Weapon of Victory. "Katyusha"

Weapon of Victory - “Katyusha”

The first combat use of Katyushas is now quite well known: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland, on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated in the market square of the town.

At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, the battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a western direction that was unexpected for the enemy, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo had died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa.

On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how missile launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov’s fulfillment of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said:

“Katyusha sang perfectly.”

In the photo: Commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery Captain Flerov. Died on October 7, 1941. But historians differ on who was the first to use Katyusha against tanks - too often in the initial period of the war, the situation forced such desperate decisions to be made.

The systematic use of the BM-13 to destroy tanks is associated with the name of the commander of the 14th separate guards mortar division, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin. This unit, made up of naval sailors, was originally called the 200th OAS Division and was armed with 130 mm fixed naval guns. Both guns and artillerymen performed well in the fight against tanks, but on October 9, 1941, by written order from the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General Vishnevsky, the 200th Artillery Division, having blown up stationary guns and ammunition for them, retreated to the east, but On October 12 he ended up in the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Having emerged from encirclement on October 26, the division was sent for reorganization, during which it was rearmed with Katyushas. The division was headed by the former commander of one of his batteries, Senior Lieutenant Moskvin, who was immediately awarded the rank of lieutenant commander. The 14th Separate Guards Mortar Division was included in the 1st Moscow Separate Detachment of Sailors, which took part in the Counter-Offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. At the end of May - beginning of June 1942, during a period of relative calm, Moskvin summed up the experience of fighting enemy armored vehicles and found new way its destruction. He was supported by the GMCH inspector, Colonel Alexey Ivanovich Nesterenko. Test firing was carried out. To give the guides a minimum elevation angle, the Katyushas drove their front wheels into dug recesses, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, smashed plywood mock-ups of tanks. So what if you break plywood? – skeptics doubted. – You still can’t defeat real tanks!

In the photo: shortly before death. There was some truth in these doubts, because the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. However, it turned out that when their fragments get into the engine part or gas tanks, a fire occurs, the tracks are interrupted, the turrets jam, and sometimes they are torn off the shoulder strap. An explosion of a 4.95-kilogram charge, even if it occurred behind the armor, incapacitates the crew due to severe concussion.

On July 22, 1942, in a battle north of Novocherkassk, Moskvin’s division, which by that time had been transferred to the Southern Front and included in the 3rd Rifle Corps, destroyed 11 tanks with two direct fire salvoes - 1.1 per installation, while a good result for the anti-tank division out of 18 guns, it was considered that two or three enemy tanks were destroyed.

Often the mortar guards were considered the only force capable of providing organized resistance to the enemy. This forced front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky to create on July 25, 1942, on the basis of such units, a Mobile Mechanized Group (PMG) led by the commander of the GMC A.I. Nesterenko. It included three regiments and a BM-13 division, the 176th Infantry Division mounted on vehicles, a combined tank battalion, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery divisions. There were no such units before or since.

At the end of July, near the village of Mechetinskaya, the PMG collided with the main forces of the 1st German tank army Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving,” Moskvin reported. “We chose a position near the road so that the batteries could fire at the same time. Motorcyclists appeared, followed by cars and tanks. Battery salvoes covered the entire depth of the column, damaged and smoking vehicles stopped, tanks flew at them like blind people and caught fire. The enemy's advance along this road stopped.

Several such attacks forced the Germans to change tactics. They left supplies of fuel and ammunition in the rear and moved in small groups: 15–20 tanks in front, followed by trucks with infantry. This slowed down the pace of the offensive, but created the threat of our PMG being bypassed from the flanks. In response to this threat, ours created their own small groups, each of which included a Katyusha division, a company of motorized rifles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries. One of these groups, Captain Puzik’s group, created on the basis of the 269th division of the 49th GMP, using the Moskvin method, destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 vehicles in two days of fighting near Peschanokopskaya and Belaya Glina.

The advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry was stopped. The regiments of the 176th Infantry Division took up defense along the ridge of the hills at the Belaya Glina, Razvilnoe line. The front has temporarily stabilized.

A method of observation invented Captain-Lieutenant Moskvin. Not a single frontal attack by enemy tanks, much less motorized infantry against volley fire Guards mortar units did not reach the target. Only flank detours and attacks forced the mobile group to retreat to other lines. That's why German tanks and the motorized infantry began to accumulate in the folds of the terrain, provoked a salvo of BM-13s with a false attack, and while they were reloading, which took five to six minutes, they made a rush. If the division did not respond to a false attack or fired with one installation, the Germans did not leave the shelters, waiting for the Katyushas to use up their ammunition. In response to this, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin used his own method of adjusting the fire. Having climbed to the top of the guide trusses, Moskvin monitored the area from this height.

The adjustment method proposed by Moskov was recommended to other units, and soon the schedule German offensive to the Caucasus was disrupted. A few more days of fighting - and the word “tank” could be removed from the name of the 1st Tank Army. The losses of the mortar guards were minimal.

At first, the guards fired at tanks from the slopes of the hills facing the enemy, but when our troops retreated to the Salsky steppes during the Battle of the Caucasus, the hills ended, and on the plain the Katyusha could not fire direct fire, and dig a corresponding hole under fire approaching enemy tanks was not always possible.

A way out of this situation was found on August 3 in a battle fought by the battery of Senior Lieutenant Koifman from the 271st Division of Captain Kashkin. She took firing positions south of the farm. Soon observers noticed that enemy tanks and motorized infantry approached the village of Nikolaevskaya. The combat vehicles were aimed at a target that was clearly visible and within reach. A few minutes later, groups of tanks began to emerge from the village and descend into the ravine. Obviously, the Germans decided to covertly approach the battery and attack it. This roundabout maneuver was first noticed by the guard, Private Levin. The battery commander ordered the flank installation to be deployed towards the tanks. However, the tanks had already entered the dead zone, and even at the lowest angle of inclination of the RS-132 guide trusses they would have flown over them. And then, to reduce the aiming angle, Lieutenant Alexey Bartenyev ordered driver Fomin to drive his front wheels into the trench trench.

When there were about two hundred meters left to the nearest tank, guardsmen Arzhanov, Kuznetsov, Suprunov and Khilich opened direct fire. Sixteen shells exploded. The tanks were filled with smoke. Two of them stopped, the rest quickly turned around and retreated into the gully at high speed. There were no new attacks. 19-year-old Lieutenant Bartenyev, who invented this method of firing, died in the same battle, but since then the mortar guards began to use infantry trenches to give the guides a position parallel to the ground.

In early August, the movement of Army Group A slowed down, posing a threat to the right flank of Army Group B, which was marching on Stalingrad. Therefore, in Berlin the 40th was redirected to the Caucasus tank corps Group B, which should have broken into Stalingrad from the south. He turned to Kuban, made a raid on the Rural steppes (bypassing the PMG coverage area) and found himself on the outskirts of Armavir and Stavropol.

Because of this, the commander of the North Caucasus Front, Budyonny, was forced to divide the PMG in two: one part of it was thrown into the Armaviro-Stavropol direction, the other covered Krasnodar and Maykop. For the battles near Maikop (but not for victories in the steppes), Moskvin was awarded the Order of Lenin. A year later he would be mortally wounded near the village of Krymskaya. Now this is the same Krymsk that suffered from the recent flood.

After the death of Moskvin, under the impression of his experience in fighting enemy tanks with the help of Katyushas, cumulative shells RSB-8 and RSB-13 were created. Such shells took the armor of any of the tanks of that time. However, they rarely found their way into Katyusha regiments - they were originally used to supply the Il-2 attack aircraft with rocket launchers.

THE LEGENDARY KATYUSHA IS 75 YEARS OLD!

June 30, 2016 will mark 75 years since the day when, by decision of the State Defense Committee, a design bureau for the production of the legendary Katyushas was created at the Moscow Kompressor plant. This rocket launcher terrified the enemy with its powerful salvoes and decided the outcome of many battles of the Great Patriotic War, including the battle for Moscow in October - December 1941. At that time combat vehicles BM-13 went to defensive lines directly from the Moscow factory workshops.

Multiple launch rocket systems fought on different fronts, from Stalingrad to Berlin. At the same time, “Katyusha” is a weapon with a distinctly Moscow “pedigree”, rooted in pre-revolutionary times. Back in 1915, a graduate of the Faculty of Chemistry of Moscow University, engineer and inventor Nikolai Tikhomirov patented a “self-propelled rocket mine,” i.e. rocket-projectile, usable in water and in the air. The conclusion on the security certificate was signed by the famous N.E. Zhukovsky, at that time chairman of the invention department of the Moscow Military-Industrial Committee.

While the examinations were going on, something happened October Revolution. The new government, however, recognized Tikhomirov’s missile as having great defensive significance. To develop self-propelled mines, a Gas Dynamics Laboratory was created in Moscow in 1921, which Tikhomirov headed: for the first six years it worked in the capital, then moved to Leningrad and was located, by the way, in one of the ravelins of the Peter and Paul Fortress.

Nikolai Tikhomirov died in 1931 and was buried in Moscow at the Vagankovskoye cemetery. An interesting fact: in his other, “civilian” life, Nikolai Ivanovich designed equipment for sugar refineries, distilleries and oil mills.

