The famous battle on the Kursk Bulge took place. Battle of Kursk: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
In order to realize this possibility, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive in this direction. It hoped, by delivering a series of powerful counter-strikes, to defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The plan of the operation (code name “Citadel”) was to encircle and then destroy Soviet troops by striking in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the operation. Subsequently, it was planned to strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in the northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group Soviet troops and creating a threat to Moscow. To carry out Operation Citadel, the best generals of the Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a large number of individual units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the army group. Center (Field Marshal G. Kluge), to the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by aircraft of the 4th and 6th air fleets. In total, this group numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated in a sector that was only about 14% of its length.
In order to achieve rapid success of its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. Medium and heavy vehicles that entered service with the German army T-IV tanks, T-V (“Panther”), T-VI (“Tiger”), Ferdinand assault guns had good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to high initial speed shells achieved increased armor penetration. Members of the artillery regiments tank divisions armored self-propelled howitzers"Hummel" and "Vespe" could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, they were equipped with excellent Zeiss optics. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to ensure maintaining air superiority and reliable support for tank divisions.
The German command attached particular importance to the surprise of Operation Citadel. For this purpose, it was envisaged to carry out disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. To this end, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the South army zone. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were deployed, transport means were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, agents were activated, rumors were spread, etc. In the Army Group Center zone, on the contrary, everything was diligently camouflaged. But although all activities were carried out with great care and method, they did not produce effective results.
In order to secure the rear areas of their strike forces, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. Thus, more than 10 divisions acted against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhitomir region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.
When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) intended to carry out a broad offensive, delivering the main blow in the southwestern direction with the goal of defeating Army Group South, liberating Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and crossing the river. Dnieper.
The Soviet command began developing a plan for upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme High Command Headquarters, the General Staff, and all the front commanders defending the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan included delivering the main attack in the southwestern direction. Soviet military intelligence It was possible to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set the date for the start of the operation.
The Soviet command was faced with a difficult task - to choose a course of action: to attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the general situation and his thoughts on the actions of the Red Army in the summer of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area, the marshal reported: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy . It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.” The boss shared the same views. General Staff: “A thorough analysis of the situation and anticipation of the development of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts must be concentrated to the north and south of Kursk, to bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go on a counter-offensive and defeat him.”
As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to switch to defense in the area of the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal course of action - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, the generals, continued to insist on launching a pre-emptive strike in the Donbass. They were supported by some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when the Citadel plan became known for sure. Subsequent analysis and real move events showed that the decision to deliberately defend in conditions of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.
The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: it was necessary to expel the German occupiers beyond the Smolensk - r. line. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive “eastern rampart” of the enemy, as well as eliminate the enemy bridgehead in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be delivered in the southwestern direction, and the second in the western direction. On the Kursk salient, it was decided to use deliberate defense to exhaust and bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive to complete their defeat. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of the Soviet troops did not always withstand massive enemy attacks, which led to tragic consequences.
To this end, it was planned to make maximum use of the advantages of a pre-created multi-line defense, bleed the enemy's main tank groups, exhaust his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air superiority. Then, launching a decisive counter-offensive, complete the defeat of enemy groups in the area of the Kursk bulge.
The defensive operation near Kursk involved mainly troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. The Supreme Command Headquarters understood that the transition to deliberate defense was associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd Reserve, 24, 53, 66, 47, 46, 5th Guards Tank Armies, 1st, 3rd and 4th Guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th Tank Armies, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the areas of Kastorny, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossoshi and Ostrogozhsk. The front field control was located near Voronezh. Five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, and a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command. From April 10 to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. In total, 5,635 guns, 3,522 mortars, and 1,284 aircraft were transferred to the two fronts.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District numbered 1,909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns artillery installations(self-propelled guns), about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, the Soviet troops were planned to launch a counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the enemy’s Oryol group (Kutuzov plan) was entrusted to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General) and the right wing of the Central Front. The offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (the “Commander Rumyantsev” plan) was planned to be carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (Army General R.Ya. Malinovsky). Coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, colonel general of artillery, and aviation - to air marshal.
The troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft with deep echeloning of battle formations and fortifications, with a widely developed system of strong points, trenches, communication passages and barriers.
