Operation Bagration was carried out in the direction. Army Group Center Command

What is Operation Bagration? How was it carried out? We will consider these and other questions in the article. It is known that 2014 marked the 70th anniversary of this operation. During it, the Red Army was able not only to liberate the Belarusians from occupation, but also, by destabilizing the enemy, accelerated the collapse of fascism.

This was due to the extraordinary courage, determination and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands Soviet partisans and soldiers of Belarus, many of whom died in the name of victory over the invaders.

Operation

Offensive Belarusian operation "Bagration" - a large-scale campaign of the Great Patriotic War, carried out in 1944, from June 23 to August 29. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of Georgian origin P.I. Bagration, who gained fame during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Campaign meaning

The liberation of Belarus was not easy for Soviet soldiers. During the above extensive offensive, the Belarusian lands, part of the Baltic states and eastern Poland were saved, and the German group of detachments “Center” was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered impressive losses partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to restore troops.

Campaign background

The liberation of Belarus was carried out in several stages. It is known that by June 1944, in the east, the front line approached the Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin line, establishing an impressive protrusion - a wedge directed deep into the USSR, called the "Belarusian Balcony".

In Ukraine, the Red Army was able to achieve a series of tangible successes (many Wehrmacht soldiers died in the chain of “cauldrons”, almost all the lands of the Republic were liberated). If we wanted to break through in the winter of 1943-1944 in the direction of Minsk, successes, on the contrary, were very modest.

Along with this, by the end of the spring of 1944, the invasion in the south had stalled, and the Supreme Command decided to change the course of efforts.

Strengths of the parties

The liberation of Belarus was quick and inevitable. Information about opponents' strengths different sources vary. In accordance with the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War,” 1 million 200 thousand soldiers (not including rear units) took part in the campaign from the USSR. On the German side - as part of the group of detachments "Center" - 850-900 thousand souls (plus about 400 thousand rear soldiers). In addition, in the second phase, the left wing of the “Northern Ukraine” group of troops and the right wing of the “North” group of troops took part in the battle.

It is known that four Wehrmacht regiments resisted the four Soviet fronts.

Campaign preparation

Before the liberation of Belarus, the Red Army soldiers intensively prepared for the operation. At first, the Soviet leadership thought that the Bagration campaign would be identical to the Battle of Kursk - something like Rumyantsev or Kutuzov, with a colossal consumption of ammunition with a subsequent modest movement of 150-200 km.

Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with persistent, long-term battles in the tactical defense area to the point of attrition - required a colossal amount of ammunition and a small amount of fuel for mechanical parts and small capacities for the revival of railway tracks, the actual evolution of the campaign turned out to be unexpected for the Soviet leadership.

In April 1944, the General Staff began to develop an operational scheme for the Belarusian operation. The command intended to crush the flanks of the German Group Center, encircle its base forces east of Minsk and completely liberate Belarus. The plan was extremely large-scale and ambitious, since during the war the simultaneous defeat of an entire group of troops was planned extremely rarely.

Significant personnel moves have been made. Direct preparations for the Belarusian operation began at the end of May. On May 31, private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command containing specific plans were delivered to front commanders.

The Red Army soldiers organized a thorough reconnaissance of enemy positions and forces. Information was obtained in various directions. For example, reconnaissance teams of the 1st Front of Belarus were able to capture about 80 “languages”. Human agents and active acoustic reconnaissance were also conducted, enemy positions were studied by artillery observers, and so on.

The headquarters sought to achieve extreme surprise. The army commanders personally gave all orders to the military commanders of the units. It was forbidden to talk on the phone about preparations for an offensive, even in coded form. The fronts preparing for the operation began to observe radio silence. Troops concentrated and regrouped mainly at night. It was necessary to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, so General Staff officers were specially assigned to patrol the area.

Before the offensive, commanders at all levels, down to companies, carried out reconnaissance. They assigned tasks to their subordinates on the spot. To improve cooperation, Air Force officers and artillery spotters were sent to tank units.

It follows that the campaign was prepared very carefully, while the enemy remained in the dark about the impending assault.

Wehrmacht

So, you already know that the Red Army thoroughly prepared for the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. The leadership of the Red Army was perfectly aware of the enemy grouping in the area of the future attack. The General Staff of the ground forces of the Third Reich and the military leaders of the Group of Forces Center were in the dark about the plans and forces of the Red Army.

The High Command and Hitler thought that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. They hoped that the Soviet garrisons would strike from the area south of Kovel towards the Baltic Sea, cutting off the “Center” and “North” groups of troops.

The General Staff of the Third Reich assumed that the Red Army wanted to mislead the German military leaders about the course of the most important strike and withdraw reserves from the region between Kovel and the Carpathians. The situation in Belarus was so calm that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the campaign.

Progress of hostilities

So, the Great Patriotic War was going on. The liberation of Belarus played a decisive role in this tense confrontation. The preliminary phase of the campaign symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union - June 22, 1944. The most significant battle site was the Berezina River, as during the Patriotic War of 1812.

To liberate Belarus, the commanders used all their skills. Soviet troops of the 2nd, 1st, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German group of forces “Center” in many areas. The Red Army soldiers surrounded and destroyed impressive enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Vilnius, Bobruisk, Brest and east of Minsk. They also liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and Vilnius (July 13), and the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet soldiers were able to reach the lines of the Vistula and Narev rivers and the Rubicons of East Prussia. It is noteworthy that the Soviet troops were commanded by Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, General G. F. Zakharov, General K. K. Rokossovsky, and the German troops were commanded by Field Marshal General E. Bush, later - V .Model.

