Kursk arc of loss of sides. Historical significance of the Battle of Kursk: causes, course and consequences

The front line at the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 ran from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga, then along the Svir River to Leningrad and further to the south; at Velikie Luki it turned to the southeast and in the Kursk region it formed a huge ledge that went deep into the location of enemy troops; further from the Belgrade area it ran east of Kharkov and along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers stretched to east coast Sea of Azov; on the Taman Peninsula it passed east of Timryuk and Novorossiysk.

The largest forces were concentrated in the southwestern direction, in the area from Novorossiysk to Taganrog. In naval theaters, the balance of forces also began to develop in favor Soviet Union, primarily due to the quantitative and qualitative growth of naval aviation.

The fascist German command came to the conclusion that the most convenient area for delivering a decisive blow was a ledge in the Kursk area, called the Kursk Bulge. From the north, the troops of the Army Group "Center" hung over it, creating a heavily fortified Oryol bridgehead here. From the south, the ledge was covered by troops of Army Group "South". The enemy hoped to cut off the ledge to the base and defeat the formations of the Central and Voronezh fronts operating there. The fascist German command also took into account the exceptionally great strategic importance of the salient for the Red Army. Occupying it, Soviet troops could strike from the rear of the flags of both the Oryol and Belgrade-Kharkov enemy groups.

The Nazi command completed the development of the plan for the offensive operation in the first half of April. It received the code name "Citadel". The general plan of the operation was as follows: with two simultaneous counter strikes in the general direction of Kursk - from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north - to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts on the Kursk salient. Subsequent offensive operations of the Wehrmacht were made dependent on the results of the battle on Kursk Bulge. The success of these operations was supposed to serve as a signal for the attack on Leningrad.

The enemy prepared carefully for the operation. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the fascist German command transferred 5 infantry divisions from France and Germany to the area south of Orel and north of Kharkov. It paid particular attention to the concentration of tank formations. Large aviation forces were also assembled. As a result, the enemy managed to create strong strike groups. One of them, consisting of the 9th German Army of the Center Group, was located in the area south of Orel. The other, which included the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South, was located in the area north of Kharkov. The 2nd was deployed against the western front of the Kursk salient. german army, part of Army Group Center.

The former chief of staff of the 48th Tank Corps, which participated in the operation, General F. Mellenthin, testifies that “not a single offensive was prepared as carefully as this one.”

Soviet troops were also actively preparing for offensive actions. In the summer-autumn campaign, the headquarters planned to defeat army groups "Center" and "South", liberate Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass, the eastern regions of Belarus and reach the Smolensk-Sozh River line, the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper. This large offensive was supposed to involve troops of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Steppe Fronts, the left wing of the Western Front and part of the forces of the South-Western Front. At the same time, it was planned to concentrate the main efforts in the southwestern direction with the aim of defeating enemy armies in the areas of Orel and Kharkov, on the Kursk Bulge. The operation was prepared by the General Headquarters, the military councils of the dandies and their headquarters with the utmost care.

On April 8, G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time on instructions from Headquarters in the area of the Kursk salient, outlined his thoughts on the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. “It will be better,” he reported, “if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.” A. M. Vasilevsky shared this point of view.

On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters at which a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense. The final decision on deliberate defense was made by Stalin in early June. The Soviet High Command, understanding the significance of the Kursk salient, took appropriate measures.

Reflecting the enemy’s attack from the area south of Orel was assigned to the Central Front, which defended the northern and northwestern parts of the Kursk ledge, and the enemy’s offensive from the Belgorod area was supposed to be thwarted by the Voronezh Front, which defended the southern and southwestern parts of the arc.

Coordination of the actions of the fronts on the spot was entrusted to representatives of the Marshal Headquarters G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Never before during the war had Soviet troops created such a powerful and grandiose defense.

By the beginning of July, Soviet troops were fully prepared to repel the enemy's offensive.

The fascist German command kept postponing the start of the operation. The reason for this was the enemy’s preparation for an attack on Soviet troops with a powerful tank avalanche. On July 1, Hitler summoned the main leaders of the operation and announced final decision start it on July 5th.

The fascist command was especially concerned about achieving surprise and crushing impact. However, the enemy’s plan failed: the Soviet command promptly revealed the intentions of the Nazis and the arrival of their new technical means at the front, and established exact date Operation Citadel began. Based on the data received, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to conduct a pre-planned artillery counter-preparation, launch a fire strike on the areas where the main enemy groups were concentrated in order to stop his initial onslaught, inflict heavy damage even before he attacks.

