious publications. At 2300 rpm, the engine, which had a 4.6-fold compression ratio, developed 73 horsepower, which was good for those times, but due to the heavy load maximum speed limited to 55 kilometers per hour.

In this version, elongated guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing. The weight of the vehicle with a crew (5-7 people) and full ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range reached 8470 m. In just one salvo lasting 8-10 seconds, the combat vehicle fired 16 shells containing 78.4 kg of highly effective explosives at enemy positions substances. The three-axle ZIS-6 provided the MU-2 with quite satisfactory mobility on the ground, allowing it to quickly perform a march maneuver and change position. And to transfer the vehicle from the traveling position to the combat position, 2-3 minutes were enough. However, the installation acquired another drawback - the impossibility of direct fire and, as a result, a large dead space. However, our artillerymen subsequently learned to overcome it and even began to use Katyushas against tanks.
On December 25, 1939, the Red Army Artillery Directorate approved the 132 mm M-13 rocket and launcher, called the BM-13. NII-Z received an order for the production of five such installations and a batch of missiles for military testing. In addition, the artillery department of the Navy also ordered one BM-13 launcher to test it in the coastal defense system. During the summer and autumn of 1940, NII-3 manufactured six BM-13 launchers. In the fall of the same year, BM-13 launchers and a batch of M-13 shells were ready for testing.

On June 17, 1941, at a training ground near Moscow, during an inspection of samples of new weapons of the Red Army, salvo launches were made from BM-13 combat vehicles. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Zhukov, who were present at the tests, praised the new weapon. Two prototypes of the BM-13 combat vehicle were prepared for the show. One of them was loaded with high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and the second with illumination rockets. Salvo launches of fragmentation rockets were made. All targets in the area where the shells fell were hit, everything that could burn on this section of the artillery route burned. The shooting participants praised the new missile weapons. Immediately at the firing position, an opinion was expressed about the need to quickly adopt the first domestic MLRS installation.
On June 21, 1941, literally a few hours before the start of the war, after examining samples of missile weapons, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin decided to launch mass production of M-13 missiles and the BM-13 launcher and to begin the formation of missile military units. Due to the threat of an impending war, this decision was made despite the fact that the BM-13 launcher had not yet passed military tests and had not been developed to the stage allowing mass industrial production.

On July 2, 1941, the first experimental battery of rocket artillery in the Red Army under the command of Captain Flerov set out from Moscow to the Western Front. On July 4, the battery became part of the 20th Army, whose troops occupied the defense along the Dnieper near the city of Orsha.

In most books about the war - both scientific and fiction - Wednesday, July 16, 1941, is named as the day of the first use of the Katyusha. On that day, a battery under the command of Captain Flerov attacked the Orsha railway station that had just been occupied by the enemy and destroyed the trains that had accumulated there.
However, in fact, Flerov’s battery was first deployed at the front two days earlier: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated in the market square of the town. At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, the battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a western direction that was unexpected for the enemy, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo had died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa. On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how rocket launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to headquarters, the 217th separate battalion communications 144th rifle division 20th Army about Flerov’s completion of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said: “Katyusha sang perfectly.”

On August 2, 1941, the chief of artillery of the Western Front, Major General I.P. Kramar, reported: “According to the statements of the command staff of the rifle units and the observations of the artillerymen, the surprise of such massive fire inflicts heavy losses on the enemy and has such a strong moral effect that enemy units flee in panic. It was also noted that the enemy is fleeing not only from the areas fired by new weapons, but also from neighboring ones, located at a distance of 1-1.5 km from the shelling zone.
And here’s how the enemies talked about the Katyusha: “After the volley of Stalin’s organ, from our company of 120 people,” said German Chief Corporal Hart during interrogation, “12 remained alive. Of the 12 heavy machine guns Only one remained intact, and even that one was without a carriage, and out of the five heavy mortars, not a single one.”
The stunning debut of jet weapons for the enemy prompted our industry to speed up the serial production of a new mortar. However, at first there were not enough self-propelled chassis for Katyushas - carriers of rocket launchers. They tried to restore production of the ZIS-6 at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, where the Moscow ZIS was evacuated in October 1941, but the lack of specialized equipment for the production of worm axles did not allow this to be done. In October 1941, the T-60 tank with a BM-8-24 installation mounted in place of the turret was put into service. It was armed with RS-82 missiles.
In September 1941 - February 1942, NII-3 developed a new modification of the 82-mm M-8 projectile, which had the same range (about 5000 m), but almost twice as much explosive (581 g) compared to the aircraft projectile (375 g).
By the end of the war, the 82-mm M-8 projectile with a ballistic index TS-34 and a firing range of 5.5 km was adopted.
In the first modifications of the M-8 missile, a rocket charge made of nitroglycerin ballistic gunpowder, grade N, was used. The charge consisted of seven cylindrical blocks with an outer diameter of 24 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm. The length of the charge was 230 mm, and the weight was 1040 g.
To increase the projectile's flight range, the engine's rocket chamber was increased to 290 mm, and after testing a number of charge design options, OTB specialists from Plant No. 98 tested a charge made from NM-2 gunpowder, which consisted of five blocks with an outer diameter of 26.6 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm and length 287 mm. The weight of the charge was 1180 g. With the use of this charge, the projectile range increased to 5.5 km. The radius of continuous destruction by fragments of the M-8 (TS-34) projectile was 3-4 m, and the radius of actual destruction by fragments was 12-15 meters.

STZ-5 tracked tractors and Ford-Marmont, International Jiemsi and Austin off-road vehicles received under Lend-Lease were also equipped with jet launchers. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker cars. In 1943, M-13 projectiles with a welded body, with a ballistic index TS-39, were put into production. The shells had a GVMZ fuse. NM-4 gunpowder was used as fuel.
The main reason for the low accuracy of M-13 (TS-13) type rockets was the eccentricity of the thrust of the jet engine, that is, the displacement of the thrust vector from the rocket axis due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs. This phenomenon is easily eliminated when the rocket rotates. In this case, the thrust impulse will always coincide with the axis of the rocket. The rotation imparted to the finned rocket in order to improve accuracy is called rotation. Twist rockets should not be confused with turbojet rockets. The turning speed of the finned missiles was several tens, in extreme cases hundreds, of revolutions per minute, which is not enough to stabilize the projectile by rotation (moreover, rotation occurs during the active phase of the flight while the engine is running, and then stops). The angular velocity of turbojet projectiles that do not have fins is several thousand revolutions per minute, which creates a gyroscopic effect and, accordingly, higher hit accuracy than that of finned projectiles, both non-rotating and with rotation. In both types of projectiles, rotation occurs due to the outflow of powder gases from the main engine through small (several millimeters in diameter) nozzles directed at an angle to the axis of the projectile.

We called rockets with rotation due to the energy of powder gases UK - improved accuracy, for example M-13UK and M-31UK.
The M-13UK projectile differed in design from the M-13 projectile in that there were 12 tangential holes on the front centering thickening, through which part of the powder gases flowed out. The holes were drilled so that the powder gases flowing out of them created a torque. The M-13UK-1 projectiles differed from the M-13UK projectiles in the design of their stabilizers. In particular, the M-13UK-1 stabilizers were made of steel sheet.
Since 1944, new, more powerful BM-31-12 installations with 12 M-30 and M-31 mines of 301 mm caliber, weighing 91.5 kg each (firing range - up to 4325 m), began to be produced on the basis of Studebakers. To improve the accuracy of fire, the M-13UK and M-31UK projectiles with improved accuracy, rotating in flight, were created and developed.
The projectiles were launched from honeycomb-type tubular guides. The time to transfer to a combat position was 10 minutes. When a 301-mm projectile containing 28.5 kg of explosives exploded, a crater 2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter was formed. A total of 1,184 BM-31-12 vehicles were produced during the war years.

