A short course in history. Fighting near Lake Khasan

In 1938, heated clashes broke out in the Far East between the forces of the Red Army and Imperial Japan. The cause of the conflict was Tokyo's claims to ownership separate territories belonging to the Soviet Union in the border region. These events went down in the history of our country as the battles at Lake Khasan, and in the archives of the Japanese side they are referred to as the “incident at Zhanggufeng Heights.”

Aggressive neighborhood

In 1932, a new state appeared on the map of the Far East, called Manchukuo. It was the result of Japan's occupation of the northeastern territory of China, the creation of a puppet government there and the restoration of the Qing dynasty that had once ruled there. These events caused a sharp deterioration in the situation along the state border. Systematic provocations by the Japanese command followed.

Red Army intelligence repeatedly reported on the large-scale preparation of the enemy Kwantung Army for an invasion of the territory of the USSR. In this regard, the Soviet government presented notes of protest to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Mamoru Shigemitsu, in which they pointed out the inadmissibility of such actions and their dangerous consequences. But diplomatic measures did not bring the desired result, especially since the governments of England and America, interested in escalating the conflict, did their best to fuel it.

Provocations at the border

Since 1934, systematic shelling of border units and nearby settlements has been carried out from Manchurian territory. In addition, both individual terrorists and spies and numerous armed detachments were sent. Taking advantage of the current situation, smugglers also intensified their activities.

Archival data indicate that during the period from 1929 to 1935, in just one area controlled by the Posyet border detachment, more than 18,520 attempts to violate the border were stopped, smuggled goods worth about 2.5 million rubles, 123,200 rubles in gold currency were seized and 75 kilograms of gold. General statistics for the period from 1927 to 1936 show very impressive figures: 130,000 violators were detained, of which 1,200 were spies who were exposed and admitted their guilt.

During these years, the famous border guard, tracker N.F. Karatsupa, became famous. He personally managed to detain 275 state border violators and prevent the transfer of contraband goods worth more than 610 thousand rubles. About this fearless man the whole country knew, and his name remained forever in the history of the border troops. Also famous were his comrades I.M. Drobanich and E. Serov, who detained more than a dozen border violators.

Border areas under military threat

For the entire period preceding the events, as a result of which Lake Khasan became the center of attention of the Soviet and world community, not a single shot was fired from our side into Manchurian territory. This is important to take into account, since this fact refutes any attempts to attribute actions of a provocative nature to Soviet troops.

As the military threat from Japan took on more and more tangible forms, the command of the Red Army took actions to strengthen the border detachments. For this purpose, units of the Far Eastern Army were sent to the area of possible conflict, and a scheme for interaction between border guards and fortified units was developed and agreed upon with the High Command. Work was also carried out with residents of border villages. Thanks to their help, in the period from 1933 to 1937, it was possible to stop 250 attempts by spies and saboteurs to enter the territory of our country.

Traitor-defector

The outbreak of hostilities was preceded by an unpleasant incident that occurred in 1937. In connection with the activation of a possible enemy, the state security agencies of the Far East were tasked with increasing the level of intelligence and counterintelligence activities. For this purpose, a new head of the NKVD, Security Commissioner 3rd Rank G.S. Lyushkov, was appointed. However, having taken over the affairs of his predecessor, he took actions aimed at weakening the services loyal to him, and on June 14, 1938, after crossing the border, he surrendered to the Japanese authorities and asked for political asylum. Subsequently, collaborating with the command of the Kwantung Army, he caused significant harm to the Soviet troops.

Imaginary and true causes of the conflict

The official pretext for the attack by Japan was claims regarding the territories surrounding Lake Khasan and adjacent to the Tumannaya River. But in reality, the reason was the assistance provided by the Soviet Union to China in its fight against the invaders. To repel the attack and protect the state border, on July 1, 1938, the army stationed in the Far East was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front under the command of Marshal V.K. Blucher.

By July 1938, events had become irreversible. The whole country was watching what was happening thousands of kilometers from the capital, where few people had previously been shown on the map. famous name- Hassan. The lake, the conflict around which threatened to escalate into a full-scale war, was the center of everyone's attention. And soon events began to develop rapidly.

Year 1938. Lake Khasan

Active fighting began on July 29, when, having previously evicted the residents of border villages and placed artillery firing positions along the border, the Japanese began shelling our territory. For their invasion, the enemies chose the Posyetsky region, replete with lowlands and reservoirs, one of which was Lake Khasan. Located on a hill located 10 kilometers from the Pacific Ocean and 130 kilometers from Vladivostok, this territory was an important strategic site.

Four days after the start of the conflict, particularly fierce battles broke out on the Bezymyannaya hill. Here, eleven border guard heroes managed to resist an enemy infantry company and hold their positions until reinforcements arrived. Another place where the Japanese attack was directed was the Zaozernaya height. By order of the commander of the troops, Marshal Blucher, the Red Army units entrusted to him were sent here to repel the enemy. An important role in holding this strategically important area was played by the soldiers of the rifle company, supported by a platoon of T-26 tanks.

End of hostilities

Both of these heights, as well as the area surrounding Lake Khasan, came under heavy Japanese artillery fire. Despite heroism Soviet soldiers and the losses they suffered, by the evening of July 30 the enemy managed to capture both hills and gain a foothold on them. Further, the events that history preserves (Lake Khasan and the battles on its shores) represent a continuous chain of military failures that resulted in unjustified human casualties.

Analyzing the course of hostilities, the High Command armed forces The USSR came to the conclusion that most of them were caused by the improper actions of Marshal Blucher. He was removed from command and subsequently arrested on charges of aiding the enemy and espionage.