The operation to liberate Belarus was carried out in two steps. The first step was taken from June 23 to July 4 and included the following offensive front operations:

Mogilev operation;
Vitebsk-Orsha;
Minsk;
Polotsk;
Bobruiskaya.

Osovets operation;
Kaunasskaya;
Vilnius;
Bialystok;
Siauliai;
Lublin-Brestskaya.

Partisan actions

So, you already know that the liberation of Belarus during the Second World War played a significant role. Before the offensive, a guerrilla action of unprecedented proportions took place. In Belarus at that time there were many active partisan formations. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement recorded that 194,708 supporters joined the Red Army troops in the summer of 1944.

Soviet commanders successfully linked military operations with the actions of partisan groups. Taking part in the Bagration campaign, the partisans first disabled the enemy’s communications, and later prevented the withdrawal of the defeated Wehrmacht troops.

They began to destroy the German rear on the night of June 19-20. Russian partisans in the central region of the eastern front carried out 10,500 explosions. As a result, they were able to delay the transfer of enemy operational reserves for a couple of days.

The partisans planned to carry out 40 thousand various explosions, that is, they managed to fulfill only a quarter of their intentions. And yet, they were able to briefly paralyze the rear of the Center group of troops.

At the end of June 1944, on the night before the general attack of the Russians in the zone of the Center group of forces, the partisans carried out a powerful raid on all important roads. As a result, they completely deprived the enemy troops of control. During this one night, the partisans managed to install 10.5 thousand mines and charges, of which only 3.5 thousand were discovered and neutralized. Due to the activities of partisan detachments, communication along many routes was carried out during the day and only under the cover of an armed convoy.

Railways and bridges became the main targets for partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were also actively disabled. This activity greatly facilitated the Red Army's offensive at the front.

Results of the operation

The liberation of Belarus in 1944 turned history back. The success of the Bagration campaign exceeded all expectations Soviet leaders. Having attacked the enemy for two months, the Red Army soldiers completely cleared Belarus, recaptured part of the Baltic states, and liberated the eastern regions of Poland. In general, on a front 1100 km long, Soviet soldiers were able to advance to a depth of 600 km.

The operation also left the North group of troops stationed in the Baltic states defenseless. After all, they managed to bypass the “Panther” line, a carefully constructed border. In the future, this fact significantly facilitated the Baltic campaign.

The Red Army also captured two large bridgeheads south of Warsaw across the Vistula - Pulawski and Magnuszewski, as well as a bridgehead at Sandomierz (recaptured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Sandomierz-Lvov campaign). With these actions they created the groundwork for the upcoming Vistula-Oder operation. It is known that the offensive of the 1st Front of Belarus, which stopped only at the Oder, began in January 1945 from the Pulawy and Magnushevsky bridgeheads.

The military believes that the liberation of Soviet Belarus contributed to the large-scale defeat of the German Armed Forces. Many are confident that the Battle of Belarus can safely be called “the largest defeat of the German Armed Forces in the Second World War.”

On the scale of the German-Soviet front, the Bagration campaign became the greatest in the long annals of offensives. It is a sensation of the Soviet theory of military mastery thanks to the superbly coordinated movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to deceive the enemy about the location of the fundamental assault that began in the summer of 1944. It destroyed German reserves, seriously limiting the invaders' ability to fend off both the Allied advance in Western Europe and other attacks on the Eastern Front.

So, for example, the German command transferred the “Great Germany” division from the Dniester to Siauliai. As a result, she was unable to take part in repelling the Iasi-Kishinev campaign. The Hermann Goering division had to abandon its positions in mid-July in Italy near Florence, and was thrown into battle on the Vistula. When Goering units attacked the Magnushevsky sector in vain in mid-August, Florence was liberated.

Losses

The human losses of the Red Army are known quite accurately. In total, 178,507 military personnel died, went missing, or were captured; 587,308 people were injured or fell ill. Even by World War II standards, these losses are considered high. In absolute numbers, they significantly outnumber the victims not only in successful, but also in many unsuccessful campaigns.

So, for comparison, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 cost the Red Army a little more than 45 thousand dead, and Berlin operation- 81 thousand. This disruption was due to the duration and scope of the campaign, which was carried out on complex terrain against a competent and energetic enemy who occupied superbly prepared defensive lines.

Scientists still debate about the human losses of the Wehrmacht today. Western professors estimate that the Germans had 262,929 captured and missing, 109,776 wounded and 26,397 dead, for a total of 399,102 soldiers. These data were obtained from ten-day reports compiled by the fascist troops.

Why, in this case, is the number of those killed small? Yes, because many of the dead were recorded as missing in action, and sometimes this status was given to the entire division’s personnel.

However, these figures have been criticized. For example, the US historian of the Eastern Front D. Glantz discovered that the difference between the number of military personnel of the Center group of troops before and after the campaign was much larger. D. Glantz said that the information from the ten-day reports gives the situation a minimal assessment. When Russian investigator A.V. Isaev spoke on the Ekho Moskvy radio, he stated that the Nazis’ losses amounted to about 500 thousand souls. S. Zaloga claims that before the surrender of the 4th Army, 300-500 thousand Germans died.

It is also necessary to emphasize that in all cases the losses of the “Center” group of forces were calculated, without taking into account the victims of the “North” and “Northern Ukraine” regiment groups.

