Katyusha artillery mount. Katyusha combat rocket launchers

In the protocol of interrogation of German prisoners of war, it was noted that “two captured soldiers in the village of Popkovo went crazy from the fire of rocket launchers,” and the captured corporal stated that “there were many cases of madness in the village of Popkovo from the artillery cannonade of the Soviet troops.”

T34 Sherman Calliope (USA) Rocket system volley fire(1943). Had 60 guides for 114 mm M8 rockets. Installed on a Sherman tank, guidance was carried out by turning the turret and raising and lowering the barrel (via traction)

One of the most famous and popular characters weapons of victory Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War - multiple launch rocket systems BM-8 and BM-13, which received the affectionate nickname “Katyusha” among the people. Developments rockets in the USSR were carried out from the beginning of the 1930s, and even then the possibilities of their salvo launch were considered. In 1933, the RNII - Jet Research Institute was created. One of the results of his work was the creation and adoption of 82- and 132-mm rockets into aviation service in 1937-1938. By this time, considerations had already been expressed about the advisability of using rockets in ground forces Oh. However, due to their low accuracy, the effectiveness of their use could only be achieved when firing simultaneously a large number shells. The Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) at the beginning of 1937, and then in 1938, set the institute the task of developing a multi-charge launcher for firing multiple rocket launchers with 132-mm rockets. Initially, the installation was planned to be used to fire rockets for chemical warfare.

In April 1939, a multi-charge launcher was designed based on the principle new scheme with longitudinal guides. Initially, it received the name “mechanized installation” (MU-2), and after the design bureau of the Kompressor plant was finalized and put into service in 1941, it was given the name “ fighting machine BM-13". The rocket launcher itself consisted of 16 guides for grooved type rockets. The placement of guides along the vehicle chassis and the installation of jacks increased the stability of the launcher and increased the accuracy of fire. Loading of rockets was carried out from the rear end of the guides, which made it possible to significantly speed up the reloading process. All 16 shells could be fired in 7 - 10 seconds.

The formation of guards mortar units began with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 21, 1941 on the deployment of mass production of M-13 shells, M-13 launchers and the beginning of the formation of units rocket artillery. The first separate battery, which received seven BM-13 installations, was commanded by Captain I.A. Flerov. The successful operations of rocket artillery batteries contributed to the rapid growth of this young type of weapon. Already on August 8, 1941, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin began the formation of the first eight regiments of rocket artillery, which was completed by September 12. By the end of September, the ninth regiment was created.

Tactical unit

The main tactical unit of the Guards mortar units became the Guards mortar regiment. Organizationally, it consisted of three divisions of M-8 or M-13 rocket launchers, an anti-aircraft division, and service units. In total, the regiment consisted of 1,414 people, 36 combat vehicles, twelve 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 9 anti-aircraft DShK machine guns and 18 light machine guns. However, the difficult situation on the fronts due to a decrease in the production of anti-aircraft artillery guns led to the fact that in 1941, some rocket artillery units did not actually have an anti-aircraft artillery battalion. Go to staff organization based on a regiment provided an increase in fire density compared to a structure based on individual batteries or divisions. A salvo of one regiment of M-13 rocket launchers consisted of 576, and a regiment of M-8 rocket launchers consisted of 1,296 rockets.

The eliteness and significance of batteries, divisions and regiments of rocket artillery of the Red Army were emphasized by the fact that immediately upon formation they were given the honorary name of guards. For this reason, as well as for the purpose of maintaining secrecy, Soviet rocket artillery received its official name - “Guards Mortar Units”.

An important milestone GKO Decree No. 642-ss of September 8, 1941 became the history of Soviet field rocket artillery. According to this resolution, the Guards mortar units were separated from the Main Artillery Directorate. At the same time, the position of commander of the Guards mortar units was introduced, who was supposed to report directly to the Headquarters of the Main Supreme Command (SGVK). The first commander of the Guards Mortar Units (GMC) was 1st rank military engineer V.V. Aborenkov.

First experience

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station, where large number German trains with troops, equipment, ammunition, fuel. As a result of the battery's fire, the railway junction was wiped off the face of the earth, and the enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

T34 Sherman Calliope (USA) - multiple launch rocket system (1943). Had 60 guides for 114 mm M8 rockets. It was installed on a Sherman tank, guidance was carried out by turning the turret and raising and lowering the barrel (via a rod).

On August 8, Katyushas were deployed in the Kiev direction. This is evidenced by the following lines of a secret report to Malenkov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “Today at dawn at the Kiev UR, new means known to you were used. They hit the enemy to a depth of 8 kilometers. The installation is extremely efficient. The command of the area where the installation was located reported that after several turns of the circle, the enemy completely stopped pressing the area from which the installation was operating. Our infantry boldly and confidently moved forward.” The same document indicates that the use of new weapons caused an initially mixed reaction Soviet soldiers who had never seen anything like it before. “I am telling you how the Red Army soldiers told it: “We hear a roar, then a piercing howl and a large trail of fire. Panic arose among some of our Red Army soldiers, and then the commanders explained where they were attacking from and where... this literally caused the soldiers to rejoice. Very good review given by artillerymen...” The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the Wehrmacht leadership. Initially, the use of Soviet BM-8 and BM-13 rocket launchers was perceived by the Germans as a concentration of fire from a large amount of artillery. One of the first mentions of BM-13 rocket launchers can be found in the diary of the chief of the German ground forces, Franz Halder, only on August 14, 1941, when he made next entry: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barrel flamethrower cannon... The shot is fired by electricity. When fired, smoke is generated... If such guns are captured, report immediately.” Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled “Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles.” It said: “The troops are reporting that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3 to 5 seconds... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command on the same day.”

By June 22, 1941, German troops also had rocket launchers. By this time, the Wehrmacht chemical troops had four regiments of six-barreled 150 mm chemical mortars (Nebelwerfer 41), and the fifth was under formation. The regiment of German chemical mortars organizationally consisted of three divisions of three batteries. These mortars were first used at the very beginning of the war near Brest, as historian Paul Karel mentions in his works.

There is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind

By the fall of 1941, the bulk of the rocket artillery was concentrated in the troops Western Front and the Moscow defense zone. Near Moscow there were 33 divisions out of 59 that were in the Red Army at that time. For comparison: the Leningrad Front had five divisions, the Southwestern Front had nine, the Southern Front had six, and the rest had one or two divisions each. In the Battle of Moscow, all armies were strengthened by three or four divisions, and only the 16th Army had seven divisions.

The Soviet leadership attached great value the use of Katyushas in the Battle of Moscow. In the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, issued on October 1, 1941, “To the commanders of front troops and armies on the procedure for using rocket artillery,” in particular, the following was noted: “Parts of the active Red Army for lately got a new one powerful weapon in the form of combat vehicles M-8 and M-13, which are the best remedy destruction (suppression) of enemy personnel, his tanks, engine parts and fire weapons. Sudden, massive and well-prepared fire from the M-8 and M-13 divisions ensures an exceptionally good defeat of the enemy and at the same time causes a severe moral shock to his manpower, leading to a loss of combat effectiveness. This is especially true in at the moment, when the enemy infantry has much more tanks than we do, when our infantry most of all needs powerful support from the M-8 and M-13, which can be successfully opposed to the enemy tanks.”

