Battle of Kursk reconnaissance. The Great Battle of Kursk: plans and forces of the parties

The Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad, where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.

The main idea of the "Citadel" was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled units. Hitler had no doubt about his success. But general staff Soviet army developed a plan aimed at liberating Russian troops and battle defense.

Yours interesting name in the form of a battle on Kursk Bulge The battle took place due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.

Change the course of the Great Patriotic War and deciding the fate of Russian cities such as Orel and Belgorod was entrusted to the armies Center, South and Task Force Kempf. Detachments of the Central Front were assigned to the defense of Orel, and detachments of the Voronezh Front were assigned to the defense of Belgorod.

Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the destruction of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel region, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Fronts, switching to Operation Kutuzov. In three days, from July 16 to 18, the Central Front liquidated the Nazi group. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and were thus driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.

Results of the Battle of Kursk (briefly).

a sharp turn in the course of events of the Great Patriotic War;
after the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the global level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
The fascists found themselves morally depressed and lost all confidence in their superiority.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk.

After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued to advance to the West, liberating Russian cities.

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of key battles Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).

The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

The Battle of Kursk was the fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, which began with the victory at Stalingrad, ended.

Chronological framework

In domestic historiography, there is an established point of view that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. It distinguishes two periods: the defensive stage and the counter-offensive of the Red Army.

At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts, Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943), with the involvement of strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan "

Background and plans of the parties

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German leadership faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough as was the case in 1942 should have helped not only to solve these problems, but also to raise the morale of the troops.

In April, the Operation Citadel plan was developed, according to which two groups strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk salient. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, reduce the front line to 245 km, and form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) “Center” deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several modifications to the plan, she received the task: breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, connecting in the Kursk area with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Tank Army (TA) of Colonel General G. Hoth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the Voronezh Front line, she had to travel more than 140 km to the meeting place. The external front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 AK 9A and the army group (AG) “Kempf” from the GA “South”. Active combat operations were planned to take place over an area of about 150 km.

For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated to V. Model, whom Berlin appointed responsible for the operation, 3 tank (41,46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 were tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 SS Tank Corps) and two army (52 AK and AK "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) received the first information about Berlin's planning of a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky received the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk Bulge, repelling possible blow, and then together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, launching a counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel area.

The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk ledge, bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete its defeat in the Bel region -city and Kharkov.

The Kursk defensive operation was considered as the most important element of the entire summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise to complete its defeat and launch a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western Fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front to completely thwart the enemy’s plans. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the Southwestern Front.

On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.

Kursk defensive operation. Fighting in the north of the Kursk Bulge July 5-12, 1943

During April - June, the start of the Citadel was postponed several times. The last date was determined to be dawn on July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles took place over an area of 40 km. 9 A attacked in three directions at short intervals. The main blow was delivered to the 13A of Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov by the forces of 47 Tank Tank - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 Tank Tank and 23 AK - to Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing of 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L. .Romanenko and the third - 46 tk - on Gnilets on the right flank of 70A Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.

In the Olkhovat-Ponyrovsk direction, Model launched more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers were flying in waves in the air, but the powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to immediately break the lines of the Soviet troops.

In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main zone, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry supported by artillery stopped the enemy's offensive. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken anywhere. Troops 48A and the left flank 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, the 47th and 46th Tank Corps managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, and the 70A troops retreated only 5 km.

To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky, in the second half of July 5, decided to carry out a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by the 2nd TA of Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19th Tank Tank in cooperation with the second echelon of 13A - 17th Guards . rifle corps (sk). He was unable to fully solve the problems. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A was stuck in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to July 11, the epicenter of the fighting in zones 13 and 70A was the Ponyri station and the area of the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful resistance centers were created that blocked the path to Kursk. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, it made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.

On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops near Oryol aimed at Kursk. And on July 13, Hitler officially stopped the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at a front of up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results were achieved. Moreover, she did not retain the positions already taken. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive and two days later it basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered in the 6th Guards zone. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1,168 armored units were deployed here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochan direction (east and northeast of Belgorod) positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 tanks and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the tenacity of the soldiers and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA “South” was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the strike force of the Civil Aviation Unit "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because AG Kempf was unable to cover the right wing of 4TA and their troops began to move in diverging directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the impact wedge and direct great forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front than in the north of the Kursk Bulge (up to 130 km) and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the Voronezh Front line in a strip of up to 100 km and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km by the end of the fifth day, while 66% of the armored vehicles in its corps failed.

