5th Guards Don Cavalry Corps of General A. G. Selivanov

5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov

• 52nd Army:

73rd Rifle Corps (Major General Batitsky Pavel Fedorovich): part of the forces of the 206th Rifle Division (Colonel Kolesnikov Vladimir Pavlovich); 294th Rifle Division (Colonel Sergeev Leonid Gavrilovich).

• 5th Air Army:

1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps (Lieutenant General of Aviation Ryazanov Vasily Georgievich): 8th Guards Assault Aviation Division (Colonel Rodyakin Fedor Grigorievich); 9th Guards Assault Aviation Division (Major General of Aviation Agaltsov Philip Aleksandrovich); 12th Guards Fighter Aviation Division (Major General of Aviation Baranchuk Konstantin Gavrilovich).

41st Guards Rifle Division (Major General Tsvetkov Konstantin Nikolaevich); 202nd Rifle Division (Colonel Revenko Zinovy ​​Savvich); 206th Infantry Division; 12th Guards Cavalry Division (Major General Grigorovich Vladimir Iosifovich); 63rd Cavalry Division (Major General Beloshnichenko Kuzma Romanovich); 7th Guards motorized rifle brigade(Colonel Petukhov Panteley Vasilievich); 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Filippovich Marshev); 11th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel Koshaev Nikolai Mikhailovich); 8th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Zemlyanoy Andrey Grigorievich); 1896th self-propelled artillery regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Vasilyevich Zaitsev); 150th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Kazankov Mitrofan Vissarionovich);

Zhukov G.N.

315th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Mefodiy Leontyevich Shevchenko); 452nd Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Mikhailovich Solodovnikov); 206th separate anti-tank artillery division (Major Ivan Grigorievich Shpits); 1328th Army Cannon Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Ratanov Anatoly Mikhailovich); 466th Army Mortar Regiment (Major Sambolya Pyotr Illarionovich); 480th Army Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Georgievich Shturman); 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (Colonel Mezhinsky Gennady Pavlovich); 249th Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (Major Dardiker Israel Abramovich); 4th separate regiment communications (Lieutenant Colonel Gorbachev Alexander Maksimovich); 25th Army Engineer Battalion (Major Ivan Ivanovich Mogilevtsev); 38th Army Engineer Battalion (Major Spitz Joseph Khatskeleevich); 48th Army Engineer Battalion (Major Ilya Zakharovich Terentyev).

1st Ukrainian Front whose troops in this battle from February 13 were led, at the request of Stalin, personally by G.K. Zhukov. ,

• 27th Army

• 6th Tank Army Kravchenko,

• Bogdanov's 2nd Tank Army, transferred from the Headquarters reserve.

From the outside fascist Germany:

on the flanks of our breakthrough, the Nazis hastily created strong strike groups: on the left - as part of the 3rd, 11th and 14th tank divisions, on the right - as part of the 72nd and 389th infantry divisions with a regiment of the 57th infantry and units of the SS Viking Panzer Division. The enemy in front of the outer front of the encirclement on the section of our front on February 3 had 10 divisions, of which 5 tank divisions (17th, 11th, 14th, 13th and 3rd), 5 infantry (34th, 198th I, 167th, 320th and 376th) and 4 brigades assault guns. From February 4 to 10, the 1st and 16th Panzer Divisions, the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division, the 106th Infantry Division, 4 tank battalions and 3 assault gun divisions were additionally brought up.

Tasks of the parties.

The command's plan was to deliver counter attacks by troops from two fronts under the base of the ledge and unite in the Shpola and Zvenigorodka areas.

Composition of forces of the parties at the beginning of the operation

On January 12, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command tasked the fronts with counter strikes under the base of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge to encircle and destroy the enemy group in the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky ledge by closing the left-flank units of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the right-flank units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Shpok area. This made it possible to carry out a general offensive with the aim of complete liberation Right Bank Ukraine and gives them the opportunity to develop striking force to reach the river. Southern Bug.

The fascist German command sought to retain the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge at all costs and stubbornly defended it, because it could not come to terms with the final loss of the “Eastern Wall”. It was obvious that Hitler’s generals hoped to use this ledge as a springboard for an offensive in order to restore the front line along the western bank of the Dnieper.

The start of the offensive was determined: the 1st Ukrainian Front - January 26, the 2nd Ukrainian Front - January 25. The difference in timing was due to the difference in distances that the strike groups of the fronts had to overcome to Zvenigorodka, i.e., to the point where they were supposed to connect.

Carrying out the operation.

Commander of the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko with headquarters officers during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation.

The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive on January 24, the 1st Ukrainian Front - on January 26. Having broken through the enemy’s defenses, the front’s strike groups rushed towards each other. On January 25, on the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breakthrough, rapidly advancing to Zvenigorodka. On the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 6th Tank Army also took the lead, building on its success at Zvenigorodka.