It is known that the Sovinformburo published Soviet information, according to which German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 lost 631 aircraft, 2,735 self-propelled guns and tanks, 57,152 vehicles, 158,480 people were captured, 381,000 soldiers were killed. Perhaps these data are quite exaggerated, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses. In any case, the question of the Wehrmacht’s human losses in Bagration is not yet closed.

The Germans, captured near Minsk in the amount of 57,600 people, were marched through Moscow - a column of prisoners of war walked through the streets of the capital for about three hours. In this way, the meaning of success was demonstrated to other powers. After the march, every street was cleared and washed.

Memory

We still honor the year of the liberation of Belarus today. In honor of this event, the following memorial signs were created:

Memorial “Campaign “Bagration” near the village of Rakovichi (Svetlogorsk district).
Mound of Glory.
In 2010, on April 14, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus issued and put into circulation a series of coins “Campaign “Bagration”.

Awards

Subsequently, anniversary awards appeared in Belarus in the form of the medal “For the Liberation of Belarus.” In 2004, a commemorative badge “60 years of the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders” was introduced. Later, anniversary medals were issued for the 65th and 70th anniversaries of the liberation of Belarus.

There is no re-awarding of the anniversary medal. If you have lost your medal or certificate for it, you will not be given a duplicate. They can only allow the wearing of the established version of the bar.

A “lunar landscape” of shell craters of various calibers, fields surrounded by barbed wire, deep and branched trenches - this is exactly what the front line looked like in the western direction in the spring of 1944.

"Iron" of the great battle Heavy bomber He-177 (Germany)

The picture was more reminiscent of the Somme or Verdun of 1916, with only the charred remains of tanks indicating the change of eras. It would be a big mistake to believe that positional battles are forever a thing of the past, on the fields of the First World War. The Second World War was simply more diverse, combining positional meat grinders and fast-moving maneuver battles.

While Soviet troops were successfully advancing in Ukraine in the winter of 1943-1944, the front line on the approaches to Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk remained almost motionless. A giant “Belarusian balcony” was formed. The offensive operations undertaken by the Western Front failed over and over again. Things were somewhat better for the 1st Baltic and 1st Belorussian fronts, but they also achieved only limited success; the directives of the Headquarters remained unfulfilled.

Army Group Center was the toughest nut to crack - for three whole years it held back the offensive impulses of the Red Army. When in the south, in steppe zone the war was already rolling towards the borders of the USSR; fierce positional battles were taking place in the forests and swamps in the western direction.

Impregnable shaft of fire

This happened due to the fact that in the fall of 1943 the Germans managed to stabilize the front, gain a foothold in advantageous positions and bring up artillery, including the heaviest - captured 280-mm French mortars. The short delivery period to Belarus from Germany, the increase in the production of shells within the framework of the declared total war, allowed the troops of the Civil Aviation Center "Center" to literally drown out Soviet offensives in a barrage of artillery fire, with the consumption of up to 3000 tons of ammunition per day. For comparison: during the assault on Stalingrad, less than 1000 tons per day were consumed at its peak. Thousands of heavy gun shells were carried big losses to the advancing Soviet units.

In addition, in the wooded and swampy terrain of Belarus, the Germans managed to realize the technical advantage of the Tiger tanks, which fired from long distances fashion shows and roads, knocking out Soviet T-34−76. According to German data, Tigers accounted for almost half of the destroyed Soviet tanks at the beginning of 1944. The situation seemed hopeless, the command changed the direction of attacks, attempts to break through were made by different armies, but the result was invariably unsatisfactory.

The goal of Operation Bagration was to destroy the so-called “Belarusian balcony” hanging over the right flank of the Soviet troops advancing in Ukraine. In just two months, Army Group Center was defeated. On the Soviet side, the operation was attended by troops of the 1st Baltic Front (commander - Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General G . F. Zakharov), 1st Belorussian Front (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky). On the German side - 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel General G. H. Reinhardt), 4th Army (Infantry General K. von Tippelskirch), 9th Army (Infantry General H. Jordan), 2nd Army ( Colonel General V. Weiss).

A series of failures in the western direction led to an investigation by the GKO (State Defense Committee) commission in April 1944, as a result of which the commander of the Western Front, V.D., was removed. Sokolovsky, commander of the 33rd Army (which was often placed in the direction of the main attack) V.N. Gordov and some other persons from the front headquarters. G.K. Zhukov and A.M. were sent to Belarus as representatives of Headquarters. Vasilevsky, who were in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front during the winter campaign of 1943-1944. The first was assigned to coordinate the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and the second - the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic. IN general outline, the offensive plans were worked out to the level of Headquarters directives by the end of May 1944. The operation received the code name “Bagration”.

Wehrmacht mistake

Zhukov and Vasilevsky partially made the task of storming the “Belarusian balcony” easier for themselves with their own successes against Army Groups “South” and “A”. On the one hand, after the successful liberation of Crimea in May 1944, several armies were released - they were loaded into trains and sent to the western direction. On the other hand, by the beginning of summer, the overwhelming majority of German tank divisions, a most valuable reserve in defense, were pulled south. There was only one 20th tank division left in the Center Civil Aviation Division near Bobruisk. Also, the army group was left with the only battalion of “Tigers” (in winter there were two). To characterize the GA "Center" in terms of equipment tank troops it is enough to cite one fact: the largest German formation on the Eastern Front did not have a single Panther tank, although the Pz. V have already been produced more than a year! The basis of the armored vehicle fleet of the GA "Center" was approximately 400 assault guns.