A state defense line was established along the left bank of the Don. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. Each front had three army and three front defensive lines, equipped in engineering terms.
Both fronts had six armies: Central Front - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6th, 7th Guards, 38th, 40th, 69th Combined Arms and 1st Tank. The width of the defense zones of the Central Front was 306 km, and that of the Voronezh Front was 244 km. On the Central Front, all combined arms armies were located in the first echelon; on the Voronezh Front, four combined arms armies were located.
The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army, having assessed the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th Combined Arms Army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the 13th Army’s defense zone from 56 to 32 km and increase its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational structure became two-echelon.
To the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Therefore, the defense line of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was the one that defended in the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army) was 64 km. Given the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division, the army commander was forced to build the army troops into one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.
Thus, the defensive depth is 6th Guards Army initially turned out to be less than the depth of the 13th Army's band. This operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of the rifle corps, trying to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.
Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groups. Special attention addressed the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy attacks. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery from the reserve of the High Command in battle, the assignment of reinforcement artillery regiments to the armies, and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.
In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, in the expected direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (taking into account the second echelon and reserves of the front). Moreover, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated in the zone of the 13th Army, where the spearhead of the attack of the main enemy forces was aimed. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was reinforced by the 4th Breakthrough Artillery Corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery installations. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). Such a density of artillery had not been seen in any of the previous defensive operations.
Thus, the desire of the Central Front command to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, without giving the enemy the opportunity to break out beyond its boundaries, was clearly visible, which significantly complicated the further struggle.
The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved somewhat differently. Since the front troops were built in two echelons, the artillery was distributed between the echelons. But even on this front, in the main direction, which made up 47% of the entire front line of defense, where the 6th and 7th Guards armies were stationed, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density - 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. 67% of the front's guns and mortars and up to 66% of the artillery of the RVGK (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.
The command of the Central and Voronezh Fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the vast majority of anti-tank weapons, were located on the Voronezh Front. On the Central Front, more than one-third of all artillery anti-tank weapons became part of the artillery anti-tank reserve of the front, as a result, the commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky was able to quickly use his reserves to fight enemy tank groups in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh Front, the bulk of anti-tank artillery was transferred to the first echelon armies.
Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy group opposing them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1 times, in artillery by 2.5 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 1.8 times, and in aircraft by 1.4 times.
On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike forces, weakened by the preemptive artillery counter-training of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 tanks and assault guns against the defenders in the Oryol-Kursk direction, and about 700 in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army and the adjacent flanks of the 48th and 70th armies in a 45 km wide zone. The enemy's northern group delivered the main blow with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th Army of the general. Four infantry divisions attacked against the right flank of the 13th and left flank of the 48th Army (commander - general) towards Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the general's 70th Army in the direction of Gnilets. The advance of ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn fighting ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, not expecting to encounter such powerful resistance, was forced to re-conduct an hour-long artillery preparation. In increasingly fierce battles, warriors of all branches of the military fought heroically.
Defensive operations of the Central and Voronezh fronts during the Battle of Kursk
But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly move forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery units, rifle formations, field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, intensifying the actions of its aviation, also brought heavy tanks into the battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.
Having encountered stubborn resistance from the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought almost all of the formations of the strike group of Army Group Center into the battle, but they were unable to break through the defenses. In seven days they managed to advance only 10-12 km, without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that in other directions in the defense zone of the troops of the Central Front, the enemy did not carry out active offensive operations.
Having repelled enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive actions.
On the southern front of the Kursk salient, in the Voronezh Front, the struggle was also extremely intense. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the military outpost of the 6th Guards Army of the general. By the end of the day they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - towards Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary blow fell on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod area to Korocha.
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Memorial "The beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge." Belgorod region
The German command sought to develop achieved success, continuing to increase their efforts along the Belgorod - Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense line of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to wedge into it approximately 9 km southwest of Prokhorovka. However, he failed to break into operational space.
On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, an auxiliary strike force attacked Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included selected divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Adolf Hitler”, as well as units of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were brought to the Prokhorovsk direction.
