The reasons for the first Soviet failures in the Great Patriotic War. Reference

Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.

Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, placing responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they “did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of German troops.”

Unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff hoped that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the fascists, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily associated with powerful attacks by armored forces, supported by aviation, which quickly cut through the enemy’s defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defenses of the invaded country.
A miscalculation by the USSR command led to the fact that German aviation destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft on the very first day of the war and actually secured air supremacy. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or captured. The German command achieved its goal: control of the Red Army troops was disrupted for some time.

Poor deployment of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of Soviet troops was very convenient for striking German territory, but detrimental for carrying out a defensive operation. The dislocation that emerged at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the General Staff plan to launch preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the “Fundamentals of Deployment”, such deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with their rear deployed, but were divided into three echelons without operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to quite easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy Soviet troops piecemeal.

The situation was especially alarming at the Bialystok Ledge, which stretched for many kilometers towards the enemy. This disposition of troops created a threat of deep envelopment and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. The fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counter-offensives

On June 22 at 7 o’clock in the morning, Stalin issued a directive, which said: “troops with all forces and means to attack enemy forces and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border.”

Such an order indicated a lack of understanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts. Few could object to him. Despite the unwillingness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops received orders to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction and could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov area, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the enemy’s capabilities and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a “cauldron.” About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the conditions of an impending war, material and technical means needed to be brought closer to the troops. 340 of the 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. In the area of ​​the Brest Fortress alone, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the front-line zone, but in training camps.
The course of military operations showed the recklessness of such a decision. IN short term military equipment, ammunition and fuels and lubricants it was no longer possible to withdraw. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was the large concentration of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the advanced units army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km, then parts of the front and long-range aviation were located too far away - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces to Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into the gap in Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, Headquarters placed its main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some data, up to 40% of the Red Army personnel, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of total number planes and tanks
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then launch a counter-offensive with all available forces. The main task - to hold Moscow at any cost - was completed, but most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the “cauldrons” near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two “cauldrons” there were 7 field army departments out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but concentrated most of the reserves not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the Southern direction.

On the same topic:

The main reasons why the Red Army failed in 1941 How the Red Army defended the Brest Fortress in 1941

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression treaty, suddenly, without declaring war, dealt a powerful blow to the Soviet Union. This day went down in the history of our country as a tragic date, it became the day of the beginning of the incredibly difficult war of the Soviet people against fascism, rightly called the Great Patriotic War.

The military-political leadership of Germany, having concentrated the main armed forces against the USSR, planned to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces and achieve victory within 4-5 months by delivering crushing blows on a wide front and to great depth.

Before the attack on the USSR, the German armed forces numbered 8.5 million people. The ground forces had 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and brigades, a total of 5.2 million people. Against Soviet Union of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66.5% of all available), 33 motorized and tank (94.3%) divisions and 2 brigades were deployed. In addition, at the borders of the USSR they were brought into combat readiness 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania. In total, this grouping of troops of Germany and its allies numbered 5.5 million people, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4.3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft.

At the beginning of the German aggression, the Red Army had 303 divisions, including 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 31 motorized, 61 tank. Mechanized and tank divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. There were up to 4,826,907 military personnel in the Red Army and Navy. In addition, in the formations of other departments, which were on the payroll of the People's Commissariat of Defense, there were 74,940 people, including 64,900 military personnel.

There were 2 million 900 thousand military personnel in the troops of the five western border districts and the forces of three fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets). The ground group had 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized, 7 cavalry) and two brigades. They were armed with 32.9 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm), 14.2 thousand tanks, 9.2 thousand combat aircraft, which is much more than half of the entire combat and numerical strength of the Red Army and Navy fleet.

The attack of Nazi Germany caught the Soviet Armed Forces during a period of strategic deployment, when its activities were begun, but none were completed by the beginning of the war. The North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, deployed on the basis of the Baltic, Western and Kyiv military districts, found themselves in the most difficult situation. The troops of these fronts took on the blows of the main groups of enemy wars.