Before the offensive, Hitler issued two orders to maintain the morale of his soldiers: one, on July 1, for officers, the other, on July 4, for all personnel of the troops participating in the operation.

On July 5, at dawn, troops of the 13th Army, 6th and 7th Guards Armies of the Voronezh and Central Fronts launched a powerful artillery strike on his battle formations, artillery firing positions, command and observation posts. One of the largest battles of the Great has begun Patriotic War. During the artillery counter-preparation, serious losses were inflicted on the enemy, especially in the artillery. The battle formations of Hitler's units were largely disorganized. There was confusion in the enemy camp. In order to restore disrupted command and control, the fascist German command was forced to postpone the start of the offensive by 2.5-3 hours.

At 5:30 a.m. after artillery preparation, the enemy went on the offensive in the central front zone and at 6 a.m. in the Voronezh zone. Under cover of the fire of thousands of guns, with the support of many aircraft, a mass of fascist tanks and assault guns rushed into the attack. The infantry followed them. Fierce battles began. The Nazis launched three attacks on the troops of the Central Front in a 40 km zone.

The enemy was confident that he would be able to quickly engage battle formations Soviet troops. But its main blow fell on the strongest sector of the defense of the Soviet troops, and therefore, from the very first minutes of the battle, it began to unfold differently than the Nazis had planned. The enemy was met with a barrage of fire from all types of weapons. The pilots destroyed enemy manpower and equipment from the air. Four times during the day, fascist German troops tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and each time were forced to roll back.

The number of enemy vehicles shot down and burned quickly grew, and the fields were covered with thousands of Nazi corpses. Soviet troops also suffered losses. The fascist command threw more and more tank and infantry units into battle. Up to 4 infantry divisions and 250 tanks were advancing against two Soviet divisions operating on the main direction (the left flank of the 13th Army) (81st General Barinov A.B. and 15th Colonel V.N. Dzhandzhgov). They were supported by about 100 aircraft. Only by the end of the day did the Nazis manage to wedge 6-8 km into the defenses of the Soviet troops in a very narrow area and reach the second defensive line. This was achieved at the cost of huge losses.

At night, the troops of the 13th Army consolidated their positions and prepared for the next battle.

Early in the morning of July 6, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Separate Tank Corps, with aviation support, launched a counterattack on the main enemy group. Both sides fought with extraordinary tenacity. Enemy aircraft, despite heavy losses, continuously bombed the battle formations of Soviet units. As a result of a two-hour battle, the enemy was pushed north by 1.5-2 km.

Having failed to break through to the second line of defense through Olkhovatka, the enemy decided to concentrate his main efforts on another sector. At dawn on July 7, 200 tanks and 2 infantry divisions, supported by artillery and aviation, attacked in the direction of Ponyri. The Soviet command urgently transferred large forces here anti-tank artillery and rocket launchers.

Five times during the day the Nazis launched violent attacks, and all of them ended unsuccessfully. Only at the end of the day the enemy, having brought up fresh forces, broke into the northern part of Ponyri. But the next day he was kicked out of there.

On July 8, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the enemy resumed the attack on Olkhovatka. In a small area of 10 km, he brought two more tank divisions into battle. Now almost all the forces of the fascist German strike group, advancing on Kursk from the north, took part in the battle.

The ferocity of the fighting increased every hour. The enemy onslaught was especially strong at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies in the area of the village of Samodurovka. But the Soviet soldiers survived. The enemy, although he advanced another 3-4 km at the cost of exceptional losses, was unable to break through the Soviet defense. This was his last push.

During four days of bloody battles in the area of Ponyri and Olkhovatka, the fascist German group managed to join the defense of the troops of the Central Front in only a strip up to 10 km wide and up to 12 km deep. On the fifth day of the battle, she could no longer advance. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive at the reached point.

Enemy troops from the south tried to break through to meet this group, which was trying to get to Kursk from the north.

The enemy delivered the main blow from the area west of Belgorod in the general direction of Kursk; the enemy included the bulk of tanks and aircraft in this grouping.

The fighting in the Oboyan direction resulted in a major tank battle, which had a significant impact on the entire course and outcome of events on the southern front of the Kursk salient. The Nazis intended to immediately ram the first and second lines of defense operating in this direction of the 6th Guards Army of General I.M. Chistyakov. Providing the main blow from the east, the enemy's 3rd Tank Corps advanced from the Belgorod area towards Korocha. Here the defense was occupied by the troops of the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov.