Disadvantages identified during the battles

Through the efforts of units of the Far Eastern Front and border troops, the enemy was driven out of the country. Hostilities ended on August 11, 1938. They completed the main task assigned to the troops - the territory adjacent to the state border was completely cleared of invaders. But the victory came at an unreasonably high price. Among the Red Army personnel, there were 970 dead, 2,725 wounded and 96 missing. In general, this conflict showed the unpreparedness of the Soviet army to conduct large-scale military operations. Lake Khasan (1938) became a sad page in the history of the country’s armed forces.

Having occupied Northern Manchuria, Japan considered (under favorable conditions) the possibility of transferring military operations to the border areas of the USSR. To check the combat status of OKDVA units, Japanese troops periodically organized provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. Japanese aviation demonstratively invaded the airspace of the USSR, mainly for reconnaissance purposes. From June 11 to June 29, 1937, its planes violated air borders in Primorye 7 times, being over Soviet territory from 2 to 12 minutes.

On April 11, 1938, the airspace of the Soviet Union was violated by a large group of Japanese aircraft, one of which was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from border troops. Pilot Maeda was captured. During his interrogation, it became clear that the Japanese side was carefully studying air routes in the border zone in the Soviet Far East in case of hostilities.

Providing effective assistance to the Republic of China during, the armed forces of the USSR had been fighting for almost a year (with the help of military advisers and volunteers, up to 4 thousand people) with Japanese troops in China. A full-scale war between the Soviet Union and Japan was only a matter of time. In the second half of the 1930s. Japanese General Staff ground forces had already prepared a plan for a military invasion of the USSR in three directions - eastern (coastal), northern (Amur) and western (Khingan). Special rate was made for use air force. According to General Staff The Red Army, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, Japan could quickly concentrate up to 1000 ground aircraft near our borders.

Anticipating the possibility of a similar scenario developing, the Soviet military leadership took appropriate measures. On July 1, 1938, OKDVA, further reinforced by personnel and military equipment, was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (KDF, 2 armies) and the Northern Group of Forces of central subordination. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher became the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet, and his deputy for aviation was. The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation.

On the 20th of July 1938, increased activity of Japanese troops was noticed in the coastal area, accompanied by rifle and machine-gun shelling of the Soviet border territory. Our border guards have received instructions to use weapons in the event of a direct violation of the border. Units of the 1st Primorsky Army of the Far Eastern Fleet were brought to increased combat readiness.

Meanwhile, the Japanese side chose the Posyetsky district in the Primorsky Territory, at the junction of the borders of the USSR, the puppet state of Manchukuo and Korea, to attack the USSR, seeking to seize disputed territories (Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights) in the area of Lake Khasan.

On July 29, 1938, an armed conflict broke out. In the following days, regardless of losses, the enemy managed to capture the dominant heights, which he quickly turned into heavily fortified positions.

The commander of the Far Eastern Fleet troops was given the task of defeating the enemy in a short time and liberating the border strip he had captured (without invading the adjacent territory of Manchukuo). To conduct combat operations in the air, an advanced aviation group was created: 21 R-5 SSS attack aircraft of the 2nd chapter (Shkotovo airfield or Shkotovskaya Valley), 15 I-15 fighters of the 40th IAP (Augustovka), 12 36th SBA (Knevichi ) and 41 I-15 (11 from and 30 from the 48th IAP, Zaimka Filippovsky airfield).

On August 1, our aviation with the forces of 4 squadrons (40 I-15, 8 R-Z) carried out a bombing attack on Japanese troops, causing them minor damage. This was followed by other raids by bomber, attack and fighter aircraft. To combat Soviet aircraft, the Japanese side used only 2 anti-aircraft batteries (18-20 guns) located on the territory of Manchukuo, which damaged 3 Soviet aircraft (1 I-15, 2 SB) with their fire. The next day, our air raids continued.

Fearing retaliatory actions from the Japanese Air Force, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army dated August 4, 1938 No. 0071 “On bringing the troops of the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness in connection with the provocation of the Japanese military Lake Khasan" in major points Air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia was ordered: “install artillery and machine-gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit.”

August 5th from one of submarines The Pacific Fleet received unverified information about 98 Japanese bombers approaching Vladivostok. The city's air defense was urgently put on full combat readiness. Up to 50 fighters were taken into the air. Fortunately, the information turned out to be false.

The task was also to provide air defense facilities to field airfields, rifle, cavalry and tank units located in camps or bivouacs. For this purpose, 5 anti-aircraft divisions were involved (32nd, 39th, 40th rifle divisions; 39th and 43rd rifle corps).

The measures taken were based on the presence of an aviation group (up to 70 aircraft) on the Japanese side in the lake area. Hassan. However, she was almost never involved in battles. As a result, the 69th Fighter Aviation Brigade, armed with and, refocused on conducting aerial reconnaissance, protecting its aircraft and bombing enemy positions.

On August 4-9, Soviet troops, actively supported from the air by aviation, managed to defeat the Japanese-Manchurian group in the area of Lake Khasan and push it out of the territory of the USSR. On August 11, the conflict was settled, which was officially recognized in Tokyo.

During the period of hostilities near Lake Khasan, Soviet aviation carried out 1003 sorties, of which: - 41, SB - 346, I-15 -534, SSS - 53, R-Zet - 29, I-16 - 25. 4265 were dropped on the enemy bombs of various calibers (total weight about 209 tons), 303,250 rounds of ammunition were spent.