In the first months of the war, the Red Army suffered heavy defeats and suffered heavy losses. By the end of the first day of the German attack, enemy tank groups in many sectors of the front had penetrated deep into Soviet territory from 25 to 35, and in some places up to 50 km. By July 10, enemy troops had advanced in decisive directions from 380 to 600 km. The Red Army suffered heavy losses. The enemy managed to defeat 28 Soviet divisions and more than 72 divisions suffered losses in personnel and military equipment of 50% or more. “The total losses of the Red Army,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “in divisions alone, excluding reinforcement units and combat support during this time, amounted to about 850 thousand people, up to 6 thousand tanks, at least 6.5 thousand caliber guns 76 mm and above, more than 3 thousand. anti-tank guns, about 12 thousand mortars, as well as about 3.5 thousand aircraft.”

What is the reason for these severe defeats of the Red Army. In our opinion, there is a whole complex of objective and subjective factors that determined the difficult course of military operations for the Red Army in initial period war. "IN historical literature, published in the country and abroad, writes G.A. Kumanev, there are many works containing the answer to this question. They usually refer to the enormous military-economic potential of the Nazi Reich, which in June 1941 relied on the resources of the Europe it enslaved. Readers' attention is also drawn to the fact that the Nazi army had two years of war experience, was well trained and equipped last word technology. The failures of the Red Army are also explained by pre-war repressions against military personnel, an erroneous assessment of the military-strategic situation by Stalin and his inner circle, an incorrect determination of the direction of the aggressor’s main attack, our insufficient preparedness for war in economic terms, and too short a peacetime framework, which did not allow us to accomplish everything. outlined plans, etc.”

Among these and other factors that led to extremely dire consequences for the Soviet troops, the main one, we believe, was that the German army in June 1941 was stronger, more combat-ready, and better armed than the Red Army. She gained experience in combat modern warfare. The German army was the best army at that time in Europe. Suffice it to remember that it only took about a month for the Wehrmacht to bring France to its knees. At the same time, German troops lost only 29 thousand killed. The entire campaign in Poland took the Wehrmacht only 14 days.

As a result of the occupation of European countries, the Wehrmacht received a large number military equipment and material reserves. In France alone, 3 thousand aircraft and over 3.5 thousand tanks were captured. In total, military equipment for 150 divisions was taken from the occupied countries. After the campaigns in Western Europe and Poland, a number of measures were taken in Germany to improve the quality of weapons. Samples of weapons and equipment that showed the best effectiveness in combat operations were left with the troops. At the same time, modernization of a number of produced types and types of weapons was carried out, and all equipment available to the troops was repaired and its service life was brought to the required level.

Let us note that when assessing the capabilities of the German army before the attack on the USSR, many researchers pay attention to the high level of its command staff, who in the second half of the 1930s acquired the practice of commanding troops and organizing their support in combat conditions. About the training of non-commissioned officers, former Wehrmacht General K. Tippelskirch wrote that german army“has... such a non-commissioned officer corps that no other army in the world has had - numerous, exceptionally well prepared and trained.”

In addition, the group of enemy troops concentrated near the border of the USSR outnumbered the Soviet troops of the western military districts in the number of personnel by 1.9 times, in heavy and medium tanks - by 1.5 times, in combat aircraft of new types - 3.2 times. Despite the large number of aircraft and tanks available in the Red Army, the overall superiority (taking into account all the given indicators) was in favor of Germany by 1.2 times.

The size of the Red Army, as already noted, from 1939 to 1941 increased two and a half times and amounted to more than five million people. As a result, the Red Army was largely composed of recently conscripted youth aged 18-21. Almost half of the Red Army soldiers in the first year of service were conscripts of 1941. A significant part of those called up from the reserve during the winter and spring of 1941 did not have time to complete the full course of combat training.

