On March 13, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree on the formation of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. By order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 18, the structure of the new department was determined, in a certain sense, repeated in the capital’s department of the State Security Committee. On the same day, Major General N.I. Krainov was appointed its chief.

Departments were formed in the apparatus of the UKGB: 2nd - counterintelligence, search for state criminals; 4th – fight against anti-Soviet and other hostile manifestations and elements; 5th – ensuring the safety of particularly important industrial enterprises, protecting state secrets, ensuring the safety of production and transportation of special products, preventing sabotage, accidents and catastrophes; 7th – external surveillance; 9th – participation in ensuring the safety of the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, city and regional authorities; investigation department and others.

In addition, there were offices of representatives of the KGB at the Moscow railway junction and Moscow public transport.

Its district and city divisions were also renamed - now they began to be called the offices of commissioners in the districts of the capital (there were 25 of them) and the cities of the region (22).

Also on the territory of Moscow and the Moscow region, military counterintelligence units were stationed and operated - the Third Main Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR - special departments of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District. The heads of the named special departments, as well as the head of the department of administrative bodies of the Moscow City Committee (MGK) of the CPSU and prosecutors of Moscow and the region, took part in particularly important operational meetings at the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region. In addition, the head of the department regularly informed the First Secretary of the IGC about the results of the work.

In the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the following task was formulated, which had the most direct impact on the activities of the KGB of the USSR: “In the shortest possible time, eliminate the consequences of Beria’s enemy activities in the state security bodies and achieve the transformation of the state security bodies into a sharp weapon of our party, directed against the real enemies of our socialist states, and not against honest people."

This situation is explained by the fact that after the arrest of L.P. Beria, from August 1953 to March 1, 1954, the prosecutor's office received 78,982 applications and complaints from citizens about illegal methods of investigation and requests for rehabilitation. In this regard, on May 4, 1954, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to organize work to verify and review cases - initially based on statements from citizens, and subsequently from a significant part of those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes (with the exception of persons from among the party nomenklatura, whose arrest was decided adopted by republican, regional or regional party committees).

In the capital, such a Commission for the review of cases of persons convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes and held in camps, prisons and colonies of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, who are in exile and in settlement, is chaired by acting. regional prosecutor P.I. Markova was formed on May 29, 1954. The commission staff consisted of 120 people (98 people - court employees, investigators from the prosecutor's office, including 40 investigators and operational employees of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, and 22 technical workers, including 10 - from the UKGB).

As reported on December 28, 1955 to the Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the CPSU I.V. Kapitonov in the final report on the work of the commission; since June 1954, it has examined 4,365 investigative cases involving 5,039 convicts. Based on the results of their review of 1,767 cases involving 1,960 people, decisions were made to change previously passed sentences: in connection with amnesty, criminal reclassification of crimes, reduction of sentences, partial or complete rehabilitation. At the same time, 352 former convicts were completely rehabilitated.

However, work on reviewing archival investigative files with the participation of KGB officers continued in subsequent years.

For example, in the report to the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU No. 11/67 dated January 31, 1958, on the work of the department, it was reported that “an audit of 1,332 cases involving 1,887 people was completed,” as a result of which a decision was made to terminate the cases of 803 accused, there were As of January 1, another 90 archival investigative cases involving 136 people were under review.

Based on the revealed facts of the use of illegal methods of investigation, the perpetrators were brought to party, administrative and judicial responsibility.

It should also be noted that even earlier, on May 24, 1955, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the Regulations on prosecutorial supervision in the USSR, and a special department was formed in the USSR Prosecutor's Office to supervise the investigation in the KGB bodies.

Since the formation of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, control over its activities was also carried out by the CPSU Central Committee, in particular, by the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee, as well as the corresponding departments of the republican, regional and regional party committees. These departments often received complaints and statements from citizens regarding the actions of KGB officers, addressed to party authorities, who organized their verification.

In this regard, it is unacceptable to identify the KGB of the USSR with its historical predecessors the NKVD-NKGB and the MGB. Although, at the same time, the activities of the KGB in the 50s - 60s. was not free from the influence of subjectivism and voluntarism of their leadership.

Conducted in 1953 - 1954. By employees of the courts, the prosecutor's office and the KGB, large-scale work on the review of criminal cases led to a revision of approaches to the assessment of operational materials in relation to persons put on the operational wanted list by the MGB.

In this regard, on August 10, 1955, the KGB of the USSR issued an order “On establishing order in the records of wanted persons and focusing on the search for real enemies of the Soviet state.”

However, in addition to the work mentioned above, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR continued to inform territorial bodies that, according to intelligence information received from abroad, American intelligence continued to prepare more and more intelligence groups to be sent to the USSR.

In another such orientation on the search for American intelligence agents No. 4ss dated April 28, 1954, the head of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region proposed “to take into account the capabilities of the Special Departments and transport bodies of state security and police stationed in these areas, to establish a search with them work operational contact."

In December 1954, the KGB again informed the territorial authorities about the expected transfer of 6 NTS agents to the territory of our country. The significant activity of the NTS in providing the CIA with its members for training with a view to their further transfer to the USSR naturally put this organization among the primary targets of the state security agencies.

Registration - in card form, of persons identified as identified by intelligence agents of foreign states, traitors to the Motherland and other persons wanted by state security agencies (later they began to be called state criminals in official documents of the Committee), their identities, family and other connections, was carried out in the 2nd department UKGB, which was headed by G.I. Serov from October 4, 1946.

Thus, in the KGB orientation dated March 8, 1958, it was again reported that American paratrooper agents were planned to be deployed into the territory of Hungary, Romania and the USSR for the month of May with the requirement to take all necessary measures to detect and detain them.

Previously, the KGB was repeatedly informed about the recent attempts of the NTS to drop leaflets and other propaganda anti-Soviet literature onto the territory of the USSR using specially equipped balloons. The first orientation of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region on this issue is dated August 4, 1954 (No. 8 ss).

At the end of April - beginning of May 1958, in a number of districts of the region, a considerable number of propaganda publications of the NTS were indeed discovered in the form of leaflets, newspapers and brochures, thrown with the help of specially equipped balloons.

On October 25, 1955, the KGB of the USSR sent out a collection of reference materials about the German intelligence agencies that acted against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (the so-called “blue book”) to all subordinate bodies for direct use in the operational search for state criminals.

On February 12, 1955, by order of the KGB of the USSR, a new “Instruction for the search for state criminals” was announced. And in March 1959, a new, already three-volume “List of Wanted State Criminals” was sent to the local state security authorities, in which, along with identified agents of the German and Finnish intelligence services, fascist punitive forces and accomplices of the occupiers during the Great Patriotic War, traitors were also included Homeland and persons for whom there was information about their connections with the intelligence services of foreign states (USA, UK, France, etc.) already in the post-war period.

As of January 1, 1958, the 2nd Department of the KGB had wanted files on 394 state criminals. Including, for agents: former German special services - 200; American intelligence - 7; intelligence services of other states - 7. As well as traitors, punitive forces, fascist collaborators - 67; traitors to the Motherland – 86; established members of the NTS – 23; OUN members - 4.

For 12 of them, there was information about their possible presence on the territory of the USSR.

In 1957, 49 people were tracked down: on the territory of the USSR - 14 people (3 of them were arrested and convicted by other security agencies); living abroad – 35 people. It was considered inappropriate to continue the All-Union search for 79 suspects.

In April 1958, the KGB informed the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU about the arrest of the wanted Abwehrstelle "Ukraine" agent A. Smirnov, who turned out to be A.A. Komyagin, born in 1914 It was also established that Komyagin in 1946, as a lieutenant of the Vlasov “Russian Liberation Army”, had already been sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Stalingrad Region under Article 58-1b to 20 years of imprisonment in forced labor camps. In 1955 he was released under an amnesty with his criminal record expunged.

At the same time, it was reported that, according to information received during the search, the facts of the provocative activities of the traitor to the Motherland A. Komyagin in Kyiv in 1942 - 1943, which led to the arrest by the Gestapo of many members of the city underground, were previously unknown and the tribunal did not consider. Komyakin-Smirnov managed to hide these facts of his biography when going through filtration after the end of hostilities in Germany.

An active search for state criminals, including agents of foreign intelligence services, was carried out by the 2nd department (from 1967 - 2nd service) of the department in subsequent years.

For example, in 1965, departments of the Directorate searched for 18 state criminals who were put on the All-Union wanted list. Including agents of the former German special services, punitive forces and traitors to the Motherland, persons who have committed other serious crimes.

In 1968, 12 state criminals were sought (2 of them were identified as living abroad), including the arrest of fascist intelligence agent Maksimov, Finnish Euters, punisher Smirnov, traitor to the Motherland and member of the NTS Budulak-Sharagin.

Also, the employees of the 2nd management service did a significant amount of work to implement the instructions of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 27 from May 31, 1968 “On intensifying work to identify and collect evidence of the guilt of Nazi war criminals who escaped punishment.” Based on an additional study of about 5,000 archival investigative files, Moscow security officers identified and registered 250 war criminals.

The 4th Department of the KGB was tasked with combating various kinds of anti-Soviet (“Trotskyist”, nationalist, Zionist, clerical, sectarian and other) hostile manifestations and elements.

The publication on May 29, 1955 of the order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR “On the tasks of the 5th directorate and 5 departments of local bodies of the KGB” (No. 00450), that is, to ensure security at strategically important industrial facilities, was also extremely important for the activities of the state security agencies . And it was not only about the safety of state secrets during the operation of these enterprises, but also about the prevention of various types of accidents, catastrophes, identifying and eliminating the preconditions for their occurrence.

As a significant factor in changing the operational situation, the opening of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow in September 1955, and the Embassy of Japan in 1957, should be noted. Residencies of the corresponding national intelligence services appeared in them. Moreover, the West German “Bundesnachrichtendins” (BND), officially created only in May 1954, in fact, under the full control of American intelligence units in the western occupation zones, functioned since 1945 under the name “Gehlen Organization”, specializing specifically in intelligence work against the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG).

In the 1960s the number of foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow continued to increase at the expense of African states establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR.

From the first days of the formation of the KGB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee and the KGB of the USSR, its leaders systematically informed the first secretaries of the Moscow City (MGK) and Moscow Regional (MK) Committees of the CPSU about identified security threats and emergency incidents , as well as the prerequisites for their occurrence, as well as other changes in the operational situation in the capital and Moscow region.

For example, secretaries of the capital and regional committees of the CPSU were systematically sent special messages about: measures to ensure the security of mass socio-political events - elections to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, holiday demonstrations of workers on public holidays on May 1 and November 7; checking the state of preservation of state secrets at enterprises in Moscow and the region; unsatisfactory work of the Moscow State University dormitory canteen; poor quality of a number of works on the construction of the stadium. V.I. Lenin in Luzhniki; squandering public funds allocated for the construction of urban infrastructure facilities; unsafe storage of explosives at industrial enterprises; individual cases of workers' dissatisfaction with working and living conditions; preconditions for accidents and fires at various enterprises of the city; various types of emergency incidents (explosions, fires) at enterprises and the results of their investigations; improper storage of radioisotopes in research institutes and enterprises; release of low-quality products, including at enterprises of the capital's military-industrial complex; shortcomings in the transportation of special products from enterprises in the capital, and similar facts and circumstances. The Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU was also informed both about the arrests of individual citizens for anti-Soviet activities, and about the shortcomings of political and educational work in groups, including universities and schools.

The KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region informed the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU E.A. about the reaction of Muscovites to the events in Hungary in October - November 1956, as well as the triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. Furtsev.