In the photo, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, and the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov. The 1st Baltic Front took part in three Bagration operations - Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk and Siauliai. His troops marched from the eastern regions of Belarus to the coast of the Gulf of Riga, from which, however, they had to retreat under the pressure of a German naval landing.

To patch up the front of the army groups “Northern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” they also seized approximately 20% of the RGK artillery and 30% of the assault gun brigades. By the beginning of the summer of 1944, the German high command considered the most likely Soviet offensive in the GA zone “Northern Ukraine”, in the development of winter and spring successes. It was assumed that a powerful blow would be delivered through Poland to the Baltic Sea, cutting off the GA “Center” and GA “North” from Germany. Therefore, large forces of tank troops were assembled in the GA “Northern Ukraine”, and it was headed by the “genius of defense” and the Fuhrer’s favorite Walter Model. The opinion that the main attack would not take place in the Center GA zone was also shared by the commanders of the armies in Belarus. They were convinced that there would be pinning offensives with limited objectives on the central sector of the front by their own defensive successes in the winter campaign. They were convinced: after a series of failures, the Red Army would change the direction of its attack. If offensives are undertaken with limited objectives, they will be repelled just as successfully as in the winter of 1943-1944.

Bet on wings

On the contrary, the Soviet command decided to focus efforts on the liberation of Belarus. An error in assessing the plans of the Red Army to a large extent predetermined the collapse of the German front in the summer of 1944. However, the task of the Soviet troops in the western direction remained difficult. The new offensive of the Red Army could still be drowned in a barrage of artillery fire, just like the winter operations. To combat enemy artillery, in addition to strengthening traditional counter-battery warfare, it was decided to use aviation. The situation for the large-scale use of aviation in the summer of 1944 in Belarus could not have been more favorable.

At the beginning of 1944, the German Tigers represented serious problem for the Red Army: Soviet T-34−76 became victims of their long-range guns. However, by the time Operation Bagration began, most of the Tigers had been redeployed to the south.

At that time, the 6th Air Fleet, under the command of Luftwaffe Colonel General Robert von Greim, operated in the interests of GA Center. By the beginning of the summer of 1944, its composition was quite unique. In total, 15% of combat-ready Luftwaffe aircraft of all types in all theaters of military operations were located in Belarus. Moreover, as of May 31, 1944, out of 1051 combat-ready single-engine fighters in the Luftwaffe as a whole, only 66 aircraft, or 6%, were in the 6th Air Fleet. These were the headquarters and two groups of the 51st Fighter Squadron. There were 444 of them in the Reich Air Fleet, and 138 in the neighboring 4th Air Fleet in Ukraine. In total, the 6th Air Fleet at that time had 688 combat-ready aircraft: 66 single-engine fighters, 19 night fighters, 312 bombers , 106 attack aircraft, 48 night bombers, 26 long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 67 short-range reconnaissance aircraft and 44 transport aircraft.

Shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive, the number of fighters in Belarus decreased and as a result, by June 22, 1944, only 32 Bf.109G-6 fighters based in Orsha remained in the 6th Air Fleet. For the almost 1000-kilometer front of the Civil Aviation Center “Center”, this number can hardly be called anything other than ridiculous. The abnormality of the situation can be illustrated by another fact: there were a comparable number of Messerschmitts as photo reconnaissance aircraft (modifications Bf.109G-6 and Bf.109G-8) subordinate to the 6th Air Fleet - 24 combat-ready vehicles on May 31, 1944. This, on the one hand, shows the Germans’ attention to aerial reconnaissance, and on the other hand, demonstrates a catastrophic decline in the number of parks German fighters in Belarus. By the way, it was the photo reconnaissance officers of the GA “Center” who revealed the concentration of Soviet artillery in the direction of the main attacks of four fronts, and they were not a secret to the Germans by June 22, 1944.

At the initial stage of Operation Bagration, Soviet bomber aircraft were engaged in suppressing German artillery positions. Then artillery began to suppress the enemy’s defenses. Subsequently, the Germans noted the increased quality of artillery fire control on the part of our troops.

At the same time, the 6th Air Fleet could boast of a very impressive number of bombers. Three hundred, mostly He-111s, were intended for night strikes against targets in the Soviet rear. If the fighter group was weakened in June 1944, the bomber fist of the 6th Air Fleet, on the contrary, strengthened. Three groups of He-177s from the KG1 squadron landed at the airfields in Königsberg. They numbered about a hundred heavy aircraft - quite an impressive force. Their first task was to attack the railway junction in Velikiye Luki. The Luftwaffe command was very late in realizing the prospect of strikes strategic aviation behind the rear of the Soviet Union. However, these ambitious plans were not destined to come true, and soon the He-177s were used to attack completely different targets.

Heavy bombers were also massing on the other side of the front. By the spring and early summer of 1944, long-range aviation (LRA) of the Red Army Air Force was a serious force, capable of solving independent problems. It consisted of 66 air regiments, united in 22 air divisions and 9 corps (including one corps on Far East). The ADD aircraft fleet has reached an impressive figure of 1000 long-range bombers. In May 1944, this impressive air force was aimed at Army Group Center. Eight ADD corps were relocated to the areas of Chernigov and Kyiv, which made it possible to strike at the “Belarusian Balcony” hanging over Ukraine. The fleet of long-range aviation at that time consisted mainly of twin-engine aircraft: Il-4, Lend-Lease B-25 and Li-2 transport aircraft converted into bombers. The first ADD strikes in the western strategic direction followed in May 1944, when the transport network in the rear of the GA “Center” was attacked.