On May 17, 1941, a directive was issued, signed by Zhdanov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, criticizing the shortcomings identified during inspections of Red Army units and formations in early 1941. It was noted that training, especially of battalions and divisions, in almost all military districts is poor. The middle and junior command staff of many units and formations also received low ratings. All military districts tested for fire training received a poor rating.

Not all was well with the tank forces. In 1941, a decision was made to create 9 mechanized corps, and in March 1941, 20 more. A paradoxical situation was created: with almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army, only one corps out of 29 mechanized corps could be fully equipped with them. There were few new tanks. Even in western districts on June 22, 1941, out of 12,782 tanks, there were 1,301 new (469 KV tanks and 832 T-34). Of the old tanks in the armed forces of the USSR as of June 15, 1941, 29% needed major repairs, on average - 44%, no more than 27% were serviceable.

There were serious problems with the combat training of tank crews. The training of tank unit personnel left much to be desired. Many driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving tanks. Secrecy forced us to master the machines in the dark.

The head of the armored department, Ya.N. Fedorenko, speaking at the December 1940 meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, said that last year The tankers were only able to practice shooting from a standstill, and did not start shooting as part of a platoon and company at all. “Fire training,” he noted, “remained unfinished this year... In tactical training, issues of interaction remained unfinished this year...” “Unfortunately, note the authors of the first book of the four-volume book “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.” , what they did not manage to do in 1940, could not be completed in the next year either.”

It was necessary to replace outdated aircraft with new ones, since most of the Soviet aircraft were inferior to the German ones in many technical characteristics. Of the 6,379 combat aircraft available to the five border districts, only 1,540 were new designs. Plus there is a shortage and low qualifications of flight personnel, since these new types of aircraft accounted for only 208 crews. Even in the Western Special Military District, with all 1909 combat aircraft, there were 1343 combat crews and 1086 combat vehicles. On 242 new aircraft, 64 crews were able to carry out combat missions, and 4 in difficult weather conditions.

In the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense from May 17, 1941(emphasized - author) the following was noted, in particular: “... the low performance in combat training of the aviation units of the Red Army was accompanied by extremely a large number disasters and accidents... The operation of new equipment by the flight technical personnel has been poorly mastered... The flight personnel according to combat use- bombing, aerial shooting, high-altitude and route flights - was trained completely unsatisfactorily... Average flight time per pilot for the entire winter period was in the Air Force KOVO (Kyiv Special Military District - author) six hours, and in the OVO (Odessa Military District - author) - two hours and fifteen minutes...”

The order of the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force dated the same date indicated that as a result of an inspection of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, whose troops were stationed in Belarus, in the direction where the German command planned to deliver the main attack, low fire training of the pilots was revealed, even on the ground they fired the machine gun unsatisfactorily. In July 1941, due to a lack of fuel in the Western Special Military District, flights in a number of aviation regiments were stopped. At its meeting on May 5, 1941, the Main Military Council recognized the combat training of the Red Army Air Force as unsatisfactory.

It is worth emphasizing that in the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe troops had 8 thousand high-ranking pilots who had the right to fly any type of military aircraft day and night. 25% of pilots were proficient in blind piloting. Of course, during the two years of war they significantly improved their skills and acquired valuable combat experience.

This, one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, was aggravated by a number of mistakes, miscalculations, and wrong decisions in preparing the army and the country for fascist aggression.

Let us note, first of all, the problems of surprise. When determining its role in the defeat of the Red Army, as it seems to the author, an extreme is allowed that does not correspond to reality. There is still an assertion that Stalin and the country's intelligence agencies knew about the German attack, and therefore any supposed surprise is excluded. However, documents show that, despite reports from intelligence agencies and diplomats about the impending danger, Stalin was afraid to give Germany a reason to attack. Only on the night of June 22, when signals about an impending attack became extremely alarming, Stalin allowed the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov to transmit a directive to bring troops to combat readiness. However, this measure came too late.

The formations, formations and units of the Red Army of the North-Western, Western and South-Western Fronts (formerly the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special Military Districts) had to fully implement operational deployment and take their starting position to repel enemy attacks. However, this was not done. Of the 75 rifle divisions of these fronts, more than a third were on the move, making marches to a new location or to concentration areas, 20 divisions required additional strength from 25 to 50%.