The next stage of work on the future Katyusha also took place in the capital. On September 21, 1933, the Jet Research Institute was created in Moscow. Friedrich Zander was at the origins of the institute, and S.P. was the deputy director. Korolev. RNII maintained close contact with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. As we can see, the fathers of the Guards mortar were almost all the pioneers of domestic rocket technology of the 20th century.

One of the prominent names on this list is Vladimir Barmin. At the time when his work on new jet weapons began, the future academician and professor was a little over 30 years old. Shortly before the war he was appointed chief designer.

Who could have foreseen in 1940 that this young refrigeration engineer would become one of the creators of the world-famous weapons of World War II?

Vladimir Barmin retrained as a rocket scientist on June 30, 1941. On this day, a special design bureau was created at the plant, which became the main “think tank” for the production of Katyushas. Let us remember: work on the rocket launcher continued throughout the pre-war years and was completed literally on the eve of Hitler’s invasion. The People's Commissariat of Defense was looking forward to this miracle weapon, but not everything went smoothly.

In 1939, the first samples of aircraft rockets were successfully used during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, successful field tests of BM-13 installations were carried out (with high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-13 caliber 132 mm), and already on June 21, literally a few hours before the war, a decree on their mass production was signed. Already on the eighth day of the war, production of Katyushas for the front began at Kompressor.

On July 14, 1941, the first Separate Experimental Field Battery was formed rocket artillery The Red Army, led by Captain Ivan Flerov, armed with seven combat installations. On July 14, 1941, the battery fired a salvo at the railway junction of the city of Orsha, captured by fascist troops. Soon she successfully fought in the battles of Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk.

At the beginning of October 1941, while moving to the front line from the rear, Flerov's battery was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr (Smolensk region). Having shot all the ammunition and blown up the combat vehicles, most of the fighters and their commander Ivan Flerov died.

219 Katyusha divisions took part in the battles for Berlin. Since the fall of 1941, these units were given the title of Guards upon formation. Since the Battle of Moscow, not a single major offensive operation of the Red Army could have been carried out without fire support from Katyusha rockets. The first batches of them were completely manufactured at the capital's enterprises in those days when the enemy stood at the city walls. According to production veterans and historians, this was a real labor feat.

When the war began, it was the Kompressor specialists who were tasked with launching the production of Katyushas as soon as possible. Previously it was planned that these combat vehicles would be produced by the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern, however, the difficult situation at the fronts forced adjustments to this plan.

At the front, “Katyusha” represented a significant fighting force and was capable of single-handedly determining the outcome of an entire battle. 16 regular heavy guns during the Great Patriotic War they could fire 16 high-power shells in 2–3 minutes. In addition, moving such a number of conventional guns from one firing position to another requires a lot of time. “Katyusha” mounted on a truck requires just a few minutes. So the uniqueness of the installations was in their high firepower and mobility. The noise effect also played a certain psychological role: it was not for nothing that the Germans, because of the strong roar that accompanied the Katyusha salvos, nicknamed it the “Stalinist organ.”

The work was complicated by the fact that in the fall of 1941 many Moscow enterprises were being evacuated. Some of the workshops and the Compressor itself were relocated to the Urals. But all the Katyusha production facilities remained in the capital. There were not enough qualified workers (they went to the front and the militia), equipment, and materials.

Many Moscow enterprises in those days worked in close cooperation with Kompressor, producing everything necessary for Katyushas. Machine-building plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich made rocket shells. Car repair plant named after. Voitovicha and the Krasnaya Presnya plant manufactured parts for the launchers. Precise mechanisms were supplied by the 1st watch factory.

All of Moscow united in difficult times to create unique weapons, capable of bringing Victory closer. And the role of “Katyusha” in the defense of the capital has not been forgotten by the descendants of the victors: monuments to the legendary guards mortar have been erected near several museums in Moscow and on the territory of the Kompressor plant. And many of its creators were awarded high state awards during the war.

The history of the creation of "Katyusha"

In the list of contractual work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final payment for which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618с dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered a proven fact that the idea of creating a mechanized multiple-charging installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the idea of using cars to fire missiles in general was also found in the book “Rockets, their design and use,” authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the conclusion of this book, in particular, the following is written: “The main area of application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, such as airplanes, small ships, vehicles of all kinds, and finally escort artillery.”

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, commissioned by the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical shells. It was necessary to make non-rapid-firing machines (such as a pipe). According to the agreement with the Artillery Department, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a stand and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was manufactured, which was then recognized as not meeting the requirements. In parallel, research institute No. 3 developed a mechanized rocket salvo installation, mounted on a modified ZIS-5 truck chassis with 24 rounds of ammunition. According to other data from the archives of the State Scientific Center FSUE “Keldysh Center” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations on vehicles were manufactured. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artillery Ground and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." Based on factory tests, it could be stated: the flight range of the RHS (depending on the specific gravity of the explosive agent) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000 m, Vd = (1/100)X and Vb = (1/70)X, useful volume of the explosive agent in the projectile - 6.5 liters, metal consumption per 1 liter of agent - 3.4 kg/l, radius of dispersion of the agent when a projectile explodes on the ground is 15-20 liters, maximum time required to fire the entire vehicle's ammunition load of 24 rounds is 3-4 sec.

The mechanized rocket launcher was intended to provide a chemical attack with chemical rocket projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire across areas with both single shots and a salvo of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4–6 vehicles, represent a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of toxic substance passed successful field and state tests; its adoption was planned in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of chemical missile projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, illuminating and other missile projectiles. Option I without a guidance device - the number of shells in one salvo is 24, the total weight of the toxic substance released in one salvo is 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred and twenty 152 mm howitzers, the vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery Regiments. II-version with control device. Data not provided.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, tests were carried out on unguided 132 mm caliber rockets and an automatic launcher. However, the installation was submitted to the tests unfinished and did not pass them: a large number of failures were discovered when the missiles were discharged due to the imperfections of the corresponding installation components; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time-consuming; the rotating and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sighting devices did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See the gallery Tests of an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Test time: from 12/8/38 to 02/4/39).

The letter about the bonus for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for chemical attack (out. Scientific Research Institute No. 3, number 733c dated May 25, 1939 from the director of Scientific Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Ammunition, Comrade I.P. Sergeev) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gwai I.I. – leading designer; Popov A. A. – design technician; Isachenkov – installation mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. – prof. advised the subject; Luzhin V. – engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 rounds.

In a letter dated 14.II.1939 to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Council of the S.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer 1st rank Kostikov, says: “For ground forces, use the experience of a chemical mechanized installation for:

the use of high-explosive fragmentation missiles to create massive fire in areas;
the use of incendiary, lighting and propaganda projectiles;
development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the firing range compared to existing chemicals.”

In 1939, Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. The installation of sample II differed from the installation of sample I in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 missile shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to fire a salvo of 16 missiles is 3.5 – 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes with a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the design load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Test Site (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see photos taken at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the first model cannot be allowed for military testing due to technical imperfections. The installation of model II, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the conclusion of the commission members, could be allowed for military testing after making significant constructive changes. Tests have shown that when firing, the installation of sample II sways and the elevation angle reaches 15″30′, which increases the dispersion of projectiles; when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it should be noted characteristic directions, on which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is further development of the II sample installation in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the II sample installation. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“upgraded installation for RS” in the terminology of documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, provided for: constructive improvements to the lifting and rotating device, increasing the horizontal guidance angle, and simplifying the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even to 7000 mm. The delivery date for the drawings was set for October 1941. Nevertheless, to conduct various types of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for RS were manufactured. Total number V different sources different values are indicated: in some – six, in others – seven. The data from the archive of Research Institute No. 3 as of January 10, 1941 contains data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See letter UANA GAU No. 668059) Based on the available documents - the source states that there were eight installations, but at different times. On February 28, 1941 there were six.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the Red Army AU - of six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of experimental orders in production for the month of November 1940 by Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB indicates that with the delivery batch of six installations to the customer by November 1940, the quality control department accepted 5 units, and the military representative accepted 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with developing a powerful rocket and rocket launcher in a short period of time to carry out the tasks of destroying the enemy’s long-term defensive structures on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute's team was a finned missile with a flight range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosives and an installation with four guides on a T-34 tank or on a sled towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and missiles were sent to the combat area, but a decision was soon made to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad Scientific Testing Artillery Range. The war with Finland soon ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further work on the installation and projectile was stopped.

In 1940, the department of 2n Research Institute No. 3 was asked to carry out work on the following objects:

Object 213 – Electrified installation on a ZIS for firing lighting and signal signals. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 Polevoy combat vehicle jet system M-21).
Object 214 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (remodeling and adaptation of object 204)
Object 215 – Electrified installation on a ZIS-6 with a transportable reserve of R.S. and with a large range of aiming angles.
Object 216 – Charging box for PC on trailer
Object 217 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
Object 218 – Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
Object 219 – Anti-aircraft stationary installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
Object 220 – Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with a generator electric current, aiming and firing control panel
Object 221 – Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible range shooting of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
Object 222 – Mechanized unit for tank escort
Object 223 – Introduction of mass production of mechanized installations into industry.

