5 turret tank T 35. Service and combat use
Despite its young age, the history of tank building is unusually rich and fascinating. Tanks appeared on the battlefield only a hundred years ago, but the development of this type of military equipment was rapid; the tank can easily be called the main military invention of the last century. Only at the end of the 20th century did their importance on the battlefield begin to decline.
During its short but very turbulent history, the tank has changed beyond recognition: its weapons and means of defense have changed, and the tactics of its use on the battlefield have changed. Modern fighting machine also resembles a World War I tank, just as the first airplane made by the Wright brothers resembles the latest generation fighter. This became possible thanks to the work of thousands of weapons designers from different times and nationalities.
From the very beginning of the tank era, every self-respecting country sought to create larger armored hordes and equip them with the most formidable equipment. They did not spare money for this and did not limit the flight of design imagination too much. As a result, cars with completely bizarre appearance and characteristics were born. The overwhelming majority of them remained on paper or in the form of prototypes.
Therefore, the fate of unusual tanks, which not only went into production, but even managed to fight, is especially interesting. One of these vehicles was the Soviet five-turret heavy tank T-35. It was created in the early 30s, it had several modifications and managed to take part in the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. Into history heavy tank The T-35 entered production as a tank with the largest number of turrets.
But it’s not just the number of towers, the T-35 is a real symbol of the power of the USSR and the power of its armed forces. None of the central parades were complete without this tank. When this Stalinist “dreadnought” drove along the paving stones of Red Square, it immediately became clear to everyone that “the armor is really strong.”
If we talk about symbolism, it should be said that one of the most revered Soviet medals “For Courage” depicts the T-35 tank.
History of creation
The creation of multi-turreted tanks was by no means distinctive feature Soviet tank building or a reflection of the gigantomania inherent in the USSR. Immediately after the end of the First World War, the installation of several towers on tanks was considered commonplace and was fully consistent with the military doctrine of that time.
In the tank classifications of almost all major countries of that time, there were heavy tanks, whose task was to break through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive lines. Such vehicles were supposed to have powerful protection (ideally anti-ballistic) and powerful weapons; they were supposed to directly accompany the infantry during an attack on enemy positions and methodically suppress enemy firing points.
In the classification that was adopted in the USSR before the war, there were two types of heavy tanks, the first of which was supposed to break through “strongly fortified defensive lines,” and the second’s task was to overcome particularly strong enemy fortifications. It was the second type of vehicle that the T-35 belonged to.
The T-35-1 crew consisted of ten people, the vehicle had a 500 hp engine. s., which allowed her to reach speeds of up to 28 km/h. The maximum armor thickness reached 40 mm, and the range was 150 km.
In 1933, the next modification of the tank was made - T-35-2, it even managed to take part in the parade on Red Square. However, already at this moment the designers were developing the T-35A - new tank, which was supposed to go into mass production. This vehicle was very different from its predecessors: the length and shape of the hull were changed, turrets of a different design and size were installed on the tank, and the chassis of the tank was also modified. In fact, it was already a completely new car.
In 1933, the T-35A was put into service. Production was established at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant. In 1934, the T-35 heavy tank began to enter service with the troops.
A total of 59 units of this car were produced.
Various changes and improvements were continuously made to the tank. The thickness of the armor was increased, the power of the power plant was increased, and the turrets acquired a conical shape. The weight of the tank increased; for later models it was 55 tons.
Use of the T-35
The T-35 was not used in any of the conflicts of the 1930s in which the USSR took part. The five-tower giants were not seen either in the Soviet-Polish war, or in conflicts in the Far East, or in the Finnish campaign. At the same time, in the Winter War, the USSR used heavy tanks, the SMK, T-100, KV were tested there - heavy vehicles of the new generation, which were supposed to replace the T-35. It is obvious that the leadership of the Red Army perfectly understood the real capabilities of the T-35 and that is why they kept it away from the front.
The T-35 can be called the main “ceremonial” tank of the 30s: not a single parade on Red Square or Khreshchatyk was complete without the display of these giants.
These tanks had to “smell gunpowder” at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Most of these vehicles were located in units located on the westernmost border, in the Lviv region. T-35s took part in the border battle, and most of them were abandoned by their crews.
The tank showed extremely low combat qualities, but things were even worse with the reliability of the vehicle. Only seven tanks were lost directly during the fighting; thirty-five vehicles simply broke down and were abandoned or destroyed by the crews.
Several more vehicles (according to one information, five) took part in the defense of Kharkov in 1941, but there is no information about their combat use. The last two T-35s took part in the defense of Moscow.
The first days of the war became real for the T-35 " finest hour" The Germans loved taking photographs against the backdrop of the defeated Russian giants. Despite the relatively a small amount of these tanks, the number of photographs of German soldiers against the backdrop of knocked out or abandoned T-35s is simply off the charts.
The fate of two Soviet T-35s, which were captured by the Nazis in good condition at the beginning of the war, is interesting. One tank ended up at the Kumersdorf training ground, where it was used as a target, and the other stood at the Zossen training ground throughout the war. The Germans used it during the Battle of Berlin, but it was soon shot down by Red Army soldiers using a captured Faustpatron.
Today the last example of this unique machine is in Kubinka.
Description of design
The T-35 has a classic layout, with the power plant located at the rear of the hull. This is a five-turreted vehicle that has two tiers of weapons. The hull is divided into five compartments: the front turret compartment with the driver's seat, the main turret compartment, the rear turret compartment, as well as the engine compartment and transmission compartment.
The tank hull is welded, there are also elements secured with rivets.
Two turrets were installed on the roof of the front compartment: a machine gun and a gun. The first turret was occupied by a machine gunner, and the second turret housed a gunner and loader.
The main turret of the tank was completely identical to the T-28 turret, which significantly reduced the cost of its production and simplified maintenance. The tower is equipped with a suspended floor for the convenience of tank crews.
The small machine gun turrets are completely identical to the similar turrets of the T-28 tank, and the medium gun turrets are identical to the turrets of the BT-5 tank.
The T-35 was equipped with a four-stroke gasoline aircraft engine M-17, which had a power of 500 hp. With.
The gearbox provided four speeds when moving forward and one in reverse.
The chassis consisted of eight (on each side) rubber-coated road wheels, six support rollers, and the rear wheels were driven. The tank's suspension was blocked; two rollers were installed in the bogie; two spiral springs provided spring loading.
The chassis of the tank was covered with an armored bulwark consisting of several armor plates.
The main task of the T-35 was to support infantry when breaking through enemy defense lines; it was supposed to destroy enemy fortifications.
According to the designers, a 76-mm cannon located in main tower, and for simpler purposes 45 mm guns were intended.
The tank's auxiliary armament consisted of six 7.62 mm DT machine guns, which could fire all around. Each gun turret had a coaxial machine gun. In addition, diesel engines were installed in the machine gun turrets, as well as in the rear of the main turret. The latest modifications of the tank also featured an anti-aircraft machine gun, which was mounted on the gunner's hatch of the main turret.
The T-35's surveillance equipment consisted of ordinary viewing slits covered with armored glass; the tank commander and tank turret commanders had periscope panoramic sighting devices.
Depending on the series of the tank, the number of crew could vary from 9 to 11 people. There were three people in the main turret of the tank: the tank commander, the radio operator (loader) and the machine gunner. Each of the small gun turrets contained a gunner and a machine gunner. There was one gunner in each machine gun turret.
The main turret compartment was separated from the rest of the vehicle; the front and rear compartments were connected to each other. Between the front compartments there was a place for the driver, who had an extremely limited view.
Evaluation of the machine and comparison with foreign analogues
In the pre-war period, the T-35 surpassed any foreign combat vehicles in its firepower. This tank, armed with three guns and several machine guns, could create a real sea of fire around itself.
However, the low-power power plant and low reliability of the engine, chassis, and many other technical defects made it unsuitable for use in real combat conditions. The long march that the T-35 made as part of the 34th tank division in the summer of 1941, proved fatal for these monsters.
The multi-turret layout of the tank overcomplicated its design, increased its weight and made it impossible to strengthen the armor. The bulky size of the T-35 made it an excellent target for both tanks and enemy anti-tank artillery. In battle, the speed of the T-35 did not exceed 10 km/h.
There were other problems: the tank commander had to perform the work of the main gun gunner, which prevented him from commanding the vehicle in battle.
Already before the start of World War II, it became clear that the engine was as important a tank weapon as its gun. The effectiveness of using this type of armored vehicle depended on maneuverability and speed.
The multi-turret layout has become a dead-end branch of tank development; the T-35 can safely be called its symbol. This tank is hard to compare with foreign analogues, because there are no serial tanks with as many as five turrets. These land dreadnoughts were usually made in single copies and, as a rule, they did not participate in battles.
Specifications
| Main characteristics | |
| Combat weight, t | 50 (54) |
| Crew, people | 10 |
| Dimensions, mm: | |
| Length | 9720 |
| Width | 3200 |
| Height | 3430 (3740) |
| Clearance | 530 (570) |
| Armor thickness, mm: | |
| bottom inclined sheet | 20 |
| front inclined sheet | 50 (70) |
| upper inclined sheet | 20 |
| front sheet | 20 |
| hull sides, turret box | 20 (25) |
| suspension protection bulwark | 10 |
| hull stern | 20 |
| body roof | 10 |
| Bottom | 10-20 |
| side of the big tower | 20 (25) |
| roof of the great tower | 15 |
| side of the middle tower | 20 |
| middle tower roof | 10 |
| small tower side | 20 |
| small tower roof | 10 |
| Specific pressure, kgf/cm2 | 0,78 (0,64) |
| Maximum speed, km/h: | |
| along the highway | 28,9 |
| along the country road | 14 |
| Power reserve, km: | |
| along the highway | 100 (120) |
| along the country road | 80-90 |
| Fuel tank capacity, l | 910 |
| Obstacles to be overcome: | |
| rise, hail | 20 |
| vertical wall, m | 1,2 |
| ford depth, m | 1 (1,7) |
| ditch, m | 3,5 |
| thickness of the tree to be felled, cm | up to 80 |
Video about T-35
If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them
The Soviet T-35 heavy tank was a symbol of the power of the Red Army in the 1930s. These multi-turreted combat vehicles proudly marched at the head of a column of military equipment during parades on Red Square in Moscow and Khreshchatyk in Kyiv. Moreover, the T-35 tank is depicted on the Soviet (and today Russian) medal “For Courage” - the most honorable soldier’s medal, awarded only for military merit.
The T-35 was the only five-turret tank in the world produced in series, although in limited quantities. The vehicle was intended to strengthen tank and rifle formations when breaking through heavily fortified enemy positions. Powerful weapons: three cannons and five machine guns, located in five turrets, provided the “thirty-fifth” with the ability to fire from two guns and three machine guns forward, backward or on any side, providing all-round fire.
T-35 tanks took part in battles in Western Ukraine in June - early July 1941, where all were lost. Four "thirty-fifths" were used in the defense of Kharkov in October 1941. To this day, the only copy of the T-35 has survived and is on display at the Military Historical Museum of Armored Weapons and Equipment, which is a branch of the Military Patriotic Park of Culture and Recreation of the Russian Armed Forces “Patriot”.
This book tells about the history of the creation, design, modifications and combat use of T-35 tanks and combat vehicles created on its basis. A significant amount of unique new data and archival documents are presented for the first time, and a large number of photographs are included.
With the start of production of the T-35 heavy tanks, the question arose: to which formations should these combat vehicles be sent? Apparently, the leadership of the Red Army could not immediately decide on this, and the first T-35s began to be sent to a separate training tank regiment, which was formed in Kharkov at the beginning of 1934. The decision was correct - there was a plant nearby that produced the T-35, and the company’s specialists could provide assistance to the military in mastering such a complex combat vehicle as the T-35 was at that time. By the way, along with the T-35, the training regiment also had BT tanks. A similar training regiment, but with three-turret T-28s, was formed in the Leningrad Military District.
At the end of 1935, the General Staff of the Red Army decided to create heavy tank brigades of the High Command Reserve (RGK), which were supposed to be equipped with medium three-turret T-28s and heavy five-turret T-35s. At first, the brigades were supposed to be deployed on the basis of training battalions with T-28 and T-35, but then they decided to use separate RGK tank regiments for this purpose. By 1935, there were four such regiments in the Red Army: 1st in the Belorussian, 2nd in Leningrad, 3rd in Moscow and 4th in the Ukrainian military districts. They were formed in 1929–1931, and were initially equipped with MS-1, and then T-26 and BT tanks, and in quite significant quantities - from 99 to 132, depending on the time and state. These regiments were intended to strengthen the war time rifle and cavalry units operating in the directions of the main attacks.
On December 12, 1935, the 1st and 4th regiments of the RGK and the training tank battalion T-28 were deployed, respectively, to the 1st, 4th and 6th tank brigades of the RGK on the T-28, and the training battalion in Kharkov - to the 5th RGK brigade on T-35.
According to the staff, the heavy tank brigade of the RGK on heavy T-35s consisted of two line and one training tank battalions, a combat support battalion, communications companies, repair, park, chemical, commandant and music platoons, a fire brigade and a tankodrome. Fully equipped, it was supposed to have 38 T-35 and BT, 16 T-26 teletanks (TT and TU), one T-26, three chemical HT-26 and three FAI armored vehicles. However, in practice things did not work out so well. So, according to the report on combat strength, as of March 1936, the 5th Tank Brigade of the RGK had 15 T-35s, nine T-28s and 13 BTs.
In connection with the beginning of the formation of the RGK brigades, in January 1936, the calculation of the combat crews of the T-28 and T-35 tanks was approved. In order to make it more clear who was stationed where in the “thirty-fifth”, it is necessary to provide a numbering scheme for its turrets: No. 1 - main, with a 76-mm cannon, No. 2 - front with a 45-mm cannon, No. 3 - front machine-gun, No. 4 - rear with a 45 mm cannon, No. 5 - rear machine gun. The calculation of the T-35 combat crew looked like this:
"1. The commander (person of the command staff, senior lieutenant) - in turret No. 1, to the right of the gun at the periscope, fires from a diesel engine, loads the gun with the help of a radio operator. Commands a tank.
2. Assistant tank commander (person of the command staff, lieutenant) - in turret No. 2, fires from a 45-mm gun, is the deputy commander, and is responsible for the condition of all the tank’s weapons. Outside of combat, he supervises the training of artillerymen and machine gunners.
3. Junior tank technician (person of command, military technician 2nd rank) - in the control department, controls the movement of the tank, is responsible for its technical condition. Outside of combat, he supervises the training of driver mechanics and mechanics.
4. Tank driver mechanic (junior command staff, foreman) - in turret No. 3 at the machine gun, fires, provides engine care, and is a deputy tank driver. Responsible for the state of the tower's weapons.
5. The commander of the artillery tower - main No. 1 (junior platoon commander) - is placed to the left of the gun, fires, and is responsible for the state of the tower's armament.
6. Turret No. 2 commander (detached commander) - in turret No. 2 to the right of the assistant tank commander. Serves as a loader for a 45 mm gun. If the assistant tank commander leaves, he fires from it. Responsible for the state of the weapons of tower No. 2.
7. The commander of tower No. 4 (detached commander) is at the 45-mm cannon, firing from it. He is the deputy commander of tower No. 1. Responsible for the state of the weapons of tower No. 4.
8. Junior driver (detached commander) - in turret No. 4 to the right of the turret commander. Serves as a loader for a 45-mm cannon and provides care for the vehicle's chassis.
9. Machine gun turret commander (detached commander) - located in turret No. 5. Fires a machine gun and is responsible for the state of the armament of turret No. 5.
10. Senior radio telegraph operator (detached commander) - located in tower No. 1. Serves the radio station, and at the same time helps load the gun in battle.
11. Senior driver (junior platoon commander) - is outside the crew. Provides care for transmission and chassis. He is a deputy foreman - driver.
12. Motor operator (junior technical staff) - outside the crew. Provides constant engine care, cleaning and lubrication.”
From the above document it is clear that the full crew of the T-35 tank consisted of 12 people, while two of them were outside the tank, and their task was to maintain the vehicle in the park.
Meanwhile, the formation of heavy tank brigades did not proceed as quickly as originally planned. For example, a report on the progress of the formation of tank brigades of the RGK dated April 15, 1936 stated:
“All heavy tank brigades have one training heavy tank battalion. In addition, the 5th and 6th brigades each have one linear heavy battalion. The deployment of the remaining battalions has begun. The deadline for the deployment of these brigades was June 1, 1936.
Their re-equipment with new material will be completed by September 1, 1936. By this time, the third heavy tank battalions will be formed. The headquarters of heavy tank brigades are deployed from the headquarters of the RGK tank regiments, which greatly facilitates the process of rearmament and retraining of units.”
In May 1936, by directive of the General Staff of the Red Army, the training tank battalion of the 3rd tank regiment of the RGK was planned to be repurposed for training on T-35 vehicles. To do this, he was supposed to be sent “for training and gaining experience” to Kharkov, to the 5th T-35 heavy tank brigade. Here the battalion was supposed to undergo camp training in the period from May 15 to September 15, 1936. For training, one “thirty-fifth” was transferred to the battalion by the 5th brigade “for permanent use,” but the vehicles were allocated from the 3rd Tank Regiment of the RGK.
On May 11, 1936, the head of the armored department of the Red Army, G. Bokis, sent a directive to the head of the armored forces of the Kharkov Military District, in which he stated the following:
“According to the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 4/2/34891 ss, the training battalion of the 3rd tank regiment from the Moscow Military District will arrive at the disposal of the commander of the 5th heavy tank brigade to undergo camp training and acquire training skills for the period from May 15 to September 15, 1936 G.
This battalion will be provided with vehicles by the 3rd Tank Regiment.
You must:
a), transfer to the permanent use of the training battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment one T-35 tank with its exclusion from the lists of the 5th Heavy Tank Brigade and a corresponding number of combat vehicles to ensure the training of this battalion during the camp period from May 15 to September 15, 1936 G.
b), give appropriate instructions to the commander of the 5th heavy tank brigade to receive this battalion and create appropriate conditions for the normal training of this battalion on the T-35.
For organizing the reception, accommodation, food and combat training training battalion of the 3rd tank regiment of the Moscow Military District, you personally bear full responsibility.
Pay special attention to the battalion arriving to you, and personally supervise the life and training of this battalion during its stay in the 5th heavy tank brigade.
However, the plans of the General Staff soon changed - a decision was made to reorganize the two separate RGK tank regiments remaining in the Red Army into heavy brigades - the 2nd in the Leningrad Military District and the 3rd in the Moscow. This decision was reflected in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated May 21, 1936.
At the same time, the status of heavy tank brigades changed. This order, entitled “On the preparation of tank units,” stated:
“For the purpose of unity of operational-tactical and special-technical training of general-purpose tank units, I order:
1. Tank brigades of heavy and medium tanks from July 1 of this year will be allocated to the command’s tank reserve (TRGK).
2. Rename the 2nd separate tank regiment into the 2nd brigade of medium tanks RGK and the 3rd separate tank regiment into the 3rd brigade of heavy tanks RGK.
3. Include in the tank reserve of the High Command:
1st Medium Tank Brigade RGK - Smolensk;
2nd Medium Tank Brigade RGK - Strelna;
3rd Heavy Tank Brigade RGK - Ryazan;
4th Medium Tank Brigade RGK - Kyiv;
5th Heavy Tank Brigade RGK - Kharkov;
6th Medium Tank Brigade of the RGK named after Comrade Kirov - Slutsk.
4. The tank reserve of the High Command in training and combat shall be subordinated directly to the head of the Automotive Armored Directorate, as the head of the reserve tank forces of the High Command, leaving in other respects the TRGC units subordinate to the commanders of the military districts on the same basis.
Entrust the head of the reserve tank forces of the High Command with constant monitoring of mobilization preparations and readiness of TRGC formations.
5. The Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army should include the indicated changes in the regulations being developed on the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
People's Commissar Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov.”
In addition, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the mobilization plan provided for the deployment of two training tank battalions to train T-28 and T-35 crews. And in peacetime, specialists from the enterprises that produced these combat vehicles were involved in training tank crews of medium T-28 and heavy T-35. For example, at the 5th brigade there were special courses led by engineers from the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, which produced “thirty-fifths”.
The heavy tank brigades of the RGK were intended to strengthen rifle and tank formations when breaking through particularly strong and pre-fortified enemy positions. In accordance with this purpose, training of tank crews was carried out according to programs specially developed by the armored department of the Red Army. For example, on July 14, 1936, the headquarters of the Kharkov Military District informed the chief of staff of the 5th heavy tank brigade that “for practice this year,” additional quantities of the following ammunition were being released for training firing of the unit: 76-mm rounds - 300 pieces, 45-mm shots - 260 pieces, 7.62 mm cartridge - 11,000 pieces.
In November 1936, the commander-commissar of the 5th heavy tank brigade, Colonel M. Faktorovich, in his order on the results of preparations for the current year and on the tasks for the winter period of 1937, wrote:
"In the past academic year As a result of the hard work of all personnel, the brigade achieved some success in combat and political training.
The political and moral state of the brigade units was invariably at the proper level. The Red Army soldiers and command personnel have proven their devotion to the Motherland, Communist Party and the Great Leader of Nations, Comrade Stalin.
However, to this day the brigade still has a number of shortcomings. The main shortcomings that the team must and will work to overcome in the coming year are the following:
1. The issues of reconnaissance, observation, control and interaction with other branches of the military before and in battle are poorly developed.
2. A significant number of accidents and breakdowns occurred in all units and divisions; the park service was not well established.
3. Poor work on raising Stakhanovites, innovators and inventors.
Based on the general level of combat training of the brigade and in pursuance of NKO order No. 00105, I order:
1. Line units should complete the formation of companies by conducting two company exercises each winter. In the period February 10–28, 1937, conduct one battalion exercise.
2. Organize the training of senior and middle command personnel, paying special attention to field training at exits with communications and reconnaissance equipment.
3. The training of cadets is carried out with the expectation of preparing full-fledged junior commanders - excellent shooters and masters of their craft - according to the following calculation:
Senior driver mechanics - 25;
Junior mechanic-drivers - 28;
Motorists - 20;
Radio operators - 30;
Commanders of the central tower - 25;
Commanders of the 2nd and 4th towers - 30;
Commanders of the 3rd and 5th towers - 25...
When training cadets, motor resources should be used as follows:
For single training - 50 engine hours per vehicle;
To assemble a crew - 15 engine hours per vehicle.
For training in working at night, one (third) five-day session every two months should be conducted at night from 23.00 to 7.00.”
The use of the T-35 in the 5th Heavy Brigade revealed a number of serious problems in the operation of the vehicle. In particular, the forces on the tank control levers and pedals turned out to be very significant, which required great physical effort from the driver mechanics. Low reliability of T-35 components and assemblies was noted, especially the transmission, which often broke down and failed. A technical inspection of the tank was required to be carried out after 50 kilometers of movement - otherwise breakdowns were inevitable. In addition, the traction characteristics of the T-35 turned out to be quite weak. For example, in a report from one of the vehicle commanders of the 5th Heavy Brigade in 1936, it was reported that “the tank could only overcome a 17-degree climb and could not get out of a large puddle.”
The large mass of combat vehicles also caused operational difficulties. So, on February 15, 1937, the commander of the 5th heavy tank brigade of the RGK was sent rules for driving on bridges. Regarding the T-35 tanks it said the following:
“I propose that the following rules for driving on bridges of T-35 tanks be adopted for continued guidance:
1) on single-span bridges - only one tank at a time;
2) on multi-span bridges there can be several tanks, but not less than 50 m from each other.
In all cases, movement along the bridge must be carried out so that the axis of the tank strictly coincides with the axis of the bridge. The speed on the bridge is no more than 15 km/h.”
The small volume of production of T-35 tanks - between 1933 and 1937 in Kharkov they managed to produce only 42 five-turret giants - was the reason that the 3rd heavy tank brigade of the RGK in Ryazan could not be staffed according to the staff. Therefore, in the spring of 1938, the 3rd brigade was reorganized into the 3rd light tank training regiment with the T-26.
Things were no better with the T-35 in the 5th Heavy Tank Brigade - they also could not bring it up to full-time strength. Thus, as of January 1, 1938, the Red Army had 41 T-35 tanks, which were located in the following military units and organizations:
5th heavy tank brigade RGK, Kharkov - 27;
3rd heavy tank brigade RGK, Ryazan - 1;
Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army (VAMM), Moscow - 1;
Oryol armored school - 1;
Kazan Armored Technical Improvement Courses (KBTKUTS) -1;
Leningrad Armored Command Improvement Courses (LBTKUKS) - 1;
Leningrad School of Tank Technicians - 1;
Scientific testing armored training ground, Kubinka - 2;
Research Institute No. 20-1;
Plant No. 183 named after the Comintern, Kharkov - 5.
Considering that a total of 42 T-35s were manufactured between 1934 and 1937, it can be assumed that at the time of writing this document one vehicle had not yet been finally accepted for military acceptance.
In March 1938, according to the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army, the 5th heavy tank brigade was transferred from Kharkov to the Kiev Military District (KVO).
Its new location was the city of Zhitomir. On March 31, a report to the chief of staff of the KVO reported that “upon the departure of the 5th heavy tank brigade to the place of new quartering in your district, the KVO handed over the following material to it: T-35-32, T-28-16, BT-2- 1, BT-5-2, BT-7 radio - and, T-26 double-turret - 7, T-26TT - 6, T-26TU - 6.” Thus, out of 42 T-35 tanks, the 5th heavy brigade had 76 by the beginning of 1938 % of all 42 vehicles manufactured in 1934–1937.
Attached to this document were individual vehicle registration cards, which contained information on the numbers of 31 T-35 tanks. A table has been compiled based on these data.
From the table above it can be seen that the T-35 vehicles of the 5th heavy tank brigade were distributed by year of production as follows: produced in 1934 - 5 units (50% of all those produced this year), 1935 - 6 (86%), 1936 2nd - (73%), and 1937 - 8 (80%).
In November 1938, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, consumption standards for fuels, oils and lubricants were established for armored forces. According to this document, the T-35 required 45 kg of Baku B-70 gasoline per hour of engine operation and 5 kg per one kilometer of travel (for comparison: for the T-28 these figures were 40 and 4 kg, for the BT-7 30 and 2 kg ). In addition, per hour of operation of the T-35 engine, 5.2 kg of various lubricants(aircraft oil, autol, grease).
Soon the 5th Heavy Tank Brigade changed its number - now it became known as the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade. Exact date The renaming could not be found. It can be reliably said that in October 1938 it was still the 5th, and in September 1939 it was already the 14th. Thus, the number change occurred between these dates.
In 1939, the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade transferred to a new staff, and therefore the number of “thirty-fifths” in it increased. So, as of April 1, there were already 45 T-35s, on May 1 - 47, on June 1 - 49, on July 1 - 50, on August 1 - 51. The number of “thirty-fifths” did not change.
It should be said that after the change in staff, the brigade became mixed - now it included three linear tank battalions (one with T-35 and two with T-28), a training battalion (with T-28 and T-35), a repair and restoration battalion battalion, reconnaissance, communications and motor transport companies. In this form, the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade existed until June 1940.
In September 1939, the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade was brought into combat readiness, in connection with the planned operation to cross the border with Poland by the Red Army. However, in the period that began on September 17, “ liberation campaign“The brigade did not participate in Western Belarus and Ukraine, remaining in Zhitomir.
On April 23, 1940, a meeting was held in Moscow, chaired by the head of the GBTU KA, Army General D. Pavlov, on the weapons system and organization of the armored forces of the Red Army. The following was proposed for the T-35 tanks:
“...T-35 from the 14th tank brigade should be withdrawn and transferred to the Moscow Military District for parades, including the latter in the mechanized regiment of the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization. Stalin."
However, this proposal remained in the draft. By the way, the “thirty-fifths” were regular participants in all parades on May 1 and November 7 on Red Square in Moscow, starting from 1934 and up to May 1, 1941 inclusive. In addition to Moscow, these cars were demonstrated at parades on Khreshchatyk in Kyiv (approximately since 1937). True, the number of “participants” was small: for example, on November 7, 1940, only 20 T-35s were taken to the parades (10 each in Moscow and Kyiv).
On June 27, 1940, another meeting “On the armored vehicle system of the Red Army” was held in Moscow. It discussed the issue of promising types of tanks and the removal of old models from service. Regarding the T-35, it was proposed to convert it into high-power self-propelled artillery mounts (SU-14 type). However, in connection with the beginning of the reorganization of the tank forces of the Red Army, the T-35 was decided to “be left in service until completely worn out.”
At the beginning of 1940, Soviet-Romanian relations worsened. Without going into the political background of the events, it should be said that in May 1940, preparations began for a military operation to annex Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The fact is that these territories were previously part of the Russian Empire, and were occupied by Romania in 1918. Neither the RSFSR, nor later the USSR categorically recognized these territories as Romanian.
On June 9, 1940, by directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S. Timoshenko, the directorate of the Southern Front was created, the commander of which was appointed Army General G. Zhukov. A week later, an operation to capture Bessarabia was developed. To do this, three armies were deployed as part of the Southern Front - the 5th, 9th and 12th, which had 32 rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 6 cavalry divisions, and tank brigades and 30 artillery regiments. The total number of front troops was about 640 thousand people, about 2,500 tanks, more than 9,400 guns and mortars.
The 14th heavy tank brigade with T-35 vehicles, included in the 9th Army, was also involved in the upcoming operation.
The movement of troops to the Romanian border began on the 11th, and was supposed to end on June 24, 1940. However, for a number of reasons it was not possible to complete this on time. Thus, the lack of a developed plan for the movement of echelons (most of the troops moved forward by railways) led to large delays. As a result, it turned out that it would not be possible to complete the concentration by the appointed date - June 24, 1940. On June 23, the commander of the Southern Front, G. Zhukov, reported on the deployment of troops to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Regarding the tank brigades of the 9th Army, this document said:
«… Tank forces. Of the three tank brigades, the 4th Tank Brigade was concentrated, the 14th Tank Brigade began arriving on June 21, 1940, 6 echelons unloaded, there is no information about the 21st Tank Brigade...
Two tank brigades will be on site, 21 tank brigades may not be suitable.”
According to the original plan, the 9th Army was ordered to advance across the Prut River to the Iasi-Galati line, occupying the middle and southern part of Bessarabia. The 14th Heavy Tank Brigade received the following mission:
“...14 TBR by the end of June 28, 1940, cross the Bendery Bridge and concentrate for the night in the Tanatara, Ursoy area. By the morning of June 30, 1940, moving along the route Novo-Kaushany, Troitskoye, Cimislia, Kochalia, advance units reached the river. Prut on the front of the Leovo-Tsyganka metro station, the main forces are Tigech, Kochalia. Headquarters - Kochalia".
On the night of June 28, 1940, the Romanian government agreed to the conditions put forward by the Soviet Union - the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In connection with the peaceful resolution of the conflict, it was decided to introduce only part of the forces of the Southern Front into the territory of Romania. At 14.00 on June 28, 1940, units of the Red Army began crossing the Romanian border. However, the 14th Heavy Tank Brigade did not take part in this - it remained at its concentration point in the Tiraspol region.
On July 9, 1940, the brigade began to load into trains, but it never returned to its previous location in Zhitomir. The fact is that in the summer of 1940, the Red Army was in the midst of an active process of forming new large tank formations - mechanized corps, each of which included two tank and motorized divisions. The divisions were deployed on the basis of various formations, including tank brigades already existing at that time.
In this regard, the 14th heavy tank brigade was disbanded, and its units were sent to staff two divisions of the 8th mechanized corps at once: the 12th and 15th. The 12th, which was formed in the city of Stryi in Western Ukraine, received a T-35 battalion and part of a training battalion, and the 15th, located in Stanislav, received T-28 battalions. As a result, as of August 1940, the 12th Tank Division had 51 T-35 heavy tanks. All vehicles were part of the 1st battalion of the 23rd tank regiment of the 12th division - according to the original staff approved on July 6, 1940, the heavy tank battalion of the tank regiment of the tank division of the mechanized corps included 51 vehicles (five companies ). Over the next two months, two T-35s were sent for overhaul to plant No. 183 in Kharkov.
In December 1940, an order appeared from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko, which ordered:
“In order to preserve the material part of heavy and medium tanks (T-35, KV, T-28, T-34) and maintain them in constant combat readiness with the maximum amount of motor resources, I order:
1). By January 15, 1941, all tank battalions (training and line) of heavy and medium tanks should be equipped with T-27 tanks at the rate of 10 tanks for each battalion.
All tactical exercises of these battalions are carried out on T-27 tanks.
For training personnel of heavy and medium tanks in driving and shooting and for putting together parts and formations, it is allowed to spend on each heavy and medium tank:
a), combat training park - 30 engine hours per year;
b), combat fleet - 15 engine hours per year. The rest of the number of engine hours allocated for combat training according to the order of the NKO dated October 24, 1940.
No. 0283, to be covered by T-27 tanks.
2). All crews of heavy and medium tanks will be staffed with old-timers who have received training on other combat vehicles.
3). By January 15, 1941, the head of the GABTU must equip all tank divisions with T-27 tanks from the above calculation.”
As can be seen from this order, they tried to protect not only the new T-34s and KVs, but also the old “thirty-fifths” and “twenty-eighths”. It should also be noted that the T-27 was intended to be used specifically for tactical training, and not for driving training for driver mechanics.
In the spring of 1941, the formation of the second wave of mechanized corps began. As a result, the 15th Tank Division was removed from the 8th Mechanized Corps and transferred to the new 16th Mechanized Corps. Instead, the formation of the 34th Tank Division began in March, which was deployed on the basis of the 26th T-26 light tank brigade. To staff the first (heavy) battalions of the new formation, 48 T-35s were transferred from the 12th division (one T-35 left for repairs in Kharkov). The 12th Division, instead of the "thirty-fifths", received the KV-1 and KV-2. By this time, due to the fact that industry could not provide new mechanized formations with heavy tanks, the staff of the heavy tank battalion of the tank regiment of the tank division was revised downward - now it had 31 combat vehicles (three companies).
As a result, T-35 tanks in the 34th division of the 8th mechanized corps were distributed as follows: 67th tank regiment - 20 T-35 (of which three vehicles were under repair in Kharkov), 68th tank regiment - 31 T -35 (fully equipped battalion of heavy tanks). In addition, in April 1941, the battalion of the 67th Regiment received an additional eight KV-1s, bringing its number of combat vehicles closer to the standard number.
As of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 59 T-35 tanks, which were in next parts and educational institutions: 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps (KOVO) - 51 vehicles (of which five required medium and four major repairs, of the last four tanks, three were sent to plant No. 183 in Kharkov).
Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization, Moscow - one.
Scientific testing armored training ground, Kubinka - one.
2nd Saratov Tank School - six (of which two are under repair in Kharkov).
As can be seen from the above data, in June 1941, 5 T-35s were under repair in Kharkov.
At the end of May - beginning of June 1941, the commission of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army checked the staffing and combat training of the 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. Its tank regiments were located in two places - the 67th in Gorodok (24 km west of Lviv), and the 68th in Sudovaya Vyshnya (42 km west of Lviv). As part of this check, on June 3, alerts were carried out with the withdrawal of equipment in the division's tank regiments. It is interesting to cite some excerpts from materials on the 68th regiment, the first battalion of which was armed with the T-35. Thus, in the conclusions “on checking the combat readiness of military unit No. 8863” (this is the designation of the 68th tank regiment), signed by Captain Kholoptsev, it was said:
"1. The raising of the unit and notification of personnel and command personnel was carried out according to plan and in a timely manner.
2. The appearance of the command staff is timely, the receipt of mobile documents is mostly timely...
3. The issue of blackout during the ascent of the unit and during the exit to the assembly area has not been worked out (lights in the windows, in the yard, lit headlights).
4. The technique of sending messengers for command staff in duty vehicles has not been worked out...
5. At the unit headquarters, during preparations for leaving for the assembly area, there is a crush, messengers and communications delegates do not know their place, communications delegates from the battalions show up without maps.
6. Vehicles and weapons are not assigned to the personnel of the motor transport battalion...
7. In the wheeled vehicle park opposite the parking lot, a hole was dug (for the ends), into which the first vehicle fell upon exiting.
8. The bridges along the route to the assembly point have not been repaired, the roads have not been explored.
9. The companies’ exit routes to their areas were not checked, as a result, 1 T-35 tank (2 company 1 TTB) got stuck, and the ATB confused the roads and created traffic jams.
10. The units left for the assembly area on time, 4 TB was late (was in a camp outside the unit’s location without materiel).
11. The choice of location for the unit’s headquarters was unsuccessful...
12. Issues that need to be addressed in the collection areas have not been worked out...
13. The crews are not assembled and not formed in case of a real alert. Turret gunners are not trained in anything for combat work in a tank.
14. The plan is basically real, with the exception of the calculations of personnel who are actually withdrawn on alert.”
Some additions to the above are contained in another document entitled “Notes on the conduct of a drill in 68 TP 3.6.41.” It says the following:
"1. The alert service in the regiment was organized and carried out without fuss and noise. The regimental duty officer and battalion duty officers performed their duties quickly. There was no darkening in the cantonment area, and blackout discipline (smoking) was violated.
2. Mobile documentation was issued without delay to all performers.
3. The personnel arrived at the park quickly and in an orderly manner and immediately began performing their duties. The first tanks left the park after 15 minutes (3 companies of 3 TB), the last tanks of 1 TB after 1 hour 20 minutes. The time given for pulling out the columns, indicated in the mob. plan, is real.
4. Traffic controllers were posted in a timely manner, but were not provided with the means to regulate traffic at night, and do not know their responsibilities. The march discipline is not high (stopping in the middle of the roads, moving on the wrong side, sitting on the turret of a tank, etc.).
5. The route of movement of 1 and 4 companies 2 TB requires engineering equipment (strengthening bridges, laying roads).
6. There was no combat support for movement to the assembly areas - anti-aircraft machine guns, etc. were not installed, air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense signals were not installed.
7. The concentration of the regiment to the assembly area was completed after 2 hours 30 minutes (4 TB). The best options are 1 and 3 TB.
The tanks were supplied with ammunition within the time period specified by the mob. plan, only if only art. shots.
8. Out of 187 tanks, 156 left for the assembly area. Of those that did not leave, 31–10 did not leave for lack of drivers, the rest for technical reasons. Of the 153 wheeled vehicles, 95 reached the collection area; various reasons 58.
9. The location of tank battalions and regiment units in the concentration area is mediocre.
10. Laying in combat and transport vehicles has not been worked out (turrets do not rotate, shells are not placed correctly on vehicles, etc.)…
1. The mobilization plan was worked out realistically, all calculations for the issuance and loading of property of all types of allowances corresponded to the specified deadlines.
2. Technical condition combat vehicles are quite satisfactory.
3. The crews of the vehicles (combat) are not assembled. The transport fleet is not fully equipped with drivers.
Incidents during anxiety.
1. The 4 TB tank was placed in the city center, and did not allow the movement of horse-drawn transport in the direction of Gorodok and Przemysl.
2. In 2 TB, during the training of a turret gunner, a gun shot was fired (from a fragmentation shell) and there was a finger injury.
3. During the movement to the concentration area, two combat vehicles were loaded into 1 TB, two combat vehicles into 2 TB, and four combat vehicles into 4 TB.”
As can be seen from the above documents, the 1st battalion of the 68th tank regiment, equipped with T-35 vehicles, stands out for the better. Also noteworthy is the fact that two “thirty-fifths” got stuck (the original says “loaded”) while moving to the concentration area.
The T-35's combat career was very short. On June 21, 1941, at 24.00, the alarm was announced in the tank regiments of the 34th Tank Division of Lvov. The vehicles were refueled and taken to the training ground, where loading of ammunition began.
According to the “Information on the reserve of engine hours of combat materiel during the withdrawal of 34 TD on combat alert,” at the beginning of the war, the engine life available in the T-35 division was distributed as follows:
During subsequent battles, all T-35s of the 8th Mechanized Corps were lost.
Thus, in the “War Journal of the 34th Tank Division” there is following entries about the T-35: “On June 22, 1941, the division set out with 7 KV, 38 T-35, 238 T-26 and 25 VT...
To the above, it is worth adding that Grudek-Jagiellonian is the settlement of Gorodok, which before the war housed the 67th Tank Regiment of the 34th Division. That's what it was called during the period it was part of Poland.
The 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps was one of the few formations that retained acts for the write-off of combat and transport vehicles lost in the first weeks of the war. Thanks to these documents, it is possible to trace the combat path of each T-35 tank of the 34th division.
Thus, information about the fate of the T-35 tanks of the 68th Tank Regiment can be found out from the decommissioning act, drawn up on July 18, 1941 in Nizhyn and approved by the regimental commander, Captain Dolgirev, and the military commissar of the regiment, battalion commissar Gorbach (the documents are provided while maintaining style and spelling):
“On July 18, 1941, on the basis of the order for 68 TP, a commission consisting of: chairman of the military unit 1st rank Levkovich Yu.B., members: captain Lysenko V.P., military unit 2 r. Bushkov I.A., v/t 2 r. Frolov V.N. and political instructor Tyutyunik drew up a real report on the losses of the material part of 68 TP.
The act was drawn up on the basis of a survey and oral questioning crews.
During the survey and investigation it was found out:
1. Tank T-35 No. 0200-4, 196-94, 148-50 - left during medium repairs in Saidova (correctly Sudovaya - Approx. author) Cherry. Armament and optics have been removed from the vehicles. The vehicles, on the orders of the deputy regiment commander for the combat unit, Major Shorin, were blown up during the withdrawal of units on June 24, 1941.
2. Tank T-35 No. 220-29, 217-35 - stuck in the Saidova Cherry swamp. Armament and optics have been removed. The machine was abandoned while parts were leaving.
3. Tank T-35 No. 0200-8 - in the Sandov area Cherry broke the crankshaft 23.6 - the vehicle was abandoned by the crew. The weapons and optics have been removed from the vehicle.
4. Tank T-35 No. 220-27, 537-80 - suffered an accident (breakdown of the final drive and gearbox) in the Grudek-Yagelensky area. On June 24, 1941, the cars were left in place. The machine guns and ammunition from the vehicles were removed and buried.
5. Tank T-35 No. 988-17,183-16 (the number is erroneous, probably No. 0183-5 or No. 0197-6. - Note author) were left in the Lvov area on June 29, awaiting major repairs. The cars could not move under their own power. Armament and optics were removed from the vehicles and transferred to the division's transport vehicles.
6. Tank No. 288-11 - fell from the bridge, capsized and burned along with the crew 29.6. in the Lviv region.
7. Tank No. 0200-9, 339-30, 744-61 - the vehicles suffered an accident (transmission and final drive failure). Cars left 30.6. when parts leave. Tank No. 0200-9 was hit by the enemy and burned down. Optics and weapons from all three vehicles were removed and buried.
8. Tank T-35 No. 339-48 was hit during the retreat on June 30. in the Belo-Kamenka area and burned down.
9. Tank T-35 No. 183-8 (wrong number, obviously No. 0183-3. - Note author) - engine failure. The tank was abandoned by the crew in Belo-Kamenka on June 30. The weapons and ammunition from the vehicle were removed and buried.
10. Tank T-35 No. 148-39 - was hit by the enemy in the Verbi area where it burned down on June 30.
11. Tank T-35 No. 148-25 - final drive failure. Was abandoned by the crew in the village of Zapit. Optics and weapons from vehicle 29.6 and buried by the crew.
12. Tank T-35 No. 288-74 failure of the main and side clutches. Set on fire by the crew during the withdrawal of their troops 2.7. near Tarnopol.
13. Tank T-35 No. 196-96 - final drives are broken. Left by crew 2.7. near Tarnopol. The weapon has not been removed from the vehicle.
14. Tank T-35 No. 148-26 (the number is erroneous, obviously No. 148-22. - Note) - the gearbox is broken. Left in the forest before reaching the village of Sosovo 1.7. The optics and firing mechanisms of the guns were buried, the machine guns were removed.
15. Tank T-35 No. 288-14 - the tank went missing along with its crew in the area of the village of Zapit on June 28.
16. Tank T-35 No. 220-25 was hit during an attack in the Ptich 30.6 area and burned out.
17. Tank T-35 No. 744-63 - jamming of the pistons in the engine. The tank was left on the way from Zlochev to Tarnopol, the firing mechanisms and machine guns from the vehicle were removed and transferred to the transport vehicles of the 1.7 division.
18. Tank T-35 No. 988-15 - gearbox jammed, 1st and reverse gears broken. The car was left in Zlochiv 1.7. The weapons and optics were removed from the vehicle and handed over to the warehouse of the military unit in Zlochev.
19. Tank T-35 No. 715-61 - the gearbox and primary fan drive are broken. Left by the crew on June 29. 15 km outside Lvov. The gun bolts, ammunition and optics from the vehicle were removed and buried.
20. Tank T-35 No. 234-34, the main clutch was burned and got stuck while crossing the river near Tarnopol. Left by crew 4.7. The machine guns were removed and placed on transport vehicles.
21. Tank T-35 No. 988-16 was hit and burned in battle in the village of Ptich on June 30.
22. Tank T-35 No. 715-62 failure of the primary fan drive, derite compounds in the motor burned out. The firing mechanisms of the guns were buried, the machine guns were removed. The tank was abandoned by the crew on June 29. in Lvov.
23. T-35 tank No. 339-68 (the number is erroneous, probably No. 339-78. - Note author) - failure of onboard clutches and leakage of cylinder jackets. Hit by a shell and burned near Brody on June 30.
24. T-35 tank No. 0200-0 burned out in battle during an attack in the village of Ptichye 30.6... (further in the document there is similar information on other combat and transport vehicles of the 68th tank regiment, points 25 to 205. This work does not provide .- Note author).
Commission conclusions:
The large number abandoned along the way was a result of:
1. Long and continuous marches were carried out without allowing time for technical inspections by crew personnel.
2. Some of the cars had a small power reserve, which led to natural wear and tear of the mat. parts.
3. The vehicles were not provided with spare parts for their restoration on the road and the repair service was not organized.
4. The service for evacuation of vehicles, both faulty and damaged, was not organized, the locations of SPAMs were not indicated.
There were not enough evacuation means.
5. The reasons for leaving cars on the road requires clarification from some crews, since there are two cases of leaving cars on the road for no reason, which is being investigated.
COMMISSION
Chairman of the commission, military technician 1st rank Levkovich
1. Captain /Lysenko/
2. political instructor /Tyutyunik/
3. Military technician 2nd rank /Bushkov/
4. Military technician 2nd rank /Frolov/.”
For the vehicles of the 67th Tank Regiment of the 34th Tank Division, in addition to the consolidated certificate, certificates for individual tanks have also been preserved, thanks to which you can find out the names of the commanders of some T-35s. These documents, handwritten on approximately A5 paper, look like this:
The present conclusion is that vehicle No. 18317 brand T-35 was damaged on June 29, 1941:
The gearbox teeth are broken, the shoe stop is torn off. Further movement is impossible.
The car was left on the territory in the Lviv region (20 km to the east) in a state of complete disrepair.
K-p company Art. l-t /Shapin/
K-p machines/Petrov/
Living crew members /Tyrin/.”
Apparently, on the basis of such documents, a consolidated act on the decommissioning of combat and transport vehicles was drawn up, approved by the commander of the 67th tank regiment, Captain Skidin, on July 18, 1941 in Nezhin:
“Based on the order of the commander of 34 TD dated July 19, 1941 (as in the document. - Note author) commission consisting of: chairman military engineer 2 r. Zykov and members of the technical. 1 rub. Kononenko and v/t 2 r. Umanets conducted an investigation to establish the cause of the loss of vehicles of 67 TP.
When interviewing the command, political, technical and driving personnel of the unit, it was established:
1. T-35 No. 23865 (wrong number, probably No. 228-65. - Note author) - On June 30, the ship suffered an accident. lane lane on the Busk - Krasne road. Rendered unusable, weapons removed. Company commander Soklakov testifies.
2. T-35 No. 23435 - overturned into the river with its tracks upside down in the area of the village. Ivankovtsy fell into disrepair. Svid. com. mash. Ognev 30.6.41.
3. T-35 No. 74465 - victim. emergency cor. lane lane 9.7.41 on the road between Ternopil and Volochisk, cited. unusable, weapons removed. Svid. com. Shalin companies.
4. T-35 No. 18317 (wrong number, probably No. 0183-7. - Note author) -29.6.41 patient emergency cor. lane lane in the Lvov region. Lead. into disrepair. Svid. com. Shalin companies.
5. T-35 No. 1836 (wrong number, probably No. 0183-5 or No. 0197-6. - Approx. author) - 9.7.41 burned heads, frikts. and brake Ribbons in the region of Volochisk. Rendered unusable. Voor. removed. Svid. com. Soklakov companies.
6. T-35 No. 28843 - 26.6.41 suffered a head failure, clutch, rendered unusable, weapons removed in the Gorodok region.
7. T-35 2005 - 3.7.41 suffered an accident ch. clutch, drive in disrepair, weapons were removed in the Zlochev region. Svid. com. Shapin companies.
8. T-35 No. 23442 - 3.7.41 mountains. Zapytov suffered an accident, the cylinder burst and the head was burned. clutch Lead. unusable, weapons removed. Svid. com. Soklakov companies.
9. T-35 No. 53770 - 30.6.41 suffered. Avar, cor. lane lane and the shoes of the left brake band flew off in the Ozhidev-Olesno region. Rendered unusable, weapons removed. Svid. com. Soklakov companies.
10. T-35 No. 74462 - received. damaged The limiter board was torn off, the tapes were torn and burned. board, fric. in the Gorodok district. The shells were all shot, the vehicle was rendered unusable, the weapons were removed. Svid. com. mash. Taranenko.
11. T-35 No. 74467 - 2.7.41 worn. accident: the knee burst. engine shaft in the region of the mountains. Waiting. Rendered unusable, weapons removed. Svid. com. companies Shapin and com. mash. Doroshenko.
12. T-35 No. 74466 - burned ch. and onboard clutches 9.7.41 in the region of the village. Blozhino. Rendered unusable, weapons removed. Svid. com. Shapin companies.
13. T-35 No. 74464, No. 19695, 33075 (wrong number, probably No. 339-75 - Approx. author) - were in medium repair in the town of Gorodok. They were rendered unusable, weapons were removed. Svid. com. companies Shapin and com. mash. Taranenko.
14. T-35 No. 1967 (wrong number, probably No. 0197-6. - Note author) - burned ch. friction clutch, discharge batteries in the Dzerdzuev region 9.7.41. The car was burned, the weapons were removed. Swede com. companies Saklakov and com. Taranenko's company.
15. T-35 No. 1431 (wrong number, probably No. 197-1. - Note author) - the cylinder burst, ch. clutch 25.6.41. The vehicle is rendered unusable, the weapons have been removed. Svid. com. Saklakov company... (hereinafter, from points 16 to 63, other combat and transport vehicles of the regiment are not given in this work. - Approx. author).
Chairman of the commission, engineer 2 r. /Zykov/
v/technician 1 r. /Kononenko/
v/technician 2 r. /Umanets/.”
In addition to the names indicated, other documents contain references to the commanders of the following T-35s: No. 28843 - Ivanov, No. 18317 - Petrov, No. 23442 - Yakovlev.
Several reports on materiel losses have also been preserved, which were compiled daily by the technical services of the regiments when the division was withdrawn to rest in the Kozatin area in July. They did not indicate the serial numbers of the vehicles, but they allow us to clarify some points. For example, the reports indicate that six vehicles of the 68th Tank Regiment were left in winter quarters in Sudovaya Vishnya, three of them were under repair, and three were stuck in the river, which, in general, corresponds to the data in the report on the losses of tanks of the 68th Tank Regiment .
As can be seen from the above documents, most of the T-35s were abandoned during the marches for one reason or another. However, four vehicles were lost in battle in the area settlements Willows and Birds. Here the rear of the 34th Tank Division, which by this time was attacking Dubno, took up defensive positions. Apparently four T-35s moving towards Dubno “attached” to these rear units. According to documents from the 16th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, the fighting here was fierce. So, on the evening of July 29, 1941, the Sikenius battle group (2nd tank regiment, motorized rifle battalion and 88-mm battery anti-aircraft guns) The 16th Panzer Division tried to break through Ptich to Dubno. The unit's report for June 209, 1941 stated:
“At approximately 21.30, the 2nd Tank Regiment was subjected to a Russian counterattack by tanks and infantry. The Russians fought extremely hard, repeatedly jumping into combat vehicles in groups, shooting at the crews. Next, they attached explosive charges to stopped combat vehicles. As a result, the tank regiment was withdrawn to the area south of Verba at about 23.00, and 10 combat vehicles were lost.”
This battle is described more emotionally in the history of the 16th Panzer Division:
“The fighters tried to turn their guns around, the tanks backed up and tried to avoid the shelling. It seemed that no one had heard the orders, and random shooting began all around. The retreat partially turned into panic. Only for a short time was it possible to once again stop the pressure of tanks and infantry. I had to leave the willow.”
As you can see, the German units retreated, even in panic. T-35 tanks also took part in this battle, which in the history of the 16th Tank Division were mistakenly called “Klim Voroshilov” - apparently for some reason they were confused with the KV:
“The Russians flaunted their 52-ton Klim Voroshilov tanks, but anti-aircraft and field artillery confidently coped with these hulking hulks with five rotating turrets.”
It is clear that against the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which could also cope with the KV, the “thirty-fifths” were powerless. At the same time, there is a possibility that the T-35s that took part in the battle at Verba and Ptich on June 29, 1941 destroyed several enemy tanks - in the photo next to the destroyed T-35s you can see two damaged Pz.III and one Pz.II 16- th tank division. Thus, the five-tower giants sold their steel lives dearly.
By the way, the fact that the T-35 tanks of the 34th division fell behind on the march does not at all exclude their participation in the battle. In any case, photographs of several of these vehicles show battle damage and shell marks.
As for the cars that were being repaired in Kharkov, we were able to find the following documents. On August 3, 1941, the head of the 1st department of the GABTU KA, Lieutenant Colonel Panov, who was at plant No. 183, sent the following letter to the head of the BTU KA, military engineer 1st rank Korobkov:
“At plant No. 183 there are 5 T-35 tanks, which arrived at the plant at different times for repairs. The plant partially carries out this repair, taking away labor and some of the machines for processing parts for these machines. Of the available 5 tanks:
One was overhauled and handed over to a military representative (No. 988-18).
Tanks No. 148-30, 537-90 and 220-28 can be on the move after minor repairs.
Tank No. 0197-2 is completely disassembled.
In order not to overload the plant with unnecessary work, and thereby strengthen the repair of T-34 and KV tanks on the one hand, and on the other to avoid their destruction during an enemy air raid, I ask for your order not to overhaul these tanks, to carry out only minor repairs so that the tanks could make independent movement within 100 km, install the weapons placed on them and urgently ship them from the factory. Use these tanks as permanent firing points in critical areas for the defense of the cities of Leningrad or Moscow.”
There are two resolutions on this document:
"T. Korobkov. I consider Comrade Panov’s conclusion correct. These tanks must be used for defense. 7.8.41 Colonel /Alymov/.”
"T. Chirkov. Comrade Alymov ordered to prepare an order signed by Comrade Fedorenko. 08/11/41 Afonin.”
Moscow militia fighters practice interaction with tanks. The T-35 from the regiment of the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after I. Stalin is used as a training vehicle. October 1941 (AKSM).
A telegram signed by the head of the GABTU KA Fedorenko was sent to the district engineer of plant No. 183 on August 21, 1941. It said:
“The 4 T-35 tanks Nos. 148-30, 537-90, 220-28 and 0197-2 located at the plant No. 183 undergo minor repairs, allowing the tanks to move independently, install the required weapons and urgently ship from the plant according to the GABTU KA order . Report your readiness."
As can be seen from the document, one T-35 was repaired in the summer of 1941 and sent to its duty station. Most likely, it was a tank from the troops of the Volga Military District.
As for the four cars mentioned in the telegram, their repairs were never completed. As the Germans approached Kharkov, all four vehicles became part of the so-called armored detachment, which, in addition to the “thirty-fifths,” had five T-26 tanks, 25 T-27 tankettes, 13 KhTZ-16 armored tractors and three armored vehicles. The detachment was subordinate to the commander of the defense of Kharkov, Major General I.I. Marshalkova. This is what Kharkov historian Alexander Podoprigora managed to find about the actions of this detachment during the defense of the city.
On October 22, 1941, part of the tanks supported the counterattack of their infantry against units of the 55th Wehrmacht Army Corps that approached the western outskirts of Kharkov. In the “Report on the Capture of Kharkov”, signed by the commander of the 57th infantry division, which stormed the city, it is said that four light and two heavy tanks took part in the attack. Five of them, according to the report, were hit, and one retreated. If the Germans were not mistaken in calling two tanks heavy, then they were T-35s - there were simply no other heavy (or medium) tanks in the city.
Just a few days after the capture of Kharkov, the “Report on the activities of the headquarters of the LV AK Wehrmacht while performing the duties of the city commandant’s office in Kharkov” indicates that on November 3, 1941, in the New Bavaria region, a 45-ton tank with one 76-mm, two 45 mm cannons and 5 machine guns. Here without a doubt we're talking about about the T-35, since New Bavaria - an area in the southwest of Kharkov - was the starting point for the Soviet attack on October 22. Apparently this T-35 mentioned in the document took part in this battle.
In addition, two more “thirty-fifths” in Kharkov are known from numerous German photographs. Judging by the fact that they were in the eastern part of the city, their crews were trying to leave Kharkov.
One of these tanks was blown up by sappers of the 229th Infantry Regiment of the 101st Light Infantry Division near the school building, which housed the city defense headquarters. The second T-35 was parked on the Chuguevskoye Highway near an experimental agricultural station on the eastern outskirts of Kharkov. This tank was also blown up, possibly by its crew.
On September 15, 1941, the GABTU KA approved a list of 40 vehicles of “domestic and foreign brands of museum storage at the GABTU KA test site, to be sent to the Kazan KUKS.” Among them was a T-35 tank. The vehicles left Kubinka on September 29, 1941, and already on October 4, the deputy head of the GABTU KA, Major General Lebedev, sent a letter to the head of the Kazan courses in which he reported the following:
“From the number of museum storage vehicles sent by the scientific testing site of the GABTU KA to your address, transfer the following vehicles to the defense construction department of the State Military University for their further use in the SD (then there was a list of 12 tanks, but the T-35 is not among them).”
And on October 10, 1941, Lebedev sent the following document to the head of the NIBT test site, Colonel Romanov:
“The T-35 tank remaining from the museum storage will be transferred to the Defense Construction Department for use in fortified areas. Turrets with weapons, rotating mechanisms and turret plates are subject to transfer.
Take away everything that can be used in the future as spare parts and store it in a warehouse; transfer the body and everything unsuitable for further use to scrap metal, registering the transfer with the appropriate acts.”
Based on this, it can be assumed that the “thirty-fifth” was not sent from Kubinka to Kazan, although this vehicle is listed in the landfill invoice No. 2909 dated September 29 about the transfer of tanks to the Kazan courses. The author does not know what happened to this tank.
The only T-35 available in the training tank regiment of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after I.V. Stalin in Moscow in the fall of 1941 appeared in several photographs taken in the area of Komsomolsky Prospekt. However, it is documented that the academy regiment was not sent to the front, so most likely this “thirty-fifth” was used as a training vehicle.
In the summer of 1941, one captured T-35 was sent by the Germans to Germany. The tank was delivered to the German training ground in Kummersdorf, where it was tested. For some time, the vehicle was stored in a box, among other models of armored vehicles at the test site. Subsequently, it, along with other captured Thirty-Fifth tanks, was transferred to the Wünsdorf training center, near Zossen. A number of sources mention that in 1945 the Germans used a captured five-turret tank in the battles near Berlin (right in the Zossen area). Apparently this information was first published in the book “Combat History of Schwere Panzeijager Abteilung 653”. However, no evidence of this could be found. Moreover, among the photographs of the commander of the 22nd Guards motorized rifle brigade(6th Guards Tank Corps, 3rd Guards tank army) Hero of the Soviet Union Bogdanov Khamzi Salimovich, kept in his family, there is a photograph with a T-35 tank, taken in the Zossen area. The vehicle shown in the photograph has clearly not been running for a long time - the tracks and chassis elements, as well as weapons, are missing. In this form, the tank clearly could not be used in battle. Thus, information about the use of the T-35 by the Germans in the battles for Berlin should be considered untrue.
One copy of the T-35 heavy tank has survived to this day: this is a vehicle with serial number 0197-7, produced in 1938. Currently it is located in the Military Historical Museum of Armored Weapons and Equipment, which is a branch of the Military Patriotic Park of Culture and Recreation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation "Patriot". Most likely, this T-35 was listed as part of the 2nd Saratov Tank School during the war.
Main characteristics
Briefly
Details
1.3 / 1.3 / 1.3 BR
10 people Crew
195% Visibility
forehead / side / stern Booking
30 / 20 / 20 housings
20 / 20 / 30 towers
Mobility
52.0 tons Weight
954 l/s 500 l/s Engine power
18 hp/t 10 hp/t specific
29 km/h forward
4 km/h back27 km/h forward
3 km/h back Speed
Armament
96 rounds of ammunition
4.0 / 5.2 sec recharge
5° / 25° UVN
226 rounds of ammunition
2.9 / 3.8 sec recharge
8° / 32° UVN
3,780 rounds of ammunition
8.0 / 10.4 sec recharge
63 rounds clip size
600 rounds/min rate of fire
2,520 rounds of ammunition
8.0 / 10.4 sec recharge
63 rounds clip size
600 rounds/min rate of fire
Economy
Description
Soviet heavy tank T-35 was a true symbol of the power of the Red Army in the 1930s.
These multi-turreted combat vehicles led columns of military equipment in parades on Red Square in Moscow and on Khreshchatyk in Kyiv. Moreover, the T-35 tank was depicted on many posters and postcards, and it is also present in a stylized form on the obverse of the Soviet soldier’s medal “For Courage” - an award awarded only for military merit.
The T-35 was the only five-turret tank in the world that was mass-produced, although in very limited quantities. The purpose of this tank was to qualitatively strengthen other formations of the Red Army when breaking through heavily fortified defense lines. Powerful weapons: three cannons and five machine guns, located in five turrets, provided the “thirty-fifth” with the ability to conduct all-round fire from at least two guns and three machine guns.
During the war, T-35 tanks took part in battles in Western Ukraine in the first, most difficult months of the war. It is known, for example, that four “thirty-fifths” were used in the defense of Kharkov in October 1941. All combat T-35s were lost in these battles, not so much from enemy fire, but due to technical reasons or exhaustion of fuel and ammunition.
To this day, the only copy of the T-35 has survived, which is on display at the Military Historical Museum of Armored Weapons in Kubinka, and not so long ago this tank was restored to running condition.
T-35- premium heavy tank in the Soviet development line with BR 1.3 (AB/RB/SB). Was introduced in update 1.43.
Main characteristics
Armor protection and survivability
The armor of the T-35 was quite good for its time and could withstand shells from the anti-tank guns that existed at that time, whose caliber did not exceed 40 mm. Hull forehead - 30 mm, VLD - 24 mm with a slope of 77°, sides - 23 mm, stern - 20 mm. True, the sides are still covered with chassis protection bulwarks, 11 mm thick, and the side walls of the turret box are covered with 10 mm thick armored walls of tool boxes. The towers also do not shine with the thickness of their armor. The 76 mm turret is armored all around with 20 mm armor, the mantlet and front part are 20 m thick, the 45 mm gun turret is all around 25 mm thick and the mantlet is 17 mm thick, the machine gun turret is 23 and 22 mm thick, respectively. Theoretically, armor of this thickness should not pose a problem for classmates. In practice, they do not always break through it.
The layout of the tank is quite dense, but, oddly enough, destruction of a vehicle with one hit is extremely rare. The very high survivability for its BR is greatly facilitated by its huge, by tank standards, crew of 10 people and the distribution of weapons into independent turrets. 
Mobility
The T-35 cannot boast of any outstanding speed characteristics. The power of the M-17T is clearly not enough for such a weighty (52 tons) vehicle. In AB the tank accelerates to 29.8 km/h, in RB - up to 28 km/h, and on various types of unevenness and climbs the speed is lost quite quickly. The tank turns so reluctantly that one can say that it cannot turn at all. And this should be taken into account when choosing a route. It should also be noted that the tank is simply huge compared to other peer vehicles and hiding it behind some kind of cover is very difficult.
The advantages include the fact that due to the considerable length of the hull, the vehicle overcomes various kinds of ditches and trenches easily and freely.
Armament
The main feature of the tank that sets it apart from the general series is the range and arrangement of weapons. This same feature was one of the reasons why such tanks did not receive further development. It turned out to be almost impossible for one commander to control the fire of five towers located in two tiers. Insufficient visibility did not allow it to cover the entire battlefield, so the tower commanders were forced to independently find and destroy targets. To facilitate the commander’s work, the Special Technical Bureau for Special Purpose Military Inventions (“Ostekhbyuro”) was tasked with developing a fire control system for the T-35 tank. Its production was to be carried out by Ostekhbyuro, and installation and testing were planned to be carried out in Kharkov, at KhPZ. However, the work was not finished.
Judging by the description, the T-35 fire control system was supposed to consist of a tank artillery fire control device and a naval rangefinder.
Main weapon
The T-35-1 was equipped with a 76-mm PS-3 cannon designed by Syachintov as the main weapon, but it was never brought into mass production. Instead, the T-35A and early T-28s began to be equipped with a 76-mm KT cannon (which can be found in the game on the T-26-4, for example). The T-35 turret of the early series was unified with the T-28 turret of the corresponding period. The turret installation provides horizontal guidance of the gun in the range of ±180° and vertical guidance - -5/+25°. The horizontal guidance speed is 33°/sec, and the vertical guidance speed is 7.2°/sec. The breech of the gun is piston, unified with the regimental gun mod. 1927, reloading the gun takes about 4.3 seconds. The main gun's ammunition capacity is 96 rounds, of which it is better to unload 22 rounds, thereby freeing the upper side stowage. The following shells are available for the gun:
- Sh: Sh-353 - 6.2 kg/85 g TNT, 381 m/s, normal armor penetration - 27 mm at 10 m, 25/100, 21/500;
- OF: OF-350M - 6.2 kg/710 g TNT, 387 m/s, high-explosive armor penetration - 11 mm, regardless of distance;
- BB: BR-350A - 6.3 kg/155 g TNT, 370 m/s, normal armor penetration - 37 mm at 10 m, 37/100, 33/500, 30/1000.
Since our tank is premium, the entire range of shells is available initially, unlike the linear T-26-4. Therefore, it makes no sense to load shrapnel at all - its armor penetration and armor protection are still worse than those of the chambered BR-350A. The HE projectile works well against unarmored vehicles and very mediocre against vehicles that have at least light armor. For some reason, kinetic armor penetration for the HE projectile was not delivered and all that was left was the high-explosive penetration of 11 mm.
Additional weapon
The T-35's auxiliary guns are the well-known 45 mm 20-K cannons, mounted in two diagonally positioned small turrets. Initially, the T-35-1 had 37-mm Syachintov PS-2 cannons in its small turrets, but later the small turrets on production tanks were unified with the BT-5. Turret installations provide horizontal guidance of guns in the range of -50/+123° for the front turret and -48/+117° for the rear. The vertical guidance angles are identical for both towers - -8/+32°. The horizontal guidance speed is 22°/sec, the vertical guidance speed is 7.2°/sec. The gun's bolt is wedge-shaped; reloading the gun takes about 3.2 seconds. Each gun carries 113 rounds of ammunition. The following shells are available for the guns:
- BB: BR-240SP - 1.43 kg, 757 m/s, normal armor penetration - 73 mm at 10 m, 71/100, 62/500;
- BB: BR-240 - 1.43 kg/19 g A-IX-2 (29.2 g TNT), 760 m/s, normal armor penetration - 69 mm at 10 m, 68/100, 59/500.
The main purpose of the “forty-five” was to fight armored vehicles, therefore, unlike the main gun, they do not have HE shells in their ammunition load. The armor penetration of a solid shell for this BR seems even excessive, so whether it’s worth taking them is up to you to decide. The chamber projectile quite confidently hits all opponents, and the presence of a charge brings much better armor protection.
Machine gun weapons
7.62-mm DT machine guns on the T-35 are installed in the amount of five barrels. One - in the ball mount of the main turret, two - as twin mounts in small gun turrets, and two more - in small machine-gun turrets. At least three of them can work in a circle, leaving no non-shootable zones. Small machine gun turrets provide horizontal guidance of -10/130° for the front turret and -20/140° for the rear turret. Guidance speed - 37°/sec. The ammunition capacity of each machine gun is 1260 rounds in magazines of 63 rounds with non-pumpable packing BZ-BZT.
Use in combat
Actually, the techniques for using a tank in battle directly follow from its characteristics. A very durable tank with powerful and varied weapons and mediocre speed and maneuverability. Consequently, we choose the direction of the main attack and push through it, supporting the attack of our teammates. As for weapons. To successfully fight on the T-35, you will have to master a powerful sorcery called “shooting from a multi-turret tank.” You can, of course, fire a doublet from the main and auxiliary guns - in the short term this method of shooting brings wonderful results in the form of a “shot-to-death”, but at a distance serious differences in the ballistics of the main and auxiliary guns come into force and one shell will almost certainly be wasted. Well, in parallel with the development of separate shooting, the words that it was difficult for the T-35 commander to control the fire of so many guns and machine guns will become clearer than ever.
Advantages and disadvantages
In general, we have a heavy tank, on its BR it fully meets its purpose - to support the attack of its lighter counterparts in the most important direction. Due to low speed and maneuverability, a quick throw to the other flank is impossible for the T-35 under any circumstances, so think through the trajectory of movement in battle in advance.
Advantages:
- Good survivability;
- Powerful and varied weapons;
- Large crew;
- Possibility of separate firing from the main and auxiliary guns.
Flaws:
- Low speed and maneuverability;
- Big sizes;
- Difficulty controlling weapons.
Historical reference
Two legends are associated with the T-35 tank. One of them says that the T-35 was copied from the English Independent, the second - that it was developed by a group of German engineers led by Edward Grotte, who worked for some time in the USSR and worked on heavy tanks. Both legends are quite far from the truth. In fact, the starting point for the emergence of the T-35 was the report “On the organization of work in the field of tank construction”, made on October 8, 1924 at a meeting of the leadership of the GUVP (Main Directorate military industry). It examined promising types of tanks, such as: maneuverable, escort And positional. If everything was more or less clear with maneuverable (later high-speed) tanks and infantry escort tanks, then with regard to positional tanks the following was literally said:
|
It must be admitted that with all the considerations in favor of a wide maneuver in a future conflict of the Red Army, one cannot but take into account the possibility of the need to overcome fortified positions in advance or even for a long time, in which case the power of maneuverable tanks will be insufficient. In view of this, there is a need for a third type of severe powerful tank, capable of overcoming the obstacles encountered in a positional war. A tank of this kind can only be a special means given to troops when overcoming heavily fortified positions (breakthrough tank). Supplying the Red Army with this kind of tanks is a task of the second order. This kind of heavy tank is hereinafter referred to as positional (heavy). |
That is, there was no clear idea of what this heaviest tank would be like, and the task of creating it seemed clearly of secondary importance, but this did not make it any simpler. The point is also that neither the Republic of Ingushetia nor the USSR had its own tank building school; everything had to start from scratch. That is why the Grotte group was invited to work. The result of the work of Grotte's group was the TG tank, which for a number of parameters was not suitable for production, but its design provided the necessary initial experience to Soviet designers working with the Germans. As for the Independent, in fact, negotiations were held with Vickers not about its purchase, but about development heavy tank according to Soviet technical specifications from 1929. But it didn’t work out.
And so, in November 1930, the Main Design Bureau (GKB) of the Gun-Weapons-Machine-Gun Association began the development of a heavy tank based on the tactical and technical requirements developed by the UMM of the Red Army. The work dragged on, and the project for the T-30 multi-turret tank, created by the end of 1931, was rejected. It was followed by the development of the T-32 tanks and, in parallel, the medium TA-1, TA-2 and TA-3. None even reached the prototype level. After the departure of the Grote group, the KB was reorganized. It additionally included domestic designers M. Siegel, B. Andrykhevich, A. Gakkel, Y. Obukhov and others. The new design bureau was headed by Nikolai Barykov, who at one time worked as E. Grote’s deputy. The new design bureau received the task from the UMM of the Red Army “by August 1, 1932, to develop and build a new 35-ton breakthrough tank of the TG type.” Work on the design of a new vehicle, which was supposed to have a mass of 35 tons, a chassis and a “power unit” of the TG type, weapons and layout similar to the T-32 project developed by N. Barykov and M. Siegel, began in November 1931 . Soon the tank was assigned an index - T-35.
Assembly of the first prototype, designated T-35-1, was completed at the Leningrad Bolshevik plant on August 20, 1932. On September 1, the tank was shown to representatives of the UMM Red Army led by G. Bokis, who were greatly impressed. As a result, the tank absorbed many features of previous projects. The armament was arranged according to the “Independent” type, the transmission was taken from the TG, the design of the chassis was greatly influenced by the German “Grosstractor” from the Krupp company, which a year before was tested at the Kama school training ground near Kazan and was available for study Soviet military specialists. Based on the results of field tests, it became clear that the design of the transmission and pneumatic control was too complex and expensive for mass production. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the main attention when designing the improved version of the T-35-2, which began in November of the same year, was paid to every possible simplification and reduction in cost of the model. The T-35-2 received a new engine - M-17, a different transmission and gearbox, and a PS-3 cannon with progressive rifling was mounted in a large cylindrical turret. Otherwise, the T-35-2 was practically no different from its predecessor, except for the modified bulwark design.
While the T-35-2 prototype was being assembled, the design bureau was finishing work on the T-35A tank project, which was to be mass-produced. Moreover, the T-35-2 was considered only as a “transitional one, identical in terms of transmission to the production model.” In terms of power plant, chassis and transmission, the new vehicle was similar to the T-35-2, but had an elongated hull of a modified design, a chassis reinforced by one bogie, small machine-gun turrets of a new design, larger medium turrets with 45 mm guns and a modified shape housings. In accordance with the decree of the USSR Government in May 1933, serial production of the T-35 was transferred to the Kharkov Comintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). There, at the beginning of June 1933, they were urgently sent passed tests the T-35-2 vehicle and all working documentation for the T-35A. In addition to KhPZ, several other plants were involved in the cooperation, including Izhora (armored hulls), Red October (gearboxes), Rybinsk (engines), Yaroslavl (rubber rollers, oil seals, etc.).
Production of the T-35 was difficult and slow. The plant delivered several tanks a year, which is not very surprising, since the car turned out, even after all the simplifications, to be complex and expensive. Suffice it to say that the T-35A cost the state 525 thousand rubles (for the same money it was possible to build nine BT-5 light tanks). In parallel with the production of T-35 tanks, the plant worked to improve its design and increase the reliability of components and assemblies. At the same time, work on the tank’s power plant was considered a priority. The M-17T engine, which was installed on the “thirty-fifth”, was a variant of the M-17 aircraft engine. On the “tank” version, the spark plugs were moved inside the cylinder camber, and to increase engine life, the engine speed was reduced, as a result, the maximum power decreased to 500 hp. The M-17 engine installed on the 14-ton BT-7 provided the tank with very high dynamic characteristics, but for the 50-ton T-35 the “engine” turned out to be rather weak. He often did not “pull” a heavy car and overheated greatly. The question of manufacturing the T-35B, a vehicle equipped with an M-34 engine with a power of 750 hp, was raised several times, but the project did not go further, although references to the T-35B are found in documents and correspondence for 1936. In addition, a BD-2 diesel engine was installed on one tank on a trial basis.
In total, by the beginning of the war, taking into account the experimental T-35-1 and T-35-2, only 59 tanks of all modifications were produced. The Red Army had 48 T-35 tanks, which were in service with the 67th and 68th tank regiments of the 34th tank division of the Kyiv OVO. The rest were at the disposal of the military educational institutions and under repair (2 tanks - VAMM, 4 - 2nd Saratov BTU, 5 - under repair at plant No. 183). In addition, the T-35-2 was kept as an exhibit in the BT Museum in Kubinka, and the T-35-1 was decommissioned in 1936. All combat tanks were lost in the first months of the war, one was captured by the Germans and transported to the Kummersdorf training ground, and there are references to the fact that in 1945 it took part in hostilities. At the same time, there are also photographs of this tank taken by our soldiers in 1945 in the Zossen area and, judging by the lack of tracks, the vehicle had not been running for a long time by that time.
Media
T-35 projections
Tank T-35 (No. 0183-5) overcomes a ford. June 1936
T-35 tanks pass through Red Square. May 1, 1937. Most likely, the car was manufactured at the end of 1936.
Tank T-35 from the training tank regiment of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after I.V. Stalin. 1940
The Red Army is the pride of the people! Poster from 1937.
Medal "For Courage", 1942
The poster “Forward, to the West!”, judging by the presence of the banner of the Sumy division - the poster was published after September 1943.
T-35 on the frieze of the House of Soviets, St. Petersburg
T-35 tank with conical turrets and an inclined turret box. Moscow, 1940
The most famous Soviet tank, which largely ensured our country’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, was the legendary T-34. However, it is not he who is depicted on the medal “For Courage”, but the T-35 tank, which was practically not used in battles, but was formidable in appearance.
Fortress on wheels
Paradoxically, the T-35, which Soviet artists loved to depict on propaganda materials during the Great Patriotic War, was out of production for two years by 1941. A total of 61 vehicles of this model of heavy tank were produced in the USSR. Its main difference from other combat vehicles of the USSR was the presence of five combat towers at once. During military parades of the 1930s, indeed, the T-35 looked like an indestructible monster. At the same time, it should be noted that while the Germans unsuccessfully tried to put their multi-turret tanks into mass production only at the end of the war, in the USSR they were mass produced starting in 1933. At the same time, as surprising as it may sound, the most powerful tank of the Soviet Union did not participate in military operations in the period from 1933 to 1939, when it was discontinued. He could only be seen on Red Square during parades or during exercises. Individual samples of this combat vehicle were sent to the front only after the start of the Great Patriotic War. But on the battlefield they performed extremely poorly. Heavy, clumsy, and often breaking, the T-35 quickly broke down or was destroyed by the enemy. At the same time, the fewer examples of this tank remained in the army, the more the number of its images on propaganda posters, calling for fighting to the last drop of blood, grew. On them, the T-35 was supposed to personify the power of the Soviet army, although in reality it never was.
Birth of a legend
However, the blame for the almost complete inability to fight in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War lies not with the crew of the tank or its designers, but with the rapid evolution of military equipment, during which the T-35 quickly became obsolete. The appearance of this combat vehicle was due to the work of the German tank designer Edward Grotte in the USSR in 1930. A talented inventor and a group of assistants worked in the Soviet Union to create the first domestic heavy tank. However, shortly before the completion of the work, the designer was politely sent home, and his work was continued by Soviet military engineers. As a result, by 1932, the T-35-1 was born, weighing 42 tons. The tank's armor reached 40 mm, and the crew consisted of 11 people. The combat vehicle was armed with five combat turrets, two cannons and three machine guns. During testing, the tank completely satisfied the military, but the designers decided to further refine their creation. First, by 1933, the T-35-2 tank appeared, and then it went into the T-35A series. Latest version The tank had an improved chassis and significantly changed machine-gun turret designs from the original version. In 1934, the heavy tank entered service with the troops. At the time of its appearance, the five-turreted T-35 tank was the most formidable tank in the world in terms of firepower. The five rotating turrets of the combat vehicle were armed with machine guns and could conduct all-round combat. In turn, three cannons also placed on the towers could create significant gaps in the enemy’s manpower and equipment. The main disadvantages of the tank were thin armor and low speed of movement due to the huge mass of the tank. However, by 1941, over the past seven years since its creation, the tank had become obsolete, although it still gave the impression of a serious combat vehicle.
Combat use
In the first days of the war, there were 48 T-35 tanks in the Red Army units. Basically, they were on the balance of the 67th and 68th tank regiments, as well as the 34th division of the Kyiv Military District. As soon as the war began, the command of the Red Army tried to use tanks that had never fought before for their intended purpose. Unsuccessfully. Thirty-five of them broke down on the way to the front, and only seven died during the fighting. True, in fairness it is worth noting that two T-35 tanks performed well during the battle of Moscow. But most of the T-35s were abandoned by their crews due to technical faults. In this case, time can be noted, one interesting fact. When the Germans captured the first captured T-35, it was immediately sent to Berlin for study. The tank remained in the capital of the Third Reich until May 1945, when the repaired one was used by the Germans during the defense of the city, but was quickly knocked out by Soviet troops. This episode was the last combat use of the T-35 in history. However, this tank, although not successful as a combat vehicle, played a significant propaganda role during the propaganda during the Great Patriotic War.
The interwar period in tank building became a time of exploration and experimentation. What should a tank be like and what tasks should it perform on the battlefield? In this sense, the attempt to increase the firepower of tanks by increasing the number of turrets can be called a pattern rather than an exception. In theory, such a tank, in addition to its seemingly impressive combat power, made a colossal impression and became one of the propaganda symbols. But if in Europe things did not go further than experiments and propaganda, then in the USSR they approached the creation of a powerful breakthrough tank, which, together with the infantry, would attack the enemy’s previously prepared defenses very seriously and thoroughly.
The impetus for the creation of the five-turret giant was the appearance in Great Britain of the five-turret Independent tank, which remained in a single copy. And in the Soviet Union, since 1930, complex work to create a heavy breakthrough tank. In 1934, serial production of the T-35 tank began at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant. At the same time, work was carried out to eliminate numerous shortcomings that were identified during production and operation. The T-35 had five turrets. A short (barrel length of 16.5 calibers) KT gun was installed in the main turret. This gun was intended to suppress enemy firing points and fight enemy infantry. In addition to the gun, a 7.62 mm DT-29 machine gun was installed in the turret. In two artillery towers at the ends there was one 45-mm anti-tank gun and a DT-29 machine gun.
Small towers were armed only with DT machine guns. The ammunition consisted of 96 shells for a 76 mm gun and 226 shells for 45 mm guns and 10,080 rounds for machine guns. The tank's speed was 28.5 km/h. The crew usually consisted of ten people. The tank had bulletproof armor. On later tanks produced in 1938 and 1939, the armor was reinforced, which, however, could not save the tank from the anti-tank artillery of the late 1930s. Even at the beginning of the production of the T-35, a new multi-turreted T-39 tank with anti-ballistic armor was proposed as an alternative, costing 3 million in production. Considering that the T-35 cost much less to produce - 525 thousand rubles, it was decided to maintain production of the T-35. Although 525 thousand rubles is the cost of nine BT-5 light tanks. Production of the T-35 continued in Kharkov from 1934 to 1938. There was a total. 59 five-tower giants were produced.
SU-14−1. (fandom.com)
In addition to the obvious advantages - powerful weapons and impressive appearance, the tank had many shortcomings. It was simply impossible for the tank commander to control the action of all five turrets. With the development of anti-tank artillery, the T-35 lost its advantage, turning into a huge, slow-moving target. It was difficult to get into the four-meter-tall tank. It was no easier for the crew, if necessary, to urgently leave the tank: this was only possible through the top hatches. By the early 1940s, the T-35 was largely outdated, and the possibilities for its modernization were almost completely exhausted. In 1940, the question was raised about the future fate of the tank - a serious transformation of the tank into a self-propelled gun of special power or the use of the T-35 for parades was proposed. However, in the end they decided to keep the tank in service until the resource was completely exhausted.
The military biography of the T-35 turned out to be very short. If the row Soviet tanks Since the 1930s managed to take part in five or more wars and conflicts, the T-35’s combat participation is limited to the first months of the Great Patriotic War. As of June 1941, in the troops and military educational institutions There were 59 T-35 tanks. Of this number, five vehicles were under repair at the beginning of the war. Forty-eight tanks were part of the 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps and were stationed in the Lvov salient. During the fighting, most of the tanks were lost as a result of breakdowns, several vehicles were killed during military clashes with the enemy. One of the last episodes of combat use of the T-35 was the defense of Kharkov in October 1941, when two T-35s took part in a tank attack on German positions and were shot down.
Two more T-35s were discovered on the eastern outskirts of the city. Several T-35s survived, remaining in the inner districts as training vehicles. The tank also made its mark in cinematography in the filming of staged shots in the film “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow.” Only one single T-35 has survived to this day, which is now in the museum of armored forces in Kubinka, near Moscow. The T-35 could often be found on posters. The land battleship was also placed on the obverse of the medal "For Courage". Moreover, it is present both on the Soviet award (1938) and on medals in the modern award system of the Russian Federation.
SU-14
On the basis of the T-35 tank, work was also carried out to create a self-propelled gun of special power. Back in 1931, it was planned to create a system of three self-propelled guns of Special Purpose Heavy Artillery. The complex was supposed to consist of a 130 mm or 152 mm gun, a 203 mm howitzer and a 305 mm mortar. Since the required 152 mm guns and 305 mm mortars did not exist, work focused on the creation of a self-propelled gun with a B-4 howitzer. Initially they tried to use the base of the T-24 tank, then the T-28, but then, after a series bad experiences decided to create it on the basis of the T-35. At the end of 1936, experimental self-propelled guns received new 152 mm long-barreled guns U-30 and Br-2. The result was a self-propelled gun with a heavy gun, which was superior in firing range to all existing analogues in other countries at that time.
T-35 on the obverse of the medal "For Courage". (otvaga.net)
The serial production of one hundred similar guns was supposed, but for a number of reasons production did not begin until the end of 1939. When the Soviet-Finnish War began and the Red Army felt a great need for self-propelled guns of special power. Work has begun to strengthen the armor protection of self-propelled guns. The mass of self-propelled guns with 30-50 mm armor reached 64 tons, and the speed dropped to 22 km/h. As a result, mass production of the gun never began, and two prototypes were transferred to Kubinka for storage. In the fall of 1941, as the front line approached, the guns were used to fire at enemy positions from long distances. One of them has survived to this day as an exhibit in the Museum of Armored Forces.
Similar articles
The best amulets against the evil eye and damage Amulet against the evil eye with hands for children
How to read the Psalter correctly
Delicious dishes with sausages
A glimpse of Bella. Romantic chronicle. A glimpse of genius. Messerer about Akhmadulina Boris Messerer glimpse of Bella romantic chronicle
I dreamed that I was sailing on a boat on the river
How to cook beef entrecote in a frying pan
About the company Foreign language courses at Moscow State University
Which city and why became the main one in Ancient Mesopotamia?
Why Bukhsoft Online is better than a regular accounting program!
Which year is a leap year and how to calculate it