Having discovered the enemy’s maneuver, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin advanced the 69th Army in this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. On July 9, she ordered the commander of the troops of the Steppe Front, the general, to advance the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the subordination of General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army. The troops of the Voronezh Front were supposed to disrupt the enemy’s offensive by delivering a powerful counterattack (five armies) against his group, which had wedged itself in the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11 it was not possible to launch a counterattack. On this day, the enemy captured the line planned for the deployment of tank formations. Only by introducing four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army into the battle did the general manage to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, oncoming battles of forward detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.
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Tankers, in cooperation with infantry, counterattack the enemy. Voronezh Front. 1943
On July 12, both opposing groups went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovsk direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle ensued. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the north-west, Yakovlevo was attacked by formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. East of Belgorod, the attack was launched by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 went on the offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.
Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psel, in the defense zone of the 5th Guards Army, the Totenkopf tank division launched an offensive. However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which were directly opposed to the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, having prepared them for defense overnight. In a rather narrow area from Berezovka (30 km northwest of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle between two tank strike groups took place. The battle lasted all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The fight was extremely fierce. The losses of Soviet tank corps were 73% and 46%, respectively.
As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk area, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to reach the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed. The motorized SS divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf” stopped attacks and consolidated their positions. On that day, the 3rd German Tank Corps, advancing on Prokhorovka from the south, was able to push back the formations of the 69th Army by 10-15 km. Both sides suffered heavy losses.
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The collapse of hopes.
German soldier on the Prokhorovsky field
Despite the fact that the counterattack of the Voronezh Front slowed down the enemy’s advance, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.
In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy strike force was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterattack of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the counterattacking Soviet - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines they occupied. During these 5-6 days (after July 12), there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.
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On the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Broken enemy equipment after a Soviet air raid
On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received orders from the commander of the Voronezh Front to switch to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.
One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful group of Soviet troops struck the most powerful group of the enemy, but not in the flank, but in the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the advantageous configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike at the base of the enemy wedge in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire group of German troops operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole, did not yet properly master combat skills, and military leaders did not properly master the art of attack. There were also omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground troops with aviation, and between formations and units.
On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army had 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 heavy Churchill III tanks with a 57-mm cannon, received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery units, but not a single SU-152. Soviet medium tank had the ability with an armor-piercing projectile to penetrate armor 61 mm thick at a distance of 1000 m and 69 mm at a distance of 500 m. Tank armor: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, turret - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. The armor-piercing shell of its 75-mm cannon at a range of up to 1500 m penetrated armor of more than 63 mm. The German heavy tank T-VIH "tiger" with an 88-mm cannon had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, turret - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing projectile penetrated 115 mm thick armor. It penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a range of up to 2000 m.
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Company American tanks M3s "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. July 1943
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps opposing the army had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy Tiger tanks (88 mm gun), dozens of high-speed (34 km/h) medium Panther tanks, modernized T-III and T-IV (75 mm gun) and Ferdinand heavy assault guns (88 mm gun). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to get within 500 m of it, which was not always possible; the rest of the Soviet tanks had to come even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. It was possible to fight with any hope of success in such conditions only in close combat. As a result, losses mounted. At Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of their tanks (500 out of 800), and German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). For them it was a disaster. For the Wehrmacht, such losses turned out to be difficult to replace.
The repulsion of the most powerful attack by the troops of Army Group South was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, perseverance and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the military.
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Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul on Prokhorovsky Field
The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began on July 12 with attacks from the northeast and east of the formations of the left wing of the Western Front and the troops of the Bryansk Front against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center defending in the Oryol direction. On July 15, troops of the Central Front launched attacks from the south and southeast on Kromy.
Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Kursk
Concentric strikes by the front troops broke through the enemy's deeply layered defenses. Advancing in converging directions towards Orel, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the approaches to Bryansk.
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As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy’s Oryol group (they defeated 15 divisions) and advanced westward up to 150 km.
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Residents of the liberated city of Oryol and Soviet soldiers at the entrance to the cinema before the screening of the newsreel documentary film “The Battle of Oryol.” 1943
The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing the retreating enemy troops, by July 23 reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation, and on August 3 launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.
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Crossing of the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943
With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Tank Army and Task Force Kempf, and liberated Belgorod on August 5.