At the beginning of December 1956, the head of the KGB V.S. Belokonev informed the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU E.A. Furtsev that in the capital there live over 4,000 people who were previously convicted of participating in anti-Soviet activities, released under an amnesty, after serving their sentences, or due to the termination of criminal cases. The message emphasized that “some of them continue today to remain in their hostile positions, openly express anti-Soviet sentiments among their circle, slander Soviet reality, the leadership of the Party and the Government... in recent times there have been repeated cases of hostile elements spreading anti-Soviet documents executed and copied as carbon copies on typewriters. In these documents, their authors assess the events taking place in Hungary and Poland from an anti-Soviet position, condemn the policies of the Party and the Government, and slander the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The KGB Directorate has taken measures to search for the authors and distributors of these documents.”

In total, this special message mentioned the names of about 30 previously convicted Moscow residents aged from 30 to 65 years old, “who remain in anti-Soviet positions.”

The increasingly widespread dissemination of anonymous anti-Soviet documents, including those addressed both to party bodies and, often, to the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, even led to the formation in the 4th department in August 1957 of a department consisting of 17 search officers and identifying their authors.

And although very often the authors of these documents were identified by Moscow security officers, not all of them, taking into account the identity of the perpetrators and distributors, and for reasons of humanity, were brought to criminal liability. Thus, in 1957, 61 authors of such documents were identified, but only 20 of them were arrested, and 25 were prevented by state security agencies. Of the 64 authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents identified in 1968, 4 were brought to criminal liability, and two more of them were given compulsory medical measures by the courts.

In subsequent months, newspapers, brochures and the NTS magazine “Grani” were often found in packages of cargo arriving at Moscow enterprises.

On April 8, 1957, the head of the USSR KGB V.S. Belokonev sent instructions to district and city commissioners to develop a system of measures to solve security problems during the VI World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow.

It was not only the first such festival held in a socialist country, but also the largest international socio-political event in Moscow 12 years after the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The words “For peace and friendship” were chosen as his motto.

The festival was planned to be held from July 28 to August 11 and the participation of youth delegations from many countries of the world was expected. As a result, 34 thousand guests in Moscow represented 131 countries of the world.

Of course, the Soviet leadership sought to use the festival in Moscow, which was expected to attract 25 thousand participants from capitalist states, to demonstrate the achievements of the socialist state in overcoming the destruction of the bloodiest war in human history. At the same time, the country's leadership also wanted to avoid any emergency situations that could damage the international authority and prestige of the USSR.

Including - to exclude the possibility of carrying out any extremist or terrorist actions. (The last public terrorist act, in which two people were killed and four more were injured, which, however, was not reported in the Soviet press, occurred in Arkhangelsk on May 1, 1955 at the festive podium during a workers’ demonstration. Its perpetrator was G. Romanov , a previously convicted repeat offender, was sentenced to capital punishment).

The festival events were planned to be held in more than 17 squares and other facilities in the capital. Including the Khimki Reservoir, cultural parks named after. A.M. Gorky, Sokolniki, Ostankino, Hermitage, Aquarium, them. Bauman, in Izmailovo.

The management’s orientation to the units indicated (which was later confirmed) that broad contacts with Soviet citizens could be used by foreign intelligence services to “restore ties with their old agents, to try to persuade individual morally and politically unstable individuals to engage in espionage work, as well as by organizing various provocations, to some extent undermine the authority and political significance of the festival. Taking advantage of extensive communication with Soviet youth, foreign intelligence services and their agents will show interest in military units and sensitive facilities in the Moscow region, as well as in the life and work activities of Soviet citizens.” In this regard, the entire operational staff of the department was required to “intensify counterintelligence work in all areas of activity.”

In particular, many festival participants said that the media abroad tried to discredit the festival in Moscow and intimidated its potential participants with all sorts of tall tales about the USSR.

At the same time, certain foreign organizations asked its individual participants to collect “impressions of their stay in the USSR,” focusing on various shortcomings, both in the organization of accommodation, festival events, and in the life of the capital of the Soviet Union itself.

Moscow security officers stopped an attempt by two festival participants from Germany to make a provocative film, commissioned by anti-Soviet organizations (NTS and Radio Liberation), aimed at discrediting the festival.

Some guests of the Festival also showed noticeable interest in the situation of the church and religion in the USSR. During the days of the festival, they visited 25 churches of the Russian Orthodox Church, located close to their places of residence.

How the KGB informed the First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU E.A. Furtsev, most of the festival participants who visited religious institutions were favorable towards the USSR.

The results of the work of the security officers during the festival indeed confirmed that individual foreigners arrived in Moscow to meet with persons known to them, some of whom they knew about, both from traitors to the Motherland and from various foreign emigrant organizations. As a result of the work of Moscow security officers, about 50 foreigners were identified who were reasonably suspected of involvement in the activities of foreign intelligence services. This fact clearly demonstrates that the KGB employees did not suffer from excessive suspicion and spy mania.

The subsequent prosecution of a number of persons from among the connections of foreigners - about 8 people, whose criminal activities were documented and confirmed by material evidence (instructions, letters in hiding places, rewards for transferred materials, etc.), indicates that the fears of the security officers were not groundless, but based on knowledge of the tactics and organization of intelligence and subversive activities of the intelligence services of foreign states.

However, the Festival of Youth and Students also brought unexpected consequences in the form of the spread among some young people of imitation of foreign models of behavior and fashion (the appearance of “hipsters”), which were perceived extremely negatively by many citizens.

February 8, 1958 V.S. Belokonev informed the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU V.I. Ustinov “about the presence of unhealthy and immoral manifestations among some of the students at Moscow universities.” These included drunkenness, gambling, and hooliganism. It was also noted that some of them “establish contacts with foreigners, buy for resale” both items of clothing and foreign currency, and engage in speculation, which has received the general name “fartsovka.”

“Hipsters” appeared among junior students, and the head of the KGB explained that this type of behavior applies “not only to morally unstable elements, but also to persons engaged in criminal activities (speculation, fraud).” It was noted that such “facts are largely the result of the fact that party and Komsomol organizations at universities do not carry out proper ideological work among students.”
In response to a request from the leadership of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU to inform him in more detail about the essence of the phenomenon, in July 1958 he sent a new special message. In which, in fact, there are elements of sociological analysis.

In particular, it noted that “in the behavior of a certain part of Moscow youth, certain traits and inclinations began to appear that are incompatible with the principles of communist morality: disdain for work, desire for an idle “beautiful” life, vulgarity, immorality, apoliticality, overestimation of one’s personality , the desire to stand out in some way (clothing, behavior, jargon, way of thinking) from the surrounding, “gray” as they put it, mass of Soviet people.

These individuals, and in total about two dozen names were mentioned, “are most susceptible to the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology,” due to which “not only ideological vacillations, a negative attitude towards everything Soviet, praise of bourgeois democracy, freedoms and way of life, and sometimes direct anti-Soviet manifestations." Some of them “willingly make contact with foreigners and are sources of intelligence and slanderous information about Soviet reality, and harbor treasonous intentions... American journalist Schwarzenbach said that at present all foreign correspondents in Moscow willingly make acquaintances with “hips.”

As an example, an article from a Norwegian newspaper was cited: “50 Moscow students sentenced to 5–10 years in prison. They opposed the intervention in Hungary.”

V.S. Belokonev was offered a number of measures by public organizations and university management, which were designed to improve the situation.

And indeed, by vigorous measures taken, this “issue” was quickly brought to naught.

It should be noted that in the early years, the KGB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region did not independently carry out overseas operational activities. Perhaps the first of them was the provision of travel from June 23 to July 3, 1956 to the Federal Republic of Germany for the first time after the signing of the agreement on the first group of tourists (25 people) from Moscow. The group visited the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Nuremberg, Munich and West Berlin.

With a few exceptions, Captain V.E., an employee of the 2nd Department of the KGB, who accompanied the group, wrote in his report on this trip. Kevorkov, “the attitude was friendly. The Germans showed a keen interest in everything related to the USSR, they were interested in the standard of living, the salaries of workers and employees, the purchasing power of the ruble, the education system and other issues. The working part of the population of Germany was especially warm towards Soviet tourists.”

The stay of the first Soviet tourists was widely covered by the German press. The general tone, reported Vyacheslav Ervandovich, who spoke excellent German, “was benevolent, with the exception of a few attacks.”

The burgomaster of Kreuzberg (a suburb of West Berlin), having organized a reception in honor of Soviet tourists, invited a large group of journalists, as well as representatives of various kinds of organizations that took an active part in anti-Soviet work. The organizers of the meeting jealously ensured that guests drank as much as possible so that they could be photographed in compromising positions or settings. (On July 20, the Social Democratic faction of the magistrate reprimanded the burgomaster “for exceeding his authority” when organizing a reception for Soviet tourists and even invited him to resign).

Members of local branches of the People's Labor Union (NTS) launched significant and quite expected activity towards the group members.

Acquaintance with them began at the Goethe Museum in Frankfurt am Main, where, as the Entees did not hide, the “most powerful NTS organization” is located. They did not hide the purpose of their activities - “the fight against communism”, in connection with which they tried to hand out leaflets and other literature to Muscovites, and made offers to some of them to “choose the free world” to stay in Germany.

ENTESS members appeared both at bus parking areas near the objects of visit, and were in the evenings in the halls of hotels of Soviet tourists, behaving extremely intrusively (which later became the “corporate style” of the NTS when trying to “process” Soviet citizens abroad). Some of them, trying to justify their stay in Germany, posed as “victims of the Stalinist regime.”

“The presence of active anti-Soviet emigrant and other reactionary organizations,” noted Captain Kevorkov, “constantly provoking Soviet tourists, makes the trip very tense.

All tourists showed patriotism and restraint in encounters with unfriendly elements and were able to correctly and decisively rebuff numerous attempts to drag them into one or another provocation.”

At the same time, some of the compatriots the Muscovites met, on the contrary, were interested in the possibilities of returning to their homeland.

Subsequently, already in the early 1960s, KGB employees rose to the level of not only starting operational games with the NTS and similar foreign anti-Soviet centers, but also with the US CIA. One of these games, which ended in March 1977 with the arrest of an agent, actually paralyzed the activities of the CIA embassy station in Moscow for a long time.

On the same day, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation and the Fundamentals of Criminal Proceedings of the USSR and Union Republics.

Both of these legislative acts were extremely important for the activities of state security agencies, since on their basis new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the Union Republics of the USSR were developed, in accordance with which the protection of national interests and state security of the country was carried out. (New Criminal Codes were put into effect on January 1, 1961).

In the Russian Federation, the jurisdiction of criminal cases initiated was determined by Article 126 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR of 1960. In accordance with this article, 18 elements of crimes provided for by the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960 were assigned to the competence (jurisdiction) of the KGB bodies. They were: treason to the Motherland (Article 64 of the Criminal Code RSFSR), espionage (Article 65), terrorist act (Articles 66 and 67), sabotage (Article 68), anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70), organizational anti-Soviet activity (Article 72), sabotage (Article 73 ), disclosure of state secrets (Article 75) and loss of documents containing state secrets (Article 76), smuggling (Article 78), mass riots (Article 79), illegal crossing of the state border (Article 83), illegal currency transactions (Art. 88). And for another 15 crimes, alternative jurisdiction was provided jointly with the prosecutor’s office.

Another important innovation was the approval on January 9, 1959 by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU of the Regulations on the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies. (This Regulation continued to be formally in force - since the personnel of the KGB bodies were not familiar with it, and its content was only communicated to them in presentation - until May 16, 1991, when the first law in Russian history “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” was adopted ).