A rocket artillery division under the command of Captain Karsanov left a bright mark on the defense of Moscow. For example, on November 11, 1941, this division supported the attack of its infantry on Skirmanovo. After the division's salvos this locality was taken almost without resistance. When examining the area where the volleys were fired, 17 destroyed tanks, more than 20 mortars and several guns abandoned by the enemy in panic were discovered. During November 22 and 23, the same division, without infantry cover, repelled repeated enemy attacks. Despite the fire from machine gunners, Captain Karsanov’s division did not retreat until it completed its combat mission.

At the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow, not only infantry and military equipment enemy, but also fortified defense lines, using which the Wehrmacht leadership sought to delay Soviet troops. The BM-8 and BM-13 rocket launchers fully justified themselves in these new conditions. For example, the 31st separate mortar division under the command of political instructor Orekhov used 2.5 divisional salvoes to destroy the German garrison in the village of Popkovo. On the same day, the village was taken by Soviet troops with virtually no resistance.

Defending Stalingrad

The Guards mortar units made a significant contribution to repelling the enemy's continuous attacks on Stalingrad. Sudden volleys of rocket-propelled mortars devastated the ranks of the advancing German troops and burned their military equipment. At the height of fierce fighting, many guards mortar regiments fired 20-30 salvos per day. The 19th Guards Mortar Regiment showed remarkable examples of combat work. In just one day of battle he fired 30 salvos. The regiment's combat rocket launchers were located with the advanced units of our infantry and destroyed a large number of German and Romanian soldiers and officers. Rocket artillery used great love defenders of Stalingrad and, above all, infantry. Battle glory The regiments of Vorobyov, Parnovsky, Chernyak and Erokhin thundered across the entire front.

In the photo above, the Katyusha BM-13 on the ZiS-6 chassis was a launcher consisting of rail guides (from 14 to 48). The BM-31−12 installation (“Andryusha”, photo below) was a constructive development of the Katyusha. It was based on a Studebaker chassis and fired 300-mm rockets from cellular rather than rail-type guides.

V.I. Chuikov wrote in his memoirs that he would never forget the Katyusha regiment under the command of Colonel Erokhin. On July 26, on the right bank of the Don, Erokhin’s regiment took part in repelling the offensive of the 51st Army Corps German army. At the beginning of August, this regiment joined the southern operational group of forces. In early September, during German tank attacks on the Chervlenaya River near the village of Tsibenko, the regiment was again at its dangerous place fired a salvo of 82-mm Katyushas at the main enemy forces. The 62nd Army fought street battles from September 14 until the end of January 1943, and Colonel Erokhin's Katyusha regiment constantly received combat missions Army Commander V.I. Chuikova. In this regiment, the guide frames (rails) for projectiles were mounted on a T-60 tracked base, which gave these installations good maneuverability on any terrain. Being in Stalingrad itself and choosing positions beyond the steep bank of the Volga, the regiment was invulnerable to enemy artillery fire. Erokhin quickly brought his own tracked combat installations to firing positions, fired a volley and with the same speed again went into cover.

IN initial period war, the effectiveness of rocket mortars was reduced due to an insufficient number of shells.
In particular, in a conversation between Marshal of the USSR Shaposhnikov and Army General G.K. Zhukov, the latter stated the following: “volleys for R.S. (missiles - O.A.) at least 20 are required to be enough for two days of battle, but now we are giving negligible amounts. If there were more of them, I guarantee that it would be possible to shoot the enemy with just RSs.” Zhukov’s words clearly overestimate the capabilities of Katyushas, which had their drawbacks. One of them was mentioned in a letter to GKO member G.M. Malenkov: “A serious combat disadvantage of the M-8 vehicles is the large dead space, which does not allow firing at a distance closer than three kilometers. This shortcoming was especially clearly revealed during the retreat of our troops, when, due to the threat of the capture of this latest secret equipment, the Katyusha crews were forced to blow up their rocket launchers.”

Kursk Bulge. Attention, tanks!

In anticipation Battle of Kursk Soviet troops, including rocket artillery, were intensively preparing for the upcoming battles with German armored vehicles. Katyushas drove their front wheels into dug recesses to give the guides a minimum elevation angle, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, could hit tanks. Experimental shooting was carried out on plywood mock-ups of tanks. During training, rockets smashed targets to pieces. However, this method also had many opponents: after all, the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. The effectiveness of Katyushas against tanks had to be tested during the battles. Despite the fact that the rocket launchers were not designed to fight against tanks, in some cases Katyushas successfully coped with this task. Let us give one example from a secret report addressed during defensive battles on Kursk Bulge personally I.V. To Stalin: “On July 5 - 7, the guards mortar units, repelling enemy attacks and supporting their infantry, carried out: 9 regimental, 96 divisional, 109 battery and 16 platoon salvos against enemy infantry and tanks. As a result, according to incomplete data, up to 15 infantry battalions were destroyed and scattered, 25 vehicles were burned and knocked out, 16 artillery and mortar batteries were suppressed, and 48 enemy attacks were repelled. During the period July 5–7, 1943, 5,547 M-8 shells and 12,000 M-13 shells were used. Of particular note combat work on the Voronezh Front of the 415th Guards Mortar Regiment (regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Ganyushkin), which on July 6 destroyed the crossing of the Sev River. Donets in the Mikhailovka area and destroyed up to one company of infantry and on July 7, participating in a battle with enemy tanks, shooting with direct fire, knocked out and destroyed 27 tanks...”

In general, the use of Katyushas against tanks, despite individual episodes, turned out to be ineffective due to the large dispersion of shells. In addition, as noted earlier, the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. Therefore, even with a direct hit, the rocket was unable to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tigers and Panthers. Despite these circumstances, the Katyushas still caused significant damage to the tanks. The fact is that when hit rocket frontal armor, the tank crew was often out of action due to severe concussion. In addition, as a result of Katyusha fire, tank tracks were broken, turrets jammed, and if shrapnel hit the engine part or gas tanks, a fire could occur.

Katyushas were successfully used until the very end of the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War, earning the love and respect of Soviet soldiers and officers and the hatred of Wehrmacht soldiers. During the war years, BM-8 and BM-13 rocket launchers were mounted on various cars, tanks, tractors, installed on armored platforms of armored trains, combat boats, etc. Katyusha “brothers” were also created and participated in battles - heavy rocket launchers M-30 and M-31 300 mm caliber, as well as BM-31−12 300 mm caliber launchers. Rocket artillery firmly took its place in the Red Army and rightfully became one of the symbols of victory.

