The beginning and outcome of the Battle of Kursk. German offensive tactics
Tank counterattack. Still from the film “Liberation: Arc of Fire.” 1968
There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time you can hear the bell ringing, calling parishioners to worship in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died in Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoe, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo... These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here; the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area. Everything that could burn was burning; everything was covered in dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions - met head-on here.
Before the Prokhorovsky tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles took on the largest scale in the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans collided with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards Separate Tank Corps.
“LET'S HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!”
The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to knock down military outposts in the 6th zone Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive attack with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and an officer shouted to him: “Let's have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive line of the 6th Army. Exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to eat dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Task Force Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and attacked the 7th Guards Army.
Tiger shooter of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps Gerhard Niemann: “One more thing anti-tank gun 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, with the exception of one man. He leans towards the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the rear of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.”
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Tank Army took the main attack. In a few hours of battle, all that was left of its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say, were only numbers. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a front stretching five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive air and artillery strike.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hill where a command post was equipped. It was half past four in the afternoon. But it seemed that it had come solar eclipse. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and tracks clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again.”
By the end of July 8, Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, retreated to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Koneva. Stalin gave the order to move the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march took place around the clock under the cover of aviation from the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust covered roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks in a thick layer, the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling guns), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The soldiers' faces were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. It was unbearably hot. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver mechanics during the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone would replace the drivers, and during short rest stops they would be allowed to sleep.”
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army so reliably covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march that German intelligence was never able to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of July 8. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and, by the end of July 9, concentrated in the area of Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky, strictly at the appointed time.
MAN MAIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling massive enemy attacks, themselves began to launch strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Tank Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division “Grossdeutschland”, 3rd and 11th tank divisions, reinforced by individual companies and battalions of “Tigers” and “Ferdinands”. Units of the 1st Tank Army again bore the brunt of enemy attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce fighting continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochan direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite big losses, which were carried by the enemy, and despite the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were not able to dislodge from the northern part of the defensive line the enemy group that had settled there with the strength of a battalion. The Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.”
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to launch three strong strikes in a comprehensive manner, which should have led to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to introduce fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from Donbass to Kharkov. The German command scheduled the start of the attack on Kursk from the north and south for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counter-offensive with the aim of encircling and defeating enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovsky directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main group of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorovsk direction. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of July 12.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than everyone else, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS Corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, awarded the highest award of the Third Reich " oak leaves to the Knight's Cross."
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich Division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, posing a threat to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was sent in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
The second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions - achieved even less success. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, northeast of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation had arisen. The enemy's 6th and 7th tank divisions broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main group of SS tank divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to begin the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Tank Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all his available forces into repelling the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of intense fighting during July 11. The main enemy group deployed and operated on the bridgehead as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command delivered its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Control in the enemy's advanced units was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived in close combat of their fire advantage, which they enjoyed at the beginning of the offensive in a clash with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield swirled with smoke and dust, and the ground shook from powerful explosions. The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer separate, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Tank Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades They disrupted the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the boundaries of my tank battalion. The 170th Tank Brigade was ahead of us. With tremendous speed, it wedged itself into the location of the heavy German tanks that were in the first wave, and the German tanks penetrated our tanks. The tanks were very close to each other, and therefore they literally shot at point-blank range, simply shooting at each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes—sixty-five vehicles.”
Radio operator of the command tank of the Adolf Hitler tank division, Wilhelm Res: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. On full speed ahead they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they covered three or four meters in it, but then seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the gun raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.”
Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing along the railway, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw a Tiger tank, which stood sideways to me and fired at our tanks. Apparently he knocked out quite a few of our vehicles, since the vehicles were moving sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our vehicles. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile and fired. The tank caught fire. I fired again and the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for them. I walked around this tank, then knocked it out T-III tank and "Panther". When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.”
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railroad and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps' combat log, the attack began without artillery bombardment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This enabled the enemy to open concentrated fire on the corps’ combat formations and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this, in turn, enabled the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began handing shells to me one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander above kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth – “Shot” – did I hear: “Thank God!”
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes located at the same distance from each other, as if they had been measured with a compass. The battle formations of the parties were mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close ranges, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.”