On January 27, the German command launched a counterattack against the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in order to close the gap in its defense created as a result of their breakthrough. Since the advancing Soviet units were significantly stretched, the Germans managed to achieve tactical success. Advanced 20th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards tank army found themselves cut off from the main forces. Nevertheless, the commander of the 20th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General I.G. Lazarev decided to continue the offensive, despite the threat of encirclement. By the end of the day, his tankers drove the Germans out of the village of Shpola, which is 35 kilometers from Zvenigorodka. Well understanding the extreme danger of the current situation for the two corps of Rotmistrov’s tank army, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to provide immediate assistance to his neighbors. He sent a mobile strike group under the command of Major General M.I. to meet Lazarev’s tankers. Savelyev as part of the 233rd tank brigade, 1228th self-propelled artillery regiment, motorized rifle battalion and anti-tank artillery battery. Savelyev's group successfully broke through the German defensive formations in the Lisyanka area and began to rapidly advance behind enemy lines. On January 28, tankers Lazarev and Savelyev united in Zvenigorodka, completing the encirclement of the Cherkassy German group. But it took the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front another two days to make a new hole in the German defense and restore communication with the advanced corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Marshal Konev had to introduce additional forces into the battle for this purpose: the second echelon of Rotmistrov’s army, the 18th tank corps and the cavalry corps of General A.G. Selivanova.

Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Army General I.S. Konev (left) and commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General M.F. Vatutin.

At the same time, troops from both fronts created an outer ring of encirclement in order to prevent the Germans from carrying out an operation to relieve their encircled units. The fascist German command was forced to stop counterattacks against the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front east of Vinnitsa and north of Uman, and transfer all tank divisions to save the encircled troops. The Soviet command took measures to quickly create a stable external encirclement front using the tank armies of both fronts, reinforced by rifle formations, anti-tank artillery and engineer units. At the same time, the combined arms armies formed a continuous internal front of encirclement. Aviation provided great assistance to the advancing troops, making 2,800 sorties from January 29 to February 3.

After the encirclement of the enemy was completed, the 2nd Air Army, together with the country's 10th Air Defense Fighter Corps, carried out an air blockade of the group, and the 5th Air Army supported the Soviet troops operating on the outer front of the encirclement. Multiple counterattacks launched by the enemy in order to break through to the encircled group were repelled. This was largely facilitated by the measures taken by the Soviet command to strengthen the external front of the encirclement with rifle divisions, large artillery forces and the 2nd Tank Army, transferred from near Vinnitsa. The commander of the 11th Army Corps, General Stemmermann, took command of the pocket. At the headquarters of Army Group South, urgent measures were taken to release the encircled troops. For this purpose, two strike groups were concentrated: the 48th Tank Corps of General Voormann in the Uman region and the 3rd Tank Corps under the command of General Breit in the Lisyanka region. In total, six tank divisions were expected to participate in the release operation. But, as Manstein complained in his memoirs, the concentration of relief troops was carried out very slowly due to the onset of mud, which turned all the roads into a muddy mess.

Chief of Staff of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Colonel General M.V. Zakharov (left) and front commander Marshal Soviet Union I.S.Konev. (Right Bank Ukraine, March 1944)

On February 3, General Wormann's 48th Tank Corps made the first attempt to break through the outer front of the encirclement in the sector of the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Novo-Mirgorod area. Attacks German tanks were repulsed. Then Voormann regrouped and attacked the 40th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. To hold back the onslaught of the enemy, who managed to wedge himself into the defensive formations Soviet troops, who coordinated the actions of both fronts, Marshal G.K. Zhukov brought the 2nd Tank Army into the battle. As for the German 3rd Panzer Corps, it has not yet completed its concentration.

On February 8, the Soviet command presented the encircled troops with an ultimatum of surrender, which the enemy rejected. On February 11, the command of Army Group South launched a decisive offensive on the outer front of the encirclement. The 1st Tank Army and the 8th Army, with up to 8 tank divisions, attacked Lysyanka from areas west of Rizino and Yerka. An encircled group attacked them. However, this attempt to save the encircled group failed. To quickly defeat the remainder of the encircled enemy troops, the Soviet command regrouped part of the forces from the external to the internal front of the encirclement.

Military losses.

According to Soviet data, German losses in the encirclement amounted to 55,000 people killed and more than 18,000 prisoners, and in total during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation - 82,000 people killed and about 20,000 prisoners. According to Manstein, 35,000 people emerged from the encirclement, total quantity the death toll was about 19,000 people.

Peter Krivonogov. In the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area 1944-45.

However, Manstein’s data contradicts the data of other German historians that the group did not carry out an organized exit from the cauldron. This is what K. Tippelskirch says: “... the encircled corps received orders to break through in a southern direction... The brilliantly prepared breakthrough on the night of February 16-17 did not, however, lead to a connection with the advancing corps, since the advance, already slow, due to poor ground conditions, was stopped by the enemy.” But Tippelskirch also gives a figure of 30,000 people who escaped from the cauldron. One way or another, in the sector of the 180th Soviet Rifle Division, the boiler was broken through by German troops from the inside. The report of the commander of the encircled 42nd German Army Corps said that 27,703 German troops and 1,063 Hiwis had broken through.