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Soldiers of the 89th Belgorod-Kharkov Guards Rifle Division
pass along the street of Belgorod. August 5, 1943
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Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of World War II. On both sides, more than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand aircraft were involved in it. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tanks) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft . The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could attack only in winter. The collapse of the Wehrmacht's offensive strategy once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally secured their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy at the "Fire Arc" became important stage in achieving a radical turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.
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Cemetery of German soldiers near Glazunovka station. Oryol region
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.
In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. Feature decision taken was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, it was planned to transition to a decisive counter-offensive and deploy a general offensive in order to liberate Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts big amount mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.
In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and Mius pp. constrained the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here of his troops near Kursk).
The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the front forces made it possible to firmly hold the second and army defense lines and front lines during a defensive battle, preventing the enemy from breaking through into the operational depth. High activity and greater stability of the defense were given by the wide maneuver of second echelons and reserves, artillery counter-preparation and counter-attacks. During the counter-offensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured high rates advance of ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during the offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groups (in the Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka areas). The problem of ensuring sustainable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing control points closer to the combat formations of troops and the widespread introduction of radio equipment into all organs and control points.
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Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge". Kursk
At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were also significant shortcomings that negatively affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of Soviet troops, which amounted to: irrevocable - 254,470 people, sanitary - 608,833 people. They were partly due to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy’s offensive, the development of a plan for artillery counterpreparation in the fronts had not been completed, because reconnaissance was unable to accurately identify the locations of troop concentrations and target locations on the night of July 5. Counterpreparations began prematurely, when the enemy troops had not yet completely occupied their starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, the fire was carried out over areas, which allowed the enemy to avoid heavy losses, put the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day penetrate 3-6 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The counterattacks of the fronts were prepared hastily and were often launched against an enemy who had not exhausted its offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the counterattacking troops going over to the defensive. During the Oryol operation, there was excessive haste in going on the offensive, which was not determined by the situation.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, perseverance and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev.
Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(Used illustrations from the book Arc of Fire. Battle of Kursk July 5 - August 23, 1943 Moscow and / d Belfry)
Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Non-refundable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Non-refundable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Non-refundable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Non-refundable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470
killed, captured, missing
608 833
wounded, sick
153 thousand units of small arms
6064
tanks and self-propelled guns
5245
guns and mortars
1626
combat aircraft
1000
tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696
airplanes
| The Great Patriotic War |
|---|
| Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:
| Source | Personnel (thousands) | Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns | Guns and (sometimes) mortars | Aircraft | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | |
| RF Ministry of Defense | 1336 | over 900 | 3444 | 2733 | 19100 | about 10000 | 2172 2900 (including Po-2 and long range) |
2050 |
| Krivosheev 2001 | 1272 | |||||||
| Glanz, House | 1910 | 780 | 5040 | 2696 or 2928 | ||||
| Müller-Gill. | 2540 or 2758 | |||||||
| Zett., Frankson | 1910 | 777 | 5128 +2688 “reserve rates” in total more than 8000 |
2451 | 31415 | 7417 | 3549 | 1830 |
| KOSAVE | 1337 | 900 | 3306 | 2700 | 20220 | 10000 | 2650 | 2500 |
The role of intelligence
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:
...I think the main ones offensive operations the enemy will deploy against these three fronts in order to, having defeated our troops in this direction, gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support large quantity aviation will strike with its Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.
Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. ( german army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 o'clock in the morning), 30-40 minutes before it began, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Without achieving success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.
To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tank Tank did not reach Oboyan at all.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of 48 Tank Tank on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches along almost the entire length of the defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against enemy tanks accumulated in front of engineering barriers, the competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division zone, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassy and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassy in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment battalions (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 gap) and army (493 iptap, and also the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) with an anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd and 11th infantry divisions with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 sap (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU -76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.
A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units
Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.
The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to 48 Tank Tank), less saturated armored vehicles, who managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the above-described hostilities, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).
After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
Battle of Prokhorovka
Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut off the railway Kharkov-Poltava, captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the “Watch on the Rhine” () or the operation at Lake Balaton () were also unsuccessful.
The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).