Specific gravity rocket artillery on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was constantly increasing. If in November 1941 45 Katyusha divisions were formed, then on January 1, 1942 there were already 87 of them, in October 1942 - 350, and at the beginning of 1945 - 519. By the end of the war, there were 7 divisions in the Red Army, 40 separate brigades, 105 regiments and 40 separate divisions of guards mortars. Not a single major artillery barrage took place without Katyushas.

Combat vehicle BM-13 "Katyusha". The BM-13 Guards rocket mortar consists of a launcher, rocket shells and a specially adapted vehicle on which it is mounted. The launcher was initially mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The installations were also equipped with STZ-5 tracked tractors, ZIL-151 vehicles, and Ford-Marmon, International Jimmy and Austin off-road vehicles obtained under Lend-Lease. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker cars. Launcher. Eight guides are fixed to the lifting boom, each of which has two grooves (top and bottom), along which rocket shells slide during launch. The guides are connected to each other using three transverse parts to form a so-called set of guides mounted on a lifting boom. It is welded from pipes and can be rotated in a vertical plane around its horizontal axis. The axle is located at the rear of the base mounted on a rotating frame. A given firing angle is attached to the guides by a lifting mechanism, with the help of which they are fixed in a certain position on the rotating frame. The rotating frame rotates around a vertical axis. The latter is installed on the brackets of the base of the rotating frame. To orient it, and therefore the arrow with guides, in the horizontal plane during shooting, a guiding mechanism is used. The base of the rotating frame is rigidly fixed to the vehicle chassis. It has a curved guide groove (part of a circular arc) in which the front support of the launcher's rotating frame slides. The Katyusha is loaded with rocket shells from behind. Accidental dropping of missiles is prevented by locks installed in each guide. They are designed so that when missile shells are installed in the guides, the pins of the shells are passed forward, preventing them from moving downwards. To ignite the rocket charge in the combustion chamber, there are special contacts located in each guide. When charging the Katyusha, these contacts are connected to the contacts of the electric powder igniters of the rocket shells. Through them, current from the battery installed on the car is transmitted to the powder igniters. The starting panel is located in the driver's cab.
Performance characteristics BM-13 rocket artillery combat vehicle
Missile caliber, mm - 132
Number of guides, pcs - 16
Maximum angle of elevation, degrees. - 45
Minimum angle of elevation, degrees. - 7
Field (sector) of fire in the horizontal plane (direction to the target), deg. ±10
Salvo production time, s 7 -10
Firing range, m - 8470
Weight of the BM-13 launcher, kg - 2200 kg
Weight of the BM-13 combat vehicle (together with the launcher), kg - 6200 kg

M-13 rocket.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is attached to the front of the head. The body ensures the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a casing, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electric powder igniters. On the outer surface of the combustion chamber shell there are two threaded guide pins, which serve to hold the missile projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse pin, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Voronezh Katyusha

Great Patriotic War showed the world the crushing striking force and power of Soviet weapons. At the same time, about three quarters of the gun samples and up to half of the types small arms, with which the Armed Forces of the USSR came to victory, were created and put into mass production during the war. Among such weapons, a special place is occupied by the BM-13 guards mortar - the legendary "Katyusha", the lyrical name of which, according to one version, originates from the letter "K", the mark of the manufacturer - the Voronezh plant named after. The Comintern, which launched the production of this formidable weapon literally in the very first days of the war.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union already possessed examples of rocket artillery and had successful experience in its use. The development of rockets using smokeless powder was started by N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev back in 1921. Their many years of work culminated in the great success of Soviet rocket science - in 1928, successful tests The world's first smokeless powder rocket. By 1933, two types of missiles were created - the fragmentation RS-82 and the high-explosive fragmentation RS-132. At the same time, the efforts of laboratories working on this topic are united - the Jet Research Institute is being created in Moscow. Soon, within its walls, several hundred prototypes of projectiles and launching devices were manufactured, intended for installation under the wing of an aircraft. In 1935, the first launches of RS-82 missiles from I-15 fighters began at the test site, and in 1937 military tests began. Their successful completion allowed the I-15 and I-16 fighters to adopt the RS-82 air-to-air missile in December 1937 and the RS-132 air-to-ground missile for SB bombers in July 1938.

After the adoption of rockets into aviation service, the Main Artillery Directorate set the Jet Research Institute the task of creating a multiple rocket launcher field system based on RS-132 projectiles. A refined tactical and technical assignment was issued to the institute in June 1938. In accordance with this assignment, by the fall of 1939, the institute developed a new 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which was later received official name M-13 and MU-2 launcher. In the summer of the same year, RS-82 missiles were first tested in air battles against Japanese militarists in the Khalkhin Gol River area. These battles fully confirmed the assumption that a qualitatively new type of ammunition was born - a rocket with a solid propellant engine. The combat successes of the "eres" confirmed the need and accelerated the development of missile weapons for ground forces.

Head of Department

In September 1939, tests of the MU-2 installation were carried out and, based on the results, it was accepted by the Main Artillery Directorate for field testing. After modifications in 1940, the world's first mobile multiple rocket launcher successfully passed factory and field tests. It received the army designation BM-13-16, or simply BM-13, and a decision was made to industrial production. RNII received an order for the production of five such installations and a batch of missiles for military testing. In addition, the Navy Ordnance Department also ordered one BM-13 launcher for testing in the coastal defense system. The People's Commissariat of Ammunition did not hesitate to begin organizing the mass production of rockets, taking into account the large scale of their expenditure. In 1940, serial production of M-13 and M-8 rockets was established, and their mass production was fully mastered before the start of the war.

It turned out to be more difficult to establish mass production of launchers. Only in February 1941, the People's Commissariat of General Engineering issued an order to organize the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern for the production of BM-13 vehicles. The Voronezh plant was ordered to produce a prototype by July 1 and another 40 units by the end of 1941.

Director of the plant named after. Comintern Fyodor Nikolaevich Muratov was urgently summoned to the People's Commissariat. Returning to the plant two days later, he immediately familiarized the head of the department, Pyotr Semenovich Gavrilov, with the order of the People's Commissariat and instructed him to select a group of intelligent designers to work on the drawings in the coming days. The created group included leading machine designer Nikolai Andreevich Pucherov, chief technologist of the plant Serafim Semenovich Silchenko, designers Mikhail Ivanovich Pavlov, Alexander Alexandrovich Yakovlev and Nikolai Nikolaevich Avdeev.

BM-13 rocket artillery combat vehicle: 1 - switch, 2 - armor shields
cabin, 3 — package of guides, 4 — gas tank, 5 — base of the rotating frame,
6 — lifting screw casing, 7 — lifting frame, 8 — traveling support, 9 — stopper,
10 — rotating frame, 11 — M-13 projectile, 12 — brake light, 13 — jacks,
14 — launcher battery, 15 — towing device spring, 16 — bracket
sight, 17 — lifting mechanism handle, 18 — rotating mechanism handle,
19 — spare wheel, 20 — junction box.

Within a week, drawings of the launcher with the code BM-13-16 arrived at the plant from the RNII. The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single unit by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided the ability to change the angle of elevation and azimuth rotation. Targeting was carried out through a sight with a conventional artillery panorama by rotating the handles of the lifting and rotating mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 truck. The guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before shooting.