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Column of captured Nazis. District of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. February 1944

The internal and external fronts of encirclement were created in conditions of strong enemy counterattacks and counterattacks. The troops of two Ukrainian fronts not only destroyed large group the enemy, but also defeated another 15 divisions, including 8 tank divisions operating against the outer front of the encirclement. During the operation, Soviet troops demonstrated the high art of maneuver, carried out in a short time in difficult conditions. The 2nd Tank Army, up to 13 rifle divisions, were regrouped on the external front, large number artillery and engineering formations, on the internal front - 2 tank corps, 2 rifle divisions and large artillery forces.

Unusual in Soviet military art was the use of tank armies - the 6th in the first echelon of the front to break through enemy defenses, the 5th Guards and 6th for defense on the external front. Actions were highly active Soviet aviation. Despite the unfavorable weather conditions and the poor condition of unpaved airfields, she flew 11,300 sorties.

For the exploits and courage shown in battles, 23 units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsun”, 6 formations - “Zvenigorod”.

Museum of the History of the Korsun-Shevchenko Battle.

In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, the Museum of the History of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Battle was opened, in the palace of the princes Lopukhin-Demidov. In it, in particular, you can see a diorama of the battle, a huge number of documents, weapons and equipment of those times. Almost every month, information about the disposal of ammunition of those times appears in the local press. Explosions are heard in some forest or ravine. The thunder from them spreads around for tens of kilometers, as if warning us not to forget those who won the victory near Korsun in January-February 1944.

Cannes on the Dnieper, Ukrainian Stalingrad, the Korsun-Shevchenko massacre - they called the victory of the Soviet troops near Korsun as many names were called in their time. Much time has passed since that cloudy and fickle winter with snowfalls and thaws, when it was possible to finally and forever knock the Germans out of the glory of history. Ukrainian people places

Today, a huge number of monuments and memorials remind us of the heroic victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko. For example, a reinforced concrete ring 7.5 m high was built near Steblevo - a symbol of the encirclement of German units. And how many tank monuments there are in this area is even difficult to count

Cannes on the Dnieper. Ukrainian Stalingrad.

Restoring the signature on the card.

Names of main settlements, army groups, fronts, etc.

Basic populated areas: Lysyanka, Shenderovka, Steblevka, Olshana, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Zvenigorodka, Shpola, Tolmach, Rizino, Yerki.

Front names: 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Army groups: 2nd and 5th Air Armies, 1st, 2nd, 5th Guards Tank Army and 6th Tank Armies, 4th Guards, 8th, 27th, 40th, 52nd me and the 53rd Army.

From Nazi Germany: 1st Tank and 8th Army of Army Group South

"Our Victory" No. 4 from 02/09/15

By the beginning of 1944, the pendulum of war had finally swung towards the Red Army. As a result of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Bryansk, Smolensk, Kharkov, Kyiv, Belgorod were liberated... But the enemy was still strong. His fighting spirit was not broken either.

According to the Stalingrad scenario

Moreover, German designers have finally brought to mind technical part their newest "tigers" and "panthers", turning them into truly formidable weapon(however, in the first months of use on the Eastern Front, the losses of such tanks mainly occurred not from Soviet artillery fire, but due to the failure of the chassis). And back in November 1943, after a series of months-long retreats in the southwest, the Nazis “snarled” with a counter-offensive near Zhitomir. At the cost of incredible efforts and big losses Our troops managed to prevent the breakthrough of fascist equipment to Kyiv, but the recently recaptured Zhitomir still had to be abandoned.

It was in such conditions that preparations for the Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya began. offensive operation. With converging attacks from two fronts, it was supposed to “cut off” the emerging bulge of enemy defense on the right bank of the Dnieper, encircle and destroy the main forces of Hitler’s Army Group “South”. At the same time, the 1st Ukrainian Front, led by Nikolai Vatutin, was supposed to attack from the north. And towards him, from the southeast, rushed the armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of our fellow countryman, Army General Ivan Konev

Ten days before the start of the offensive in the area of ​​​​the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, volleys of artillery guns thundered in the north-west. Units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, where there were traditionally many conscripts from the Vologda region, went on the attack. During fierce battles, our troops managed to finally lift the blockade of Leningrad. In addition, several reserve enemy divisions from France, which the Nazis initially intended to use in Ukraine, were transferred to the North-West at the very last moment and could no longer intervene in the battle unfolding on the right bank of the Dnieper.

"Thirty-Fours" vs. "Tigers"

On the morning of January 24, after a powerful artillery barrage, the advanced units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack and by the end of the day had pushed the enemy back 4-6 kilometers. On the 25th, the “Konev” units increased pressure and were able to break through gaps in the Nazis’ defensive formations. And a day later we rolled forward and tank brigades“Vatutino” front, at the forefront of which were the T-34 tanks, which had proven themselves in previous battles.