Katyusha - Weapon of Victory

The history of the creation of Katyusha dates back to pre-Petrine times. In Rus', the first rockets appeared in the 15th century. By the end of the 16th century, Russia was well aware of the design, manufacturing methods and combat use rockets. This is convincingly evidenced by the “Charter of Military, Cannon and Other Affairs Relating to Military Science,” written in 1607-1621 by Onisim Mikhailov. Since 1680, a special rocket establishment already existed in Russia. In the 19th century, missiles designed to destroy enemy personnel and materiel were created by Major General Alexander Dmitrievich Zasyadko. Zasyadko began work on creating rockets in 1815 on his own initiative at own funds. By 1817, he managed to create a high-explosive and incendiary combat rocket based on a lighting rocket.
At the end of August 1828, a guards corps arrived from St. Petersburg under the besieged Turkish fortress of Varna. Together with the corps, the first Russian missile company arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Vnukov. The company was formed on the initiative of Major General Zasyadko. The rocket company received its first baptism of fire near Varna on August 31, 1828 during an attack on a Turkish redoubt located by the sea south of Varna. Cannonballs and bombs from field and naval guns, as well as rocket explosions, forced the defenders of the redoubt to take refuge in holes made in the ditch. Therefore, when the hunters (volunteers) of the Simbirsk regiment rushed to the redoubt, the Turks did not have time to take their places and provide effective resistance to the attackers.

On March 5, 1850, Colonel Konstantin Ivanovich Konstantinov was appointed commander of the Rocket Establishment - illegitimate son Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich from a relationship with actress Clara Anna Lawrence. During his tenure in this position, 2-, 2.5- and 4-inch missiles of the Konstantinov system were adopted by the Russian army. The weight of combat missiles depended on the type of warhead and was characterized by the following data: a 2-inch missile weighed from 2.9 to 5 kg; 2.5-inch - from 6 to 14 kg and 4-inch - from 18.4 to 32 kg.

The firing ranges of the Konstantinov system missiles, created by him in 1850-1853, were very significant for that time. Thus, a 4-inch rocket equipped with 10-pound (4.095 kg) grenades had a maximum firing range of 4150 m, and a 4-inch incendiary rocket - 4260 m, while a quarter-pound mountain unicorn mod. 1838 had a maximum firing range of only 1810 meters. Konstantinov's dream was to create an airborne rocket launcher, firing rockets with hot air balloon. The experiments carried out proved the long range of missiles fired from a tethered balloon. However, it was not possible to achieve acceptable accuracy.
After the death of K.I. Konstantinov in 1871, rocketry in the Russian army fell into decline. Combat missiles sporadically and small quantity were used in Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878. Rockets were used more successfully during the conquest Central Asia in the 70-80s of the XIX century. They played a decisive role in the capture of Tashkent. IN last time Konstantinov's missiles were used in Turkestan in the 90s of the 19th century. And in 1898, combat missiles were officially removed from service with the Russian army.
New impetus for development missile weapons was given during the First World War: in 1916, Professor Ivan Platonovich Grave created gelatin gunpowder, improving the smokeless gunpowder of the French inventor Paul Viel. In 1921, developers N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev from the gas-dynamic laboratory began developing rockets based on this gunpowder.

At first, the gas-dynamic laboratory, where rocket weapons were created, had more difficulties and failures than successes. However, enthusiastic engineers N.I. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev, and then G.E. Langemak and B.S. Petropavlovsky persistently improved their “brainchild,” firmly believing in the success of the business. Extensive theoretical development and countless experiments were required, which ultimately led to the creation at the end of 1927 of an 82-mm fragmentation rocket with a powder engine, and after it a more powerful one, with a caliber of 132 mm. Test firing conducted near Leningrad in March 1928 was encouraging - the range was already 5-6 km, although dispersion was still large. For many years it could not be significantly reduced: the original concept assumed a projectile with tails that did not exceed its caliber. After all, a pipe served as a guide for it - simple, light, convenient for installation.

In 1933, engineer I.T. Kleimenov proposed making a more developed tail, more than twice the caliber of the projectile in scope. The accuracy of fire increased, and the flight range also increased, but it was necessary to design new open - in particular, rail - guides for projectiles. And again, years of experiments, searches...
By 1938, the main difficulties in creating mobile rocket artillery had been overcome. Employees of the Moscow RNII Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, F. N. Poyda, L. E. Schwartz and others developed 82-mm fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and thermite shells (PC) with a solid propellant (powder) engine, which was started by a remote electric igniter.

The baptism of fire of the RS-82, mounted on the I-16 and I-153 fighter aircraft, took place on August 20, 1939 on the Khalkhin Gol River. This event is described in detail here.

At the same time, for firing at ground targets, the designers proposed several options for mobile multi-charge multiple rocket launchers (by area). Engineers V.N. Galkovsky, I.I. Gvai, A.P. Pavlenko, A.S. Popov took part in their creation under the leadership of A.G. Kostikov.
The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single unit by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles weighing 42.5 kg each were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided the ability to change the angle of elevation and azimuth rotation. Aiming at the target was carried out through the sight by rotating the handles of the lifting and rotating mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a ZiS-5 truck, and in the first version, relatively short guides were located across the vehicle that received common name MU-1 (mechanized installation). This decision was unsuccessful - when firing, the vehicle swayed, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the battle.

M-13 shells, containing 4.9 kg of explosive, provided a radius of continuous damage by fragments of 8-10 meters (when the fuse was set to “O” - fragmentation) and an actual damage radius of 25-30 meters. In soil of medium hardness, when the fuse was set to “3” (slowdown), a funnel with a diameter of 2-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 meter was created.
In September 1939, the MU-2 rocket system was created on the ZIS-6 three-axle truck, which was more suitable for this purpose. The car was an off-road truck with dual-pitch tires on the rear axles. Its length with a 4980 mm wheelbase was 6600 mm, and its width was 2235 mm. The car was equipped with the same in-line six-cylinder water-cooled carburetor engine that was installed on the ZiS-5. Its cylinder diameter was 101.6 mm and its piston stroke was 114.3 mm. Thus, its working volume was equal to 5560 cubic centimeters, so that the volume indicated in most sources is 5555 cubic centimeters. cm is the result of someone’s mistake, which was subsequently replicated by many serious publications. At 2300 rpm, the engine, which had a 4.6-fold compression ratio, developed 73 horsepower, which was good for those times, but due to the heavy load maximum speed limited to 55 kilometers per hour.

In this version, elongated guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing. The weight of the vehicle with a crew (5-7 people) and full ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range reached 8470 m. In just one salvo lasting 8-10 seconds, the combat vehicle fired 16 shells containing 78.4 kg of highly effective explosives at enemy positions substances. The three-axle ZIS-6 provided the MU-2 with quite satisfactory mobility on the ground, allowing it to quickly perform a march maneuver and change position. And to transfer the vehicle from the traveling position to the combat position, 2-3 minutes were enough. However, the installation acquired another drawback - the impossibility of direct fire and, as a result, a large dead space. However, our artillerymen subsequently learned to overcome it and even began to use Katyushas against tanks.
On December 25, 1939, the Red Army Artillery Directorate approved the 132 mm M-13 rocket and launcher, called the BM-13. NII-Z received an order for the production of five such installations and a batch of missiles for military testing. In addition, the artillery department of the Navy also ordered one BM-13 launcher to test it in the coastal defense system. During the summer and autumn of 1940, NII-3 manufactured six BM-13 launchers. In the fall of the same year, BM-13 launchers and a batch of M-13 shells were ready for testing.