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tiger formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit his T turret -34, and the other penetrated the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver, Sergeant Nikolaev, and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a crater, but still one of the Tigers noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and aimed it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded upon collision.”
The impact of Soviet armor and new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From a report from a representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters in the Kursk Bulge region, Marshal Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.”
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS tank divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” to the northeast was thwarted; these divisions suffered such losses that they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Units of the SS tank division “Reich” also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of the Army Group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, fierce fighting also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Army Group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. At one point, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burnt-out Panther, rammed by a T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood a Tiger and a T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ radically in different sources. Manstein writes in his book “Lost Victories” that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts” talks about 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book “The Citadel. Battle of Kursk". If we put his diagram into a table, we get the following picture: (see the table for the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army in the period July 4–17, 1943).
Cross's data differs from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. Thus, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (Kross had 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48 Tank lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing attacks on concentrated enemy troops (SS Great Germany and 11th TD) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area of the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots that were burning. According to Cross, there were no losses at all in the 4th German Tank Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubbornly, overcoming fierce resistance from Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Sergeant M.F. accomplished his feat. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle of Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th Tank Corps dated July 13, 1943, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, it is possible to obtain a more or less accurate figure for the losses that the 5th Guards Tank Army suffered in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Totenkopf” - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in the numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and they began to remove the broken military equipment, then in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted. Rotmistrov claimed in his memoirs that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed.
But in the late 1990s, German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. Thus, the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps states that enemy losses included 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Cross’s data). A combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943 states that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past 24 hours. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed his damaged tanks, the number of which exceeded 200 vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps chalked up several dozen destroyed enemy tanks.
We can agree with Cross’s statement that tank losses are generally difficult to calculate, since disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Reich Panzer Division, which operated south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Tank Army from July 4 to July 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916 at the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein’s report, claims that in the period from July 5 to July 13, the German 4th Tank Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Tank Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. The Soviet side lost 500 and the German side lost 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up damaged German equipment that was beyond repair and standing in no man's land. After August 1, German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov accumulated such a quantity of faulty equipment that they had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered its greatest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorovsky battle lies not even in the damage caused to the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.
| Number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army July 4–17, 1943 | |||||||
| Date | The number of tanks in the 2nd SS Tank Tank | Number of tanks in the 48th Tank Tank | Total | Tank losses in the 2nd SS Tank Tank | Tank losses in the 48th Tank Tank | Total | Notes |
| 04.07 | 470 | 446 | 916 | 39 | – | 39 | 48th TK – ? |
| 05.07 | 431 | 453 | 884 | 21 | – | 21 | 48th TK – ? |
| 06.07 | 410 | 455 | 865 | 110 | 134 | 244 |
|
| 07.07 | 300 | 321 | 621 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
|
| 08.07 | 308 | 318 | 626 | 30 | 95 | 125 |
|
| 09.07 | 278 | 223 | 501 | – | – | – | ? |
| 10.07 | 292 | 227 | 519 | – | 6 | 6 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 11.07 | 309 | 221 | 530 | – | 33 | 33 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 12.07 | 320 | 188 | 508 | 68 | – | 68 | 48th TK – ? |
| 13.07 | 252 | 253 | 505 | – | 36 | 36 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 14.07 | 271 | 217 | 488 | 11 | 9 | 20 |
|
| 15.07 | 260 | 206 | 466 | – | – | – | ? |
| 16.07 | 298 | 232 | 530 | – | – | ? |
|
| 17.07 | 312 | 279 | 591 | no data | no data | – |
|
| Total tanks lost in the 4th Tank Army |
|
| 280 | 316 | 596 |
|
|
Battle of Kursk. Chronology of FAME.
If the Battle of Moscow was an example of heroism and dedication, when there was really nowhere to retreat, and Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mournful tones for the first time, she finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. Not one more scrap native land will not be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree on one opinion: Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.
Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, let’s make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians the victory in World War II is attributed to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who rid the world of terrible disease- fascism!
1943. The war is moving into a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as they were at the beginning of the war. The Allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, and all positions in North Africa are lost. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is being herded under arms. The notorious Aryan type of the German soldier is diluted by all nationalities. The Eastern Front is every German's worst nightmare. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to preach about the invincibility of German weapons. But does anyone except himself and the Fuhrer believe in this?