In the letter to the acting Director of Research Institute No. 3 Kostikov A.G. about the possibility of submitting to K.V.Sh. with the USSR Council of People's Commissars for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate GB PR No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 dated February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilievich.
tactical and technical justification for the scheme and design of the automatic installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
testing of high-explosive fragmentation chemical rocket projectiles of 132 mm caliber. – Schwartz Leonid Emilievich, Artemyev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich.

The basis for nominating Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of Research Institute No. 3 NKB dated December 26, 1940.

№1923

scheme 1, scheme 2

galleries

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements No. 1923 were approved for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the CPSU (6) and the Soviet government and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War a decision was made to urgently launch the production of M-13 missiles and M-13 installations (see diagram 1, diagram 2). The production of M-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow Kompressor plant. One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from mass production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation in the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly , other). It was necessary to organize a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war, see our gallery website (follow the links below).

According to various sources, the formation of Guards mortar units began at the end of July - beginning of August (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had information about the new Soviet weapons (see:).

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Armament Directorate of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the STZ-5 NATI tractor chassis modified for installation. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant “Compressor”. SKB carried out the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, SKB, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, for the defense of the city of Moscow, a 16-round installation on an armored railway platform. The installation was a missile launcher of the serial M-13 installation on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis with a modified base. (for more information about other works of this period and the war period in general, see: and).

At a technical meeting at SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The goal of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes previously made to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and, when assembled, installed and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without extensive processing technical documentation, as was the case previously. The goal was achieved by dividing the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

When testing components and parts for the normalized combat installation BM-13N, the following were obtained:

increase in the firing sector by 20%
reduction of forces on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;
doubling the vertical aiming speed;
increasing the survivability of the combat installation by armoring the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas lines;
increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;
increasing the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;
significant reduction in the volume of welding work, machining, elimination of bending of truss rods;
reducing the weight of the unit by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cabin and the gas tank;
reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation due to the assembly of the artillery part separately from the vehicle chassis and installation of the installation on the vehicle chassis using fastening clamps, which made it possible to eliminate the drilling of holes in the side members;
reduction by several times of the idle time of the chassis of vehicles arriving at the plant for installation of the unit;
reduction in the number of standard sizes of fasteners from 206 to 96, as well as the number of part names: in the rotary frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to use a high-performance in-line method for assembling and installing the installation.

The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6x6 wheel arrangement, which was supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N mount was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified chassis of foreign-made trucks were also used.

At the end of 1942 V.V. Aborenkov proposed adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial installation M-13, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on an edge, each of them had a groove cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work to create installations with a normalized propellant installation for the M-13 installation on modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was manufactured on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the availability of sufficient quantities of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, SKB specialists developed the M-13 installation on an armored chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, modified for installation of a missile launcher, for launching M-13 projectiles. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” type guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made of shortened pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, and served mainly as a support for fastening the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cockpit using handwheels and the cardan shaft of the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, SKB specialists and rocket projectile developers were faced with the question of improving the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber projectiles. To impart rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the projectile design along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the standard M-31 projectile, and was proposed for the M-8 projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the flight range indicator. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, designated M-13UK, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

During the same period, NII-1 specialists (Lead Designer V.G. Bessonov) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy, but it could not be fired from the standard M-13 mounts, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from the usual standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the linings from them. To a lesser extent, this also occurred when launching M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began exploratory design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of fire of M-13 and M-8 missiles by developing guides. It was based on new principle launching rockets and ensuring their sufficient strength for firing M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since imparting rotation to finned unguided rocket projectiles at the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born of imparting rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide took the form of a barrel formed by four spiral rods, three of which were smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, was made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped cross-section profile. The rods were welded to the legs of the ring clips. In the breech there was a lock for holding the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. Special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting and welding of guide barrels along their length. Initially, the installation had 12 guides, rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of the 12-round M-13-CH installation were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the vehicle chassis was overloaded, and a decision was made to remove two guides from the upper cassettes. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of guides, a truss, a rotating frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. Except for the cassettes with guides and the truss, all other components were unified with the corresponding components of the M-13N normalized combat installation. Using the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD projectiles of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better indicators were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK projectiles from M-13 installations that had “beam” type guides. There was no longer a need to manufacture M-13UK projectiles, which were complicated by drilling in the engine casing. Installation of the M-13-SN was simpler, less labor-intensive and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine tools have been eliminated: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to the guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and cutting threads of spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. Prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow Kompressor plant (No. 733) and were subjected to field and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation passed military tests in 1945 with good results. Due to the fact that the M-13 type projectiles had to be modernized, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of NCOM order No. 27 of October 24, 1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 it was produced Quick Guide on the BM-13-SN combat vehicle

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions in the development of rocket artillery was the use of missile launchers developed during the war for installation on modified types of domestically produced chassis. Several variants were created based on the installation of the M-13N on modified chassis of the ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) trucks. .

After the war, M-13 type installations were exported to different countries. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion National Day 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing).

In 1959, while working on a projectile for the future M-21 Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in the letter to the deputy director for scientific affairs of NII-147 (now FSUE SNPP Splav (Tula), signed by the chief engineer of plant No. 63 SSNH Toporov (State plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959с): “In response to your request No. 3265 dated 3/UII-59 for the sending of technical documentation on the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, and the classification of secrecy has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopying machine, the album of technical processes will be blueprinted and sent to you no earlier than in a month.”

Compound:

Main cast:

M-13 installations (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
The main missiles are M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.

Machines for transporting ammunition (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the rocket part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The projectile's jet powder engine consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal powder charge two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering bulges with guide pins screwed into them. Guide pins held the projectile on the combat vehicle's guide before firing and directed its movement along the guide. The chamber contained a powder charge of nitroglycerin powder, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel bombs. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on a grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of black gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. The gunpowder was placed in a special case. The M-13 projectile was stabilized in flight using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escapes, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. In addition, the M-13-UK projectile has a nozzle critical section diameter that is slightly smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Performance characteristics:

Characteristic	M-13	BM-13N	BM-13NM	BM-13NMM
Chassis	ZIS-6	ZIS-151,ZIL-151	ZIL-157	ZIL-131
Number of guides	8	8	8	8
Elevation angle, degrees: - minimal — maximum	+7 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45
Horizontal firing angle, degrees: - to the right of the chassis - to the left of the chassis	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10
Handle force, kg: - lifting mechanism - rotary mechanism	8-10 8-10	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8
Dimensions in stowed position, mm: - length - width - height	6700 2300 2800	7200 2300 2900	7200 2330 3000	7200 2500 3200
Weight, kg: - package of guides - artillery unit - installations in combat position — installations in stowed position (without calculations)	815 2200 6200 —	815 2350 7890 7210	815 2350 7770 7090	815 2350 9030 8350
	2-3
	5-10
Full salvo time, s	7-10

Basic tactical and technical data of the BM-13 combat vehicle (on Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides	16
Projectile used	M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 shells
Guide length, m	5
Guide type	straight
Minimum elevation angle, °	+7
Maximum elevation angle, °	+45
Horizontal guidance angle, °	20
	8
Also, on a rotating mechanism, kg	10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length	6780
height	2880
width	2270
Guide set weight, kg	790
Weight of artillery unit without shells and without chassis, kg	2250
The weight of a combat vehicle without shells, without crews, with a full tank of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg	5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK	680 (16 rounds)
M20	480 (8 shells)
Weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people. (2 in the cabin, 2 on the rear wings and 1 on the gas tank) with full refueling, tools, snow chains, spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg	6770
Axle loads from the weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people, fully loaded with spare parts and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front	1890
to the back	4880

Basic data of BM-13 combat vehicles
Characteristic	BM-13N on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13N on a modified Studebaker truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified Studebaker truck chassis
Number of guides*	16	16	16	16
Guide length, m	5	5	5	5
Maximum elevation angle, degrees	45	45	45	45
Minimum elevation angle, degrees	8±1°	4±30 ‘	7	7
Horizontal aiming angle, degrees	±10	±10	±10	±10
Force on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg	up to 12	up to 13	to 10	8-10
Force on the rotating mechanism handle, kg	up to 8	up to 8	8-10	8-10
Guide package weight, kg	815	815	815	815
Artillery unit weight, kg	2350	2350	2200	2200
Weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg	7210	7210	5520	5520
Weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg	7890	7890	6200	6200
Length in stowed position, m	7,2	7,2	6,7	6,7
Width in stowed position, m	2,3	2,3	2,3	2,3
Height in stowed position, m	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,8
Time to transfer from traveling to combat position, min	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Time required to fire a salvo, sec	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10
Combat vehicle index	52-U-9416	8U34	52-U-9411	52-TR-492B

NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index	TS-13
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type	GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm	132
Total projectile length, mm	1465
Stabilizer blade span, mm	300
Weight, kg: - finally equipped projectile - equipped warhead — explosive charge of the warhead - powder rocket charge - equipped jet engine	42.36 21.3 4.9 7.05-7.13 20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3	18.48
Head filling coefficient, %	23
Current required to ignite the squib, A	2.5-3
	0.7
Average reactive force, kgf	2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s	70
	125
Maximum speed projectile flight, m/s	355
Tabular maximum projectile range, m	8195
Deviation at maximum range, m: - by range - lateral	135 300
Powder charge burning time, s	0.7
Average reaction force, kg	2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s	70
Length of the active trajectory section, m	125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Highest projectile flight speed, m/s	335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile range, m	8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section of Egypt, in the mid-90s of the 20th century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type Arab Organization for Industrialization was engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. Analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we're talking about about the M-13UK type projectile.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia with the majority of production facilities located in Egypt and with major funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three Gulf states phased them out. financial resources, intended for the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and at that time (data from the Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog 1982-1983) Egypt received other assistance in projects.