These and other facts allow us to conclude that there was no strategic surprise; the country, the people, the army knew that sooner or later aggression from Germany was possible. However, there was a clear operational-tactical surprise of the start of hostilities, which had an extremely negative impact on the course of the war.

On June 22, 1941, General F. Halder wrote in his diary: “... All armies except the 11th went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, came as a complete tactical surprise for the enemy... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the facts that the units were taken by surprise at the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units were suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do... One can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events...”

In discussions about the events of the first days of the war, a special place is occupied by the discussion of the influence of repressions against the command cadres of the Red Army in the pre-war years. With a certain degree of convention, three points of view can be distinguished when considering this problem.

The essence of the first is the assertion that it was as a result of the repressions that the army was beheaded and could not withstand the blow of the German Wehrmacht. Supporters of this point of view refer to the fact that from 1937 to the start of the Great Patriotic War, 40 thousand commanders of all levels were repressed, which, in their opinion, left the army without command personnel.

The second point of view is almost the opposite. Its essence: supporters of the first version exaggerate the damage caused by Stalin's repressions. In total, 36,898 commanders of various ranks were dismissed and repressed. This is less than 7% of the total number of command personnel of the Red Army. In addition, some of the repressed commanders, about 15 thousand, were rehabilitated before the war or at the beginning of the war. Consequently, they believe, the repressions did not have such a detrimental effect on the course of hostilities attributed to them.

And the third point of view, which is close to us, proceeds from the fact that the training of command personnel did not keep pace with the rapid numerical growth of the army, despite the wide network of senior and middle military personnel deployed in the country educational institutions, the opening of military faculties in civilian universities, the creation of numerous courses for junior lieutenants. By 1941, the ground forces alone were short of 66,900 command personnel (more than all those dismissed and repressed). The shortage of flight technical personnel of the Air Force reached 32.3%. It was simply impossible to eliminate such a situation in a short period of time. In addition, more than 75% of military personnel did not have experience in commanding troops in combat conditions. Their rapid promotion without acquiring the necessary experience adversely affected the quality of military personnel. More than 55% of the command personnel before the start of the Great Patriotic War were in their positions for less than six months and only a quarter of them can be considered to have experience, since they held positions for more than one year.

At the same time, these researchers believe that repressions against command personnel and various types of purges had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. All military district commanders, 90% of their deputies, and heads of military branches and services were replaced. 80% of the leadership of corps and division units, 91% of regiment commanders and their deputies. That is, the trained level of commanders suffered, which was extremely difficult to restore in a short time. The repressions to a large extent determined the insufficient quality level of the command staff. At a meeting of the leadership of the Red Army in December 1940, V.N. Kurdyumov said: “The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that of the 225 regiment commanders involved in the training, only 25 people were graduates of a military school, the remaining two hundred people were people who graduated from junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserves.” In general, by the beginning of the war, only 7% of commanders had higher education, up to 37% did not complete the full course of study even in secondary military educational institutions.

The psychological consequences of repression were also quite noticeable, which gave rise to uncertainty among the command staff and fear of making responsible decisions on their own.

The course of the battles of the first days of the war was in a certain way affected by the erroneous view of the outbreak of the war by Nazi Germany. “A sudden transition to an offensive on such a scale, moreover, immediately with all available and pre-deployed forces in the most important strategic directions,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, “that is, the nature of the attack itself, was not foreseen by us in its entirety. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov and the leadership of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day in powerful compact groups at all strategic directions with the aim of delivering crushing cutting blows.”

“It should be emphasized,” write the authors of the book “The Great Patriotic War without the Classification of Secrecy,” “that Germany has already used a similar method of starting a war when attacking the countries of Western Europe and Poland. There was time to analyze it and take it into account in the training of our troops and military personnel. Unfortunately, this was not fully done. And some of the military personnel of the Red Army turned out to be unprepared for command and control of troops in a difficult situation. This is one of the reasons for the large losses of the Red Army in the first months of the war.”