The Battle of Kursk is a prelude.
It can be said that Battle of Kursk in brief characterized a new round in the distribution of forces on the eastern front. The Wehrmacht needed a victory, it needed a new offensive. And it was planned in the Kursk direction. The German offensive was codenamed Operation Citadel. It was planned to launch two strikes on Kursk from Orel and Kharkov, encircle the Soviet units, defeat them and launch a further attack to the south. It is characteristic that the German generals still continued to plan the defeat and encirclement of Soviet units, although quite recently they themselves were surrounded and completely destroyed at Stalingrad. The eyes of the staff officers became blurred, or the directives from the Fuhrer became something akin to the orders of the Almighty.
Photos of German tanks and soldiers before the start of the Battle of Kursk
The Germans gathered huge forces for the offensive. About 900 thousand soldiers, more than 2 thousand tanks, 10 thousand guns and 2 thousand aircraft.
However, the situation in the first days of the war was no longer possible. The Wehrmacht had no numerical, no technical, and most importantly, no strategic advantage. From the Soviet side in Battle of Kursk More than one million soldiers, 2 thousand aircraft, almost 19 thousand guns and about 2 thousand tanks were ready to join. And, most importantly, the strategic and psychological superiority of the Soviet army was no longer in doubt.
The plan to counter the Wehrmacht was simple and at the same time absolutely brilliant. The plan was to bleed the German army dry in heavy defensive battles and then launch a counteroffensive. The plan worked brilliantly, as she showed herself .
Reconnaissance and the Battle of Kursk.
Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr - German military intelligence, never suffered so many professional defeats as during the war on the eastern front. Well-trained agents, saboteurs and spies of the Abwehr, and on the Kursk Bulge they went astray. Having learned nothing about the plans of the Soviet command or the disposition of troops, the Abwehr became an involuntary witness to another triumph of Soviet intelligence. The fact is that the plan for the German offensive was already on the table of the commanders of the Soviet troops in advance. Day, start time of the offensive, all Operation Citadel were known. Now all that remained was to position the mousetrap and slam the trap shut. A game of cat and mouse began. And how can one not resist saying that our troops were now the cat?!
The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.
And so it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out the last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing the last lines of a letter to their beloved, someone is simply enjoying another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the Wehrmacht positions. Operation Citadel received the first hole. An artillery strike was carried out along the entire front line on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not so much in causing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. In a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tacticians and strategists, whose savvy boots trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.
The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction - Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet Army. The Germans threw up to 500 tanks into battle, including new development, heavy tank "Tiger". It was not possible to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide offensive front. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, and the German command was unable to offer anything new in offensive operations. And it was no longer possible to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and the warrior-heroes were simply invincible. How can we not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, this catastrophe called the World War would not have happened.
Photo of the Battle of Kursk (on the left, Soviet soldiers are fighting from a German trench, on the right, the attack of Russian soldiers)
First day of the Battle of Kursk was coming to an end. It was already clear that the Wehrmacht had lost the initiative. The General Staff demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, introduce reserves and second echelons! But this is only one day!
At the same time, the forces of the Soviet 13th Army were replenished with reserves, and the command of the central front decided to launch a retaliatory counterattack on the morning of July 6th.
The Battle of Kursk is a confrontation.
The Russian commanders responded with dignity to the German staff officers. And if one German mind was already left in the cauldron at Stalingrad, then Kursk Bulge German generals were opposed by equally talented military leaders.
German Operation Citadel was supervised by two most talented generals, this cannot be taken away from them, Field Marshal von Kluge and General Erich von Manstein. The coordination of the Soviet fronts was carried out by Marshals G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The fronts were directly commanded by: Rokossovsky - Central Front, N. Vatutin - Voronezh Front, and I. Konev - Steppe Front.
Lasted only six days Operation Citadel, for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the steadfastness and courage of an ordinary Soviet soldier thwarted all the enemy’s plans.
On July 12, she found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, began an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was fighting an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the strength of weapons that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. Soviet heroes they liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force; it seemed that the earth itself was helping the soldiers, going and going, liberating city after city, village after village.
It went on for 49 days and nights fierce battle on the Kursk Bulge, and at this time the future of each of us was completely determined.