Another innovation for the activities of security agencies has been the increased attention to the prevention of illegal and criminal acts and acts. It was proposed to the new Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR by a group of professional security officers, including the first deputy chairman, Colonel General P.I. Ivashutin. This initiative of the security officers was supported by the Department of Administrative Bodies and the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and was presented in the form of order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 00225 dated July 15, 1959 “On the application of preventive measures against persons who have committed minor offenses.”

The text of the order explained that “preventive measures are personal influence of a state security officer, or influence through public organizations, the press or radio on a person in respect of whom a decision has been made to warn him about the inadmissibility of further anti-Soviet actions.” This order was essentially a specification of the previously cited paragraph 12 “Regulations on the KGB of the USSR and its local bodies.”

Here is an excerpt from another order of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On strengthening the fight of state security bodies against hostile manifestations of anti-Soviet elements” (N 00175 of July 28, 1962), which emphasized: “in Soviet society there are still antisocial elements that are under under the influence of hostile propaganda from outside, they take the anti-Soviet path, erect malicious slander on the policies of the party and the Soviet state, spread various kinds of provocative rumors with the aim of undermining people's trust in the party and government, and under certain conditions try to use temporary difficulties arising during communist construction to for their criminal purposes, while inciting politically unstable people to riot. Despite this, state security agencies do not always take active measures against persons who commit various anti-Soviet manifestations...”

In this regard, all management and operational personnel were ordered “without weakening the fight against the subversive activities of the intelligence services of capitalist countries and their agents, to take measures to decisively strengthen intelligence and operational work to identify and suppress the hostile actions of anti-Soviet elements within the country.”

At the same time, the KGB bodies were obliged to “know the processes taking place among young people and the intelligentsia, to determine their nature in a timely and correct manner, in order, together with party and public organizations, to prevent the development of political errors and ideologically harmful mistakes into anti-Soviet manifestations.”

The heads of the departments of the KGB bodies were obliged to clearly inform the party bodies - from the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics to the district committee of the CPSU "on all incoming signals about hostile manifestations being prepared and committed, as well as about facts and phenomena that could lead to mass unrest, and to take timely and specific measures to prevent similar excesses."

Prevention of illegal forms of behavior was widely used by Moscow security officers, but citizens prevented by security officers did not always heed the voice of reason and insinuating warnings and exhortations.

Even during the VI World Festival of Youth and Students in 1957, several young people came to the attention of the capital’s security officers, obsessively offering their “services” to citizens of the USA and Great Britain. The measures taken to persuade did not produce the expected results.

Constant contacts with the American Richard Lane, who visited Moscow twice in 1957 and was suspected of belonging to the special services, as well as other foreigners, naturally led to a sad result. To the young and romantically enthusiastic balabol and rake Repnikov (a forensic psychiatric examination called him “a psychopathic personality with elements of mental immaturity and a tendency to daydreaming and fantasizing”), in response to a previously expressed agreement to “provide assistance to the West in the fight against the USSR”, in the spine The mailed book came with a "classic" set of spy instructions. It included, in addition to an instructional letter “from your Western friends,” special copy paper for making secret writing, “Instructions for secret writing” (correspondence sent abroad), as well as instructions on the chemical processing of conditional letters arriving to the addressee from abroad or other cities of the USSR.

In response, the recipient of this spy equipment bluntly informed his new overseas “friends”: “together with Rybkin I have the opportunity to engage in espionage work...”.

And the aforementioned graduate of the Institute of Foreign Languages, the talented polyglot Rybkin, was taken into close contact in July 1959 by Joan Barth, a stand guide at the American Exhibition in Sokolniki.

The criminal case against two young Muscovites was considered by the Moscow Military Tribunal (one of the accused gave a foreign citizen information about one of the Moscow enterprises, which, according to experts, contained state secrets)…

Speaking at a tribunal meeting in January 1960, the accused Rybkin stated:

Previously, I considered the state security agencies to be arbitrary, but after my arrest I became convinced that my ideas about cruelty and arbitrariness in the security agencies turned out to be completely unfounded. I saw that smart and humane people work there. I am very grateful to my investigator, Captain Karasev, and the head of the department, Colonel Borisenkov, for the fact that, regardless of time, and this was not part of their official duties, they long and patiently explained to me the error of my views and beliefs.

To a direct question from the chairman of the tribunal, the accused Rybkin quietly answered:
- I did all this in order to help the West... .

The Tribunal, however, taking into account the youth of the accused, their active repentance and active assistance to the investigation, considered it possible to limit the punishment to below the lowest limit provided for these offenses.

The large-scale historical canvas of the “secret war” is made up of events and facts, sometimes unknown to a wide circle of contemporaries, or properly underestimated by them.

It is noteworthy that, ironically, two weeks after the appointment of V.E. Semichastny Chairman of the KGB, on November 28, 1961, US President J.F. Kennedy, at the opening ceremony of the new CIA headquarters building in the Washington suburb of Langley, said: “Your successes are never talked about, but your failures are trumpeted everywhere. Clearly you can't talk about operations that are going well. The ones that go badly usually speak for themselves.” The US President emphasized: “I am confident that you understand how important your work is and how highly your efforts will be appreciated in the distant future.”

Speaking at an operational meeting at the KGB dedicated to the results of work in 1966, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB N.S. Zakharov, in particular, noted that foreign ideological centers “are trying to shake the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, play on the national and religious feelings of certain groups of the population, and, thereby, create the most favorable situation for themselves in the Soviet Union. And that is why the intelligence services of the leading imperialist states have become the main organizers of ideological sabotage.” He noted that 28 foreign radio stations broadcast daily in 21 languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR.

In an effort to develop new methods of discrediting socialism in the USSR, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a special international symposium was held at the Hoover Institute for the Study of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University in the USA (California, near San Francisco) dedicated to this global event. history.

In order to study the effectiveness of subversive information and psychological actions, at the initiative of the US State Department, a special sociological study was planned for five years, the purpose of which is “to develop measures to increase the effectiveness of information and ideological influence on the population of socialist states.” And its immediate task was formulated by the State as follows: “It is necessary to focus on the appropriate treatment of local authorities in the field of culture and persons who can influence the formation of public opinion.”

At the same time, in order to prove the existence of “broad opposition” to socialist ideas among the population, it was recommended to ensure the receipt of manuscripts of literary works unpublished in the USSR. This was necessary to give “convincingness” to the programs of “non-voices” and to create in listeners the psychological effect of “involvement with the time and what is happening.”

The organizers of political and ideological sabotage were not embarrassed by the fact that often among the “oppositionists” and “fighters against the regime” were bribe takers, currency traders and plunderers of socialist property.

In this regard, the leadership of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR clearly set tasks: to promptly reveal and suppress the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services and other propaganda centers, to expose and thwart their plans.

It was proposed to solve the problem of paralyzing foreign centers “by compromising the main ideological centers of the enemy, catching red-handed and expelling intelligence officers and agents engaged in ideological sabotage from the USSR, and bringing materials about their subversive actions to the general public.”

At the end of his speech, N.S. Zakharov emphasized that among the leadership of the KGB of the USSR, the Moscow department is considered a forge of worthy leadership personnel.

And there really were grounds for such conclusions: already in 1950-1970. worked in the department, who later grew into experienced managers of the central apparatus of G.I. Serov, V.E. Kevorkov, A.F. Volkov, V.S. Shironin, Yu.V. Denisov, A.G. Mikhailov, N.D. Kovalev.

Undoubtedly, one of the indicators of the operational work of units, its unique completion and reflection, is the indicators and results of investigative work, when, in the presence of sufficient legal and factual grounds, a criminal case is initiated for specific criminal acts.

Let us note, for example, that in 1966, the investigative department of the KGB investigated 23 criminal cases (20 cases were initiated this year), in which 48 people were accused. One person under investigation was suspected of committing a crime under Article 64 (“Treason to the Motherland”) of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR; 17 people – under Article 70 (“Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”), 8 people – in violation of the rules on currency transactions and smuggling (Articles 89 and 78 of the Criminal Code), 14 – in theft of state property on a large scale and bribery, 8 – in committing other crimes within the jurisdiction of the KGB of the USSR.

In 1968, the investigative department of the department investigated 27 criminal cases, in which 47 people were accused.

Five of the defendants were suspected of committing a crime under Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, another five - Art. 70 and six - according to Art. 190.1, 31 people - for crimes provided for in other articles of the criminal code (illegal currency transactions, smuggling, theft of socialist property on an especially large scale, etc.).

In the operational materials of the KGB for the city of Moscow and the Moscow region of that time, it was indicated that “there is a group of interconnected persons in the amount of 35–40 people, which, using various reasons, is engaged in inflammatory activities, produces and distributes politically harmful documents, organizes all kinds of kind of protests against the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Some of these people are oriented toward the bourgeois press and radio.”

The security authorities informed the USSR Prosecutor General and the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU about this.

In this regard, is it any wonder that some particularly fixated members of this group in the end, after numerous and many hours of preventive exhortations from the security officers, were nevertheless brought to criminal responsibility for specific criminal acts?

The first in this series was Amalrik. The New York Times wrote about him in August 1969: “Andrei Amalrik, a well-known figure among the dissident Moscow intelligentsia, openly agreed to the publication in the West of two books in which he criticizes the Soviet system. He preferred a direct confrontation with the Soviet authorities, no longer willing to tolerate the lack of freedoms."

And here is how this “dissident” expressed his “creed” to one of the foreign correspondents, directly stating:

I am a hostile person and will fight until my last breath against the existing government in the USSR.

In a letter to the KGB of the USSR, the head of the Moscow department, Lieutenant General S.N. Lyalin, noted: “State security agencies repeatedly warned Amalrik to stop unwanted contacts with foreigners and antisocial behavior. However, he did not draw the proper conclusions from this, and moreover, he has recently significantly intensified his anti-Soviet activities...

Considering that Amalrik’s actions have become openly hostile and fall under Article 70, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, we ask you to agree to bring him to criminal responsibility. It was agreed with the 5th Directorate (Comrade F.D. Bobkov) and the Investigation Department (Comrade N.F. Zhukov."

Someone may immediately start talking about the infringement of the right to freedom of expression and dissemination of information, but... But shouldn’t you first get acquainted with the internationally recognized norms and principles of law in this regard?

Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) recognize legal restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech, receipt and dissemination of information. So there is hardly any reason to talk about the “illegitimacy” of the actions of security agencies to suppress the targeted anti-state activities of individual citizens.

The former head of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, Colonel General V.I. Alidin, recalled this event as follows:

They called from the chairman's reception and asked him to urgently come to him. In the reception room I met other heads of headquarters and departments.

A few minutes later, members of the Politburo appeared: the secretaries of the Central Committee A.P. Kirilenko, I.V. Kapitonov, Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee A.Ya. Pelshe, Yu.V. Andropov and V.E. Semichastny.

A.P. sat down at the chairman’s table. Kirilenko, next to him were A.Ya. Pelshe, I.V. Kapitonov and Yu.V. Andropov. V.E. Semichastny stood at the side of the table. Based on the order in which the leaders were placed, we understood without words what had happened. A.P. Kirilenko, taking the document in his hands, reported on the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Government, according to which Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was appointed Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

As always in such cases, A.P. Kirilenko explained this decision by the need to strengthen the leadership of security agencies. A.P. Kirilenko asked those gathered to provide all possible assistance to Yuri Vladimirovich so that he could quickly get used to the new business for him

Since 1967, recalled V.I. Alidin, the Party Central Committee and the government began to show more attention to the work of state security agencies. With the advent of Yu.V. Andropov, active work was launched to improve the operational activities of the divisions of the central apparatus and local state security agencies.

Supervision of the Moscow department of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov secured his place. Among the first innovations of Yu.V. Andropov initiated the creation of a department to combat ideological sabotage by foreign intelligence services and foreign ideological centers.