Among other versions of the tragic events of the beginning of the war, there is one that openly mocks from the position of blind hatred of the Russian people, Russians, and participants in the war. It is difficult not to regard it as slander against the defenders of the Fatherland. Supporters of this version (I. Bunich, M. Solonin and others) argue that at the beginning of the war a “spontaneous, uncontrolled uprising arose in the Red Army; the army did not want to fight in defense of the Stalinist regime.” On a thousand-kilometer front, “... millions of officers and soldiers gave an objective lesson to the criminal regime, beginning to switch to the enemy’s side” (Bunich).

How is this monstrous slander against Soviet soldiers? The basis for this malice for them was the large number of soldiers and commanders who were captured in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. According to official data for July-December 1941, the Red Army and Navy lost 802,191 people killed and 2,335,482 missing and captured. One cannot but agree that a large number of Soviet soldiers were captured. But let us pay attention to what this ratio was like in other campaigns conducted by the Wehrmacht in Europe during the Second World War. The Polish army, for example, in battles with the Wehrmacht lost 66.3 thousand killed, and 420 thousand missing and captured. That is, for every Polish soldier killed, 6.3 were captured. The defeated French army lost 84 thousand soldiers and officers, and 1,547,000 prisoners, that is, for every one killed - 18 prisoners.

A.I. Burlakov quite rightly poses the question: whose army fought more courageously: the French, in which 18 per one killed surrendered, or the Soviet, which lost 2.9 prisoners per killed? And he emphasizes the obviousness of the answer - Soviet soldiers defended their socialist Fatherland more courageously than the soldiers of the French army defended their Motherland, which was considered a model of democracy.

But the main refutation of the version of M. Solonin, I. Bunich and others like them lies in reality itself, in the real facts of the military operations of the Red Army against German troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. From the very first days of the war, the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army selflessly fought the enemy in extremely difficult conditions and offered him stubborn resistance. To confirm this, one can cite evidence of the resilience of border outposts, the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, Mogilev, the fierce defensive Battle of Smolensk, the defense of the Luga line in July-August 1941, the heroic defense of Odessa.

The troops of Nazi Germany and its allies had never encountered such fierce resistance anywhere before and had not suffered such heavy losses in manpower and military equipment.

This is evidenced by former Wehrmacht generals and German researchers of the Second World War, based on archival documents, reports of commanders of formations and units of the German army.

On June 24, 1941, General Halder wrote in his diary: “The tenacity of Russian formations in battle should be noted. There have been cases when garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.” A little later, on June 29, he writes: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last bullet... The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West we could take certain liberties. Now this is no longer acceptable."

General Blumentritt, who fought with the rank of lieutenant for two years on the Eastern Front during the First World War, told the English historian Liddell Hart: “Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet Army was like. We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles.. Red Army 1941-1945. was a much stronger opponent than tsarist army, because she selflessly fought for the idea.”

Here are the statements of the authors of the Federal Republic of Germany. “Despite unsatisfactory weapons and supplies,” writes P. Gostoni in his book “The Red Army,” “the Red Army fought for its Motherland, usually stubbornly and fiercely. There was no case when entire sections of the front stopped resisting; outbreaks of panic almost always managed to be extinguished.” I. Dec titled one of the chapters of his book “The Road Through a Thousand Deaths” “Only dead Russians don’t shoot.” He writes about the “extraordinary resistance of Soviet troops in the region of Smolensk,” “a city before which all conquerors on their way to Moscow were forced to stop.”

It is probably worth recalling the statement of W. Churchill. In his memoirs, listing the factors that allowed the Soviet Union to survive in the first months of the war, he named the resilience of the Russian people. He writes: “President Roosevelt was considered a very brave man when he declared in September 1941 that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken. The remarkable courage and patriotism of the Russian people confirmed the correctness of this opinion.” Note that these statements refer to facts and events that occurred long before the introduction of penal battalions and barrage detachments.

