We recommend reading it. Russian Black Sea Fleet during the First World War Combat composition of the Black Sea Fleet in 1914

Black Sea Fleet. Campaign of 1914.

The military operations of the fleets in the First World War covered almost the entire oceans. But they were carried out most intensively in the North Sea, in the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, in the Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Seas.
Along the coasts of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania there were sea communications that were very important for Turkey, through which reinforcements and supplies were delivered to the troops of the Caucasian Front, coal, oil (from Romania before it entered the war on the side of the Entente), agricultural products to Constantinople and other cities western part of Turkey. The blockade of the Bosphorus and the disruption of Turkish maritime communications in the theater were one of the main tasks of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The equipment and defensive means of Russian bases (with the exception of Sevastopol) were in unsatisfactory condition at the beginning of the war. Coastal artillery was especially weak.
The enemy's coast had no means of defense. Only the Bosphorus area was fortified.
The fighting in the Black Sea began with a treacherous (without declaration of war) attack by German-Turkish naval forces on Russian bases and ports. Early in the morning of October 16 (29), they fired at Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Novorossiysk.
Two Turkish destroyers, Gayret and Muavenet, took part in the attack on Odessa. Taking advantage of the surprise of the raid, enemy ships sank the gunboat Donets and damaged the minelayer Beshtau, the gunboat Kubanets, 4 steamships, port facilities, as well as a sugar factory and a tram station in the city; there were human casualties.

The raid on Sevastopol was carried out by the battle cruiser Goeben, accompanied by two destroyers. Having come almost close (at 45 cables) to the entrance to the Northern Bay, in 17 minutes he fired 47 280-mm and 12 152-mm shells in salvoes at Sevastopol. Three shells hit the battleship "George the Victorious" and two shells hit coastal batteries. One boiler on the battleship was disabled. Return fire was carried out by 8 batteries and the St. George the Victorious. But the latter, due to poor visibility in the fog, managed to fire only three shots. Coastal batteries fired to extreme distances, expending 360 shells with a caliber of up to 280 mm.
When departing from Sevastopol, the German cruiser attacked, west of Cape Khersones, Russian patrol destroyers and the minelayer Prut, which was returning from Yalta to Sevastopol. The destroyer "Lieutenant Pushchin" received heavy damage, and a strong fire broke out on the "Prut" and its crew was forced to scuttle the ship, as there was a direct threat of explosion of 710 mines on board. The enemy destroyers that were with the Goeben picked up 75 people from the Prut crew from the water and captured them.

Feodosia came under fire from the Turkish light cruiser Hamidiye, which fired 150 shells at the port and city, resulting in fires in the port warehouses and railway depot. The shelling of Novorossiysk was carried out by the German light cruiser Breslau and the Turkish mine cruiser Werk. Over 300 shells were fired into the city, destroying the radio station, damaging several ships, an oil tank, and grain warehouses.
In addition to shelling, enemy ships laid minefields near Odessa (28 minutes), Sevastopol (60 minutes) and at the entrance to the Kerch Strait (60 minutes). On the same day, the Russian steamships Kazbek and Yalta were blown up and sank by mines placed near the strait.
After shelling and laying mines, the enemy ships headed for the Bosphorus. On the afternoon of October 16 (29), the main forces of the Russian fleet (5 battleships, 3 cruisers and several destroyers) went out to search for them. Until October 19 (November 1), they cruised in the southwestern part of the sea and, not finding the enemy, returned to Sevastopol. Thus, the German-Turkish fleet managed to raid Russian naval bases and ports with impunity.
The high Russian military command forgot the lessons of Port Arthur. Wanting Turkey to maintain neutrality for as long as possible, which in fact was fictitious, it doomed the fleet command to passivity. Without the permission of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Black Sea Fleet did not have the right to go far into the sea and even conduct reconnaissance with warships in the southern part of the theater. Only after the enemy attack did the fleet commander gain freedom of action. The fleet command, in turn, showed exceptional carelessness by not organizing the defense of ports and bases from the sea in advance. There was no coordination between naval and land commanders in actions in the event of an enemy attack.
In this situation, the treacherous attack of the German-Turkish fleet could have led to more significant consequences if the enemy command had not dispersed its forces across several objects far apart from each other. The enemy's initial calculations to weaken the Russian Black Sea Fleet did not come true.
After the raid by enemy ships, the command of the Russian fleet began to stir. Measures were taken to strengthen coastal defenses. A state of siege has been declared in Sevastopol. The laying of defensive minefields began. In November - December, in the Odessa area, at the entrance to the Dniester estuary, in the Kirkinitsky Bay, near Sevastopol, in the Kerch Strait and off the Caucasian coast, 4423 mines were laid. Coastal artillery in the theater was also strengthened, especially in Batum, which had weak defenses before the war.
Simultaneously with defensive measures, the Black Sea Fleet launched operations against the enemy’s sea communications. These communications ran along the Anatolian coast and were of paramount importance for Turkey, since the network of railways and dirt roads was poorly developed. They transported coal and various kinds of raw materials from Zonguldak to the Bosphorus and carried out military transportation from west to east, to the land front line. The purpose of the actions of the Russian fleet was not only to interrupt sea communications, but also to block the enemy fleet in the Bosporus, and if it tried to break into the sea, to force a battle on it.

Until the end of 1914, the Black Sea Fleet squadron made six missions to enemy communications in the southern part of the sea. The first such exit was undertaken on October 22-25 (November 4-6). It resulted in the laying of a minefield (240 min) near the Bosphorus, the shelling of the port of Zonguldak and the sinking of 5 transports.
The second exit of the squadron on November 2-5 (15-18) was associated with the provision of mine laying by the Batumi detachment of minelayers (Konstantin, Ksenia) near south-eastern Anatolia. Barrages (400 mines in total) were set up at Trebizond, Platana, Unye and Samsun. In addition, the ships fired at the port facilities of Trebizond. On November 5 (18), upon returning to Sevastopol, the squadron met at Cape Sarych (Crimea) the cruisers Goeben and Breslau, sent by the enemy to intercept part of the ships of the Russian squadron. The first military clash took place on the Black Sea. The Russian squadron (5 battleships, 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers) sailed in the usual marching order: battleships in the wake column, cruisers on patrol, and destroyers behind the battleships.

At 12 hours 10 minutes on November 5 (18), not far from Cape Sarych, enemy cruisers appeared from the fog. The lead Russian battleship Eustathius immediately turned left to bring the enemy to a heading angle of 90°, which ensured the most effective use of the main caliber guns. The rest of the battleships followed. At 12 hours 21 minutes, "Eustathius" from a distance of 40 cables opened fire on the "Goeben" from the bow 305-mm guns and covered it with the first salvo, causing a fire on it. The German cruiser immediately set a parallel course with the Russian squadron and responded to the Eustathius with fire from all five towers. But only with the third salvo was he able to hit the Russian ship with two shells.” Subsequently, the Goeben scored two more hits on the Eustathius. At 12:35 he turned sharply to the right and disappeared into the fog. The shooting stopped. The battle lasted 14 minutes. The battleships “John Chrysostom”, “Three Saints” and “Rostislav” also took part in the battle (they fired at the “Breslau”), but their fire was ineffective, since they fired with the wrong sight setting (60 cables).
Thus, the battle actually came down to a duel between two ships. The Russian ships did not pursue the enemy, fearing the mines that the German cruisers could lay during their departure. And it was useless to do this in view of the significant superiority of enemy ships in speed.
In 14 minutes of battle, the battleships of the Russian squadron fired 34 305-mm shells and several dozen medium-caliber shells at the Goeben. The enemy cruiser received 3 hits from 305 mm shells and 11 hits from 203 and 152 mm shells. It killed 105 people and wounded 59 people. It took two weeks to repair the cruiser.
"Goeben" fired 19 shots from 280-mm guns and scored 4 hits on "Eustathius", which caused damage to casemates and auxiliary mechanisms. Russian losses were 33 killed and 25 wounded.
This time the enemy failed to carry out his plan. His cruisers met not with single ships or a weak formation, but with an entire squadron. After a short battle, due to the superiority of the Russian squadron, they ceased fire and hastily retired. But the battle at Cape Sarych once again showed the command of the Black Sea Fleet that sailing ships alone or in small groups is very dangerous. Correction of the damage received by "Eustathius" temporarily suspended the action of the fleet's forces on the enemy's sea communications. The German-Turkish fleet at this time intensified its actions. However, this did not last long. On November 19 (December 2), the Russian squadron again went to sea. In December, another 607 mines were placed near the Bosphorus, and Turkish ports were shelled. On December 13 (26), the cruiser Goeben was blown up by mines laid near the Bosphorus and was out of action for 4 months.
Of great importance at the end of the 1914 campaign were the actions of the Batumi detachment of ships, which in December was reinforced by the destroyers Zharkiy and Zhivoy. The detachment supported the coastal flank of the Caucasian army with naval artillery fire, ensured the landing of sabotage troops behind enemy lines, and prevented the transfer of reinforcements and supplies for Turkish troops from Trebizond. All these actions helped the Russian troops go on the offensive and push the enemy back across the state border.
Sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and soldiers of the Russian army also fought on the Danube in 1914. At the beginning of the war, Serbia turned to Russia for military assistance. She asked to deliver small arms, which were in dire need, to send mine specialists and mine-torpedo weapons to combat enemy river forces, as well as engineering units to arrange crossings across the Danube and its tributaries. Serbia's request was granted. In August 1914, a special unit was sent to the Danube - the Special Purpose Expedition (EON) under the command of Captain 1st Rank Veselkin. The expedition included: a detachment of combat and transport ships, a barrage detachment, a detachment for the defense of the Iron Gates, an engineering detachment and various coastal units.
The special purpose expedition provided very significant assistance to the Serbian armed forces in the fight against the enemy in the Danube basin. Mine, net and other obstacles, coastal installations and artillery batteries significantly limited the actions of the Austro-Hungarian river flotilla. On October 10 (23), the enemy flagship monitor “Temesh” was blown up by Russian mines and killed. The creation of river crossings allowed the Serbian command to maneuver their forces in a timely manner during combat operations. 113,120 rifles, 93 million rounds of ammunition, 6 radio stations and other military equipment were delivered to Serbia. All this helped the Serbs withstand the offensive of superior enemy forces in 1914, and in a number of areas even forced the Austrian troops to retreat.
The actions of the German-Turkish ships after the treacherous attack on Russian bases and ports were reduced mainly to ensuring their maritime communications. Their main concern was to prevent Russian naval forces from clogging the Bosporus. At the same time, they did not refuse new raids on the Russian coast and other actions. Thus, the light cruisers Breslau and Hamidiye fired at Poti and Tuapse in November, and the battle cruiser Goeben cut the Sevastopol-Varna cable on October 28 (November 10), and shelled Batum in December. On November 24 (December 7), the Turks landed a sabotage force near Akkerman, which, however, was immediately destroyed by the Russians.

Summing up the results of the 1914 campaign on the Black Sea, it should be noted that neither side achieved the main goal - to change the balance of forces in the theater in their favor. The losses suffered by the fleets affected only secondary ships (old gunboats, auxiliary minelayers).
The main content of the combat activity of the Russian fleet in the 1914 campaign was the defense of its coast and actions on the enemy’s sea communications. However, due to the lack of bases in the southwestern part of the sea, Russian ships had to operate as part of a squadron that could not continuously cruise. After spending several days at sea, she returned to Sevastopol to take on fuel and supplies. The enemy took advantage of this and increased transportation. The effectiveness of the squadron's actions was also affected by the lack of systematic operational reconnaissance in the theater, for which the fleet did not have the necessary forces.
The Russian command pinned great hopes in the fight on enemy reports on minefields off the Turkish coast. But these hopes were not completely realized. Firstly, due to the unreasonably high consumption of mines for defensive purposes, there were not enough of them for active barriers. Secondly, there was no way to guard the deployed barriers and therefore the enemy could freely mine them. Nevertheless, the actions of the Russian fleet on sea communications caused serious concern to the enemy. The German-Turkish command was forced to almost completely abandon active operations and redirect their forces to protecting shipping. Direct enemy losses from the actions of Russian naval forces also affected communications. The Turks lost 1 minelayer, 1 gunboat, 11 transports and 120 motor and sailing schooners; the best ship of the German-Turkish fleet, the battlecruiser Goeben, was damaged and out of action for a long time.

German cruisers in the Mediterranean and Constantinople

Back in 1911, when Turkey bought four large destroyers from England and ordered the construction of two dreadnoughts, the advantage of the Black Sea Fleet forces over the Turkish one was violated. The State Duma then approved a program for the construction of new ships. First of all, they began building two battleships-dreadnoughts, a new type of destroyers and submarines.

The Franco-Russian naval treaty of 1912 aimed to strengthen the left flank of the Russian army front by:

1) countering the connection of the Austrian fleet with the Turkish and 2) facilitating the conditions for the Black Sea Fleet to enter the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

Taking into account that the appearance of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea, on the left flank of the front (which abutted the Black Sea) could cause serious events: paralyze the connection between the Russian European front and the Asian one and stop the offensive ability of the Black Sea Fleet, the French naval minister Delcasse and the chief of the General Staff, Vice -Admiral Aubert recognized it necessary to include in the plan for the deployment of the French fleet in the fight against the enemy - to pass the Dardanelles.

On the Russian side, the agreement was signed by the Chief of the Russian Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral Prince Lieven, and the Minister of Naval Affairs, Admiral Grigorovich.

According to the concentration plan of the French army, it was necessary to transport the 19th Corps and most of the colonial troops from Morocco and Tunisia from Algeria as quickly as possible. The French Supreme Council of National Defense recognized that the best method of transportation, due to the diversity in tonnage and speed, would be the independent movement of transports with troops without large escort detachments, requiring transports to go at full speed to their destination ports.

The French battle fleet was charged with the duty of achieving supremacy at sea, and not wasting time on convoys.

A few days before the declaration of war, the entire French fleet was stationed in Toulon after maneuvers. According to the previously planned plan, the fleet was supposed to be off the Algerian coast on August 1, but in order to avoid conflict and due to the tense political situation, the government postponed the departure of the fleet from Toulon until the last possible opportunity.

On August 2, at 9 o’clock in the morning, Admiral Boué de Lapereire, commander of the fleet, received a telegraphic order from the government: “the cruisers Goeben and Breslau arrived in Brindisi on the night of August 1.” Go to sea and, upon receiving news of the outbreak of hostilities, detain them.” The Council of Ministers once again confirmed that the transportation of troops is carried out by separate ships. The French government knew that war would be declared the next day and therefore gave complete freedom of action to the battle fleet to block the path of the Goeben and Breslau, whose exit from the Adriatic Sea into the waters of Sicily seemed to indicate their movement to the west, towards Gibraltar.

"Goeben", a dreadnought cruiser built in 1912 (with a displacement of 23 thousand tons, with 10 - 11-inch guns and a test speed of 27.8 knots), was sent to the Mediterranean Sea in 1913, so that in case of war sink French transports and disrupt France's communications with its colonies in North Africa.

After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, the commander of the German detachment consisting of the Goeben and Breslau, Admiral Souchon, foreseeing an imminent war, went to the Austrian port of Pola to replace the Goeben's badly burnt boiler pipes. After 18 days, Admiral Tirpitz orders Admiral Souchon to leave Pola immediately to avoid being blocked. Despite the feverish work (4 thousand tubes were replaced), the repair was still not completed. On August 1, the Goeben arrived in Brindisi, where the Italians, under various pretexts, refused to give it coal. Admiral Souchon entered Tarento for the Breslau, and both ships went to Messina. There the Italians again refused coal, but the detachment still managed to accept 2 thousand tons of coal from a German company. These days, Italy was still considered an ally of Germany...

On August 3 at 4 o'clock in the morning, Admiral Lapereire left Toulon for the sea with the entire battle fleet, moving at a small 12-knot speed.

Both the marching order (a collection of the most diverse types of ships), and the purpose of the squadrons and the actual division of the fleet at the height of the Balearic Islands: the 1st squadron - to Philippeville, the 2nd - to Algiers and the 3rd - to Oran definitely showed that Admiral La Pereire I didn’t intend to go in search of “Goeben” and “Breslau” to block their path at least between Sicily and Tunisia.

On August 3, at 9 pm, the government for the third time forbade him to form a convoy with a battle fleet of transports sent at the appointed hours and moving independently at full speed. He was also instructed, at the request of the English admiral, to coordinate with him actions for the safety of transport and the destruction of German cruisers, since war with Germany had been declared.

On August 2, 1914, the commander-in-chief of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, Admiral Milns, received an order from Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) not to let Goeben and Breslau out of sight, since war was inevitable!