Japanese anti-aircraft artillery shot down 1 SB and 1 I-15 (Lieutenant Soloviev). From anti-aircraft gun and machine gun fire, 29 aircraft had minor holes and damage, of which: 18 - I-15, 7 - SB and 4 - TB-3RN. Two more I-15 fighters were considered lost for non-combat reasons. Pilot Koreshev crashed a fighter while landing at an unfamiliar airfield - the plane fell into a ditch and crashed. Another car was crushed when it landed unsuccessfully on the airfield.

The reluctance of the Japanese side to use its air force in an armed conflict was probably caused by the danger of air strikes from Soviet bomber aircraft not only in the area of Lake Khasan, but also on Japanese territory.

According to the publication: 100 years of the Russian Air Force (1912 - 2012)/ [Dashkov A. Yu., Golotyuk V. D.] ; under general ed. V. N. Bondareva. - M.: Russian Knights Foundation, 2012. - 792 p. : ill.

Notes:

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF THE HASSAN ARMED CONFLICT
June 13. The Commissioner fled to Manchukuo, fearing arrest. state security 3rd rank head of the Far Eastern Regional NKVD Genrikh Lyushkov.

July 3. The Japanese company launched a demonstration attack on the village. Zaozernaya.

July 8. By order of the head of the border detachment V. Zaozernaya is occupied by a permanent detachment of 10 people and a reserve outpost of 30 people. Digging of trenches and installation of barriers has begun.

July 11. V.K. Blucher ordered a company of 119 rifle regiments to be moved to the area of Khasan Island to support the border guards.

July 15 (according to other sources, July 17). Sergeant Major Vinevitin shot and killed the Japanese Matsushima Sakuni, who, together with a group of Japanese, had penetrated Soviet territory. A camera with photographs of the area was found on him. Zaozernaya. To help Lieutenant P. Tereshkin, a reserve outpost was allocated under the command of Lieutenant Khristolubov.

July 15. The Japanese side lodged a protest against the presence of forty Soviet military personnel on Japanese territory in the Zhang-Chu-Fung area (the Chinese name for the Zaozernaya hill).

July 17. The Japanese begin transferring the 19th Division to the conflict zone.

July 18 at 7 p.m. At the Quarantine outpost site, in groups of two or three, twenty-three people violated our line with a package from the Japanese border command demanding to leave Japanese territory.

July 20. Up to 50 Japanese were swimming in the lake, two were conducting surveillance. Up to 70 people arrived at Homuyton station on a freight train. The Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu, in the form of an ultimatum, presented territorial claims and demanded a withdrawal Soviet troops from the height of Zaozernaya. Minister of War Itagaki and Chief of the General Staff Prince Kanin presented to the Emperor an operational plan for ousting Soviet troops from the top of the Zaozernaya hill with the forces of two infantry regiments of the 19th Division of the Korean Army of Japan without the use of aviation.

July 22. The Soviet government sent a note to the Japanese government in which it decisively rejected all Japanese claims.

July 23. The transfer of the violators to the Japanese side took place. Japanese in once again protested the border violation.

July 24. The KDF Military Council issued a directive on the concentration of reinforced battalions of the 119th and 118th infantry regiments and the 121st cavalry squadron. regiment in the Zarechye area and bringing the front troops to increased combat readiness. Marshal Blucher sent to V. The Trans-Lake Commission, which discovered a violation of the border line by 3 meters by the border guards' trench.

July 27. Ten Japanese officers went to the border line in the area of Bezymyannaya Height, apparently for the purpose of reconnaissance.

July 28. Units of the 75th Regiment of the 19th Infantry Division of the Japanese took positions in the area of Khasan Island.

July 29, 3 p.m. Before the company of the Japanese attacked the outpost of Lieutenant Makhalin at the height of Bezymyannaya, with the help of the squads of Chernopyatko and Batarshin who arrived in time and the cavalrymen of Bykhovets, the enemy was repulsed. Lieutenant Levchenko’s 2nd company of the 119th joint venture, two platoons of T-26 tanks (4 vehicles), a platoon of small-caliber guns and 20 border guards under the command of Lieutenant Ratnikov come to the rescue.

July 29. The third reinforced battalion of the 118th rifle regiment was given the order to move to the Pakshekori-Novoselki area.

July 29 24 hours. The 40th Infantry Division receives an order to move to the area of Khasan Island from Slavyanka.

July 30. 32nd Infantry Division advances to Khasan from the Razdolnoye area.

July 30, 11 p.m. The Japanese are transporting reinforcements across the Tumangan River.

July 31, 3-20. With up to two regiments, the Japanese begin attacks on all heights. With artillery support, the Japanese launch four attacks. Under pressure from a superior enemy, by order, Soviet troops leave the border line and retreat beyond the island. Khasan at 7-00 from the village of Zaozernaya, at 19-25 from the village of Bezymyannaya, the Japanese pursue them, but then return behind the island of Khasan and consolidate on the western coast of the lake and on the lines conditionally connecting the peaks of the lake and the existing border line.

July 31 (day). 3rd SB 118th Regiment, with the support of border guards, ousted the enemy from the eastern and southern coasts of the lake.

August 1st. The Japanese are hastily strengthening the captured territory, setting up artillery positions and firing points. There is a concentration of 40 sd. Due to muddy roads, units are late.

1 August 13-35. Stalin, via direct wire, ordered Blucher to immediately drive the Japanese out of our territory. The first air raid on Japanese positions. At the beginning of 36 I-15s and 8 R-Zets attacked Zaozernaya with fragmentation bombs (AO-8 and AO-10) and machine-gun fire. At 15-10 24 SB bombed the area of Zaozernaya and the road to Digasheli with high-explosive bombs of 50 and 100 kg. (FAB-100 and FAB-50). At 16:40 fighters and attack aircraft bombed and shelled height 68.8. At the end of the day, SB bombers dropped on Zaozernaya large number small fragmentation bombs.