The population rose up to fight the aggressors, regardless of class, social status in society, nationality and religion. National spiritual values ​​came to the fore. The war revealed the patriotism of the people, who elevated the duty of serving the Fatherland above their own needs, suffering, and losses. Thus, the highest and enduring value of the Fatherland was affirmed.

Despite the heavy defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, the aggressor failed to achieve the implementation of the “Barbarossa Plan”, and the deadlines for the “blitzkrieg” were missed. Thanks to the ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered heavy losses; he was unable to capture a number of the most important strategic centers of the Soviet Union provided for by the plan, and in the battle for Moscow the “blitzkrieg” plan was finally buried.

Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, vice-president of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, professor

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78 comments

Comments

28. S. Shvetsov : Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:11

PS. In that photo is Brodsky. His well-known accusation of parasitism and the subsequent exile is a fact, in general, known, but it is possible not to know. No reputational consequences.

27. S. Shvetsov : Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:10

You and I were talking about Khrushchev buildings, which began to be built - let me remind you - in 1959. What does “after the war” have to do with it?

How to fight the Germans? Like in 1943, for example. And further. Why did the Germans know how to do it in 1941, but we didn’t, even though we had no less military experience? What lessons were possible to learn from the Polish and French campaigns that could not be learned at Khalkingol and the Finnish campaign? Moreover, we had a brilliant leader, and they had a demoniac one, right?

26. Alejandro : Reply to 25., S. Shvetsov:
2012-06-26 at 23:16

“Everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside.” I hope, Shvetsov, this time you will lay out all your cards and tell us HOW it was necessary to fight against the Germans. It turned out that no one was ready for the new tactics. Neither the French nor the arrogant Poles. But Shvetsov knows HOW. I kept waiting for you to tell me HOW it was necessary to immediately provide everyone with elite housing after the war, but I didn’t get it. Well, I hope you are a better military strategist than a builder.

25. S. Shvetsov : Reply to 23., Ivan:
2012-06-26 at 21:42

Germany had by that time perfected this organization throughout Europe.

And which particular Europe offered greater resistance to the Germans than the Japanese (Khalkhingol) and the Finns of the Red Army? Or have you already thrown into the closet the historical version according to which Europe fell together under Hitler, and then the entire European world fell on the USSR?

24. : Myth No. 37. Stalin planned to surrender Moscow to the Nazis and escape from the capital in October 1941.
2012-06-26 at 20:14