England declared war on Germany at midnight on August 5, but on August 3 the English admiral asked Lapereira:

“The Admiralty desires concerted action between French and British forces. How could I best help you?"

Lapereire replied:

“Currently occupied in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea covering the transport of troops, I would be very grateful if you could observe the movement of the Italian, Austrian and German fleets in the Adriatic. You will be notified when I regain freedom of movement."

This response was sent on the night of August 3-4 by the French admiral, the commander of the fleet, who had already three times received orders to go to the enemy, and not to engage in convoy when the situation was so favorable. Having to deal with only two German cruisers, deprived of bases, he, with the assistance of the English fleet, had an overwhelming superiority of forces on his side.

On the same night from August 3 to 4 (at 1 am), Admiral Souchon set off with the Goeben and Breslau to the shores of Algeria. At 2 a.m. on August 4, he received orders from Tirpitz to immediately proceed to Constantinople, since Germany hoped that the presence of “Goeben” in Constantinople would put adequate pressure on Turkey and it would come out on its side, that is, declare war on Russia.

At 6 o'clock in the morning he received notification from Tirpitz that war had been declared on France. While off the coast of Algeria, Admiral Souchon did not miss the opportunity to bombard French bases: at dawn, raising St. Andrew's flags”(!P), “Goeben” bombarded Philippeville, and “Breslau” bombarded Beaune. Then both ships again went to Messina to load coal and soon met with the English cruisers - dreadnoughts Indomitable and Indefatigable - on counter courses. Both detachments first separated at a distance of 8 thousand meters, with guns pointed at each other and without exchanging the prescribed fireworks (since on August 4, England had not yet declared war on Germany, but only at midnight on August 5).

Not wanting to let Goeben and Breslau out of sight (according to Churchill’s orders back on August 2), the British turned and rushed after them. "Goeben" could not give more than 24 knots, since the boiler tubes burst, four stokers died from burns, and yet the British dreadnought cruisers, together with the light cruiser "Dublin" that joined them, lost Goeben and "Breslau" by the evening view from behind the fog.

Admiral de Lapereire, after having already divided the fleet into three squadrons and passed the Balearic Islands, on August 4 at 4 hours 50 minutes in the morning received a radio from Bizerte:

“Goeben and Breslau have just bombarded Beaune and Philippeville!”

Thus Admiral Souchon discovered his ships. But Admiral La Pereire did not try to look for them... The 1st squadron of the French fleet, under the flag of Vice Admiral Chocheport, was heading to Philippeville, that is, to the location of the Goeben, and, continuing to move in the same direction, would have met with him... But Admiral de Lapereyre, who was going with the 2nd squadron to Algeria, orders the 1st squadron (going towards the Goeben) to also turn to Algeria in order to stop the German cruisers there, in the hope that they will continue their demonstration along the coast.

At 6 1/2 pm on August 4, Lapereire was notified by telegram from Paris that the British cruisers were in contact with Goeben and Breslau, which at 10 am were 50 miles north of Beaune.

Admiral Lapereire had enough time to block them there, but instead the 1st detachment (Vice Admiral Chocheport) was ordered to go to Philippeville to take the convoy there, the 2nd detachment (Vice Admiral Le Brise) was ordered to remain in Algiers to escort the transports that would leave this port, and the 3rd group, sent to Oran and arriving there on August 4, prepared to escort the western convoy. The commander himself, holding his flag on the Courbet, with the ships Condorcet and Vergniaud, formed a “pursuit detachment” and left Algeria on August 5 at 8 o’clock 30 minutes in the morning and headed towards the Balearic Islands. At 12:30, when the detachment was 50 miles north of Algiers, he received radio from Bizerte that the English admiral was looking for German cruisers south of Sardinia. On August 4 at 5 pm they were at the southern tip of this island, heading east. But Admiral Lapereire, despite this message, headed towards the Balearic Islands, that is, in the completely opposite direction.

Arriving in Messina, as already mentioned, at dawn on August 5, Admiral Souchon received permission to stay in the roadstead for only 24 hours. By noon on August 6, 1,500 tons of coal had been accepted from a German steamship - not a coal ship, without special holds, and therefore holes had to be cut in its deck. People were collapsing from fatigue, and loading was slow. This amount of coal was not enough to reach Constantinople, and to top it all off, Admiral Tirpitz telegraphed that due to disagreements with the Turkish government about the admission of the Goeben and Breslau into Turkish waters, a trip to Constantinople was not recommended!.. Admiral Souchon was left to act at his discretion. Locked by the British in the Mediterranean, the Goeben and Breslau did not have access to the Adriatic Sea and were cut off from the allied Austrian fleet.

Possessing superiority in artillery and speed over the detachment of British cruisers blocking the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, Admiral Souchon could break through and join the Austrians. But he decided to go to Constantinople, even without the consent of the Turks, and there, by the fact of his appearance, provoke them into war with Russia. The entrance to the Dardanelles was mined!..

On August 7, 1914, at 5 o’clock in the morning, both German cruisers left the Strait of Messina to the southeast. Only one English cruiser guarded them outside Italian waters. The commander of the English naval forces in the Mediterranean, Admiral Milns, still did not believe that Admiral Souchon would go east! escorting transports with troops. On August 8, at 7 a.m., the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the French fleet, led by the fleet commander, Admiral Lapereire, arrived in Toulon.

As a result: 1) The arrival of the much-anticipated troops was four days late and 2) the Goeben and Breslau slipped away from Messina.

From the moment he left Toulon on August 3 at 4 a.m., the admiral was assigned to pursue the enemy with all the warships of the French fleet at his disposal. But Admiral Lapereire acted slowly and hesitantly, entrusting the pursuit of the German cruisers to the English fleet. Back on August 4th at 4:50 am. In the morning, he received radio that the Goeben and Breslau had just bombarded Beaune and Philippeville, but instead of rushing to cross their Algiers-Sardinia route, he gathered the entire fleet in Algiers. He did not even send a single ship to blockade the Goeben and Breslau in Messina along with the English squadron.

Four English cruisers with a displacement of 14 thousand tons and a 9.2 dm were cruising at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. guns of Admiral Trubridge, who was supposed to not release the Austrians and prevent the Goeben and Breslau from connecting with them. During the day, engage in battle with your 9.2-dm. guns against 11-dm. He did not risk “Goeben” and, following him, tried to overtake him at night. But he failed. The light cruiser Gloucester, without looking away from the Germans, conducted reconnaissance and at one time entered into a firefight with the Breslau. The goal of the Gloucester was to call the Goeben and Breslau to pursue it and, by maneuvering, point them at the English squadron. But already at the Greek Cape Matapan he received orders to stop the pursuit... Admiral. Milns, the commander of the English fleet, aware of Turkey's neutrality, did not believe that Admiral Souchon would violate it and therefore considered the Goeben and Breslau to be his sure prey, trapped. But they entered the Aegean Sea and on August 9, near Smyrna, off a deserted island, having a rendezvous with a German coal miner (disguised as a Greek transport ship) and a tanker (Tanker is a water tanker.), loaded up with coal. In order not to give himself away, Souchon sent a tanker to Smyrna instead of radio with a telegram to the German naval agent in Constantinople: “The military situation requires attacking the enemy in the Black Sea. Go to any lengths to get consent for me to cross the bays, even if only unofficially.”

“Come in! Demand the capitulation of the Ferts! Arrest the pilot!

"Goeben" and "Breslau" approached the Chanak fortress in the evening with servants at the guns and signaled for a pilot. But a Turkish destroyer came out and raised a signal: “Follow me!” At 9 pm on August 10, Goeben and Breslau entered the Dardanelles.

The Turkish government, wanting to maintain neutrality, wanted Admiral Souchon’s detachment to be disarmed, especially since both the Goeben and Breslau were badly worn out during their wanderings in the Mediterranean Sea, their boiler tubes were burned and required extensive repairs. But the German ambassador protested and categorically insisted on repairs. Then one of the Turkish ministers, seeing the indecisiveness and confusion of the government, proposed to buy these ships and officially announce that they had arrived under a contract. Everyone jumped on this offer! In their justification, they pointed to the fact that the British had requisitioned two dreadnoughts armed with 13.5-dm. guns and newly built for the Turks.

"Goeben" and "Breslau" raised the Turkish flag. "Goeben" began to be called "Jawuz", and "Breslau" - "Midilli". The crew put on fezzes. The Sultan himself inspected the ships.

The Turks kept delaying in declaring war on Russia and blackmailed the allies, demanding more and more for neutrality. So four months passed. The blockade of the Black Sea coast of Russia became increasingly necessary for Germany. Its cannons on the Bosporus and Dardanelles batteries threatened Constantinople and the Sultan himself...

On October 28, 1914, Goeben and Breslau entered the Black Sea and bombarded Odessa, Sevastopol and Feodosia. Only then did Russia declare war on Turkey.

The entire Middle East was on fire.

“Goeben and “Breslau” in the Black Sea in 1914 before the declaration of war with Turkey.

The presence of German cruisers in the Mediterranean Sea greatly worried the Allied headquarters. Based on the agreement, all issues related to the Mediterranean basin were discussed jointly, so monitoring of these cruisers was carried out from the English, French and Russian sides back in 1913.

The French General Staff assumed that in the event of war, the appointment of German cruisers would impede communications between France and its colonies in North Africa, and from the political side, ensure an alliance between Italy and Austria.

The Russian General Staff considered the Germans' intentions to be broader and explained the presence of German cruisers in the Mediterranean with the desire to create a political situation that, in the event of a conflict, would force Turkey to take the side of Germany. Then the straits will be closed to Russia and thus it will be isolated from its allies.

The tactical qualities of these cruisers, their great advantage in speed, will ensure their success at the beginning of the war.

In the early spring of 1914, this issue was discussed jointly by the Naval General Staffs of France and Russia and, in order to fend off these intentions of the Germans, it was decided that the dreadnought cruisers Borodino, Izmail, Kinburn and Navarin, laid down this year , two - at the Galernaya shipyards, and the other two at the shipyards of the Baltic Shipyard, with a displacement of 28 thousand tons, armed with 12 14-dm guns. (356 mm.), 20 guns - 150 mm. (5.1 dm.), with a speed of 29 knots, will be sent to Toulon. This was supposed to be done in 1916.

But war with Germany broke out in the Baltic Sea on August 2, 1914 (July 18, O.S.), before this project could be completed, and the exit was subsequently closed.

The Russian Naval General Staff tirelessly shared its concerns with France and England, proving the dangerous position the Black Sea Fleet would be in if German cruisers were allowed to enter Constantinople. The Russian naval agent in Italy was in Messina when the Goeben and Breslau came in to load coal. He immediately informed the English military agent in Italy about the moment of their departure and the direction they had taken. Thus, the British Admiralty was warned in time.

On the Russian side, the attention of the allies was persistently drawn to the fact that the German cruisers were, without any doubt, going to Turkey and the Russians asked to prevent them in every possible way. A Russian naval agent in Greece reported the presence of cruisers off Cape Matapan. There could no longer be any doubt about their intentions. But the commander of the English fleet, Admiral Milns, released them because he did not believe that Turkey would enter the war and hoped that she would not allow them into her straits. He believed that Goeben and Breslau had fallen into a trap and would sooner or later be his prey. But “Goeben” and “Breslau”, worn out in campaigns and with burnt pipes in the boilers, still on August 10 at 9 o’clock. evenings under the convoy of a Turkish destroyer entered the Dardanelles!!!

Admiral Eberhard personally appealed to the Emperor with a request to allow the Black Sea Fleet to destroy the Goeben while it was being repaired in the Constantinople roadstead after long campaigns (without bases) and while the Germans had not yet managed to rearm the coastal batteries of the Bosphorus. Under the influence of the political situation, the Emperor not only refused this request, but even categorically forbade the fleet to appear off the Turkish coast. Back on August 9, when the German cruisers were in the Aegean Sea, but when it was already clear that, having avoided pursuit by the British, they were heading to the Dardanelles, Foreign Minister Sazonov sent the following telegram to Admiral Eberhard:

“The appearance of the Goeben in the Black Sea should not be taken as a rupture... In view of the differences in the main political issues between England and France, it is very important, if war with Turkey is inevitable, that she declare war first...”

The Main General Staff gave Admiral Eberhard a directive - to consider German cruisers as enemies and to attack, without expecting their hostile actions, if they appeared in the Black Sea, even under the Turkish flag. But this directive was soon canceled by the Headquarters, since the Turkish political parties and the government were indecisive, and it was impossible to foresee which side Turkey would lean towards. On September 6, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople sent an encrypted radio telegram to Admiral Eberhard:

“There are intense rumors about the upcoming entry into the Black Sea by the Goeben and Breslau. Despite the categorical denial of them by the Turkish government, I believe that the time has come to take, Your Excellency, all necessary measures to protect the coast, ports, etc.”

The ambassador had very good reasons for sending this telegram, since the Turkish ships were armed with German crews who were actively preparing for battle. It was no secret to anyone in Constantinople that Admiral Souchon and his staff had prepared a plan for a surprise attack on the Russian Black Sea coast in order to draw Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. The conversations of German officers in the wardrooms reached the ears of Russian secret agents, and through them they became known to the ambassador.

“Information received from Constantinople confirms the inevitability of war. Expect hostile actions from Turkey even before the declaration of war in the form of attacks by destroyers and laying mines in front of Sevastopol."

But after a few days the political situation eased and seemed less serious.

On October 20, Sazonov informed Admiral Eberhard that: “German gold has arrived in Constantinople, as a result of which it is possible that Turkey will soon act against us.” Embassy reports showed how the situation was worsening every day, and on October 28, 1914, a message was received:

"Türkiye officially and immediately enters the war."

The Baltic Fleet had already been mobilized by Admiral Essen on July 27, and hostilities began on August 2 with the declaration of war by Germany. The Black Sea Fleet from August 2 to October 28, that is, almost three months, was forced to be prepared for a “sneaky” strike and at the same time pretend that it was not going to fight with Turkey. Despite this, a few days before the declaration of war, the Black Sea Fleet was mobilized and all preparatory measures for laying mines were carried out. All the commercial steamships that the fleet needed were requisitioned, including four high-speed mine-laying transports to assist the personnel minelayers Prut and Danube. With the order of dreadnoughts (two) by Turkey in 1911 from England, the "operational plan of the Black Sea Fleet 1914", drawn up by Admiral Eberhard and approved by the naval General Staff, indicated that in 1914 the war in the Black Sea would be offensive on the part of Turkey and defensive on the Russian side, at least in the first period of the war and counting on the strict neutrality of Bulgaria and Romania. In the war in 1914, the goal of the Russian army in the Caucasus should be considered to be the destruction of the Turkish army, in the event of its attempted invasion (in the Caucasus), and in the future - the offensive movement in Asia Minor. The task of the fleet was to fight for dominance in the Black Sea. The case of strengthening the Turkish fleet with German and Austrian ships was foreseen by Admiral Eberhard in this regard, as was foreseen “the possibility of an attack on Sevastopol, which was considered desirable, since the battle would take place in a place favorable to us.” The Black Sea Fleet began to prepare in tactical exits, in artillery shooting exercises, in mine attacks, in reconnaissance, etc.

The political situation changed - England requisitioned two Turkish dreadnoughts, but German cruisers in the Mediterranean could take their place. In this regard, the struggle for dominance in the Black Sea seemed already possible with great success for the Russians.

The desire of the commander, Admiral Eberhard, to give a decisive battle even against a stronger enemy made a favorable impression. Admiral Eberhard was given complete freedom of action and even led the defense of the coast with forts.

The fleet's strongholds were Sevastopol, Kerch and Batum. Sevastopol, with its two excellent roadsteads, protected from the shore by artillery and from the sea by minefields, was the main, best and closest base to the enemy shores. But at the same time, it was not an impregnable fortress, since in 1914, at the beginning of the war, its forts were armed with 11-dm. (254 mm.), old type guns. The protection of the port was better provided by minefields of two types: 1) permanent (electric current) and 2) temporary - laid from ships as needed.

The port had two large dry docks for battleships, two for small displacement ships (cruisers, gunboats and destroyers) and a small floating dock, workshops and fleet supply stores. The construction shipyards were located in Nikolaev, on the banks of the Bug River, far from the sea. The entrance to the Bug was protected by the Ochakov fortress. In Nikolaev there were two dry docks for the construction of large naval vessels and one floating dock of 50,000 tons. The ports of Kerch and Batum were protected by such outdated forts that the War Ministry intended to completely destroy them, but Admiral Eberhard, through the mediation of the Minister of Naval Admiral Grigorovich, managed to defend them as strategic points on the Black Sea, and especially the fortresses of Ochakov and Batum. However, by the beginning of the war these forts had not been improved and the coastal defense of the Black Sea was still insufficient.