On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this center of resistance lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours in the area of the station, about 1,100 armored units of the warring parties operated at different times in a 40 km area. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" were able to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retained their combat effectiveness. In the next four days, the most intense battles took place south of the station in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of 4TA and the left wing of AG Kempf. However, it was not possible to defend this area. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2 SS Tank and 3 Tank surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to escape from the “ring”, although with heavy losses

On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to retreat in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front had pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it had launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.

Oryol offensive operation

After two weeks of bloody battles, the Wehrmacht’s last strategic offensive was stopped, but this was only part of the Soviet command’s plan for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.

The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel area, codenamed Operation Kutuzov, was developed before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction of Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, encircle them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy them.

To carry out the operation, part of the forces of the Western Front (commander Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk Front (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Front were involved. Breaking through enemy defenses was planned in five areas. The Western Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the left wing - 11th Guards A Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and the auxiliary one - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Orel (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, had to concentrate the main efforts of 70.13, 48A and 2 TA in the Krom direction. The start of the offensive was strictly linked to the moment when it became clear that strike group 9A was exhausted and tied up in battles on the borders of the Central Front. According to Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.

A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in force on the left flank of the 2nd TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the enemy’s front line and its fire system clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was driven out of the first trench. THEIR. Bagramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. The 1 tk introduced on July 13 completed the breakthrough of the second band. After which 5 Tank Corps began to develop an offensive bypassing Bolkhov, and 1 Tank Corps - towards Khotynets.

The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating on the main, Oryol direction, 3A of Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A of Lieutenant General V.Ya. By the end of July 13, Kolpakchi had broken through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova, in the Bolkhov direction, penetrated the enemy’s defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation. By the end of July 17, his troops had pushed back 9A only to the positions it occupied at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.

However, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because 11th Guards A broke through 70 km in a southern direction, stubbornly moving towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the “key” to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On July 19, the 3rd Guards TA of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko advanced in the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day it had broken through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front was also hastily strengthened. The significant superiority of forces, although not quickly, bore fruit. August 5, 1943 one of the largest regional centers In the European part of the USSR, the city of Orel was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.

After the destruction of the group in the area of Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense fighting took place on the Khotynets - Kromy front, and at the final stage of Operation Kutuzov, the heaviest fighting broke out for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.

On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This concluded Operation Kutuzov. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy group were eliminated in a strategically important direction, and favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.

Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation

It received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”, was carried out from August 3 to 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: in the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the State Guard "South" in the area of Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The Steppe Front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh Front was to bypass them from the north-west and develop success towards Poltava. The main blow was planned to be delivered by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area north-west of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG "Kempf", to fragment them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and south-west. Launch an auxiliary attack on Akhtyrka with forces of 27 and 40A to block the movement of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the Southwestern Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.

On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery barrage, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6th Guards A under Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5th Guards A under Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, made a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed through the “corridor” of the breakthrough and deployed into battle formation, their troops struck swipe on Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having gone 26 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod group from the Tomarov group and reached the line with. Good Will, and the next morning it broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. And on the evening of August 3rd they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA offered stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5th Guards. The TA was pinned down by enemy counterattacks for two days, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to leave west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy group.

After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of AG Kempf to the outskirts and began an assault on it, which by evening ended with the clearing of its main part from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, fireworks were given in Moscow for the first time during the war years.

On this day, a turning point came and in the Voronezh Front zone, in the auxiliary direction, Lieutenant General K.S. 40A went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boromlya and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 liberated Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.

After the liberation of Belgorod, the onslaught of the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagena. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, E. von Manstein on August 11 launched counterattacks on the 1TA and 6th Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of the 3rd Tank AG Kempf, which slowed down the pace of the advance of not only the Voronezh, but also the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of AG Kempf, Konev’s troops continued to persistently advance towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.