Kursk Bulge. Photo of Russian infantrymen going into battle under the cover of a tank
Battle of Kursk. Photos of the greatest tank battle
Battle of Kursk. Photo of Russian infantrymen against the background of a destroyed German Tiger tank
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a Russian tank against the background of a destroyed "tiger"
The Battle of Kursk is the greatest tank battle.
Neither before nor after, the world has known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks on both sides throughout the entire day of July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow patch of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, in once again which surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.
Battle of Kursk. Photos of destroyed German self-propelled guns
Battle of Kursk! Photo of a destroyed German tank. Ilyin's work (inscription)
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a destroyed German tank
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian soldiers inspect a damaged German self-propelled guns
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian tank officers inspect the holes in the "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. I'm happy with the work! The face of a hero!
Battle of Kursk - Results
Operation Citadel showed the world that Hitler's Germany was no longer capable of aggression. The turning point of the Second World War, according to absolutely all historians and military experts, came precisely at Kursk Bulge. Underestimate meaning of Kursk battles are difficult.
While German troops suffered huge losses on the eastern front, they had to be replenished by transferring reserves from other parts of conquered Europe. It is not surprising that the Anglo-American landing in Italy coincided with Battle of Kursk. Now the war has come to Western Europe.
The German army itself was completely and irrevocably broken psychologically. Talk about the superiority of the Aryan race came to naught, and the representatives of this very race themselves were no longer demigods. Many remained lying in the endless steppes near Kursk, and those who survived no longer believed that the war would be won. The time has come to think about protecting our own “Fatherland”. So, all of us who are now living can proudly say that Battle of Kursk in brief and definitely proved once again that strength does not lie in anger and the desire for aggression, strength lies in love for the Motherland!
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a shot down "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. The photo shows a damaged self-propelled gun from a direct hit from a bomb dropped from an airplane
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a killed German soldier
Kursk Bulge! In the photo, a killed crew member of a German self-propelled gun
BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic group of German troops.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over a vast area from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined military power Germany. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they pinned their hopes on regaining the lost strategic initiative and turning the course of the war in their favor.
It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Supreme Command Headquarters revised the method of planned actions. The reason for this was Soviet intelligence data that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on a counter-offensive and defeat his striking forces. A rare case in the history of wars occurred when the strongest side, possessing the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start fighting not offensively, but defensively. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.
FROM A. VASILEVSKY’S MEMORIES ABOUT STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943.
(...) Soviet military intelligence It was possible to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the area of the Kursk ledge using the latest tank equipment on a massive scale, and then establish the time of the enemy’s transition to the offensive.
Naturally, in the current conditions, when it was quite obvious that the enemy would strike with large forces, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command found itself faced with a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if to defend, then how? (...)
Analyzing numerous intelligence data about the nature of the enemy's upcoming actions and his preparations for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and Headquarters were increasingly inclined to the idea of transitioning to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov at the end of March - beginning of April. The most specific conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk salient, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of the Kursk ledge, which noted: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. Better. It will happen if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.”
I had to be there when he received G.K. Zhukov’s report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without expressing his opinion, said: “We must consult with the front commanders.” Having given the General Staff an order to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging them to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked them to submit their views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts(...)
At a meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)
After making a preliminary decision on deliberate defense and the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, a comprehensive and careful preparation to upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became aware of the exact timing of the start of the enemy offensive, which was postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose was clearly emerging, it was decided final decision for deliberate defense.
Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. First, that this plan is the central part strategic plan the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not by other command authorities (...)
Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk. M.: Nauka, 1970. P.66-83.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk salient, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front) was deployed, which was the reserve of Headquarters. He had to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.
The German side included 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into two strike groups intended for an offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy’s plans was given to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, as well as new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.
ADDRESS BY THE FÜHRER TO GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION CITADEL, no later than July 4, 1943.
Today you are beginning a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.
With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will become stronger than before. In addition, the new brutal defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory, no matter what, will disappear.
The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.
My soldiers! Now you finally have best tanks than the Russians.
Their seemingly inexhaustible masses of people have become so thin in the two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and the oldest. Our infantry, as always, is as superior to the Russian as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tank crews, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.
The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning should shake them to their foundations.
And you should know that everything may depend on the outcome of this battle.
As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. Ultimately, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult any particular battle may be.