In the event that, as was assumed, the theater of battle was the Bosporus, then the distance of the main base, Sevastopol, from it by 298 nautical miles, made operations difficult. The idea was to create a fulcrum between them. A strategic stronghold on the Bulgarian coast would greatly shorten the journey, as it would be only 90 miles from the Bosphorus. But the fleet had to rely on Sevastopol, 298 miles from the Bosphorus, and on Batum, 400 miles from Sevastopol.

With the transition of the fleet to oil heating, Batum, located near the Turkish border, became a very important base. The Pipeline connected it to Baku, the main industrial point in the Caucasus. But Batum was very vulnerable from sea and land. That is why Admiral Eberhard so insisted not only on preserving the fortress, but also on urgently equipping it with modern long-range and rapid-fire guns.

The cruiser "Goeben" could compete alone with the three most powerful Russian ships in the Black Sea Fleet, its artillery was longer-range and it was all located on one ship. A big advantage was also his speed of 26 knots versus 16, which gave him the initiative in the battle. These qualities of the dreadnought cruiser were a serious threat to the old battleships of the Black Sea Fleet. He alone could attack at any time, anywhere, both at sea and on the coast.

Could Admiral Eberhard have shown personal initiative and paralyzed the enemy with an unexpected attack? From the above facts we know how much the commanding admiral was bound in his actions and orders by foreign policy in Constantinople.

Due to the entry into the Turkish fleet of the Goeben and Breslau, which were technically more advanced, both in armament and speed, the entire Black Sea Fleet was concentrated in Sevastopol and could only leave in full force, “in a fist” to be able to fight even these cruisers alone. Patrols at sea were limited due to a shortage of long-range oil destroyers. The need to replenish battleships, cruisers and coal destroyers with coal forced the fleet to often return to Sevastopol and led to the fact that out of 6 days at sea, only two or three days were left for cruising.

Nevertheless, a squadron of battleships appeared off the Bosporus and the Anatolian coast more than once, since the government hoped to influence Turkey with such demonstrations. Then Admiral Eberhard received an order from Headquarters not to appear again off the Turkish coast in order to avoid conflict. But for the evolution of the fleet and shooting exercises, the ships continued to intensively go to sea, remaining near Crimea.

On the evening of October 27 (1914), when the squadron was still at sea, the admiral was notified by radio from a ship sailing from Constantinople that the day before, at 6 o'clock. evening, 5 miles from the Bosphorus, he met German cruisers accompanied by destroyers. On the morning of the 28th, Admiral Eberhard learned from another ship that he had met the cruiser Goeben with two destroyers heading for Kerenbe off Anastre. The squadron returned to the Sevastopol roadstead. At 17 o'clock the minelayer "Prut" received an order to go to Yalta for the infantry battalion, which was heading west. "Prut", with a load of 400 minutes, weighed anchor on October 28 at 17:00.

At 20 o'clock, when the Prut was already far away, Admiral Eberhard raised the signal:

“The situation is very serious. “Goeben” and two destroyers appeared at Anastra!”

“Floor No. 1” (be ready for immediate departure), and transports - “Floor No. 4” (be in 12-hour readiness).

On this day (October 29, the location of the fleet was as follows: cruisers and battleships - in the Sevastopol roadstead. All destroyers, under the flag of the head of the mine division, Captain 1st Rank Sablin, - in Evpatoria, northwest of Sevastopol, in mine attack exercises. In Odessa area, to protect the port, stationary gunboats “Donets” and “Kubanets” (with a displacement of 1,300 tons, 2 guns - 142 mm and 1 - 100 mm) and minelayers “Beshtau” and “Danube Last”. was in Ochakov and was supposed to mine the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug at the time of the declaration of war and then participate in the defense of the approaches to Nikolaev. The Berezan transport, armed with 75-mm guns, and the Dykhtau minelayer were in Batum from the first days of October. "Dykhtau" was supposed to place minefields in front of Batum and Poti with the declaration of war.

The remaining Black Sea ports remained unprotected.

BOMBING OF SEVASTOPOL; ATTACK BY THE 4TH DIVISION OF DESTROYERS (CAP. 1st R. Prince TRUBETSKY) “GEBENA”; THE DEATH OF "PRUT"

October 28, 1914 at 4 p.m. The flagship of the 4th destroyer division, Captain 1st Rank Prince Trubetskoy, while in Evpatoria on maneuvers, received an encrypted radiogram from the fleet commander, Admiral Eberhard:

“At nightfall, begin patrolling near Sevastopol. If you meet Turkish military ships, consider them enemy!”

Prince Trubetskoy prepared the division for the campaign and at 11 p.m. telegraphed to the fleet commander:

“In view of the serious situation, I consider it necessary to have a full supply of coal!”

The admiral replied:

“Get ready for battle! Enter Sevastopol, passing minefields and coastal batteries at dawn. In case of meeting with the enemy, open envelope No. 4" (provision in case of war).

At the same time, the following order was sent to Prut, which was already entering Yalta:

“Stay at sea all night. When daylight comes, return to Sevastopol. If you meet the enemy, open envelope No. 4."

To all minelayers located outside Sevastopol:

“Be ready to lay mines tomorrow!”

The defense of Sevastopol consisted of engineering mines, the location of which was kept secret and was indicated in envelope No. 4, and of coastal batteries, nets and booms. Engineering mine fields were safe in peacetime. They became dangerous when the current was turned on by special order of the fleet commander.

The 4th division of destroyers, captain 1st rank Prince Trubetskoy, consisting of the destroyers “Lieutenant Pushchin”, “Zharkiy” and “Zhivuchy”, set out from Yevpatoria on a patrol on the night of October 28-29, cruising between the Chersonesos lighthouse and Cape Lucullus. At 0 o'clock. 15 min. Prince Trubetskoy received the following radio from Admiral Eberhard:

“The Rod is in the sea. Go to his aid if the enemy appears!”

The rest of the night passed quietly, but the division remained at full steam on the line Chersonesus - Lucullus.

“A Turkish destroyer blew up the Donets, entered the port and is shooting at ships.”

The fleet commander notifies all ships: “War has been declared on Turkey!” The Chief of Coastal Defense sends orders to all observation posts to strengthen surveillance. One of the posts says:

“I see the smoke of a large ship in the direction of Evpatoria.”

At 5 o'clock. In the morning, the head of the coastal defense reports to the commander that perhaps the enemy is heading towards Sevastopol, and asks to equip engineering mines, and to announce to the batteries “Floor No. 1” (“be prepared to open fire immediately”). The admiral allows the coastal batteries to be given orders, but refuses to provide electricity and arm the engineering minefields, since the Prut is still at sea and must return to Sevastopol.

Communication posts continue to report the approach of smoke to Sevastopol from Evpatoria. Sarych's post reports that he notices the beams of a searchlight in the southwest... "Goeben" with two destroyers continues to head for Sevastopol and is soon within range of actual fire. There is still no order from the fleet commander for the coastal batteries to open fire... A thick fog has risen in the west and is covering the horizon... The observation post of Lucullus still sees the cruiser and indicates its course. The admiral sends a group of minesweepers to reconnaissance, which exit through the southern channel. But as soon as they came abeam the Chersonesus lighthouse, they saw the “Goeben” in the north at a distance of 8,000 meters, which was immediately reported to the fleet commander and at about 6 o’clock. 15 min. return to Sevastopol.

At 6 o'clock. 23 min. Admiral Eberhard, after receiving these reports, orders the armament of engineering fields with mines.

At 6 o'clock. 35 minutes, that is, 12 minutes later, “Goeben” began bombing the Sevastopol roadstead and forts. The batteries respond immediately and hit the Goeben (Due to the thick fog it was not possible to determine exactly where the Goeben hit), who ceases fire and retires to the sea. But while he was firing at the roadstead and batteries, for several minutes (from 6:35 a.m. to 6:40 a.m.) was his course going through fields of engineering mines? Were there engineering minefields without current yet? Or did he walk a few meters outside of them? It was not possible to establish its exact location, since the fog interfered with the coastal communications posts. Russian observations indicated that Goeben was in group No. 12 of mines. According to German information (archive of the naval war in 1914), he was not in the minefields, but only approached them a few hundred meters.

At 6 o'clock. 50 min. "Goeben" ceased fire and quickly left on a "SW" course. In total, the Goeben fired 30 large-caliber shells at the batteries and raid without causing any harm. Why did he suddenly stop firing and start leaving?

The reason was the minelayer "Prut" and the 4th division of destroyers of Prince Trubetskoy. As mentioned above, Captain 1st Rank Prince Trubetskoy received an order from Admiral Eberhard to go to the aid of the Prut if the enemy appeared.

The division was waiting for him at the southern border of the field of engineering mines, almost abeam the entrance to the Sevastopol roadstead, and at the same time watched so that the enemy would not lay barrage mines. When the division saw the Prut on the horizon in the morning fog, it seemed that an enemy destroyer was chasing it. Prince Trubetskoy, deciding that the enemy is attacking the Prut, rushes with his division to cross its course. But when the destroyers got close enough, they saw that they had mistakenly taken the Russian icebreaker Gaydamak, which was heading to Sevastopol, for the enemy. Escorting "Prut", at 6 o'clock. 30 minutes, when the morning dawn dispersed the “milk” of the fog, the 4th division saw “Goeben”.

"Prut" at that time was 8 miles from the southern border of engineering minefields and from the entrance to the Sevastopol roadstead and was heading "SW". The destroyers of Prince Trubetskoy followed a parallel course. It was at this moment, at 6 o'clock. 30 min. in the morning, when the fog cleared, “Goeben” saw the 4th division of destroyers and “Prut”. At 6 o'clock. 50 min. he stopped shelling Sevastopol and went to meet the Prut and the destroyers. Prince Trubetskoy with his little destroyers, not protected by armor, armed with only three 75-mm guns. and six Whitehead mines, attacks the Goliath, a dreadnought cruiser with 200 mm armor, armed with 10 - 280 mm. and 10 - 150 mm. with guns! He was heading towards certain death! But it was necessary to rescue the defenseless “Prut” with a load of 400 bottom mines. The prince also followed the Russian “maybe, maybe happiness will help!”

Traveling at 25 knots, at 7 o'clock. In the morning, the 4th Division was at a distance of 14,000 meters when the Goeben opened fire from 150 mm. guns The first salvo was fired by the flight. The second and third salvoes fell very close to the lead destroyer “Lieutenant Pushchin” (on which the division chief was holding his pennant). He receives the fourth salvo before he changes course. The head of the 4th division, captain 1st rank, Prince Trubetskoy, wrote in his report to the fleet commander:

The first hit was under the navigation bridge and caused a fire. The second shell, hitting almost the same place, shook the destroyer violently. The third cut off the heads of two signalmen who were with me on the bridge. The division continues to move closer. I raise the signal: “Load mines, prepare to fire!” The division, according to the rule, leans to the right, by 8 quarters. But my destroyer is burying its nose. It began to flood. The steering wheel does not work. I turn around - the helmsman is lying at the wheelhouse, in a pool of blood. The bridge is empty, and the heat from the fire increases. Explosions are heard in the cellars. The bilge mechanic reports that the bilge pumps are not working. The situation is becoming hopeless. But "Goeben", noticing a volley of our mines, sharply leans to the left, then 180 degrees to the right and opens fire on the "Zhivochy" and almost immediately stops it. The division is saved!!!"

The destroyer "Lieutenant Pushchin" was seriously damaged: 7 killed and 11 wounded. Taking advantage of the fact that the Goeben had ceased fire, Prince Trubetskoy ordered the destroyers Zhivuchy and Zharky to continue guarding the Prut and led the half-submerged destroyer Lieutenant Pushchin to Sevastopol.

At 7 o'clock In the morning, “Prut” showed its place - it was located 25 miles east of the Chersonesos lighthouse. Having received no response from either Sevastopol or the 4th division, hearing shots but not seeing the enemy, he continued on his way (to Sevastopol). At 7 o'clock 35 min. "Goeben" stopped the battle with the destroyers and headed for the "Prut". Approaching him, he raised the signal: “Surrender!” In response, “Prut” raised its topmast flags! "Goeben" opened fire. The commander of the Prut, Captain 2nd Rank Bykov, ordered the minelayer to be sunk, the cargo destroyed, and the crew to board the boats.

Senior Lieutenant Raguzsky, following the order of the commander, went down into the hold and died there along with the ship.

At 8 o'clock. 40 minutes later, the entire Prut minelayer, engulfed in flames, sank to the bottom of its native sea. The destroyers "Tenacious" and "Zharky", not being able to help the "Prut" due to the threat of the "Goeben" and the large, new and more modern Turkish destroyers (English-built) accompanying it, made their way to Sevastopol.

The commander of the Prut, captain 2nd rank Bykov, and most of the crew were captured by Turkish destroyers and only a small part of it was picked up by our submarine sent from Sevastopol.

When the Prut sank, the Goeben and the destroyers accompanying it went to SW and remained in sight of the observation posts until 10 o'clock. morning and then disappeared.

Admiral Souchon successfully carried out his political maneuver, dragging Turkey into the war with Russia with surprise attacks on the Black Sea ports - Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Kerch. But at the same time, he made a gross tactical mistake by leaving suddenly and without causing serious damage to the Black Sea Fleet. All the advantages were on his side: he could, without any risk to the Goeben, wait for the Russian fleet to leave Sevastopol and fight it, especially since the Black Sea Fleet, leaving the Sevastopol roadstead, was forced to follow a canal along the coast, which greatly limited it in maneuvering and it would represent an excellent target.

Why did Admiral Souchon, having sunk the Prut, leave Sevastopol? Why were his cruisers sunk by Russian transport ships instead of being captured? Türkiye needed them so much to transport troops and coal.

As for the laying of mines near Evpatoria and in the Kerch Strait, the result was insignificant: near Evpatoria, Turkish mines were placed outside the route of the ships, and in the Kerch Strait only two small ships were killed on them, and the mines were discovered the next day. The Black Sea Fleet went to sea after the morning bombardment of Sevastopol by the Goeben, on the same day, October 29, in the afternoon. Admiral Eberhard remained in the roadstead until 15 hours, despite the fact that the fleet was ready for the campaign, since he wanted to make sure earlier that the exit was free of enemy mines. That is why in the morning the minesweepers went out to sea to clear an area of ​​15 miles of sea in order to clear the way for the squadron to greater depths.

Admiral Eberhard headed for the Bosphorus and remained at sea for three days with the goal of meeting the enemy. But he cruised in vain and, not meeting anyone from the Turkish fleet, was forced to return to Sevastopol for coal loading.

The attack on Sevastopol, then the reluctance to meet with the Black Sea Fleet, which had been cruising for three days near the Bosporus, which Admiral Souchon certainly knew about, changed the battle plan at the pre-selected position. The enemy avoided battle and also did not intend to land troops in the Odessa area. It was necessary to come to the conclusion that, taking advantage of the cruisers’ advantage, Admiral Souchon would limit himself to “corsairing,” that is, raids on coastal port cities and laying minefields.

1914 - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER

Lacking fast ships, the Black Sea Fleet was forced to limit its operations to laying minefields in the bays and on the enemy’s routes and also to blockade the coal areas on the Turkish coast, that is, on 120 miles of the Anatolian coast east of the Bosphorus, with the ports of Zunguldak, Kozlu, Ineboli and Parfeni. The Zunguldak port was equipped for coal loading, with a jetty and cranes. The rest were open raids.

The fleet commander, Admiral Eberhard, over the last two months (November and December 1914) undertook an active blockade, as far as the forces of obsolete battleships, cruisers and coal destroyers allowed. He was free to take the initiative and received directives from Headquarters only of a general, main nature. Therefore, it did not take much time to organize a blockade of the Turkish coal region. Having returned from the first trip to the Bosphorus (from October 29 to November 1) and loaded coal, the fleet went to the Turkish shores to carry out two operations: 1) a division of four new oil destroyers of the “Daring” class ("Bold", "Wrathful", "Restless" and "Shrill".), having 60 mines on board, approached the Bosphorus and on the night of November 6th placed a field of mines 12 miles north of the entrance. While the destroyers were laying mines, the squadron walked along the Rumelian coast, guarding them, and then headed for Zunguldak, where it arrived at dawn on November 6. 2) At 7 o'clock. 30 min. The battleship "Rostislav" and the cruiser "Kahul", accompanied by six destroyers, at the commander's signal, went to Zunguldak to destroy the coal warehouses, port factories, minesweepers and transport ships located on the pier. The weather - fog and light rain - was not particularly favorable for shooting. The fire that broke out in the port was clearly visible. The shooting stopped at 9 o'clock. 30 min. "Rostislav" and "Kahul" entered service with the squadron, which went to Sevastopol. During the bombardment of Zunguldak by Kagul and destroyers, two Turkish steamships stationed in the roadstead were sunk.