Characteristics of the Sakr 132 mm caliber missile (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm	132
Length, mm
full shell	1500
head part	483
rocket engine	1000
Weight, kg:
starting	42
head part	21
fuse	0,5
rocket engine	21
fuel (charge)	7
Maximum tail span, mm	305
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type	inertial cocked, contact
Fuel type (charge)	dibasic
Maximum range (at an elevation angle of 45º), m	8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s	0,5
Projectile speed when meeting an obstacle, m/s	235-320
Minimum fuse arming speed, m/s	300
Distance from the combat vehicle for arming the fuse, m	100-200
Number of aligned holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs.	12

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941 year, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German trains with troops and military equipment located on it.

The exceptional efficiency of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 three-battery divisions with four launchers per battery operated at the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1,414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The regiment's salvo amounted to 576 132mm shells. At the same time, enemy manpower and military equipment were destroyed over an area of over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of the Reserve Artillery of the Supreme High Command. Unofficially, the rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeniy Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), who was a child during the war, in Tula at first they were called infernal machines. Let us note on our own that multi-charge machines were also called infernal machines in the 19th century.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory.8. Inv.227. LL.55,58,61.

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TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 119120ss. D. 27. L. 99, 101.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 119120ss. D. 28. L. 118-119.

Missile launchers in the Great Patriotic War. About the work of the SKB at the Moscow Kompressor plant during the war. // A.N. Vasiliev, V.P. Mikhailov. – M.: Nauka, 1991. – P. 11–12.

"Modelist-Constructor" 1985, No. 4

M-13 combat vehicle. Quick service guide. M.: Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. Military publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 1945. - P. 9.

Brief history of SKB-GSKB Spetsmash-KBOM. Book 1. Creation of tactical missile weapons 1941-1956, edited by V.P. Barmin - M.: Design Bureau of General Mechanical Engineering. — P. 26, 38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 51, 53.

Combat vehicle BM-13N. Service manual. Ed. 2nd. Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense. M. 1966. - P. 3,76,118-119.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. A-93895. D. 1. L. 10.

Shirokorad A.B. Domestic mortars and rocket artillery.// Under the general editorship of A.E. Taras. – Mn.: Harvest, M.: LLC “AST Publishing House”, 2000. – P.299-303.

http://velikvoy.narod.ru/vooruzhenie/vooruzhcccp/artilleriya/reaktiv/bm-13-sn.htm

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Langemak G.E., Glushko V.P. Rockets, their design and use. ONTI NKTP USSR. Main editorial office of aviation literature. Moscow-Leningrad, 1935. - Conclusion.

Ivashkevich E.P., Mudragelya A.S. Development of jet weapons and missile forces. Tutorial. Edited by Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor S.M. Barmas. - M.: Ministry of Defense of the USSR. — P. 41.

Combat vehicle BM-13N. Service manual. M.: Military Publishing House. - 1957. - Appendix 1.2.

Combat vehicles BM-13N, BM-13NM, BM-13NMM. Service manual. Third edition, revised. M.: Military Publishing House, - 1974. - Appendix 2.

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Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-96. - R. 723.

"Katyusha"- the popular name for rocket artillery combat vehicles BM-8 (with 82 mm shells), BM-13 (132 mm) and BM-31 (310 mm) during the Great Patriotic War. There are several versions of the origin of this name, the most likely of which is associated with the factory mark “K” of the manufacturer of the first BM-13 combat vehicles (Voronezh Comintern Plant), as well as with the popular song of the same name at that time (music by Matvey Blanter, lyrics by Mikhail Isakovsky).
(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes - 2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)

The fate of the first separate experimental battery was cut short at the beginning of October 1941. After a baptism of fire near Orsha, the battery successfully operated in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk. Over the course of three months of hostilities, Flerov’s battery not only inflicted considerable material damage on the Germans, it also contributed to raising the morale of our soldiers and officers, exhausted by continuous retreats.

The Nazis staged a real hunt for new weapons. But the battery did not stay long in one place - having fired a salvo, it immediately changed position. The tactical technique - salvo - change of position - was widely used by Katyusha units during the war.

At the beginning of October 1941, as part of a group of troops on the Western Front, the battery found itself in the rear of the Nazi troops. While moving to the front line from the rear on the night of October 7, she was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr, Smolensk region. Most of the battery personnel and Ivan Flerov were killed, having shot all the ammunition and blown up the combat vehicles. Only 46 soldiers managed to escape from the encirclement. The legendary battalion commander and the rest of the soldiers, who had fulfilled their duty to the end with honor, were considered “missing in action.” And only when it was possible to discover documents from one of the Wehrmacht army headquarters, which reported what actually happened on the night of October 6-7, 1941 near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr, Captain Flerov was excluded from the lists of missing persons.

For heroism, Ivan Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, in 1963, and in 1995 he was awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation posthumously.

In honor of the battery’s feat, a monument was built in the city of Orsha and an obelisk near the city of Rudnya.

Materials provided by: S.V. Gurov (Tula)

The list of contractual work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Tank Directorate (ABTU), the final payment for which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618с dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered a proven fact that the idea of creating a mechanized multiple-charging installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the idea of using cars to fire missiles in general was also found in the book “Rockets, their design and use,” authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the conclusion of this book, in particular, the following is written: " The main area of application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, such as airplanes, small ships, vehicles of all kinds, and finally escort artillery".

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, commissioned by the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical shells. It was necessary to make non-rapid-firing machines (such as a pipe). According to the agreement with the Artillery Department, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a stand and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was manufactured, which was then recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized multiple rocket launcher mounted on a modified ZIS-5 truck chassis with 24 rounds of ammunition. According to other data from the archives of the State Scientific Center FSUE “Keldysh Center” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations on vehicles were manufactured. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artillery Ground and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." Based on factory tests, it could be stated: the flight range of the RHS (depending on the specific gravity of the explosive agent) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000 m, Vd = (1/100)X and Vb = (1/70)X, useful volume of the explosive agent in a projectile - 6.5 liters, metal consumption per 1 liter of explosive agent - 3.4 kg/l, radius of dispersion of explosive agent when a projectile explodes on the ground is 15-20 liters, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle is 3-4 seconds.

The mechanized rocket launcher was intended to provide a chemical attack with chemical rocket projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire across areas with both single shots and a salvo of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4 - 6 vehicles, represent a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of toxic substance passed successful field and state tests; its adoption was planned in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of chemical missile projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, illuminating and other missile projectiles. Option I without a guidance device - the number of shells in one salvo is 24, the total weight of the toxic substance released in one salvo is 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred and twenty 152 mm caliber howitzers, the vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery Regiments. II-version with control device. Data not provided.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, tests were carried out on unguided 132 mm caliber rockets and an automatic launcher. However, the installation was submitted to the tests unfinished and did not pass them: a large number of failures were discovered when the missiles were discharged due to the imperfections of the corresponding installation components; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time-consuming; the rotating and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sighting devices did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See Tests of an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, NII-3 design, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Test time: from 12/8/38 to 02/04/39).

The letter about the bonus for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for chemical attack (out. Research Institute No. 3, number 733c dated May 25, 1939 from the director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Ammunition comrade Sergeev I.P.) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gwai I.I. - leading designer; Popov A. A. - design technician; Isachenkov - installation mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. - prof. advised the subject; Luzhin V. - engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 rounds.

the use of high-explosive fragmentation missiles to create massive fire in areas;
the use of incendiary, lighting and propaganda projectiles;
development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the firing range compared to existing chemicals."

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 missile shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to fire a salvo of 16 missiles is 3.5 - 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes with a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the design load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Test Site (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see those made at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the first model cannot be allowed for military testing due to technical imperfections. The installation of model II, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the conclusion of the commission members, could be allowed for military testing after making significant design changes. Tests have shown that when firing, the installation of sample II sways and the elevation angle reaches 15"30", which increases the dispersion of projectiles; when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is further development of the II sample installation in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the II sample installation. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“upgraded installation for RS” in the terminology of documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, provided for: constructive improvements to the lifting and rotating device, increasing the horizontal guidance angle, and simplifying the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even to 7000 mm. The delivery date for the drawings was set for October 1941. Nevertheless, to conduct various types of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for RS were manufactured. The total number is indicated differently in different sources: in some - six, in others - seven. The data from the archive of Research Institute No. 3 as of January 10, 1941 contains data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See letter from UANA GAU No. 668059) Based on available documents, the source states that there were eight installations, but at different times. On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with developing a powerful rocket and rocket launcher in a short period of time to carry out the tasks of destroying long-term enemy defenses on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute's team was a finned missile with a flight range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosives and an installation with four guides on a T-34 tank or on a sled towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and missiles were sent to the combat area, but a decision was soon made to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad Scientific Testing Artillery Range. The war with Finland soon ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further work on the installation and projectile was stopped.