At first, it was only intended to review the drawings of the RNII with the aim of their technological adaptation to factory conditions in order to establish mass production. However, it soon became clear that some components needed serious fine-tuning. N.A. Pucherov expressed doubts about the reliability of the screw fastenings of the guide bars in field conditions. It was necessary to increase the reliability of the most critical unit so that it could withstand any load under the most unfavorable operating conditions. To speed up the work and quickly agree on fundamental design changes, three employees of the Jet Research Institute arrived at the plant. These were the head of the institute’s department, Ivan Isidorovich Gvai, leading designer Vladimir Nikolaevich Gvalkovsky, and technologist Sergei Ivanovich Kalashnikov. In order to maintain the strictest secrecy when working with drawings, a group of designers and technologists were allocated a small room on the second floor of the administrative building. Work on "Katyusha" began to boil almost around the clock.

After a thorough and comprehensive discussion, it was decided to replace the complex shaped guides, paired with two “cheeks” made of sheet steel, with an I-beam. This replacement increased the strength of the assembly and at the same time simplified its manufacture.

The next weak link was the remote fire control panel, with a cable length of 25 meters. To fire a shot, the installation commander had to take a reel-drum from the cockpit, run twenty-five meters with it into a previously prepared shelter and turn the handle to close sixteen contacts. After the salvo was fired, the cable had to be quickly wound up and put back in the cabin. All this greatly reduced the maneuverability of the installation. At the suggestion of plant electrical engineers Yakov Mikhailovich Tupitsyn and Evgeniy Yakovlevich Nizovtsev, they decided to mount the fire control panel in the truck cabin, installing it next to the vehicle control panel. This modification made it possible to significantly reduce the salvo time. To ensure the safety of the commander and driver, an armor shield 5 mm thick was installed above the cabin.

The contactors for igniting the squibs in the rocket were also radically redesigned. Instead of the plate ones provided for in the project, they installed rod ones. As tests have shown, they reliably ensured the ignition of the squibs.

Significant design changes were made to other components as well. The locking part was re-developed, the rotating frame and the design of the supporting truss were changed, and the horizontal and vertical aiming mechanisms were combined, which greatly facilitated fire control.

On June 15-17, 1941, five vehicles, manufactured in the experimental workshops of the RNII by order of the Main Artillery Directorate, were exhibited at a review of new models of weapons of the Red Army, which was again held near Moscow. The BM-13 was inspected by Marshal Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov, People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. During the reviews, a salvo of four combat vehicles was fired, which were highly praised by the leaders of the party and government. And on June 21, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, following the review, the government decided to urgently launch mass serial production of M-13 missiles and the BM-13 launcher.

Plant director

Chief Engineer
plant

On the morning of June 22, the heads of workshops, departments and services gathered in the office of the plant director. The director of the plant, Muratov, was absent; he was urgently summoned to Moscow. The emergency meeting was held by the chief engineer of the plant, Viktor Pavlovich Chernogubovsky. He announced that, in agreement with the union, the plant would immediately switch to two shifts with an eleven-hour working day. Summing up, Chernogubovsky emphasized that they would have to work with increasing tension, since many workers would be mobilized into the Red Army in the coming days. Indeed, already on the second and third days of the war, about four hundred people were called up from the plant.

The director returning from Moscow brought an order to speed up the production of launchers. By July 1, it was necessary to present not one, but two experimental installations, and already in July, it was necessary to produce thirty combat vehicles, and in August one hundred. The plant urgently switched to producing military products. In the workshops engaged in the production of purely peaceful goods, suitable for new job machines and set them up to produce parts for launchers.

By that time, the work of revising, adapting and changing the drawings at the Voronezh plant had been successfully completed. The production of parts for the assembly of prototypes has begun. There were a lot of difficulties, as with any new machine. First of all, there were no metalworking machines of the required length. The enterprise had only one planing machine for processing guides - the most important unit of the BM-13, and even that one was of a hopelessly outdated Butler design, with a very solid production history. The length required for the guides was decent - five meters. Arose serious problems and when bending guide troughs, also having a five-meter length. There were no bending devices at the plant. At first, the trough had to be made welded from three parts, which caused great technological difficulties in processing them. The welds needed to be thoroughly cleaned for subsequent assembly with the guides.

To produce test samples of rocket launchers, a specialized assembly shop No. 4 was organized, the head of which was Yakov Efimovich Leibovich. From the very first days, the most qualified workers of A.T. were sent here. Milyaeva, E.G. Myakisheva, M.V. Gunkina, I.D. Pakhorskgo, V.N. Strelkov, electricians A.M. Stakhurlova, G.A. Fedorenko, masters S.S. Zatsepina, M.F. Anisimova, I.E. Yurova. Operational management The workshops were also carried out by the head of the production department, Nikolai Semenovich Rozanovsky, and the senior engineer of the first department, Nikolai Antonovich Ivanov.

The most labor-intensive task was assembling the assembly of guide beams with spars and the overall installation of this assembly with the entire supporting structure of the launcher. A particular difficulty was that the grooves of the eight guide beams must be strictly parallel; deviation was allowed no more than two millimeters. In addition, it should be taken into account that there was no experience in assembling such systems yet, and some components had to be redone several times. The best car assemblers I.E., Yurov, I.S. Bakhtin, M.F. Anisimov, S.S. The Zatsepins literally did not close their eyes for days. Largely only thanks to their vast experience and dedicated work, test samples of the installation were assembled on time.

Engineer-
constructor

Leading
constructor

And so, on the fifth day of the war, June 26, this long-awaited and exciting moment. In the assembly shop, around two ready-made pilot plants, a team of assemblers and all the factory management gathered - director F. N. Muratov, chief engineer V. P. Chernogubovsky, chief technologist S. S. Silchenko, designer N. A. Pucherov, shop manager Ya. E. Leibovich. And also the leading designer V.N. Galkovsky and the representative of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, military engineer of the second rank A.G. Mrykin.

But it was too early to celebrate the victory. Lead designer Galkovsky assessed the installation with an experienced eye and immediately demanded a caliper. The designer's suspicions were confirmed - the distance between the axes of the grooves of the paired guides did not correspond to the drawings, it was less than the calculated one. The inspection showed that this was done on the instructions of the head of the RNII department, I. I. Gvai. Ivan Isidorovich came to the Comintern plant for the second time, when the drawings were basically worked out, and, looking at the guide assembly, he ordered to slightly reduce the dimensions between the axes of the guides in order to reduce the width of the entire package.

In the project, on paper, this looked quite logical, but now, in the finished installation, the designer’s trained eye immediately noticed a serious defect: during the first salvo, the missile stabilizers could hit each other.

An order followed for two teams of assemblers to urgently remount the guide beams, establishing between them the dimensions previously provided for in the project. The task was completed efficiently, after just a few hours of intense work, the assemblers and craftsmen breathed a sigh of relief - the first prototypes were ready. The installations were immediately accepted by representatives of the Main Artillery Directorate at the plant. Now the formidable combat vehicles were on their way to Moscow.

The next day, two cars, carefully covered with a tarpaulin, left the factory gates and headed for Moscow along the Zadonskoye Highway. In addition to two combat installations, there was a truck containing guard soldiers armed with grenades and light machine guns, and a supply of fuel. The cars with BM-13 were driven by Stepan Stepanovich Bobreshov and Mitrofan Dmitrievich Artamonov. The installations were accompanied by two workers and senior engineer of the first department Nikolai Antonovich Ivanov. After twenty hours of travel, the vehicles arrived at the People's Commissariat of Defense, where Ivanov received the necessary documents and a direction to a military warehouse for military missiles, so that he could immediately proceed to testing grounds.