The deep reconnaissance cruiser noticed two silhouettes of large ships suddenly appearing from the fog, and then another, a third, behind them. The squadron entered the line of battle formation, opened fire with its large artillery, and at the same time the destroyers went on the attack. Very soon, when the fog cleared a little, it turned out that these were Turkish military transports “Mithad Pasha”, “Bezmi Alen” and “Vikhri Ahmed”, traveling with troops and ammunition to Trebizond. The soldiers and crews were boarded on the ships of the squadron, and all three transports were sunk. After this, the squadron headed for "N". She had to weather a severe storm. The coal destroyers of the Zh and 3 types were especially brutally battered. There was a supply of coal on their decks! On November 7, the squadron entered the Sevastopol roadstead. That same morning, in response to the bombardment of Zunguldak, the cruiser Breslau fired at Poti for 40 minutes, without causing much damage. "Goeben" did not appear at sea.

Periodic shelling of Zunguldak could not completely stop the transport of coal, since this would require an endless blockade of the banks of the coal region, which at the end of 1914 was not yet possible due to the lack of warships. “Goeben”, with its superiority in artillery and speed, forced the Black Sea Fleet to be concentrated into “one fist.”

Having learned that Trebizond had become a supply and assembly center for Turkish troops, Admiral Eberhard left on November 15 with a squadron of battleships and, already on the way to it, learned that the enemy squadron was there. On November 17, the Russian squadron approached Trebizond and, not finding enemy ships, the admiral sent the Rostislav and a division of destroyers to shell the port and military facilities in it. Then the squadron passed along the Anatolian coast to Sinop, encountering only Turkish feluccas, which were not worth wasting shells on. On the night of November 17-18, minelayers “Bel. Book Ksenia" and "Vel. Book Konstantin" placed mines in front of Sinop, Platana and Samsun. This operation was carried out in deep darkness and was very risky, since the minelayers were passenger ships with a maximum speed of 12 knots, which would have been fatal for them in the event of the appearance of Turkish cruisers and destroyers. The operation was completed successfully, and these minefields remained unknown to the Turks for a long time. “Vel. Book Ksenia" and "Vel. Book Konstantin" returned safely to Sevastopol, despite the fact that "Goeben" and "Breslau" were cruising in front of the Crimea at that time.

Admiral Eberhard, having not met enemy ships either on the way from Sevastopol to Trebizond, or from Trebizond to Sinop, and having sailed more than 600 miles with his old ships, was forced to replenish coal, especially from small destroyers, which burned during three days at sea 3/4 of your stock. There were still 200 miles left to go to Sevastopol, when the commander was informed that the enemy fleet was somewhere at sea!

Admiral Souchon, as the commander of the Turkish fleet, was, of course, already aware of the bombing of Trebizond by Russian ships and the march of the Black Sea Fleet squadron along the Anatolian coast. Therefore, if he wanted to fight the Russian squadron, he had to wait for it on the way back to Sevastopol. The advantage of the dreadnought cruiser Goeben in speed and range of guns gave the German admiral the opportunity to attack the Russian squadron in the most favorable tactical conditions for him. This is precisely why Admiral Eberhard considered the meeting possible. But if on the Black Sea squadron they considered fighting as a lucky chance, then on the German side they knew that a battle was possible if Admiral Souchon so desired! At night there was fog and it was so thick that at times it made it difficult for the ships to stay in the wake and see the destroyers, which walked in the night formation at the tail of the squadron. Only the cruisers reached the head of the squadron, approximately three miles ahead. About 10 o'clock. In the morning a small breeze from the NW began to blow in gusts and partially disperse the fog; at times the squadron passed through thick “plugs” of fog that hid the ships from one another. At 11 o'clock 30 min. the wind settled in and dispersed the fog. Visibility - 4,000 meters. But the weather was gloomy, with very low clouds and rain. The squadron formed a wake column in the following order: in the vanguard, at a distance, depending on visibility, from 1,000 to 3,000 meters, the auxiliary cruiser Almaz; to its right, 3 or 4 nautical miles away, is the cruiser Memory of Mercury, and to its left is the cruiser Cahul. The battleships were led by the battleship "Eustathius" under the flag of the fleet commander, Admiral Eberhard, and in his wake were the "John Chrysostom", "Panteleimon" (carrying the braid pennant of the head of the brigade of battleships), "Three Saints" and "Rostislav". The cruisers kept at a distance of maximum visibility of the signaling with searchlights. At noon, the squadron was located southeast of Cape Sarych, 20 miles from it, heading N 45 W (350°).

At 12 o'clock 10 min. from the Almaz, silhouettes of enemy ships were seen in the fog, approximately 5,000 meters ahead of it and to the left of the bow. “Goeben” was moving at low speed, course NE, and “Breslau” was on its left abeam, on a parallel course.

“Almaz” immediately signaled: “I see the enemy!” and turning around, went at full speed towards the squadron, giving it signals with a searchlight.

Five minutes later, the combat alarm was sounded on the squadron. The cruisers "Kahul" and "Memory of Mercury" entered the wake of the battleships. The battleship Eustathius discovered the Goeben on the left and a little further than the Breslau. Admiral Eberhard raises the signal: “Bend to the left 8 quarters, give full speed!” This maneuver was needed to prevent the enemy from leaving and thereby force him to fight.

Before this evolution, battleships kept an interval of 600 meters. But as a result of the turn and increase in speed, the distance between them increased and the line of the wake formation greatly lengthened. The destroyers were ordered to go abeam the battleships, and they entered the wake formation on the left beam of the Eustathia, 300 meters from it. At this moment, the horizon on the "NW" was covered with fog and hid the enemy cruisers. The wind turned to the SW and carried the smoke of the Russian squadron towards the enemy, making it difficult for rangefinders and gunners to see.

At 12 o'clock 18 min distance from “Eustathia” to “Goeben” 7,000 meters. “John Chrysostom” and “Panteleimon” had already embarked on a new course, but “Three Saints” and “Rostislav” had not yet begun their evolution and were barely visible. According to the already developed rule of concentrated firing from three battleships, the middle one, that is, “John Chrysostom,” should have opened fire first. Admiral Eberhard, seeing that he was not shooting, decided that the John Chrysostom, which was 1,000 meters behind the Eustathius, did not see the enemy and decided, despite the rule, to open fire first (with the Eustathius). This decision of the admiral does him great honor, since he took advantage of a favorable moment when the distance was small and the target was quite visible.

At 12 o'clock 21 min. "Eustathius" sends out the first salvo from two towers and immediately covers "Geben". The naked eye could see shell explosions in the middle of the cruiser. 50 seconds later “Goeben” responded. This first salvo fell between the battleships and destroyers, 200 meters from the latter. One of the shells, having caught the middle pipe of the Eustathius, exploded and with fragments broke the radio antenna that served to control the fire of all three battleships. That is why “Eustathius” could not quickly transfer the distance to “Goeben” (7,000) to “Zlatoust”. Because of the fog, the Zlatoust took the distance too far (12,000), and its salvo was overshot. "Goeben" concentrated its fire on "Eustathius". His second salvo missed, and the third one covered. Four 280 mm. shells hit casemates Nos. 150 and 200: four officers and 20 sailors were killed on the spot, and one officer and 19 sailors died from wounds. The fifth shell, which hit casemate No. 200, did not explode and did not cause any damage. Despite these losses, "Eustathius" continues to fire accurately and regularly.

As for the two battleships, the Panteleimon did not fire from the towers at all, since their gunners did not see the target due to the fog, the Three Saints, which followed it, fired salvos at the moments of visibility of the Goeben, and from the guns 150 mm. regularly fired at Breslau. The last "Rostislav" did not see the "Goeben" and fired at the "Breslau". The battle lasted 14 minutes, the course was 260°, the maximum speed of the Eustathia was 14 knots. "Goeben", having received damage from both large and smaller guns of the Russian "old men", interrupted the battle and turned at 12 o'clock. 5 min. to the right and disappeared at full speed into the fog.

Admiral Eberhard, in the hope that the Goeben would return, followed the same course for another 15 minutes. At 12 o'clock 37 min. the squadron “suddenly” turned 25° to the right to avoid a collision with an object floating in the waves, mistaking it for an enemy mine, but then returned to its previous course. The enemy did not show up. The destroyers sent to attack returned without catching up and lost him in the fog. The admiral decided to go to Sevastopol. At 12 o'clock 50 min. the squadron took a course of 348° and the destroyers entered service abeam the battleships. In this battle, the outdated battleships had to measure their strength against the new dreadnought cruiser, armed and built with the latest technology. And the “old men” won!

This success was solely the result of the determination of Admiral Eberhard, as well as the initiative of the commanders and the discipline in the conduct of artillery fire. The result of the battle was the following: “Goeben” received three 305 mm shells. and 11 of smaller caliber, 12 officers and 103 sailors were killed, 7 officers and 52 sailors were wounded. Accidents on the dreadnought cruiser were more significant than on the battleship Eustathius.

These accidents and losses in personnel forced Admiral Souchon to interrupt the battle. Convinced of the accuracy of the fire of the old Russian battleships, the German “young men” “Goeben” and “Breslau” always avoided meeting with our “old men” in the further course of the war on the Black Sea. Technically backward, but with the good spirit of the Black Sea people. St. George's ribbons are a guarantee of this!

Kaliakria, Fidonisi, Hadji Bey, Tserigo, Zante and even Rome, as well as Sinop and Sevastopol were their pride and tradition... To evaluate the accuracy of the fire of the Black Sea men in this battle, it is enough to remember that “Eustathius” fired 12 shells from the towers in 305 mm., “Chrysostom” and “Three Saints” together - 18, that is, a total of 30 shots, of which three hit the target, that is, 10%. According to the testimony of the artillery officers of the entire squadron, only the shells from the Eustathius reached the target, which increases accuracy to 25%. The interrupted radio communications did not bother the commanders, and they showed personal initiative in battle. At the same time, thick fog greatly interfered with aiming accuracy.

After the battle (November 18), the squadron was already at the Sevastopol roadstead on November 20 and was loading coal. The Turkish cruiser Hamidiye took advantage of this and fired at Tuapse for an hour in the morning.

On December 2, the squadron went to sea, as it was reported that enemy ships had appeared again. On December 5, without meeting anyone, she returned to Sevastopol. On December 6, Breslau appeared near Sevastopol. Attacked by seaplanes, he left, having previously fired at our minesweepers. On December 10, in the afternoon, the Goeben approached Batum and fired at the port from a distance of 14,000 meters. The Berezan transport and several other small ships were in the roadstead, and in the depths of the port there were many tanks with fuel oil and gasoline. With a successful hit, the Goeben could cause great damage both in the port and in the fortress. After a ten-minute bombardment, the Goeben withdrew without achieving any result. The forts responded, but their shells did not reach the target.

Due to the lack of high-speed cruisers for reconnaissance, the intense and persistent attempts of the Russian squadron to catch the enemy remained fruitless. Perhaps enemy cruisers, well aware of the Russian squadron's departures to sea, appeared when the squadron returned and stood in the roadstead of Sevastopol?

In the first half of December, a report was received that Turkey was preparing a landing in Batum. On December 11, the squadron weighed anchor. This was already the sixth departure of the entire squadron and its ships, especially the coal destroyers, were worn out. But the time for repairs has not yet come. It became known that the Turkish minelayer Nilufer exploded on mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus.

Approaching Batum, Admiral Eberhard sent the destroyer Zharky there to protect the port. The squadron then went to Trebizond and, extending its course to Sinop, bombarded the most important points on the Anatolian coast, sinking the steamer Derenti of 3,500 tons, loaded with military material. After being at sea for four days and not meeting anyone, Admiral Eberhard returned with the squadron to Sevastopol on December 15.

Two operations had to be urgently carried out: 1) to lay mines at the Bosphorus and 2) to block Zunguldak with sunken transports loaded with stones at the entrance to the port. On December 20, Admiral Eberhard weighed anchor to carry out the first operation. Minelayers "Vel. Book Ksenia", "Vel. Book Konstantin and Vel. Book Heir George,” accompanied by the 3rd division of destroyers, on the night of December 22, they laid two minefields at Karaburu (three miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus), with a total of 600 bottom mines. Despite the high risk of meeting with enemy cruisers, the mines were laid accurately. The minelayers (former ROPIT passenger ships) returned to Sevastopol one by one. The second operation, blocking the entrance to the port of Zunguldak, ended unsuccessfully due to poor atmospheric conditions and due to insufficient preparation. On the night of December 23, all four transports loaded with stones were scattered across the sea off the coast of Anatolia by a strong storm. At dawn, the entire detachment, led by the battleship Rostislav, the auxiliary cruiser Almaz, four loaded transports and a destroyer, was in great “disheveled” disorder. Russian radiotelegraph operators began to hear conversations between enemy ships and among them the Breslau. The detachment was missing the Atos transport and one destroyer. On the night of December 23-24, at 3 o’clock in the morning, “Rostislav” turned off course to collect the transports scattered by the storm. He did not warn the Oleg transport that was following him about this.

On “Oleg” was Captain 2nd Rank Evdokimov, who commanded a division of these transports. Not seeing any signal from the Rostislav, he decided to continue marching towards Zunguldak. About 4 o'clock. In the morning from "Oleg" in the darkness we noticed the silhouettes of two destroyers quickly moving towards it and opening searchlights at a distance of 1,000 meters. Their silhouettes were similar to the silhouettes of the destroyers of the 6th division that accompanied the detachment to Zunguldak. Evdokimov shouted to them into a megaphone: “I am the Oleg transport!” In response, there was laughter and in Russian: “Here you go, Oleg,” and the destroyers opened fire. Several shells hit "Oleg". The lead destroyer launched a mine, but the commander of "Oleg" managed to reverse, and the mine passed in front of the transport. During this attack, "Oleg" received several surface holes and several members of the crew were killed and wounded. The other ships of the detachment knew nothing about what had happened, being scattered in the dark by the storm. One Russian destroyer of the same detachment mistook the Turkish destroyers for his own in the darkness of the night and entered their wake. Only after some time, seeing their signals from the soldiers, he realized the mistake and disappeared at full speed... This was the destroyer that was missing. It entered service with a significant delay.

The transport "Athos", which was torn away from the detachment by a strong storm, was a toy of waves far out to sea at dawn on December 24th. The cruiser Breslau found him and ordered him to surrender. But its commander, Lieutenant Mikhail Chetverukhin, refused to surrender his transport and ordered the seams to be opened and the ship to be scuttled. "Breslau" fired several salvos at "Athos" and captured the commander and crew. After some time, the Breslau transferred them to the Goeben, which was returning to Constantinople. Lieutenant Chetverukhin, just two days earlier, had participated in laying mines near the Bosphorus on December 22 and, looking through the porthole of the cabin in which he was a prisoner, he immediately saw that the Goeben was walking through a minefield. There were two strong explosions! The cruiser took on a large amount of water and barely entered the Bosphorus. If the Goeben had not been so close to the Bosphorus, it is very likely that it would have sunk. This happened on December 25, new style, on the day of the German Christmas holiday.

From captivity, Lieutenant Chetverukhin managed to send this information to Admiral Eberhard. The operation of blocking the entrance to the port of Zunguldak failed, since due to the storm it was necessary to flood the transports in the sea, against it, and not at the entrance to the port itself.

While the operation was taking place at Zunguldak, the Turkish cruiser Hamidiye appeared on the night of December 24 near Batum and opened fire at one in the morning. But instead of the port and batteries, he concentrated his fire on a deserted place, at the mouth of the Chorokh River. The destroyer Zharkiy was probably looking for the Hamidiye. This little destroyer provided great assistance to the Russian troops advancing through Turkish territory. He helped them not so much with his 75 mm. cannon, sinking so many Turkish sailing ships that were bringing reinforcements to the retreating Turkish troops. The presence of Turkish cruisers at sea did not in the least prevent Russian destroyers from operating along the Anatolian coast, and by the end of 1914 they sank hundreds of sailing ships and 12 Turkish transports.