On June 17, 1941, at a training ground near Moscow, during an inspection of samples of new weapons of the Red Army, salvo launches were made from BM-13 combat vehicles. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov and chief General Staff Army General Zhukov, who attended the tests, praised the new weapon. Two were prepared for the show prototypes combat vehicle BM-13. One of them was loaded with high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and the second with illumination rockets. Salvo launches of fragmentation rockets were made. All targets in the area where the shells fell were hit, everything that could burn on this section of the artillery route burned. The shooting participants praised the new missile weapons. Immediately at the firing position, an opinion was expressed about the need to quickly adopt the first domestic MLRS installation.
On June 21, 1941, literally a few hours before the start of the war, after examining samples of missile weapons, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin decided to launch mass production of M-13 rockets and the BM-13 launcher and to begin the formation of missile military units. Due to the threat of an impending war, this decision was made despite the fact that the BM-13 launcher had not yet passed military tests and had not been developed to the stage allowing mass industrial production.

On July 2, 1941, the first experimental battery of rocket artillery in the Red Army under the command of Captain Flerov set out from Moscow to the Western Front. On July 4, the battery became part of the 20th Army, whose troops occupied the defense along the Dnieper near the city of Orsha.

In most books about the war - both scientific and fiction - Wednesday, July 16, 1941, is named as the day of the first use of the Katyusha. On that day, a battery under the command of Captain Flerov attacked the Orsha railway station that had just been occupied by the enemy and destroyed the trains that had accumulated there.
However, in fact, Flerov’s battery was first deployed at the front two days earlier: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large number of military equipment. At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, a battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a direction unexpected for the enemy in the west, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo had died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa. On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how rocket launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to headquarters, the 217th separate battalion communications 144th rifle division 20th Army about Flerov’s fulfillment of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said: “Katyusha sang perfectly.”

On August 2, 1941, the chief of artillery of the Western Front, Major General I.P. Kramar, reported: “According to the statements of the command staff of the rifle units and the observations of the artillerymen, the surprise of such a massive fire causes big losses the enemy and acts so strongly morally that enemy units flee in panic. It was also noted there that the enemy is fleeing not only from the areas fired by new weapons, but also from neighboring ones, located at a distance of 1-1.5 km from the shelling zone.
And here’s how the enemies talked about the Katyusha: “After the volley of Stalin’s organ, from our company of 120 people,” German Chief Corporal Hart said during interrogation, “12 remained alive. Out of 12 heavy machine guns Only one remained intact, and even that one was without a carriage, and out of the five heavy mortars, not a single one.”
A stunning debut for the enemy rocket weapons prompted our industry to speed up the serial production of a new mortar. However, at first there were not enough self-propelled chassis for Katyushas - carriers of rocket launchers. They tried to restore production of the ZIS-6 at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, where the Moscow ZIS was evacuated in October 1941, but the lack of specialized equipment for the production of worm axles did not allow this to be done. In October 1941, the T-60 tank with a BM-8-24 installation mounted in place of the turret was put into service. It was armed with RS-82 missiles.
In September 1941 - February 1942, NII-3 developed a new modification of the 82-mm M-8 projectile, which had the same range (about 5000 m), but almost twice as much explosive (581 g) compared to the aircraft projectile (375 g).
By the end of the war, the 82-mm M-8 projectile with a ballistic index TS-34 and a firing range of 5.5 km was adopted.
In the first modifications of the M-8 missile, a rocket charge made of nitroglycerin ballistic gunpowder, grade N, was used. The charge consisted of seven cylindrical blocks with an outer diameter of 24 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm. The length of the charge was 230 mm, and the weight was 1040 g.
To increase the projectile's flight range, the engine's rocket chamber was increased to 290 mm, and after testing a number of charge design options, OTB specialists from Plant No. 98 tested a charge made from NM-2 gunpowder, which consisted of five blocks with an outer diameter of 26.6 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm and length 287 mm. The weight of the charge was 1180 g. With the use of this charge, the projectile range increased to 5.5 km. The radius of continuous destruction by fragments of the M-8 (TS-34) projectile was 3-4 m, and the radius of actual destruction by fragments was 12-15 meters.

STZ-5 tracked tractors and Ford-Marmont, International Jiemsi and Austin off-road vehicles received under Lend-Lease were also equipped with jet launchers. But greatest number"Katyusha" was mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker cars. In 1943, M-13 projectiles with a welded body, with a ballistic index TS-39, were put into production. The shells had a GVMZ fuse. NM-4 gunpowder was used as fuel.
The main reason for the low accuracy of M-13 (TS-13) type rockets was the eccentricity of the thrust of the jet engine, that is, the displacement of the thrust vector from the rocket axis due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs. This phenomenon is easily eliminated when the rocket rotates. In this case, the thrust impulse will always coincide with the axis of the rocket. The rotation imparted to the finned rocket in order to improve accuracy is called rotation. Twist rockets should not be confused with turbojet rockets. The turning speed of the finned missiles was several tens, in extreme cases hundreds, of revolutions per minute, which is not enough to stabilize the projectile by rotation (moreover, rotation occurs during the active phase of the flight while the engine is running, and then stops). The angular velocity of turbojet projectiles that do not have fins is several thousand revolutions per minute, which creates a gyroscopic effect and, accordingly, higher hit accuracy than that of finned projectiles, both non-rotating and with rotation. In both types of projectiles, rotation occurs due to the outflow of powder gases from the main engine through small (several millimeters in diameter) nozzles directed at an angle to the axis of the projectile.

We called rockets with rotation due to the energy of powder gases UK - improved accuracy, for example M-13UK and M-31UK.
The M-13UK projectile differed in design from the M-13 projectile in that there were 12 tangential holes on the front centering thickening, through which part of the powder gases flowed out. The holes were drilled so that the powder gases flowing out of them created a torque. The M-13UK-1 projectiles differed from the M-13UK projectiles in the design of their stabilizers. In particular, the M-13UK-1 stabilizers were made of steel sheet.
Since 1944, new, more powerful BM-31-12 installations with 12 M-30 and M-31 mines of 301 mm caliber, weighing 91.5 kg each (firing range - up to 4325 m), began to be produced on the basis of Studebakers. To improve the accuracy of fire, M-13UK and M-31UK projectiles with improved accuracy that rotated in flight were created and developed.
The projectiles were launched from honeycomb-type tubular guides. The time to transfer to a combat position was 10 minutes. When a 301-mm projectile containing 28.5 kg of explosives exploded, a crater 2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter was formed. A total of 1,184 BM-31-12 vehicles were produced during the war years.

Specific gravity rocket artillery on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was constantly increasing. If in November 1941 45 Katyusha divisions were formed, then on January 1, 1942 there were already 87 of them, in October 1942 - 350, and at the beginning of 1945 - 519. By the end of the war, there were 7 divisions in the Red Army, 40 separate brigades, 105 regiments and 40 separate divisions of guards mortars. Not a single major artillery barrage took place without Katyushas.