But the Germans changed tactics, abandoning frontal tank attacks. Their "tigers" now preferred to operate from "double ambushes", making maximum use of the advantage of their long-range turret guns. Usually two or three tanks met our mechanized columns on the tops of the hills and began demonstrative shooting. The Thirty-Fours moved forward at full speed to reduce the distance for shots, and at this time exposed their sides to flanking fire from other camouflaged Tigers.

But the Nazis also did fatal errors. On the morning of January 28, they almost overnight lost a regiment of “Panthers” (almost 60 armored vehicles), which launched a reckless but self-destructive frontal attack.

On the last day of January, the advanced units of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts met in the Olshan region, completing the encirclement of the Nazi group. About 100 thousand enemy soldiers found themselves inside the Korsun-Shevchenko “cauldron”. All of them were threatened with the fate of repeating the tragic path of the 6th Nazi Army, defeated and captured at Stalingrad.

To save the encircled units, the enemy pulled all reserves to the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky “cauldron”, starting its offensive from the outside of the ring. Deep snow, frost and wind made the usual trench warfare difficult. There was practically no continuous line of defense. Basic fighting were carried out along roads and on the approaches to populated areas.

An attempt to split the encircled group into several isolated parts was unsuccessful; the Germans also fought tooth and nail. In addition, they were encouraged by the cannonade coming from the west. Now no longer taking into account their losses in tanks, Erich von Manstein's relief divisions walked and walked forward, and at some point their vanguards found themselves only 8 kilometers from the inner radius of the “ring”

About the benefits of unity of command

Ivan Konev was appointed in charge of continuing the operation. And such a step justified itself. The coordination and controllability of troops increased, and reserves began to be used more efficiently. Creating a numerical superiority, Soviet troops began to successively occupy key enemy strongholds, inexorably narrowing the inner ring of encirclement.

Everything could have turned upside down - somewhat Soviet armies, weakened by previous battles, risked being surrounded themselves. The situation was aggravated by the lack of unity of command. The two Soviet fronts acted according to their previously established plans, and precious hours were spent coordinating the joint actions of the “joining” units.

And then Ivan Konev proposed to temporarily reassign some of the “neighboring” divisions to him, while at the same time giving him the authority to liquidate the entire encircled group. In this case, Vatutin was left with the defense of the outer front of the “cauldron.” In the post-war memoirs of the military
The officials, who were not without some degree of jealousy for the victories they had won, interpreted this differently. According to Zhukov, contrary to subordination, Konev turned directly to Headquarters, to Stalin, ignoring possible objections from both Vatutin and Georgy Konstantinovich himself.

According to Konev’s recollections, Stalin called him himself, since Headquarters had information about the enemy’s breakthrough in the zone of action of the 27th “Vatutin” army, and inquired about the situation and the decisions made.

Be that as it may, despite the objections of Zhukov and Vatutin, it was Konev who was appointed in charge of continuing the entire operation. And such a step justified itself. The coordination and controllability of troops increased, and reserves began to be used more efficiently. Creating a numerical superiority on a certain section of the front, Soviet troops began to successively occupy key enemy strongholds, slowly but inexorably narrowing the inner ring of encirclement. The situation on the outer radius has also stabilized.

Realizing that there would be no radical change, the Nazis decided to save at least part of their troops. Leaving hundreds of serviceable trucks and guns, as well as almost 2,000 seriously wounded, in the depths of the “cauldron,” they reduced all combat-ready units into two “fists” and on the night of February 17, under the cover of heavy “tigers,” they launched a desperate and final attack.

How General Konev became a marshal

But almost all of the serviceable tanks that were still in service were immediately burned. The Germans were “knocked down” from the main roads and forced to leave the “cauldron” through snow-covered fields and ravines, where they suffered heavy losses not only from fire, but also from frostbite. General Stemmerman, the commander of the main breakthrough group, was killed.

Taking advantage of the absence of a continuous front line, the remnants of Nazi troops were still able to reach the positions of the relief troops. But the two army corps virtually ceased to exist. On February 20, Manstein decided to send all the remnants of the withdrawn divisions for reorganization or merge them into other military units.

The most important thing was that inside the Korsun-Shevchenko “cauldron” and during attempts to relieve the blockade, the enemy lost almost all of its tanks, including about 300 “tigers” and “panthers”. Hitler's elite units, such as the SS Viking or Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler panzer divisions, were also badly battered.

The defeat in the Korsun-Shevchenko battle had fatal consequences for the Nazis. Having failed to restore their strength in Ukraine, they abandoned any offensive actions here, and a few months later, under the continuous attacks of Soviet troops, Army Group South ceased to exist.

For their part, for the exploits and courage shown in the February battles of 1944, 23 Soviet units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsunsky”. More than 70 soldiers and officers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

A special reward was in store for our fellow countryman. For the defeat of the enemy near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Army General Konev, the first front commander during the war, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Romanov

The myth of the Korsun-Shevchenko battle

The main myth of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, created Soviet commanders and historiography, is that almost the entire encircled German group was destroyed and only a few soldiers and officers managed to break out of the encirclement. The Germans usually call this battle the Cherkassy “cauldron”.