It was proposed to create an independent department (fifth) in the central apparatus of the Committee with the task of organizing counterintelligence work to combat acts of ideological sabotage in the country. At the same time, it was also envisaged to create corresponding units “on the ground,” that is, in the Directorates and city departments of the KGB of the USSR.

Yu.V. was appointed the first head of the 5th department of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region. Denisov, in 1975 he became A.V. Korobov. About him V.I. Alidin wrote the following: “Anatoly Vasilyevich Korobov is a lawyer by training. Graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University. A good organizer, he skillfully managed large operations. Disciplined, clear in business, he knew intelligence and operational work well. A principled and decisive, strong-willed, courageous officer, he went through all the official stages of growth. By the end of my service, I was promoted to first deputy head of the Moscow department."

As noted in the note by the Head of the Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB V.S. Belokonev “Analysis of work for 1967.” “According to the unanimous opinion of the heads of local KGB bodies, the creation of units in the center and locally along the so-called “fifth line” made it possible to significantly increase the level of counterintelligence work in this politically important area.

As a result of strengthening agent-operational work, as well as a deeper study of processes among certain populations, the KGB bodies identified individuals and groups who, under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and for other reasons, allowed politically harmful and anti-Soviet manifestations, a number of such manifestations were prevented, and preventive measures were taken against those who committed them.”

On June 16, 1970, the KGB informed the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU V.V. Grishin “On the hostile activities of a group of Zionist-minded persons”: “Recently, the KGB has received a number of signals about the hostile activities of a group of Zionist-minded persons in Leningrad, Moscow, Riga and other cities of the country. In particular, it became known that a criminal intention was being hatched to hijack a civilian plane and use it to escape abroad, initially to Sweden, and then to go to Israel.

As a result of the activities carried out, it was established that on June 15 of this year. Several members of the Zionist group in Leningrad were actually preparing to hijack a regular AN-2 plane to Sweden, which was supposed to follow the route Leningrad - Priozersk (40 km from the Soviet-Finnish border).

Thanks to the measures taken, an attempt to escape by plane abroad was prevented: on June 15 at 8 a.m., 11 participants in the escape were detained at Smolny airport and four at Priozersk airport.

An investigation into all the circumstances of the case is currently underway...”

During searches of the Moscow connections of this group of criminals, “a large amount of ideologically harmful literature on the so-called "The Jewish Question" and other materials that are currently being analyzed."

It should be said about one more unknown side of the work of Moscow security officers. The number of foreign students studying at universities in the capital increased from year to year. Already in 1970, more than 6 thousand foreign students were studying in universities alone, the counterintelligence support of which was provided by employees of the KGB, which accounted for about a quarter of all foreigners studying in the USSR.

At the same time, from the very beginning of the 1960s, foreign intelligence services paid close attention to student communities from Asian and African countries in the Soviet Union. Representatives of the embassies of some capitalist states sought to establish constant contact with these students, and to turn some of them, on a paid basis, into their informants on issues of student sentiment and the content of education. Let’s not hide the fact that sometimes employees of “legal” residencies at embassies in Moscow succeeded in this.

At the same time, the special services paid considerable attention to the propaganda indoctrination of foreign students, a kind of “ideological inoculation against communism.” To do this, they also used such sophisticated techniques and forms as organizing conferences abroad (Germany, Belgium, Holland, Great Britain) for students of a particular country studying in European countries, or organizing “summer holiday camps” paid for by the “host party” for foreign students studying in the USSR. Many Moscow foreign students visited these camps, subsequently telling their friends, not without humor, about the meaning and purpose of such “charitable” events.

The information about them obtained by the security officers, the scale of the propaganda activities themselves, and the attention paid to them by diplomats indicate that in this case, coordinated international intelligence and counterintelligence operations took place, aimed both at discrediting the USSR, its foreign and domestic policies, and and to acquire sources of information and “agents of influence” from this environment.

On January 7, 1971, Lieutenant General V.I. Alidin was appointed the new head of the USSR KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region.

Notes

1. Krainov Nikolai Ivanovich - in the state security agencies since 1932. Since 1937 - in various positions in the NKVD in Moscow and Moscow Region. He was stripped of the rank of major general in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of May 4, 1956 No. 594-351s for violations of socialist legality and the use of illegal methods of investigation. (Politburo and the Beria case. M., 2012. pp. 877-879).

2. Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB.1917-1991. Directory. Documents. M., 2003. P. 151.

3. Serov Gennady Ivanovich (1915-1980), major general. In military counterintelligence since February 1939. Participant in the Soviet-Finnish (1939-1940) and Great Patriotic Wars. From October 4, 1946 – Head of the 2nd Department of the UMGB. In September 1951, he was sent to retraining courses for management personnel at the Higher School of the USSR Ministry of State Security. Subsequently, he held senior positions in the Higher School and the central apparatus of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, head of the KGB for the Kamchatka region.

4. For more information about the American program for the use of balloons for reconnaissance and propaganda actions, including with the participation of NTS, see: Druzhinin Yu.O., Emelin A.Yu., Pavlushenko M.I. Sophisticated keeping an eye on the Soviets: The appearance of foreign reconnaissance and propaganda balloons over the territory of the USSR had a subtle calculation. // Independent Military Review. M., 2016, No. 48 (931).

5. Belokonev Vladimir Semenovich (1907-1974), major general. From May 9, 1956 to January 9, 1962, head of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, from September 1959 - member of the KGB Board under the USSR Council of Ministers. Since January 1962 - head of the group under the Chairman of the KGB for studying and summarizing the experience of the security agencies and data on the enemy. Since August 1967 - Head of the Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Since 1970 - retired.

6. Kevorkov Vyacheslav Ervandovich (born 1924), in the Soviet army since 1945. In the MGB since 1950. Subsequently - an employee of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR, major general.

7. Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-1991. Directory. Documents. M., 2003, pp. 703-708.

8. Quoted from archived criminal case No. 1/3 1960, p. 41. At the end of the 1990s, both defendants in this case were rehabilitated under paragraph “a” of Art. 5 of the Law of the Russian Federation of October 18, 1991 “On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression”: “regardless of the factual validity of the accusation, the criminal case is subject to termination.”

9. Lyalin Serafim Nikolaevich (1908 – 1976), lieutenant general. In the state security agencies since August 1951. He held a number of senior positions in the central apparatus. From October 18, 1967 to January 7, 1971 – Head of the USSR KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region. From January 1971 to August 1973 he headed the Directorate of Special Departments of the KGB and GSVG.

10. Alidin V.I. State security and time. M., 1997. pp. 191-192.

11. Ibid. pp. 191-192.

Oleg KHLOBUSTOV

Sergei ZHIRNOV, former senior officer of the illegal intelligence of the PGU KGB of the USSR and the SVR of the Russian Federation

WHERE WAS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND WHERE WAS PUTIN?
(Putin never served in the foreign intelligence service of the KGB of the USSR)

After Putin and a group of security officers came to power with him, the most idiotic and persistent myths began to circulate among the people about his imaginary membership in foreign intelligence (although it is documented, including from Putin’s own memoirs, that he was never in foreign intelligence served) and about an allegedly brilliant career there, launched in the media by Kremlin PR people on the eve of the “election” to the post of President of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2000.

I often get asked a question about Putin’s real place in the KGB hierarchy and in intelligence before the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, I finally decided to draw up a kind of table of prestige ranks within the KGB, so that anyone, even someone not very privy to the secrets of the KGB, could clearly estimate for themselves who and where on this ladder was in Soviet times.

The KGB of the USSR in the late Andropov era (after 1978) had the status of an autonomous union State Committee with the rights of a union-republican ministry and officially numbered about 400 thousand employees (including about 100 thousand - border troops, then also KGB troops, special forces and a whole army of civilians and servants, personnel officers there were something like 100-200 thousand, it is impossible to determine more precisely, because the KGB always hid its numbers). At the same time, this arithmetic did not take into account the huge secret apparatus of “voluntary assistants” or “informers” (agents, trusted connections and proxies) - about 5 million Soviet and foreign citizens.

Of course, even these 400 thousand KGB employees from the 260 million population of the USSR are a drop in the bucket. There was one KGB officer for every 600 Soviet citizens. And if we take only career operative officers, there was one operative for every 1200-1400 citizens of the USSR. Therefore, the security officers, of course, arithmetically fell under the concept of rarity, the elite, the “cream” of society.

This is the security elite of the Soviet people (along with other elites - party, state, Komsomol, trade union, military, diplomatic, foreign trade, journalist, scientific, artistic, creative, writer, thieves, intellectual, religious and the like). Getting into it was considered very difficult and already a very honorable thing. Therefore, in itself, belonging to the closed and prestigious KGB corporation was considered enviable for the overwhelming majority of Soviet people.

Did Putin serve in the elite KGB corporation? Definitely yes. Did Putin serve in intelligence? For some time and conditionally, but internally. Did Putin serve in foreign intelligence? Never in my life! Putin’s career in the table of ranks of prestige of the KGB operational staff is expressed by the following numbers: 43-42-39-34-31-34-26-39. And it requires some explanation (you will find it below). Was Putin's career in the KGB bright and successful? Compared to two thirds of the security officers - yes. But compared to real employees of real foreign intelligence - no.

Inside the “elite” KGB corporation itself, there was a multi-stage ladder of success for the operational personnel - various personal elites, which looks something like this (the prestige in it decreases as you go down from the first to the forty-third position):

TABLE ON THE RANKS OF PRESTIGE OF THE USSR KGB OPERATIONAL STAFF
__________________________
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
__________________________
ILLEGAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

1. illegal intelligence officer “in the field” (operator of the “Special Reserve” of the KGB of the USSR), on a long trip abroad (DZK) in a developed capital country of the “first grade”, the Western world (USA, England, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, South Africa, Israel, etc.)
2. illegal intelligence officer of the Center (operator of the active reserve of the KGB of the USSR "under the roof" or the 1st department of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate "C")), constantly and regularly traveling "into the field" on short-term business trips and on individual, one-time illegal assignments around the world
3. illegal intelligence officer “in the field” (operator of the “Special Reserve” of the KGB of the USSR), in the DZK in a “second-class” country, in the most developed of the so-called developing countries of capitalist orientation (Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, India, Kenya, Turkey, Morocco, Latin American, Arab, African countries, Southeast Asian countries) or an officer of the “Special Reserve” for settlement or legalization in an intermediate country
4. an officer of department “C”, who is undergoing special training to become illegal immigrants through the 3rd department or a candidate for enrollment as an illegal immigrant
5. special purpose officer (special forces) of the special unit "Vympel" of the 8th department of directorate "C" (sabotage, sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla and raid warfare deep behind enemy lines in any country in the world)
__________________________
"LEGAL" FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

6. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” through illegal intelligence (“N”) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in civilian ministries, departments, institutions and organizations in the USSR in preparation for the DZK (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, State Committee for Science and Technology, GKES, TASS, Gosteleradio, APN, mass media, etc.)
7. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” along the line of political intelligence (PR) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK along this line
8. an operative of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” through scientific and technical intelligence (“X”) or external counterintelligence (“KR”) or an operative of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for DZK along this line
9. an operational “legal” employee of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate “C”), who regularly goes “to the field” on one-time “legal” special missions around the world
10. operational “legal” employee of the prestigious geographical departments of the PSU or the “T” and “K” departments of the central office (PGU), who regularly goes “to the field” on one-time “legal” special assignments around the world
11. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing capitalist-oriented country, working “in the field” through illegal intelligence (“N”) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK
12. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing country with a capitalist orientation, working “in the field” through political intelligence (“PR”) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK
13. an operative of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing capitalist-oriented country, working “in the field” through scientific and technical intelligence (“X”) and external counterintelligence (“KR”) or an operative of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for the DZK
14. an operational officer of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate “C”, Yasenevo), working at the Center in a prestigious geographical department within illegal intelligence (4th or 5th)
15. an operational officer of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence (PGU, Yasenevo) of the KGB, working in the Center in the prestigious geographical department of the entire PGU (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th or 7th)
16. an operational officer of the central apparatus of management "T" or management "K" (Yasenevo), working at the Center in the prestigious geographical department of his department
17. an operational officer of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence, working in the Center in a low-prestige geographical, functional or auxiliary department (2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 departments of management “C”)
18. an operational officer of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence (PGU in Yasenevo), working at the Center in a low-prestige geographical department of the PGU (for example, English-speaking or French-speaking countries of Africa, near-socialist countries of Southeast Asia)
19. an officer of the central apparatus of the departments "T" and "K" of foreign intelligence (PGU), working in the Center in a low-prestige geographical, functional or auxiliary department of his department, or an employee of a low-prestige department or service of the PGU (NTO, legal service, archives, NIIRP ), or CI teacher
20. student of the Basic (three-year) faculty of the KI KGB of the USSR (official diploma of the USSR of a unified state standard for second higher education).
21. student of the two-year faculty of the KGB of the USSR KGB (internal KGB certificate of advanced training).
_________________________
OTHER EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB IN CAPITAL COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING CAPITALIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES AND IN "HOT SPOTS"

22. an operative of other lines of the KGB, working in a subsidiary control department in a developed country of the Western world (security officer, cryptographer, operational driver, scientific and technical support technician, etc.)
23. an operative of other lines of the KGB, working in a DZK in a developing country with a capitalist orientation (security officer, cryptographer, NTO technician, etc.) or a “legal” and official adviser to the KGB in “hot spots” (Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Afghanistan , Syria, Libya, Iraq, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.)
_________________________
_________________________

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE (INTELLIGENCE FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR, COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIETAL BLACK COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION) AND OTHER INTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB

24. operative officer of the central official representative office of the KGB in the capital of the socialist country in the DZK, working through illegal intelligence
25. operative officer of the central official representative office of the KGB in the capital of the socialist country in the DZK, working through internal intelligence from the territory of the socialist countries and other lines of KGB activity
26. operative officer of the official representative office of the KGB in the socialist country in the DZK, working through internal intelligence in the provincial branch (intelligence point in the socialist countries)
27. operative of various lines of the KGB in the DZK in the socialist country, working in the province or in the group of Soviet troops (GSV)
28. an operative officer of the 11th department of the PGU (internal intelligence from the territory of socialist countries) or an operative officer of the active reserve of the KGB of the USSR “under the roof” of Soviet external organizations (SSOD, KMO USSR, Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Olympic Committee, etc. )
29. operative officer of the central apparatus of the RT in Moscow (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of activity of the territorial bodies of the KGB)
30. operational officer of the first department (internal intelligence from the territory in the structure of the territorial bodies of the KGB) of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region
31. student of one-year courses at the Andropov Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR (KGB certificate of advanced training for internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR and socialist countries)
32. operational officer of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR (second main board and other departments) in Moscow
33. first-line operative (internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR) of the regional departments of the KGB in Moscow and the Moscow region
34. an officer of the first departments (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of KGB activity) of the republican, regional or regional apparatus of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city and/or a major seaport (Leningrad, Klaipeda, Riga, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Batumi, Murmansk, etc.) or an employee of the active reserve “under the roof” in civil organizations
35. operational officer of the central apparatus of the republican, regional and regional KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence, etc.)
36. first-line operational officer (internal intelligence from the territory) of the regional departments of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city and/or a major seaport (Leningrad, Klaipeda, Riga, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Batumi, Murmansk and etc.)
37. operative officer of the first departments (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of KGB activity) of the regional apparatus of the KGB for the non-prestigious regions of the RSFSR and union republics
38. first-line operative (internal intelligence from the territory) of regional departments of the KGB in non-prestigious regions of the RSFSR and union republics
39. an officer of other lines (general, military, economic, transport, ideological counterintelligence, etc.) of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city or a major seaport (Leningrad, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Murmansk, etc.)
40. an operational officer of other lines (general, military, economic, transport, ideological counterintelligence, etc.) in territorial bodies (district departments) in the province or a career border guard officer
41. Cadet of the Higher Red Banner and Dzerzhinsky School of the KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence, diploma of first higher education) or student of the Higher Courses of the KGB
42. student of operational courses of the KGB of the USSR (certificate of advanced training) or cadet of a border school
43. non-certified (civilian) employee of the KGB of the USSR or a long-term conscript, or a contract soldier

________________________

EXPLANATIONS AND NOTES

(strong request: do not engage in meaningful discussions with me without carefully reading and understanding all of this):

1. In the KGB of the USSR, according to the geographical principle, there were two completely different and incomparable intelligence services: external (real - in developed Western countries and in the most developed of the so-called developing countries) and internal (surrogate - intelligence from the territory of the USSR, socialist countries and poor satellite countries )

2. Accordingly, there were significant differences in the prestige of the position within the KGB and outside it - in the rest of Soviet society. Thus, in the USSR it was generally considered prestigious to go to any “abroad” (even to such backward and poor socialist countries as Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Syria or North Korea), and within the KGB, neither many developing countries, nor, especially, socialist, were not considered prestigious at all. Even capitalist countries like Finland. Because of this difference in perception between intelligence professionals and ordinary laymen, the latter think that Putin’s business trip to the GDR is a career success, although in reality it was considered at PGU as ending up in a landfill or in a garbage pit.

3. My report card on prestige ranks applies exclusively to the operational, but not to the commanding staff of the KGB.

4. The structure of this table is only quantitatively pyramidal. That is, the lower categories are much more numerous (tens of thousands) than the higher ones (only a few hundred and tens of people). But they have no official dependence on each other.

5. The transition of an operational employee to the management team could significantly change his prestige, but this is outside the presented report card, because it becomes too difficult (impossible) for an objective assessment. What is better and more prestigious: to be a simple lieutenant in an “illegal” foreign intelligence station in Paris or Washington, or a general in some provincial “Uryupinsk” at the head of the regional KGB department?

6. In the KGB of the USSR, the operational staff could grow from a junior lieutenant to a lieutenant colonel (in rank) and from a junior intelligence officer to a senior assistant to the head of a department (in position). Up to and including lieutenant colonel, ranks were assigned by internal orders of the chairman of the KGB of the USSR. Already in the GDR, Putin reached the limit of automatic growth of the operational staff within the KGB (lieutenant colonel, senior assistant to the head of the department) and would never have been able to rise higher (he was old and did not have the necessary education and qualifications for further growth), even if he really wanted to.

7. Starting with the colonel, the procedure changed, becoming radically more complicated, making it accessible to units. The assignment of military ranks, starting with colonel, fell into the nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee. In this case, the following were required: successful completion of management courses (in Moscow at the CI or in Alma-Ata), representation by the Collegium and the Chairman of the KGB and approval in the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee apparatus, and the assignment itself was made by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

8. It is very important not to confuse the prestige of a position in this table of ranks with profitability or material benefits. For example, a simple cryptographer working for a subsidiary in the most shady country and receiving foreign currency was financially much better off than any of the most prestigious officers in Yasenevo. So the senior intelligence officer, Major Putin, being in the DZK at a provincial point of internal intelligence from the territory of the socialist countries in Dresden (GDR), received more (in 4 years he saved up for a new Volga) than the colonel of the most prestigious department of real foreign intelligence (PGU), but on This material side of the matter was where his advantages ended.

9. It must be said that full training at the KGB Intelligence Institute (CI) was not mandatory for working in “internal” intelligence - in surrogate intelligence from the territory, in the first line of the territorial bodies of the KGB in the USSR and socialist countries. For this, six-month advanced training courses in Kyiv, Gorky, a year in Minsk or at the CI in Moscow were enough. Therefore, when Putin went to a one-year course in Moscow, it was already clear from the very beginning that his personnel officers did not plan to join any foreign intelligence service. That’s why he later returned to St. Petersburg and went only to the GDR, to the official representation of the KGB under the Stasi, where real intelligence officers were practically not sent at the beginning of their careers.

10. Putin began his career in the KGB (from 1975 to 1991) from the lowest 43rd position (a civilian employee of the secretariat, an uncertified legal adviser of the Leningrad KGB), then rose to 42nd. For most of his career in the KGB, he was in the territorial bodies of the KGB in provincial Leningrad in the 39th position out of 43 in my table of prestige ranks in the KGB, gradually moving to 34th position (internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR in Leningrad). For 9 months before leaving for the GDR, he moved to Moscow to the 31st position, and then very briefly (for four months) back to Leningrad to the 34th position. During the DZK in the GDR (1986-1990), Putin temporarily rose to 26th position, and this was his highest achievement in the structure of the KGB of the USSR. Immediately after returning from the GDR (1990-1991), he moved back to Leningrad to 39th position.

11. The fact that Putin ended up as President of the Russian Federation is completely unrelated to his non-existent “successes” in the KGB and, moreover, in “foreign intelligence”, in which he never served (it starts from the 21st position and higher in table of prestige ranks). He simply turned out to be in the right place at the right time: in 1991-95 (under Sobchak in the St. Petersburg mayor's office) and then in 1997-99 (in the administration of President Yeltsin). Yeltsin’s “family” and a group of oligarchs led by Berezovsky, mistakenly assessing Putin’s dullness and diligence as his main advantage, made their main bet in an attempt to maintain elusive power on him, as a puppet at the highest post in the state. And over time he abandoned them all. That's all the explanation. It has nothing to do with Putin’s “merits” in the KGB.

12. Personally, I immediately started in the KGB from the 4th position (1981-82), but then I proactively refused to complete special training and enlist as an illegal immigrant in the KGB (2nd position). After a forced return to the issue of personnel service in the KGB, I had to fall far down - all the way to 20th position (1984-87)! Thus, personally, my lowest point in the table of prestige ranks in the KGB (20th) was six positions higher than Putin’s highest (26th)! Moreover, we never served in the same intelligence service: I was always in the real external intelligence service, and he was in the surrogate, internal intelligence service, and even then not always. Then I managed to immediately rise sharply to the 14th position (1987-1988), and from there I returned to the top again - to my original one, where I started, 4th (1988-89), with a loss of 6 years. And then to the 2nd (1989-91). Well, I ended my operational career in 1992 in the highest 1st position. After the destruction of the USSR and the liquidation of the KGB, I proactively retired, first to the reserves, and then finally retired from the spy agency, which I never regretted before and do not regret now (Read the autobiographical novel “How the KGB Hunted Me”).

Paris, March 2016.

KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of the Great Power Oleg Maksimovich Khlobustov

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

Actually last Chairman of the KGB of the USSR in 1988–1991 years became Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov.

During the 23 months of Kryuchkov’s tenure as chairman of the KGB of the USSR, many dramatic events occurred in the history of our country, the apotheosis of which was the death of the Great Power - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Like Chebrikov and Fedorchuk, Kryuchkov was a leader Andropov school, but, apparently, did not possess his intellectual, business and strong-willed qualities.

The head of the PGU Kryuchkov was appointed to the post of chairman of the KGB in connection with the election of V.M. Chebrikova Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee by a joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on October 1, 1988.

According to established tradition, even earlier, on September 20, 1989, V.A. Kryuchkov was also elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - Politburo of the Central Committee and personally General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev remained the main recipients of information from the KGB of the USSR.

In accordance with the ongoing reforms of government and administrative bodies, after the formation of the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the appointments of Union ministers, including chairmen of state committees and other departments, were made by him in July 1989.