On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of the two fronts with a counterattack, now on the extended right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But it was not possible to quickly turn the situation around. The destruction of the Akhtyrka group dragged on until August 25.

On August 18, the offensive of 57A was resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, moved towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture of a resistance node in the forest north-east of Kharkov on August 20 by units 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov was important. Using this success, 69 A of Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin began to bypass the city from the north-west and west. During August 21, the 5th Guards TA corps concentrated in zone 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later it was cut railways Kharkov - Zolochev, Kharkov - Lyubotin - Poltava and the Kharkov - Lyubotin highway, and on August 22, 57A went south of Kharkov to the area of the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of the enemy’s retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.

On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.

Results, significance

In the battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days, about 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12,000 aircraft took part on both sides. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “A major defeat on the Kursk Bulge came for German army the beginning of a mortal crisis, wrote outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the path to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly secured in the hands of the Red Army."

In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive on the Orel-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks by the thousands Soviet tanks T-34.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 - 04:30 The Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

up

In the summer of 1943, Hitler sent all military power Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.

After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up their results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The German army as a whole was short-staffed by 700,000 men.

Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.

Supply problems

The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Second, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.

The plans of the German command are revealed

German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within a day, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.

The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing parties. The Great Controversy

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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS tank divisions (as well as the Grossdeutschland division) each had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those associated with unreliable transmission and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.

1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons last time in this war, classic massive dive bombing attacks were carried out.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Also actively used combat vehicles rocket artillery - "Katyusha".

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.

Victory tactics

Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in a labyrinth of trenches in a futile attempt to break out. Soviet troops, with the help of the local population, dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

			Red Army
Red Army groups: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573,195 soldiers, 8,510 guns and mortars, 1,639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625,591 soldiers, 8,718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft.
Commander-in-Chief: Stalin Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky
Central Front Army General Rokossovsky 48th Army 13th Army 70th Army 65th Army 60th Army 2nd Tank Army 16th air force				Steppe (Reserve) Front Colonel General Konev 5th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Army 27th Army 47th Army 53rd Army 5th Air Army	Voronezh Front Army General Vatutin 38th Army 40th Army 1st Tank Army 6th Guards Army 7th Guards Army 2nd Air Army
		German army
Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft.
Army Group "Center": Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model
20th Army Corps General von Roman 45th Infantry Division 72nd Infantry Division 137th Infantry Division 251st Infantry Division 6th Air Fleet Colonel General Graham 1st Air Division	46th Tank Corps General Zorn 7th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 258th Infantry Division 41st Tank Corps General Harpe 18th Panzer Division 86th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division					47th Tank Corps General Lemelsen 2nd Panzer Division 6th Infantry Division 9th Panzer Division 20th Panzer Division 23rd Army Corps General Friessner 78th Assault Division 216th Infantry Division 383rd Infantry Division
Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein 4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Hoth Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf
11th Army Corps General Routh 106th Infantry Division 320th Infantry Division 42nd Army Corps General Mattenklott 39th Infantry Division 161st Infantry Division 282nd Infantry Division	3rd Tank Corps General Bright 6th Panzer Division 7th Panzer Division 19th Panzer Division 168th Infantry Division 48th Tank Corps General Knobelsdorff 3rd Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 167th Infantry Division Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany"					2nd tank corps SS General Hausser 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" 52nd Army Corps General Ott 57th Infantry Division 255th Infantry Division 332nd Infantry Division 4th Air Fleet General Dessloch
Army Group	Frame					Tank Corps
Army	Division					Tank division
Airborne Brigade

First stage. Strike from the North

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Tanks and infantry from Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. It delayed the start German offensive, but still, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from anti-personnel mines planted at a high density. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they had to not only break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although the Soviet tanks suffered damage from the fire of the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.

German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated, and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.

Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counter-offensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast

Events

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad”.
5. On July 9, the 508th German Grenadier Regiment, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second stage. Strike from the south

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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became known exact date the beginning of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-artillery preparation for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than during the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was supposed to be a place tank battle, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map of the defense of Cherkasy

Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 – view from the south

Events:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New tanks "Panther" 10th tank brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, battle formations mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, strengthens the 67th Guards Army to repel the German offensive rifle division two shelves anti-tank guns. It didn't help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events occurred that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.

Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support even more large group of the 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12th is the decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.

The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks on maximum speeds in order to prevent the enemy from using the superiority of the guns and armor of his tanks on long distance. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army on full speed ahead crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”

Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported that it had destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage to the tune of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.

Events:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of a German armored armada on high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at a very close range (the fire was fired almost point blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles

Results of the Battle of Kursk

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The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. On the outcome Battle of Kursk influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans had to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. The enormous importance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides was also reflected.

According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.

The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted 50 days. As a result of this operation, the strategic initiative finally passed to the side of the Red Army and until the end of the war it was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part. On the day of the 75th anniversary of the beginning legendary battle The website of the Zvezda TV channel has collected ten little-known facts about the Battle of Kursk. 1. Initially the battle was not planned as offensive When planning the spring-summer military campaign of 1943, the Soviet command was faced with a difficult choice: which method of action to prefer - to attack or defend. In their reports on the situation in the Kursk Bulge area, Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle and then launch a counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed it - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Timoshenko, Voroshilov - but Stalin supported the decision to defend, fearing that as a result of our offensive the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. Final decision was adopted in late May - early June, when.

« Real move events showed that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic action,” emphasizes military historian, candidate of historical sciences Yuri Popov.

2. The number of troops in the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of Stalingrad The Battle of Kursk is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. More than four million people were involved in it on both sides (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad, just over 2.1 million people participated at various stages of the fighting). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, during the offensive alone from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tank and two motorized. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat effectiveness. In the Battle of Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions out of a total of 26 divisions available at that time on the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely destroyed. 3. Information about the enemy’s plans was promptly received from intelligence officers from abroad Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Foreign residencies obtained information in advance about Germany’s preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. Thus, on March 22, GRU resident in Switzerland Sandor Rado reported that “...an attack on Kursk may involve using the SS tank corps (an organization banned in the Russian Federation - approx. edit.), which is currently receiving replenishment." And intelligence officers in England (GRU resident Major General I. A. Sklyarov) obtained an analytical report prepared for Churchill, “Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943.”

“The Germans will concentrate forces to eliminate the Kursk salient,” the document said.

Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April revealed in advance the plan of the enemy’s summer campaign and made it possible to forestall the enemy’s attack. 4. The Kursk Bulge became a large-scale baptism of fire for Smersh The counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" were formed in April 1943 - three months before the start of the historic battle. "Death to spies!" - so succinctly and at the same time succinctly defined the main task of this special service Stalin. But the Smershevites not only reliably protected units and formations of the Red Army from enemy agents and saboteurs, but also, which was used by the Soviet command, conducted radio games with the enemy, carried out combinations to bring German agents to our side. The book “The Arc of Fire”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka,” published based on materials from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, talks about a whole series of operations by security officers during that period.

Thus, in order to misinform the German command, the Smersh department of the Central Front and the Smersh department of the Oryol Military District conducted a successful radio game “Experience”. It lasted from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legendary on behalf of the reconnaissance group of Abwehr agents and misled the German command about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk region. In total, 92 radiograms were transmitted to the enemy, 51 were received. Several German agents were called to our side and neutralized, and cargo dropped from the plane was received (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). . 5. On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality What is considered to be the largest battle of armored vehicles of the entire Second World War began near this settlement. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to the greater efficiency of its equipment. Let's say the T-34 had only a 76-mm cannon, and the T-70 had a 45-mm gun. The Churchill III tanks, received by the USSR from England, had a 57-millimeter gun, but this vehicle was characterized by low speed and poor maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm cannon, with a shot from which it penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a range of up to two kilometers.

Our tank could penetrate armor 61 millimeters thick at a distance of a kilometer. By the way, the frontal armor of the same T-IVH reached a thickness of 80 millimeters. It was possible to fight with hope of success in such conditions only in close combat, which was used, however, at the cost of heavy losses. Nevertheless, at Prokhorovka, the Wehrmacht lost 75% of its tank resources. For Germany, such losses were a disaster and proved difficult to recover almost until the very end of the war. 6. General Katukov’s cognac did not reach the Reichstag During the Battle of Kursk, for the first time during the war, the Soviet command used large tank formations in echelon to hold a defensive line on a wide front. One of the armies was commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Katukov, future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, marshal of the armored forces. Subsequently, in his book “At the Edge of the Main Strike,” he, in addition to the difficult moments of his front-line epic, also recalled one funny incident related to the events of the Battle of Kursk.