August 2. Failed attempt knock out the enemy with 40 rifle divisions. Troops are prohibited from crossing the state border line. Heavy offensive battles. The 118th rifle battalion and the tank battalion stopped in the south at the height of Machine Gun Hill. 119 and 120 joint ventures stopped on the approaches to V. Bezymyannaya. Soviet units suffered heavy losses. The first air raid at 7:00 had to be postponed due to fog. At 8-00 24 SB attacked the western slopes of Zaozernaya. Then six R-Zet worked on the Japanese positions on the Bogomolnaya hill.

August 3. Under heavy enemy fire, the 40th Infantry Division retreats to its original positions. People's Commissar Voroshilov decides to entrust the leadership of the military operations near Khasan Island to the chief of staff of the KDF G.M. Stern, appointing him commander of the 39th Rifle Corps, effectively removing Blucher from command.

August 4th. The Japanese ambassador declared his readiness to begin negotiations to resolve the border conflict. The Soviet side presented a condition for restoring the position of the parties on July 29, the Japanese rejected this demand.

August 5th. Approach 32nd. The order for a general offensive was given on August 6 at 16-00. The Soviet command is making a final reconnaissance of the area.

6 August 15-15. In groups of several dozen aircraft, 89 SB bombers began bombing the Bezymyannaya, Zaozernaya and Bogomolnaya hills, as well as Japanese artillery positions on the adjacent side. An hour later, 41 TB-3RNs continued the bombing. Finally, FAB-1000 bombs were used, which had a strong psychological effect on the enemy. Throughout the entire operation of the bombers, the fighters effectively suppressed enemy anti-aircraft batteries. After the bombing and artillery barrage, the assault on Japanese positions began. The 40th Infantry Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade advanced from the south, the 32nd Infantry Division and the tank battalion of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade from the north. The offensive was carried out under continuous enemy artillery fire. The marshy terrain did not allow the tanks to deploy into a battle line. The tanks moved in a column at a speed of no more than 3 km/h. By 21-00 units of the 95th joint venture reached the wire fences in. They were repulsed by black but strong fire. The Zaozernaya height was partially liberated.

August 7. Numerous Japanese counterattacks, attempts to regain lost positions. The Japanese are bringing new units to Khasan. The Soviet command is strengthening the grouping of the 78 Kazan Red Banner and 176 joint ventures of the 26 Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division. After reconnaissance of the Japanese positions, in the morning the fighters worked as attack aircraft on the border strip; in the afternoon, 115 SB bombed artillery positions and infantry concentrations in the near rear of the Japanese.

August 8. 96 joint venture reached the northern slopes of the. Zaozernaya. Aviation continuously storms enemy positions. Even individual soldiers are being hunted; the Japanese do not risk showing themselves in open areas. Fighters are also used to reconnoiter Japanese positions. By the end of the day, Voroshilov’s telegram prohibited the massive use of aviation.

August 9. The Soviet troops were ordered to go on the defensive at the achieved lines.

August 10. Fighters were used to suppress Japanese artillery. Effective interaction between aviation and heavy artillery. The Japanese artillery practically stopped firing.

11 August 12 noon. Cease-fire. Aviation is prohibited from crossing the border line.

Invasion of Japanese troops into Mongolia. Khalkin-Gol

Crossing of Soviet troops through flooded areas to the bridgehead at Lake Khasan.

Cavalrymen on patrol.

View of camouflaged Soviet tanks.

The Red Army soldiers go on the attack.

Red Army soldiers at rest.

Artillerymen during a break between battles.

Soldiers plant a victory banner on the Zaozernaya hill.

A Soviet tank crosses the Khalkhin Gol River.

Having suffered defeat during the intervention against Soviet Russia, in 1922, the Japanese were forced to evacuate from Vladivostok, but in the future they did not lose hope of subjugating the vast Asian territories of the USSR, right up to the Urals. By the early 1930s. The militarists took over in Japanese ruling circles. Japanese troops repeatedly staged military provocations against the Soviet Union from the territory of Manchuria they occupied in 1931-1932. In the summer of 1938, Japan with large military forces violated the Soviet border in the south of Primorye near Lake. Hassan. The 19th Infantry Division took part directly in the invasion. In addition, the 15th and 20th infantry divisions and other units were moving towards the combat area. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops, after a series of attacks, throwing back the border units, captured the tactically advantageous Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, relying on which they threatened the entire Posyet region. Troops of the future 39th Rifle Corps (formed on August 2, 1938, commander - corps commander G.N. Stern) took part in repelling the Japanese invasion. As soon as the provocation became known, the 40th Infantry Division of Colonel V.K. was concentrated in the conflict area. Bazarova. On July 31, the Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on alert. The 32nd Infantry Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were additionally sent to the Lake Khasan area. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade was formed in April 1932 in Kyiv, and in 1934 it was transferred to the Far East. In October 1938, it was reorganized into the 42nd Light Tank Brigade. Just before the start of the conflict, Colonel A.P. took command of the brigade. Panfilov. The brigade was armed with, among other things, 94 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. The brigade also includes a company of fire-reinforced HT-26s (5 serviceable units). In addition, the 32nd Rifle Division had a 32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov) with T-26s. The same battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnikov) was in the 40th Rifle Division. With considerable difficulty, the attack was repulsed and the border was restored, however, this incident revealed shortcomings in the management and training of troops. Miscalculations were used to justify repression. Many commanders, including one of the five first Marshals of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher were arrested and then shot.