After successful tests, on the same day, June 28, five installations previously manufactured at the RNII and two Voronezh Katyushas were combined into a battery to be sent to the front and tested the quality of the new weapon and its combat effectiveness. Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov, a student of the F. Dzerzhinsky Military Artillery Academy, was appointed commander of the first separate experimental battery of rocket launchers. Already on July 2, 1941, the battery was sent from Moscow to the Western Front, and on July 14, Flerov’s battery, with about three thousand shells, took up a combat position near Orsha, on the banks of the Dnieper, from where it delivered its first crushing blow to the enemy. Mortar fire reduced the trains with manpower and equipment that had accumulated at the station to dust. The artillerymen did not just inflict serious damage on the enemy. They brought terror to him, which haunted the Nazis throughout the war at the mere mention of this formidable weapon.

And at the plant there was an intense search for reserves to increase the production of military weapons. In one of last days June Muratov gathered shop managers, their deputies, and shift supervisors in his office. He was preoccupied and stern. Only the first samples of the machines were delivered. Too much time was spent on reworking the drawings, and other unforeseen difficulties were encountered in mastering this technologically complex machine. Muratov said that the rocket launcher was extremely important for the fiercely fighting Red Army. He criticized managers for their slowness in mastering the production of the most labor-intensive parts, for allowing defects, for the fact that many craftsmen are engaged in work unusual for them - getting blanks for machine operators, running from workshop to workshop. It was about setting a strict car production plan for each month. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account all the capabilities of each workshop, take into account every minute of working time, and do everything to ensure that not a single machine operator was idle due to a lack of workpieces or tools.

However, the plant was not ready for such a radical restructuring of all work. At the end of June, the plant received four planing machines, but their tables were short, and it turned out to be impossible to make guide beams on them. At an emergency meeting with the chief engineer, it was decided to lengthen the machine tables on our own. There was an urgent need to complete drawings of extension parts, make models, make cast iron castings, and process them. While this work was being carried out, changes were being agreed upon, holes were being dug in the workshop for the foundations of the elongated machines, anchor bolts were laid and concrete was poured. The work went on around the clock. The new machines were put into operation five days ahead of schedule.

Reconstructing machines and rebuilding the entire working rhythm in accordance with wartime is, of course, not easy. And all this was possible to do in record time only thanks to the dedication of the workforce and managers. We worked for days, almost without breaks. Chief engineer V.P. devoted all his efforts to production. Chernogubovsky and mechanic P.I. Larin. There was not a workshop, shift or department where these managers would not visit at least one day, ready to help with advice and action.

The machine shop was having trouble making the starting guide beams. The main difficulty was that the guide beam, five meters long, went through two operations on a longitudinal planing machine. During the first operation, the excess metal from the edges of the I-beam profile was removed, the supporting planes were carefully planed on both sides, and grooves twenty millimeters wide and eight millimeters deep were selected in them. Then the beam was removed from the machine and guide troughs made of sheet steel three millimeters thick were riveted onto the planed planes. The beam with the troughs attached was returned to the planer, and grooves eleven millimeters wide were cut into it. Moreover, it was necessary to maintain strict parallelism between the guide edges of the trough and the grooves, because the accuracy of the projectile’s movement and the accuracy of fire depended on this.

Chief technologist
S. S. Silchenko

Workshop foreman

The site team spent a lot of effort and nerves on the guide beams, but at first a lot of parts were still scrapped. Plant director F.N. Muratov was forced to convene a meeting specifically on this issue. Shop managers A.G. Puzoshchatov and S.P. Zakharov, chief technologist S.S. Silchenko, craftsmen, and the most qualified planers were invited to attend. The meeting was also attended by a representative of the State Defense Committee and the secretary of the regional party committee A. A. Ivanov.

A more thorough study of the beam processing technology revealed insufficient rigidity of its fastening on the machine. The head of the guide beam section, Boris Lvovich Tagintsev, remembered one device that he had previously used for other purposes. I found it with difficulty, figured out what was what, and it turned out that with minor modifications it can be used for processing guide beams. Boris Lvovich told Muratov in detail about his idea and asked him to transfer it to the machine in order to try out the innovation with his own hands. The director agreed.

Tagintsev immediately went to the workshop, and twelve hours later the device was mounted on a Butler planing machine. Things went well. The strong and rigid mounting of the guide beam on the machine eliminated vibration. The military representative accepted the part made using the new device from the first presentation. Now another problem was on its way: reducing the time for processing the beam. To speed up this operation, Tagintsev and Fedin proposed a special tool holder, into which three incisors were inserted at once. This simple device made it possible to significantly increase the productivity of the machine.

A simple cutter was used to process the edges of the guide trough. Installing and refueling it was difficult and time consuming. Avdeev and Tagintsev developed the design of a special, somewhat unusual cutter, shaped like a tea saucer. 6 hard alloy plates were soldered around the circumference of a disk with a diameter of 132 millimeters. The plates were positioned symmetrically at an angle of 60 degrees. Each pair of such plates made it possible to process both edges of the guide trough at once, and exceptionally high processing accuracy was achieved.

Throughout July, intensive preparations continued for the implementation of a strictly daily schedule in the workshops. The party bureau, the factory trade union committee, the Komsomol organization, and the large-circulation newspaper Kominternovets were energetically involved in this matter. Large, beautifully designed posters were hung at the main entrance of the plant. The results of the activities of each workshop were updated twice a day. The area for assembly work was significantly increased by accommodating two large bays of the metal structures workshop. The leadership of some departments was strengthened. Thus, the communist Dmitry Ivanovich Zhirov was appointed head of assembly shop No. 3, and the chief mechanic of the plant, party member Pavel Ivanovich Larin, was sent to assembly shop No. 4.

The results of organizational and political-mass work were not slow to show. In all subsequent months, right up to the evacuation of the plant to the Urals, the daily schedule was the law for each production team; it made it possible to establish a precise production of all components and parts, and to significantly increase the number of manufactured launchers.

On July 2, 1941, the bureau of the Voronezh regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the speedy establishment and increase in the production of military weapons at the Comintern plant. With this resolution, the regional party committee involved other city enterprises in the production of formidable weapons. Thus, the Kalinin Machine-Building Plant began to produce beams for the guide trough. He also had to work on extending the planer table length first. This work was carried out by a group of designers from the chief mechanic’s department under the leadership of Yu. P. Smirnov. But even when the machines were rebuilt, many of the problems observed in initial period production of the first beams at the Comintern plant. The beams were often deformed; they had to be straightened with great difficulty on special massive slabs, which took a lot of time.

Technologist A.P. Molchanov and head of the mechanical shop K.P. Tarasov devoted a lot of effort, energy, and invention to debugging the technological process. For days they did not leave the planers A. I. Pankov, I. A. Zverev, M. V. Shedagubov, A. Perelygin. It turned out that it was impossible to remove large-section chips with a given length and complex profile of the beam. There was a threat of disruption to the production schedule of this important part. Then they decided to first carry out rough processing using the milling method. For this purpose, a disc shears unit with a roller table available at the factory was used. The re-equipment of the unit for milling was carried out by designer F. E. Durov, and technologist A. P. Molchanov designed an original mandrel with a set of disk cutters. For final processing of the beams on the planer, the minimum allowance was left. Things got going.

Kalinin residents also completely manufactured the so-called lifting unit. It included quite complex parts: a screw with a two-start tape thread, a nut and two bevel gears. The cutting of the threaded pair was entrusted to highly qualified turners S. Boev, P. Zotov, I. Komarov. It turned out to be more difficult with cutting bevel gears. We had to hastily restore the old gear cutting machine. This work was completed in a short time under the leadership of the head of the mechanical repair shop L. Ya. Agarkov, who spent more than one sleepless night with the machine operators.

Various components and parts for the launcher were manufactured by teams from the Lenin Machine-Building Plant, the Dzerzhinsky Locomotive Repair Plant, and the Elektrosignal plant. The Institute of Chemical Technology also joined them, in whose mechanical laboratory they mastered sighting sights with an optical part. Therefore, the Katyushas assembled at the Comintern plant can rightfully be called Voronezh.