German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly united, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly in the name of victory; they look with ardent hope at you, my soldiers.
ADOLF HITLER
This order is subject to destruction at division headquarters.
Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation “Zitadelle”. Stuttgart, 1966.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE
Since the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command had been working on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, based on army intelligence data, it became clear to the leadership of the Red Army that the Wehrmacht command itself was planning to carry out an attack under the base of the Kursk ledge, in order to encircle our troops located there.
The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to launch attacks in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents to such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a major battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The Wehrmacht strategy for the summer of 1943, according to generals such as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to become exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.
However, the bulk of German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation, codenamed "Citadel", was set for July 5, and German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the combat qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and installing an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, the Wehrmacht strike forces in the area of the Kursk bulge at the beginning of the offensive included about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. The strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein, which included General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, were concentrated on the southern wing of the ledge. The troops of von Kluge's Army Group Center operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Hoth and Kemph had approximately twice as many tanks as Model.
The Supreme Command headquarters decided not to go first on the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The idea of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy’s forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, bringing fresh reserves into action, go on a counteroffensive. I must say that this was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the high Soviet command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that the pre-prepared German offensive fizzled out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).
However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to rush into launching an offensive. A deeply layered defense was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as an anti-tank weapon. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions respectively in the northern and southern sections of the Kursk ledge, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and enter the battle at the moment the Red Army went on a counteroffensive.
The country's military factories worked uninterruptedly to produce tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional “thirty-fours” and powerful SU-152 self-propelled guns. The latter could already great success fight the Tigers and Panthers.
The organization of Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive lines were erected. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. The Don has prepared a state line of defense. The total depth of the area's engineering equipment reached 250-300 km.
In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in men and equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts had about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had at their disposal up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us versus about 2 thousand for the Germans.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE
The closer the start date for Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy attack was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time were German troops able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began around half past six in the morning.
The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops with a ramming attack and reaching Kursk. In the Central Front, the main enemy attack was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the Central Front troops launched a counterattack against the advancing group with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies and the 19th Tank Corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.
The first surprise for the German command on both the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and the guns of tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in minefields were well covered by artillery fire. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, they combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to maintain air supremacy. More and more often, Soviet attack aircraft - the famous Il-2 - appeared over the battlefield.
In the first day of fighting alone, Model’s group, operating on the northern flank of the Kursk salient, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of German “Tigers” advancing against the forces of the Central Front destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period July 5-6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the shock units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The outcome of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike group was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations “Grossdeutschland”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth and the Kempf group managed to wedge into the Soviet defense up to 20 and more than km. The offensive initially went in the direction settlement Oboyan, but then, due to strong opposition from the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South, von Manstein, decided to strike further east - in the direction of Prokhorovka. It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO HUNDRED TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.
The Battle of Prokhorovka is largely a collective concept. The fate of the warring parties was not decided in one day and not on one field. The theater of operations for Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. And yet, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Battle of Kursk, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.
On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer from the Steppe Front to the aid of the troops of the Voronezh Front the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the wedged enemy tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. The need was emphasized for attempting to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.
Concentrating in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks launched an attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the combat qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many “thirty-fours” while approaching their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German tanks almost armor to armor. But this is precisely what the command of the 5th Guards Army sought. Moreover, soon the enemy battle formations were so mixed up that the “tigers” and “panthers” began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal armor, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat striking power. But German losses did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.
The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Tank Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing their last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably greater. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to introduce the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps - on the southern wing of the Kursk salient. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received orders on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tank crews no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. German units began to gradually retreat from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?
Back on July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. That day, he ordered Operation Citadel to continue and not reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success at Kursk, it seemed, was just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the Bryansk troops went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and left wing of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and began to crack at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern flank of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.
At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to continuing attacks on the southern flank of the Kursk salient (although this was no longer possible on the northern flank of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command ground forces Germany ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE
In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12-15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge, they began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). The fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were delivered not against the weak, but against the strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to reduce the preparation time for offensive actions as much as possible, and to take the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a strong defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups on narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.
Courage Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, and the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, Red Army units had pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west and liberated Kharkov for the second time.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. The losses of Soviet troops were even greater: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably larger number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army's offensive continued to increase its pace after bringing new formations into battle. In the central sector of the front, troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv area. Having immediately captured several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag flew over Kiev.