ENTRY IN I.M.MAISKY’S DIARY OF APRIL 12, 1938 ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH SUN FO

Sun Fo spent 6 weeks in Moscow. Negotiated with the Soviet government about assistance to China. He left satisfied and expressed gratitude to me for the careful implementation of the agreements we concluded in Moscow. However, Sun Fo apparently did not immediately become satisfied with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his somewhat vague explanations in this part (in general, he speaks very clearly, precisely and frankly), on his way to Moscow, he hoped to convince the Soviet government of the need for a military action by the USSR against Japan in alliance with China. The Soviet government rejected such a proposal, but promised energetic assistance by sending weapons, airplanes, etc. The results are visible in the course of military operations in China. There is no doubt that the Chinese successes of three weeks are largely due to the arrival of our aircraft, our tanks, our artillery, etc. It is not surprising that Sun Fo now feels almost triumphant. The details of his decisive conversation with Comrade are curious. “I was told,” Sun Fo said, “that I would see your leader on a certain day, but they did not indicate the exact date. I got ready. I'm sitting at the embassy and waiting. Evening comes - 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock... Nothing!.. Somewhat disappointed, I decided to go to bed. He undressed and climbed into bed. Suddenly, at a quarter to twelve they came for me: “Please, they are waiting for you!” I jumped up, got dressed and drove off. Along with Stalin were Molotov and Voroshilov. At the end, Mikoyan and Yezhov also came. Our conversation lasted from 12 at night to 5 1/2 in the morning. And then everything was decided.” It was during this conversation, according to Sun Fo, that the Soviet government rejected direct military participation of the USSR in the fight against Japan. The motives put forward by Comrade Stalin in defense of such a line of behavior, as transmitted by Sun Fo, boil down to the following: 1) a military action by the USSR would immediately unite the entire Japanese nation, which is now far from united in supporting Japanese aggression in China; 2) a military offensive by the USSR, on the contrary, could frighten the right-wing elements in China and, thus, split the united national front that has now been created there; 3) a military offensive by the USSR with the prospect of our victory would frighten England and the USA and could turn the current sympathy of both countries for China into its opposite; 4) a military offensive by the USSR - and this is especially important - would be used by Germany to attack our country in Europe, and this would unleash world war. For all the above reasons, Comrade Stalin considers an open military action by the USSR against Japan inappropriate. But he is ready to help China in every possible way by supplying weapons, etc. (Sun Fo is the head of the Chinese special mission sent to the USSR, England and France; Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant, millionaire). Published: Sokolov V.V. two meetings between Sun Fo and I.V. Stalin in 1938-1939. // New and recent history. 1999. N6.

HEAD OF THE PODGORNAYA BORDER POST P. TERESHKIN

On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and says in an excited voice: “ Large squad The Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us!” The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posiet. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union P.F. Tereshkina

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0071, August 4, 1938

In recent days, the Japanese in the Posyet region suddenly attacked our border units and captured part of Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. This new military provocation met with due resistance on our part. However, the Japanese stubbornly cling to Soviet territory, despite heavy losses of their troops. The provocative actions of the Japanese military are obviously calculated on our peacefulness and restraint. The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union and the Red Army will endlessly tolerate the brazen provocations of their military, which, under the guise of local border incidents, began to seize entire chunks of Soviet territory. We don’t want a single inch of foreign land, including Manchurian and Korean, but we will never give up even an inch of our own, Soviet land, to anyone, including the Japanese invaders! In order to be ready to repel provocative attacks by the Japanese-Manchus and in order to be ready at any moment to deliver a powerful blow to the burrowing, insolent Japanese aggressors along the entire front, immediately bring the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness, for which I order: 1 Immediately return all command, political, commanding and Red Army personnel from all types of work, secondment and vacation to their units. 2. The Military Council of the DKFront take measures to cover the borders of the front. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that if a new provocation arises from the Japanese-Manchus, then the covering troops with aircraft and tanks must be ready, upon special orders from Moscow, for an immediate powerful, crushing blow. 3. Bring the air forces of the DKFront and ZabVO to full combat readiness: a) relocate air units to field airfields, providing them with air defense systems and reliable communications, having strong fists for powerful blows; b) establish constant duty of fighter flights in full readiness for immediate departure; c) provide units at field airfields with bombs, ammunition for at least 2 sorties, at remote airfields for 5 sorties and fuel for 5 sorties; d) provide all flight personnel with oxygen devices for high-altitude flights and the required amount of oxygen; check and seal devices; e) The Military Councils of the DKFront, the Western Military District, the 1st and 2nd Armies and the Khabarovsk Group should immediately, through special flight technical groups, together with the command, verify the readiness of the aircraft’s materiel, weapons and instruments. This check should be carried out at least four times a month. Commanders and commissars of air units should check daily; f) commanders and commissars of air units ensure the speed of refueling aircraft, hanging bombs and filling with cartridges; g) all commanders of the air forces of the specified front, armies, district and Khabarovsk group immediately have the stock of bombs, aircraft cartridges, fuel and technical personnel in charge of storing weapons and fuel checked, immediately eliminating all discovered shortcomings. 4. A. The Military Councils of the Democratic Front and the Western Military District should put all fortified areas on full combat readiness, reinforcing them, if necessary, with field troops. B. In fortified areas, their commandants: a) immediately install fully weapons and equipment in all structures; b) fill military installations with the required standard amount of ammunition and property; c) install wire barriers in important directions and build anti-tank obstacles; d) fully provide combat installations, command posts and field troops occupying fortified areas with communications means; e) establish a permanent military guard, patrol and observation service. 5. Rifle, cavalry and tank units must be placed in camps or bivouacs with combat support measures (security, duty units, air surveillance and air defense), having reliable communications within the formation. 6. In tank units, put ammunition in combat vehicles, have tanks constantly refueled and fully ready for immediate action. 7. In rifle and cavalry units: a) restore the full regular number of units in the units; b) check the readiness of mobilized plans for formations and units; c) issue the weapons and ammunition assigned to the soldiers to the units, where they are stored in a sealed form under the responsibility of the duty officer; d) transported supplies of ammunition should be placed in charging boxes and carts; e) commission repair horses at least 3 years old and check forging. Reforge horse train with old forging; f) have weapons and other property ready for quick delivery. 8. At air defense points, install artillery and machine gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit. 9. Fully provide transport parts with rubber, spare parts and fuel. 10. The military councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk group and the Western Military District: a) fully provide the units with all required property and ammunition according to wartime standards at the expense of the front-line (district, army) warehouses; b) put warehouses in order, and primarily ammunition warehouses: disassemble the property stored in them, check the readiness of warehouses for the rapid release of property, review the security of warehouses and strengthen the main ones at the expense of secondary objects; c) conduct combat alerts of units and subunits. When raising units on combat alert, check their equipment down to the smallest detail and material security in accordance with established standards and report cards. At the same time, conduct tactical exercises as part of formations, in which units raised on combat alert will act, obtaining from each commander, soldier and staff excellent knowledge of the terrain and combat conditions in their sector. Monitor the organization of communications at all levels of the headquarters service; d) pay special attention to training in night operations and repelling surprise enemy attacks at night and in fog, training your units to operate at night and in fog. I would like to draw the special attention of the entire command staff to this; e) in support units of border troops: 1) commanders of support units to develop on the ground, together with commanders of border units, a plan for border defense in their sectors. Provide technical communication between support units and the command of border units and with their direct superiors; 2) strengthen continuous military surveillance abroad, especially be vigilant at night; 3) study in detail the topography of their plots on the territory of the USSR; 4) store weapons and ammunition of support units in units, ensuring their uninterrupted food supply. 11. All measures to bring units into full combat readiness must be carried out while maintaining military secrets. 12. Commanders and commissars of all military formations should check all units and correct all detected deficiencies on the spot. The results of verifications and the measures taken must be reported in code to the command of units and formations, the Military Councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk Army Group of Forces and the ZabVO once every five days, and the command of the DKFront and the ZabVO must be reported to the General Staff of the Red Army at the same time. Report receipt of this order and its communication to the executors no later than 24 hours on 08/06/38.37. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank B. Shaposhnikov