The regional party committee kept the production of military weapons under constant control. At eleven o'clock at night, meetings were held in F.N. Muratov's office on the results of the day. They were often attended by the first secretary of the regional committee, Vladimir Dmitrievich Nikitin, or the secretary of industry, Alexander Alexandrovich Ivanov. They provided the Comintern members with invaluable assistance in organizing the rhythmic supply of parts to other factories in the city, as well as in the uninterrupted supply of metal and other materials. A. A. Ivanov was almost hopelessly at the Comintern plant. Together with the secretary of the party committee, Ivan Efimovich Brovin, he often visited workshops and departments. During shift changes, for five to eight minutes, he made a report on the situation at the fronts, informed about the working life of the city and the entire region. The intimate conversation, specific examples, and the party's rallying cry mobilized people to quickly complete an extremely important task.

In August, difficulties with transporting launchers to Moscow began to increase. Their delivery on railway platforms was impossible due to the increasing frequency of enemy air raids on the road. Most of the plant's drivers were drafted into the army from the very first days of the war, and there were also not enough cars. And here assistance was provided by the regional and city party committees. Industrial enterprises and various economic organizations were instructed to allocate the required number of vehicles and drivers to ensure emergency transportation of launchers to Moscow.

The column of machines was necessarily accompanied by a responsible employee of the enterprise, approved by the director of the plant - the head of the department, designer, technologist, engineer. Along the route, it was strictly forbidden to stop in populated areas and at gas stations. Short stops to refuel with fuel, which you always carried with you, for technical inspection of vehicles were arranged in an open field or in a sparse forest with good review terrain. Breaking up of cars in a convoy while driving was not allowed under any circumstances; drivers had the right to drive their cars even at a red traffic light.

The successful work of the entire plant team was greatly facilitated by a well-organized dispatch service. The chief dispatcher of the enterprise had at his disposal a switchboard with loud-speaking installations in workshops and departments. Clearly organized communication allowed planners and shop foremen to maintain contact all the time and at any moment take the most the right decision on any question. The head of the factory telephone exchange, August Petrovich Yagund, put a lot of work and ingenuity into the introduction of a widely ramified dispatch communications (at that time it was a novelty).

In 1972, on the territory of the plant
a monument to the installation of BM-13 was erected.
photo by S. Kolesnikov from the archives of the Kommuna newspaper.

Day by day, along with alarming reports from the front, labor tension grew. When the fascist hordes were on the outskirts of Moscow, the slogan “More combat vehicles for the defenders of the capital!” was hung in the factory workshops. People accepted this call with all their hearts, understanding the danger looming over the Motherland, and completed the release rocket launchers up to five or six a day.

The production of units at the Comintern plant continued until the fall. And in October the front moved close to the upper Don. Enemy aircraft began to appear more and more often over the city. First reconnaissance aircraft, and soon bombers. The decision was made to evacuate. The Moscow Kompressor plant was appointed the leading enterprise for the production of launchers.

The Kominternovsky plant was evacuated beyond the Urals to the village of Maly Istok, where at the Uralelectromashina plant as soon as possible resumed production of parts for missile launchers. And although a small number of combat vehicles were assembled at the Istok plant, its team provided a significant amount of parts to the Uralelectromashina plant, where the main assembly of BM-13 units was established.

In a short time, the Cominternists also mastered the mass production of 82 mm mortars and uninterruptedly supplied them to the Red Army throughout the war.

Savchenko A.A. © www.site
The article uses drawings and illustrations from the Modelist-Constructor magazine.

Barrelless field rocket artillery system, which received affectionate treatment in the Red Army female name“Katyusha”, without exaggeration, became probably one of the most popular types of military equipment of the Second World War. In any case, neither our enemies nor our allies had anything like this.

Initially, barrelless rocket artillery systems in the Red Army were not intended for ground battles. They literally descended from heaven to earth.

The 82 mm caliber rocket was adopted by the Red Army Air Force back in 1933. They were installed on fighters designed by Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153. In 1939, they underwent baptism of fire during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, where they performed well when shooting at groups of enemy aircraft.

In the same year, employees of the Jet Research Institute began work on a mobile ground launcher that could fire rockets at ground targets. At the same time, the caliber of the rockets was increased to 132 mm.
In March 1941, field tests were successfully carried out new system weapons, and the decision to mass produce combat vehicles with RS-132 missiles, called BM-13, was made the day before the start of the war - June 21, 1941.

How was it structured?

The BM-13 combat vehicle was a chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle, on which a rotary truss with a package of guides and a guidance mechanism was installed. For aiming, a rotating and lifting mechanism and an artillery sight were provided. At the rear of the combat vehicle there were two jacks, which ensured its greater stability when firing.
The missiles were launched using a hand-held electric coil connected to a battery and contacts on the guides. When the handle was turned, the contacts closed in turn, and the starting squib was fired in the next projectile.
The explosive material in the warhead of the projectile was detonated from both sides (the length of the detonator was only slightly less than the length of the explosive cavity). And when two waves of detonation met, the gas pressure of the explosion at the meeting point increased sharply. As a result, the hull fragments had a significantly higher acceleration, heated up to 600-800 ° C and had a good ignition effect. In addition to the body, part of the rocket chamber also burst, which was heated from the gunpowder burning inside; this increased the fragmentation effect by 1.5-2 times compared to artillery shells of the same caliber. That is why the legend arose that Katyusha rockets were equipped with a “thermite charge.” The “thermite” charge was indeed tested in besieged Leningrad in 1942, but it turned out to be unnecessary - after the Katyusha salvo, everything around was burning. And the joint use of dozens of missiles at the same time also created interference of blast waves, which further enhanced the damaging effect.

Baptism of fire near Orsha

The first salvo of a battery of Soviet rocket-propelled mortars (as the new type of military equipment began to be called for greater secrecy) consisting of seven BM-13 combat installations was fired in mid-July 1941. This happened near Orsha. An experienced battery under the command of Captain Flerov launched a fire strike at the Orsha railway station, where a concentration of enemy military equipment and manpower was noticed.
At 15:15 on July 14, 1941, heavy fire was opened on enemy trains. The entire station instantly turned into a huge cloud of fire. On the same day, the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, wrote in his diary: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used weapons unknown until that time. A fiery barrage of shells burned the Orsha railway station and all the trains with personnel and military equipment of the arriving military units. The metal was melting, the earth was burning.”

The morale effect of the use of rocket mortars was stunning. The enemy lost more than an infantry battalion and a huge amount of military equipment and weapons at the Orsha station. And Captain Flerov’s battery dealt another blow on the same day - this time at the enemy crossing over the Orshitsa River.
The Wehrmacht command, having studied the information received from eyewitnesses of the use of new Russian weapons, was forced to issue a special instruction to its troops, which stated: “ There are reports from the front that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds. Any appearance of these weapons must be reported on the same day to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command." A real hunt began for Captain Flerov's battery. In October 1941, she found herself in the Spas-Demensky “cauldron” and was ambushed. Of the 160 people, only 46 managed to reach their own. The battery commander himself died, having first made sure that all the combat vehicles were blown up and would not fall into enemy hands intact.

On land and sea...

In addition to the BM-13, in the SKB of the Voronezh plant. Comintern, which produced these combat installations, new options for placing missiles have been developed. For example, taking into account the extremely low cross-country ability of the ZIS-6 vehicle, an option was developed for installing guides for missiles on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tracked tractor. In addition, an 82 mm caliber rocket has also found use. Guides were developed and manufactured for it, which were later installed on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle (36 guides) and on the chassis of the T-40 and T-60 light tanks (24 guides).