It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more complicated. Thus, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to deliver a powerful counterattack in the area of Fastov and Zhitomir against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the advance of the Red Army on the territory of right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of Smolensk and Bryansk regions By November 1943, Soviet troops reached areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk Fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken a tough defensive position, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to the formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened already in the summer of 1944.
And in 1943, victories at Kursk and then in the Battle of the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht's offensive strategy suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of military and military awards - the Order of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already occurred.
In the spring of 1943, relative calm established itself on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment using the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad.
A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus improved old ones and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Improved aviation technology, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing is that afterwards the troops were instilled with confidence in victory.
Stalin and Stavka initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwest. However, marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky were able to predict the place and time of the future Wehrmacht offensive.
The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having gathered together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the bulge of the front line, which had formed in the Kursk region.
By winning this operation he planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor.
Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number.
The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2 thousand tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.
Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy’s attack with an offensive, but to organize a reliable defense and meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3.6 thousand tanks and 2.4 thousand aircraft were concentrated.
Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank strike of the entire war on the Red Army formations.
Methodically breaking down the defenses, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.
On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle took place near the small village of Prokhorovka. At the same time, up to 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns met in a counter battle. The battle lasted until late at night and so bled the German divisions that the next day they were forced to retreat to their original positions.
In the most difficult offensive battles, the Germans lost a huge amount of equipment and personnel. Since July 12, the nature of the battle has changed. Soviet troops took offensive actions, and the German army was forced to go on the defensive. The Nazis failed to contain the attacking impulse of the Soviet troops.
On August 5, Oryol and Belgorod were liberated, and on August 23, Kharkov. The victory in the Battle of Kursk finally turned the tide; the strategic initiative was wrested from the hands of the fascists.
By the end of September, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper. The Germans created a fortified area along the river - the Eastern Wall, which was ordered to be held with all their might.
However, our advanced units, despite the lack of watercraft, began crossing the Dnieper without artillery support.
Suffering significant losses, detachments of miraculously surviving infantrymen occupied bridgeheads and, after waiting for reinforcements, began to expand them, attacking the Germans. The crossing of the Dnieper became an example of the selfless sacrifice of Soviet soldiers with their lives in the name of the Fatherland and victory.
Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as the Battle of Kursk) is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”
After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.
Story
After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German command decided to take revenge, having in mind the implementation of a major offensive on the Soviet-German front, the location of which was the so-called Kursk ledge (or arc), formed by Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1943. The Battle of Kursk, like the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was distinguished by its great scope and focus. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, 13.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft took part in it on both sides.
In the Kursk area, the Germans concentrated up to 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, which were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the Center group of General Field Marshal von Kluge, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force group Army "South" of Field Marshal E. Manstein. Operation Citadel, developed by the Germans, envisaged the encirclement of Soviet troops with converging attacks on Kursk and a further offensive into the depths of the defense.
The situation in the Kursk direction by the beginning of July 1943
By the beginning of July, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops operating in the Kursk salient area were reinforced. From April to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units . From March to July, 5,635 guns and 3,522 mortars, as well as 1,294 aircraft, were placed at the disposal of these fronts. The Steppe Military District, units and formations of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. The troops concentrated in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were prepared to repel powerful attacks from selected Wehrmacht divisions and launch a decisive counteroffensive.
The defense of the northern flank was carried out by the troops of the Central Front under General Rokossovsky, and the southern flank by the Voronezh Front of General Vatutin. The depth of defense was 150 kilometers and was built in several echelons. Soviet troops had some advantage in manpower and equipment; In addition, warned of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out counter-artillery preparation on July 5, inflicting significant losses on the enemy.
Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. Troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd Tank Army, 16th air force, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky was supposed to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12–26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance. Simultaneously with tank armies The following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.
One of the largest tank battles in world history took place in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in this battle on both sides. On July 12, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive, and on July 16 they began to retreat. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops drove the Germans back to their starting line. At the same time, at the height of the battle, on July 12, Soviet troops on the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol bridgehead area and liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. Active assistance was provided to the regular troops partisan units. They disrupted enemy communications and the work of rear agencies. In only one Oryol region from July 21 to August 9, more than 100 thousand rails were blown up. The German command was forced to keep a significant number of divisions only on security duty.