In November and December 1943, German troops defended themselves in the bend of the Dnieper near Cherkassy to ensure the possibility of a counterattack on Zhitomir and Kyiv. Their flanks were stretched out and poorly protected, which made a Soviet offensive to cut off the Cherkassy salient likely. On December 27, 1943, Manstein proposed a retreat from this ledge and from the Nikopol area near the Dnieper bend. Hitler refused, because after such a withdrawal, Soviet troops could attack the already cut off Crimea, and Nikopol manganese was considered vital for the German war economy. But some precautions were still taken. In particular, two rear positions were prepared north of the Ros River and east of Boguslav.

On January 24, 1944, the right flank of the Cherkasy salient was attacked by the 2nd Ukrainian Front of General Ivan Konev, and the left flank by the 1st Ukrainian Front of General Nikolai Vatutin.

At the start of the offensive on the Korsun-Shevchenko salient on January 24, 1944, the 1st Ukrainian Front included 335 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the 2nd Ukrainian Front included 335 armored vehicles. On January 27, the SS Viking division, together with three infantry divisions from the Pastorsky area, launched a counterattack on the 2nd Ukrainian Front group advancing on Shpola. Fighting broke out with units of the 4th Guards Army. During the three-day battles, separate detachments of German tanks and infantry several times managed to reach the communications of the advancing Soviet troops, but by January 29 they were driven back. According to Manstein, during this counterattack, large forces of the Soviet 1st Tank Army were surrounded and defeated, losing 8 thousand killed, 5.5 thousand prisoners, 700 tanks and 700 guns.

However, these losses still did not stop the advance of the Soviet troops. On January 28, in the Zvenigorodka area, the 5th mechanized corps 1st Ukrainian Front and 20th Tank Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement ring. The surrounded 11th and 52nd Army Corps had approximately 200 tanks and assault guns, consisting of a Viking division and three assault gun battalions.

They had to be supplied by air. The breakthrough could only be made to the south. Five infantry divisions were encircled, one tank division SS Viking, motorized brigade SS Wallonia, light artillery division of the RGK and an assault gun brigade, consisting of two divisions. Those surrounded were led by the commander of the 11th Corps, General Wilhelm Stemmermann. Soviet troops constantly attacked Korsun and Shanderovka in order to dismember the “cauldron” in two. The liquidation of the encircled was made difficult by roads softened by mud and snowstorms. Although the entire territory of the “cauldron”, starting from February 8, was shelled by Soviet artillery, the delivery of shells for the guns was difficult.

The 1st Panzer Army of General Hans Hube began to create a relief group. Hube sent a radiogram to the “cauldron”, promising to help those surrounded. The basis of the group was the 3rd Panzer Corps of General Hermann Breit. This corps formed the basis of the relief group.

On February 9, those surrounded were presented with an ultimatum signed by Zhukov, Vatutin and Konev. They were promised life, safety, food, medical care and return to Germany after the war. Stemmerman rejected the ultimatum and continued to prepare for a breakthrough. 2,000 wounded Germans were left to their mercy Soviet soldiers. The breakthrough was initially scheduled for February 10, but due to muddy roads and strong Soviet attacks, which made regrouping difficult, it was postponed until February 16.

From 3 to 16 February German transport aviation made almost 900 sorties into the “cauldron”, delivering ammunition, fuel and food and evacuating the wounded. On February 14, after the capture of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, the last landing site passed into the hands of Soviet troops, after which cargo had to be dropped from aircraft.

8th attempts German army break through to the encircled divisions through battle formations Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front ended in vain. The relief group of the 1st Tank Army, consisting of the Leibstandarte and three Wehrmacht tank divisions, acted more successfully against Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front. She managed to wedge into the positions of the 47th Rifle Corps. After this, Vatutin brought into battle the 2nd Tank Army of General Semyon Bogdanov, which had just arrived from the General Headquarters reserve and numbered 326 tanks and self-propelled guns. This army attacked the enemy on the morning of February 6 in cooperation with units of the 40th and 6th Tank Armies. As a result of the counter tank battle The advance of the German 3rd Panzer Corps was stopped, but it held the penetration.

In the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the outer front of the encirclement, the enemy managed to push back units of the 49th Rifle Corps and occupy the stations of Zvenigorodka, Yerki and Skalevatka. Only the brigades of the 20th Tank Corps were able to stop the further advance of the Germans. In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, a German strike force advancing from the Rizino area broke through the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps and captured Lisyanka. On the night of February 12, the encircled began to break out from the Steblevo area on a narrow front of 4.5 km. The Viking motorized infantry battalion was in the vanguard, followed by the Deutschland motorized regiment. They managed to push back units of the 27th Army and reach the Shanderovka area. The distance to the divisions of the 3rd Tank Corps was reduced to 10–12 km.