In 2007, Colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky conveyed his war memories to the portal “Uninvented Stories about War”. After publication, he continued working on the text. Additions and clarifications have been made. New archival documents (combat orders, instructions, award lists, etc.) made it possible to tell in more detail about the military operations of the 28th OGMD, in which Yakov Mikhailovich served, his battle path. And, most importantly, to supplement the memories with a story about the military exploits of the division’s guardsmen, to name many by their last names (more than 40 last names).

The disbandment of the brigade continued until mid-October. Most of the officers had already left for Moscow, to the personnel department of the GMCH, and me and a small group of officers were still detained in Sormovo to carry out various tasks related to the liquidation of the unit. Finally, on October 15th I received necessary documents. At the beginning of October we were given certificates: at the brigade headquarters - to receive the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, at the plant - the medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”. I still have this factory certificate – seventy years old – (I was awarded the medal “For Victory over Germany” as a participant in hostilities).

I provide this certificate:

On October 17 I arrived in Moscow. And there - the personnel department in the 2nd NGO House, and then the already familiar Officer Reserve Division on Khoroshevskoye Shosse.

The division was as crowded as ever. Some were awaiting assignment to units, others an order for demobilization. Some officers, who had already formalized their transfer to the reserve and received a substantial severance pay, either hoping to increase it, or simply out of excitement, sat in the evening card game and literally lost every penny. Often among those to whom they lost were two officers who always played together, officers in brand new, well-fitted uniforms, from the regular employees of the division.

In the barracks next to my bed there was the bed of an officer who, as it turned out, also studied at the Omsk school, albeit in a different battery, and fought on the Western Front.

Naturally, it was interesting for us to remember our days at school and mutual friends. They were interested in whether our units had to operate in the neighborhood and participate in the same combat operations. It turned out that we maintained different connections in different areas.

We also touched upon issues related to the history of the Katyusha. One day we started talking about the strange omission of the name Kostikov, who was considered the creator of the Katyusha. Last names and photos of the creators military weapons and after the war they began to publish techniques, but Kostikov was not among them. In general, for us, who fought on Katyushas, there was a lot of unclear and contradictory things here. This also affected the former commander of the GMCh, Lieutenant General V. Aborenkov. An acquaintance of mine heard from one of the officers that the general was in trouble because he allegedly tried to take credit for the authorship of the Katyusha.

And later, for a long time in the post-war years there was no clarity on these issues.

One could notice that gradually Kostikov’s name completely disappeared from the pages of newspapers and magazines and ceased to be mentioned in official publications.

In the early 80s, while in Leningrad, I visited the Military Historical Museum of the History of Artillery, engineering troops and signal troops. In the exhibition dedicated to rocket artillery and guards mortar units, I did not see either Kostikov’s name or portrait.

Kostikov was not mentioned among the creators of the Katyusha in the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (GSE), the Encyclopedia “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, in the book “Rocket Men”, published by DOSSAF publishing house in 1979, etc.

To some extent, the situation began to become clearer at the end of 1988, when publications appeared in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, and then twice in the “Military Historical Journal”, questioning the authorship and very participation of Kostikov in the creation of “ Katyusha”, accusing him of involvement in arrests at the research institute in 1937-1938. I. T. Kleimenov, G. E. Langemak, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, as “enemies of the people”, in order to advance to the leadership of the institute.

In “Military Historical Journal” No. 10 for 1989 it was written:

« In 1939, after successful field tests, having somehow pushed aside the main participants in the development, testing and introduction of new weapons, Kostikov and Gvai made an application to be recognized as the authors of the invention. When the deputy head of the artillery department of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) Aborenkov expressed a desire to join them, they did not dare refuse... It is possible that it was after his insistent petitions that the invention department of the NKO recognized all three as the inventors of the M-13 machine unit and issued them copyright certificates».

/ « VIZH" No. 10, 1989 Anisimov N.A., Oppokov V.G. “Incident at NII-3” .P.85./

The magazine published the conclusions of a technical examination carried out in 1944 after Kostikov was removed by the State Defense Committee resolution of February 18. this year from the post of director of the institute and his arrest for disrupting the government task for the development rocket engine for a jet fighter-interceptor.

The investigator for particularly important cases of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, who interrogated Kostikov and doubted his scientific credibility, brought in Academician S.A. for the examination. Khristianovich, professors A.V. Chesalova, K.A. Ushakova, deputy Head of the weapons department of laboratory No. 2 TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) A.M. Levina.

Answering the investigator’s question whether Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov are the authors of the M-8, M-13 projectiles and launching devices for them, the experts stated that Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov, who received an author’s certificate for a machine installation for firing rocket projectiles, have nothing to do with had no involvement in their development. Arguments: smokeless powder missiles M-8 and M-13 differ only in minor modifications from the RS-82 and RS-132 projectiles developed at NII-3 in 1934 - 1938; The idea of creating a launcher was put forward back in 1933 by G. Langemak and V. Glushko in the book “Missiles, their design and application.”

After his death, academicians S. Korolev and V. Glushko launched an active campaign against Kostikov, believing that it was he who, for careerist purposes, was guilty of their arrest. In an appeal to the publishing house of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, a copy of which was sent and published in the magazine “Ogonyok” No. 50 for 1988, they wrote: “Kostikov, who worked at the institute as an ordinary engineer, made a lot of efforts to achieve the arrest and conviction as enemies the people of the main leadership of this institute, including the main author of the new type of weapons, a talented designer, deputy director of the institute for scientific affairs G.E. Langemaka. Thus, Kostikov turned out to be the head of the institute and the “author” of this new type of weapon, for which he was generously awarded at the beginning of the war.” /“Ogonyok” No. 50, p.23/.

At the insistence of V. Glushko, the portrait and surname of A. Kostikov were confiscated from the exhibition of the Military History Museum, as well as in Leningrad. Ch. The censor was instructed not to mention Kostikov's name in the open press.

But in 1989-1991, materials in defense of A. Kostikov began to appear in a number of publications. The newspapers “Socialist Industry”, “Radyanska Ukraina”, “Krasnaya Zvezda”, “Trud” and some others published materials refuting the statements of the authors in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, etc., and which made it possible to analyze the facts without bias and assignments.

As Colonel V. Moroz wrote in the article “Katyusha”. Triumph and Drama”, published in the newspaper “Red Star” on July 13, 1991, the idea outlined in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Rockets, their design and use”, “... is not identical to the idea of the Katyusha... military engineer 1st rank G. Langemak, deputy director of the institute, launchers on the vehicle were not designed at all, and attempts to arm others with rockets vehicles ended in failure." And only as a result of a closed competition announced at the Research Institute in 1938 for the creation of object 138 (launcher), in which 18 leading engineers of the institute took part, did a completely original project of a “mechanized multi-charger located on ZIS-5 car installation for firing rockets.”

Sending the project signed by A. Kostikov and I. Gvai to the customer, the director of the institute B. Slonimer officially named A. Kostikov “the initiator of the creation of the installation.” In February 1939, after the combat vehicle passed trial tests at the Sofrinsky artillery range, and then received the go-ahead from the State Commission headed by the famous artilleryman V. Grendal, A. Kostikov and I. Gvai submitted a joint application (written in the hand of I. Gvai ) on issuing a copyright certificate to them. In September of this year, another co-author was added to the application - V.V. Aborenkova. On February 19, 1940, A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, and V. Aborenkov were issued a non-public copyright certificate by the invention department of the NPO.