On the morning of July 5, when the enemy went on the offensive, the Soviet troops had to withstand exceptional enemy pressure. Hundreds of planes and bombs were thrown at Soviet positions. But the soldiers fought back the enemy.

Pilots and sappers caused great damage to the enemy. But the Nazis, despite huge losses, continued their attacks. The most brutal battles broke out in the area of the village of Cherkesskoye. By evening, the enemy managed to wedge into the division's main defense line and encircle the 196th Guards rifle regiment. Having pinned down significant enemy forces, they slowed down his advance. On the night of July 6, the regiment received an order to break out of the encirclement and retreat to a new line. But the regiment survived, ensuring an organized retreat to a new defensive line.

On the second day the battle continued with unrelenting tension. The enemy threw more and more forces into the attack. Trying to break through the defense, he did not take into account the huge losses. Soviet soldiers fought to the death.

The pilots provided great assistance to the ground troops.

By the end of the second day of the battle, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, advancing on the right flank of the strike force, wedged itself into the second line of defense on a very narrow section of the front. On July 7 and 8, the Nazis made desperate attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and go deeper in the direction of Prokhorovka.

No less fierce battles broke out in the Korochan direction. Up to 300 enemy tanks were advancing from the Belgorod area to the northeast. In four days of fighting, the enemy's 3rd Tank Corps managed to advance only 8-10 km in a very narrow area.

On July 9-10-11, in the direction of the main attack, the Nazis continued to make desperate efforts to break through to Kursk through Oboyan. They brought all six into battle tank divisions both corps operating here. Intense fighting took place in the zone between the railway and highway leading from Belgorod to Kursk. Hitler's command expected to complete the march to Kursk in two days. It was already the seventh day, and the enemy had advanced only 35 km. Having encountered such stubborn opposition, he was forced to turn to Prokhorovka, bypassing Oboyan.

By July 11, the enemy, having advanced only 30-35 km, reached the Gostishchevo-Rzhavets line, but he was still far from the goal.

Having assessed the situation, the Headquarters representative, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, and the command of the Voronezh Front decided to launch a powerful counterattack. The 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, which arrived at the front's disposal, was involved in its application. guards army General A. S. Zhadov, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th Guards Army and part of the forces of the 40.69 and 7th Guards Army. On July 12, these troops launched a counteroffensive. The struggle flared up on the entire front. A huge mass of tanks took part in it on both sides. Particularly heavy fighting took place in the Prokhorovka area. The troops encountered exceptional, stubborn resistance from units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which continuously launched counterattacks. A major oncoming tank battle took place here. The fierce battle lasted until late in the evening. Both sides suffered heavy losses. On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. On this day, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Bryansk and Western Fronts went on the offensive. With strong blows On the very first day, in a number of sectors of the enemy’s Oryol grouping, they broke through the defenses of the 2nd Tank Army and began to develop an offensive in depth. On July 15, the central front also began an offensive. As a result, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon its plan to destroy Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge and began to take urgent measures to organize defense. On July 16, the fascist German command began to withdraw its troops on the southern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front introduced into the battle on July 18 began to pursue the enemy. By the end of July 23, they had basically restored the position they had occupied before the battle began.

Thus, the enemy’s third summer offensive on the eastern front completely failed. It choked within a week. But the Nazis argued that summer was their time, that in the summer they could truly use their enormous capabilities and achieve victory. This turned out to be far from the case.

Hitler's generals considered the Red Army incapable of widespread offensive operations in summer time. Incorrectly assessing the experience of previous companies, they believed that Soviet troops could only advance in “alliance” with the bitter winter. Fascist propaganda persistently created myths about the “seasonality” of Soviet strategy. However, reality has refuted these claims.

The Soviet command, possessing the strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy in the Battle of Kursk. The defeat of the advancing enemy groups created an advantageous situation for the transition here to a decisive counteroffensive, which was prepared by Headquarters in advance. Its plan was developed and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May. After that, it was discussed more than once at Headquarters and corrected. Two groups of fronts were involved in the operation. The defeat of the enemy's Oryol group was entrusted to the troops of the Bryansk, the left wing of the Western and the right wing of the central fronts. The blow to the Belgorod-Kharkov group was to be delivered by troops of the Voronezh and Stepnovsky fronts. Partisan formations The Bryansk region, Oryol and Smolensk regions, Belarus, as well as regions of Left Bank Ukraine were tasked with disabling railway communications in order to disrupt supplies and regroupings of enemy forces.