A 16-charging installation for RS-132 shells and a 48-charging installation for RS-82 shells for armored trains were developed. In the fall of 1942, during the fighting in the Caucasus, 8-round mining pack launchers for RS-82 shells were manufactured for use in mountain conditions.

Later they were installed on American Willys all-terrain vehicles, which came to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
Special launchers for 82 mm and 132 mm caliber missiles were manufactured for their subsequent installation on warships - torpedo boats and armored boats.

The launchers themselves received the popular nickname “Katyusha”, under which they entered the history of the Great Patriotic War. Why Katyusha? There are many versions on this matter. The most reliable - due to the fact that the first BM-13 had the letter “K” - as information that the product was produced at the plant named after. Comintern in Voronezh. By the way, the cruising boats of the Soviet Navy, which had the letter index “K,” received the same nickname. In total, 36 launcher designs were developed and produced during the war.

And the Wehrmacht soldiers nicknamed the BM-13 “Stalin's organs.” Apparently, the roar of the rockets reminded the Germans of the sounds of a church organ. This “music” clearly made them feel uncomfortable.
And from the spring of 1942, guides with missiles began to be installed on British and American all-wheel drive chassis imported into the USSR under Lend-Lease. Still, the ZIS-6 turned out to be a vehicle with low cross-country ability and carrying capacity. The three-axle all-wheel drive American truck Studebakker US6 turned out to be most suitable for installing rocket launchers. Combat vehicles began to be produced on its chassis. At the same time, they received the name BM-13N (“normalized”).

During the entire Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry produced more than ten thousand rocket artillery combat vehicles.

Relatives of the Katyusha

For all their advantages, high-explosive fragmentation rockets RS-82 and RS-132 had one drawback - large dispersion and low efficiency when affecting enemy personnel located in field shelters and trenches. To correct this shortcoming, special 300 mm caliber rockets were manufactured.
They received the nickname “Andryusha” among the people. They were launched from a launching machine (“frame”) made of wood. The launch was carried out using a sapper blasting machine.
“Andryushas” were first used in Stalingrad. The new weapons were easy to manufacture, but installing them in position and aiming at the target required a lot of time. In addition, the short range of the M-30 rockets made them dangerous for their own crews.

Therefore, in 1943, the troops began to receive an improved missile, which, with the same power, had a greater firing range. The M-31 shell could hit manpower in an area of ​​2 thousand square meters or form a crater 2-2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter. But the time to prepare a salvo with new shells was significant - one and a half to two hours.
Such shells were used in 1944-1945 during the assault on enemy fortifications and during street battles. One hit from an M-31 missile was enough to destroy an enemy bunker or a firing point located in a residential building.

Fire sword of the "god of war"

By May 1945, rocket artillery units had about three thousand combat vehicles of various types and many “frames” with M-31 shells. Not a single Soviet offensive since Battle of Stalingrad, did not begin without artillery preparation using Katyusha rockets. Salvos from combat installations became the “fiery sword” with which our infantry and tanks made their way through enemy fortified positions.
During the war, BM-13 installations were sometimes used for direct fire at enemy tanks and firing points. To do this, the combat vehicle drove its rear wheels onto some elevation so that its guides assumed a horizontal position. Of course, the accuracy of such shooting was quite low, but a direct hit from a 132-mm rocket would smash any enemy tank to pieces, and a nearby explosion would knock over military equipment enemy, and heavy hot fragments reliably disabled it.

After the war, Soviet designers of combat vehicles continued to work on Katyushas and Andryushas. Only now they began to be called not guards mortars, but multiple launch rocket systems. In the USSR, such powerful SZOs as “Grad”, “Hurricane” and “Smerch” were designed and built. At the same time, the losses of an enemy caught in a salvo from a battery of Hurricanes or Smerchs are comparable to losses from the use of tactical nuclear weapons with a power of up to 20 kilotons, that is, with the explosion of an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

BM-13 combat vehicle on a three-axle vehicle chassis

The caliber of the projectile is 132 mm.
Projectile weight - 42.5 kg.
The mass of the warhead is 21.3 kg.
The maximum projectile flight speed is 355 m/s.
The number of guides is 16.
The maximum firing range is 8470 m.
Charging time of the installation is 3-5 minutes.
The duration of a full salvo is 7-10 seconds.

Guards mortar BM-13 Katyusha

1. Launcher
2. Missiles
3. The car on which the installation was mounted

Guide package
Cabin armor shields
Hiking support
Lifting frame
Launcher battery
Sight bracket
Swivel frame
Lifting handle

The launchers were mounted on the chassis of ZIS-6, Ford Marmont, International Jiemsi, Austin vehicles and on STZ-5 tracked tractors. The largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker vehicles.

M-13 projectile

01. Fuse retaining ring
02. GVMZ fuze
03. Detonator checker
04. Bursting charge
05. Head part
06. Igniter
07. Bottom of the chamber
08. Guide pin
09. Powder rocket charge
10. Missile part
11. Grate
12. Critical section of the nozzle
13. Nozzle
14. Stabilizer

Few survived

The effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas during an attack on an enemy fortified unit can be illustrated by the defeat of the Tolkachev defensive unit during our counteroffensive near Kursk in July 1943.
The village of Tolkachevo was turned by the Germans into a heavily fortified resistance center with a large number of dugouts and bunkers of 5-12 roll-ups, with a developed network of trenches and communication passages. The approaches to the village were heavily mined and covered with wire fences.
Salvos of rocket artillery destroyed a significant part of the bunkers, the trenches, along with the enemy infantry located in them, were filled up, and the fire system was completely suppressed. Of the entire garrison of the junction, numbering 450-500 people, only 28 survived. The Tolkachev junction was taken by our units without any resistance.

Supreme High Command Reserve

By decision of the Headquarters, in January 1945, the formation of twenty guards mortar regiments began - this is how the units armed with the BM-13 began to be called.
The Guards Mortar Regiment (Gv.MP) of the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) consisted of a command and three divisions of three batteries. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, a salvo of only one division of 12 BM-13-16 PIP vehicles (Staff Directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of rocket artillery in quantities less than a division) could be compared in strength to a salvo of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 152 mm howitzers per regiment ) or 18 heavy howitzer brigades of the RVGK (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).

Victor Sergeev

Officially, the 1st experimental Katyusha battery (5 out of 7 installations) under the command of Captain Flerov fired the first salvo at 15:15. July 14, 1941 at the railway junction in Orsha. The following description of what happened is often given: “A cloud of smoke and dust rose over the ravine overgrown with bushes where the battery was hidden. There was a rumbling grinding sound. Throwing tongues of bright flame, more than a hundred cigar-shaped projectiles quickly slid from the guide launchers. For a moment, black arrows were visible in the sky, gaining height with increasing speed. Elastic jets of ash-white gases burst out with a roar from their bottoms. And then everything disappeared together.” (...)

“And a few seconds later, in the very thick of the enemy troops, explosions thundered one after another, shaking the ground. Where wagons with ammunition and tanks with fuel had just stood, huge geysers of fire and smoke shot up.”

But if you open any reference literature, you can see that the city of Orsha was abandoned Soviet troops a day later. And who was the salvo fired at? It is problematic to imagine that the enemy was able to change the railway track in a matter of hours and drive trains into the station.

It is even more unlikely that the first to enter the captured city from the Germans are trains with ammunition, for the delivery of which even captured Soviet locomotives and wagons are used.

In 2007, Colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky conveyed his war memories to the portal “Uninvented Stories about War”. After publication, he continued working on the text. Additions and clarifications have been made. New archival documents (combat orders, instructions, award lists, etc.) made it possible to tell in more detail about the military operations of the 28th OGMD, in which Yakov Mikhailovich served, his battle path. And, most importantly, to supplement the memories with a story about the military exploits of the division’s guardsmen, to name many by their last names (more than 40 last names).