Results of the Battle of Kursk
The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions. Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass. Our relatives also took part in the Battle of Kursk.
Strategic talent was revealed at the Battle of Kursk Soviet commanders. The operational art and tactics of military leaders showed superiority over the German classical school: second echelons in the offensive, powerful mobile groups, and strong reserves began to emerge. During the 50-day battles, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions, including 7 tank ones. The total losses of the enemy amounted to more than 500 thousand people, up to 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.5 thousand aircraft.
Near Kursk, the Wehrmacht military machine suffered such a blow, after which the outcome of the war was actually predetermined. This was a radical change in the course of the war, forcing many politicians on all warring sides to reconsider their positions. The successes of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1943 had a profound impact on the work of the Tehran Conference, in which the leaders of the participating countries took part anti-Hitler coalition, on its decision to open a second front in Europe in May 1944.
The victory of the Red Army was highly appreciated by our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, US President F. Roosevelt wrote in his message to J.V. Stalin: “During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also began a successful a counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences... The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories.”
The victory at the Kursk Bulge was invaluable for the further strengthening of moral and political unity Soviet people, raising the morale of the Red Army. The struggle of Soviet people located in the territories of our country temporarily occupied by the enemy received a powerful impetus. The partisan movement gained even greater scope.
The decisive factor in achieving the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was the fact that the Soviet command managed to correctly determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s summer (1943) offensive. And not only to determine, but also to be able to reveal in detail the plan of Hitler’s command, to obtain data about the plan for Operation Citadel and the composition of the group of enemy troops, and even the time of the start of the operation. The decisive role in this belonged to Soviet intelligence.
In the Battle of Kursk received further development Soviet military art, moreover, all 3 of its components: strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, in particular, experience was gained in creating large groupings of troops in defense capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tanks and aircraft, creating powerful positional defense in depth, the art of decisively massing forces and means in the most important directions, as well as the art of maneuvering as during a defensive battle as well as an offensive one.
The Soviet command skillfully chose the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy’s strike forces were already thoroughly exhausted during the defensive battle. With the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, the correct choice of attack directions and the most appropriate methods of defeating the enemy, as well as the organization of interaction between fronts and armies in solving operational-strategic tasks, were of great importance.
The presence of strong strategic reserves, their advance preparation and timely entry into battle played a decisive role in achieving success.
One of the most important factors that ensured the Red Army's victory at the Kursk Bulge was courage and heroism Soviet soldiers, their dedication in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, their unshakable resilience in defense and unstoppable onslaught in the offensive, readiness for any test in order to defeat the enemy. The source of these high moral and fighting qualities was not at all the fear of repression, as some publicists and “historians” are now trying to present, but a feeling of patriotism, hatred of the enemy and love of the Fatherland. It was they who were the sources of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their loyalty to military duty when carrying out combat missions of the command, countless feats in battle and selfless dedication in defending their Fatherland - in a word, everything without which victory in the war is impossible. The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of Soviet soldiers in the Battle of the Arc of Fire. More than 100 thousand participants in the battle were awarded orders and medals, and over 180 of the bravest warriors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The turning point in the work of the rear and the entire economy of the country, achieved by the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people, made it possible by mid-1943 to supply the Red Army in ever-increasing volumes with all the necessary material resources, and above all with weapons and military equipment, including new models, not only not inferior according to tactical and technical characteristics the best examples German weapons and equipment, but often superior to them. Among them, it is necessary first of all to highlight the appearance of 85-, 122- and 152-mm self-propelled guns, new anti-tank guns using sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles, which played a big role in the fight against enemy tanks, including heavy ones, new types of aircraft, etc. d. All this was one of the most important conditions for the growth of the combat power of the Red Army and its increasingly steadily increasing superiority over the Wehrmacht. It was the Battle of Kursk that was the decisive event that marked the completion of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union. In a figurative expression, the backbone of Nazi Germany was broken in this battle. The Wehrmacht was never destined to recover from the defeats it suffered on the battlefields of Kursk, Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to victory over Nazi Germany. In terms of its military-political significance, it was the largest event of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most glorious dates in the military history of our Fatherland, the memory of which will live for centuries.
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