The tasks of the Soviet troops in the counteroffensive were very complex and difficult. Both on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, the enemy created a strong defense. The Nazis strengthened the first of them for almost two years and considered it as the starting area for striking Moscow, and they considered the second “a bastion of German defense in the east, a gate that blocked the paths for Russian armies to Ukraine.”

The enemy defense had a developed system of field fortifications. Its main zone, 5-7 km deep, and in some places up to 9 km, consisted of heavily fortified strongholds, which were connected by trenches and communication passages. In the depths of the defense there were intermediate and rear lines. Its main hubs were the cities of Orel, Bolkhov, Muensk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Merefa - large junctions of railways and highways that allowed the enemy to maneuver with forces and means.

It was decided to begin the counteroffensive with the defeat of the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies defending the Oryol bridgehead. Significant forces and resources were involved in the Oryol operation. Its general plan, which received the code name “Kutuzov,” consisted of simultaneous attacks by troops from three fronts from the north, east and south on the eagle with the aim of enveloping the enemy group here, dissecting it and destroying it piece by piece. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front, operating from the north, were first supposed to, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, defeat the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy, and then, advancing on Khotynets, intercept the enemy’s escape routes from the Orel region to the west and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, destroy it.

To the southeast of the Western Front, troops of the Bryansk Front prepared for an offensive. They had to break through the enemy's defenses from the east. The troops of the right wing of the central front were preparing for an attack in the general direction of Kromy. They were instructed to make their way to Oryol from the south and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Western Fronts, defeat the enemy group on the Oryol bridgehead.

On the morning of July 12, powerful artillery and air preparation began in the offensive zone of the strike groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

The Nazis, after powerful artillery and air strikes, were initially unable to provide any serious resistance. As a result of two days of fierce fighting, the defenses of the 2nd Tank Army were broken through to a depth of 25 km. The fascist German command, in order to strengthen the army, began to hastily transfer units and formations here from other sectors of the front. This favored the transition of the troops of the Central Front to the offensive. On July 15, they attacked the enemy’s Oryol group from the south. Having broken the resistance of the Nazis, these troops in three days completely restored the position they occupied before the start of the defensive battle. Meanwhile, the 11th Army of the Western Front advanced south to 70 km. Its main forces were now located 15-20 km from the village of Khotynets. Above the enemy's most important communication line is the railway. There is a serious threat looming over the Orel-Bryansk highway. Hitler's command hastily began to pull additional forces to the breakthrough site. This somewhat slowed down the advance of Soviet troops. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, new forces were thrown into the battle. As a result, the pace of the offensive increased again.

The troops of the Bryansk Front successfully advanced towards Orel. The troops of the Central Front, advancing on Kromy, interacted with them. WITH ground forces aviation actively interacted.

The position of the Nazis on the Oryol bridgehead became more and more critical every day. Divisions transferred here from other sectors of the front also suffered heavy losses. The stability of soldiers in defense has sharply decreased. Facts became more and more frequent when commanders of regiments and divisions lost control of their troops.

At the height of the battle of Kursk, the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, and Oryol regions, according to a single plan “Rail War,” began a massive disabling of the railway. enemy communications. They also attacked enemy garrisons, convoys, and intercepted railways and highways.

Hitler's command, irritated by failures at the front, demanded that the troops hold their positions to the last man.

The fascist command failed to stabilize the front. The Nazis retreated. Soviet troops increased the force of their attacks and did not give respite either day or night. On July 29, the city of Bolkhov was liberated. On the night of August 4, Soviet troops broke into Orel. At dawn on August 5, Oryol was completely cleared of the enemy.

Following Orel, the cities of Kroma, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Karachaev, as well as hundreds of villages were liberated. By August 18, the Oryol bridgehead of the Nazis ceased to exist. During the 37 days of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops advanced westward up to 150 km.

On the southern front, another offensive operation was being prepared - the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, which received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow on its left wing. The task was to break through the enemy defenses and then develop an offensive with mobile formations in the general direction of Bogodukhov and Valki. Before the counter-offensive, the troops went through intense preparations day and night.

Early in the morning of August 3, artillery preparation for the attack began on both fronts. At 8 o'clock, following a general signal, the artillery shifted fire into the depths of the enemy's battle formations. Pressing against its barrage of fire, the tanks and infantry of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the attack.

On the Voronezh Front, the troops of the 5th Guards Army advanced up to 4 km by noon. They cut off the enemy's retreat to the west for his Belgorod group.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having broken the enemy's resistance, reached Belgorod and on the morning of August 5 began fighting for the city. On the same day, August 5, two ancient Russian cities were liberated - Orel and Belgorod.