(End to follow)

G. M. von Helmersen

Composition of the Black Sea Fleet in the First World War

By the beginning of the First World War, the Black Sea Fleet included five battleships, but all of them were already outdated, not so much physically as morally. The fact is that these were squadron battleships, which, according to the new classification of 1907, began to be called battleships, but the new name did not add either speed or firepower to them. Nevertheless, it was these ships that bore the brunt of the battles with the German-Turkish battle cruiser Geben. We will talk about this fierce struggle for dominance in the Black Sea today.

As the slipway work on the Potemkin and two cruisers was completed, the question arose about the further workload of the shipyards in Nikolaev and Sevastopol. The military leadership decided to continue building battleships. The Borodino project was initially considered as a prototype, but management wanted to rework it to suit the conditions of the Black Sea. Then they decided that it would be better to build an improved copy of Potemkin. They planned to strengthen its armament and improve its armor, but in the end the original design went into construction without any changes. It was decided to build two ships. In the Nikolaev Admiralty, work began on the construction of the “Eustathius” (sometimes in the literature it is called “St. Eustathius”), the Lazarevsky Admiralty of the Sevastopol port was instructed to build the “John Chrysostom”. It was planned that the ships would be tested in the spring of 1906.

Preparations for the construction of ships began in the summer of 1903; work began on the “John Chrysostom” in November, and on the “Eustathia” in March 1904. Their official laying took place on October 31 and November 10, 1904, respectively. Initially, work proceeded at a rapid pace, but in 1905-1906. they, for a number of reasons, were actually suspended. During mass strikes and strikes in 1905-1906. work was stalled. Taking into account the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, the military leadership ordered to rework the project, strengthen the armament and armor as much as possible: 4x203 mm and 12x152 mm were placed on the ships (there was even a version of the project with 6x203 mm and 20x75 mm) and removed all 47 mm guns , the reservation system has become more thoughtful (the total weight of the armor has increased by 173.7 tons compared to the original version). To compensate for the overload, masts with combat tops, bulky cranes for lifting boats, and even net barriers were removed from the battleships. The issue of the number of masts (one or two) was repeatedly resolved at the highest level in the Maritime Ministry. In turn, the designers tried to rid the battleships of anachronisms - useless mine boats, a bow torpedo tube and a full supply of barrage mines (45 ball mines). In the process of making changes to the project, the ships began to gradually grow in size, but their hulls were already formed on the stocks and the designers had to look for a compromise.

The main weapons of the newest battleships were four 40-caliber 305-mm guns in turrets manufactured according to the Metal Plant design. Now they received new ammunition - the shells “grew” to 965.2 mm in length and became heavier due to an increase in the amount of explosive. Because of this, it was necessary to redo the cellars and turret compartments of the towers. The rate of fire of the 305 mm gun was one shot per minute, and the magazines could hold 240 (later 308) twelve-inch shells and charges. The firing range of the main caliber was 110 cables due to the elevation angle of the guns in the new turrets increasing to 35 degrees.

The debate about medium-caliber guns for new ships continued for a long time. Only in October 1906 was the final decision made to install four 50-caliber 203 mm guns. Their rate of fire is 4 rounds/min, their ammunition capacity is 440 rounds, and their firing range is 86 cable. The ships' armament was supplemented by 12x152 mm guns (rate of fire 6 rounds/min, ammunition capacity 2160 rounds, firing range 61 cables) and 14x75 mm guns (rate of fire 12 rounds/min, ammunition capacity 4200 shells, firing range 43 cables). These metamorphoses with weapons were reflected in the construction time frame; the battleships became yet another long-term Russian construction project. On April 30, 1906, “John Chrysostom” was launched, on October 21, “Eustathius”. Construction began, which dragged on for several years. Traditionally, delivery deadlines for machinery, equipment and weapons were constantly missed, their installation on ships was behind schedule, and sometimes work had to be suspended. In May 1910, “Eustathius” was transferred to Sevastopol to complete work. In July, both ships entered sea trials for the first time. The first tests were unsuccessful, but then they were “satisfactory in all respects.” On January 26, 1911, the act of “acceptance into the treasury” of the “John Chrysostom” mechanisms was signed, and on July 20, “Eustathius”. The cost of building the battleships was 13,784,760 and 14,118,210 rubles, respectively.

The newest battleships (as squadron battleships began to be called according to the new classification in October 1907) significantly strengthened the Black Sea Fleet. They became part of the active fleet in 1911 - on March 19, “John Chrysostom” and on May 15, “Eustathius”. On July 29, a brigade of battleships of the Black Sea Fleet was formed. It included two new battleships, Panteleimon and Rostislav, i.e. three practically identical battleships and a relatively weak (due to 254 mm guns) battleship. It was this formation that became the forefront in the Russian fleet in combat training and fully realized the invaluable experience of the Russian-Japanese War, which was paid for in great blood.

Experiments began on the Black Sea in the fall of 1906. A separate practical detachment was created under the flag of Rear Admiral G.F. Tsyvinsky. It included “Panteleimon”, “Rostislav”, “Three Saints” and “Sinop”. At the Tendra training ground, a special place was equipped for artillery firing. The detachment's ships began to develop new methods for centralized fire control of the squadron at long distances. In June 1907, the first results of these experiments were demonstrated to a commission from St. Petersburg. They were demonstrated five types of long-range shooting. In October, Panteleimon was the first in the Russian fleet to fire the main caliber at 80 cables. In 1908, research continued - now shooting was carried out at a distance of 110 cables. In addition to shooting, the detachment’s ships maneuvered together at different speeds, practiced sailing in any weather and constantly conducted various experiments with communications, etc. In 1909, one of the campaigns ended in tragedy - on the night of May 30, the Rostislav, when the detachment was returning to Sevastopol, sank the submarine Kambala with a ram. The ships continued to engage in experimental shooting at distances of up to 100 cables. At the same time, they “tested” new 305-mm armor-piercing shells weighing 380 kg (the previous ones weighed 332 kg). Their combat capabilities proved to be excellent and they performed well during the war.

After the commissioning of two battleships, the fleet command again faced the question of the future fate of the veteran ships. It was planned to rearm the Chesma with the latest 305 mm guns, but these plans remained on paper. And new turrets for rearmament of the Chesma were transferred for installation on the John Chrysostom. Three old battleships were written off, two more were converted into auxiliary vessels. Now the fate of the “Three Saints” and “Rostislav” was being decided by the military leadership. These ships were quite new, but they needed modernization and rearmament. It was planned to change the masts, bridges, and redo the superstructures. This made the ships lighter and reduced overload, which impaired combat performance. They refused to undertake major work at Rostislav because... the necessary re-equipment with 305-mm guns was extremely costly and was not supported by the military budget of the country, where every ruble counted.

The only battleship that underwent an almost complete modernization was the Three Saints, the first classic “capital ship” of the Black Sea Fleet. Several projects were developed, and there were fierce debates around them. Two projects became “finalists”; the Sevastopol port version won. Its development was completed in August 1909; it was planned to allocate more than 600 thousand rubles for the work. But then there were no funds in the budget, and work began only in November 1911. They continued until the summer of 1912. The masts and bridges on the “Three Saints” were changed, new deckhouses were installed, the superstructure was changed and the spardeck was dismantled, the casemate was redone and installed in it 10x152 mm guns. The composition of the armament was changed: the surface torpedo tubes were removed, the number of 152 mm guns was increased from 8 to 14 (ammunition capacity of 190 shells per gun), and all 120 mm, 47 mm and 37 mm guns were removed. The main caliber turrets were repaired and their design flaws were corrected. Thanks to this, the firing range increased to 80 cables. Unfortunately, no funds were allocated (105 thousand rubles were required) to modernize the turrets and increase the elevation angle of the 305 mm guns from 15 to 25 degrees. This would allow increasing the firing range to 100 cables. On July 19, 1912, the updated battleship entered sea trials, and by August 23, artillery tests were completed. Soon after the complete completion of the test program (September 21, 1912), the modernized battleship Three Saints replaced the Rostislav battleship brigade.

The new ships were actively engaged in combat training and made voyages in the Black Sea. One of them ended in a scandalous episode, which led to a change in the fleet commander. When leaving the Romanian port of Constanta on September 19, 1912, Vice Admiral I.F. Boström decided to “booze” and performed a risky maneuver. As a result, two battleships ran aground on the outer roadstead of the port. “Eustathius” was soon able to disembark on its own, and the work to refloat the “Panteleimon” took 8 hours. Both ships received damage to the hull and, after returning to Sevastopol, were forced to dock. In August 1913, “John Chrysostom” took part in the most secret experiment in the entire history of the Russian Imperial Navy - experimental shooting at the “Excluded Vessel І°4” (former battleship “Chesma”). Its results were immediately classified. The brigade's combat training continued and every year it became more and more intense due to the worsening situation in the Balkans. The brigade's firing at the Tendra training ground continued, and the ships continued their voyages in the Black Sea. For the first time in the winter of 1913-14. battleships were not put into the armed reserve.

Combat training became even more intense and intense in 1914. In April, “Rostislav” and “Sinop” were reduced to a reserve brigade of battleships, and in September it became the 2nd brigade of battleships. It also included the “Three Saints” (the result of savings on the modernization of the towers). The last firing of the battleships took place on October 7 in the area of ​​Cape Feolent. On this day, battleships, cruisers and the 2nd destroyer division carried out live artillery and torpedo firing. Their target was “Excluded Ship No. 3” (former battleship “Ekaterina II”). Firing battleships from a distance of 90 cables showed a high level of training of gunners and became a “dress rehearsal” for the upcoming battles. And they finished off the target with a torpedo from the destroyer “Strict”. The hull of the veteran ship sank at a depth of 183 m.

By this time, the Black Sea battleships had a formidable enemy. Thanks to the “insufficiently energetic” opposition from the British fleet, two German ships were able to pass the Mediterranean Sea and enter the Dardanelles on July 28, 1914. We are talking about the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. On August 3, Turkish flags were raised on them and they were renamed “Yavuz Sultan Selim” and “Midilli” respectively. The crews on them remained German, but the ships became the property of the Ottoman Empire. The Goeben was a dangerous adversary: ​​its speed reached 28 knots (instead of the 16 knots of Russian battleships), powerful weapons (10x280 mm and 12x150 mm guns) and excellent optics, fairly advanced armor, and an experienced and capable crew. He became the main opponent of Russian battleships. Our officers continued, despite the renaming, to call it “Goeben”, and soon the cruisers received the nicknames “Goeben” became “uncle”, and “Breslau” became “nephew”.

The situation on the Black Sea after Turkey’s purchase of the Geben became a stalemate: the “German” could sink any of the battleships of the Black Sea Fleet, but when meeting them as part of a brigade, our battleships posed a serious threat to it. Then the “uncle” willingly used his advantage in speed and quickly left the battlefield. Both our leadership and the enemy command had to take these facts into account: “Goeben” tried to catch our battleships one by one, and our command was forced to go to sea only with all its might.

For the Black Sea Fleet, the war began on October 16, 1914 with an attack by the German-Turkish fleet on the Black Sea ports. In Odessa, Turkish ships sank a gunboat. Sevastopol was fired upon by the Goeben, which fired 47x280mm and 12x150mm shells. Not a single ship in the port was damaged by his salvos. The enemy battle cruiser walked along the fortress minefield (300 galvanic mines), but its chain was not closed. The order to close the circuit was not received in time. This accident saved the best ship of the German-Turkish fleet from destruction. Our battleships, standing on their barrels, did not open fire in the Sevastopol Bay. With the exception of "St. George the Victorious", which fired three shots from 152 mm guns. Coastal batteries fired, and naval aviation was scrambled into the air. Departing from Sevastopol, the Goeben damaged the destroyer Lieutenant Pushchin with fire and forced the crew of the minelayer Prut to scuttle their ship due to the danger of a mine explosion. On the same day, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.A. Eberhard took the fleet to sea (5 battleships, 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers), but did not find the enemy. The first meeting of the fleet with the Goeben took place on November 5, 1914 and went down in history as the battle at Cape Sarych. Russian ships were returning from a three-day voyage after shelling Trebizond and at 12.05, 40 miles from Cape Khersones, they discovered “big smoke” on the horizon. The battleships began to rebuild. At 12.20, with a salvo from the Eustathius, our battleships opened fire on the enemy. The fight lasted

14 min. “Goeben” answered, he concentrated his fire on the flagship. The first two salvoes of 280-mm guns overshot and undershot, shrapnel covered our flagship, damaged the radio antenna and pierced the middle chimney. The German gunners demonstrated an excellent rate of fire and soon the attacks began. Three volleys of the “uncle” resulted in hits: two 280-mm shells hit the right bow 152-mm casemate (5 officers and 29 lower ranks were killed, 24 lower ranks were wounded), another hit the casemate of a 152-mm battery in the ship’s superstructure, and another one exploded on the starboard side of the bow and riddled it with fragments. Two German “gifts” lay next to the side of the Rostislav. Soon the Goeben increased its speed and left the battlefield. The question of the number of hits on the Goeben still remains unclear - Russian officers observed at least 1 hit, our historians wrote about 14 hits, 115 killed and 59 wounded, while the Germans generally deny hits and damage to the Yavuz. Due to various reasons, our battleships were unable to act together in this battle, and in fact it came down to an unequal, fleeting duel between Goebe and Eustathius. Our flagship was damaged, but managed to fire 12x305mm shells. “John Chrysostom” fired 6 shots, “Panteleimon” did not open fire, “Three Saints” fired 12 shots, “Rostislav” managed to fire 2x254 mm and 6x152 mm shots.

On November 6, those killed in the battle at Cape Sarych were buried in Sevastopol. On November 16, Eustathius underwent repairs, repaired the damage and returned to service. The fleet continued combat operations off the Turkish coast. On the evening of December 24, our ships were met by the cruisers Midilli and Hamidiye. “Eustathius” managed to fire 5x305-mm, 4x203-mm, 17x152-mm and 1x75-mm, “John Chrysostom” 1x203-mm and 7x152-mm shells, but they fell short. During a short firefight, the Eustathius again suffered no direct hits, but shells from the Midilli damaged the railings and made five gouges on the barrel of the right bow 305-mm gun. The bombardment of the Turkish coast by battleships continued, but the Goeben did not appear, because it was repaired after being blown up by 2 Russian mines.

On April 27, a second meeting of the battleships with the Goeben took place near the Bosporus. Admiral A.A. Ebergard took the entire fleet to sea - 5 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 seaplane transports, 15 destroyers and 6 minesweepers. In the morning, the Russians divided their forces - “Panteleimon” and “Three Saints” went to shell Turkish fortifications in the Bosphorus area. The enemy decided to take advantage of this, and “Goeben” moved towards rapprochement with half the Russian forces. In such a situation, his chances increased sharply. At 6.50 our patrol ships discovered the Goeben. At 7.20 a combat alarm was sounded on the battleships. Eberhard sought to connect with 2 battleships as soon as possible, because "Rostislav" posed no danger to "Goeben". At 7.51 two Russian battleships opened fire, and the enemy responded. Our shots undershot, German salvoes began to cover the Eustathia. The flagship was “taken into a fork”, it was surrounded by huge columns of water, it was flooded with water, the ship’s hull was shaken by dynamic shocks, but there was not a single direct hit on the Eustathius. This is a huge credit to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who controlled the ship’s maneuvers. A few more volleys from the “uncle” and hits could no longer be avoided. Now "Goeben" a new enemy appeared - "Panteleimon", speeding up the vehicle (it reached a speed of 17.5 knots) approached the battlefield. At 8.05 his guns fired the first shot at the Goeben. With the second salvo from a distance of 100 cables, he managed to hit the middle part of the left side of the “uncle”. This was followed by two more hits from Panteleimon, and at 8.16 the Goeben left the battle. He fired 160 shots, but did not achieve a single hit. “Eustathius” fired 60x305 mm and 32x203 mm, “John Chrysostom” 75x305 mm and 4x203 mm, “Panteleimon” fired 16x305 mm shots,
"Three Saints" fired 13x305 mm shells. Russian battleships continued operations off the Turkish coast.

On July 1, 1915, the battleship Empress Maria, the first dreadnought of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived in Sevastopol. This huge ship was armed with 12x305 mm guns and alone could deal with both the “uncle” and the “nephew”. He had not yet completed the test program and on the passage from Nikolaev he was accompanied by veteran battleships. They were moving south of the dreadnought and were ready to repel the Goeben's attack. Soon the main caliber of the dreadnought was tested and it went out on its first combat campaign. In November, the second dreadnought Empress Catherine the Great joined the fleet. This changed the strategic situation in the Black Sea and now the Goeben had only one advantage: speed.