Present: Voroshilov, Stalin, Shchadenko... Blucher. Listened: About the events on the lake. Hassan. The Main Military Council, having heard a report from the NGO on the situation in the DKF [Far Eastern Red Banner Front] in connection with the events at Lake. Khasan, as well as the explanations of the front commander Comrade Blucher and the deputy front commander, member of the military council Mazepov, and having discussed this issue, we came to the following conclusions: 1. Combat operations near the lake. Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all DCF troops without exception. 2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the composition of the DCF. Combat training troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications). Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and military units, found themselves in a chaotic state. In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and NGOs were criminally not implemented by the front command for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people. killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extremely difficult terrain in which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese. The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller... Moreover, the percentage of losses of command and political personnel is unnaturally high - about 40%, which once again proves that The Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves, defending the honor and inviolability of the territory of their great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese, i.e. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade Rychagov in the actions of our aviation (...) During the period of hostilities, we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating all kinds of confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops. The troops advanced to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared... In many cases, entire artillery batteries found themselves at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unsighted, and many soldiers, and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division , arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-footed, and a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area. All types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, maneuver, combine movement and fire, and adapt to the terrain. .. the tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in material. The culprit for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small clash are the commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the DKF and, first of all, the commander of the DKF, Marshal Blucher... The Main Military Council decides: 1. The administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front is to be disbanded. 2. Marshal Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the DKF troops and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. 3. Create two separate armies from the DKF troops, directly subordinate to the NPO... RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 46. L. 183-189 Blucher V. (1890-1938). Since 1929, commander of the Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. Arrested and shot in 1938. Rehabilitated after 1953. Stern G. (1900-1941). In 1938 - chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front. In 1941 - Colonel General, Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the NPO of the USSR. Arrested on June 7, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954. Rychagov P. (1911-1941) - Lieutenant General of Aviation (1940). In 1938 - commander of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of the Far Eastern Front, 1st Separate Red Banner Army. In 1940 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force. Arrested on June 24, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954.

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0169, September 8, 1938

On the imposition of penalties on the command of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front for violating the orders of the NKO On August 7, 1938, during the period of hot battles with the Japanese in the area of Lake Khasan, the deputy commander of the DKFront, corps commander Comrade Filatov, signed an order on the disbandment of medical battalions and field hospitals in the rifle divisions located in battles. The Military Council of the 1st Army delayed the execution of this order. On August 17, the corps commander, Comrade Filatov, made another gross mistake - he ordered the deputy commander of the front air force to provide a DB-3 aircraft for the transfer of a representative of the NKVD from Khabarovsk to the city of Chita, thereby violating the orders of NKO No. 022 of 1934 and [No. 022] of 1936, categorically prohibiting the use of combat aircraft as transport vehicles. Asked on my orders why the plane was provided, and even the DB-3, Comrade Filatov reported that he had given the order to provide the plane, but did not indicate the type of plane; Meanwhile, Comrade Senatorov reported to me that Comrade Filatov’s written order specifically indicated DB-3. Thus, Comrade Filatov did not find the courage to admit his mistake, did not tell the truth, trying to shift the blame to Comrade Senatorov. In turn, the deputy commander of the DKFront Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Comrade Senatorov, having received and executed the order of the Corps Commander Comrade Filatov to send an aircraft for the specified purpose, did not report to him about the illegality of this order. Wine vol. Filatov and Senatorov is aggravated all the more so because they, having violated my orders, also did not take the necessary measures to organize this flight, and the plane crashed on the way back from Chita to Khabarovsk and 3 crew members were killed. For a frivolous attitude towards service and violation of NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and No. 022 of 1936, I severely reprimand Comrade Commander Filatov. I put Colonel Comrade Senatorov on notice for violating NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and 1936. I warn you that for the use of combat aircraft for purposes not related to combat and training missions, I will severely punish those responsible. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