During interrogations from the investigator and then from the Central Committee of the CPSU, I. Gvai argued that without Kostikov there would have been no Katyusha. Gvay, Kostikov, Aborenkov told the investigator that although they are related to the development of the rocket, they do not claim authorship in its invention, that although the idea of the launcher was expressed in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Missiles, their design and application,” but there was no launcher as such and there was no specific clarity of what it should be until the Gwai project appeared.

During interrogations, it was also proven that V. Aborenkov was included in the application, not as a “punchy person,” but as one of the active participants in the creation of the machine installation. In particular, they were asked to increase the length of the guides to 5 meters, use separate ignition of the pyracartridges from an electrical circuit (Gwai suggested simultaneous ignition), use an artillery panorama and a sight for aiming.

In November 1989, the newspaper “Socialist Industry” introduced readers to the conclusions of a special commission chaired by Candidate of Technical Sciences Yu. Demyanko, created by the CPSU Central Committee. The commission concluded:

« The authors of the invention of a mechanized installation for salvo firing of rockets - and even more broadly - the authors of the proposal for a fundamentally new type of weapon - jet systems volley fire are A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, V. Aborenkov. The most meticulous analysis shows that there is no person who could claim inclusion in this team».

“The Prosecutor's Office of the USSR most carefully studied the materials related to the arrest of prominent scientists of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 in the 30s. In the materials of the criminal cases against S.P. Korolev, G.E. Langemak, V.P. Glushko, I.T. Kleymenov, there is no data indicating that they were arrested following Kostikov’s denunciation.”

The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote that it was not failures at work, “... battles at party meetings, which were not typical for that time, nor signals from informants from the walls of the institute, became the reason for the arrest of I. Kleimenov, G. Langemenok, V. Glushko, S. Korolev, and later V. Luzhin.” Danger already loomed over them during the period of exposure as “enemies of the people” (later rehabilitated) by the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal M. Tukhachevsky, who was in charge of weapons and for a long time patronized the research institute, and the head of Osoviakhim R. Eideman, under whose auspices the Moscow group of GDL S. Korolev worked.”

/gas. “Red Star” 07/13/1991 V. Moroz, “Katyusha”: triumph and drama.”/

As noted in a number of publications, Andrei Grigoryevich Kostikov was not such a careerist as the authors of articles from Ogonyok, Agitator, and others tried to present him.

He was born on October 17 (old style) 1899 in the city of Kazatin, in the family of a railway worker. Participant civil war. Graduated from Kyiv military school communications, then - the Air Force Academy named after N. E. Zhukovsky. Upon graduation, he was sent to the Rocket Research Institute, where he worked his way up from engineer to department head, chief engineer, and director of the institute. Major General, Hero of Socialist Labor, Laureate of the Stalin Prize 1st degree, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In February 1944, by decree of the State Defense Committee, he was removed from the post of director of NII-3 for failure to fulfill a government assignment and was brought to justice by the USSR Prosecutor's Office criminal liability. He spent 11.5 months in a pre-trial prison. But no hostile intent was established in his actions (within the established eight months, Kostikov failed to ensure the creation of a liquid-propellant rocket engine for an interceptor fighter), and he was released.

Despite serious illness, continued to work fruitfully and raised many students. After his release from custody, Kostikov continued to be summoned for questioning by the CPSU Central Committee and investigative authorities. All this affected his health, his heart could not stand it. He died on December 5, 1950 at the age of 51, and was buried in Moscow.

The life of I.I. ended no less tragically. Guaya. Endless interrogations and groundless accusations led to the same thing. He died five years later, in 1955, in the prime of his creative powers.

Publications in defense of A. Kostikov received an inadequate assessment. Some publications, in particular the Military Historical Journal, tried to question the conclusions of the commission of the CPSU Central Committee, created under the leadership of Yu. Demyanko.

And although the question about Kostikov and his role remained open, it is wrong to deny his merits as one of the creators of “Katyusha”. There is also no doubt that a large team of talented scientists and engineers took part in the creation of Katyusha. Their success was facilitated by many years experimental work on the development of jet weapons by the creators of rocket technology.

Posthumously this high rank Kleymenov Ivan Terentyevich, Langemak Georgy Erikhovich, Luzhin Vasily Nikolaevich, Petropavlovsky Boris Sergeevich, Slonimer Boris Mikhailovich, Tikhomirov Nikolay Ivanovich were awarded. All of them made a great contribution to the creation of domestic jet weapons.

N. Tikhomirov- in 1921 he founded and headed until his death in 1930 the Gas Dynamic Laboratory (GDL) in Petrograd (Leningrad), the main object of which was a powder rocket.

B. Petropavlovsky– graduate of the Military Technical Academy. Continued leadership of the GDL. His inventions were reminiscent of today's recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. He died in 1933 from a cold.

I. Kleimenov- graduate of the Air Force Academy. N. E. Zhukovsky, was last leader GDL and first chief new structure– Jet Research Institute (RNII), formed on the initiative of M. Tukhachevsky by combining two teams – the Leningrad GDL and the Moscow Study Group jet propulsion, headed by S. Korolev. At the end of 1937, Kleimenov was arrested and executed in 1938;

G. Langemak– military engineer 1st rank, deputy. Head of the RNII, made a great contribution to bringing the missile to combat standards. He was also repressed and shot;

V. Luzhin- engineer, together with other employees of the RNII, found many original solutions in the creation of a powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which during the war the Germans mistook for thermite, although incendiary properties it was pierced with hot shards. In 1940 he was arrested, sentenced to 8 years, and died in prison.

B. Slonimer- Director of NII-3 (the so-called Jet Institute) from the end of 1937 to November 1940. Although he was not a jet designer, he did a lot to defend the new combat vehicle, to give it a “start in life”, taking on all the blows associated with its creation in extremely difficult conditions and a tense situation, with stubborn resistance from “rail” artillery from the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Marshal G. Kulik, and others . /“Red Star” 07/13/1991/

The year 1945 was ending. Year of Victory Soviet people over Nazi Germany.

After almost a month in the reserves, I was sent to Ukraine, to the Carpathian Military District (PrikVO), where on December 1 I was appointed head of the reconnaissance division of the 61st Guards Mortar Regiment (61st GMP). The regiment had glorious military traditions and was awarded three orders of Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and Alexander Nevsky. It was given the name "Zaporozhye". It was an honor to serve in such a regiment. But due to the reduction of the army, the 61st GMP was disbanded in June 1946. Some of the officers were demobilized. The rest began to be transferred to other units. As a rule, with a demotion. Not everyone agreed. They wrote reports and sought dismissal. I was left in the frames.

The certification for me from that period stated:

“...Comrade Lyakhovetsky, working as the division's intelligence chief, showed himself to be a demanding, strong-willed officer towards himself and his subordinates. For short period Service in the regiment managed to weld together a team capable of completing any task. At the inspection review by the commission of the Chief. Marshal of Artillery Voronov, the scouts trained by him received a good rating.