The old battleships were repaired and slightly modernized, with anti-aircraft guns and fore-trawls installed. They began to go to sea less often, but still continued to make trips to the Turkish shores. They shelled Zunguldak, Kilimli, Kozlu and other places on the coast. The veteran ships had no new encounters with the Goeben. Instead, a new dangerous enemy appeared - submarines. In October 1915, Bulgaria entered the war
side of Germany, and the port of Varna became a base for German submarines. The old battleships “Eustathius”, “John Chrysostom” and “Panteleimon” were sent against him, which were supposed to deliver an artillery strike on the port. On October 22, they carried out the first shelling, but due to a lack of data, they fired “in areas.” He gave no results. The second shelling on October 27 was combined with an air raid, but it did not produce any special results. At the same time, Panteleimon was attacked by the submarine UB 7, which fired a 450-mm torpedo from 5 cables. It was discovered in a timely manner by signalmen and an evasive maneuver was carried out in a timely manner. The torpedo passed by. At the same time, fire was opened with diving shells on the periscope.

The Russian army successfully operated in the Caucasus and captured a number of cities and fortresses. The old battleships Rostislav and Panteleimon were brought in to support the offensive of our troops. In 1915, the Batumi detachment was formed. In 1916, it was headed by “Rostislav”, who suppressed batteries with fire from 254 mm and 152 mm guns and fired at the positions of the Turkish army. The old battleship covered landing operations, accompanied huge convoys with troops and cargo for the army, and with its presence gave “solidity” to the guard of destroyers, minesweepers and fast boats. After the occupation of Trebizond, which became the main supply base of the Caucasian army, veteran battleships came to Batum to protect sea communications from a possible attack by the Goeben. But “uncle” never showed up. In the fall they returned to Sevastopol.

In August-October 1916, "Rostislav" operated near Constanta. He led a special forces detachment consisting of 10 destroyers, 10 fast boats, 9 minesweepers, 4 messenger ships and 2 transports. It covered communications off the coast of Romania and operated off the coast of Bulgaria and in the Bosphorus region. Here, “Rostislav”, while carrying out command tasks (supporting Romanian troops with fire, suppressing enemy batteries), had to face another danger from enemy aircraft. On August 20, 25 bombs were dropped on the battleship. One of them hit the edge of the vertical armor of the battleship's main battery turret. 16 sailors were wounded.

In February 1917, a revolution occurred in Russia and the Romanov dynasty was overthrown. Democratic transformations began in the country. Anarchy set in in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, thanks to the authority of Commander A.F. Kolchak, it was possible to maintain relative order: ship committees were formed on the ships of the fleet, but there were no murders of officers, the ships still went to sea for military operations on the shores of Turkey. In March, “Panteleimon” was given back the name “Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky”, which he had during the uprising. But its crew did not want such a renaming and on April 28 the ship received a new name “Freedom Fighter”. In the summer, the discipline of the Black Sea people began to weaken due to the influence of envoys from the Baltic. Numerous rallies began. In the fall, power in the country passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and anarchy began on the Black Sea: officers were killed, sailors began to desert, ships stopped going to sea, and crews did not follow the orders of the command. The old battleships also stopped going on cruises; they were placed at the berths of the South Bay of Sevastopol. Soon they were empty, and the sailors left them.

In May 1918, German troops entered Sevastopol. They captured old battleships, but did not do anything with them, because... they were more interested in the contents of naval warehouses. Although during the occupation a number of valuable equipment and materials disappeared from veteran ships. In November they were replaced by English and French invaders. They also had little interest in armadillos. In April 1919, while leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the cylinders of the main engines of all the old battleships. Soon the whites recaptured Crimea. They decided to use the Rostislav as a floating battery. It was towed to Kerch and then installed in the Kerch Strait. He guarded the approaches from the north to the strait and fired at Red units on the Taman Peninsula. His team consisted of former officers, high school students, students, cadets and cadets. In November 1920, the Whites, leaving Sevastopol and Crimea, sank the Rostislav on the fairway. And “Freedom Fighter”, “Eustathius”, “John Chrysostom” and “Three Saints” became trophies of the Red Army.

After the end of the Civil War, various authoritative commissions examined the veteran ships several times, which still stood in the South Bay of Sevastopol, which had become a “ship graveyard.” There had been no crews on them for a long time and traces of desolation and plunder were visible everywhere. The condition of the hulls was not bad, no one was monitoring the artillery, and the blown cylinders of the main engines required replacement. There was nowhere and no one to do this. As a result, they were declared unsuitable for restoration and decided to be sent “on pins and needles.” In the 1920s all of them were dismantled in Sevastopol. The artillery was put into storage. Several guns from battleships in the 20-30s. was installed on coastal batteries near Sevastopol.

During the First World War (1914-1918), the enemy of the Russian Empire on the Black Sea was the German-Turkish fleet. And although the Young Turk government for a long time doubted who to fight with and who to be friends with, it adhered to neutrality. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and intelligence closely monitored internal political events in Turkey: Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha advocated an alliance with the German Empire, and Minister of the Navy, head of the Istanbul garrison Jemal Pasha for cooperation with France. They informed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, A. A. Eberhard, about the state of the Turkish fleet and army, their preparations, so that he could correctly respond to the actions of a potential enemy.

Admiral A. A. Ebergard.

With the outbreak of war (Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914), the government instructed Admiral A. A. Eberhard to avoid aggressive actions that could trigger a war with the Ottoman Empire, strengthening the arguments of the Turkish “war party.” The Black Sea Fleet had the right to begin hostilities only by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (he was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (Junior) from July 20, 1914 to August 23, 1915), or according to a message from the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. Although the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) showed the fallacy of this position, when the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron and temporarily paralyzed its activities, which allowed the Japanese to carry out an unhindered landing of ground armies. The imperial government, 10 years later, “stepped on the same rake”; the commander of the fleet was bound by government directives, instructions from the high military command and was unable to implement all measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleet, including the possibility of a preventive strike. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet, although significantly stronger than the Turkish naval forces, was forced to passively wait for an enemy attack.

Balance of forces: Russian Black Sea Fleet and German-Turkish Fleet

Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet, in all respects, had complete superiority over the enemy: in the number of pennants, in firepower, in combat training, and in the training of officers and sailors. It included: 6 battleships of the old type (the so-called battleships, or pre-dreadnoughts) - the flagship of the fleet "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" (built 1904-1911), "Panteleimon" (formerly the notorious "Prince Potemkin" -Tavrichesky", built in 1898-1905), "Rostislav" (built in 1894-1900), "Three Saints" (built in 1891-1895), "Sinop" (built in 1883-1889); 2 Bogatyr-class cruisers, 17 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines. The main base was Sevastopol, the fleet had its own shipyards in Sevastopol and Nikolaev. Another 4 powerful modern-style battleships (dreadnoughts) were built: “Empress Maria” (1911-July 1915), “Empress Catherine the Great” (1911-October 1915), “Emperor Alexander III” (1911-June 1917 .), “Emperor Nicholas I” (since 1914, unfinished due to the sharp deterioration of the political, financial and economic situation after the February Revolution of 1917). Also, during the war, the Black Sea Fleet received 9 destroyers, 2 aircraft (prototypes of aircraft carriers), 10 submarines.

At the beginning of 1914, the emergence of the Turkish fleet from the Bosphorus Strait to fight the Russian fleet seemed fantastic. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline for almost two centuries, and by the 20th century the processes of decomposition only intensified. Turkey lost three wars to Russia in the 19th century (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1877-1878), and was victorious in the Crimean War (1853-1856), but only due to an alliance with England and France ; already in the 20th century it was defeated by Italy in the war for Tripolitania (1911-1912), and in the Balkan War (1912-1913). Russia was one of the five world leaders (Great Britain, Germany, USA, France, Russia). By the beginning of the century, the Turkish navy was a pitiful spectacle - a collection of outdated ships. One of the main reasons for this is the complete bankruptcy of Turkey; there was no money in the treasury. The Turks had only a few more or less combat-ready ships: 2 armored cruisers "Mecidiye" (built in the USA 1903) and "Gamidiye" (England 1904), 2 squadron battleships "Torgut Reis" and "Hayreddin Barbarossa" (battleships type "Brandenburg", purchased from Germany in 1910), 4 destroyers built in France (1907 type "Durendal"), 4 destroyers of German construction (purchased from Germany in 1910, type "S 165"). A distinctive feature of the Turkish naval forces was the almost complete lack of combat training.

It cannot be said that the Turkish government did not try to change the situation in its favor: in 1908, a grandiose fleet renewal program was adopted, it was decided to purchase 6 new-style battleships, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and a number of auxiliary vessels. But the war with Italy and two Balkan wars devastated the treasury, orders were disrupted. Turkey ordered more ships from France and England (interestingly, Russia’s allies in the Entente, but they were building ships for Turkey, Russia’s potential enemy on the Black Sea), so a battleship, 4 destroyers and 2 submarines were built in England. This replenishment could seriously change the balance of power in favor of the Ottoman Empire, but as soon as the war began, England confiscated the ships in favor of its fleet. Only the arrival from the Mediterranean Sea on August 10, 1914 of two newest German cruisers: the heavy Goeben (called Sultan Selim) and the light Breslau (Midilli), they became part of the Turkish fleet along with their crews, allowed Turkey to conduct fighting in the Black Sea basin. The commander of the German Mediterranean Division, Rear Admiral V. Souchon, led the combined German-Turkish forces. "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the Russian battleships would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" escaped, taking advantage of its high speed.

Plans of the parties

The main goal of the Black Sea Fleet was complete dominance in the Black Sea in order to reliably protect strategically important objects near the sea, cover the flank of the Caucasian Army, and ensure the transfer of troops and supplies by sea. At the same time, disrupt Turkish shipping along its Black Sea coast. When the Turkish fleet appeared near Sevastopol, the Russian fleet was supposed to destroy it. In addition, if necessary, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing to conduct the Bosphorus operation - to capture the Bosphorus Strait, by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and landing units. But after the appearance of German cruisers in Turkey, the plans of the Russian command were confused; Admiral Souchon was not going to engage in battle with the main forces of the Russian fleet, but using his speed, carried out targeted strikes and left before the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet arrived.

German cruiser Goeben

In 1915, when the newest Empress Maria class battleships, the fleet was tasked with using all its might to disrupt the supply of coal and other supplies to the Bosphorus area and to provide assistance to the troops of the Caucasian Front. For this purpose, 3 ship groups were created, each of which was more powerful than the German cruiser Goeben. They were supposed to, changing each other, constantly be near the Turkish coast and thereby fulfill the main task of the fleet.

The strategic intent of the commander of the combined German-Turkish fleet, Rear Admiral Souchon, was to launch a surprise attack almost simultaneously on the main base of the Russian fleet of Sevastopol, the ports of Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. Sink or seriously damage the warships and merchant ships located there, as well as the most significant military and industrial facilities on the shore and, thereby weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet, achieve the possibility of complete superiority at sea. Thus, the German admiral planned to repeat the experience of the Japanese in 1904. But despite the success of the operation, the Russian fleet did not suffer serious losses; Souchon simply did not have enough firepower. If the Turkish fleet had been more powerful, the Black Sea Fleet could have received a severe blow, which would have sharply worsened the position of the Russian Caucasian Army and disrupted the Black Sea communications.

Beginning of hostilities: “Sevastopol wake-up call”

Vice Admiral A. A. Ebergard received news of the departure of the German-Turkish squadron from the Bosphorus on October 27. He took the Black Sea Fleet out to sea and waited all day on the approaches to Sevastopol in the hope of meeting the enemy. But on the 28th, the fleet headquarters received an order from the Supreme Command “not to seek a meeting with the Turkish fleet and engage in battle with it only if absolutely necessary.” The Black Sea Fleet returned to base and no longer took active action. Although Admiral A.A. Ebergard acted on orders from above, this does not relieve him of the guilt for passivity; I think Admiral S.O. Makarov would not have taken rank into account if the honor of the Russian Fleet was at issue.

Of course, the fleet command took action to prevent a surprise attack by the Turkish fleet. Reconnaissance was carried out, three destroyers were on patrol on the approaches to Sevastopol, the main forces of the fleet were in the base in full readiness. But all this turned out to be not enough. The command did not make any orders to prepare the fleet forces, including the Sevastopol fortress, to repel the enemy attack. The head of the raid security wanted to turn on the minefield, but A.A. Ebergard forbade this, as he was expecting the approach of the Prut minelayer. But the raid commander nevertheless warned the fortress artillery commander about the possible arrival of an enemy squadron. And the coastal artillery more or less completed its task.

As a result, the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task - it was unable to protect the Russian coast, it missed the enemy fleet, which calmly went to the Bosphorus. On October 29-30, the German-Turkish fleet launched an artillery strike on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk. This event was called “Sevastopol Reveille”. In Odessa, the destroyers “Muavenet-i Millet” and “Gayret-i-Vataniye” sank the gunboat “Donets” and shelled the city and port. The battle cruiser "Goeben" approached Sevastopol and for 15 minutes walked freely through our minefield, without opposition, firing at the city, port and ships stationed in the outer roadstead. The minefield's electrical circuit was turned off, and no one turned it on without orders. The Konstantinovskaya battery was silent, waiting for the German cruiser to enter the targeted square, but opening fire, it immediately hit the target three times. "Goeben" immediately gave full speed and retreated to the sea. On the way back, he met the Prut minelayer, which was expected in Sevastopol with a full load of mines. Trying to save the Prut, three old destroyers that were on patrol (Lieutenant Pushchin, Zharkiy and Zhivuchy) launched an attack on the Goeben. They did not have a single chance of success, but “Goeben” could not drown them, “they parted in peace.” The Goeben's gunners easily repulsed this attack. The commander of the minelayer, Captain 2nd Rank G. A. Bykov, sank the ship, which is interesting: “Goeben” fired at it - 1 hour 5 minutes, on a practically unarmed ship. But it was a success, because the Prut carried most of the naval sea mines. The cruiser Breslau laid mines in the Kerch Strait, on which the ships Yalta and Kazbek were blown up and sank. This is the great fault of the commander and his staff, especially the Supreme Commander, who with his instructions bound the initiative of A. A. Eberhard, was to blame. But in the end, the German-Turkish plan still did not work: the forces of the first strike were too dispersed, and there was not enough firepower.

This is how Türkiye entered the First World War and the last war with Russia. On the same day, Russian ships began voyages to the enemy’s shores. The fire from the cruiser "Kahul" destroyed huge coal storage facilities in Zonguldak, and the battleship "Panteleimon" and destroyers sank three loaded troop transports. The Turks were amazed by such activity of the Russian fleet, they miscalculated, imagining that they had gained time, the Black Sea Fleet was alive and operating.

The fighting in the Black Sea began unexpectedly for the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet was taken by surprise and only the lack of sufficient firepower and the dispersion of forces prevented the German-Turkish fleet from becoming master of the sea. The main reasons for this are the fear of the high command to provoke a war with the Ottoman Empire and the lack of initiative of the command of the Black Sea Fleet.

But as history has shown, for Russia war very often begins unexpectedly, but the Russians very quickly “enter” the process and seize the strategic initiative from the enemy. The Black Sea Fleet did not take a “break”, but immediately responded: on November 4-7, destroyers, under the cover of battleships, laid mines (in total, during the war years, the Black Sea Fleet laid 13 thousand mines) near the Bosporus, the battleship “Rostislav”, the cruiser “Kahul” and 6 destroyers fired at Zunguldak, destroying coal storage facilities and 2 Turkish transports. On the way back, the squadron sank 3 Turkish minesweepers, and more than 200 people were captured. On November 15-18, the Russian squadron goes out to search for enemy ships, shells Trebizond and meets the German cruiser Goeben on the way back.

Battle at Cape Sarych (November 18, according to Art. 5th)

The remoteness of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, from the Bosphorus did not allow establishing a permanent blockade of the Turkish fleet. The Russian squadron was forced to periodically return for repairs and rest. Since the Goeben was superior to any Russian battleship in firepower and speed, the Russian command had to keep the main forces together. The fleet headquarters believed that the German cruiser could move at a speed of 29 knots, but in reality, due to the impossibility of high-quality repairs in Turkey, the speed of the Goeben did not exceed 24 knots. For example: the flagship of the Russian squadron “Eustathius” could travel at a maximum speed of 16 knots, the cruiser “Kahul” - 23 knots. But the Russian squadron had one interesting novelty - before the war, they practiced firing a formation of ships at one target.