“In June 1941, after leaving the hospital, on the way to the front I dropped into a store and bought a bottle of cognac, deciding that I would drink it with my comrades as soon as I achieved my first victory over the Nazis,” the front-line soldier wrote. - Since then, this treasured bottle has traveled with me on all fronts. And finally the long-awaited day has arrived. We arrived at the checkpoint. The waitress quickly fried the eggs, and I took a bottle out of my suitcase. We sat down with our comrades at a simple wooden table. They poured cognac, which brought back pleasant memories of peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - “For victory! To Berlin!”

7. Kozhedub and Maresyev crushed the enemy in the sky over Kursk During the Battle of Kursk, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.

“Every day of fighting gave many examples of courage, bravery, and perseverance of our soldiers, sergeants and officers,” notes retired Colonel General Alexey Kirillovich Mironov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. “They consciously sacrificed themselves, trying to prevent the enemy from passing through their defense sector.”

Over 100 thousand participants in those battles were awarded orders and medals, 231 became Hero of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, and 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. Future three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Alexey Maresyev also took part in the battles. On the twentieth of July 1943, during air combat with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots by destroying two enemy FW-190 fighters at once. On August 24, 1943, the deputy squadron commander of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 8. Defeat at the Battle of Kursk came as a shock to Hitler After the failure at the Kursk Bulge, the Fuhrer was furious: he lost his best formations, not yet knowing that in the fall he would have to leave the entire Left Bank Ukraine. Without betraying his character, Hitler immediately laid the blame for the Kursk failure on the field marshals and generals who exercised direct command of the troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

“This was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front."

A German historian from the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, Manfred Pay, wrote:

“The irony of history is that Soviet generals began to assimilate and develop the art operational management troops, which was highly appreciated by the German side, and the Germans themselves, under pressure from Hitler, switched to Soviet positions of rigid defense - according to the principle “at all costs.”

By the way, the fate of the elite SS tank divisions that took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge - “Leibstandarte”, “Totenkopf” and “Reich” - later turned out even more sad. All three units took part in battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remnants made their way into the American zone of occupation. However, the SS tank crews were handed over to the Soviet side, and they were punished as war criminals. 9. The victory at Kursk brought the opening of the Second Front closer As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force in the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. In August 1943, the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff prepared an analytical document in which it assessed the role of the USSR in the war.

“Russia occupies a dominant position,” the report noted, “and is a decisive factor in the impending defeat of the Axis countries in Europe.”

It is no coincidence that President Roosevelt realized the danger of further delaying the opening of the Second Front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference he told his son:

“If things in Russia continue to go as they are now, then perhaps next spring the Second Front will not be needed.”

It is interesting that a month after the end of the Battle of Kursk, Roosevelt already had his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at the conference in Tehran. 10. For the fireworks in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, the entire supply of blank shells in Moscow was used up During the Battle of Kursk, two key cities of the country were liberated - Orel and Belgorod. Joseph Stalin ordered an artillery salute to be held on this occasion in Moscow - the first in the entire war. It was estimated that in order for the fireworks to be heard throughout the city, it was necessary to use about 100 anti-aircraft guns. There were such fire weapons, but the organizers of the ceremonial action had only 1,200 blank shells at their disposal (during the war they were not kept in reserve in the Moscow air defense garrison). Therefore, out of 100 guns, only 12 salvos could be fired. True, the Kremlin mountain cannon division (24 guns) was also involved in the salute, blank shells for which were available. However, the effect of the action may not have been as expected. The solution was to increase the interval between salvos: at midnight on August 5, all 124 guns were fired every 30 seconds. And so that the fireworks could be heard everywhere in Moscow, groups of guns were placed in stadiums and vacant lots in different areas of the capital.