Statement of V.A. Kryuchkov as Chairman of the KGB of the USSR - his candidacy was supported and proposed for approval by the Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR - at a meeting of the Supreme Council was accompanied by his report on the main directions and tasks of the activities of state security agencies. This report also became a kind of report on the work of the KGB to the highest legislative body of the country, which marked the beginning of parliamentary control over the state of state security of the country.

It should be especially emphasized that, for a number of reasons, which will be discussed below, in Soviet society at the end of the 80s of the last century there was an inadequate understanding of the history, purpose and content of the activities of domestic state security bodies, which was reflected directly in speeches of KGB leaders, as well as in questions asked to them in various audiences.

For objective coverage of the entire range of problems of ensuring state security, as national security of the USSR was then called, the leadership of the State Security Committee decided to more actively, regularly and systematically inform the population about the activities of the KGB, explaining both the features of the current situation in the country and in the world, and the tasks the solution of which is entrusted to the KGB, and the contribution of the security agencies to the solution of various problems facing the state.

As noted in the editorial preface to the collection "KGB facing the people"(Moscow, 1990), the content and essence of the activities of the security agencies in the conditions of perestroika were actively discussed not only in the KGB groups - and this is the absolute truth, I testify to this as an eyewitness and contemporary - but also by people's deputies, executive authorities, representatives of various public organizations and the media.

This collection of interviews and speeches by the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and his deputies was prepared to objectively inform the people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR on the entire range of issues of the activities of the KGB bodies, and then it was planned to publish it in mass circulation. The last project was not destined to come true. Due to its small circulation of 1 thousand copies and the targeted nature of the publication, this collection, which has now become a bibliographic rarity, is still a valuable source of information for historians today about the activities of the KGB bodies in 1985–1991.

However, let us immediately make a reservation that all the speeches of V.A. included in this collection. Kryuchkov were later included in his book “Without a Statute of Limitations” (M., 2006).

It should also be noted that great importance for truthful and objective coverage of the activities of security agencies there was also adoption and implementation decision of the KGB Board of April 21, 1989 “On the development of transparency in the activities of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.”

This decision was dictated both by the growing interest of the population in the activities of state security agencies, and as a consequence of the change in the information situation in the country, as well as attempts inspired from abroad to discredit the KGB bodies. The desire to discredit state security agencies has always been inherent in ideological sabotage against the USSR, because foreign political strategists understood perfectly well that undermining the population’s trust in the KGB, weakening the state structure designed to protect the public and state interests of the country, would create more favorable conditions for the activities of its geopolitical competitors , implementation of their plans and intentions.

As rightly noted by the deputy head of the VGU KGB of the USSR, General A.A. Fabrichnikov, “glasnost in all its manifestations and various combinations with forms, methods and techniques of secret warfare was previously and is today in the arsenal of all counterintelligence services in the world.” Emphasizing that “there is every reason to consider Glasnost as one of the most important socio-political principles of the activities of Soviet counterintelligence, which, along with other socio-political principles, ensures high efficiency of counterintelligence activities.”

On December 1, 1987, the issue of expanding openness in the activities of the KGB was considered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

In the previous meeting KGB note to the CPSU Central Committee dated November 24, 1987, in particular, it was noted:

“The State Security Committee of the USSR, in restructuring its activities, pays great attention to measures aimed at increasing the role of the KGB in implementing the party’s goals for the comprehensive development of socialist democracy. Of great importance in this process are the expansion of openness in matters of ensuring the state security of Russia, a deep understanding among broad circles of the Soviet public of the goals and objectives of the KGB, and the active participation of workers in protecting against the subversive machinations of opponents of the revolutionary process of perestroika.

The work of the KGB agencies to uncover the aspirations and suppress hostile actions of the enemy is quite noticeably reflected in the media. However... the demands of today put before the State Security Committee the task of further expanding transparency in its activities.

In this regard, it was considered advisable to implement a number of additional measures, which, in the opinion of the KGB of the USSR, would contribute to expanding transparency in the activities of the KGB bodies, strengthening their ties with workers and would have important preventive and preventive significance.”

The note also noted that “Glasnost is one of the main forms of active communication between state security agencies and workers. But today Our fellow citizens do not know everything they should know about state security agencies. It happens that information from the KGB does not keep up with events, sometimes sweeping criticism and sometimes malicious attacks against the KGB go unanswered.

...specific measures to promote transparency in activities The KGB of the USSR is aimed at creating a system of constant and comprehensive information to society, which is one of the defining guarantees of strengthening ties with workers, compliance with socialist legality, and constitutional obligations.

Today, in covering the activities of the State Security Committee, there are essentially no taboo topics, with the exception of quite understandable restrictions arising from the requirements of secrecy.

... topical issues are increasingly reflected in the media - the participation of the KGB in the fight against organized crime, interaction in this matter with the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and customs officials.

Glasnost concerns not only the present, but also the past, it requires its objective analysis, further measures to eliminate the consequences of violations of Leninist principles in the activities of the security agencies during the period of the cult of personalities...”

The intensification of this area of ​​activity led not only to the reorganization of the Press Bureau of the KGB of the USSR, on the basis of which the Center for Public Relations (CPR) was formed, but also prompted the search and approval of qualitatively new approaches to interaction with the media.

The practice of the CSO bodies began to include holding a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Press Agency "Novosti" (APN), meetings with foreign correspondents.

It is also becoming traditional for territorial KGB departments to conduct interviews with their leaders, round table meetings, and broadcast “live” on radio and television.

The museums and rooms of the glory of the KGB departments____ opened their doors to visitors.

In addition, publications of declassified documents also began to appear, including those from the KGB of the USSR, articles, collections, studies and documentary journalistic publications prepared on their basis, which became very numerous in 1988–1990. In particular, they were regularly published in the socio-political bulletin “Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU”, in the newspapers “Pravda”, “Glasnost”, “Military Historical Journal” and other publications.

A significant contribution to the expansion of relations between journalists and representatives of the KGB bodies was made by the former head of the press service of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, and subsequently of the Public Relations Center (CSR) of the MB-FSK-FSB, now retired Major General A.G. Mikhailov, as well as Lieutenant General A.A., who replaced him. Zdanovich.

Speech by V.A. Kryuchkov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 14, 1989 was broadcast on Central Television, and later his transcript was published in the newspaper “Soviet Russia”, as a result of which a multimillion-dollar audience and readership in our country could become acquainted with him.

In his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kryuchkov also described the work KGB foreign intelligence:“The main task of intelligence activities is to contribute in every possible way to ensuring peace, strengthening the security of the Soviet state, its foreign policy positions and interests.”

Somewhat later, specifying the activities of the PSU, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR in an interview with a correspondent of the weekly newspaper “Novoye Vremya” noted:

“The very fact that we are participating in the development of certain foreign policy problems requires us to be responsible and indicates that we are taken into account. In general, I must say that there is no country where intelligence is not taken into account. Sometimes we initiate certain steps in the field of foreign policy. However, in my opinion, in this area we have one organization - a trendsetter - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...

The task of intelligence is to provide the country’s leaders with objective information so that they can make the best decision.”

V.A. Kryuchkov also clarified that the KGB “must receive and communicate (to senior authorities - O.Kh.) objective information, I emphasize - objective, proactive if possible” (Novoye Vremya, 1989, No. 32).

At that time, Soviet intelligence already knew that October 30, 1988 US CIA Director W. Webster emphasized that “The work carried out against the USSR will remain the main focus of the CIA’s activities in collecting and analyzing information in the 90s. The Soviet Union's military capabilities, efforts to expand its global influence, and active intelligence activities continue to pose a threat to the security of the United States." And regarding “perestroika,” he noted that the United States “must pay closer attention to the processes and political struggle in the Soviet Union.”

To implement this task, a special Perestroika Progress Center was created in the US intelligence community in 1989, which included representatives of the CIA, DIA and the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research.

Intelligence reports on the situation in the USSR prepared by the Center were reported daily personally to President George W. Bush and other members of the US National Security Council.

At the direction of George W. Bush, annual appropriations for human intelligence alone have increased by more than 20% since 1989.

It is clear that achieve precisely proactive information was not always possible. Since KGB, like any other intelligence agency in the world, worked in a confrontation with a real and strong enemy represented by the intelligence coalition of NATO countries, seeking to both hide and disguise their true goals and intentions, and conduct special disinformation and diversionary campaigns and activities.

These circumstances explain the occurrences failures and failures in the activities of the intelligence services, including the KGB of the USSR.

It seems interesting to compare Soviet and American conceptual views on the purpose and role of intelligence in the mechanism of government.

In this regard, we note that in a keynote speech in the US Congress, Robert Gates, who became director of the CIA in the George W. Bush administration, stated that “Intelligence is becoming an increasingly central factor in the formation of American foreign policy... The most important thing is that the role of intelligence is increasing as the only organization in the American administration that looks forward, one might say, “scouts the future.” Intelligence is significantly ahead of other US agencies in assessing and identifying the problems that the US will face in 5-10 years and even in the 21st century.”

In a speech at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, candidate for the post of chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov emphasized that “one of the main activities of the state security agencies is counterintelligence, that is, the protection of our interests and secrets.”

The term “national interests” itself had not yet been uttered, but it was specifically about protecting interests of the Soviet Union, the interests of the peoples inhabiting it, in Western political terminology - the national interests of the country.

And later, answering numerous questions from deputies - a total of 96 questions were asked to him during the meeting - V.A. Kryuchkov added:

What is happening in our country is of great interest to the special services of Western countries, some other countries, and especially all kinds of organizations that often take anti-socialist, anti-Soviet positions. We feel this from the propaganda, from the arrival of their emissaries here, from the literature that they bring here. There is another direction, the so-called Islamic fundamentalist. This is a very dangerous thing, given the fanaticism and indiscriminateness in methods and means. It seems that this is a question of state security agencies, and legal authorities, and our organizations engaged in propaganda work...

Of course, those on the other side are not inactive, they are trying to actively influence the state of affairs in our country. But, comrades, let's look for reasons first of all in our own home, in ourselves. Look for reasons within ourselves, where we once did something wrong... I, as the chairman of the KGB, as a former intelligence chief, can say that they are not inactive there. We see it. It seems to them that the Soviet Union, when it looks like a powerful factor, is one situation that is unfavorable for them. And the Soviet Union as a weakened factor is another situation that is beneficial for them. Although there are sober people there who understand that this is far from true.”

As the events of subsequent years showed, these words turned out to be prophetic in the full sense of the word.

Such a detailed reproduction of some of the speeches of that a time already far from us, in our opinion, it is necessary in order to show what the KGB of the USSR knew at that time, what it informed the political leadership of the country about, what decisions were made based on this information.

Because, as we know, history tends to repeat itself...

At the same meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in July 1989, Kryuchkov was also for the first time stated that The KGB is fighting terrorism, including international terrorism. Although, until the mid-90s, this topic seemed irrelevant not only to the general audience, but also to the majority of political figures of that era.

But the security officers already then really realized, felt this threat and were actively preparing to repel it, and It is not their fault that in less than 15 months the KGB will fall victim to political intrigue and confrontation. And the victims of these hidden intrigues and political confrontations will be the security and population of our Motherland, its genuine rights and freedoms, and national interests.

On the issue of the essence of perestroika in the activities of state security agencies KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov explained:

We believe that qualitatively new principles of the relationship between state and security should be formulated and implemented. It is not the interests of society and the state that should adapt to the activities of state security agencies and their special services, but, on the contrary, the KGB bodies and their services must strictly submit to the interests of society and the state and proceed from them.

In the course of answering numerous questions from deputies, Kryuchkov explained that the scope of activity of state security bodies is determined, in particular, by the criminal and criminal procedural legislation of the USSR and union republics - Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR of 1960 and the corresponding articles of the criminal procedural codes of the union republics of the USSR .