The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming collision occurred tank battle World War II - a battle between an advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.
Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.
August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.
Fact 1
The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.
Battle of Kursk
Fact 2
The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of the Second World War, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.
Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.
Scheme of the Battle of Kursk
Fact 3
1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, then how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.
Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation it would be to exhaust the enemy on their defense, destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.
As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.
In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.
Construction of defensive lines
Fact 4
Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.
Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.
In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was inaccurately determined.
Fact 5
Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies in the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.
Soviet tanks officers inspect the damaged Tiger
Fact 6
The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It happened on Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.
Fact 7
In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.
Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.
Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide, facing west, was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or salient). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.
For this purpose, a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”) was developed and approved in April 1943.
To carry it out, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones, as well as a large number of individual units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center, in the 4th 1st Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South.
The group of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft.
Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts included more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern front (the area facing the enemy) of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin– southern. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps (commander - Colonel General Ivan Konev).
The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
Progress of the battle
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorovsky field.
Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it on both sides.
The battle near Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region became largest battle Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge.
The staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was fought not by tanks, but by rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11 the Nazis were stopped at the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.
Tank units “Adolf Hitler”, “Totenkopf”, division “Reich” and others were able to decisive battle regroup your forces. The Soviet command did not know about this.
The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a notoriously difficult position: the tank strike group was located between the girders southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full width. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area limited on one side by the railway and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River.
The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.
Ivan Markin first wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century.
In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went on the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces.
July, 12 The next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counter-offensive of Soviet troops.
5th of August As a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Oryol and Belgorod were liberated; in the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of this event for the first time during the war.
August 23 Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction and took up an advantageous position for launching a general offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. The Soviet Army finally consolidated its strategic initiative; the German command was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front.
In one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, more than 4 million people took part on both sides, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.
Results of the battle
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued its advance to the West.
After the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
The fascists found themselves morally depressed, their confidence in their superiority disappeared.
The significance of the victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. It had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the fascist German command to withdraw large formations of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean theater of operations.
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of new formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and their advance to it. central regions, which ultimately predetermined the country’s exit from the war. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change was completed not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For their exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 formations and units received the guards rank, more than 20 received the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov.
For its contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.
On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title of the Russian Federation - City of Military Glory.
In 1983, the feat was immortalized in Kursk Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge - On May 9, a memorial to those killed during the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the Kursk Bulge memorial complex was opened.
The material was prepared according to TASS-Dossier data
Wounded Memory
Dedicated to Alexander Nikolaev,
the driver-mechanic of the T-34 tank, who carried out the first tank ramming in the battle of Prokhorovka.
The memory will not heal like a wound,
Let's not forget all the common soldiers,
That they entered this battle, dying,
And they remained alive forever.
No, not a step back, look straight ahead
Only the blood has drained from the face,
Just clenching your teeth stubbornly -
We will stand here until the end!
Let any price be the life of a soldier,
We will all become armor today!
Your mother, your city, the honor of a soldier
Behind the boyish thin back.
Two steel avalanches - two forces
They merged among the fields of rye.
No you, no me - we are one,
We came together like a steel wall.
There are no maneuvers, no formation - there is strength,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And a fierce battle mowed down
Both armor and soldier names.
The tank is hit, the battalion commander is wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burn!
Shouting over the radio feat is equal to:
- All! Farewell! I'm going to ram!
Enemies are paralyzed, the choice is difficult -
You won't believe your eyes right away.
A burning tank flies without a miss -
He gave his life for his homeland.
Only the black funeral square
Will explain to mothers and relatives...
His heart is in the ground, like fragments...
He remained always young.
...On the burnt land there is not a blade of grass,
Tank on tank, armor on armor...
And there are wrinkles on the foreheads of the commanders -
The battle has nothing to compare with in war...
The earthly wound will not heal -
His feat is always with him.
Because he knew when he was dying
How easy it is to die young...
In the memorial temple it is quiet and holy,
Your name is a scar on the wall...
You stayed to live here - yes, that’s how it should be,
So that the earth does not burn in fire.
On this land, once black,
The burning trail does not let you forget.
Your torn heart of a soldier
In spring it blooms with cornflowers...
Elena Mukhamedshina
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