This armed conflict between the USSR and Japan matured gradually. Japan's policy in the Far East did not imply any improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. The aggressive policy of this country in China posed a potential threat to the security of the USSR. Having captured all of Manchuria in March 1932, the Japanese created a puppet state there - Manchukuo. The Japanese Minister of War, General Sadao Araki, said on this occasion: “The State of Manjugo (so Manchukuo in Japanese - M.P.) is nothing more than the brainchild of the Japanese army, and Mr. Pu Yi is his dummy.” In Manchukuo, the Japanese began to create a military infrastructure and increase the size of their army. The USSR sought to maintain normal relations with Japan. At the end of December 1931, he proposed concluding a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, but a year later received a negative response. The capture of Manchuria fundamentally changed the situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The road was in the zone of direct control of the Japanese armed forces.

There were provocations on the road: damage to tracks, raids to rob trains, the use of trains to transport Japanese troops, military cargo, etc. The Japanese and Manchu authorities began to openly encroach on the CER. Under these conditions, in May 1933, the Soviet government expressed its readiness to sell the CER. Negotiations on this issue took place in Tokyo for 2.5 years. The problem came down to price. The Japanese side believed that given the current situation, the USSR was ready to give way under any conditions. After lengthy negotiations that lasted more than 20 months, on March 23, 1935, an agreement was signed on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the following terms: Manchukuo pays 140 million yen for the Chinese Eastern Railway; 1/3 of the total amount must be paid in money, and the rest - in the supply of goods from Japanese and Manchurian companies under Soviet orders for 3 years. In addition, the Manchu side had to pay 30 million yen to the dismissed Soviet road employees. On July 7, 1937, a new Japanese invasion of China began, the capture of which was seen as the threshold of war against the Soviet Union. Tensions have increased on the Far Eastern border.

If previously the main violators on the border were armed detachments of White emigrants and the so-called White Chinese, now more and more Japanese military personnel are becoming violators. In 1936-1938, 231 violations of the state border of the USSR were registered, of which 35 were major military clashes. This was accompanied by losses of border guards, both from the Soviet and Japanese sides. Japan's aggressive policy in China and the Far East forced the Soviet Union to strengthen its defenses. On July 1, 1938, the special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA) was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. was appointed its commander. Blucher. The front consisted of two combined arms armies - the 1st Primorskaya and the 2nd Separate Red Banner armies, commanded by brigade commander K.P. Podlas and corps commander I.S. Konev. The 2nd was created from the Far Eastern Aviation Air Force. The construction of 120 defensive areas was underway in the most threatened directions. By the end of 1938, the number of rank and file and command personnel was supposed to be 105,800 people. The military conflict between the two states arose at the southernmost tip of the state border - at the previously unknown Lake Khasan, surrounded by a ridge of hills, just 10 kilometers from the shore Sea of Japan, and in a straight line - 130 kilometers from Vladivostok. Here the borders of the USSR, the puppet state of Manchukuo and Korea, occupied by the Japanese, converged.

On this section of the border, two hills played a special role - Zaozernaya and its neighbor to the north - Bezymyannaya Hill, along the tops of which the border with China ran. From these hills it was possible to view in detail the coast, railways, tunnels, and other structures adjacent to the border without any optical instruments. From them, direct artillery fire could fire at the entire section of Soviet territory south and west of Posyet Bay, threatening the entire coast in the direction of Vladivostok. This is what caused the Japanese to take special interest in them. The immediate reason for the start of the armed conflict was the border incident on July 3, 1938, when Japanese infantrymen (about a company) advanced to the border guard of two Red Army soldiers on the Zaozernaya hill. Without firing any shots, the Japanese detachment left this place a day later and returned to the Korean locality, located 500 meters from the hill, and began to build fortifications. On July 8, the Soviet reserve border outpost occupied the Zaozernaya hill and established a permanent border guard, thereby declaring it Soviet territory. Here they began to build trenches and wire fences. The measures of the Soviet border guards, in turn, caused the conflict to escalate in the following days, since both sides considered the hills to be their territory.

On July 15, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov, in a conversation with the Charge d'Affaires of the Japanese Embassy in the USSR, Nishi, tried to document the issue of the legality of the presence of Soviet border guards on the shores of Lake Khasan and at the height of Zaozernaya. Stomonyakov, relying on the Hunchun Protocol, signed between Russia and China on June 22, 1886, as well as the map attached to it, proved that Lake Khasan and some areas west of these shores belong to the Soviet Union. In response, the Japanese diplomat demanded that the Soviet border guards be removed from the Zaozernaya heights. The situation seriously escalated on July 15, when in the evening, with a rifle shot, Lieutenant V.M. Vinevitin killed Japanese intelligence officer Sakuni Matsushima, who was on the Zaozernaya hill. This provoked a massive violation of the section of the border guarded by the Posyetsky border detachment. The violators were Japanese “postmen”, each of whom carried a letter to the Soviet authorities demanding to “clean up” the Manchurian territory. On July 20, 1938, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Mamoru Segemitsu at a reception with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinova, on behalf of his government, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the Zaozernaya hill because it belonged to Manchukuo.