In 1940, the department of 2n Research Institute No. 3 was asked to carry out work on the following objects:

Object 213 - Electrified installation on a ZIS for firing lighting and signaling devices. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 Field Rocket System).
Object 214 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (remodeling and adaptation of object 204)
Object 215 - Electrified installation on a ZIS-6 with a transportable reserve of R.S. and with a large range of aiming angles.
Object 216 - Charging box for PC on trailer
Object 217 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
Object 218 - Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
Object 219 - Anti-aircraft stationary installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
Object 220 - Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with an electric current generator, aiming and firing control panel
Object 221 - Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible range shooting of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
Object 222 - Mechanized unit for tank escort
Object 223 - Introduction of mass production of mechanized installations into industry.

In the letter to the acting Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer 1st rank Kostikov A.G. about the possibility of submitting to K.V.Sh. with the USSR Council of People's Commissars for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate GBPRI No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 dated February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilevich.
tactical and technical justification for the scheme and design of the automatic installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
testing of high-explosive fragmentation chemical rocket projectiles of 132 mm caliber. - Schwartz Leonid Emilievich, Artemyev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich

The basis for nominating Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of Research Institute No. 3 NKB dated December 26, 1940. ,.

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets were approved.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to urgently launch the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see. Scheme 1, Scheme 2). The production of M-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

The date of adoption of the M-13 installation and shells into service has not been documented. The author of this material has established only data on the draft Resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of February 1940 (See electronic versions of documents: , , ). In M. Pervov’s book “Stories about Russian Missiles” Book One. on page 257 it is stated that “On August 30, 1941, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, the BM-13 was adopted by the Red Army.” I, Gurov S.V., got acquainted with the electronic versions of the GKO Resolutions for August 30, 1941 in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI, Moscow) and did not find in any of them any mention of data on the adoption of the M-13 installation for service.

At a technical meeting at SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The goal of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes previously made to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and, when assembled, installed and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without extensive processing of technical documentation, as was the case previously. The goal was achieved by dividing the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

When testing components and parts for the normalized combat installation BM-13N, the following were obtained:

increase in the firing sector by 20%

reduction of forces on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;

doubling the vertical aiming speed;

increasing the survivability of the combat installation by armoring the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas lines;

increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;

increasing the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;

significant reduction in the volume of welding work, machining, elimination of bending of truss rods;

reducing the weight of the unit by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cabin and the gas tank;

reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation due to the assembly of the artillery part separately from the vehicle chassis and installation of the installation on the vehicle chassis using fastening clamps, which made it possible to eliminate the drilling of holes in the side members;

reduction by several times of the idle time of the chassis of vehicles arriving at the plant for installation of the unit;

reduction in the number of standard sizes of fasteners from 206 to 96, as well as the number of parts: in the rotary frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to use a high-performance in-line method for assembling and installing the installation.

The throwing unit was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6x6 wheel arrangement, supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N mount was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified chassis of foreign-made trucks were also used.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, SKB specialists and rocket projectile developers were faced with the question of improving the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber projectiles. To impart rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the projectile design along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the standard projectile, and was proposed for the projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the flight range indicator. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, designated M-13UK, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

At the same time, SKB specialists began exploratory design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of firing rockets and by testing the guides. It was based on a new principle of launching rockets and ensuring they were strong enough to fire M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since imparting rotation to finned unguided rocket projectiles at the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born of imparting rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide took the form of a barrel formed by four spiral rods, three of which are smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, is made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped cross-section profile. The rods were welded to the legs of the ring clips. In the breech there was a lock for holding the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. Special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting and welding of guide barrels along their length. Initially, the installation had 12 guides, rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of a 12-charge unit were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the vehicle chassis was overloaded, and a decision was made to remove two guides from the upper cassettes. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of guides, a truss, a rotating frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. Except for the cassettes with guides and the truss, all other components were unified with the corresponding components of the M-13N normalized combat installation. Using the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD projectiles of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better indicators were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK projectiles from M-13 installations that had “beam” type guides. There was no longer a need to manufacture M-13UK projectiles, which were complicated by drilling in the engine casing. Installation of the M-13-SN was simpler, less labor-intensive and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine tools have been eliminated: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to the guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and cutting threads of spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. The prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow Kompressor plant (No. 733) and were subjected to field and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation passed military tests in 1945 with good results. Due to the fact that the M-13 type projectiles had to be modernized, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of NCOM order No. 27 of October 24, 1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN combat vehicle was published

M-13 type installations were exported to different countries after the war. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion of National Day 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing).

In 1959, when carrying out work on a projectile for the future Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of ROFS M-13. This is what was written in the letter to the deputy director for scientific affairs of NII-147 (now FSUE SNPP Splav (Tula), signed by the chief engineer of plant No. 63 SSNH Toporov (State plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959с): “In response to your request No. 3265 dated 3/UII-59 about sending technical documentation on the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, and the secrecy stamp has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopying machine, the album of technical processes will be blueprinted and sent to you no earlier than in a month."

Compound

Main cast:

M-13 installations (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
The main missiles are M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.
Machines for transporting ammunition (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the rocket part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The projectile's jet powder engine consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering bulges with guide pins screwed into them. Guide pins held the projectile on the combat vehicle's guide before firing and directed its movement along the guide. The chamber contained a powder charge of nitroglycerin powder, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel bombs. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on a grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of black gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. The gunpowder was placed in a special case. The M-13 projectile was stabilized in flight using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases comes out, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. In addition, the M-13-UK projectile has a nozzle critical section diameter that is slightly smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Performance characteristics

Characteristic	M-13	BM-13N	BM-13NM	BM-13NMM
Chassis	ZIS-6	ZIS-151,ZIL-151	ZIL-157	ZIL-131
Number of guides	8	8	8	8
Elevation angle, degrees: - minimal - maximum	+7 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45
Horizontal firing angle, degrees: - to the right of the chassis - to the left of the chassis	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10
Handle force, kg: - lifting mechanism - rotary mechanism	8-10 8-10	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8
Dimensions in stowed position, mm: - length - width - height	6700 2300 2800	7200 2300 2900	7200 2330 3000	7200 2500 3200
Weight, kg: - package of guides - artillery unit - installations in combat position - installations in stowed position (without calculations)	815 2200 6200 -	815 2350 7890 7210	815 2350 7770 7090	815 2350 9030 8350
	2-3
	5-10
Full salvo time, s	7-10

Basic tactical and technical data of the BM-13 combat vehicle (on Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides	16
Projectile used	M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 shells
Guide length, m	5
Guide type	straight
Minimum elevation angle, °	+7
Maximum elevation angle, °	+45
Horizontal guidance angle, °	20
	8
Also, on a rotating mechanism, kg	10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length	6780
height	2880
width	2270
Guide set weight, kg	790
Weight of artillery unit without shells and without chassis, kg	2250
The weight of a combat vehicle without shells, without crews, with a full tank of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg	5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK	680 (16 rounds)
M20	480 (8 shells)
Weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people. (2 in the cabin, 2 on the rear wings and 1 on the gas tank) with full refueling, tools, snow chains, spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg	6770
Axle loads from the weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people, fully loaded with spare parts and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front	1890
to the back	4880

Basic data of BM-13 combat vehicles
Characteristic	BM-13N on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13N on a modified Studebaker truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified Studebaker truck chassis
Number of guides*	16	16	16	16
Guide length, m	5	5	5	5
Maximum elevation angle, degrees	45	45	45	45
Minimum elevation angle, degrees	8±1°	4±30 "	7	7
Horizontal aiming angle, degrees	±10	±10	±10	±10
Force on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg	up to 12	up to 13	to 10	8-10
Force on the rotating mechanism handle, kg	up to 8	up to 8	8-10	8-10
Guide package weight, kg	815	815	815	815
Artillery unit weight, kg	2350	2350	2200	2200
Weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg	7210	7210	5520	5520
Weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg	7890	7890	6200	6200
Length in stowed position, m	7,2	7,2	6,7	6,7
Width in stowed position, m	2,3	2,3	2,3	2,3
Height in stowed position, m	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,8
Time to transfer from traveling to combat position, min	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Time required to fire a salvo, sec	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10
Combat vehicle index	52-U-9416	8U34	52-U-9411	52-TR-492B

NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index	TS-13
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type	GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm	132
Total projectile length, mm	1465
Stabilizer blade span, mm	300
Weight, kg: - finally equipped projectile - equipped warhead - explosive charge of the warhead - powder rocket charge - equipped jet engine	42.36 21.3 4.9 7.05-7.13 20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3	18.48
Head filling coefficient, %	23
Current required to ignite the squib, A	2.5-3
	0.7
Average reactive force, kgf	2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s	70
	125
Maximum projectile flight speed, m/s	355
Tabular maximum projectile range, m	8195
Deviation at maximum range, m: - by range - lateral	135 300
Powder charge burning time, s	0.7
Average reaction force, kg	2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s	70
Length of the active trajectory section, m	125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Highest projectile flight speed, m/s	335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile range, m	8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section of Egypt, in the mid-90s of the 20th century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (Arab Organization for Industrialisation) was engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. Analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we are talking about a projectile of the M-13UK type.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with the majority of production facilities located in Egypt and with major funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three members of the Gulf countries withdrew their funds intended for the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and at that time (data from the Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog 1982-1983) Egypt received another assistance in projects.

