The significance of the Battle of Kursk in the Second World War. Battle of Kursk and tank battle for Prokhorovka

After the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the following year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

Background to the Battle of Kursk

During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate very large territories. Thus, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached approximately 200 kilometers in width and 100-150 in depth.

Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a series of energetic actions in the Kharkov area. Very quickly, a strike force was created, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and attempted to cut off the ledge in the Kursk area. However, here the German advance was stopped.

As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically flat along its entire length, and only in the Kursk area did it bend, forming a large ledge jutting into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.

Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk

In the spring, heated debate broke out among the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Some of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from an offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.

Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.

The meaning of the operation, called “Citadel,” was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their attack in the general direction of Kursk. The Soviet troops located in the bulge would inevitably be surrounded and destroyed. After this, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap created in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk ledge.

The Soviet leadership learned important lessons in the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to defeat near Kharkov. After this, it was decided not to begin the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed most to this.

That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

To attack Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, numbering 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe air fleets. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groupings on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), leadership was exercised by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.

The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern by troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.

Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 – 12 July 1943)

On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-preparation, which made it possible to inflict serious losses in the first minutes and hours of the battle and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.

However, the German offensive began and achieved some successes in the early days. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, unable to break through the Soviet defenses, they turned towards the village of Ponyri. However, here too the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of action. On July 10, army units went on the defensive.

The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here, in the first days, the German army managed to wedge itself into the Soviet defenses, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.

After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the attack to Prokhorovka. Implementing this decision would make it possible to cover a larger area than planned. However, here units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.

On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, approximately 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the situation at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.

By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire length of the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme High Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.

Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.

To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).

As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops who liberated the cities from the enemy.

The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city became very fierce, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses of the parties

Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more unclear are the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.

Thus, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. Moreover, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Armored vehicle losses range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Soviet aviation losses are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.

However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at approximately 420 thousand. The losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.

Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk

Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.

Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops sought to hold at least the Dnieper line.

For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was a higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.

For the German command, the battle of Kursk became the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.

The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which vast territories were liberated by the end of 1943 Soviet Union, including such major cities, like Kyiv and Smolensk.

Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk became the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis took heart. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.

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Battle of Kursk
	Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine
	Victory of the Red Army
Commanders
Georgy Zhukov	Erich von Manstein
Nikolay Vatutin	Gunther Hans von Kluge
Ivan Konev	Walter Model
Konstantin Rokossovsky	Hermann Got
Strengths of the parties
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3,444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2,172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve	According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, according to it. according to data - 780 thousand people. 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317,361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71,611 Hospital - 183,955 General in the battle for the Kursk ledge: Irrevocable - 189,652 Hospital - 406,743 In the Battle of Kursk as a whole ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded, sick 153 thousand small arms 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5245 guns and mortars 1626 combat aircraft	According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data, less than 1696 aircraft

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences is one of key battles The Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During winter offensive The Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine formed a protrusion in the center of the Soviet-German front with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the western side (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”). During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: 2nd tank corps The SS turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, 24th Tank Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.

To carry out the operation, several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk area:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)

The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source	Personnel (thousands)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
						about 10000	2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and long-range)
Krivosheev 2001
Glanz, House				2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson			5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G. K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

Although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan had already become obvious to the highest Soviet military command four days earlier, and the general details of the existence of such a plan had been known to them for at least another year. eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th air armies(more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) to the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the Korocha and Oboyan areas.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were carried out by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the Army Group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10 tank brigade and 911 dept. assault gun division, supported by 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Infantry Division), change units of the 2nd SS Division Tank Division, after which the units of the SS division were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards SD (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards SD (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of a military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing enormous armored forces, the VG division for a long time actually could not bring them into battle.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Corps became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5th was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45 mm guns, the power of 76 mm Soviet field and American tanks s guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times shorter than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6 Guards. And, but also in M.E. Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, without having large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 saps) were held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Grouse.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . There was practically no general leadership of the withdrawing battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards SD and the 5th Guards Division coming from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. Transient, but fierce battle flared up for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of restraining its advance: the main forces of the army’s anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade brigades) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Tank, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A . D. Getman) 1 TA.

However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Offensive TD "Death's Head" significant development during July 6 did not receive due to the stubborn resistance of the 375th Infantry Division units, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards carried out in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 Tank Tank, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) oncoming tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th took part in the battle. tank army P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three batteries of the SAP, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd Grp:

During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level of commander losses in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company commander (100%) and battalion commander (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:

... Heavy images remained in my memory... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. Shots into the gas tanks instantly set the tanks on fire. The hatches opened and the tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burned, hanging from his armor. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you’re alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a knocked out German “tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the tank company commander Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out an enemy Tiger, but was also hit. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And we went into battle again

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge back to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; in the opinion of the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Totenkopf” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrecoverable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

According to Guderian,

Discrepancies in loss estimates

The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (film epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• “Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) — documentary, produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
• “Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
• Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton

Dates of the Battle of Kursk: 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War had 3 significant events:

• Liberation of Stalingrad;
• Battle of Kursk;
• Capture of Berlin.

Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.

Battle for Kursk. The situation before the battle

Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated a small success, managing to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut deep into German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called “Citadel”.

Strengths of the parties

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (against 900 thousand for the enemy), the number of tanks was 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans), guns were 20,000 (10,000), and aircraft were 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger (Panther) tanks, self-propelled units(self-propelled guns) "Ferdinand", by Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. Innovations on the Soviet side were the St. John's wort cannon (57 mm), capable of penetrating the armor of the Tiger, and anti-tank mines, which caused significant damage to them.

Plans of the parties

The Germans decided to launch a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided to first defend itself, launching counterattacks, and when the enemy was weakened and exhausted, go on the offensive.

Defense

We managed to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 05/06/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00 the enemy’s guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting intense pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified their attack on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans attempted to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second one held out. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200mm frontal armor became impenetrable to Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held due to anti-tank mines and powerful raids by Soviet aviation.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks faced 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost versus 80 for the enemy. Average tanks The T-34 had difficulty resisting the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive

While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repelling enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went on the attack. For three days (12-14), leading heavy fighting, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.

BATOV Pavel Ivanovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 65th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Higher Officer Courses "Vystrel" in 1927, and the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.

Participant in the First World War since 1916. Awarded for distinction in battles

2 St. George's crosses and 2 medals.

In 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936 he successively commanded a company, battalion, and rifle regiment. In 1936-1937 he fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain. Upon return, commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he took part in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, deputy commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, commander of the special rifle corps in Crimea, deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (from August 1941), commander of the 3rd Army (January-February 1942), assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February -October 1942). From October 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 65th Army, participating in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The troops under the command of P.I. Batov distinguished themselves in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted about 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For personal courage and courage, for organizing clear interaction between subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P. I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for crossing the river. Oder and the capture of Stettin (the German name of the Polish city of Szczecin) was awarded the second “Golden Star”.

After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1962-1965, Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. Since 1965, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee.

Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Orders of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, “Badge of Honor”, ​​Weapon of Honor, foreign orders, medals.

VATUTIN Nikolay Fedorovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). In the Battle of Kursk he took part as commander of the Voronezh Front.

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kyiv Higher United military school in 1924, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1929, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937

Participant in the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, and worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941 was the chief of staff of the division, head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District, deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff.

From June 30, 1941, Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943, he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (from October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, while leaving for the troops, he was seriously wounded and died on April 15. Buried in Kyiv.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st degree, Kutuzov 1st degree, and the Czechoslovakian Order.

ZHADOV Alexey Semenovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 5th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, and the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950

Participant in the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against the Denikinites. From October 1920, as a platoon commander of a cavalry regiment of the 11th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army, he participated in battles with Wrangel’s troops, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia, was seriously wounded. Since 1925, commander of a training platoon, then commander and political instructor of the squadron, chief of staff of the regiment, chief of the operational unit of the division headquarters, chief of staff of the corps, assistant cavalry inspector in the Red Army. Since 1940, commander of the mountain cavalry division.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (from June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central and then Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the Battle of Moscow, and in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th Cavalry Corps on the Bryansk Front.

Since October 1942, commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. Since April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army.

Under the leadership of A. S. Zhadov, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations.

Army troops were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for successful military operations. For his skillful command and control of troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and bravery shown, A. S. Zhadov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). Since September 1964 - First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Died in 1977

KATUKOV Mikhail Efimovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 1st Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1927, the academic advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army in 1935, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951.

Participant of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

IN Civil War fought as a private on the Southern Front.

From 1922 to 1940, he successively commanded a platoon, a company, was the head of a regimental school, commander of a training battalion, chief of staff of a brigade, and commander of a tank brigade. Since November 1940, commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he took part in defensive operations in the area. Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten.

On November 11, 1941, for brave and skillful military actions, M. E. Katukov’s brigade was the first in the tank forces to receive the rank of guards.

In 1942, M.E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which repelled the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, and then the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

In January 1943, he was appointed commander of the 1st Tank Army, which, as part of the Voronezh and later the 1st Ukrainian Front, distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk and during the liberation of Ukraine.

In June 1944, the army was transformed into a guards army. She participated in the Lviv-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

In the post-war years, M.E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1963 - military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, Kutuzov 2nd degree, Order of the Red Star, “For service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR » 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

KONEV Ivan Stepanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Steppe Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1926, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1934

First world war was drafted into the army and sent to the Southwestern Front. Having been demobilized from the army in 1918, he took part in the establishment of Soviet power in the city of Nikolsk (Vologda region), where he was elected a member of the Nikolsky district executive committee and appointed district military commissar.

During the Civil War, he was a commissar of an armored train, then a rifle brigade, a division, and the headquarters of the people's revolutionary army of the Far Eastern Republic. Fought on the Eastern Front.

After the Civil War - military commissar of the 17th Primorsky Rifle Corps, 17th Rifle Division. After completing advanced training courses for senior commanders, he was appointed regiment commander. Later he was an assistant division commander in 1931-1932. and 1935-1937, commanded a rifle division, corps and the 2nd Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

In 1940-1941 - commanded the troops of the Transbaikal and North Caucasus military districts.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front. Then he successively commanded the Western, Kalinin, Northwestern, Steppe and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

In the Battle of Kursk, troops under the command of I. S. Konev successfully acted during the counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

After the war, he held the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the participating states Warsaw Pact, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1970), Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (1971).

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory" and the Weapon of Honor.

MALINOVSKY Rodion Yakovlevich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Southwestern Front.

In the Red Army since 1919

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

Since 1914 he participated as a private in the First World War. Awarded the St. George Cross, 4th degree.

In February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon returning to Russia, he voluntarily joined the Red Army in 1919.

During the Civil War he took part in battles as part of the 27th Infantry Division of the Eastern Front.

In December 1920, he was the commander of a machine-gun platoon, then the head of a machine-gun team, assistant commander, and battalion commander.

Since 1930, he was chief of staff of the cavalry regiment of the 10th Cavalry Division, then served in the headquarters of the North Caucasus and Belarusian military districts, and was chief of staff of the 3rd Cavalry Corps.

In 1937-1938 Volunteered in the Spanish Civil War and was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Red Banner for combat.

Since 1939, teacher at the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze. Since March 1941, commander of the 48th Rifle Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 6th, 66th, 2nd Guards, 5th Shock and 51st Armies, the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd Ukrainian, 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. He took part in the Battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, Zaporozhye, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirev, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Budapest, and Vienna operations.

Since July 1945, commander of the Transbaikal Front, which delivered the main blow in the Manchurian strategic operation. For high military leadership, courage and bravery, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District, was the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East, and the commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Since March 1956, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR has been the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

Since October 1957, Minister of Defense of the USSR. He remained in this position until the end of his life.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory".

POPOV Markian Mikhailovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Bryansk Front.

Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya (now the town of Serafimovich, Volgograd region).

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the infantry command courses in 1922, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1925, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze.

He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as a private.

Since 1922, platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and head of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. From May 1936, chief of staff of the mechanized brigade, then the 5th mechanized corps. From June 1938, deputy commander, from September, chief of staff, from July 1939, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and from January 1941, commander of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the Northern and Leningrad fronts (June - September 1941), the 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. Successfully commanded the 5th Shock Army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and the troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June-October 1943), Baltic and 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war, chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, and then again the Leningrad fronts.

He participated in the planning of operations and successfully led troops in the battles near Leningrad and Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.

In the post-war period, commander of the troops of the Lvov (1945-1946), Tauride (1946-1954) military districts. From January 1955, Deputy Chief and then Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, and from August 1956, Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals, as well as foreign orders.

ROKOSSOVSKY Konstantin Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Central Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, and advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929

In the army since 1914. Participant in the First World War. He fought in the 5th Dragoon Kargopol Regiment, as a private and junior non-commissioned officer.

After October Revolution 1917 fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal courage and courage he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. For military distinctions at the Chinese Eastern Railway he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

From 1930 he commanded the 7th, then the 15th cavalry divisions, from 1936 - 5th Cavalry, from November 1940 - 9th Mechanized Corps.

From July 1941 he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the Bryansk, from September the Don, from February 1943 the Central, from October 1943 the Belorussian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky took part in the Battle of Smolensk (1941), the Battle of Moscow, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Belorussian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations.

After the war, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet government, he went to the People's Republic of Poland, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. He was awarded the rank of Marshal of Poland.

Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector has been the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962. Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1962, chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory". Awarded the Arms of Honor.

ROMANENKO Prokofy Logvinovich

Colonel General. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 2nd Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1933, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948

On military service since 1914. Participant of the First World War, ensign. Awarded 4 St. George Crosses.

After the October Revolution of 1917 he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then during the Civil War he commanded partisan detachment, fought on the Southern and Western fronts as a squadron and regiment commander and assistant commander of a cavalry brigade.

After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, and from 1937 a mechanized brigade. Participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Since 1938, commander of the 7th Mechanized Corps, participant in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940). From May 1940, commander of the 34th Rifle Corps, then the 1st Mechanized Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front. From May 1942, commander of the 3rd Tank Army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944, commander of the 5th, 2nd Tank Armies, 48th army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and in the Belarusian operation.

In 1945-1947 Commander of the East Siberian Military District.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, foreign order.

ROTMISTROV Pavel Alekseevich

Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

Graduated from the Military United School named after. All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff.

During the Civil War he commanded a platoon, company, battery, and was deputy battalion commander.

From 1931 to 1937 he worked at division and army headquarters and commanded a rifle regiment.

Since 1938, teacher at the Department of Tactics at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of a tank battalion and chief of staff of the 35th Tank Brigade.

From December 1940, deputy commander of the 5th Tank Division, and from May 1941, chief of staff of the mechanized corps.

During the Great Patriotic War he fought on the Western, Northwestern, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

Participated in the battle of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, as well as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Uman-Botoshan, Korsun-Shevchenkovsk, and Belarusian operations.

After the war, commander of armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, then the Far East. Deputy Chief, then Head of the Department of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, Suvorov 2nd degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

RYBALKO Pavel Semenovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Born on November 4, 1894 in the village of Maly Istorop (Lebedinsky district, Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine).

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1926 and 1930, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1934

Member of the First World War, private.

During the Civil War, regimental and brigade commissar, squadron commander, cavalry regiment and brigade commander.

After graduating from the academy, he was sent as an assistant commander of a mountain cavalry division, then as a military attache to Poland and China.

During the Great Patriotic War, deputy commander of the 5th Tank Army, later commanded the 5th, 3rd, 3rd Guards Tank Armies in the Bryansk, Southwestern, Central, Voronezh, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

Participated in the Battle of Kursk, in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk, Kharkov, Kyiv, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Lvov-Sandomierz, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.

For successful military operations of the troops commanded by P. S. Rybalko

22 times noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, first deputy commander and then commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Soviet Army.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

SOKOLOVSKY Vasily Danilovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Western Front.

Born on July 21, 1897 in the village of Kozliki, Bialystok district (Grodno region, Republic of Belarus).

In the Red Army since 1918

Graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1921, Higher Academic Courses in 1928.

During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern, Southern and Caucasian fronts. He held the positions of company commander, regiment adjutant, assistant regiment commander, regiment commander, senior assistant chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Division, brigade commander, chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.

In 1921, assistant to the head of the operational department of the Turkestan Front, then chief of staff of the division, division commander. Commanded the Group of Forces of the Fergana and Samarkand regions.

In 1922 - 1930 chief of staff of a rifle division, rifle corps.

In 1930 - 1935 commander of a rifle division, then chief of staff of the Volga Military District.

Since May 1935, chief of staff of the Ural, since April 1938, of the Moscow military districts. Since February 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

During the Great Patriotic War, he held the positions of chief of staff of the Western Front, chief of staff of the western direction, commander of the troops of the Western Front, chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

For his skillful leadership of the military operations of troops in the Berlin operation, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he served as deputy commander-in-chief, then commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, chief of the General Staff - first deputy minister of war.

Awarded 8 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 3 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals, Weapons of Honor.

CHERNYAKHOVSKY Ivan Danilovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 60th Army.

In the Red Army since 1924

He graduated from the Kyiv Artillery School in 1928, and the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936.

From 1928 to 1931, he served as platoon commander, head of the regiment's topographic detachment, assistant battery commander for political affairs, and commander of a reconnaissance training battery.

Upon graduation from the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of a battalion, then commander of a tank battalion, tank regiment, deputy division commander, and commander of a tank division.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded a tank corps and the 60th Army on the Voronezh, Central and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky distinguished themselves in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the Battle of Kursk, and during the crossing of the river. Desna and Dnieper. Later they participated in the Kyiv, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Rivne-Lutsk, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Vilnius, Kaunas, Memel, and East Prussian operations.

For successful military operations during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by I. D. Chernyakhovsky were noted 34 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Near the city of Melzak he was mortally wounded and died on February 18, 1945. He was buried in Vilnius.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree and medals.

CHIBISOV Nikandr Evlampievich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 38th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1935

During the First World War he fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. Commanded a company.

During the Civil War, he took part in battles on the Karelian Isthmus, near Narva, Pskov, and in Belarus.

He was a platoon, company, battalion, regiment commander, assistant chief of staff and chief of staff of a rifle brigade. From 1922 to 1937 in staff and command positions. Since 1937, commander of a rifle division, since 1938 - a rifle corps, in 1938-1940. Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Chief of Staff of the 7th Army.

Since July 1940, deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, and since January 1941, deputy commander of the Odessa Military District.

Troops under the command of N. E. Chibisov took part in the Voronezh-Kastornensky, Kharkov, Belgorod-Kharkov, Kyiv, Leningrad-Novgorod operations.

For skillful leadership of army troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, courage and heroism, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Since June 1944, he served as head of the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze, from March 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee, and from October 1949 - Assistant Commander of the Belarusian Military District.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov 1st degree and medals.

SHLEMIN Ivan Timofeevich

Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 6th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1925, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932

Member of the First World War. During the Civil War, he participated as a platoon commander in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. From 1925 he was the chief of staff of a rifle regiment, then the chief of an operational unit and the chief of staff of a division, and from 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (from 1935 the General Staff).

Since 1936, commander of a rifle regiment, since 1937, head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940, chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position he entered the Great Patriotic War.

From May 1942, chief of staff of the North-Western Front, then of the 1st Guards Army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th Tank, 12th, 6th, 46th Armies on the Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.

Troops under the command of I. T. Shlemin took part in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirev, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen and Budapest operations. For successful actions they were noted 15 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For skillful command and control of troops and the heroism and courage demonstrated, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Great Patriotic War, he was the chief of staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and from April 1948, the deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces - the head of the operational department, and from June 1949, the chief of staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962. senior lecturer and deputy head of the department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1962 in reserve.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, medals.

SHUMILOV Mikhail Stepanovich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 7th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the courses for command and political personnel in 1924, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1929, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, the Chuguev Military School in 1916.

Member of the First World War, ensign. During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts, commanding a platoon, company, and regiment. After the war, the commander of the regiment, then the division and corps, took part in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle corps, deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 64th Army (transformed in March 1943 into the 7th Guards Army), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Steppe, and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

Troops under the command of M. S. Shumilov took part in the defense of Leningrad, in battles in the Kharkov region, heroically fought at Stalingrad and together with the 62nd Army in the city itself, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles of Kursk and the Dnieper, in Kirovograd , Uman-Botoshan, Iasi-Chisinau, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnov operations.

For excellent military operations, the army troops were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the White Sea (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) military districts.

In 1956-1958 retired. Since 1958, military consultant to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .

BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic group of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over a vast area from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined military power Germany. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they pinned their hopes on regaining the lost strategic initiative and turning the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Supreme Command Headquarters revised the method of planned actions. The reason for this was Soviet intelligence data that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on a counter-offensive and defeat his striking forces. A rare case in the history of wars occurred when the stronger side, possessing the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to begin hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM A. VASILEVSKY’S MEMORIES ABOUT STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943.

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge using the latest tank equipment on a massive scale, and then establish the time of the enemy’s transition to the offensive.

Naturally, in the current conditions, when it was quite obvious that the enemy would strike with large forces, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command found itself faced with a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if to defend, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data about the nature of the enemy's upcoming actions and his preparations for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and Headquarters were increasingly inclined to the idea of ​​​​transitioning to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov at the end of March - beginning of April. The most specific conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk salient, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, which noted: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. Better. It will happen if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.”

I had to be there when he received G.K. Zhukov’s report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without expressing his opinion, said: “We must consult with the front commanders.” Having given the General Staff an order to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging them to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked them to submit their views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts(…)

At a meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After making a preliminary decision to deliberately defend and subsequently go on a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations for the upcoming actions began. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became aware of the precise timing of the start of the enemy offensive, which was postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose was clearly emerging, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not by other command authorities (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk. M.: Nauka, 1970. P.66-83.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of Headquarters. He had to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side included 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into two strike groups intended for an offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy’s plans was given to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, as well as new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

ADDRESS BY THE FÜHRER TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION CITADEL, no later than July 4, 1943.

Today you are beginning a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will become stronger than before. In addition, the new brutal defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory, no matter what, will disappear.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible masses of people have become so thin in the two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and the oldest. Our infantry, as always, is as superior to the Russian as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tank crews, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning should shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything may depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. Ultimately, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult any particular battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly united, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly in the name of victory; they look with ardent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF HITLER

This order is subject to destruction at division headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation “Zitadelle”. Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

Since the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command had been working on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, based on army intelligence data, it became clear to the leadership of the Red Army that the Wehrmacht command itself was planning to carry out an attack under the base of the Kursk ledge, with the aim of encircling our troops located there.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to launch attacks in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents to such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a major battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The Wehrmacht strategy for the summer of 1943, according to generals such as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to become exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.