A competent, strong-willed officer, he enjoys well-deserved authority among his subordinates. Sociable, polite. Artillery and tactical training is quite satisfactory. He knows his personal weapons and is quite proficient with them. He works systematically to improve his knowledge. Has good organizational skills, combining them in caring for subordinates. Politically literate, morally stable...

Conclusions: B peacetime The position is fully appropriate; it would be advisable to remain in the armed forces.

Commander of the 2nd Division of the 61st GMP

Guard Major /Malyutin/

"I affirm"

Commander of the 61st Guards Mortar Zaporozhye Order of Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Alexander Nevsky Regiment.

This was followed by service in the 87th (also later disbanded) and 5th Guards Mortar Regiments. However, over the years, the consequences of a serious wound received at the front became clear, and the frequent change of units no longer suited me, and I submitted my report for dismissal.

My generation has had a difficult fate. Literally after school prom the war began. Out of every hundred of my peers, only three returned from it. Many of those who returned lost their health, became disabled due to wounds, and died early. And although it was not easy for us, we do not complain about fate. We have fulfilled our duty to our Motherland. Our conscience before our descendants, our children and grandchildren, is clear.

Zhitomir, 2001-2005, 2015

Prepared and sent for publication: retired colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky

1937 The leaders of the Jet Research Institute, without whom the legendary Katyusha would not have existed, were shot. For many years, only the Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Andrei Kostikov, was considered the author of the formidable weapon, according to strange coincidence who headed the institute after the arrest of his colleagues.

Why the government of those years decided to shoot the designers who forged the “weapon of Victory”, and whether they were the only creators of “Katyusha”, read the material on the site.

To understand difficult fate creators, first let us remember what role the installation played in the Great Patriotic War. The Katyusha, or rocket-propelled mortar based on the ZiS-6 truck (later Studebaker US6), was adopted by the Red Army on June 21, 1941. The weapon is a rocket and a launcher consisting of guides - a “rail”. The projectile accelerates along the guide and explodes upon contact with the ground.

Soviet commanders used Katyusha rockets en masse, and this terrified the enemy: after a salvo, only scorched earth remained at the target site, and Reich acoustics could not “detect” Russian artillery.

During the war, more than 10 thousand units were produced, which fought on many fronts. Later, the Katyushas became adept at firing almost directly, “knocking out” the Germans from the ruins of Berlin.

Work on the creation of missile weapons in the Soviet Union began already in the 20s. This was done by a group led by Georgy Langemak, and at the end of 1933, the world's first Jet Research Institute, also known as NII-3, appeared in Moscow.

The head of the gas-dynamic laboratory, Ivan Kleimenov, was appointed director of the institute, and Sergei Korolev (the same Korolev who would later become the father of Soviet cosmonautics) was appointed his deputy. Later Andrei Kostikov also came there. According to many testimonies, his scientific successes were small. Previously, he graduated from the Kyiv Military School, then from the Zhukovsky Academy, where in those days the teaching was not very good.

Soon Kostikov became the head of the department for the development of liquid rocket engines, but his ambitions clearly extended further. In the documents of that time there is a denunciation where he writes that Langemak, Glushko and so on, “instead of improving one model, they are expanding production in breadth.” In other words, scientists allegedly did not improve the sample, but immediately launched mass production with the thought “look, someone will improve it themselves.”

Later, Kostikov wrote another note, but to the CPSU Central Committee, as a result of which the leadership of the research institute was arrested. Then Kostikov became acting. chief engineer, and already in 1938 - chief engineer. Let us note that the denunciation was about people who “deliberately do things wrong and thereby cause damage to the state.”

The engineer took everything into account: he was “one of his own,” the son of a handyman, a former mechanic, who received his education after the revolution, and Langemak was from a priest’s family, studied at a gymnasium and fought in the tsarist army.

Another competitor of Kostikov in career growth there was Sergei Korolev, deputy head of the institute. And again, an internal memo to the Central Committee, as a result of which Korolev, together with another scientist, one of the founders of rocketry, Valentin Glushko, ends up in “sharaga” - a specialized scientific institution in the NKVD system, essentially in prison. Those who sit there continue to work on their projects, but under supervision.

In 1940, Andrei Kostikov, together with his colleague Ivan Gvai and a representative of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Vasily Aborenkov, received a patent for the invention. In June 1941, literally on the eve of the war, he showed the new weapon to Stalin, and he gave the go-ahead to put it into production.

What exact contribution Kostikov made to the matter is still unknown. He received almost finished shells for the Katyusha and a design for a transverse launcher (remember, in the BM-13 the rails are located along the vehicle). However, many parameters of the weapon were not specified by scientists, but were dictated by objective reasons - dimensions, ease of use, cost.

Dozens of engineers took part in the creation of the Katyusha: those who developed the engines, came up with the empennage, the hull, and simply created the ideology of rocket artillery. At the same time, there was simply no person who could give at least the concept of the combat use of a mortar. Everything was done by trial and error.

Later, in 1955, all participants in those events were rehabilitated, but this did not mean recognition of authorship. It was only during the years of perestroika that archival files were raised and Kostikov’s denunciations were found. Having reviewed the materials, Georgy Langemak, Ivan Kleimenov and their colleagues were made Heroes of Socialist Labor in 1991 with the wording “for their great contribution to the creation of the BM-13-Katyusha launchers.”

We also returned to the fate of Kostikov. It turned out that his life was not without prison: they tried to arrest him at the beginning of the war, but then the fame of the creator of the “weapon of Victory” saved him. He died in December 1950 with the rank of major general and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences.

As for the authorship - who exactly created "Katyusha", then, according to scientists, it was a collective work. Thus, historian Nikita Petrov cites the example of the Kalashnikov assault rifle - a weapon behind which dozens of people stand, but only one has become its symbol.

It turns out that the leaders of the research institute - Georgy Langemak and Ivan Kleimenov - were only partly the creators of Katyusha, just like Kostikov. But why were they shot then?

The fact is that the institute was subordinate to Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was accused of a fabricated “military case” - an alleged attempt to seize power and transfer secret information to Germany. In addition to the marshal himself, several dozen more people were shot, including Langemak and Kleimenov.

The fact that scientists made significant contributions to the creation of the mortar is not reflected in the “military file.” Rather, it was just a coincidence - they worked at a “disgraced” research institute. And Kostikov, who for a long time was considered the author of the legendary "Katyusha", simply turned out to be at the right time and in the right place and decided to gain fame in this way.

After the adoption of 82-mm air-to-air missiles RS-82 (1937) and 132-mm air-to-ground missiles RS-132 (1938) into aviation service, the Main Artillery Directorate set the projectile developer - The Jet Research Institute is tasked with creating a multiple launch rocket system based on RS-132 projectiles. The updated tactical and technical specifications were issued to the institute in June 1938.

In accordance with this task, by the summer of 1939 the institute developed a new 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which later received the official name M-13. Compared to the aircraft RS-132, this projectile had a longer flight range and was significantly more powerful. combat unit. The increase in flight range was achieved by increasing the number rocket fuel, for this it was necessary to lengthen the rocket and head parts of the rocket projectile by 48 cm. The M-13 projectile had slightly better aerodynamic characteristics than the RS-132, which made it possible to obtain higher accuracy.