Characteristics of the Sakr 132 mm caliber missile (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm	132
Length, mm
full shell	1500
head part	483
rocket engine	1000
Weight, kg:
starting	42
head part	21
fuse	0,5
rocket engine	21
fuel (charge)	7
Maximum tail span, mm	305
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type	inertial cocked, contact
Fuel type (charge)	dibasic
Maximum range (at an elevation angle of 45º), m	8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s	0,5
Projectile speed when meeting an obstacle, m/s	235-320
Minimum fuse arming speed, m/s	300
Distance from the combat vehicle for arming the fuse, m	100-200
Number of aligned holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs.	12

Testing and operation

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"Modelist-Constructor" 1985, No. 4

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Published: January 11, 2016

Katyusha (BM-13): Our weapon of retaliation

Initially barrelless jets artillery systems in the Red Army they were not intended for ground battles. They literally descended from heaven to earth.

The 82 mm caliber rocket was adopted by the Red Army Air Force back in 1933. They were installed on fighters designed by Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153. In 1939, they underwent a baptism of fire during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, where they performed well when shooting at groups of enemy aircraft.

In the same year, employees of the Jet Research Institute began work on a mobile ground launcher that could fire rockets at ground targets. At the same time, the caliber of the rockets was increased to 132 mm.

In March 1941, field tests of the new weapon system were successfully carried out, and the decision to mass produce combat vehicles with RS-132 rockets, called BM-13, was made the day before the start of the war - June 21, 1941.

How was it structured?

The BM-13 combat vehicle was a chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle, on which a rotary truss with a package of guides and a guidance mechanism was installed. For aiming, a rotating and lifting mechanism and an artillery sight were provided. At the rear of the combat vehicle there were two jacks, which ensured its greater stability when firing.

The missiles were launched using a hand-held electric coil connected to a battery and contacts on the guides. When the handle was turned, the contacts closed in turn, and the starting squib was fired in the next projectile.

The explosive material in the warhead of the projectile was detonated from both sides (the length of the detonator was only slightly less than the length of the explosive cavity). And when two waves of detonation met, the gas pressure of the explosion at the meeting point increased sharply. As a result, the hull fragments had significantly greater acceleration, heated up to 600-800 ° C and had a good ignition effect. In addition to the body, part of the rocket chamber, which was heated from the gunpowder burning inside, also burst; this increased the fragmentation effect by 1.5-2 times compared to artillery shells of the same caliber. That is why the legend arose that Katyusha rockets were equipped with a “thermite charge”. The “thermite” charge was indeed tested in besieged Leningrad in 1942, but it turned out to be unnecessary - after the Katyusha salvo, everything around was burning. And the joint use of dozens of missiles at the same time also created interference of blast waves, which further enhanced the damaging effect.

Baptism of fire near Orsha

The first salvo of a battery of Soviet rocket launchers (as they began to call it for greater secrecy) the new kind military equipment) as part of seven combat installations BM-13 was produced in mid-July 1941. This happened near Orsha. An experienced battery under the command of Captain Flerov launched a fire strike at the Orsha railway station, where a concentration of enemy military equipment and manpower was noticed.

At 15:15 on July 14, 1941, heavy fire was opened on enemy trains. The entire station instantly turned into a huge cloud of fire. On the same day, in his diary, the head of the German General Staff General Halder wrote: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used weapons unknown until that time. A fiery barrage of shells burned the Orsha railway station and all the trains with personnel and military equipment of the arriving military units. The metal was melting, the earth was burning.”

The morale effect of the use of rocket mortars was stunning. The enemy lost more than an infantry battalion and a huge amount of military equipment and weapons at the Orsha station. And Captain Flerov’s battery dealt another blow on the same day - this time at the enemy crossing over the Orshitsa River.

The Wehrmacht command, having studied the information received from eyewitnesses of the use of new Russian weapons, was forced to issue special instructions to its troops, which stated: “There are reports from the front about the Russians using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds. Any appearance of these weapons must be reported on the same day to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command.". A real hunt began for Captain Flerov's battery. In October 1941, she found herself in the Spas-Demensky “cauldron” and was ambushed. Of the 160 people, only 46 managed to reach their own. The battery commander himself died, having first made sure that all the combat vehicles were blown up and would not fall into enemy hands intact.

On land and sea...

In addition to the BM-13, in the SKB of the Voronezh plant. The Comintern, which produced these combat installations, developed new options for placing missiles. For example, taking into account the extremely low cross-country ability of the ZIS-6 vehicle, an option was developed for installing guides for missiles on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tracked tractor. In addition, an 82 mm caliber rocket has also found use. Guides were developed and manufactured for it, which were later installed on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle (36 guides) and on the chassis of the T-40 and T-60 light tanks (24 guides).

A 16-charging installation for RS-132 shells and a 48-charging installation for RS-82 shells for armored trains were developed. In the fall of 1942, during the fighting in the Caucasus, 8-round mining pack launchers for RS-82 shells were manufactured for use in mountain conditions. Later they were installed on American Willys all-terrain vehicles, which came to the USSR under Lend-Lease.

Special launchers for 82 mm and 132 mm caliber rockets were manufactured for their subsequent installation on warships- torpedo boats and armored boats.

The launchers themselves received the popular nickname “Katyusha”, under which they entered the history of the Great Patriotic War. Why Katyusha? There are many versions on this matter. The most reliable - due to the fact that the first BM-13 had the letter “K” - as information that the product was produced at the plant named after. Comintern in Voronezh. By the way, the cruising boats of the Soviet Navy, which had the letter index “K,” received the same nickname. In total, 36 launcher designs were developed and produced during the war.

And the Wehrmacht soldiers nicknamed the BM-13 “Stalin's organs.” Apparently, the roar of the rockets reminded the Germans of the sounds of a church organ. This “music” clearly made them feel uncomfortable.

And from the spring of 1942, guides with missiles began to be installed on British and American all-wheel drive chassis imported into the USSR under Lend-Lease. Still, the ZIS-6 turned out to be a vehicle with low cross-country ability and carrying capacity. The three-axle all-wheel drive American truck Studebakker US6 turned out to be most suitable for installing rocket launchers. Combat vehicles began to be produced on its chassis. At the same time, they received the name BM-13N (“normalized”).

During the entire Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry produced more than ten thousand rocket artillery combat vehicles.

Relatives of the Katyusha

For all their advantages, high-explosive fragmentation rockets RS-82 and RS-132 had one drawback - high dispersion and low effectiveness when affecting enemy personnel located in field shelters and trenches. To correct this shortcoming, special 300 mm caliber rockets were manufactured.

They received the nickname “Andryusha” among the people. They were launched from a launching machine (“frame”) made of wood. The launch was carried out using a sapper blasting machine.

“Andryushas” were first used in Stalingrad. The new weapons were easy to manufacture, but installing them in position and aiming at the target required a lot of time. In addition, the short range of the M-30 rockets made them dangerous for their own crews.

Therefore, in 1943, the troops began to receive an improved missile, which, with the same power, had a greater firing range. The M-31 shell could hit manpower in an area of 2 thousand square meters or form a crater 2-2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter. But the time to prepare a salvo with new shells was significant - one and a half to two hours.

Such shells were used in 1944-1945 during the assault on enemy fortifications and during street battles. One hit from an M-31 missile was enough to destroy an enemy bunker or a firing point located in a residential building.

Fire sword of the "god of war"

By May 1945, rocket artillery units had about three thousand combat vehicles of the most different types and many “frames” with M-31 shells. Not a single Soviet offensive, since the Battle of Stalingrad, began without artillery preparation using Katyusha rockets. Salvos from combat installations became the “fiery sword” with which our infantry and tanks made their way through enemy fortified positions.

During the war, BM-13 installations were sometimes used for direct fire at enemy tanks and firing points. To do this, the combat vehicle drove its rear wheels onto some elevation so that its guides assumed a horizontal position. Of course, the accuracy of such shooting was quite low, but a direct hit from a 132-mm rocket would blow any enemy tank to pieces, and a nearby explosion would knock over military equipment enemy, and heavy hot fragments reliably disabled it.

After the war, Soviet designers of combat vehicles continued to work on Katyushas and Andryushas. Only now they began to be called not guards mortars, but multiple launch rocket systems. In the USSR, such powerful SZOs as “Grad”, “Hurricane” and “Smerch” were designed and built. At the same time, the losses of an enemy caught in a salvo from a battery of Hurricanes or Smerchs are comparable to losses from the use of tactical nuclear weapons with a yield of up to 20 kilotons, that is, with the explosion of an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

BM-13 combat vehicle on a three-axle vehicle chassis

Projectile caliber - 132 mm.

Projectile weight - 42.5 kg.

The mass of the warhead is 21.3 kg.

The maximum projectile flight speed is 355 m/s.

Number of guides - 16.

Maximum firing range - 8470 m.

Charging time of the installation is 3-5 minutes.

The duration of a full salvo is 7-10 seconds.

Guards mortar BM-13 Katyusha on a Studebaker chassis

1. Launcher
2. Missiles
3. The car on which the installation was mounted

Guide package
Cabin armor shields
Hiking support
Lifting frame
Launcher battery
Sight bracket
Swivel frame
Lifting handle

Launchers mounted on the chassis of ZIS-6, Ford Marmont, International Jiemsi, Austin cars and on STZ-5 tracked tractors Largest number"Katyusha" was mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker vehicles.