The disbandment of the brigade continued until mid-October. Most of the officers had already left for Moscow, to the personnel department of the GMCh, and me and a small group of officers were still detained in Sormovo to carry out various tasks related to the liquidation of the unit. Finally, on October 15, I received the necessary documents. At the beginning of October we were given certificates: at the brigade headquarters - to receive the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, at the plant - the medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”. I still have this factory certificate – seventy years old – (I was awarded the medal “For Victory over Germany” as a participant in hostilities).

I provide this certificate:

On October 17 I arrived in Moscow. And there - the personnel department in the 2nd NGO House, and then the already familiar Officer Reserve Division on Khoroshevskoye Shosse.

The division was as crowded as ever. Some were awaiting assignment to units, others an order for demobilization. Some officers, who had already been transferred to the reserve and received a substantial severance pay, either hoping to increase it, or simply out of excitement, sat in the evening playing cards and literally lost every penny. Often among those to whom they lost were two officers who always played together, officers in brand new, well-fitted uniforms, from the division’s regular employees.

In the barracks next to my bed there was the bed of an officer who, as it turned out, also studied at the Omsk school, albeit in a different battery, and fought on the Western Front.

Naturally, it was interesting for us to remember our days at school and mutual friends. They were interested in whether our units had to operate in the neighborhood and participate in the same combat operations. It turned out that we maintained different connections in different areas.

We also touched upon issues related to the history of the Katyusha. One day we started talking about the strange omission of the name Kostikov, who was considered the creator of the Katyusha. The names and photos of the creators of military weapons and equipment began to be published after the war, but Kostikov was not among them. In general, for us, who fought on the Katyushas, ​​there was a lot of unclear and contradictory things here. This also affected the former commander of the GMCh, Lieutenant General V. Aborenkov. An acquaintance of mine heard from one of the officers that the general was in trouble because he allegedly tried to take credit for the authorship of the Katyusha.

And later, for a long time in the post-war years, there was no clarity on these issues.

One could notice that gradually Kostikov’s name completely disappeared from the pages of newspapers and magazines and ceased to be mentioned in official publications.

In the early 80s, while I was in Leningrad, I visited the Military Historical Museum of the History of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps. In the exhibition dedicated to rocket artillery and guards mortar units, I did not see either Kostikov’s name or portrait.

Kostikov was not mentioned among the creators of the Katyusha in the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (GSE), the Encyclopedia “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, in the book “Rocket Men”, published by DOSSAF publishing house in 1979, etc.

To some extent, the situation began to become clearer at the end of 1988, when publications appeared in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, and then twice in the “Military Historical Journal”, questioning the authorship and very participation of Kostikov in the creation of “ Katyusha”, accusing him of involvement in arrests at the research institute in 1937-1938. I. T. Kleimenov, G. E. Langemak, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, as “enemies of the people”, in order to advance to the leadership of the institute.

In “Military Historical Journal” No. 10 for 1989 it was written:

« In 1939, after successful field tests, having somehow pushed aside the main participants in the development, testing and introduction of new weapons, Kostikov and Gvai made an application to be recognized as the authors of the invention. When the deputy head of the artillery department of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) Aborenkov expressed a desire to join them, they did not dare refuse... It is possible that it was after his insistent petitions that the invention department of the NKO recognized all three as the inventors of the M-13 machine unit and issued them copyright certificates».

/ « VIZH" No. 10, 1989 Anisimov N.A., Oppokov V.G. “Incident at NII-3” .P.85./

The magazine published the conclusions of a technical examination carried out in 1944 after Kostikov was removed by the State Defense Committee resolution of February 18. this year from the post of director of the institute and his arrest for disrupting the government task for the development rocket engine for a jet fighter-interceptor.

Special investigator important matters The People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, who interrogated Kostikov and doubted his scientific credibility, brought in Academician S.A. for the examination. Khristianovich, professors A.V. Chesalova, K.A. Ushakova, deputy Head of the weapons department of laboratory No. 2 TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) A.M. Levina.

Answering the investigator’s question whether Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov are the authors of the M-8, M-13 projectiles and launching devices for them, the experts stated that Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov, who received an author’s certificate for a machine installation for firing rocket projectiles, have nothing to do with had no involvement in their development. Arguments: smokeless powder missiles M-8 and M-13 differ only in minor modifications from the RS-82 and RS-132 projectiles developed at NII-3 in 1934 - 1938; The idea of ​​​​creating a launcher was put forward back in 1933 by G. Langemak and V. Glushko in the book “Rockets, their design and application.”

After his death, academicians S. Korolev and V. Glushko launched an active campaign against Kostikov, believing that it was he who, for careerist purposes, was guilty of their arrest. In an appeal to the publishing house of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, a copy of which was sent and published in the magazine “Ogonyok” No. 50 for 1988, they wrote: “Kostikov, who worked at the institute as an ordinary engineer, made a lot of efforts to achieve the arrest and conviction as enemies the people of the main leadership of this institute, including the main author of the new type of weapons, a talented designer, deputy director of the institute for scientific affairs G.E. Langemaka. Thus, Kostikov turned out to be the head of the institute and the “author” of this new type of weapon, for which he was generously awarded at the beginning of the war.” /“Ogonyok” No. 50, p.23/.

At the insistence of V. Glushko, the portrait and surname of A. Kostikov were confiscated from the exhibition of the Military History Museum, as well as in Leningrad. Ch. The censor was instructed not to mention Kostikov's name in the open press.

But in 1989-1991, materials began to appear in a number of publications in defense of A. Kostikov. The newspapers “Socialist Industry”, “Radyanska Ukraina”, “Krasnaya Zvezda”, “Trud” and some others published materials refuting the statements of the authors in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, etc., and which made it possible to analyze the facts without bias and assignments.

As Colonel V. Moroz wrote in the article “Katyusha”. Triumph and Drama”, published in the newspaper “Red Star” on July 13, 1991, the idea outlined in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Rockets, their design and use”, “... is not identical to the idea of ​​the Katyusha... military engineer 1st rank G. Langemak, deputy director of the institute, launchers on the vehicle were not designed at all, and attempts to arm others with rockets vehicles ended in failure." And only as a result of a closed competition announced at the Research Institute in 1938 for the creation of object 138 (launcher), in which 18 leading engineers of the institute took part, did a completely original project of a “mechanized multi-charger located on ZIS-5 car installation for firing rockets.”

Sending the project signed by A. Kostikov and I. Gvai to the customer, the director of the institute B. Slonimer officially named A. Kostikov “the initiator of the creation of the installation.” In February 1939, after the combat vehicle passed trial tests at the Sofrinsky artillery range, and then received the go-ahead from the State Commission headed by the famous artilleryman V. Grendal, A. Kostikov and I. Gvai submitted a joint application (written in the hand of I. Gvai ) on issuing a copyright certificate to them. In September of this year, another co-author was added to the application - V.V. Aborenkova. On February 19, 1940, A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, and V. Aborenkov were issued a non-public copyright certificate by the invention department of the NPO.

During interrogations from the investigator and then from the CPSU Central Committee, I. Gvai argued that without Kostikov there would have been no Katyusha. Gvai, Kostikov, Aborenkov told the investigator that although they are related to the development of the rocket, they do not claim authorship in its invention, that although the idea of ​​the launcher was expressed in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Missiles, their design and application,” but there was no launcher as such and there was no specific clarity of what it should be until the Gwai project appeared.