At the same time, the ambassador stated in an ultimatum that if this territory is not liberated voluntarily, then it will be liberated by force. In response, on July 22, the Soviet government sent a note to the Japanese government, which rejected the Japanese demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Zaozernaya heights. Commander of the Far Eastern Front V.K. Blucher tried to avoid military conflict. He proposed to “exhaust” the border conflict by recognizing the actions of the Soviet border guards, who dug trenches and carried out simple sapping work not on their territory, as a mistake. The “illegal” commission he created on July 24 established that part of the Soviet trenches and wire fences on the Zaozernaya hill was installed on the Manchurian side.

However, neither Moscow nor Tokyo no longer wanted to hear about a peaceful, diplomatic settlement of the border conflict. By his actions, Blucher caused Stalin and the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov has doubts about whether he is capable of fighting decisively and following the instructions of the country's leadership. On July 29, Japanese troops, numbering up to infantry company, launched an offensive with the aim of capturing the top of the Bezymyannaya hill, where the Soviet garrison, consisting of 11 people, was located. The Japanese managed to capture the heights for a short time. Of the 11 border guards, six remained alive. The head of the outpost, Alexei Makhalin, who became posthumously a Hero of the Soviet Union, also died. Having received reinforcements, the height was again in the hands of the Soviet border guards. The Japanese command brought up large artillery forces and the 19th Infantry Division in order to capture both hills - Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya. On the night of July 31, the Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya, and then Bezymyannaya. By the end of the day, these heights were captured, and within three days trenches, dugouts, firing positions, and wire barriers were built there. The commander of the 40th Infantry Division of the Far Eastern Front made a decision - on August 1, attack the enemy at the heights on the move and restore the status quo on the border. However, the commanders fought using maps that were compiled by the cartographic division of the NKVD and marked “top secret.”

These maps were deliberately made with variations, meaning they did not reflect the actual geography of the area. These were “cards for foreign tourists.” They did not indicate swampy places, and the roads were indicated completely differently. When hostilities began, the Soviet artillery got stuck in the swamps and was shot at by the Japanese with direct fire from the commanding heights. The artillerymen suffered particularly heavy losses. The same thing happened with tanks (T-26). On August 1, in a telephone conversation with the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Blucher, Stalin sharply criticized him for commanding the operation. He was forced to ask the commander a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I would think that you should go to the place immediately.” On August 3, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov decided to entrust the leadership of combat operations in the area of Lake Khasan to the chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front, corps commander G.M. Stern, appointing him simultaneously as commander of the 39th Rifle Corps. By this decision V.K. Blucher actually removed himself from the direct leadership of military operations on the state border. The 39th Rifle Corps included the 32nd, 40th and 39th Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade. 32 thousand people were concentrated directly in the combat area; on the Japanese side there was the 19th Infantry Division, numbering about 20 thousand people. It should be noted that there was still an opportunity to end the military conflict at Lake Khasan through peaceful negotiations. Tokyo understood that there would be no quick victory. And the main forces of the Japanese army at that time were not in Manchukuo, but were conducting military operations against Chiang Kai-shek in China. Therefore, the Japanese side sought to end the military conflict with the USSR at favorable conditions. On August 4 in Moscow, Japanese Ambassador Segemitsu informed M.M. Litvinov about the desire to resolve the conflict diplomatically.

Litvinov stated that this is possible provided that the situation that existed before July 29 is restored, that is, before the date when Japanese troops crossed the border and began to occupy the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights. The Japanese side proposed returning to the border before July 11 - that is, before the appearance of Soviet trenches on the top of Zaozernaya. But this no longer suited the Soviet side, since protest rallies took place throughout the country, demanding to curb the aggressor. In addition, the leadership of the USSR, led by Stalin, had the same sentiments. The offensive of the Soviet troops on the Japanese positions, in whose hands the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills were located, began on August 6 at 16:00. The first blow was struck by Soviet aviation - 180 bombers covered by 70 fighters. 1,592 aerial bombs were dropped on enemy positions. On the same day, the 32nd Infantry Division and a tank battalion advanced on the Bezymyannaya hill, and the 40th Infantry Division, reinforced by a reconnaissance battalion and tanks, advanced on the Zaozernaya hill, which was captured after two days of fierce fighting on August 8, and on August 9 they captured the Bezymyannaya height . Under these conditions, Japanese Ambassador Segemitsu sued for peace.

On the same day, a truce agreement was signed. Hostilities ceased on August 11 at 12 noon. Two hills - Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, over which a military conflict broke out between the two states, were assigned to the USSR. There is still no accurate data on the number of losses of the Red Army. According to declassified official data, during the battles on Lake Khasan, irretrievable losses amounted to 717 people, 75 were missing or captured; 3,279 were wounded, shell-shocked, burned or sick. On the Japanese side, there were 650 dead and 2,500 injured. Commander of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front V.K. Blucher was removed from his post and soon repressed. 26 combat participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union; 95 - awarded the Order of Lenin; 1985 - Order of the Red Banner; 4 thousand – Order of the Red Star, medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit”. The government established a special badge for “Participant in the Khasan battles.” It was also awarded to home front workers who helped and supported the soldiers. Along with the courage and heroism of the soldiers, the Khasan events also showed something else: the poor training of the command staff. Voroshilov’s secret order No. 0040 stated: “The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the state of the front’s CDV. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It has been discovered that the Far Eastern theater is poorly prepared for this war (roads, bridges, communications) ... "

Polynov M.F. USSR/Russia in local wars and
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