On July 17, 1944, a column of 57,000 German prisoners of war was marched through Moscow, after which the streets were ostentatiously swept and washed. The Wehrmacht suffered a severe defeat, but the losses of the Red Army were also very high - almost 178,500 killed.

Reconnaissance in force

The task set by the command to defeat the German defense was significantly different from the usual ADD attacks on railway junctions and other targets of this kind deep behind enemy lines. A serious problem was the threat of defeat of one's own troops, who were preparing to attack, at the slightest navigational error, which was inevitable at night. To prevent this from happening, a complex system of light designation of the leading edge was thought out. Searchlights were used to indicate the direction of attack, fires and even... trucks. They lined up in the near rear parallel to the front line and shined their headlights towards the rear. From the air at night this row of headlights was clearly visible. Additionally Front edge was indicated by artillery fire; flashes of shots were also clearly observed from above. The ADD crews received clear instructions at the slightest doubt about identifying the front line to go to a reserve target in the depths of the enemy’s defense.

Much of June 1944 was spent in preparation for the summer battles. The German High Command believed that a new Soviet offensive would begin on June 22, 1944, the anniversary of the start of the war. However, in reality, on June 22, reconnaissance in force began on the right wing of the Soviet troops in Belarus. The Germans habitually met it with a barrage of artillery fire, and Soviet artillery reconnaissance spotted the firing batteries.

280 mm French mortar used by the Wehrmacht.

At this moment, the front command unexpectedly intervened in the plans heavenly office: The weather worsened and the very use of aviation was called into question. Low clouds hung over the ADD airfields in Ukraine and Belarus. Showers and thunderstorms began. However, the ADD had a sufficient number of experienced crews capable of flying in difficult weather conditions. Therefore, with a decrease in the number of aircraft involved, there was no refusal to complete the mission.

On the night of June 22-23, 1944, heavy air bombs with a caliber of up to 500-1000 kg fell on German positions in the direction of the main attacks of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. The relatively low accuracy of bombing from horizontal flight was compensated by the power of the bombs and the massive impact in a small space. As the pilots dryly wrote in one of the reports, “bomb explosions were located throughout the entire target area.”

Crush the defense

On the morning of June 23, after night raids by long-range aviation, Soviet artillery fell on German positions. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the German 4th Army outlined the reasons for the “stunning successes” of the Red Army as follows:

Soviet attack aircraft Il-2

“Enemy artillery activity—primarily the amount of ammunition expended and the duration of the hurricane fire—was significantly higher than in previous battles. Control of enemy artillery fire became more maneuverable, and more attention was paid to suppressing German artillery than before.”

Soon the Soviet Air Force also had their say. At the beginning of Bagration, the four fronts had about 5,700 aircraft. However, not all of this mass could be used for attacks against German artillery and infantry positions. Since the morning of June 23, Soviet aviation almost did not fly, but as weather conditions improved, activity increased due to the actions of the most experienced crews. Despite heavy pouring rain and poor visibility not exceeding 500 m, small groups of Ilovs searched for enemy batteries and showered them with bombs, including anti-tank PTABs, which acted as highly effective fragmentation bombs. The 337th Infantry Division, which found itself in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Belorussian Front, lost ¾ of its artillery in two days. A similar picture was observed in all directions of the main attack. This persistence brought the expected success. A report on the actions of the German 9th Army, written hot on the heels of the events, noted:

“Especially noteworthy was the use of superior aviation forces, which operated on a previously unknown scale and suppressed our artillery for hours... Thus, the main defense weapon was put out of action at the decisive moment.”

Heavy bomber He-177 (Germany).

The Soviet command managed to find the key to the German positional front. The massive impact on the German artillery silenced it and opened the way for the Soviet infantry. Rifle formations have also significantly improved their combat training during the spring calm period. In the rear, life-size sections of the German positions that were to be attacked were built, with real barbed wire entanglements and marked minefields. The soldiers trained tirelessly, bringing their actions to automaticity. It must be said that in the winter of 1943-1944 there was no such practice of training on mock-ups. Good preparation allowed the attacking units to quickly break into the enemy trenches and prevent the Germans from gaining a foothold in the following positions.

Major disaster

The collapse of the positional front in several directions at once - near Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk - became fatal for the armies of the Civil Aviation Center "Center". They consisted mainly of infantry divisions, they were sorely lacking in mobile reserves. The only mobile reserve was used extremely ineptly, torn apart between two Soviet attacks.

This made the collapse of the entire army group inevitable and rapid. First, the 3rd Tank Army near Vitebsk and the 9th Army near Bobruisk were surrounded. Through two gaps punched in the place of these “boilers”, Soviet tank units rushed towards Minsk. The meeting of two fronts near Minsk on July 3, 1944 formed another “cauldron” for the German 4th Army. By that time, the retreating German divisions had almost lost their combat effectiveness under the continuous attacks of Il-2 attack aircraft on forest roads and at crossings. The Germans failed to organize any significant supply by air, and this led to the rapid collapse of the “cauldrons”, which were left without ammunition and even food. GA "Center" turned into an unorganized crowd with small arms with minimum quantity ammunition. Later, the prisoners captured in Belarus were driven out in a “march of the vanquished” through Moscow on July 17, 1944. The losses of GA “Center” as a whole can be estimated at 400–500 thousand people (an exact calculation is difficult due to the loss of documents). |photo-9|

To contain the advance of Soviet mechanized formations, the Germans even sent heavy He-177 bombers into battle. In fact, the situation in 1941 was mirrored, when Soviet DB-3 bombers flew against tank groups, regardless of losses. Already in the first attacks on Soviet tanks, KG1 lost ten aircraft. The huge, unarmored He-177s were extremely vulnerable to fire from anti-aircraft guns and even small arms. At the end of July 1944, the remnants of the squadron were withdrawn from the battle.

The Germans managed to stop the Soviet offensive only on the Vistula and on the approaches to East Prussia, including through the transfer of tank reserves from the Northern Ukraine Civil Aviation Authority and from the reserve. The defeat of the Civil Aviation Center "Center" became the largest disaster of the German army in its entire history. It is all the more impressive because the armies that had held a strong positional front for many months were defeated.

The article “Operation Bagration: Blitzkrieg to the West” was published in the magazine “Popular Mechanics” (No. 5, May 2014).

Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration"

"The greatness of a victory is measured by the degree of its difficulty."

M. Montaigne

Belarusian offensive operation (1944), “Operation Bagration” - a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

In the summer of 1944, our troops were preparing for the final expulsion of the Nazi invaders from Russian soil. The Germans, with the despair of the doomed, clung to every kilometer of territory still remaining in their hands. By mid-June, the Soviet-German front ran along the line Narva - Pskov - Vitebsk - Krichev - Mozyr - Pinsk - Brody - Kolomyia - Iasi - Dubossary - Dniester Estuary. On the southern sector of the front, fighting was already taking place beyond the state border, on the territory of Romania. May 20, 1944 General base completed the development of the plan for the Belarusian offensive operation. It was included in the operational documents of the Headquarters under the code name “Bagration”. The successful implementation of the plan for Operation Bagration made it possible to solve a number of other, no less strategically important tasks.

1. Completely clear the Moscow direction from enemy troops, since the front edge of the ledge was 80 kilometers from Smolensk;

2. Complete the liberation of the entire territory of Belarus;

3. Reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the enemy’s front at the junctions of army groups “Center” and “North” and isolate these German groups from each other;

4. Create favorable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive actions in the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, in the East Prussian and Warsaw directions.

On June 22, 1944, on the third anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, reconnaissance in force was carried out in sectors of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The final preparations for the general offensive were being made.

The main blow in the summer of 1944 was delivered by the Soviet Army in Belarus. Even after the winter campaign of 1944, during which Soviet troops occupied advantageous positions, preparations began for an offensive operation under the code name “Bagration” - one of the largest in terms of military-political results and the scope of operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The Soviet troops were tasked with defeating Hitler's Army Group Center and liberating Belarus. The essence of the plan was to simultaneously break through the enemy’s defenses in six sectors, encircle and destroy the enemy’s flank groups in the area of Vitebsk and Bobruisk.

One of the largest strategic operations of the Second World War was carried out by troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts with the participation of the Dnieper military flotilla. The 1st Army of the Polish Army operated as part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Based on the nature of the combat operations and the content of the tasks performed, the Belarusian strategic operation is divided into two stages. At the first stage (June 23–July 4, 1944), the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk. At the second stage (July 5–August 29, 1944), the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Vilnius, Siauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets.

The operation began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, Soviet troops successfully broke through the enemy’s defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five of his divisions to the west of the city. Their liquidation was completed by the morning of June 27. The position on the left flank of Army Group Center's defense was destroyed. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, it cleared Borisov of the enemy. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the strong and deeply echeloned enemy defenses prepared along the Pronya, Basya, and Dnieper rivers, and liberated Mogilev on June 28.

On the morning of June 3, a powerful artillery barrage, accompanied by targeted air strikes, opened the Belarusian operation of the Red Army. The first to attack were the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts.

On June 26, tankers of General Bakharov made a breakthrough to Bobruisk. Initially, the troops of the Rogachev strike group encountered fierce enemy resistance.

Vitebsk was taken on June 26. The next day, the troops of the 11th Guards and 34th armies finally broke the enemy's resistance and liberated Orsha. June 28 soviet tanks We were already in Lepel and Borisov. Vasilevsky set the task for General Rotmistrov’s tankers to liberate Minsk by the end of July 2. But the honor of being the first to enter the capital of Belarus fell to the guardsmen of the 2nd Tatsin Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeyny. They entered Minsk at dawn on July 3. Around noon, tankmen from the 1st Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front made their way to the capital from the southeast. The main forces of the 4th German Army - the 12th, 26th, 35th Army, 39th and 41st Tank Corps - were surrounded east of the city. They included more than 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

Undoubtedly, the command of Army Group Center made a number of grave mistakes. First of all, in terms of maneuvering on our own. During the first two days of the Soviet offensive, Field Marshal Bush had the opportunity to withdraw troops to the Berezina line and thereby avoid the threat of encirclement and destruction. Here he could create a new line of defense. Instead, the German commander allowed an unjustified delay in issuing the order to withdraw.

On July 12, the surrounded troops capitulated. 40 thousand soldiers and officers, 11 generals - commanders of corps and divisions - were captured by the Soviets. It was a disaster.

With the destruction of the 4th Army, a huge gap was opened in the German front line. On July 4, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent a new directive to the fronts, containing the requirement to continue the offensive without stopping. The 1st Baltic Front was supposed to advance in the general direction of Siauliai, reaching Daugavpils with its right wing and Kaunas with its left. Before the 3rd Belorussian Front, the Headquarters set the task of capturing Vilnius and part of the forces - Lida. The 2nd Belorussian Front received orders to take Novogrudok, Grodno and Bialystok. The 1st Belorussian Front developed an offensive in the direction of Baranovichi, Brest and further to Lublin.

At the first stage of the Belarusian operation, the troops solved the problem of breaking through the strategic front of the German defense, encircling and destroying flank groups. After successfully solving the problems of the initial stage of the Belarusian operation, the issues of organizing continuous pursuit of the enemy and maximizing the expansion of breakthrough areas came to the fore. On July 7, fighting took place on the Vilnius-Baranovichi-Pinsk line. The deep breakthrough of Soviet troops in Belarus created a threat to Army Group North and Army Group Northern Ukraine. Favorable preconditions for an offensive in the Baltic states and Ukraine were evident. The 2nd and 3rd Baltic and 1st Ukrainian fronts began to destroy the German groups opposing them.

The troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front achieved great operational successes. By June 27, they surrounded over six enemy divisions in the Bobruisk area and, with the active assistance of aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla and partisans, by June 29 they completely defeated them. By July 3, 1944, Soviet troops liberated the capital of Belarus, Minsk. To the east they surrounded 105 thousand German soldiers and officers. The German divisions that found themselves encircled tried to break through to the west and southwest, but were captured or destroyed during the battles that lasted from July 5 to July 11. The enemy lost over 70 thousand people killed and about 35 thousand captured.

With the entry of the Soviet Army to the Polotsk-Lake Naroch-Molodechno-Nesvizh line, a huge gap 400 kilometers long was formed in the strategic front of the German troops. The Soviet troops had the opportunity to begin pursuing the defeated enemy troops. On July 5, the second stage of the liberation of Belarus began; The fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out five offensive operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Brest-Lublin.

The Soviet Army one by one defeated the remnants of the retreating formations of Army Group Center and inflicted major damage on the troops transferred here from Germany, Norway, Italy and other areas. Soviet troops completed the liberation of Belarus. They liberated part of Lithuania and Latvia, crossed the state border, entered the territory of Poland and approached the borders of East Prussia. The Narew and Vistula rivers were crossed. The front advanced westward by 260-400 kilometers. It was a victory of strategic importance.

The success achieved during the Belarusian operation was promptly developed by active actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. By August 22, Soviet troops reached the line west of Jelgava, Dobele, Siauliai, Suwalki, reached the outskirts of Warsaw and went on the defensive. During the June-August 1944 operation in Belarus, the Baltic states and Poland, 21 enemy divisions were completely defeated and destroyed. 61 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The German army lost about half a million soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured. On July 17, 1944, 57,600 German soldiers and officers captured in Belarus were escorted through the central streets of Moscow.

Duration – 68 days. The width of the combat front is 1100 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 550-600 km. Average daily rate of advance: at the first stage - 20-25 km, at the second - 13-14 km.

Results of the operation.

The troops of the advancing fronts defeated one of the most powerful enemy groupings - Army Group Center, its 17 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, and 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of East Prussia. During the offensive, the large water barriers Berezina, Neman, and Vistula were crossed, and important bridgeheads on their western banks were captured. Conditions were provided for striking deep into East Prussia and into central areas Poland. To stabilize the front line, the German command was forced to transfer 46 divisions and 4 brigades to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and the west. This made it much easier for the Anglo-American troops to conduct combat operations in France.

In the summer of 1944, on the eve and during Operation Bagration, which aimed to liberate Belarus from the Nazi occupiers, the partisans provided truly invaluable assistance to the advancing Soviet army. They captured river crossings, cut off the enemy's escape routes, blew up rails, caused train wrecks, made surprise raids on enemy garrisons, and destroyed enemy communications.

Soon, Soviet troops began defeat during the Iasi-Kishinev operation large group Nazi troops in Romania and Moldova. This military operation of the Soviet troops began in the early morning of August 20, 1944. Within two days, the enemy's defenses were broken through to a depth of 30 kilometers. Soviet troops entered the operational space. The large administrative center of Romania, the city of Iasi, was taken. The operation was attended by the search of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (commanding army generals R.Ya. Malinovsky and F.I. Tolbukhin), sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube River Flotilla. Fighting deployed over an area of more than 600 kilometers along the front and up to 350 kilometers in depth. More than 2 million 100 thousand people, 24 thousand guns and mortars, 2 and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 3 thousand aircraft took part in the battles on both sides.

In 1944, the Red Army was able to liberate Belarus. Actions Soviet armies The liberation of Belarus went down in history as “Operation Bagration”. The Soviet command began developing an operation plan in the spring of 1944. It was supposed to break through the German defenses on 6 sectors of the front, encircle and destroy the Vitebsk, Bobruisk group of troops and successively defeat the Orsha and Mogilev group of Germans.

The second stage of “Operation Bagration” involved a strike by three Belarusian fronts in one direction towards Minsk, followed by the encirclement and destruction of enemy troops. The third stage of hostilities involved expanding the offensive front, complete liberation Belarus and the exit of Soviet troops to the western, pre-war border of the USSR.

On June 23, 1944, the line of the Belarusian front ran: east of Polotsk - Vitebsk - east of Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk, along Pripyat. Troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were stationed in this area. The number of Soviet troops reached 1.4 million people, who had at their disposal 31 thousand guns, 5.2 thousand tanks, and more than 5 thousand aircraft. The general coordination of the actions of Soviet troops in this sector was carried out by and.

In Belarus, Soviet troops were opposed by a powerful German group under the command of Field Marshal Bush (from July 28 Model). The number of troops under Bush's leadership was 1.2 million people, at its disposal were 9.5 thousand guns, 900 tanks, 1.4 thousand aircraft.