During interrogations, it was also proven that V. Aborenkov was included in the application, not as a “punchy person,” but as one of the active participants in the creation of the machine installation. In particular, they were asked to increase the length of the guides to 5 meters, use separate ignition of the pyracartridges from an electrical circuit (Gwai suggested simultaneous ignition), use an artillery panorama and a sight for aiming.

In November 1989, the newspaper “Socialist Industry” introduced readers to the conclusions of a special commission chaired by Candidate of Technical Sciences Yu. Demyanko, created by the CPSU Central Committee. The commission concluded:

« The authors of the invention of a mechanized installation for salvo firing of rockets - and even more broadly - the authors of the proposal for a fundamentally new type of weapon - multiple launch rocket systems are A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, V. Aborenkov. The most meticulous analysis shows that there is no person who could claim inclusion in this team».

“The Prosecutor's Office of the USSR most carefully studied the materials related to the arrest of prominent scientists of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 in the 30s. In the materials of the criminal cases against S.P. Korolev, G.E. Langemak, V.P. Glushko, I.T. Kleymenov, there is no data indicating that they were arrested following Kostikov’s denunciation.”

The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote that it was not failures at work, “... battles at party meetings, which were not typical for that time, nor signals from informants from the walls of the institute, became the reason for the arrest of I. Kleimenov, G. Langemenok, V. Glushko, S. Korolev, and later V. Luzhin.” Danger already loomed over them during the period of exposure as “enemies of the people” (later rehabilitated) by the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal M. Tukhachevsky, who was in charge of weapons and for a long time patronized the research institute, and the head of Osoviakhim R. Eideman, under whose auspices the Moscow group of GDL S. Korolev worked.”

/gas. “Red Star” 07/13/1991 V. Moroz, “Katyusha”: triumph and drama.”/

As noted in a number of publications, Andrei Grigorievich Kostikov was not such a careerist as the authors of articles from Ogonyok, Agitator, and others tried to present him.

He was born on October 17 (old style) 1899 in the city of Kazatin, in the family of a railway worker. Participant civil war. He graduated from the Kyiv Military School of Communications, then from the N. E. Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. Upon graduation, he was sent to the Rocket Research Institute, where he worked his way up from engineer to head of department, chief engineer, and director of the institute. Major General, Hero of Socialist Labor, Laureate of the Stalin Prize 1st degree, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In February 1944, by decree of the State Defense Committee, he was removed from the post of director of NII-3 for failure to fulfill a government assignment and was brought to criminal liability by the USSR Prosecutor's Office. He spent 11.5 months in a pre-trial prison. But no hostile intent was established in his actions (within the established eight months, Kostikov failed to ensure the creation of a liquid-propellant rocket engine for an interceptor fighter), and he was released.

Despite his serious illness, he continued to work fruitfully and raised many students. After his release from custody, Kostikov continued to be summoned for questioning by the CPSU Central Committee and investigative authorities. All this affected his health, his heart could not stand it. He died on December 5, 1950 at the age of 51, and was buried in Moscow.

The life of I.I. ended no less tragically. Guaya. Endless interrogations and groundless accusations led to the same thing. He died five years later, in 1955, in the prime of his creative powers.

Publications in defense of A. Kostikov received an inadequate assessment. Some publications, in particular the Military Historical Journal, tried to question the conclusions of the commission of the CPSU Central Committee, created under the leadership of Yu. Demyanko.

And although the question about Kostikov and his role remained open, it is wrong to deny his merits as one of the creators of “Katyusha”. There is also no doubt that a large team of talented scientists and engineers took part in the creation of Katyusha. Their success was facilitated by many years of experimental work on the development of jet weapons by the creators of rocketry.

Posthumously this high rank Kleymenov Ivan Terentyevich, Langemak Georgy Erikhovich, Luzhin Vasily Nikolaevich, Petropavlovsky Boris Sergeevich, Slonimer Boris Mikhailovich, Tikhomirov Nikolay Ivanovich were awarded. All of them made a great contribution to the creation of domestic jet weapons.

N. Tikhomirov- in 1921 he founded and headed until his death in 1930 the Gas Dynamic Laboratory (GDL) in Petrograd (Leningrad), the main object of which was a powder rocket.

B. Petropavlovsky– graduate of the Military Technical Academy. Continued leadership of the GDL. His inventions were reminiscent of today's recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. He died in 1933 from a cold.

I. Kleimenov- graduate of the Air Force Academy. N. E. Zhukovsky, was the last head of the GDL and the first head new structure– Jet Research Institute (RNII), formed on the initiative of M. Tukhachevsky by combining two teams – the Leningrad GDL and the Moscow group for the study of jet propulsion, headed by S. Korolev. At the end of 1937, Kleimenov was arrested and executed in 1938;

G. Langemak– military engineer 1st rank, deputy. Head of the RNII, made a great contribution to bringing the missile to combat standards. He was also repressed and shot;

V. Luzhin- engineer, together with other employees of the RNII, found many original solutions in creating a powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which during the war the Germans took for thermite, although incendiary properties it was pierced with hot shards. In 1940 he was arrested, sentenced to 8 years, and died in prison.

B. Slonimer- Director of NII-3 (as the Jet Institute was called) from the end of 1937 to November 1940. Although he was not a jet designer, he did a lot to defend the new combat vehicle, give it a “start in life”, taking upon itself all the blows associated with its creation in extremely difficult conditions and tense conditions, with stubborn resistance from “rail” artillery from the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Marshal G. Kulik, and others . /“Red Star” 07/13/1991/

The year 1945 was ending. Year of Victory Soviet people over Nazi Germany.

After almost a month in the reserves, I was sent to Ukraine, to the Carpathian Military District (PrikVO), where on December 1 I was appointed head of the reconnaissance division of the 61st Guards Mortar Regiment (61st GMP). The regiment had glorious military traditions and was awarded three orders of Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and Alexander Nevsky. It was given the name "Zaporozhye". It was an honor to serve in such a regiment. But due to the reduction of the army, the 61st GMP was disbanded in June 1946. Some of the officers were demobilized. The rest began to be transferred to other units. As a rule, with a demotion. Not everyone agreed. They wrote reports and sought dismissal. I was left in the frames.

The certification for me from that period stated:

“...Comrade Lyakhovetsky, working as the division's intelligence chief, showed himself to be a demanding, strong-willed officer towards himself and his subordinates. In a short period of service in the regiment, he managed to weld together a team capable of completing any task. At the inspection review by the commission of the Chief. Marshal of Artillery Voronov, the scouts trained by him received a good rating.

A competent, strong-willed officer, he enjoys well-deserved authority among his subordinates. Sociable, polite. Artillery and tactical training is quite satisfactory. He knows his personal weapons and is quite proficient with them. He works systematically to improve his knowledge. Has good organizational skills, combining them in caring for subordinates. Politically literate, morally stable...

Conclusions: B peacetime The position is fully appropriate, it is advisable to remain in the armed forces.

Commander of the 2nd Division of the 61st GMP

Guard Major /Malyutin/

"I affirm"

Commander of the 61st Guards Mortar Zaporozhye Order of Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Alexander Nevsky Regiment.

This was followed by service in the 87th (also later disbanded) and 5th Guards Mortar Regiments. However, over the years, the consequences of a serious wound received at the front became clear, and the frequent change of units no longer suited me, and I submitted my report for dismissal.

My generation has had a difficult fate. Literally after school prom the war began. Out of every hundred of my peers, only three returned from it. Many of those who returned lost their health, became disabled due to wounds, and died early. And although it was not easy for us, we do not complain about fate. We have fulfilled our duty to our Motherland. Our conscience before our descendants, our children and grandchildren, is clear.

Zhitomir, 2001-2005, 2015

Prepared and sent for publication: retired colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky