Pulsating is the first reactive. Pulsating - the first jet engine projectile aircraft V-1

About the creation and features of the V-1 cruise missile. But at the beginning, an episode of an explosion that occurred in the area of the British capital of a plane, which occurred on the night of June 13, 1944, is mentioned. The results of an inspection of the area showed that the pilot was absent from the aircraft. It was at this moment that the British discovered a new means of air attack created by the Germans (we are talking about the V-1 cruise missile).

“The first projects of long-range guided missiles equipped with wings were proposed back in the First World War. During the interwar period, development work on cruise missiles with liquid propellant engines was carried out in many countries, including the Soviet Union and Germany. The fact that the Third Reich was the first to use new weapons is fully explained by the funds that were invested in the project, as well as traditional high level development of German industry.
The leadership of the German Air Force became interested in projectile aircraft in 1939. The initiation of their development was a kind of response from G. Goering’s department to the “army” project of the A-4 ballistic missile, which later became widely known under the name V-2. In the middle of the summer of 1941, the Argus and Fieseler companies proposed a design for a cruise missile with an estimated flight range of about 250 km, which was based on the ideas of an unmanned aircraft by F. Gosslau and an extremely simple pulsating air-breathing engine by P. Schmidt, powered by cheap fuel. The occupation of northern France made it possible to fire similar shells at London and many other cities in England.

In January 1942, the project, called for secrecy purposes FZG-76 (flying target for training air defense combat crews), was presented to the leadership of the Ministry of Aviation, and in July it was reported to the head of the technical service of the Luftwaffe, Field Marshal Milch. Simplicity and low cost ensured the project "top priority" status. It was decided to accept the “target” into service no later than December 1943.

Already in April 1942, Robert Lusser, who was involved in various tasks on self-propelled aerial bombs at the Fieseler plant in Kassel, was introduced to plans for the development of a cruise missile. Knowing this, the project coordinator, staff engineer Bree from the Ministry of Aviation, approved the Fieseler company as the main developer. Ascania was chosen as the supplier of the control system. Lusser recruited teams from DFS, Henschel and Schwartz, which carried out work in related fields in 1930-1937.

This made it possible in December 1942 to test a prototype in a gliding flight after being dropped from an FW-200 Condor aircraft. And just a few days later, the FZG-76 prototype made its first flight over a distance of 2.7 km with the engine running. After 50 launches, the main characteristics of the cruise missile were determined: range - 240 km, speed - 550-600 km/h, flight altitude - 200 - 2000 m, warhead weight - 700 kg. At the same time, the missile’s capabilities to overcome British air defense. We carried out several training interceptions of the new aircraft using a captured Spitfire Mk.V fighter. This, by the way, led to an underestimation of the enemy’s forces, since the speeds of subsequent modifications of the British Spitfire and Tempest interceptors were much higher.

In May 1943, an authoritative commission at the Peenemünde training ground heard the comparative characteristics of the FZG-76 and the V-2 ballistic missile (V-2). The show took place and practical shooting. The launch of two V-2s was quite successful, and both launches of the FZG-76 ended in an explosion a few seconds after launch. However, the missile launches looked so impressive that even these accidents did not shake the confidence of the German leadership in the new weapon. The commission decided to speed up serial production as much as possible and recommended using both types of missiles in combination. The cruise missile was named Fi-103, but became better known under the unofficial name V-1. The "V" (German "Vau") stood for Vergeltungswaffe, "weapon of vengeance." The Goebbels apparatus announced that it was intended for “retaliation strikes” for the barbaric destruction of Lubeck and Hamburg by American-British aircraft.

A program for the production of projectile aircraft was developed from August 1943 to July 1944, which provided for the production of 24.5 thousand V-1s, with monthly assembly reaching 5,000 units by May 1944. But the Ministry of Armaments was unable to ensure such a pace of work. After all, just for the monthly production of 3 thousand V-1s, the chemical industry required 2 thousand tons of low-octane gasoline and 4.5 thousand tons of explosives. The situation was no better with other required materials and semi-finished products. In addition, in September 1943 alone, more than 150 additions and changes to the project were made.”

“Despite this, in the spring of 1943 the accelerated formation of missile units. At the Zinntowitz test site (Usedom island) the 155th anti-aircraft regiment was formed under the command of Colonel M. Wachtel. The name “anti-aircraft” and the encrypted names of the commander “Michael Wagner” and “Martin Wolf” were given for reasons of secrecy. The regiment consisted of four divisions, including four fire batteries and two auxiliary batteries (service and supply).

It is also emphasized how a number of other countries sought to obtain as much data as possible about German developments of these weapons. Thus, British intelligence has been trying to obtain relevant information since October 1939. However, “the information was scanty and scattered, but it led to the conclusion that work on huge ballistic and cruise missiles is literally in full swing in Germany.” destructive force. Tests are being carried out at a mysterious test site somewhere in the North Sea, launch sites are being prepared on the English Channel coast, and mass production is already underway at factories.”

The amount of incoming information gradually increased. “This was reported by Resistance groups from Poland and France, captured generals Gruvel and Tom, anti-fascist engineer Hans Kummerow, who worked at the Berlin Higher Technical School. On May 15, 1942, a Spitfire photo reconnaissance aircraft took the first photograph of the training ground and airfield at Peenemünde. Since then, the island of Usedom has not escaped the close attention of British intelligence.

The painstaking work of the scouts was embodied on August 17, 1943 in Operation Hydra - a strike on Peenemünde. To disorient the Luftwaffe, eight Mosquitoes, dropping aluminum foil over the training ground, which “blinded” the air defense radars, rushed towards Berlin. Following them, 597 heavy bombers took off, flying only to the “mysterious island.” Having discovered a huge concentration of aircraft over the Baltic, and having traced the path of eight Mosquitoes, the Germans decided that a massive raid on the capital was expected.

When the Mosquitoes reached Berlin and dropped illumination and marking bombs, the German command gave the order to scramble 160 night fighters and an additional 55 day fighters. In the confusion, they attacked their own night interceptors, then anti-aircraft artillery joined. For two hours there was an “air battle” over Berlin without the participation of enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, almost 1,600 tons of high-explosive bombs and more than 280 tons of incendiary bombs fell on Peenemünde. The raid killed 732 people. 50 of the 80 buildings of the landfill and 18 of 39 barracks for workers, a power plant and a plant where 20-40 liquid oxygen were produced were destroyed. The British lost 42 aircraft.

Meanwhile, aerial photographic reconnaissance of the English Channel coast brought more and more interesting information. In two days, from November 8 to 10, the number of starting positions increased from 19 to 26, and two weeks later there were already 95. Comparing several images of the Peenemünde training ground, one of the cryptographers discovered the same positions, but equipped with rail guides. On them stood a small airplane without a cockpit with a straight short wing, which was given the name Peenemünde-20 by British intelligence.

Almost a year before the missile attack began, it became clear that of the two types of new weapons - ballistic missiles and "flying bombs" - the latter would pose the greatest danger. Captured German pilots from the KG-100 squadron, which was armed with He-111 bombers, said that they experimented with launching winged projectiles. And the report received by the head of the scientific and technical intelligence department of the Ministry of Aviation noted that this type of weapon would be the first to be used.

The British command decided to thwart the enemy's plans by bombing factories manufacturing unmanned aircraft and launchers. On December 5, 1943, American and British planes began bombing launch sites and warehouses of V-1 rockets. Within six months, 36 out of 52 launch sites were completely destroyed, and 88 out of 96 aircraft-shell depots. In total, allied bombers flew more than 25 thousand sorties to missile sites located near the coast.

But even after this the British could not breathe easy, because German game The cat-and-mouse game had them throwing bombs into the sand. The Germans devoted all their efforts to the construction of small concrete platforms. By June 1944, reconnaissance had already discovered 69 such objects. Little did British intelligence analysts realize that it would take just 48 hours to install a 6-metre section of prefabricated structure with guide rails.

In December 1943, the English air defense command received orders to develop a plan for defense against the V-1. It was necessary to reorganize the existing air defense system, which during the “Battle of Britain” covered London and the industrial cities of central England. The situation was quite difficult: after all, only Tempests and Spitfires XIV could successfully fight the V-1. And even then, all unnecessary equipment was removed from them, the protective paint was washed off and the casing was polished to a shine. Only in this situation, with an increase in speed by 35-50 km/h, did they become a truly formidable enemy for cruise missiles.

On June 6, 1944 (a few hours after the Allied landing in Northern France), the radio operator of the 155th “anti-aircraft” regiment of projectile aircraft received an encrypted ciphergram. The headquarters of the 65th Army Corps ordered Colonel Wachtel to bring his regiment to combat readiness. On June 10, the first train carrying 90 V-1 aircraft passed through Ghent to the forward depots. Wachtel intended to postpone the missile launches until the 20th. He reported that he was short of fuel and many supplies, and prefabricated launchers were not fully prepared. But the command did not pay any attention to the report and gave the order to launch strikes on London on the night of June 13.

In total, during the period of systematic shelling of London, from June 13 to September 5, 9,017 missiles were fired at the English capital, but some of the launches were unsuccessful. About 2 thousand V-1s exploded shortly after launch or on the flight path to the target. At the beginning, the effectiveness of the application was very high. 82% of V-1s exploded within London during the first week of launches, but by the end of the month this number had dropped to 60%.

To make it more difficult to fight the new weapon, the Germans alternated between massive salvos from all installations and single harassing launches during one “launch” day. Few people know, but the flight altitude of cruise missiles, equal to 900-1000 m, was not chosen by chance. The missiles were fired below the engagement line of heavy artillery and above the effective fire zone of small-caliber artillery. At this altitude, the small-sized cruise missile was poorly detected by radars and was a difficult target for automatic and manual aiming of anti-aircraft guns and fire control devices.

It also required great skill and considerable courage from fighter pilots to destroy a small target, often in bad weather conditions. It had to be hit from behind and from above from a distance of more than 100 m, since the detonation of 800 kg of explosives posed a mortal threat to the attacking aircraft.

All this gave rise to unusual ways of dealing with projectile aircraft. One of French officers As part of the Royal Air Force, Captain Jean-Marie Maridor brought his Tempest close to the flying missile and overturned it with the wing console. Maridor's tactics were adopted by other pilots, and the courageous 24-year-old pilot was awarded the Legion of Honor by General Charles de Gaulle. The brave pilot died on August 4, 1944, after ramming a diving V-1.

Another method was used to destroy the V-1 without using small arms: Some Tempest pilots used jets from their fighter's propeller to cause the cruise missile to flip over and crash into the ground. Although these methods brought victory in the fight against “flying bombs,” most pilots made do with standard weapons, achieving significant success. One of the most effective was squadron commander T. Barry, who had 37 destroyed cruise missiles.

Prefabricated V-1 launchers were easily restored after raids by Allied bombers. Therefore, despite all the efforts of the Allies, in June-July 1944 the intensity of V-1 raids did not noticeably decrease. On some days, up to 160 cruise missiles penetrated the RAF patrol area.

In order to somehow solve this problem, the Americans developed a rather extravagant “Anvil” plan, according to which the role precision weapons were carried out by B-17 aircraft that had served their service life. The "flying fortresses" were cut off top part cabins to facilitate the exit of the aircraft by two crew members, television equipment and a radio command control system were installed. After the B-17 loaded with explosives took off, the crew members put the plane on course and left the bomber with parachutes. Further control of the B-17 was carried out from a fighter, which was flying on a parallel course. From an altitude of 6000 m, the fighter pilot detected and recognized the target, after which he put the radio-controlled bomber into a dive. On August 4 and 6, targets, reliably protected by strong reinforced concrete shelters, in the areas of Sprakot, Watton and Wiersen were destroyed in this way.

From the second half of July, bombing of supply bases and factories related to missile production resumed. In less than a month, 20 large raids by Allied strategic aviation on V-1 warehouses were carried out. 15,000 sorties were flown against missile industry facilities and 48,000 tons of bombs were dropped.

The new 6-ton Tollboy bombs were used against the underground missile depot in St. Jezern, the Volkswagen plant in Fallersleben, the pilot plant in Peenemünde and the Opel plant in Rüsselheim. However, strikes on German industrial facilities failed to have any serious impact on the production of cruise missiles. The pace of production has even increased. Primarily due to the fact that since July 1944, the assembly of the V-1 was concentrated in Nordhausen, in an underground plant invulnerable to air raids.

System missile defense England consisted of four zones: external and internal zones covered by fighters, a zone of coastal anti-aircraft artillery and a zone of barrage balloons. The outer zone included airspace over the English Channel to the British coast. There were four to six Mustang Mk.III and Spitfire Mk.XIV fighters patrolling there during the day, or 3-4 aircraft at night. 15 radar patrol ships were also stationed here to direct interceptors to targets. Their light anti-aircraft guns also fired at incoming cruise missiles.

During the summer of 1944, the losses of the British population from rockets amounted to about 21,400 people killed and wounded. 25,511 houses were completely destroyed, and a huge number of buildings received varying degrees of damage. In densely populated areas of London and its suburbs alone, up to 75% of buildings were damaged. This is all that the creators of the “miracle weapon” could be “proud of.”

Left without a system of launch positions as a result of the Allied summer offensive, the Germans abandoned the launch of V-1s over England from France and redeployed the 155th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment from Holland to Germany. The cities of Antwerp, Brussels and Liege became new targets. The combat experience of launching the V-1 from carrier aircraft, first carried out on July 8, made it possible to strike Britain from various directions, bypassing the already formed air defense system. About one hundred carrier aircraft from three air groups were used.

Until January 14, 1945, about 1,200 V-1s were launched from bombers into English cities. For the crews of the carrier aircraft, this was not at all a simple task. Night flight without landmarks over the sea at an altitude of 100-300 m, reaching the launch line at a distance of 50-60 km from coastline, climbing a height of several thousand meters, maintaining the exact course during the V-1 drop presented considerable difficulties. At the same time, it is necessary to remain invisible to radar stations and night interceptors. Here we should also add the threat posed to the crew by their own projectile aircraft: of the 77 He-111 crews who did not return to their airfields, 30 died when the missiles were launched.

Although the Heinkels made missile terror more mobile, they acted sporadically, and the scale of their use was relatively small. The British still managed to shoot down about half of the projectile aircraft.

However, in February 1945, German designers created an improved version of the V-1, with a launch range increased to 370 km. In the territory Western Europe managed to build three ground launch positions aimed at London. After this became known to British intelligence, two of them were destroyed. From the third launcher, located near the city of Delft, launches were made throughout March.

In February 1945, Hitler announced that a secret “miracle weapon” would change the situation in favor of the Third Reich at the last moment. This was said just two months before the fall of Berlin. The bet on missile weapons clearly failed, but again and again there were orders to increase the production of V-1, which had been reduced to 2000 copies per month. The new carrier aircraft were to be Arado Ag-234C-2 jet bombers. The V-1 was to be towed and launched using a rigid coupling.

In an alternative version, the projectile aircraft was to be installed on an elevating launch ramp above the fuselage of the missile carrier. Rocket specialists, technical documentation, unique prototypes and the latest equipment were evacuated to Nordhausen, where rocket production continued with all its might. The last plane-shell fell on the territory of England on March 29, 1945.

The Soviet military command also took into account the possibility of the Nazis using the V-1 on the Eastern Front. With the start of the first combat launches in England, the Headquarters ordered artillery commander N. Voronov to take all measures to protect Leningrad and other large cities from unmanned aerial vehicles. On July 19, 1944, “Preliminary instructions for combating projectile aircraft” were approved and sent to the air defense forces. According to a specially developed plan with the allocation of the necessary forces and means, two sectors were created in the zone of responsibility of the Leningrad Air Defense Army: northwestern and southwestern. But the rapid retreat on the Eastern Front, as well as the desire of the Nazi elite to at least finally punish “Foggy Albion” did not make it possible to use the V-1 against the Soviet Union.

Large dispersion (up to 80% of shells fell at a distance of over 6.5 km from the target point) and the impossibility aimed shooting due to the lack of correction for range and lateral drift, the Luftwaffe leadership led to the creation of a manned version based on the V-1.

The ideological inspirers of the project were SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, a famous saboteur, terrorist, developer and executor of various secret operations, and the best German pilot Hanna Reich. Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Günter Korten ordered the squadron commander special purpose KG 200 Colonel V. Baumbach to form a separate combat training group. Thus, the “Leonidasstaffel” squadron was formed within KG 200, which included 60 experienced pilots and test pilots from the research center in Rechlin.”

The author of the article examines the features technical designs V-1 rockets. “The Danneburg plant converted 175 V-1s into manned projectiles. The automatic stabilization system was removed from them, and in place of the cylinders with compressed air They equipped the cockpit with controls and a minimum number of instruments, and the wing was equipped with ailerons. Single- and double-seat training versions of the manned Fi-103 aircraft with a landing ski were produced, but no landing gear was provided for the combat version at all.

At the same time, several copies of four variants of manned projectiles called “Reichenberg” were built. This is the “Reichenberg I” - a two-seat, training aircraft, with an increased wingspan, without a pulsating air-breathing engine (PJRE), the “Reichenberg II” - a single-seat, training and training model, with a PUPRJ, “Reichenberg III” - with a weighted combat mock-up parts and a landing ski, “Reichenberg IV” - with a warhead, PuVRD, without a landing ski.”

It is emphasized that “the very first test of the Reichenberg III manned projectile, which Skorzeny and Reich observed from the ground, ended in disaster. After undocking from the carrier aircraft, the aircraft maintained the given direction and altitude for some time, and then suddenly went down sharply, disappeared behind the forest and exploded. Hanna Reich, who had experience flying the Me-163, carried out further tests herself.

During research flights it became clear that the Reichenberg had unsatisfactory flight data. Moreover, it was especially dangerous when landing with the ski extended, which was noted by other test pilots. There was no way to carry out the previously planned escape of the manned projectile by parachute, since the engine air intake gaped directly behind the canopy. A catapult was required.

The disastrous results of the Reichenberg tests did not stop the top of the Nazi leadership. To improve flight characteristics, Porsche was given a technical assignment for the development of a disposable turbojet engine “109-005” with a power of 5000 hp. They began to leave the factory stocks combat samples manned projectile "Reichenberg" IV, 28 of which even entered the combat training unit. But it never came to the point of using them in combat.

During the war years, German industry produced more than 20,440 cruise missiles (out of 60,000 planned). From July 1944 to March 1945, 10,492 V-1s were launched into England alone. Of these, 2,419 hit London, and 1,112 “flying bombs” fell on other cities. 8696 launched in Antwerp and 3141 in Liege. Although 1,847 of this number were shot down by interceptors, 1,878 by anti-aircraft artillery, 232 hit the cables of barrage balloons, and 3,004 simply did not make it due to low technical reliability, it became clear to the military and politicians that a new means of warfare with enormous potential capabilities had emerged "

In conclusion, the author writes that the results of the combat use of cruise missiles of the V-1 system did not live up to the military and political expectations of the leadership of the Third Reich. Despite the powerful moral and psychological impact produced on the British population, the British still intended to continue waging the war to a victorious end.
However, the capitulation of Nazi Germany did not mean the end of the V-1 history. At the end of the war, the remaining ballistic and cruise missiles, tons technical documentation, production technology, starting equipment, specialists went to the winning countries as trophies. Many states began to use all this, process it and “put it into service with their armies.” “The United States was the first to enter this arms race. Already on June 9, 1944, the wreckage of an unexploded V-1 was delivered by plane to Wrightfield airbase. Group of aircraft designers in urgently reconstructed the components and assemblies of the cruise missile, and just seventeen days later the first real prototype of the projectile was ready. The serial production of missiles under the designation B-2 was entrusted to the Republic company, and the production of the pulsating engine was entrusted to the Ford company. Before the end of the war, the Americans produced about 1,200 missiles, called KUW-1 “Lun”, but never had time to use them. The development of the V-1 was the SSM-N-8 Regulus I projectile, launched by the Americans into mass production in the early fifties to equip heavy cruisers and large special submarines.

The Soviet Union did not stand aside either. Despite the fact that our military experts had an extremely low opinion of the combat capabilities of the V-1 aircraft, by the end of 1944, aircraft plant No. 51 began construction of an analogue of the German rocket based on the V-1 sample received from Britain and individual parts and assemblies , discovered on the territory of Poland. Tests of the projectile aircraft, called "10X", were carried out in August 1945. Further consistent development of the 10X cruise missile took place under the leadership of V.N. Chelomeya.

Modifications 10ХН and 16Х were created, which differed from German projectile aircraft in their high operational reliability. But at the end of 1952, it was decided to stop work on creating cruise missiles based on the V-1.”

What conclusion should be drawn from the above events? Firstly, unsuccessful results Tests of the German V-1 rocket completely demonstrate the inconsistency of the assertions that the Soviet socialist economy was allegedly losing to the capitalist economy in the field of defense production. On the contrary, the quality of the V-1 demonstrated a technical and technological lag behind the production of the Soviet model. Secondly, the material presented in the article makes it clear once again that talk about the United States as “the most progressive and advanced country in the world” is also groundless. What arguments are put forward in favor of this version? Allegedly, they produce high-tech goods, actively introduce innovations, etc. But a specific example shows that Americans use the developments of other countries. appropriating them for himself, he passes them off as his mythical “successes”.

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V-1

Brief tactical and technical characteristics of FAU-1

V-1 Fieseler-103
type	cruise missile
Crew	No
Dimensions
Length, m:	7,90
Wingspan, m	5,37
Height, m	1,42
Weight
Curb weight, kg	2150
Power point
engine's type	1x Argus As 014 pulsating direct flow
Thrust, kN	2,9
Flight characteristics
Maximum flight speed: km/h	656
	240
Practical ceiling, m	3050
Warhead
Warhead weight, kg	830

The fuselage is constructed primarily from welded sheet steel

V-1 (V-1, Fi-103, FZG 76, A-2, Fieseler-103 listen)) - an aircraft-projectile (cruise missile), which was in service with the German army at the end of World War II. The V-1 rocket was the first unmanned aerial vehicle used in actual combat. Its name comes from it. Vergeltungswaffe(weapon of retaliation). The rocket project was developed by designers Robert Lusser, Fieseler, and Fritz Gosslau, Argus Motoren. The Fi-103 project was proposed to the Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Aviation jointly by both companies in July 1941. Production of the rocket began at the end of 1942.

The V-1 was equipped with a pulsating air-breathing engine (PuVRD) and carried a warhead weighing 750-1000 kg. Flight range - 250 km, later increased to 400 km.

Brief performance characteristics (TTX) of FAU-1 (V-1 Fi-103)

Length, m: 7,74
Wingspan, m: 5,30
Height, m: 1,42
Curb weight, kg : 2 160
Engine: 1 pulsating air-breathing jet Argus As 014 with a thrust of 2.9 kN (296 kgf)
Maximum flight speed: 656 km/h (approx. 0.53); the speed increased as the vehicle became lighter (with fuel consumption) - up to 800 km/h (approx. 0.65).
Maximum flight range, km : 286
Practical ceiling, m: 2700- 3050 (in practice I flew at altitudes from 100 to 1000 meters)
Warhead weight, kg: 847, Ammotol equipment
Fuel consumption was 2.35 liters per kilometer. The tank capacity is about 570 liters of gasoline (80 octane).
Circular probable deviation (calculated), km : 0,9
Rocket cost (design), Reichsmarks: 60 thousand. At the end of the war - 3.5 thousand using slave labor of prisoners.

Device

Fuselage

The fuselage of the V-1 was a spindle-shaped body of rotation with a length of 6.58 meters and a maximum diameter of 0.823 meters. The fuselage is made mainly of thin sheet steel, the sheets are joined by welding, the wings are made in the same way, or made of plywood. The V-1 was designed using a conventional aerodynamic design. The V-1 had wings with a constant chord of 1 meter, a span of 5.4 meters and an airfoil thickness of about 14%. Above the fuselage, the V-1 had a propeller jet approximately 3.25 meters long.

Engine

Scheme of operation of the PuVRD

IN pulse jet engine(PuVRD) uses a combustion chamber with inlet valves and a long cylindrical outlet nozzle. Fuel and air are supplied periodically.

The operating cycle of the thruster consists of the following phases:

The valves open and air (1) and fuel (2) enter the combustion chamber, forming an air-fuel mixture.
The mixture is ignited by a spark from a spark plug. The resulting excess pressure closes the valve (3).
Hot combustion products exit through the nozzle (4) and create jet thrust.

Currently, the PuVRD is used as a power plant for light target aircraft. It is not used in large aviation due to low efficiency compared to gas turbine engines.

Control system

The projectile control system is an autopilot that keeps the projectile on the course and altitude specified at launch throughout the flight.
Heading and pitch stabilization carried out on the basis of the readings of a 3-degree (main) gyroscope, which are summed up in pitch with the readings of a barometric altitude sensor, and in heading and pitch with the values of the corresponding angular velocities measured by two 2-degree gyroscopes (to dampen projectile oscillations around own center mass). Targeting is carried out before launch according to magnetic compass, which is part of the control system. In flight, the course is corrected using this device: if the course of the projectile deviates from the one set by the compass, the electromagnetic correction mechanism acts on the pitch frame of the main gyroscope, which forces it to precess along the course in the direction of reducing the mismatch with the course on the compass, and the stabilization system already adjusts the projectile itself to this course.
Roll control absent altogether - due to its aerodynamics, the projectile is quite stable around the longitudinal axis.
Logical part of the system implemented by means of pneumatics - operates on compressed air. With the help of rotary nozzles with compressed air, the angular readings of the gyroscopes are converted into the form of air pressure in the output pipes of the converter; in this form, the readings are summed up through the corresponding control channels (with appropriately selected coefficients) and actuate the spool valves of the pneumatic machines of the heading and elevator rudders. Gyroscopes are also spun by compressed air, which is supplied to the turbines that form part of their rotors. To operate the control system, the projectile has a ball cylinder with compressed air under a pressure of 150 atm.
Range control carried out using a mechanical counter, on which, before the launch, the value corresponding to the required range is set, and a bladed anemometer, placed on the nose of the projectile and rotated by the incoming air flow, twists the counter to zero upon reaching the required range (with an accuracy of ± 6 km). At the same time, the impact fuses of the warhead are unlocked and a dive command is issued (“the air supply to the elevator machine is cut off”).

Launch of V-1

V-1 launch catapult

Project evaluation

Memorial plaque on Grove Road, Mile End in London commemorating the site of the first V-1 shell falling on 13 June 1944, which killed 11 Londoners

About 30,000 devices were manufactured. By 29 March 1945, approximately 10,000 had been launched across England; 3,200 fell on her territory, of which 2,419 reached London, causing losses of 6,184 killed and 17,981 wounded.
After the Allies landed on the continent and captured or bombed most of the ground installations aimed at London, the Germans began bombarding strategically important points in the Netherlands, primarily the port of Antwerp.

About 20% of the missiles failed at launch, 25% were destroyed by British aircraft, 17% were shot down by anti-aircraft guns, 7% were destroyed when colliding with barrage balloons.

In late December 1944, General Clayton Bissell presented a report indicating significant advantages of the V1 over traditional aerial bombardment.

They prepared the following table:

Comparison of Blitz (12 months) and V1 flying bombs (2¾ months)

	Blitz	V1
1. Cost for Germany
Departures	90,000	8,025
Bomb weight, tons	61,149	14,600
Fuel consumed, tons	71,700	4,681
Aircraft lost	3,075	0
Lost crew	7690	0
2. Results
Structures destroyed/damaged	1,150,000	1,127,000
Population losses	92,566	22,892
Ratio of losses to bomb consumption	1.6	4.2
3. Cost for England Escort aircraft efforts
Departures	86,800	44,770
Aircraft lost	1,260	351
Lost man	2,233	805

Londoners called the V-1 "flying bombs" and also "buzz bombs" because of the characteristic sound made by the pulsating air-breathing engine.

After the war

As trophies, the Soviet Union received several V-1 missiles when they occupied the territory of a test site near the city of Blizna in Poland. Soviet engineers eventually created exact copy V-1 - 10x rockets (later called “Product 10”). The development was led by Vladimir Nikolaevich Chelomey. The first tests began in March 1945 at a test site in the Tashkent area. Unlike the V-1, Soviet 10x missiles were intended to be launched not only from ground positions, but also from aircraft and ship-based installations. Flight tests were completed in 1946, but the Air Force refused to accept this missile into service, primarily due to the low accuracy of the guidance system (hitting a 5 x 5 km square from a distance of 200 km was considered great luck, since it was significantly superior to the prototype). Also the 10x rocket had short range and the flight speed is lower than that of a piston fighter. In the post-war period, V.N. Chelomey developed several more missiles based on 10x (14x and 16x), but in the early 50s development was stopped.

Based on the Argus pulsating air-jet engine, used in V-1 rockets, Germany prepared the EF-126 aircraft, developed by Junkers. The Soviet Union allowed the plant's engineers to build the first prototype, and in May 1946, the EF-126 aircraft made its first flight without an engine, towed behind a Ju.88G6. However, during a test flight on May 21, a disaster occurred, as a result of which the test pilot was killed and the only prototype was completely destroyed. Later, several more vehicles were built, but at the beginning of 1948 all work on the EF-126 was stopped.

Notes

Story

The experimental station "Kummersdorf-West" was located between two Kummersdorf artillery ranges, approximately 3 kilometers south of Berlin, in a rare pine forest province of Brandenburg. Officers and specialists worked there, there was the best testing equipment for which a test methodology was developed, there were stands for solid and liquid fuel rockets.

In the 1930s, at the Kummersdorf training ground, Werner von Braun came under the command of Captain Dornberger, with whom he worked for many years. Dornberger was previously in charge of the development of rockets using smokeless powder. Beginning in 1937, von Braun began testing large rockets at the Peenemünde test site on the island of Usedom on the Baltic Sea, which began construction in 1935.

The first test of the rocket took place on December 21, 1932, test engineer and designer Walter Riedel from the Heyland company, located in the town of Britz, took part in the work. Engineer Arthur Rudolph proposed to the weapons department a fully automated liquid fuel engine with a thrust of 295 kilograms and a burn time of sixty seconds. In August 1932, during an unsuccessful demonstration flight, a rocket built by the Raketenflugplatz group rose vertically 30 meters, then abruptly went on a horizontal course and crashed into the forest. This rocket engine was the first to be developed, created and tested at the test site. It was made of copper, spherical containers with oxygen and alcohol were located at the top, separated from the combustion chamber, equipped with a cooling system.

The rocket project was developed by designers Robert Lusser (Fieseler) and Fritz Gosslau (Argus Motoren). The Fi-103 project was proposed to the Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Aviation jointly by both companies in July 1941. During the design work, and later during testing, the need arose to stabilize the rocket in flight, so it was equipped with a gyroscope and stabilizers were installed.

Production of the rocket began at the end of 1942, on the island of Usedom (located in the Baltic Sea, opposite the mouth of the Oder River). During World War II there was a concentration camp on the island, work force the prisoners of which were used in V-1 production plants.

The most spectacular achievement of the Home Army (AK) intelligence was the development of the research center and factories in Peenemünde, where the V-1 and V-2 missiles were assembled. The first information about what was happening there was received in the fall of 1942, and in March 1943 a detailed report was sent to London. This allowed the British to carry out a massive bombing attack on August 17-18, 1943, which suspended the production of the “miracle weapon” for several months.

Device

IN pulse jet engine(PuVRD) uses a combustion chamber with inlet valves and a long cylindrical outlet nozzle. Fuel and air are supplied periodically.

The operating cycle of the thruster consists of the following phases:

The valves open and air (1) and fuel (2) enter the combustion chamber, forming an air-fuel mixture.
The mixture is ignited using a spark from a spark plug. The resulting excess pressure closes the valve (3).
Hot combustion products exit through the nozzle (4) and create jet thrust.

Currently, the PuVRD is used as a power plant for light target aircraft. It is not used in large aviation due to low efficiency compared to gas turbine engines.

In total, about 30,000 [ ] devices. By 29 March 1945, about 10,000 had been launched across England; 3,200 fell on her territory, of which 2,419 reached London, causing losses of 6,184 killed and 17,981 wounded. Londoners called the V-1 "flying bombs" and also "buzz bombs" because of the characteristic sound made by the pulsating air-breathing engine.

About 20% of the missiles failed at launch, 25% were destroyed by British aircraft, 17% were shot down by anti-aircraft guns, 7% were destroyed when colliding with barrage balloons. The engines often failed before reaching the target and also engine vibration often disabled the rocket, so that about 20% of the V-1s fell into the sea. Although specific numbers vary from source to source, a British report published after the war indicated that 7,547 V-1s were launched into England. The report states that of these, 1,847 were destroyed by fighter aircraft, 1,866 were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery, 232 were destroyed by barrage balloons and 12 by artillery from Royal Navy ships.

A breakthrough in military electronics (the development of radio fuses for anti-aircraft shells - shells with such fuses turned out to be three times more effective even when compared with the latest radar fire control for that time) led to the fact that losses German planes-shells in raids on England increased from 24% to 79%, as a result of which the effectiveness (and intensity) of such raids decreased significantly.

After the Allies, having landed on the continent, captured or bombed most of the ground installations aimed at London, the Germans began shelling strategic points in Belgium (primarily the port of Antwerp, Liege), several shells were fired at Paris.

Project evaluation

In late December 1944, General Clayton Bissell presented a report indicating significant advantages of the V1 over traditional aerial bombing.

They prepared the following table:

Comparison of Blitz (12 months) and V1 Flying Bombs (2 ¾ months)

	Blitz	V1
1. Cost for Germany
Departures	90000	8025
Bomb weight, tons	61149	14600
Fuel consumed, tons	71700	4681
Aircraft lost	3075	0
Lost crew	7690	0
2. Results
Structures destroyed/damaged	1150000	1127000
Population losses	92566	22892
Ratio of losses to bomb consumption	1,6	4,2
3. Cost for England Efforts of escort aircraft
Departures	86800	44770
Aircraft lost	1260	351
Lost man	2233	805

In general, in terms of cost/effectiveness ratio, the V-1 was a fairly effective weapon (unlike the significantly more expensive V-2). It was cheap and simple, could be produced and launched en masse, did not require trained pilots, and in general, even taking into account the significant losses of projectile aircraft from British counteraction, the damage caused by the missiles was greater than the cost of producing the missiles themselves. A fully assembled V-1 cost only 3.5 thousand Reichsmarks - less than 1% of the cost of a manned bomber with a similar bomb load [ ] .

It should also be taken into account that countering rocket attacks required significant efforts from the British, involving a multitude of anti-aircraft guns, fighters, searchlights, radar and personnel, and as a result, the cost significantly exceeded the missiles themselves, even without taking into account the damage caused by the latter [

V-1 - CHELOMEY'S TRUMBO CARD

The FAU-1 cruise guided missile (aircraft-projectile) was designed for launch from ground-based installations. During the war, the vast majority of V-1 missiles were launched from ground-based launchers. Therefore, I will talk about it briefly, focusing on the use of airborne missiles.

The Fi-YUZ projectile was created in a very a short time in 1942 by the aircraft manufacturing company Fieseler in Kassel under the direction of the Office of the German Air Force and tested at the Peenemünde-West experimental training ground. To keep all the work on its creation secret, it was conditionally named “Kirshkern” and received the code name FZG 76.

After its first combat use on June 12-13, 1944, in addition to the factory mark Fi-YUZ, it was given the designation FAU-1 (V-1, where V (fau) is the first letter of the word Vergeltung - retribution, retribution).

The missile warhead had three contact fuses. The rocket was equipped with an Argus 109-014 pulsating engine, which developed a thrust of 2.35-3.29 kN. Low-grade gasoline was used as fuel. Marching flight speed is about 160 m/s (580 km/h). Firing range is about 250 km. Several later production missiles had their firing range increased to 370 km.

FAU-1 missiles were equipped with an inertial guidance system. For most of the projectiles, the course was set by the direction of launch and remained unchanged throughout the flight. But by the end of the war, individual models began to be equipped with turning devices, so that after launch the missiles could turn according to the program.

The flight altitude could be set using a barometric altimeter in the range of 200-3000 m. To determine the distance to the target, a path counter (“air log”) driven by a small propeller was placed in the bow of the object. Upon reaching a pre-calculated distance from the launch site, the path counter turned off the engine, simultaneously sent a command to the elevator, and the rocket was transferred to a diving flight.

Some of the V-1 missiles were equipped with radio transmitting devices, so that with the help of cross direction finding it was possible to follow the flight path and determine the location of the projectile's impact (once the transmitter stopped working).

The hit accuracy according to the project is 4 x 4 km with a flight range of 250 km. Thus, the rocket could effectively operate on major cities.

In June-August 1944, V-1 missiles were launched only in London and only from ground-based stationary catapults. To protect London, the Allies threw huge forces against the new German weapons. Hundreds of heavy bombers almost daily bombed the V-1 launch sites. In the first week of August alone, 15,000 tons of bombs were dropped on them.

Given the short firing range of the V-1, when firing at London, the missiles could cross the coast of England in a very narrow area - less than 100 km. By mid-August, in this sector the British had concentrated 596 heavy and 922 light anti-aircraft guns, about 600 launchers of unguided anti-aircraft missiles, as well as 2,015 barrage balloons. Near the English coast, fighters continuously patrolled over the sea (15 squadrons of night fighters and 6 squadrons of day fighters). All these measures led to the fact that the number of missiles shot down reached 50 percent by September.

Finally, by September 5, most of the German launch sites were captured by Allied forces, and the launch of V-1 missiles to England temporarily ceased.

In this regard, the Germans converted several dozen He 111, Ju 88, Me 111 and FW 200 Condor bombers. The problem of converting aircraft for the Germans was eased by the fact that even during the Fi-YUZ testing period, some of them were launched from the Me 111 aircraft.

At 5 a.m. on September 16, seven V-1 missiles were launched from German He 111 and Ju 88 aircraft. Of these, two fell in London and the rest in the county of Essen. This was the world's first use of aircraft long-range missiles. By the end of September, German aircraft had launched 80 V-1 missiles, of which 23 were destroyed by the Allies. In the first two weeks of October, German aircraft fired 69 missiles, of which 38 were destroyed.

The Germans' use of the V-1 rocket made a great impression on the Western Allies. In 1944-1945 Americans

created several copies of V-1 missiles, which were launched from ground launchers, from carrier aircraft B-17 and B-29.

On the basis of the FAU-1 in the United States, the KUW-1 “Loon” naval aircraft-projectile was created. At the end of 1949, two boats were converted into submarines carrying the Lun: Carbonero (SS-337) and Kask (SS-348). Each boat carried one projectile aircraft, placed in a hangar behind the wheelhouse. (Diagram 26)

Formally, Lun was accepted into service and remained on these submarines until the early 1950s. The Americans did not make any more projectile aircraft with pulsating jet engines.

The fate of the V-1 in the USSR was somewhat different. On the 20th of September 1944, an FAU-1 projectile found in a swamp was delivered to Moscow from Poland. A few weeks later, another copy was delivered from England (several V-1s fell without exploding into Great Britain).

By order of the NKAP dated September 19, 1944, the staff of plant No. 51 was instructed to create a domestic analogue of the FAU-1.

At plant No. 51, located near the current Begovaya metro station (which was previously headed by aircraft designer N.N. Polikarpov), a special design bureau is being created to work with projectile aircraft. On October 19, 1944, V.N. was appointed chief designer of plant No. 51. Chelomey.

In accordance with the GKO decree of January 18, 1945, plant No. 51 was instructed to design and build a projectile aircraft of the FAU-1 type and, together with LII, test it in February-April 1945. The Chelomeevsky FAU-1 product was assigned the index 10X . Like the FAU, the 10X was manufactured in ground-to-ground and air-to-ground variants. Moreover, work on the aviation version was ahead of work on the ground-launch version.

Three Pe-8 bombers were converted for testing 10X. From April to September 1945, 63 10X missiles were launched at the test site in the Golodnaya Steppe (between Tashkent and Syr Darya), and only 30% of the launches were successful.

In 1946, two more Pe-8 bombers were converted into 10X carriers. From December 15 to December 20, 1948, another 73 launches of 10X air-launched missiles were carried out.

The aerodynamic design of the 10X rocket is normal for aircraft. The length of the rocket is 8 m. The maximum diameter of the body is 1.05 m. The wingspan is 6 m. The first samples of 10X had metal wings, and subsequent ones had wooden wings. Pulsating engine D-3 with a thrust of 310 kg. The launch weight of the rocket is 2126-2130 kg. The weight of the warhead is 800 kg. Maximum flight speed 550-600 m/s.

In 1948, based on the results of flight tests, the 10X was recommended for adoption, but the Air Force leadership actually refused to accept it. They are very easy to understand. The missile had a short range and speed, less than the speed of propeller-driven fighters of that time. The inertial guidance system allowed shooting only at large cities. Hitting a 5 x 5 km square was considered successful, and this was from a distance of 200-300 km! Finally, the Air Force had virtually no carriers for 10X. There were only a few dozen Pe-8s, and there were no Tu-4s yet.

Chelomey fared no better with the 10XN ground-based missile, the development of which began in 1949. This rocket was created on the basis of the 10X, its main difference being the installation of a solid-fuel starting engine. (Ch. 27)

In March 1950, the preliminary design was presented to the customer, and in July 1951, flight tests began at the Kapustin Yar test site. The missiles, SD-10KhN starting powder engines, launch sleds and guides were tested. Based on the results of the tests, the State Commission proposed forming a military unit for the development and training of personnel Soviet army to operate this new type of weapon.

From December 17, 1952 to March 11, 1953, military unit 15644 underwent State tests of the 10ХН ground-based projectile aircraft, during which 15 products were launched. The shooting was carried out from a bulky PK-10KhN catapult with an air launch unit. The catapult, over 30 m long, was difficult to move by the heavy AT-T tractor. The fire was controlled from a special vehicle based on the BTR-40A1. The catapult deployment time averaged about 70 minutes. Recharge time new rocket- 40 minutes. The weight of the 10ХН product is 3500 kg, of which 800 kg was the warhead.

The shooting was carried out at a distance of 240 km at a target representing a square of 20 x 20 km. The specified flight altitude is 240 m.

The first launch took place on January 12, 1953. The rocket initially flew at an altitude of about 200 m, and then rose to 560 m. The average flight speed was 656 km/h. The rocket flew 235.6 km and missed 4.32 km, the lateral deviation was 3.51 km. For Chelomey it was a great success.

The engine of the second rocket failed at the 350th second of flight, and it fell at a distance of 113.4 km.

The third rocket flew 247.6 km at an average speed of 658 km/h. The flight was 7.66 km, and the lateral deviation was 2.05 km.

As a result, 11 missiles out of 15 hit a square of 20 x 20 km. The rocket's flight altitude was chosen by ourselves - from 200 to 1000 m. (63)

Nevertheless, work on 10ХН was continued in 1954-1955. By decision of the Council of Ministers on May 19, 1954, plant No. 475 (Smolensk) was given the task of producing 100 10ХН missiles, but already on November 3 of the same year the task was halved.

The 10ХН missile was again tested at the Kapustin Yar test site. During these tests, the length of the catapult was increased to 11 m, and at the very end of the tests two successful launches were carried out with a guide length of 8 m. However, the 10ХН rocket was never accepted for service.

Since 1951, Chelomey designed the ship version 10ХН, which in a number of documents was called “Swallow”. The Lastochka cruise missile had two powder accelerators, of which one was the “first-stage accelerator” and was placed on the launch trolley, that is, it served as a catapult, and the other, the “second-stage accelerator,” was placed directly on the rocket. The rocket was supposed to launch from a track about 20 meters long with an inclination to the horizon of 8-12° and required stabilization from roll during launch. The missile was stored on the submarine fully fueled, without removable wing and tail panels, which were located separately and had to be attached to the missile immediately before launch.

In 1949, TsKB-18 under the leadership of F.A. Kaverina developed in several versions a project for the P-2 missile submarine, armed ballistic missile R-1 and the Lastochka cruise missile. The displacement of the submarine P-2 was 5360 tons.

In the P-2 version, armed with cruise missiles, the ammunition consisted of 51 Lastochka missiles, placed in three waterproof blocks installed in special niche compartments. In other versions, waterproof blocks were supposed to contain R-1 missiles or midget submarines. But the P-2 project was considered too complex, and its development was stopped.

In 1952-1953 at TsKB-18 under the leadership of I.B. Mikhailov was developed technical project 628 - re-equipment of the XTV series submarine for experimental firing of 10ХН missiles. The cruise missile was placed in a container with a diameter of 2.5 m and a length of 10 m. The work on placing the 10ХН missile and related devices and instruments on a submarine was coded “Volna”.

To launch a rocket, a device was installed consisting of a truss with mechanisms for raising and lowering it and mechanisms for feeding rockets to the launch device. The length of the starting truss was about 30 m, its elevation angle was about 14°. The starting device was located along the center plane in the stern of the boat. The launch was made against the progress of the submarine. The connecting link between the starting device and the container was the hinged aft lid of the container. In addition to this lid, there was a hatch in the bow of the container for personnel to enter the container. The container was designed for maximum immersion depth and had cork insulation inside. The missile was to be stored in a container with the wing panels removed.

For conversion to Project 628, the B-5 submarine was allocated (until May 1949 - K-51). According to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of February 19, 1953 on the termination of work on the Volna missiles, all development of Project 628 also ceased.

In 1948-1950 The option of installing 10X, 10XN and 16X missiles on the unfinished cruiser Tallinn (Project 82), the captured German cruiser Seydlitz and the domestic cruisers of Project 68bis under construction was being explored. (Ch. 28)

Back in 1946, Chelomey designed the 14X aircraft rocket with two more powerful D-5 pulsating engines. The aerodynamic configuration 14X is normal for aircraft. The warhead is the same as that of the 10X. The control system is inertial. The 14X variant with a guidance system based on the Comet project was considered, but it was soon rejected. But the 14X missile died quietly, the question of its adoption into service was not even raised.

On May 7, 1947, Council of Ministers issued resolution No. 1401-370 on the development of the 16X rocket. Externally and structurally, the 16X differed little from the 14X. The aerodynamic design is normal for an airplane. Tu-4 (2 missiles) and Tu-2 (1 missile) could be used as a carrier. (Diagram 29)

Chelomey assigned the indices 10ХМ and 16ХМ to modifications of the 10Х and 16Х missiles. In English, “X” sounds like “ex”; as a result, the nickname “eczema” stuck to Chelomey’s missiles - “eczema-10”, “eczema-11” (64).

During the testing of the 16X rocket, various pulsating engines were installed on it: D-5, D-312, D-14-4 and others. During tests at the Akhtubinsk test site from July 22 to December 25, 1948, the maximum speed increased from 714 to 780 km/h. In 1949, with the D-14-4 engine, the speed reached 912 km/h.

From September 6 to November 4, 1950, joint tests of 16X missiles were carried out. 20 missiles with D-14-4 engines were launched from Pe-8 and Tu-2 aircraft. The firing range was 170 km, and the average speed was about 900 km/h. All shells hit a rectangle of 10.8 x 16 km, which is relatively good for the 16X inertial control system.

But the Air Force did not need such accuracy. Therefore, a decision was made to equip the 16X with a radio command guidance system, but it was never created.

From August 2 to August 20, 1952, joint tests of the 16X rocket and the Tu-4 launch vehicle took place, during which 22 launches of rockets with an inertial control system were carried out. The commission considered the test results successful, fortunately, the permissible circular deviation was considered 8 km.

However, on October 4, 1952, Air Force Commander-in-Chief Marshal K.A. Vershinin announced the impossibility of adopting the 16X due to failure to meet the requirements for shooting accuracy, reliability, etc. Vershinin proposed to test a pilot batch of 15 16X aircraft by the end of 1952, and in 1953, having formed a separate squadron of Tu-4 carrier aircraft in the Air Force, to test a military batch of sixty 16X, of which twenty should be in combat gear.

Between the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which supports Chelomey, and the Air Force, arose serious conflict. They turned to Stalin for a solution.

As Chelomey’s first deputy, Viktor Nikiforovich Bugaisky, wrote: “Representatives of the Air Force command and the testing team from the test site were invited to the meeting. Vladimir Nikolaevich brilliantly reported in optimistic tones on the results of the tests and boasted, showing photographs of successful missile hits on the target and a diagram of the distribution of the points of their impact in a given circle on the ground in the target area. All this convincingly testified to the high efficiency of the missiles. Stalin asked representatives of the testing team to speak from the test site. The major came out and stated that all the successes that V.N. spoke about. Chelomey, they do take place, but in his diagram he showed only successful launches. But there are few such launches; the bulk of the tested missiles either did not reach the target, or their impact points lie far outside the given circle. He then presented his scheme with a completely unoptimistic picture of the results of the work. Stalin asked the generals present whether everything was really as the major reported. They confirmed that the major was right. Then Stalin summed up the results of the meeting: “We, Comrade Chelomei, placed great trust in you, entrusting us with directing work in such an important area of technology for us. You did not justify the trust. In my opinion, you are an adventurer in technology, and we cannot trust you anymore ! You can’t be a leader! ”(65).

On December 19, 1952, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a resolution No. 533-271, which stated: “Objects 10ХН and 16Х have been completed, and further work on the creation of unguided cruise missiles with PuVRD, carried out in OKB-51 (designer Chelomey), are unpromising, due to the low accuracy and limited speeds provided by these missiles.... Oblige MAP before March 1, 1953 OKB-51 with its pilot plant transfer to the OKB-155 system [i.e. Mikoyan. -A.Sh.] as of March 1, 1953 to strengthen work on orders from the 3rd Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.”

Thus, in nine years of work, Chelomey’s office has not been able to bring a single missile into service.

Chelomey found himself out of work and went to teach at the Moscow Higher Technical School. N.E. Bauman. But then Stalin dies, and Khrushchev, with whom Chelomey had “old connections,” comes to power. On June 9, 1954, an order was issued from the Ministry of Aviation Industry on the creation of a special design group SKG p/ya 010 under the leadership of V.N. Chelomeya. An area was allocated for it in the buildings of plant No. 500, located in Tushino.

Cruise missiles P-5, P-6, P-7, P-35, S-5 and others will ensure Chelomey’s takeoff. But this is a topic for another story. And I refer those interested to my book “ Fire sword Russian fleet"(M.: Yauza, EKSMO, 2004).