On November 17, “Goeben” and “Breslau” went to sea with the goal of intercepting Russian ships and, if the outcome was favorable, attacking. On the same day, Admiral A. A. Ebergard received a message from the Naval General Staff about the Germans going to sea. But the lack of coal did not allow the search to begin and, increasing vigilance, the squadron moved towards the Crimea. The collision occurred on the 18th, about 45 miles from Cape Chersonesus, near Cape Sarych. At 11.40, the enemy ship noticed the Almaz cruiser on reconnaissance mission, and at the same time a radio interception was made. The Russian ships reduced the intervals between each other, and the destroyers pulled up to the main forces. Then the Almaz, which was on reconnaissance mission, and the cruisers Kagul and Memory of Mercury were recalled.

cruiser "Almaz"

Due to heavy fog and smoke ahead of the flagship, the battle came down to a shootout between “Goeben” and “Eustathius” (captain 1st rank V.I. Galanin). Senior artilleryman V.M. Smirnov, who directed the fire of a brigade of battleships (was on the John Chrysostom), was unable to accurately determine the distance to the enemy ship, so the shells from the remaining battleships flew over the top. The battle lasted only 14 minutes, Russian ships (with 34-40 cables, 6-7 km) fired 30 main-caliber shells. Russian artillerymen "Eustathius" hit the target from the very first salvo, the 12-inch "hotel" pierced the 150-mm armor of the German, causing a fire in the aft casemate on the left side. It was a success, usually even good gunners (like the Germans) hit with the 3rd salvo. "Goeben" changed course and returned fire. The Germans soon realized that the Russians had learned the bloody lesson of Tsushima; in 14 minutes of battle, the Goeben received 14 hits, including 3 and 305 mm shells. He took advantage of his superior speed and, before the other Russian battleships took aim, went into the fog. The duel with the outdated Russian hero was not cheap for the Germans - total losses ranged from 112 to 172 people (according to various sources). But the Eustathius also suffered losses; out of the 19 280 mm shells that the German cruiser fired, four (4) hit the Russian battleship. The flagship lost 58 people (33 killed, 25 wounded).

What conclusions could be drawn after this fleeting battle? Firstly, a brigade of old battleships could easily resist a new type of battleship (dreadnought). One battleship will be defeated, but in a formation they represent a formidable force if the crews are well trained, which was confirmed by the battle of May 10, 1915. Secondly, the battle showed the good training of the Russian gunners, but the mediocre training of the squadron’s high command - A. A. Eberhard was unable to organize a combined attack of his forces.

On December 13 (26), the Goeben was blown up by 2 mines near the Bosphorus Strait, the area of ​​the hole on the left side was 64 square meters. meters, and the right one - 50 square meters. meters, “drank water” from 600 to 2000 tons. Specialists from Germany had to be called in for repairs; restoration work was largely completed by April 1915.
At the very end of 1914, 5 German submarines ("UB 7", "UB 8", "UB 13", "UB 14" and "UB 15") crossed into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, and this complicated the situation.

1915

Consistently, the Black Sea Fleet got rid of shortcomings. Destroyers and seaplanes began to be used for reconnaissance of Turkish routes, and the effectiveness of agent actions was increased. But still, the lack of a base in the southwestern part of the sea did not allow a complete blockade of Turkish forces. From the beginning of January to the end of March 1915, the Russian squadron made 9 trips to enemy shores, and carried out artillery strikes on Zunguldak and Trebizond. Dozens of steamships and sailing ships carrying military cargo were sunk. Russian submarines began to patrol the Bosphorus area. The Batumi destroyer detachment was created - the 5th division ("Zavidny", "Zavetny", "Zvonky" and "Zorky"). On March 28, the Black Sea squadron fired and bombed for the first time (the Nikolai I seaplane transport with 5 seaplanes) on the fortifications of the Bosphorus. The ports in the Kozlu, Eregli, and Zunguldak regions were also shelled.

The Odessa Operation Plan and Its Failure

Admiral V. Souchon decided to take advantage of the fact that the Goeben had been largely restored and strike back at Odessa. Why did you choose Odessa? It was in Odessa that the Russian landing force could concentrate to capture the Bosphorus, therefore, by destroying the transports, Souchon thwarted the plans of the Russian command and at the same time showed that the Turkish fleet was alive and combat-ready. The Ottoman Empire at this moment could have been defeated due to an attack from 3 directions: on February 18, the Anglo-French fleet attacked the Dardanelles, the Dardanelles operation began; the Russian fleet is shelling the Bosphorus and preparing an amphibious army in Odessa, and the Russian capture of Constantinople-Istanbul is a nightmare of the Turks in recent decades. And at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, Russian troops destroy the 3rd Turkish army near Sarykamysh, the path to Anatolia is open. And here there is an opportunity to eliminate the threat from one direction. The plan of the operation was quite simple: “Goeben” and “Breslau” cover the attack forces from Sevastopol, the cruisers “Mejidiye” and “Gamidiye” with 4 destroyers at this time shell Odessa, destroying landing transports. The Turks' plan was doomed to success. However, Russian minefields spoiled the matter. The Russian Empire at that time was the world leader in the field of mine weapons. The Turks and Germans clearly underestimated the mine danger. For which they paid.

The commander of the operation was the German captain of the cruiser "Medzhidiye" - Buchsel. On April 1, the Turkish detachment left the Bosphorus, and on the night of the 3rd it was in the Odessa region. The detachment lost its course somewhat at night and reached the coast about 15 miles east of the intended point. Büchsel changed course and moved west, towards Odessa. He planned to begin shelling from the north, then moving south and southeast to continue the shelling. Destroyers with trawls walked ahead to search for mines. Behind them, exactly in the wake of the cruiser. Suddenly, at 6.40, the Medzhidiye exploded, the explosion occurred on the left side, the cruiser began to quickly sink with a list to the left side. He didn't drown completely; the depth was too shallow. The Turks threw out the gun bolts, destroyed the radio, and the destroyers removed the crew. At 7.20 one of the destroyers torpedoed the cruiser, with the aim of completely sinking it. The Turkish detachment retreated. The Russian fleet left Sevastopol and attacked the German cruisers, they did not accept the battle and disappeared. Interestingly, the enemy was discovered for the first time using seaplanes.

On June 8, 1915, “Medzhidiye” was raised, initial repairs were carried out in Odessa, then major repairs were carried out in Nikolaev, it was re-equipped and a year later in June 1916 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet as “Prut”. As part of the fleet, he participated in several operations; in May 1918, he was captured by the Germans, handed over to the Turks, and there, thanks to Russian repairs, he served in the Turkish fleet until 1947.

Bosphorus Operation Plan

After the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Russian Empire planned different options for waging war with the Ottoman Empire. After the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1877. It became finally clear that only ground forces can win at the cost of heavy losses, resource consumption and loss of time. The distance from the Danube and the Caucasus to Istanbul is too long, and it is also protected by strong fortresses.

Therefore, with the revival of the Black Sea Fleet, the idea of ​​conducting the Bosphorus operation arose. With its help, it was possible to decapitate the old enemy with one blow and realize the age-old Russian dream - to return the ancient Constantinople to the fold of the Orthodox world. To implement this plan, a powerful armored fleet was needed, an order of magnitude stronger than the Turkish naval forces. The fleet has been built since 1883, with battleships of the “Empress Catherine the Great” type laid down; a total of 4 ships were built (“Chesma”, “Sinop”, “George the Victorious”), and two of them also participated in the First World War - “Sinop” and “George” Victorious." In addition, the destroyer fleet and the Volunteer Fleet (for transporting troops) were intensively developed. In the event of war, these battleships would be quite enough to eliminate the Turkish fleet. They were built to perform two tasks: 1) squadron combat; and 2) destruction of coastal fortifications, suppression of enemy batteries.

But defeat in the Russo-Japanese War pushed these plans aside. The task of reviving the fleet came to the fore. But until the appearance of the Goeben with the Breslau in Turkey, theoretically the Black Sea Fleet could carry out this operation; there were enough forces.

After the Allies launched the Dardanelles operation, the Russian fleet systematically carried out demonstrative actions against the Bosphorus. If the British had succeeded in the Dardanelles, the Black Sea Fleet would have occupied the Bosporus. Russian troops converged on Odessa, and demonstrative loading onto transports was carried out. The frantic activity created the appearance of preparing a large-scale landing operation. Although it would hardly have been successful before the commissioning of new battleships. And the German offensive of 1915 did not allow the allocation of large forces for the operation.

A real opportunity arose only in 1916: the Caucasian Front carried out a successful Erzurum operation, the Southwestern Front successfully defeated the Austro-Hungarians, German troops tried to defeat the Anglo-French armies in the West. The Russian command now had reserves for the operation. 2 new battleships were put into operation, and the Goeben was neutralized. The operation was planned to begin in 1917, but the February Revolution threw the empire into the abyss of anarchy and Civil War. The dream of Russian Slavophiles never became a geopolitical reality - Constantinople did not become the third capital of the Russian Empire.

From March 28 to May 10, the Russian fleet fired at the Bosporus 4 times. At the same time, 2 battleships fired at coastal fortifications, 3 provided cover from the sea. On May 10, the Goeben attacked the ships under cover (Eustathius, John Chrysostom and Rostislav). Neither side achieved success when the 4th Russian battleship Panteleimon entered the battle and immediately made three hits with 305-mm shells. The Goeben was not seriously damaged, but realizing that the superiority was on the enemy’s side, it left. The shootout itself lasted only 23 minutes.

On September 3, Bulgaria took the side of Germany. In September 1915, when 2 new battleships of the Dreadnought type entered the Black Sea Fleet, 3 brigades of ships were created, each superior in power to the Goeben. 1st consisting of the dreadnought "Empress Maria" and the cruiser "Cahul". 2nd consisting of: the dreadnought "Empress Catherine the Great" and the cruiser "Memory of Mercury". 3rd consisting of: battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon". The battleships "Three Saints" and "Rostislav" formed a combat-ready reserve. Organizationally, the dreadnoughts "Empress Maria", "Empress Catherine the Great" and the Cahul-class cruisers were consolidated into the 1st brigade of the fleet, and the battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon" - into the 2nd brigade of Black Sea battleships fleet.

In general, from that time on, the Russian fleet gained complete superiority; it constantly bombarded the enemy coast. With the advent of new submarines in the fleet, including the Crab-class minelayer, it became possible to cross enemy communications using them. At the beginning, the submarines used the positional method - they took up a position and were on duty, waiting for the enemy ship. Since the summer of 1915, the cruising method was used, when the boat patrolled in a certain area, taking turns replacing each other. A new feature of the Russian fleet was the interaction of submarines and destroyers. This method paid off and increased the effectiveness of the blockade of the Bosphorus and coal districts in Turkey. Aerial reconnaissance also developed rapidly; Russian naval pilots were among the world leaders in this field.

1916

In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet strengthened its superiority and almost completely controlled the sea. Three brigades of battleships were formed, destroyer forces were actively operating, and submarine forces and naval aviation were increasing their combat experience. Conditions were created for the Bosphorus operation.

In 1916, evil fate threw up several unpleasant “surprises”: on August 14 (27), Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, but since its armed forces were of very dubious combat capability, they had to be strengthened by Russian troops, the Black Sea Fleet also assisted sides of the Balkan coast and the Danube. The underwater threat to the fleet has increased; German submarine forces in the Black Sea have grown to 10 submarines. The Black Sea Fleet did not have anti-submarine protection, so it had to be created on the approaches to Sevastopol.

In 1916, the fleet simultaneously performed several important tasks:
1) continued to block the Bosphorus Strait;
2) regularly supported the right flank of the advancing Caucasian Front;
3) provided assistance to the troops of Romania and the Russian units located there;
4) continued to disrupt enemy sea communications;
5) protect your bases and communications from enemy submarine forces and his cruising raids.

The main link was considered to be the blockade of the strait, which was of enormous military and strategic importance. Using the mine experience of the Baltic Fleet, it was decided to cover the Bosporus with mines. From July 30 to August 10, a mine-laying operation was carried out, 4 barriers were placed, about 900 mines in total. By the end of the year, another 8 mine installations were made, with the task of strengthening the main barrier and blocking coastal waters - to interfere with small ships and submarines. In total, 14 mine chains (about 2200 mines) were laid during the war. To protect the minefields from minesweepers, a patrol of destroyers and submarines was installed; since the end of the summer, mainly submarine forces have been on duty. The enemy lost several warships, submarines, and dozens of transport steam and sailing ships in the minefields. The mine blockade disrupted Turkish shipping, and the Ottoman capital began to experience difficulties in supplying food and fuel. But it was still not possible to carry out a complete blockade of the Bosphorus.

The assistance to the actions of the Caucasian Front was of a large-scale nature, it was constant and played an important role in conducting offensive operations, for example Trebizud. The fleet supported the ground forces with artillery, landed distracting troops and sabotage detachments, provided protection from a possible attack from the sea, and supplied supplies and reinforcements. The transportation of troops and supplies was carried out by a special transport flotilla (in 1916 - 90 ships).

So, at the beginning of 1916, the Batumi detachment of destroyers was reinforced, with 2 gunboats ("Donets", Kubanets) and 2 destroyers ("Strict" and "Swift"). To help carry out the Erzurum operation, it temporarily included the battleship " Rostislav" and the destroyers "Lieutenant Pushchin", "Zhivoy".

Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet

The Russian Empire was one of the world leaders in the theory of the use of aircraft at sea and the construction of seaplanes. Back in 1910, the famous Russian test pilot L. M. Matsievich wrote about the importance of using aircraft in maritime affairs and the construction of seaplanes. In 1911-1912 he was supported by the inventor D. P. Grigorovich. Work on hydroaviation in Russia kept pace with other leaders in the field of aircraft construction: the first French seaplane by A. Faber in 1910; American plane G. Curtis; and the Russian “Gakkel-V” in 1911.

After the plane of Ya. M. Gakkel, in 1912 the planes of I. I. Sikorsky were created. However, the Naval Ministry did not support the good initiative of Russian inventors in 1911-1913. seaplanes of American and French brands were purchased.

Since 1913, the construction of domestic seaplanes began to expand. The main role in that matter belonged to Russian designers, and not to the state. They were able to quickly create designs for naval aircraft that surpassed foreign ones and soon supplanted them from Russian naval aviation. These devotees are Grigorovich, Willisch, Engels, Sedelnikov, Friede, Shishmarev, as well as the design bureau of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works and the Aviation Test Station. Up to 15% of aircraft produced in Russia were for water use; this was not the case anywhere in the world.

At the beginning of the war, there were 8 seaplanes on the Black Sea, based on the Curtis type. The head of the Fleet Communications Service was Senior Lieutenant Stakhovsky. The aircraft were based at a 1st category station in Sevastopol (Kilen Bay), 1st category stations were built in Ovidiopol, Ak-mosque; 2nd category stations – Zolokarakh and Klerovka. Before the war, 3 and then 24 observation posts were created, from the Danube to Batum. This made it possible to quickly transfer aircraft along the entire Russian Black Sea coast. At the end of 1914, hangars from Ovidiopol and Ak-Mosque began to be transferred to Round Bay in Sevastopol and in May 1915 an aviation station was opened.

From August to the end of October 1914 (before the start of the war with the Ottoman Empire), they managed to complete the deployment of air units, train personnel, and develop some tactics. It became clear that aircraft could be used to detect enemy sea mines and submarines.

With the outbreak of war in the Black Sea Fleet, two steamships were rebuilt into aircraft “mothers”: “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Alexander I”; then they were joined by the hydrocruiser Romania. They could carry 6-8 aircraft. In addition, 1 seaplane was placed on the cruiser Almaz.

The first experience of using naval aviation took place on March 24, 1915: the Russian squadron made a trip to Rumelia (a region of Turkey in Europe), the squadron included “Nicholas I” with 4 aircraft. They were planned to be used for aerial reconnaissance, but then they were used for bombing coastal targets. This was the first experience of Russian naval aviation off enemy shores. On March 27, 1915, a squadron with the participation of 2 air transports (cruiser Almaz, Nikolai), planes conducted reconnaissance of the strait and established that there were no large ships, dropped 3 bombs on coastal fortifications and a destroyer.

By April 1915, the air squad had grown to 18 aircraft, in April 5 FBA seaplanes arrived, and from May the old Curtis aircraft began to be replaced with M-5 seaplanes designed by D. P. Grigorovich.

On May 3, Russian seaplanes made the first raid on the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. These actions showed that aviation was beginning to play a major role not only for reconnaissance, but also for attack operations. Until the end of the year, combat training and interaction between aircraft and ship crews were improved. In October 1915, the Russian squadron made a trip to the shores of Bulgaria, Varna and Evksinograd were shelled, and on the 25th an air raid was carried out.