The offensive breakthrough of the Soviet troops increased day by day. On August 7-8, the armies of the Voronezh Front captured the cities of Bogodukhov, Zolochev and the village of Cossack Lopan.

The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group was cut into two parts. The gap between them was 55 km. The enemy was transferring fresh forces here.

Fierce battles took place from August 11 to 17. By August 20, the enemy group was exsanguinated. The troops of the steppe front successfully attacked Kharkov. From August 18 to 22, the troops of the Steppe Front had to fight heavy battles. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, after stubborn fighting, Kharkov was liberated.

During the successful offensives of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, the tasks of the counteroffensive were completely completed. The general counteroffensive after the Battle of Kursk led to the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass, and the southeastern regions of Belarus. Italy soon left the war.

The Battle of Kursk lasted fifty days - one of greatest battles the second world war. It is divided into two periods. The first - the defensive battle of Soviet troops on the southern and northern fronts of the Kursk ledge - began on July 5. The second - a counteroffensive of five fronts (Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe) - began on July 12 in the Oryol direction and on August 3 in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended.

After the Battle of Kursk, the power and glory of Russian weapons increased. Its result was the insolvency and fragmentation of the Wehrmacht and in Germany’s satellite countries.

After the Battle of the Dnieper, the war entered its final stage.

In the summer of 1943, one of the most ambitious and important battles Great Patriotic War - Battle of Kursk. The fascists’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov literally said the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk salient seemed a particularly suitable place for such a strike. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."

The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, then new tanks were not delivered, then new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to the ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts of the Soviet army, will be difficult to resist; this numerical superiority will be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent "Werther"

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions about who “Werther” really was - some believe that Hitler’s personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) is the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of Stirlitz's prototypes. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “Leaders Soviet intelligence contacted the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that at all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles

- it seems that Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne they dictated the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle

"Kursk Bulge": T-34 tank against "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key point The Battle of Kursk is considered the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.

Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives detailed description disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka - important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned certain death hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”

It is no coincidence that Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded after the victory at Kursk - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.

One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.

On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation they defeated opposing forces Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. Painting “The Tale of a Real Man.” Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, it arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. At Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and long journey retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, greatness and resilience were demonstrated to the whole world Soviet soldier. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations about the correct choice of side in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...

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The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.

Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide, facing west, was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or salient). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.
For this purpose, a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”) was developed and approved in April 1943.
To carry it out, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones, as well as a large number of individual units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center, in the 4th 1st Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South.
The group of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft.
Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts included more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern front (the area facing the enemy) of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin– southern. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps (commander - Colonel General Ivan Konev).
The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

Progress of the battle
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorovsky field.
Up to 1 thousand 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Battle near Prokhorovka station in Belgorod region became largest battle Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge.
The staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was fought not by tanks, but by rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11 the Nazis were stopped at the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.
Tank units “Adolf Hitler”, “Totenkopf”, division “Reich” and others were able to decisive battle regroup your forces. The Soviet command did not know about this.
The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a notoriously difficult position: the strike group of tanks was located between the beams southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy to its full width tank group. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area limited on one side by the railway and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River.

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.
Ivan Markin first wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century.
In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went on the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces.
July 12 The next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counter-offensive of Soviet troops.
August 5 As a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Orel and Belgorod were liberated; in the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of this event for the first time during the war.
August 23 Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction and took an advantageous position for launching a general offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. The Soviet Army finally consolidated its strategic initiative; the German command was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front.
In one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, more than 4 million people took part on both sides, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.

Results of the battle
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued its advance to the West.
After the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
The fascists found themselves morally depressed, their confidence in their superiority disappeared.
The significance of the victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. It had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the fascist German command to withdraw large formations of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean theater of operations.
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of new formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and their advance to its central regions, which ultimately predetermined the country’s exit from the war. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change was completed not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For their exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 formations and units received the guards rank, more than 20 received the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov.
For its contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.
On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title Russian Federation- City of military glory.
In 1983, the feat of Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge was immortalized in Kursk - On May 9, a memorial to those killed during the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the Kursk Bulge memorial complex was opened.

The material was prepared according to TASS-Dossier data

Wounded Memory

Dedicated to Alexander Nikolaev,
the driver-mechanic of the T-34 tank, who carried out the first tank ramming in the battle of Prokhorovka.