Stalin was dissatisfied with the way the process of liquidation of the encircled German corps was proceeding. On February 12, despite Zhukov’s objections, he entrusted the liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenko group to Konev, and ordered Vatutin to concentrate on holding the outer front of the ring. Georgy Konstantinovich was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to prevent the enemy from breaking out of the encirclement. Zhukov understood that thereby the laurels of victory were moving from his protégé Vatutin to Konev, but he could not do anything. In Stalin’s order of February 18, following the results of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, only the 2nd Ukrainian Front was named. The 1st Ukrainian Front was not included in the order. Stalin was offended by Vatutin for allowing the main forces encircled to unite with the 1st Tank Army coming to their rescue. Therefore, he awarded the title of marshal for the Korsun-Shevchenko operation only to Konev.

On the night of February 17, thanks to surprise, without artillery preparation, German shock units consisting of the Viking division, the Wallonia brigade and Corps Group B managed to break through the internal front of the encirclement and reach the outskirts of Lisyanka. The rearguard units stayed at the opposite end of the “cauldron”, which ensured success at the beginning of the breakthrough. Soviet tank corps were scattered around the entire perimeter of the “cauldron”. Therefore, there were only 20 tanks in the breakthrough direction.

Under heavy enemy fire and attacks Soviet tanks Most of the German troops breaking out of the “cauldron” deviated from the initial direction of attack towards the Gniloya Tikich River. The tired encirclement had to break the resistance of the Soviet military guards along the river and swim and wade across it, throwing away their weapons. They linked up with units of the 3rd Tank Corps on the night of February 18th.

35 thousand people emerged from the “cauldron”, including 2 thousand wounded, led by the commander of the 52nd Army Corps, General Theobald Helmut Lieb. About 5 thousand people died or were captured during the breakthrough. General Stemmerman died during the breakthrough. It was never established whether he was the victim of a severe concussion from a Soviet mine explosion or whether his heart simply stopped. But the troops that broke through lost almost all their heavy weapons and long time turned out to be ineffective. According to Manstein, the two army corps that were surrounded totaled 54 thousand people, but some of the rear services were outside the ring. Soviet troops captured 11 thousand prisoners. The Germans, during counterattacks on Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Korsun-Shevchenko “cauldron,” captured 7 thousand prisoners.

According to our estimates, the losses of Soviet troops in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation amounted to about 81.2 thousand killed and missing and about 120.6 thousand wounded. German losses during the battle near Cherkassy amounted to about 45 thousand people, including irrevocable ones - 27 thousand people. The Sovinformburo reports spoke of 80 thousand surrounded, of which 55 thousand were allegedly killed, and 18 thousand were taken prisoner in order to preserve the myth of the destruction of the encircled group. The fact that these data do not correspond to reality was recognized in October 1957, when at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Marshal Zhukov was criticized for “Bonapartism.”

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Korsun-Shevchenko operation Konev - the 2nd Ukrainian Front - carried out its regrouping in complete silence: his radios were silent, and orders were given only through messengers. The infantry - such a bitter fate - opened the way for tanks, and a powerful movement began on a furious

From the book Victims of Victory. The Germans in the Korsun “cauldron” by Vogel Helmut

Chapter 8 Korsun-Shevchenko “bag” When the 1st Ukrainian Front launched its offensive on January 26, the threat of encirclement was obvious to German commanders, including Lieb and Stemmermann. The situation quickly deteriorated, especially at Lieb's XXXXII Army Corps. Both of his divisions are the 88th

From the book Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

Korsun-Shevchenko frontal offensive operation (January 24 - February 16, 1944) The successful offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front southwest of Kyiv and the attack of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Kirovograd direction made it possible to deeply cover the flanks of the enemy

From the book Great History of Ukraine author Golubets Nikolay

Korsun Mykola Pototsky together with the Polish hetman Kalinovsky went to the rescue of the taxed army, and in response to the news about the rebellion of the registered army and the hopeless situation of Shemberk, they decided to give in on the day, in a safe place. Khmelnitsky learned about the Polish gate and

From the book Marshal Konev author Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Chapter 7. KORSUN-SHEVCHENKOVSKY CAULDRON The troops of Army Group "South", holding the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, did not allow the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to close, constrained their freedom of maneuver and delayed access to the Southern Bug. German command

From the book Battle of Blue Waters author Soroka Yuriy

Progress of the battle The author will not sin before the truth if he says that the Battle of Blue Waters for a long time was in the shadow of others historical events. The same Battle of Kulikovo, which we talked about at the beginning, arguing that its scale and historical significance outweighed

From the book The Missing Letter. The unperverted history of Ukraine-Rus by Dikiy Andrey

Korsun Thanks to the military talent of Khmelnitsky and excellent reconnaissance of the rebels, with whom the population sympathized, the Poles were forced to take the battle in unfavorable positions, and the routes of possible retreat of the POLES were cut in advance by the Cossacks and made them

From the book Walk by Bogdan Khmelnytsky. 1648–1654 author Soroka Yuriy

From the book 100 key themes of Ukrainian history author Zhuravlyov D.V.