M-13 projectile

01. Fuse retaining ring
02. GVMZ fuze
03. Detonator checker
04. Bursting charge
05. Head part
06. Igniter
07. Bottom of the chamber
08. Guide pin
09. Powder rocket charge
10. Missile part
11. Grate
12. Critical section of the nozzle
13. Nozzle
14. Stabilizer

Few survived

About efficiency combat use"Katyusha" during an attack on an enemy fortified unit can serve as an example of the defeat of the Tolkachev defensive unit during our counteroffensive near Kursk in July 1943.

The village of Tolkachevo was turned by the Germans into a heavily fortified resistance center with a large number of dugouts and bunkers of 5-12 roll-ups, with a developed network of trenches and communication passages. The approaches to the village were heavily mined and covered with wire fences.

Salvos of rocket artillery destroyed a significant part of the bunkers, the trenches, along with the enemy infantry in them, were filled up, and the fire system was completely suppressed. Of the entire garrison of the junction, numbering 450-500 people, only 28 survived. The Tolkachev junction was taken by our units without any resistance.

Supreme High Command Reserve

By decision of the Headquarters, in January 1945, the formation of twenty guards mortar regiments began - this is how the units armed with the BM-13 began to be called.

The Guards Mortar Regiment (Gv.MP) of the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) consisted of a command and three divisions of three batteries. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, the salvo is only one division of 12 BM-13-16 PIP vehicles (Headquarters directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of rocket artillery in quantities of less than a division) could be compared in strength to a salvo of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 howitzers of 152 mm caliber per regiment) or 18 heavy howitzer brigades of the RVGK (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).

art of weapon making

From:

It is well known that on September 18, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 308, four rifle divisions The Western Front (100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st) for the battles near Yelnya - “for military exploits, for organization, discipline and exemplary order” - were awarded the honorary titles “Guards”. They were renamed 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards respectively. Subsequently, many units and formations of the Red Army that distinguished themselves and were hardened during the war were converted into guards units.

But Moscow researchers Alexander Osokin and Alexander Kornyakov discovered documents from which it follows that the issue of creating guards units was discussed in the circles of the USSR leadership back in August. And the first guards regiment was to be a heavy mortar regiment, armed with rocket artillery combat vehicles.

When did the guard appear?

While getting acquainted with documents about weapons at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we discovered a letter from the People's Commissar of General Engineering of the USSR P.I. Parshin No. 7529ss dated August 4, 1941 addressed to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin with a request to allow the production of 72 M-13 vehicles (later called “Katyushas” in our country) in excess of the plan with ammunition to form one heavy guards mortar regiment.
We decided that there was a typo, since it is known that the guards rank was first awarded by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 308 of September 18, 1941 to four rifle divisions.

The main points of the GKO resolution, unknown to historians, read:

"1. Agree with the proposal of the People's Commissar of General Engineering of the USSR Comrade Parshin on the formation of one guards mortar regiment armed with M-13 installations.
2. To assign the name of the People's Commissariat of General Engineering to the newly formed guards regiment.
3. Please note that NCOM is producing equipment for the regiment with systems and ammunition in excess of the established assignment for M-13 for August.”
From the text of the resolution it follows that it was not only agreed to produce M-13 above-plan installations, but also decided to form on their basis guards regiment.

The study of other documents confirmed our guess: on August 4, 1941, the concept of “guards” was used for the first time (and without any decision on this matter by the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Council or the Council of People's Commissars) in relation to one specific regiment with a new type of weapon - rocket launchers M-13, encrypted with the word “mortar” (inscribed personally by Stalin).

It is amazing that the word “guard” for the first time in the years of Soviet power (except for the Red Guard detachments of 1917) was introduced into circulation by People’s Commissar Parshin, a man who was not very close to Stalin and had never even visited his Kremlin office during the war.

Most likely, his letter, printed on August 2, was handed over to Stalin on the same day by military engineer 1st rank V.V. Aborenkov is the deputy head of the GAU for missile launchers, who was in the leader’s office together with the head of the GAU, Colonel General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev for 1 hour 15 minutes. The regiment created by the decision taken that day became the first regiment of mobile missile launchers M-13 (with RS-132) in the Red Army - before that, only batteries of these launchers were formed (from 3 to 9 vehicles).

It is noteworthy that on the same day, in a memorandum by the chief of artillery of the Red Army, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. Voronov about the work of 5 rocket artillery installations, Stalin wrote: “To Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky. Promote this thing with all its might. Increase the production of shells four, five, or six times.”

What gave the impetus to the decision to create the M-13 Guards Regiment? Let's express our hypothesis. In June-July 1941, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the system of strategic leadership of the armed forces was rebuilt. On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created under the chairmanship of Stalin, to which all power in the country was transferred for the duration of the war. On July 10, the State Defense Committee transformed the Headquarters of the Main Command into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. The Headquarters included I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov, marshals S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, Army General G.K. Zhukov.

On July 19, Stalin became People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, 1941, by decision of the Politburo No. P. 34/319 - “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all troops of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Navy" On the same day, August 8, the staff of “one guards mortar regiment” was approved.

We take the liberty of suggesting that initially there was talk, perhaps, of the formation of a unit intended to ensure the protection of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Indeed, the staff of the field Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army during the First World War, which was quite likely taken by Stalin and Shaposhnikov as a prototype, had heavy weapons, in particular, the aviation division of the Headquarters defense.

But in 1941, things did not come to the creation of such a field Headquarters - the Germans were approaching Moscow too quickly, and the management active army Stalin preferred to carry it out from Moscow. Therefore, the M-13 guards mortar regiment never received the task of guarding the Supreme Command Headquarters.

On July 19, 1941, Stalin, setting the task for Timoshenko to create strike groups for offensive operations in the Battle of Smolensk and the participation of rocket artillery in them, said: “I think the time has come to move from petty struggles to actions in large groups - regiments...”.

On August 8, 1941, the regiments of the M-8 and M-13 installations were approved. They were supposed to consist of three or four divisions, three batteries in each division and four installations in each battery (from September 11, all regiments were transferred to a three-divisional composition). The formation of the first eight regiments began immediately. They were equipped with combat vehicles manufactured using the pre-war reserve of components and parts created by the People's Commissariat of General Engineering (since November 26, 1941, transformed into the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons).

In full force - with regiments of Katyushas - the Red Army first struck the enemy at the end of August - beginning of September 1941.

As for the M-13 Guards Regiment, conceived for use in the defense of the Supreme Command Headquarters, its formation was completed only in September. Launchers for it were produced in excess of the established task. It is known as the 9th Guards Regiment, which operated near Mtsensk.
It was disbanded on December 12, 1941. There is information that all of its installations had to be blown up when there was a threat of encirclement by the Germans. The second formation of the regiment was completed on September 4, 1943, after which the 9th Guards Regiment fought successfully until the end of the war.

The feat of Captain Flerov

The first salvo of a rocket launcher in the Patriotic War was fired on July 14, 1941 at 15.15 by a battery of seven (according to other sources, four) M-13 launchers at an accumulation of trains of military equipment at the railway junction of the city of Orsha. The commander of this battery (called differently in different sources and reports: experimental, experimental, first, or even all these names at the same time) is indicated as artillery captain I.A. Flerov, who died in 1941 (according to TsAMO documents, missing in action). For courage and heroism, he was posthumously awarded only in 1963 with the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and in 1995 he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

According to the directive of the Moscow Military District of June 28, 1941, No. 10864, the first six batteries were formed. In the most reliable, in our opinion, source - the military memoirs of Lieutenant General A.I. Nesterenko (“Katyushas are firing.” - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975) wrote: “On June 28, 1941, the formation of the first battery of field rocket artillery began. It was created in four days at the 1st Moscow Red Banner Artillery School named after L.B. Krasina. This was the now world famous battery of captain I.A. Flerov, who fired the first salvo at the concentration of fascist troops at the Orsha station... Stalin personally approved the distribution of guards mortar units along the fronts, plans for the production of combat vehicles and ammunition...”

The names of the commanders of all six first batteries and the locations of their first salvos are known.

Battery No. 1: 7 M-13 units. Battery commander Captain I.A. Flerov. The first salvo was fired on July 14, 1941 at the freight railway station in the city of Orsha.
Battery No. 2: 9 M-13 units. Battery commander Lieutenant A.M. Kun. The first salvo on July 25, 1941 at the crossing near the village of Kapyrevshchina (north of Yartsevo).
Battery No. 3: 3 M-13 units. Battery commander Lieutenant N.I. Denisenko. The first salvo was fired on July 25, 1941, 4 km north of Yartsevo.
Battery No. 4: 6 M-13 units. Battery commander, senior lieutenant P. Degtyarev. The first salvo on August 3, 1941 near Leningrad.
Battery No. 5: 4 M-13 units. Battery commander, senior lieutenant A. Denisov. The place and date of the first salvo are unknown.
Battery No. 6: 4 M-13 units. Battery commander senior lieutenant N.F. Dyatchenko. The first salvo was fired on August 3, 1941 in the 12sp 53sd 43A band.