Let us immediately emphasize that, in connection with the reorganization of the public administration system in the USSR in 1989, the right to control the activities of the KGB, in addition to the CPSU Central Committee, was also granted to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, both directly and through its Committee on Defense and State Security , as well as the Constitutional Oversight Committee, which were truly extremely important legal innovations.

Speaking about the priorities, main directions and principles of restructuring in the work of state security agencies, V.A. Kryuchkov defined them as Law, Truth and Glasnost.

The first of them was understood as improving the entire legal framework for both ensuring the security of the country and the activities of the KGB of the USSR.

Indeed, the absence of laws on counterintelligence and operational investigative activities made the situation stalemate and acutely raised the question of the legislative basis for the work of all law enforcement agencies, including the KGB.

The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Armed Forces, together with the KGB, the Prosecutor General's Office and other government bodies, began work on the preparation of draft laws “On State Security”, “On Crimes against the State”, on KGB bodies.

At the same time, it was assumed that the latter would reveal questions about the principles of activity, tasks and functions of the KGB, the place of the State Security Committee in the comprehensive security system of the Soviet Union, since many other ministries and departments took part in its implementation, relations with other government agencies and public organizations, as well as the rights and obligations of their employees, the procedure for appealing certain of their actions.

These plans were implemented in Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR”, adopted by the Supreme Council on May 16, 1991.

On the issue of the participation of KGB bodies in the work of rehabilitating victims of Stalin’s repressions, which we will talk about in more detail later, the KGB chairman said:

This work means the need and even the need for a new generation of security officers, not involved in the tragic period of the past, to go through the pain of atrocities and losses suffered by the people, and even by the state security agencies themselves, to politically and emotionally survive the pain in order to never allow anything like this in the future.

Kryuchkov emphasized that “the most important guarantee against arbitrariness and violation of the legitimate rights and interests of citizens should be the implementation of the principles of democracy and transparency in all activities of state security agencies. Soviet people have the right to know about the activities and nature of the work of the KGB bodies. The authorities themselves are also interested in this, since this will help form an objective idea of ​​state security authorities, their duties, responsibilities and rights.

It is important to make permanent and effective connections between state security agencies and the public and labor collectives. In this case, you can count on the support of workers in solving problems of ensuring state security... This can only be done together with the people, relying on the public on a daily basis...”

The KGB chairman also pointed out to the people's deputies of the USSR the shortcomings in the work of his subordinates:

We often we don't deliver on time We have a rather sharp, principled assessment of the difficult situations that are brewing, but we do not show integrity and persistence in raising issues with local and even central authorities. They have an effect and are purely psychological barrier, timidity caused by a number of political, social events and circumstances... inability to discern negative, alarming aspects in the rapidly developing generally constructive processes. It is especially difficult in cases where we are talking about conflict situations on an interethnic basis when mass unrest occurs...

It should be noted that it was in the late 80s that mass unrest, including with the use of weapons, arose in a number of regions of the USSR. And it is in these conflicts that were not resolved in time that the reasons for many of the bloody clashes of 1991–1994 are rooted, which already took the form of armed conflicts of a non-international nature (internal armed conflicts, according to internationally accepted terminology), in the newly independent states - the former Union republics of the USSR.

The KGB leaders were asked many questions about the 5th Directorate.

Characterizing the activities of the 5th Directorate, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper on October 26, 1989, for the first time officially admitted that the state security agencies in the 70s - 80s identified and prevented more than 1,500 persons who were harboring terrorist attacks. intentions.

In the summer of 1989, in connection with changes occurring in the country, as well as changes in criminal legislation, a decision was made to abolish the 5th Directorate and create the USSR KGB Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate “3”).

Legislative changes, in particular, concerned the disposition of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of September 11, 1989, the legal norm on criminal liability for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda was abolished. Instead, in the same article 70 of the Criminal Code there was criminal liability has been established for calls for a violent change in the constitutional order.

In a note by the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in the CPSU Central Committee to justify the need to abolish the 5th Directorate and create a new division on August 4, 1989, it was emphasized:

“In the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, the expansion of democratization and openness, special services of capitalist countries and associated foreign anti-Soviet centers and other organizations are transferring their subversive activities against the USSR to a new strategic and tactical platform.

In its goals and forms, it takes on the character of a struggle against the constitutional foundations of the USSR.

By reviving nationalism, chauvinism, and clericalism, Western intelligence services and anti-Soviet organizations are actively trying to inspire hotbeds of social tension, anti-Soviet manifestations and mass unrest, and incite hostile elements to actions aimed at the violent overthrow of Soviet power.

With particular persistence, they strive to form legal and illegal groups of an anti-constitutional nature, directly supervise them, provide material and ideological support, and incite extremist actions.”

At the same time, antisocial elements, “using some of the amateur formations brought to life by the political activity of citizens, hiding behind the slogans of democratization and renewal of Soviet society, they are working for anti-constitutional purposes to create structures opposition to the CPSU and other organizational formations. Their subversive activities using nationalism and chauvinism intensified especially sharply. In a number of places, groups and movements that have arisen on this basis openly preach violent methods of changing the social and state system of the USSR, organize mass riots, commit dangerous extremist actions, terrorist manifestations, and other acts of violence against officials and citizens, including the use of weapons.

The stated circumstances urgently require strengthening of work on the proper protection of the constitutional system of the union Soviet state, protecting Soviet society from the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, foreign anti-Soviet organizations and their like-minded people within the country...

In this regard, the operational activities of the newly created counterintelligence department are intended to be focused on solving the following main tasks:

Failure of the plans of special services of capitalist countries to create and use organizational anti-socialist groups for anti-constitutional purposes;

Suppressing the criminal activities of anti-socialist elements trying to violently overthrow Soviet power;

Prevention and suppression of terrorist acts;

Prevention and localization of mass riots and other illegal group actions of an extremist nature;

Identifying and neutralizing anti-Soviet nationalist manifestations."

According to the technology of making organizational and personnel decisions that existed at that time, the note of the KGB chairman on August 11 was considered by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and, based on its results, the draft corresponding Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (N 634–143 of August 13, 1989) was approved.

On this legal basis On August 29, 1989, order N00124 of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR was issued on the abolition of 5 management and education management “3” (Protection of the constitutional order).

As noted on this occasion by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Army General F.D. Bobkov, “it may seem strange, but for the first time in the entire history of the country, the state security agencies have been publicly and clearly entrusted with the task of protecting the constitutional order.” Listing the above tasks of the new department, F.D. Bobkov also mentioned the fight against organized crime. (“Motherland”, 1989, N 11).

E.F. was appointed head of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR. Ivanov, and on January 30, 1990 he was replaced by V.P. Vorotnikov. Breaking the chronological order of presentation, we note that on September 25, 1991, by order of V.V. Bakatin, who became the chairman of the KGB, Vorotnikov was relieved of his post, and soon this department itself was liquidated.

Subsequently, the actual legal successors of Directorate “3” were first the Department for Combating Terrorism (UBT) of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (1992–1993), and then the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional System and Combating Terrorism of the FSB of Russia.

And yet, retrospectively assessing the activities of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR from the standpoint of today, it should be objectively recognized that it did not fulfill many of the tasks assigned to it...

What, however, is the fault not only of its employees and leaders, but also, first of all, of the country’s political leadership, which showed inconsistency and indecisiveness both in protecting the Constitution of the country and upholding officially declared political course.

And also already decision taken at that time, but not officially declared M.S. Gorbachev about a different concept for the restructuring of Soviet society.

In our opinion, an important recognition of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union is contained in the article of the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR F.D. Bobkov, published in January 2005 in the magazine “Life of Nationalities”.

In it he emphasized: "during the height of the Cold War" it was like war were not perceived. About her spoke and wrote only a limited circle of party lecturers, and leaders in their reports quoted the necessary excerpts for propaganda purposes. At the same time, no one warned about the danger of the Cold War for the state.

The KGB understood this danger and tried to the best of their ability not only to help the country’s leadership realize it, but also sought to convey the threat posed by the Cold War to the general public."

And again, turning to the reasons for the final collapse of the USSR, I will cite the opinion of F.D. on this matter. Bobkova:

“The leaders reveled or enjoyed power, discarding all information about threats from the outside, about processes in the country that could sow distrust in the authorities and disrupt stability in the state. Not only state leaders were affected by the “invincibility” virus. The disease has struck the community."

Genuine The cause of the collapse of the USSR was the notorious “human factor” - incompetence the then leadership of the country - which turned into a fatal “mistake of the crew” and the “ship’s captain.”

As noted on this occasion by the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences S.M. Rogov, “the unprecedented decline of the 90s is the result not of the machinations of the CIA and the Pentagon, but of the incompetent and irresponsible policies of the then Russian leaders.”

And the American the strategy of “crushing a geopolitical rival” acted only as a background, an external factor, nevertheless - powerful factor who created real challenges and threats for the USSR, which Gorbachev’s leadership was powerless to resist.

However, few people have yet spoken seriously about the real reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. But, due to the approaching twentieth anniversary(2011) “the beginning of the new history of Russia”, which means “the cessation of the existence of the USSR as a geopolitical reality”, there will undoubtedly be a serious conversation about this, as well as about the “social price”, results and “results achieved”.

As well as the fact that many unexpected discoveries and confessions await us here. But, I repeat, this matter is not yet so close future.

Another feature of the operational situation in the country at the end of the 80s of the last century was the growth of organized crime and the strengthening of its negative impact on the entire complex of socio-economic processes in the country.

In many speeches by the heads of state security agencies, it was noted that the growth and modification of crime in the country - it was then proudly emphasized that crime rate(i.e. total number of registered in the country crimes), did not reach the level of leading capitalist states, but was characterized by trends of steady growth, which required both the expansion of the participation of the KGB in the fight against its most dangerous forms, and the adoption of appropriate political decisions and legislative acts.

This is how the president of the Russian Criminological Association A.I. Dolgova characterized the dynamics of changes in the crime situation in the country using the five-year average crime rate coefficient, that is, the number of registered crimes per 100 thousand residents of Russia:

1976–1980 - 664 reported crimes;

1981–1985 - "- 901;

1986–1990 - "- 982;

1991–1995 - "- 1,770.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that in subsequent years this growth continued in our country. objective criminological indicator.

Thus, according to the All-Russian Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003, it was already 1,926 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants, and when adjusted for the number of adult (i.e., over 16 years old) citizens of the country, it was already 2,124.

Along with the general increase in the number of criminal acts in the late 80s, there was a growth and consolidation of organized crime, characterized by a higher level of criminal “professionalism”, scale of acts, organizational cohesion, secrecy, technical equipment, the presence of connections in administrative and economic management bodies, and also with foreign criminal groups.

The increase in crime in the country noted since the mid-80s, the aggravation of the crime situation at the turn of the 90s, required both certain organizational and staffing changes and appropriate legal regulation. And the basis for it was laid by the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 4, 1989 “On the decisive strengthening of the fight against crime.”

Another feature of the development of the crime situation in the country was the growth of economic crime, its merging with general criminal and violent crime, the formation of mafia-type criminal communities, which was accompanied by corruption of government officials who actually sided with serving criminal clans.

In one of his interviews, V.A. Kryuchkov noted that “we must act very energetically to restore order and destroy the causes that give rise to crime. This can be achieved in two ways: economic and financial measures; strengthening the fight against crime,” but, at the same time, “law enforcement agencies alone cannot solve this problem.”

Organized criminal groups both acquired international criminal connections, experience and “weight”, and became politicized and actively became involved in undermining the foundations of state power in the country.