Korsun-Shevchenkivsky operation 1944 Date and place of the 24th century - 17 February 1944, district of the town of Korsun-Shevchenkivsky - Shpola - Zvenyhorodka - Gorodishche (lower regional centers of the Cherkasy region). The 1st Ukrainian Front was commanded by Army General Mikola Vatutin,

From the book Tsarist Rome between the Oka and Volga rivers. author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

15. Another reflection of the Battle of Kulikovo in “ancient” Roman history as the battle of Clusia and Sentina. Apparently, the battle of Clusia and Sentina allegedly took place in 295 BC. e. is a duplicate of the Second Latin War of Rome, which we have already described above, allegedly 341–340 BC. e. Exactly

From the book One Hundred Stories about Crimea author Krishtof Elena Georgievna

Korsun Oh, my Russian land! You're already behind the mound! A Word about Igor's Regiment The Kiev prince Vladimir, who baptized Rus', entered my childhood from the fourth grade and stood next to prophetic Oleg, and Igor and Olga, who sat on a steep hill while they feasted on the shore

Korsun-Shevchenko operation 1944

offensive operation of the 1st (commander of Army General N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd (commander of Army General I.S. Konev) Ukrainian fronts January 24 - February 17 during the Great Patriotic War 1941-45. The plan of the Soviet command was to strike with troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts in the general direction of Zvenigorodka with the aim of encircling and destroying a group of Nazi troops in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, formed during the previous Zhitomir-Berdichev and Kirovograd operations. By the beginning of the operation, Soviet troops had 27 rifle divisions, 1 mechanized and 4 tank corps (255 thousand people, 5300 guns and mortars, 513 tanks and self-propelled artillery units), 772 combat aircraft. The enemy had 14 divisions (including 3 tank divisions) and a motorized brigade (170 thousand people, 2600 guns and mortars, 310 tanks and assault guns), 1000 combat aircraft. On January 24, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (4th Guards, 53rd Army, 5th Guards Tank Army) with the support of the 5th air army went on the offensive with advanced detachments, and on January 25 - with the main forces. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (40th, 27th Armies and 6th Tank Army), with the support of the 2nd Air Army, launched an offensive on January 26 and on January 28 joined forces in the Zvenigorodka area with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Up to 10 fascist German divisions and 1 brigade with a total number of about 80 thousand people were surrounded. To assist the encircled troops, the fascist German command attempted to break through the encirclement front in the areas of Novomirgorod and Tolmach (February 3) and Rizino (February 4), but were unsuccessful. The encirclement ring became more and more compressed. On February 8, the Soviet command invited the enemy divisions to lay down their arms, but this proposal was rejected. On the external front, the enemy continued to strengthen the group of troops, which by February 10 had 6 infantry, 8 tank divisions and various individual units (in total over 110 thousand people, 940 tanks and assault guns). On February 11, the enemy again launched an offensive from the Rizino area, at the cost of heavy losses, pushed back the Soviet troops and reached the Lysyanka area. On February 12, surrounded by fascist German troops managed to break through from the Steblevo area to the Shenderovka area, the distance between them and German troops in the Lysyanka area was reduced to 10-12 km. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in order to unite the efforts of all troops allocated to destroy the enemy, on February 12 subordinated them to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On the night of February 17, the enemy in three columns, under the cover of a snowstorm, moved from Shenderovka to break through the encirclement, but only a small group of tanks and armored personnel carriers managed to break through to their troops in Lysyanka. As a result, K.-Sh. O. About 55 thousand were killed and wounded and over 18 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured. The liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group created the conditions for the final liberation of Right Bank Ukraine.

Lit.: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945, vol. 4, M., 1962; Grylev A.N., Dnieper - Carpathians - Crimea, M., 1970.

A. N. Grylev.

Korsun-Shevchenko operation 1944

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

See what the “Korsun-Shevchenko Operation 1944” is in other dictionaries:

24.1 17.2.1944, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts (army generals N.F. Vatutin and I.S. Konev) during the battle for Right Bank Ukraine surrounded Shevchenko St. in the Korsun region. 10 divisions from... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

KORSUNG SHEVCHENKOVSKAYA OPERATION, 24.1 17.2.1944, during the Great Patriotic War. Troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts (army generals N.F. Vatutin and I.S. Konev) surrounded the Korsun region during the battle for Right Bank Ukraine... ...Russian history

This page is proposed to be merged with the Cherkassy environment. Explanation of reasons and discussion on the Wikipedia page: Towards unification / October 26, 2012 ... Wikipedia

January 24–February 17, 1944, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts (Army General N.F. Vatutin and I.S. Konev) during the battle for Right Bank Ukraine surrounded Shevchenkovsky in the Korsun area over... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary

Operation to encircle and destroy the German group. fash. troops from Army Group South (commander General Feldm. E. Manstein) in the region of Korsun Shevchenkovsky during the Great. Fatherland war of 1941 45 by the forces of the 1st (Commander of the General Army N.P.... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

Vyborg Petrozavodsk operation Second World War “Ten Stalinist blows” (1944) 1. Leningrad 2. Korsun Shevchenkovsky 3. Odessa Crimea 4 ... Wikipedia

Odessa liberation operation World War II ... Wikipedia

This term has other meanings, see Belarusian operation. This article is about the strategic offensive operation of the Red Army. For the computer game, see Operation Bagration ( computer game). Belarusian operation (1944) ... ... Wikipedia

Cherkasy cauldron

in Right Bank Ukraine destruction completed German group surrounded during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation.

The offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, carried out with the aim of destroying the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, became part of the strategic offensive of Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine. It ended with the complete defeat of the encircled group and the death of more than a third of its personnel.

On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and destroy enemy troops.

Started on January 24 Korsun-Shevchenko operation. At dawn, hundreds of guns opened fire on enemy positions. Powerful artillery fire destroyed defensive structures, filled up trenches and communication passages, destroyed manpower and military equipment enemy.

As soon as the artillery moved the fire into the depths, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack.

On January 26, from the opposite side of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck.

Having overcome the resistance of the enemy's 34th, 88th and 198th infantry divisions in the first line, the troops of the front shock group sought to develop a strike into the depth of the defense. The enemy, relying on prepared lines in the depths, resisted fiercely, especially in the zone of the 40th Army. Moreover, with the forces of the 16th and 17th tank divisions, he persistently attacked the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. Here, together with units of the 40th Army (50th and 51st Rifle Corps), soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, transferred here from near Bila Tserkva, fought. The front command also regrouped the 11th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army to strengthen the troops in this direction. The corps was transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the 40th Army.

The offensive of the right-flank formations of the 27th Army (337th and 180th Rifle Divisions) and the units of the 6th Tank Army interacting with them developed somewhat more successfully, and under these conditions the front commander decided to transfer the entire brunt of the main attack to the 6th Tank Army zone. and the 27th Army. For this purpose, from 23:00 on January 27, the 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th Rifle Divisions) from the 40th Army was transferred to the subordination of the 6th Tank Army.

On January 31, the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front met in the Olshany area, thereby closing the encirclement ring.

Russian T-34-76 tanks on the march.

Fiercely resisting, the Germans launched repeated counterattacks in various directions, first in order to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, and from the end of January - in order to cut off our mobile formations from the main forces.

By the end of February 3, Soviet troops completed the complete encirclement of the entire Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, establishing a continuous front line. On February 4–5, fascist German troops unsuccessfully repeated attempts to break through the encirclement front with attacks in the direction of Shpola. Also unsuccessful were the enemy’s attempts to break through the encirclement in the sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Rizino area to Lysyanka.

In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command proposed that the fascist German troops surrender on February 8. But, deceived by Hitler’s promises of help, they refused to capitulate and continued to resist. Soviet troops, tightening the encirclement, continued to eliminate the enemy group. Until February 12, the destruction was carried out by the forces of both fronts, and then by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. On February 11, the enemy launched a large counterattack with five tank divisions from the Yerki area and north of Buka in the general direction of Shanderovka.

On February 12, the troops of the encircled group went on the offensive from the Steblev-Tarasha line in the direction of Lysyanka. At the cost of heavy losses, the advancing fascist German divisions managed to reach the Chesnovka-Lysyanka line by February 16. The German troops breaking out from the encirclement at the same time captured the Khilki-Komarovka and Novo-Buda areas, but they still failed to connect with the divisions advancing towards them. The enemy was first stopped, and then defeated and destroyed. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured Korsun-Shevchenkovsky with a swift attack on February 14.

In the rear of the Germans they were active partisan detachments. The photo shows a group of demolitionists from the Khrushchev detachment near a bridge blown up by partisans.

The last attempt by the Germans to break out of the encirclement took place on February 17. There were three columns in the first echelon: the 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division on the left, the 72nd Infantry Division in the center and Corps Group B on the right flank. The 57th and 88th were in the rearguard infantry divisions. The main blow fell on the 5th Guards. airborne, 180th and 202nd rifle divisions on the inner ring of encirclement and along the 41st Guards. rifle division on the outer. Basically, German troops broke through between the villages of Zhurzhintsy and Pochapintsy directly to October, but many, due to shelling from height 239, went south of it and even south of Pochapintsy and reached Gnilomy Tikach, where there were no crossings. This led to major losses both from hypothermia when trying to cross using improvised means, and from shelling by Soviet troops. During the breakthrough, the commander of the encircled German group died artillery general Wilhelm Stemmermann.

Corpse of General Stemmermann

On February 17, 1944, the entire surrounded group of Nazi troops ceased to exist. As a result of fierce battles, the Germans lost 55 thousand killed and over 18 thousand captured. 40,423 Germans managed to escape. Our irretrievable losses amounted to 24,286 people. Only the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured: 41 aircraft, 167 tanks and self-propelled guns, 618 field guns of various calibers, 267 mortars, 789 machine guns, 10 thousand vehicles, 7 locomotives, 415 wagons and tanks, 127 tractors and other trophies.