On June 23, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive south of the city of Vitebsk. At the same time, north of Vitebsk, swipe struck by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. Moving towards each other, the Red Army soldiers surrounded 5 German motorized divisions and destroyed them by the 27th. Developing the offensive, the city of Lepel was liberated on June 28. Meanwhile, the fighters of the 3rd Belorussian Front made a decisive push forward, and by July 1 liberated Borisov. As a result of fierce bloody battles, units of the Second Belorussian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in a wide area. On June 28, Mogilev was liberated. Then the fighters of the second Belorussian Front moved towards Minsk. The troops of the First Belorussian Front with their pressure forced units of the 9th German Army to retreat. By June 29, the Germans were surrounded in the Bobruisk area, where fighters of the 1st Belarusian Front destroyed 6 enemy divisions.

As a result of the offensive and subsequent pursuit of the enemy, a large German group of up to 100 thousand people was surrounded on parallel directions, east of Minsk. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk from the Germans. A large surrounded German group was destroyed on July 11. The battles went down in the history of the Second World War as the “Minsk Cauldron”.

During the 12 days of the offensive in Belarus, the Red Army soldiers advanced 280 kilometers to the west and liberated most of the country, including Minsk. From July 5, Soviet troops, closely coordinating their actions, carried out a series of successful operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest. During these hostilities, serious damage was inflicted on the group German armies"Center". By the end of the summer of 1944, the territory of Belarus was cleared of German troops. Soviet troops also partially liberated the lands of Lithuania and Latvia. At the end of the summer, Red Army soldiers entered Poland and managed to approach the borders of East Prussia.

The General Staff of the Red Army developed a plan for delivering powerful attacks by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts in the direction of the cities of Vitebsk and Orsha. The operation was named "Bagration", in honor of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General P.I. Bagration. The offensive plan was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May thirtieth, 1944.

The general plan of the operation included the defeat of German formations in Belarus, the liberation of Minsk and access to the state border of the USSR.

In 1944, the initiative on the Soviet-German front was held by the Red Army, whose command developed strategic operations of an offensive nature only. The German leadership set defensive tasks for its troops, with the possibility of secondary counterattacks.

The zone of the Red Army's large summer offensive covered more than 500 kilometers from east to west and about 450 kilometers from north to south. In military-strategic terms, this area was the shortest to the most important industrial and administrative centers of Germany, the capture of which could have a serious impact on the outcome of the war.

Since the spring of 1944, the Soviet troops launched enhanced combat training in connection with the upcoming offensive.

At these exercises, offensive combat techniques and issues of interaction were practiced various genera troops, capturing enemy strongholds. Much attention was paid to ways of overcoming water obstacles, moving through swampy areas, taking into account the peculiarities natural landscape area of upcoming hostilities.

The regrouping of the Red Army formations took place under conditions of the strictest camouflage; the movement of troops was carried out, as a rule, at night. During the day, false maneuvers were carried out with dummies of military equipment, imaginary crossings were prepared, and the concentration of large formations in secondary directions was simulated.

By the beginning of the offensive, the troops of the four Soviet fronts numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and officers, more than 5 thousand tanks, 36 thousand guns and about 5 thousand aircraft.

On the territory of occupied Belarus, the German military command began to create fortified positions and defense strongholds back in 1942-1943. Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush, was inferior to the Soviet troops in numbers by two times, in tanks by almost six times, and in guns and aircraft by four times.

Naturally, it was impossible to completely hide such large-scale preparations for an offensive operation. However, the German command believed that the main attack of the Red Army would follow to the south, in Ukraine, in the direction of the Romanian oil fields, a secondary blow was expected in the Belarusian direction.

On June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began. Unprecedented in firepower, artillery fire from more than thirty thousand guns and mortars shook German defensive positions for two hours.

On the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops managed to penetrate up to thirteen kilometers into the German defenses. Overcoming fierce resistance, the Red Army steadily advanced to the West.

On June 25, five German divisions, numbering up to 35 thousand people, were surrounded in the area of the city of Vitebsk, the capture of which was completed a few days later.

On June 26, 1944, the city of Orsha, the strategic center of German defense, was liberated. The successful actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front led to the encirclement of six German divisions in the area of the city of Bobruisk.

The airspace was Soviet aviation and the actions of the pilots caused serious damage to the enemy.

The Red Army actively used the tactics of concentrated attacks by tank formations and subsequent advances to the rear of German troops. Raids by tank guard corps destroyed the enemy's rear communications, disorganized the defense system, blocked retreat routes and completed his encirclement.

On July 2, as a result of a swift attack by troops of the 1st and 3rd Belarusian Fronts, the capital of Belarus, the city of Minsk, was liberated. To the east of the city, a 150,000-strong German group was surrounded. By July thirteenth, the liquidation of the encircled troops was completed and about thirty-five thousand German soldiers and officers were in Soviet captivity.

By the end of August 1944, the Red Army troops, having carried out an offensive with a front of up to 1100 kilometers, advanced 500-600 kilometers in a western direction. Soviet Belarus was almost completely liberated from the invaders. Army Group Center was defeated, German troops lost more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers.

Soviet losses amounted to about 700 thousand people killed, wounded and missing.

The liberation of Belarus, a significant part of the Baltic states, and the entry of the Red Army to the border with East Prussia opened up strategic prospects for the further defeat of the enemy and the successful end of the war.