However, the bulk of German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation, codenamed "Citadel", was set for July 5, and German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the combat qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and installing an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, the Wehrmacht strike forces in the area of ​​the Kursk salient at the beginning of the offensive included about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. The strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein, which included General Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, were concentrated on the southern wing of the salient. The troops of von Kluge's Army Group Center operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Hoth and Kemph had approximately twice as many tanks as Model.

The Supreme Command headquarters decided not to go first on the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, bringing fresh reserves into action, go on a counteroffensive. I must say that this was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the high Soviet command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that the pre-prepared German offensive fizzled out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to rush into launching an offensive. A deeply layered defense was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as an anti-tank weapon. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions respectively in the northern and southern sections of the Kursk ledge, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and enter the battle at the moment the Red Army went on a counteroffensive.

The country's military factories worked uninterruptedly to produce tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional “thirty-fours” and powerful SU-152 self-propelled guns. The latter could already fight with great success against the Tigers and Panthers.

The organization of Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of ​​deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive lines were erected. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. The Don has prepared a state line of defense. The total depth of the area's engineering equipment reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in men and equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts had about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had at their disposal up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us versus about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the start date for Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy attack was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time were German troops able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past five in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops with a ramming attack and reaching Kursk. In the Central Front, the main enemy attack was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the Central Front troops launched a counterattack against the advancing group with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies and the 19th Tank Corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command on both the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and the guns of tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in minefields were well covered by artillery fire. Bye German tank crews they were waiting for the sappers combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to maintain air supremacy. More and more often, Soviet attack aircraft - the famous Il-2 - appeared over the battlefield.

In the first day of fighting alone, Model’s group, operating on the northern flank of the Kursk salient, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of German “Tigers” advancing against the forces of the Central Front destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period July 5-6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the shock units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The outcome of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike group was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations “Grossdeutschland”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army Hoth and the “Kempf” group managed to wedge into the Soviet defense up to 20 and more than km. The offensive initially went in the direction settlement Oboyan, but then, due to strong opposition from the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South, von Manstein, decided to strike further east - in the direction of Prokhorovka. It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO HUNDRED TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is largely a collective concept. The fate of the warring parties was not decided in one day and not on one field. The theater of operations for Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of ​​more than 100 square meters. km. And yet, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Battle of Kursk, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer from the Steppe Front to the aid of the troops of the Voronezh Front the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the wedged enemy tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. The need was emphasized for attempting to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Concentrating in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks launched an attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the combat qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many “thirty-fours” while approaching their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German tanks almost armor to armor. But this is precisely what the command of the 5th Guards Army sought. Moreover, soon the enemy battle formations were so mixed up that the “tigers” and “panthers” began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal armor, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat striking power. But German losses did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction: the Germans only had up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Tank Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing their last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably greater. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to introduce the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps - on the southern wing of the Kursk salient. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received orders on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tank crews no longer had to participate in the new oncoming battle. German units began to gradually retreat from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

Back on July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. That day, he ordered Operation Citadel to continue and not reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success at Kursk, it seemed, was just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the Bryansk troops went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and left wing of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and began to crack at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern flank of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to continuing attacks on the southern flank of the Kursk salient (although this was no longer possible on the northern flank of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command ground forces Germany ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12 - 15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge, they began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). The fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were delivered not against the weak, but against the strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to reduce the preparation time for offensive actions as much as possible, and to take the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a strong defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups on narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, and the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, Red Army units had pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. The losses of Soviet troops were even greater: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. She had at her disposal incomparably more fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The Red Army's offensive, after bringing new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. In the central sector of the front, troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv area. Having immediately captured several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag flew over Kyiv.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more complicated. Thus, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to deliver a powerful counterattack in the area of ​​Fastov and Zhitomir against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the advance of the Red Army on the territory of right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, Soviet troops reached areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev by November 1943. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk Fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken a tough defensive position, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to the formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened already in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, victories at Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical change in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht's offensive strategy suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of military and military awards - the Order of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already occurred.