According to law enforcement agencies, already in 1989 in the country about 700 criminal groups operated, and their annual turnover was more than 100 million rubles.

As V.A. noted later in his speech at the XYIII Congress of the CPSU. Kryuchkov, only based on materials from the KGB of the USSR only in 1989. Members of about 300 organized criminal groups were brought to criminal responsibility, illegally acquired currency and valuables worth more than 170 million rubles were converted into state income.

Despite the alarming warnings that were heard, they, unfortunately, were not heard and perceived properly, as a result of which, in subsequent years, organized crime burst into the “operational space.”

And a significant contribution to this was made by the hasty decisions of September 1991 to liquidate the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the “OP” Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

It should be noted that initially M.S. Gorbachev, as befits the leader of a Great Power, was attentive to information from state security agencies.

After cancellation March 14, 1990 Ill Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies Article 6 of the USSR Constitution “on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in Soviet society”, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov is quite rightly appointed as a member of the USSR Presidential Council, and after its reorganization on March 7, 1991, as a member of the USSR Security Council.

And here is what V.A. reported under the heading “Of Special Importance” (N 313 - K/OV dated February 14, 1990). Kryuchkov on the results of the operational and official activities of the KGB in 1989. To the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev:

“In all its activities, the State Security Committee was guided by the political line of the Communist Party, decisions of the highest authorities and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As part of the implementation of the foreign policy course of the Soviet state, the Committee directed its efforts to promoting the creation of a favorable climate in international relations, the formation of a comprehensive system of international security, disarmament, and expanding the scope of economic and humanitarian cooperation between states and peoples.

Along with the traditional areas of work on monitoring the military-strategic situation in the world, early detection of the preconditions for an enemy breakthrough in the military-technical field, the State Security Committee provided information about the plans and intentions of the ruling circles of the United States and its allies in connection with events in Eastern Europe and the development of internal political processes in our country.

The situation developing in Europe was carefully analyzed, in particular in the light of changes in German-German relations, the situation in NATO and the Warsaw War.

Significant adjustments were made to the work in the Afghan direction after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan, in China, in connection with the normalization of relations with this country, as well as in Japan, South Korea and a number of other countries. The effectiveness of intelligence support for negotiations within the CSCE on nuclear and space disarmament has been increased. The fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling has been intensified, and cooperation in these areas is being established with the intelligence services of capitalist states.

In solving internal political problems, the Committee focused on fully facilitating the perestroika processes and ensuring control over the situation in the country, destabilized by many unresolved issues in the economic and political fields. Particular attention was paid to monitoring the actions of nationalist, anti-socialist, extremist forces that entered the political arena, the localization of interethnic conflicts, separatist processes, anti-constitutional and other destructive manifestations.

Measures were consistently implemented to expand transparency in the activities of the Committee, bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.... The publication of an open information bulletin on the work of the KGB has been established. Politically, one of the leading places was occupied by the work on the rehabilitation of citizens who were unreasonably repressed during the 30-40s and early 50s. In 1989, the KGB took part in the rehabilitation of 838,630 citizens.

The dynamic development of the situation in the country and the world required the State Security Committee to intensify its work to provide information to the top leadership of the state, the government of the USSR and interested departments. A large number of notes and encrypted telegrams were sent to the authorities. Particular attention was paid to preparing materials for negotiations between Soviet leaders and leaders of the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China and India and for the discussion of international and domestic problems by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

Great importance was attached to obtaining secret documentary materials from the governing bodies of capitalist states and their military-political blocs, including by intercepting and decrypting correspondence passing through various communication systems.

A number of large-scale active measures have been carried out in order to have a long-term beneficial impact on influential foreign circles, in solving key problems in the field of international security, nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament, and in promoting the concept of a “common European home”.

A wide range of measures have been implemented to neutralize Western interference in the development of internal political processes in the USSR, to influence the positions of leaders and parliamentarians of a number of countries, in particular in their approaches to events in the Soviet Baltic republics...

Active measures in the economic field were aimed at strengthening cooperation between the USSR and leading developed countries, creating a favorable environment for Soviet exports, and gaining access to the latest technology. The actions taken had a certain positive impact on the approaches of the US administration and Congress to trade relations with the USSR, and on the decision of a number of countries to use Soviet space technology. Some measures made it possible to avoid large financial losses when concluding contracts and create favorable conditions for a number of important trade and economic transactions.

In the scientific and technical direction, the Committee's intelligence was able to obtain a number of samples and documentary materials urgently needed for the defense industries, to make a significant contribution to solving national economic problems, to accelerating fundamental and applied research, to the development of new equipment and technology...

The possibilities for conducting reconnaissance work from illegal positions and from the territory of the country have been expanded. Its quality and efficiency have improved somewhat.

The security of Soviet institutions and citizens abroad was ensured. A large number of provocative actions by enemy intelligence services, including those directed against intelligence officers, were thwarted. According to the KGB, 274 Soviet citizens were recalled from abroad ahead of schedule. It was not possible to prevent the non-return of 118 Soviet citizens to their homeland.

At the same time, there were also shortcomings in the intelligence work. In particular, the quality of intelligence information does not yet fully meet today's requirements. This is primarily due to insufficient operational capabilities in the most important targets for reconnaissance penetration. Another pressing issue is increasing the efficiency of active exploration activities and acquiring new reliable channels for their implementation.

The Committee's counterintelligence activities were aimed at suppressing attempts by enemy intelligence services and anti-socialist elements to use for subversive purposes the expansion of international cooperation, the processes of renewal in the country, and serious difficulties in interethnic relations, the economy and other spheres of life of Soviet society.

Counterintelligence operated in the context of a significant expansion of contacts between the USSR and the USA and other NATO countries... Among the citizens of NATO countries who visited Soviet defense facilities, about a third were intelligence officers.

Intelligence officers from NATO countries working in the USSR under the cover of diplomats and journalists made 2,267 trips around the country (1,478 in 1988). State security agencies stopped more than 200 attempts to penetrate military installations. 19 people were expelled from the USSR for illegal activities...

Attempts by a number of Soviet citizens, including military personnel and civilian secret carriers, to proactively establish contact with foreign intelligence services for criminal purposes were prevented.

The fight against terrorism has been intensified, and 384 members of international terrorist organizations have been prevented from entering the country. Based on reliable data on involvement in such organizations, 899 foreigners were placed under entry control. 130 citizens of the USSR were taken under control in connection with statements of terrorist intentions. Three attempts to hijack and hijack passenger planes abroad were foiled. The behavior of 140 citizens who expressed intentions to hijack aircraft was monitored.

Much attention was paid to preventing the leakage of data to the enemy about the most important weapons programs and other state secrets, his misinformation on these issues, and the diversion of attention and efforts to false targets. At the same time, significant adjustments have been made to the organization of secret protection... They (state departments of the USSR - O.Kh.) were provided with the necessary assistance in the work of declassifying documents and removing unjustified restrictions.

In the economic sphere, counterintelligence prevented a number of disruptive trade and economic actions. The largest of them is an attempt by foreign companies, through the mediation of the Moscow cooperative "Alkov", the Estonian joint venture "Estek" and other Soviet organizations, to purchase several billion rubles in the USSR at the "black market" rate. The intentions of a number of officials to reveal commercial secrets for personal gain were thwarted. Together with customs authorities, contraband items worth more than 76 million rubles were detained. In the economic zone of the USSR, fines were imposed on foreign ships in the amount of about 1 million foreign currency rubles.

Measures were consistently taken to further improve the operational and staffing structure of the KGB, and to make more rational use of available forces and means. In accordance with the basic principles of building a rule of law state, a Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System was formed in the Committee, and corresponding units were created in local bodies. They got involved in the work to stabilize the situation, especially in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics, in Moldova and a number of other regions where the most tense situation has recently developed. Much work is being done by these units in Moscow and Leningrad, especially in uncovering and neutralizing subversive actions of foreign intelligence services trying to intensify the activities of extremist organizations. Information work in this area has improved somewhat.

In connection with the increase in crime throughout the country, the Committee more actively used its forces in the fight against its organized forms. A number of successful operations have been carried out against smugglers, corrupt elements, bribe-takers and extortionists. 282 people were prosecuted for committing criminal acts as part of organized groups. A significant number of materials on these issues were transferred to the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor's office, many activities were carried out jointly with them.

Assessing the results of counterintelligence work, the State Security Committee sees that its effectiveness significantly lags behind the requirements of the situation. The effectiveness of many security measures remains low. The fight against organized crime is still progressing slowly.

Taking into account the situation in the country, the KGB authorities paid main attention to general prevention, strengthening the educational function of the State Security Committee...

Along with preventive work, criminal prosecution measures were used. 338 people were brought to criminal responsibility for especially dangerous, other state and other crimes.

Taking into account the difficult situation in the country, the KGB bodies took the necessary measures to ensure socio-political events, protect the leaders of the party and state, and distinguished foreign guests. Government communications worked steadily.

This text is an introductory fragment. From the book “Death to Spies!” [Military counterintelligence SMERSH during the Great Patriotic War] author Sever Alexander

Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which the counterintelligence departments "Smersh" were established

From the book The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People (in the context of World War II) author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

7. TELEGRAM OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE’S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.P. POTEMKIN TO THE PENOVENTIENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE CHSR S.S. ALEXANDROVSKY Moscow, September 20, 19381. To Benes' question whether the USSR, according to the treaty, would provide immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia,

From the book of the KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of a Great Power author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

11. NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR M. M. LITVINOV TO THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR F. VON SCHULENBURG Moscow, March 18, 1939 Mr. Ambassador, I have the honor to confirm receipt of your note of the 16th and note of the 17th of this month, notifying the Soviet government of the inclusion of the Czech Republic

From the book Nuremberg Alarm [Report from the past, appeal to the future] author Zvyagintsev Alexander Grigorievich

9. TELEGRAM from the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. MOLOTOV to the Plenipotentiary REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE KINGDOM OF ROMANIA A. I. LAVRENTYEV ON THE ISSUE OF THE RETURN OF BESSARABIA June 27, 1940. On June 26, I called Davidescu and gave him the following statement of the Soviet government. “B 191 8

From the book Under the Bar of Truth. Confession of a military counterintelligence officer. People. Facts. Special operations. author Guskov Anatoly Mikhailovich

5. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLIKOV, TO THE USSR NGO, SNK USSR AND THE CPSU (B) Central Committee “STATEMENTS, [ORGANIZATIONAL EVENTS] AND OPTIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY AGAINST THE USSR” March 20, 1941 .Most intelligence data concerning

From the book The Andropov Phenomenon: 30 years in the life of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

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Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which counterintelligence departments were established

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Red Chairman Ernest Wohlweber was born in 1898 in Hanover-Münden. His parents were working-class people and held left-wing views. So it’s no coincidence that immediately after graduating from school, when Ernest went to work as a loader at the port, he joined

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No. 3 FROM A REPORT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 28, 1939. From Paris they tell us the following data from August 23 about Hitler's negotiations with the British: “Halifax and the British ambassador in Berlin have been invited to Hitler for important negotiations. They received instructions -

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No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the NGOs of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941. Message from Berlin According to information received from an official of the Committee on the Four-Year Plan, several committee workers received an urgent task to make calculations of raw material reserves And

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No. 8 FROM THE REPORT OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 11, 1941. March 6 of this year. British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov.

From the author's book

No. 9 NOTE OF THE USSR People's Commissar of State Security V.N. MERKULOV TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars and the NKVD of the USSR WITH THE TELEGRAM OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS A. EDEN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF ENGLAND TO THE USSR S. CRIPPS ABOUT GERMANY'S INTENTIONS TO ATTACK THE USSR No. 1312/M April 26, 1941 Top Secret Directed

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