Five of the first six batteries were sent to the troops of the Western direction, where the main blow of the German troops was delivered to Smolensk. It is also known that in addition to the M-13, other types of rocket launchers were delivered to the Western direction.

In the book by A.I. Eremenko’s “At the Beginning of the War” says: “...A telephone message was received from Headquarters with the following content: “It is intended to widely use “eres” in the fight against the fascists and, in this regard, to test them in battle. You are allocated one M-8 division. Test it and report your conclusion...

We experienced something new near Rudnya... On July 15, 1941, in the afternoon, the unusual roar of rocket mines shook the air. The mines darted upward like red-tailed comets. Frequent and powerful explosions struck the ears and eyes with a strong roar and dazzling shine... The effect of a simultaneous explosion of 320 minutes for 10 seconds exceeded all expectations... This was one of the first combat tests of the "eres".

In the report of Marshals Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov for July 24, 1941, Stalin was informed about the defeat of the German 5th Infantry Division on July 15, 1941 near Rudnya, in which three volleys of the M-8 division played a special role.

It is quite obvious that a sudden salvo of one M-13 battery (16 RS-132 launches in 5-8 seconds) with a maximum range of 8.5 km was capable of causing serious damage to the enemy. But the battery was not intended to hit a single target. This weapon is effective when working across areas with dispersed enemy manpower and equipment with a simultaneous salvo of several batteries. A separate battery could fire a barrage, stunning the enemy, causing panic in his ranks and stopping his advance for some time.

In our opinion, the purpose of sending the first multiple launch rocket launchers to the front by battery was, most likely, the desire to cover the headquarters of the front and armies in the direction threatening Moscow.

This is not just a guess. A study of the routes of the first Katyusha batteries shows that, first of all, they ended up in the areas where the headquarters of the Western Front and the headquarters of its armies were based: the 20th, 16th, 19th and 22nd. It is no coincidence that in their memoirs Marshals Eremenko, Rokossovsky, Kazakov, General Plaskov describe precisely the battery-by-battery combat work of the first rocket launchers, which they observed from their command posts.

They indicate increased secrecy in the use of new weapons. IN AND. Kazakov said: “Access to these “touchables” was allowed only to army commanders and members of military councils. Even the chief of artillery of the army was not allowed to see them.”

However, the very first salvo of M-13 rocket launchers, fired on July 14, 1941 at 15:15 at the railway commodity hub of the city of Orsha, was carried out while performing a completely different combat mission - the destruction of several trains with secret weapons, which under no circumstances should was to fall into the hands of the Germans.

A study of the route of the first separate experimental battery M-13 (“Flerov’s battery”) shows that at first it was apparently intended to guard the headquarters of the 20th Army.

Then she was given a new task. On the night of July 6 in the Orsha area, the battery with guards moved west across territory that had already been virtually abandoned Soviet troops. It moved along the Orsha-Borisov-Minsk railway line, loaded with trains heading east. On July 9, the battery and its guards were already in the area of the city of Borisov (135 km from Orsha).

On that day, GKO decree No. 67ss was issued “On the redirection of transport with weapons and ammunition to the disposal of the newly formed NKVD divisions and reserve armies.” It demanded, in particular, to urgently find some very important cargo among the trains leaving for the east, which under no circumstances should fall to the Germans.

On the night of July 13-14, Flerov’s battery received orders to urgently move to Orsha and launch a missile attack on the station. On July 14, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery fired a salvo at trains with military equipment located at the Orsha railway junction.
What was in these trains is not known for certain. But there is information that after the salvo, no one approached the affected area for some time, and the Germans allegedly even left the station for seven days, which gives reason to assume that as a result missile strike some got into the air toxic substances.

On July 22, in an evening radio broadcast, Soviet announcer Levitan announced the defeat of the German 52nd Chemical Mortar Regiment on July 15. And on July 27, Pravda published information about German secret documents allegedly captured during the defeat of this regiment, from which it followed that the Germans were preparing a chemical attack on Turkey.

Raid of battalion commander Kaduchenko

In the book by A.V. Glushko “Pioneers of Rocket Science” shows a photograph of NII-3 employees headed by Deputy Director A.G. Kostikov after receiving awards in the Kremlin in August 1941. It is indicated that Lieutenant General of Tank Forces V.A. is standing with them in the photo. Mishulin, who was awarded the Gold Hero Star on this day.

We decided to find out why he was awarded the country's highest award and what relation his award may have to the creation of M-13 missile launchers at NII-3. It turned out that the commander of the 57th Tank Division, Colonel V.A. Mishulin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 24, 1941 “for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command... and the courage and heroism shown.” The most amazing thing is that at the same time he was also awarded the rank of general - and not major general, but immediately lieutenant general.

He became the third lieutenant general of tank forces in the Red Army. General Eremenko in his memoirs explains this as a mistake by the cipher operator, who took the title of the signer of the ciphergram to Eremenko's Headquarters with the idea of awarding Mishulin the title of Hero and General.

It is quite possible that this was so: Stalin did not cancel the erroneously signed decree on the award. But just why did he also appoint Mishulin as deputy head of the Main Armored Directorate? Isn't there too much incentive for one officer at once? It is known that after some time General Mishulin, as a representative of Headquarters, was sent to the Southern Front. Usually marshals and members of the Central Committee acted in this capacity.

Did the courage and heroism shown by Mishulin have anything to do with the first Katyusha salvo on July 14, 1941, for which Kostikov and the workers of NII-3 were awarded on July 28?

A study of materials about Mishulin and his 57th Tank Division showed that this division was transferred to the Western Front from the South-Western. Unloaded at Orsha station on June 28 and became part of the 19th Army. The division's control with one motorized rifle guard regiment was concentrated in the area of Gusino station, 50 kilometers from Orsha, where the headquarters of the 20th Army was located at that moment.

At the beginning of July, a tank battalion consisting of 15 tanks, including 7 T-34 tanks, and armored vehicles arrived from the Oryol Tank School to replenish Mishulin’s division.

After the death in battle on July 13 of commander Major S.I. Razdobudko's battalion was headed by his deputy, Captain I.A. Kaduchenko. And it was Captain Kaduchenko who became the first Soviet tanker to be awarded the title of Hero during the Patriotic War on July 22, 1941. He received this high rank even two days earlier than his division commander Mishulin for “leading 2 tank companies that defeated an enemy tank column.” In addition, immediately after the award he became a major.

It seems that the awards for division commander Mishulin and battalion commander Kaduchenko could take place if they completed some very important task for Stalin. And most likely, this was to ensure the first salvo of Katyusha rockets against trains with weapons that were not supposed to fall into the hands of the Germans.

Mishulin skillfully organized the escort of the secret Katyusha battery behind enemy lines, including the group assigned to it with T-34 tanks and armored vehicles under the command of Kaduchenko, and then its breakthrough from the encirclement.

On July 26, 1941, the Pravda newspaper published an article “Lieutenant General Mishulin,” which talked about Mishulin’s feat. About how he, wounded and shell-shocked, made his way in an armored vehicle through enemy rear lines to his division, which at that time was leading fierce battles in the Krasnoye area and Gusino railway station. It follows from this that commander Mishulin, for some reason, left his division for a short time (most likely, together with Kaduchenko’s tank group) and returned wounded to the division only on July 17, 1941.

It is likely that they carried out Stalin’s instructions to organize support for the “first salvo of Flerov’s battery” on July 14, 1941 at the Orsha station along trains with military equipment.

On the day of the salvo of Flerov’s battery, July 14, GKO decree No. 140ss was issued on the appointment of L.M. Gaidukov - an ordinary employee of the Central Committee, who oversaw the production of multiple launch rocket launchers, and was authorized by the State Defense Committee for the production of RS-132 missile shells.

On July 28, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued two decrees on rewarding the creators of the Katyusha. The first - “for outstanding services in the invention and design of one of the types of weapons that increases the power of the Red Army” A.G. Kostikov was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

Secondly, 12 engineers, designers and technicians were awarded orders and medals. The Order of Lenin was awarded to V. Aborenkov, a former military representative who became deputy head of the Main Artillery Directorate for Missile Technology, and designers I. Gvai and V. Galkovsky. The Order of the Red Banner of Labor was received by N. Davydov, A. Pavlenko and L. Schwartz. The Order of the Red Star was awarded to the designers of NII-3 D. Shitov, A. Popov and the workers of plant No. 70 M. Malov and G. Glazko. Both of these decrees were published in Pravda on July 29, and on July 30, 1941, in an article published in Pravda, the new weapon was called formidable without specification.

Yes, it was a cheap and easy-to-manufacture and easy-to-use fire weapon. It could be quickly produced in many factories and quickly installed on everything that moves - on cars, tanks, tractors, even on sleighs (this is how it was used in Dovator’s cavalry corps). And “eres” were installed on airplanes, boats and railway platforms.

The launchers began to be called “guards mortars,” and their combat crews became the first guardsmen.

In the photo: Guards rocket mortar M-31-12 in Berlin in May 1945.
This is a modification of the “Katyusha” (by analogy it was called “Andryusha”).
Fired with unguided rockets of 310 mm caliber
(unlike 132 mm Katyusha shells),
launched from 12 guides (2 tiers of 6 cells each).
The installation is located on the chassis of an American Studebaker truck,
which was supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.