The memory will not heal like a wound,
Let's not forget all the common soldiers,
That they entered this battle, dying,
And they remained alive forever.

No, not a step back, look straight ahead
Only the blood has drained from the face,
Only clenched teeth stubbornly -
We will stand here until the end!

Let any price be the life of a soldier,
We will all become armor today!
Your mother, your city, the honor of a soldier
Behind the boyish thin back.

Two steel avalanches - two forces
They merged among the fields of rye.
No you, no me - we are one,
We came together like a steel wall.

There are no maneuvers, no formation - there is strength,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And a fierce battle mowed down
Both armor and soldier names.

The tank is hit, the battalion commander is wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burn!
Shouting over the radio feat is equal to:
- All! Farewell! I'm going to ram!

Enemies are paralyzed, the choice is difficult -
You won't believe your eyes right away.
A burning tank flies without a miss -
He gave his life for his homeland.

Only the black funeral square
Will explain to mothers and relatives...
His heart is in the ground, like fragments...
He remained always young.

...On the burnt land there is not a blade of grass,
Tank on tank, armor on armor...
And there are wrinkles on the foreheads of the commanders -
The battle has nothing to compare with in war...
The earthly wound will not heal -
His feat is always with him.
Because he knew when he was dying
How easy it is to die young...

In the memorial temple it is quiet and sacred,
Your name is a scar on the wall...
You stayed to live here - yes, that’s how it should be,
So that the earth does not burn in fire.

On this land, once black,
The burning trail does not let you forget.
Your torn heart of a soldier
In spring it blooms with cornflowers...

Elena Mukhamedshina

A people who forgets their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, “fifteen sister republics” united by “Great Russia” inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of humanity - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be crushed on all fronts. The purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. From that time on, the fascists forgot what “forward to the East” meant.

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from the North Caucasus, Don, and Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of spring 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of the fighting in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a protrusion stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought calm to the front: no one was attacking, both sides were rapidly accumulating forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation for Nazi Germany

After the defeat of Stalingrad, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer longed to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation “Citadel”. The plan involved delivering attacks converging on Kursk (from the north - from the Orel region; from the south - from the Belgorod region). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts fell into the “cauldron”.

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this section of the front, including. 16 tank and motorized troops, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the leadership talent of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. He, together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future site of the battle, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy group.

Along the front line, the fascists were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General N. F. Vatutin) and the Central Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located behind the listed fronts. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group were carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the Moscow-Vladivostok distance. It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, deprive him of the initiative, making the task as easy as possible for the attackers. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, it was planned to carry out two offensive operations. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Orel. Second: “Commander Rumyantsev” to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place on the Soviet side “from defense.” For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two to three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. The day before, German sappers began making passages in minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the “tongues”: 03:00 07/05/1943.

The reaction was prompt and adequate: At 2-20 07/05/1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful artillery shelling by front-line artillery forces. This was an innovation in combat tactics. The invaders were fired upon by hundreds of Katyusha rockets, 600 guns, and 460 mortars. For the Nazis this was a complete surprise; they suffered losses.

Only at 4:30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5:30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

Start of the battle

Of course, our commanders could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, towards the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commander - General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the side of German troops was focused on the Voronezh Front, from the north. Two battalions moved against Nikolai Fedorovich’s troops heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, an assault gun division, one motorized division. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoye (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions within 24 hours they held back the advance of five enemy divisions.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for its martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between two strategies. What it looked like German offensive? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Following them were from fifty to a hundred medium Panther tanks, accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were reminiscent sea tides and low tides following each other.

We will follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tactics tank battle. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel General Hermann Hoth; he “jewellerly,” if one can say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of work The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I.M. Chistyakov) had a gun density per km of 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, whose commander was the most gifted Wehrmacht strategist, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which, in fact, he was dismissed in 1944).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P. A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A. S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Leibstandarte” changed the direction of attack to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle on the German side, 850 on ours. Impressive and scary picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was so loud that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, which caused the towers to collapse. When approaching the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire at the tanks, causing the tanks to burst into flames. The tankers seemed to be in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat or hide.

Of course, it was unwise to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses of one in five, what would they have been like during the offensive?!). At the same time, Soviet soldiers showed real heroism on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded high rank Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the day of its end - August 23 - is celebrated annually by residents of the country like Russia.

August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was not at all predetermined. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.

Fact 1

The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation it would be to exhaust the enemy on their defense, destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.

In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy Soviet armies on the Kursk ledge. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.