On January 1, 1916, the Black Sea air detachment had: 30 officers, 371 other personnel, 30 aircraft, 2 air transport and the cruiser Almaz. At the end of the year, another aircraft, Romania, entered service. The Black Sea detachment consisted of the 1st and 2nd naval detachments (on “Nikolai” and “Alexandra” - 13 pilots), a hydroaviation detachment of the Caucasian Front (8 pilots), a combat training unit in Round Bay (5 pilots), the formation of an airship detachment began .

On January 8-15, exercises were conducted, techniques of aerial photography, reconnaissance, and bombing were practiced. On January 24, the Russian squadron approached Zunguldak. The Zunguldak coal region was the second most important area of ​​influence of the Russian fleet (after the Bosphorus). Due to the underdevelopment of the railway network, coal was transported mainly by sea. Usually only ships attacked it, the pilots were given the task of bombing the ship, the secondary targets were the port, power plant, and railway. Although the pilots were hampered by heavy clouds and anti-aircraft fire, they were able to drop 18 large and 20 small bombs, set fire to and sink a 7,000-ton steamship and several ships, destroyed a railway junction building, and set fire to several mines.

A similar operation was carried out on August 25 against the Austro-German forces in Varna, but this time the enemy offered strong resistance; when the squadron left, it was attacked by enemy planes that dropped several dozen bombs.

Another task for hydroaviation was to assist in large-scale landing operations. In April 1916, both air transports took part in escorting a transport flotilla of 27 ships from Novorossiysk and Mariupol to the Rize region. The planes provided air cover for the landing troops and provided anti-submarine protection. A month later, "Alexander" took part in the landing at Trebizond. At the beginning of December 1916, the air detachment included 45 M-5 seaplanes (reconnaissance, artillery fire spotter), 45 M-9 (heavy seaplane for bombing coastal targets and ships), 10 M-11 (the first in world (!) fighter seaplane) all Russian-made, designer D. P. Grigorovich.

The naval order defined the tasks of naval aviation:
1) attack of enemy ships, its bases and coastal fortifications;
2) fight against enemy air forces;
3) anti-submarine warfare;
4) surveillance and aerial reconnaissance;
5) protecting the fleet at sea from enemy aircraft and its submarines;
6) adjustment of artillery fire of ships.

By the beginning of 1917, naval aviation forces had grown to 110 aircraft; in the summer, 8 land fighters (“Nieuports”) arrived. The Black Sea air division was formed - the 1st brigade included 4 naval detachments (then 6), the 2nd brigade included 13 land-based detachments. In March 1917, a grandiose operation to capture the Bosphorus was supposed to begin, it was supposed to be supported from the air by over 150 seaplanes, but the death of the empire destroyed the plans of this operation. After the February Revolution, “Alexander” was renamed “Republican”, and “Nikolai” was renamed “Aviator”. On May 24-27, the Aviator made its last trip to aerial photography and bombing of Sinop. Further activities of the naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet ended due to the outbreak of the Civil War, the pilots were scattered by fate on different sides of the front.

The mystery of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria"

The Russo-Japanese War revealed a number of significant shortcomings of the Russian fleet; battleships became outdated. England is building a new battleship, the Dreadnought, but Russian inventors are not inferior to the world's advanced developments. Russian shipbuilders built battleships (“dreadnoughts”) according to the plans of I.G. Bubnova and A.N. Krylov, which surpassed the English prototype in many characteristics. In 1909, the ships “Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Poltava” and “Petropavlovsk” were laid down at the Baltic shipyards.

battleship Empress Maria

The linear placement of 12 305 mm guns in three-gun turrets made it possible to fire all guns simultaneously from both sides. The weight of a salvo of one of the first English battleships of the new type, Vengard, was 3003 kg; on Sevastopol it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the Russian battleship fired up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt was 225 mm thick. For the Black Sea Fleet in the Nikolaev shipyard in 1915-1917, according to the “Emperor” project, the battleships “Empress Maria”, “Emperor Alexander III” and “Ekaterina II” were built. The 4th dreadnought “Emperor Nicholas I” was laid down in 1915, but due to revolutionary events it was not completed.

On June 25, 1915, the battleship "Empress Maria" left the Nikolaev port and, under the guard of the squadron, headed for Sevastopol. This day became a holiday for shipbuilders and for the entire Black Sea Fleet. On October 13-15, 1915, the battleship covered the actions of the 2nd battleship brigade in the Zunguldak region. On November 2-4, 6-8, 1915, he covered the 2nd Brigade from the sea during the shelling of Varna and Euxinograd. From February 5 to April 18, he assisted in the Trebizond operation. During the course of hostilities, it became clear that the battleships of the Empress Maria type lived up to the hopes placed on them. During the first year of service, the ship made 24 military campaigns and sank many Turkish ships.

In the summer of 1916, by decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Emperor Nicholas) of the Russian Army, the Black Sea Fleet was headed by Vice Admiral Alexander Kolchak. The admiral made the Empress Maria the flagship of the fleet and systematically went to sea on it. Having laid a glorious initiative, in the fall of 1916 the battleship was placed in the Sevastopol roadstead for preventative repairs. And this autumn became fatal for “Empress Maria”. The morning of October 7 (20), 1916 did not foretell trouble; an ordinary day began. Over the Northern Bay, a wake-up call was given to ship crews every day. On the battleship everything went according to a certain routine. Suddenly, at 6.20, the surrounding area was rocked by a powerful explosion, followed by 15 explosions lasting about an hour. Frightened Sevastopol residents ran out to the embankment and became eyewitnesses of the terrible picture. The battleship Empress Maria was dying while standing in the roadstead in her native bay. The ship listed to starboard, capsized and sank. The wounded were located right on the shore and first aid was provided here. There was black smoke over the city. By evening, the extent of the disaster became known: 225 sailors were killed, 85 were seriously injured, and the most powerful ship of the Black Sea Fleet was lost.

The tragedy shocked the entire Russian Empire. A commission of the Naval Ministry, headed by a combat officer (participant in the defense of Port Arthur), member of the Admiralty Council, Admiral N.M. Yakovlev, began to determine the reasons for the death of the ship. A well-known shipbuilder, one of the authors of the Black Sea battleships project, a comrade-in-arms of Admiral S.O. Makarov, Academician A.N. Krylov, also became a member of the commission, who drew up a conclusion that was approved by all members of the commission.

Three main versions of the death of the battleship have been put forward:
1. spontaneous combustion of gunpowder;
2. carelessness in handling fire or gunpowder;
3. malicious intent.
The commission was inclined to the second version (negligence), since the gunpowder was, in the opinion of all the gunners of the battleship, of high quality. As for malicious intent, even establishing violations in the rules of access to artillery magazines and a lack of control over the workers on the ship. For example: the head of the ship's weapons, Prince Russov, pointed out that the hatch to the powder magazine was not locked or guarded at all. The commission considered this version unlikely. As a result, none of the hypotheses put forward by the commission found sufficient facts to confirm.

Also investigating the causes of the explosions were the Sevastopol Gendarmerie Directorate and the counterintelligence department of the Main Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, created on the initiative of the sailors at the end of 1915. But they were also unable to discover the true cause of the death of the flagship. Revolutionary events finally stopped the investigation.

German trace: already in the Soviet period, it became clear that Germany was closely monitoring all changes in the Russian fleet, including the new dreadnoughts. And in Germany they understood how dangerous Operation Constantinople (Bosphorus Operation) was, where battleships had to play a very important role. In 1933, during the investigation of sabotage at the Nikolaev shipyard, Stalin's security officers exposed the German intelligence network led by V.E. Verman. The goal of the organization was to disrupt the shipbuilding program of the military and merchant fleet of the USSR. During the investigation, many interesting facts were revealed that date back to the pre-revolutionary period. Verman himself was an experienced intelligence officer (he was a senior electrical engineer), and began his activities back in 1908, when a large-scale program for the restoration of the Russian fleet began. The network covered all major cities of the Black Sea region, with special attention paid to Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, and Novorossiysk. During interrogation, Werman said that German intelligence was planning sabotage on the battleship, and the group was led by saboteur Helmut von Stitthoff. He was considered the best specialist in the field of mining and ship blasting. In the summer of 1916, Helmut von Stithoff began working at the Nikolaev shipyard as an electrician. The plan was to blow up the battleship right at the shipyard. However, something went wrong, Stitthoff urgently curtailed the operation and left for Germany. But Werman’s group continued to work independently and did not curtail its activities; it had the opportunity to access the battleship. After an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the warship Empress Maria, Helmut von Stitthoff was transferred to the next mission. During this period, British intelligence (a certain Haviland) tried to recruit him.

Helmut von Stitthoff

In 1942, the honored German saboteur Helmut von Stithoff was shot by the secret police (Gestapo). The trail leading to the solution to the death of the battleship "Empress Maria" was erased.

1945 - Koenigsberg, a German archive was found in a destroyed house by Soviet soldiers. There they found an album containing a whole series of photographs of the battleship Empress Maria, one of the photographs depicting the moment of the explosion. It seems as if someone knew the time and place of the sabotage in advance and carefully filmed everything.

English trace: on the night before the death of the giant, Commander Voronov was on duty at the main tower. His duties were: inspection and measurement of the temperature of the artillery cellar. This morning, Captain 2nd Rank Gorodyssky was also on combat duty on the ship. At dawn, Gorodyssky ordered his Voronov to measure the temperature in the cellar of the main tower. Voronov went down to the cellar and no one saw him again. And after some time the first explosion occurred. Voronov's body was never found among the bodies of the dead. The commission had suspicions about him, but there was no evidence and he was listed as missing.

But recently new information has appeared: the English writer Robert Merid, who has long been involved in the mysterious death of the battleship, undertook his own investigation. And from it we learn very interesting (and shameful for the “ally” of the Russian Empire) information. The British naval intelligence lieutenant served in Russia from 1914 to 1916; a week after the explosion, he left Russia and arrived in England as a lieutenant colonel. After the end of the war, he retired and left the country. After some time, he appeared in Canada, bought an estate, began to equip it, and lived the ordinary life of a rich gentleman. And in 1929 he died under strange circumstances: in the hotel where he spent the night there was a fire, everyone was saved (including a woman with a small child and a paralyzed old man in a wheelchair), but the military officer was unable to escape from the 2nd floor.

This begs the question: who was hindered by the colonel in the deep periphery of world processes while in retirement? Research into photo archives led to unexpected results - British intelligence lieutenant colonel John Haviland and gunner of the battleship "Empress Maria" Voronov are one and the same person. The same Voronov who disappeared on October 7, 1916 during the explosion of the battleship Empress Maria. It is also interesting that shortly before his death, some Russian immigrants, including the former electrician of the battleship Empress Maria, Ivan Nazarin, attempted to assassinate him. Maybe they also got on the trail and tried to at least somehow take revenge for their ship!?

To summarize, in any crime, motive and opportunity are important. German intelligence had both motive and opportunity. By destroying the battleship, they helped their ally (the Ottoman Empire), disrupted the Bosphorus operation, and dealt a heavy psychological blow to their main enemy. Yes, and there was an opportunity: unfortunately, the Security Service was not developed in the Russian Empire; any agent of the German intelligence network (and more than one) could penetrate the battleship under construction, and since he could work there, he could bring in the “infernal machine.” Anyone familiar with the realities of Soviet-Russian factories will confirm this: you can take something out or bring it in.

The British Empire was an ally of Russia in that war, but from the course of history it is known that it was one of the first to have a powerful intelligence and sabotage service, and Britain was an old enemy of the Russian Empire. The motive for the destruction of the battleship? The English elite thought with horror about the day when “Oleg’s shield” would again be nailed to the gates of Constantinople. This would be the day of the collapse of the centuries-old machinations and intrigues of England against Russia. The Straits were not to be given to the Russians at any cost. The capabilities of British intelligence in Russia were no worse than those of Germany, and besides, England often did its business with the hands of others. Perhaps the battleship was destroyed by the forces of the German intelligence network, but under the leadership of the British. And the cover is good, who is to blame (?) – the Germans!

On the resignation of Admiral A. A. Eberhard (July 1916)

In the summer of 1916, Admiral A. A Eberhard was replaced by Admiral A. Kolchak. The reasons for this event are not the failures and mistakes of Eberhard, but rather a tribute to court circles and public opinion.

Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak

A. A. Eberhard did not listen to the opinions of the greats of this world, acting based on the interests of the Black Sea Fleet, aroused their anger and Emperor Nicholas decided to compromise. Eberhard went into honorable exile to the State Council, and was replaced by a young admiral, who continued to do what the fleet had done before him.

This story began from the very beginning of the war, when German cruisers entered the straits (August 10, 1914). The Ottoman Empire was then a neutral country and did not have the right to allow warships through the straits. A. A. Eberhard decided to go with the entire fleet to Istanbul and demand their exit to the Mediterranean Sea, where the English squadron was waiting for them. In case of refusal, he wanted to attack them directly at the roadstead, where their advantage in speed disappeared. This plan was Russian in spirit, in the best traditions of F.F. Ushakov and P.S. Nakhimov. But the government categorically forbade doing this; they still hoped that Turkey would not enter the war.

Even when the German-Turkish fleet went to sea, clearly not for a walk, Eberhard was restrained by orders not to “provoke” the enemy. As a result, we received the “Sevastopol wake-up call”. But even here, the admiral did not carry out the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich), about the main task - “defense of one’s shores” and immediately responded by marching to the enemy’s shores. The admiral understood that it was possible to defend his shores only by eliminating enemy ships from the Black Sea. The best defense is an attack. Not everyone at Headquarters understood this, and things even came to the point of direct insults by the “Grand” Duke of the admiral. But the admiral apparently understood that there was only one Motherland, but there were many fools, and he continued to do his job. On November 18, 1914, German Admiral Souchon attempted to intercept Eberhard, who was returning from the shelling of Trebizond. “Intercepted”, but got “on the nose”. Since then, Souchon no longer sought a fight with the entire Russian squadron, but limited himself to tactics according to the pirate principle - “Hit and go.” Soon the Goeben was blown up by a Russian mine near the Bosphorus and was out of action for several months.

At the beginning of 1915, new high-speed destroyers of the Novik type began to arrive in the fleet. This made it possible to launch constant attacks on the Turkish coast, destroying enemy transports and destroying their shipping

"Goeben" after repairs resumed raids on the Russian coast. These attacks caused minimal damage, but greatly irritated the St. Petersburg society. In addition, 1915 was a very difficult year for Russia, the initial patriotic frenzy faded, and difficulties arose. Creeping talk began about the “treason of the German admiral,” although his family was of Swedish origin. The command demanded to protect its shores, but Eberhard continued to destroy the enemy’s naval forces.

The second battle of Russian battleships with the Goeben near the Bosporus (May 1915) was also in favor of A. A. Eberhard. The German-Turkish fleet was unable to prevent several landings in 1916. The Black Sea Fleet confidently controlled the sea, which, as in the old days (under the first Rurikovichs), again became Russian. But Petrograd heard little about the small victories of the Black Sea Fleet, which, with small bricks, prepared the overall Victory. Dirty talk continued about the admiral's passivity and mediocrity; that the Germans rule the sea, apparently some forces sponsored some of the newspapers.

At the end of May 1916, Russian battleships shelled Varna, and the Empress Maria covered them from the sea. The English admiral Phillimore, who was present on Panteleimon, called, after this campaign, the Russian battle fleet: “the best combat formation in the world.” This campaign coincided with the increased activity of German submarine forces, and on July 4, 1916, the Goeben bombarded Tuapse.

This was the last straw, A. A. Eberhard was replaced by A. Kolchak. But, interestingly, he did the same as A. A. Eberhard: he continued mining the exit from the Bosphorus (the Goeben and 6 German submarines were blown up again) to block Turkish forces; Russian destroyers and submarines tormented the Turkish coast with their cruising operations. One of the reasons for Kolchak's appointment was that he was believed to be an expert in landing operations and mine warfare.

And from the end of 1916, systematic preparations were underway for the “Operation Constantinople”: landing and landing training was underway, constant reconnaissance trips to the Bosphorus were underway, the coast was being carefully studied, and aerial photographic reconnaissance was carried out. Kolchak had every chance to go down in the history of the empire as a hero who hoisted the Russian banner over the ancient capital of the Christian world.

Literature

• Kozlov D. Yu. "Strange War" in the Black Sea (August-October 1914). - M.: Quadriga, 2009. - 223 p. - ISBN 978-5-904162-07-8
• Zolotarev V.L., Kozlov I.A. Russian navy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.. - M.: Nauka, 1988. - 208 p.