A self-propelled multi-charge launcher was also developed for the projectile. Its first version was created on the basis of the ZIS-5 truck and was designated MU-1 (mechanized unit, first sample). Field tests of the installation carried out between December 1938 and February 1939 showed that it did not fully meet the requirements. Taking into account the test results, the Jet Research Institute developed a new MU-2 launcher, which was accepted by the Main Artillery Directorate for field testing in September 1939. Based on the results of field tests completed in November 1939, the institute was ordered five launchers for military testing. Another installation was ordered by the Artillery Directorate Navy for use in the coastal defense system.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to urgently launch mass production of M-13 missiles and the launcher, which received official name BM-13 (combat vehicle 13).

The production of BM-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of launchers in urgently was deployed at several enterprises with different production capabilities, in connection with this, more or less significant changes were made to the design of the installation. Thus, the troops used up to ten varieties of the BM-13 launcher, which made it difficult to train personnel and had a negative impact on the operation of military equipment. For these reasons, a unified (normalized) launcher BM-13N was developed and put into service in April 1943, during the creation of which the designers critically analyzed all parts and components in order to increase the manufacturability of their production and reduce cost, as a result of which all components received independent indexes and became universal. Compound

The BM-13 "Katyusha" includes the following military means:

Combat vehicle (BM) MU-2 (MU-1);
Missiles.
M-13 rocket:

The M-13 projectile consists of a warhead and a powder jet engine. The design of the warhead resembles a high-explosive fragmentation artillery shell and is equipped with an explosive charge, which is detonated using a contact fuse and an additional detonator. Jet engine has a combustion chamber in which a propellant propellant charge is placed in the form of cylindrical blocks with an axial channel. To ignite powder charge igniters are used. The gases formed during the combustion of powder bombs flow through the nozzle, in front of which there is a diaphragm that prevents the bombs from being ejected through the nozzle. Stabilization of the projectile in flight is ensured by a tail stabilizer with four feathers welded from stamped steel halves. (This method of stabilization provides lower accuracy compared to stabilization by rotation around the longitudinal axis, but allows for a greater range of projectile flight. In addition, the use of a feathered stabilizer greatly simplifies the technology for producing rockets).

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. According to the shooting tables of 1942, with a firing range of 3000 m, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and at the range - 257 m.

In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part, through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escapes, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. The adoption of the M-13-UK projectile into service in April 1944 contributed to a sharp increase in the fire capabilities of rocket artillery.

MLRS "Katyusha" launcher:

A self-propelled multi-charge launcher has been developed for the projectile. Its first version, MU-1, based on the ZIS-5 truck, had 24 guides mounted on a special frame in a transverse position relative to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Its design made it possible to launch rockets only perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, and jets of hot gases damaged the elements of the installation and the body of the ZIS-5. Safety was also not ensured when controlling fire from the driver's cabin. The launcher swayed strongly, which worsened the accuracy of the rockets. Loading the launcher from the front of the rails was inconvenient and time-consuming. The ZIS-5 vehicle had limited cross-country ability.

The more advanced MU-2 launcher based on the ZIS-6 off-road truck had 16 guides located along the axis of the vehicle. Each two guides were connected, forming a single structure called a “spark”. A new unit was introduced into the design of the installation - a subframe. The subframe made it possible to assemble the entire artillery part of the launcher (as a single unit) on it, and not on the chassis, as was previously the case. Once assembled, the artillery unit was relatively easily mounted on the chassis of any make of car with minimal modification to the latter. The created design made it possible to reduce the labor intensity, manufacturing time and cost of launchers. The weight of the artillery unit was reduced by 250 kg, the cost by more than 20 percent. The combat and operational qualities of the installation were significantly increased. Due to the introduction of armor for the gas tank, gas pipeline, side and rear walls of the driver's cabin, the survivability of the launchers in combat was increased. The firing sector was increased, the stability of the launcher in the traveling position was increased, and improved lifting and turning mechanisms made it possible to increase the speed of pointing the installation at the target. Before launch, the MU-2 combat vehicle was jacked up similarly to the MU-1. The forces rocking the launcher, thanks to the location of the guides along the chassis of the vehicle, were applied along its axis to two jacks located near the center of gravity, so the rocking became minimal. Loading in the installation was carried out from the breech, that is, from the rear end of the guides. This was more convenient and made it possible to significantly speed up the operation. The MU-2 installation had a rotating and lifting mechanism of the simplest design, a bracket for mounting a sight with a conventional artillery panorama, and a large metal fuel tank mounted at the rear of the cabin. The cockpit windows were covered with armored folding shields. Opposite the seat of the commander of the combat vehicle, on the front panel there was mounted a small rectangular box with a turntable, reminiscent of a telephone dial, and a handle for turning the dial. This device was called the “fire control panel” (FCP). From it went a wiring harness to a special battery and to each guide.

With one turn of the launcher handle, the electrical circuit closed, the squib placed in the front part of the projectile’s rocket chamber was triggered, the reactive charge was ignited and a shot was fired. The rate of fire was determined by the rate of rotation of the PUO handle. All 16 shells could be fired in 7-10 seconds. The time it took to transfer the MU-2 launcher from traveling to combat position was 2-3 minutes, the vertical firing angle ranged from 4° to 45°, and the horizontal firing angle was 20°.

The design of the launcher allowed it to move in a charged state with fairly high speed(up to 40 km/h) and rapid deployment to a firing position, which facilitated the delivery of surprise attacks on the enemy.

A significant factor increasing the tactical mobility of rocket artillery units armed with BM-13N installations was the fact that the powerful American Studebaker US 6x6 truck, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, was used as a base for the launcher. This car had increased cross-country ability, provided by a powerful engine, three drive axles (6x6 wheel arrangement), a range multiplier, a winch for self-pulling, and a high location of all parts and mechanisms sensitive to water. The development of the BM-13 serial combat vehicle was finally completed with the creation of this launcher. In this form she fought until the end of the war.

Performance characteristics MLRS BM-13 "Katyusha"
M-13 rocket
Caliber, mm 132
Projectile weight, kg 42.3
Warhead mass, kg 21.3
Mass of explosive, kg 4.9
Maximum firing range, km 8.47
Salvo production time, sec 7-10
MU-2 combat vehicle
Base ZiS-6 (8x8)
BM weight, t 43.7
Maximum speed, km/h 40
Number of guides 16
Vertical firing angle, degrees from +4 to +45
Horizontal firing angle, degrees 20
Calculation, pers. 10-12
Year of adoption 1941

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941, under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured by the Jet Research Institute. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction along with the German trains with troops and military equipment located on it.

The exceptional efficiency of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 three-battery divisions with four launchers per battery operated at the fronts. For their armament, 593 BM-13 installations were manufactured in 1941. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with BM-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1,414 personnel, 36 BM-13 launchers and 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The regiment's salvo amounted to 576 132mm shells. At the same time, enemy personnel and military equipment were destroyed over an area of over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of the Reserve Artillery of the Supreme High Command.

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