“One of the most insidious anti-Stalin myths. Unlike other myths, it was put into circulation gradually, without direct accusations of Stalin. Start
Khrushchev put an end to the myth. Very often he was personally exploited by Zhukov, but only in the form of either very transparent hints about the supposed “homespun truth of history”, or in private conversations. Often used nowadays.
In reality, everything was different. It was Zhukov who proposed to surrender Moscow directly! Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, in a conversation with the writer F. Chuev (02/01/1975, see Chuev’s book “Soldiers of the Empire”) said: “Zhukov wrote that on October 6, 1941, Stalin asked him if we would defend Moscow, and Zhukov firmly answered: "We'll defend it!" But it happened that he sent General Sokolovsky to Vasilevsky (Alexander Mikhailovich should remember this) so that he would take over the communications center for the Western Front at the General Staff. Vasilevsky, in bewilderment, called Stalin about this, and he scolded Zhukov. Zhukov proposed surrendering Moscow, and this would have been the case if not for Stalin.
“But this needs to be documented,” I said (i.e. F. Chuev. - A.M.).
- How can you confirm? – answered Golovanov. - Most of the documents showing Stalin's true role in the war were burned under Khrushchev. Thus, three volumes of my correspondence with Stalin were destroyed. Vasilevsky will die, Golovanov will die, Shtemenko will die, and no one will know the true truth. But this fact does not at all belittle the role of Zhukov, but shows how much doubt there was, and by what efforts the Soviet people achieved victory near Moscow. But it is also impossible to compare Zhukov with Kutuzov in this matter, because the surrender of Moscow in 1941 meant much more to us than in 1812, when it was not the capital. Zhukov might not have known what Stalin knew and what we all knew much later: with the fall of Moscow, Japan came out against us in the East, and at that time we would have had to fight on two fronts at once.”
What Golovanov said is confirmed by the speech given to the readers by Army General SM. Shtemenko. Here is an excerpt from the transcript: “During the period of a threatening situation, Zhukov’s command post was closer to the defense line. Zhukov turned to Stalin with a request for permission to move his command post away from the defense line, to the Belorussky railway station. Stalin replied that if Zhukov moved to the Belorussky railway station, he would take his place.”
The former commander of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Defense Zone, Colonel General Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev, recalled in 1975 that in response to this request from Zhukov, Stalin responded as follows: “If you back away to the Belorussky station, then I will take your place in Perkhushkovo.”
In the first part of Golovanov’s story quoted above, published by F. Chuev under the title “Shovels” in the book “Unlisted Marshal” (M., 1995), the following is said: “In October 1941, on one of the most intense days of the Moscow defense, in The headquarters discussed the use of the 81st aviation division, commanded by Golovanov. Suddenly the phone rang. Stalin, slowly, approached the apparatus. When talking, he never put the receiver to his ear, but kept it at a distance - the volume was such that a person nearby could hear everything. Corps Commissar Stepanov, a member of the Air Force Military Council, called. He reported that he was in Perkhushkovo, a little west of Moscow, at the headquarters of the Western Front.
- How are you doing? - asked Stalin.
- The command is concerned that the front headquarters is very close to the front line of defense. It is necessary to take him east, beyond Moscow, approximately to the Arzamas region (and this, by the way, is already the Gorky region. - A.M.). And set up a command post on the eastern outskirts of Moscow.
There was quite a long silence.
- Comrade Stepanov, ask the headquarters, do they have shovels? - Stalin said without raising his voice.
- Now. - And again silence. - What kind of shovels, Comrade Stalin?
- It doesn’t matter which ones.
- Now... There are shovels, Comrade Stalin.
- Tell your comrades, let them take shovels and dig their own graves. The front headquarters will remain in Perkhushkovo, and I will remain in Moscow. Goodbye.
He said all this calmly, without raising his voice, without a hint of irritation, and slowly hung up the phone. He didn’t even ask who exactly was asking such questions, although it was clear that without the knowledge of front commander Zhukov, Stepanov would not have called Stalin.”
In the memoirs of one of the leading members of Stalin’s guard, Lieutenant General V. Rumyantsev, the ending of the same episode looks like this: “Comrade Stepanov, give each of your comrades a shovel in their hands, let them dig their own mass grave.” You will stay in Perkhushkovo, and I will stay in Moscow. There will be no retreat. Just forward.” This was Stalin's reaction.
Firstly, it is obvious that Zhukov made such attempts at least twice - through some corps commissar who had nothing to do with such issues, and the second time - through General Sokolovsky. What is called, not by washing, but by riding from the front line, although he gave others, and in the crudest forms, orders to stand to death... Secondly, in both cases, Zhukov, in fact, substituted the heads of others, although he was obliged to personally report this Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thirdly, the question of the defense of Moscow was extremely acute at that time, and only exceptional adherence to principles, awareness of his special responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, personal courage, as well as purely strategic considerations, which collectively guided Stalin at that moment, prevented the stampede of the commander of the Western front and the actual collapse of the front.
According to the testimony of Stalin’s personal driver, A. Krivchenko, it was in those days that Stalin said: “I’m staying in Moscow, with the Russian people!” Moreover. In those same days, Stalin clearly said that if the Germans entered Moscow, it would only be through his corpse!
The late publicist Felix Chuev was also a good poet. He wrote a poignant poem related precisely to these events:
Already the ambassadors live deep in the rear,
People's Commissars are no longer to be seen in Moscow,
And von Bock's armored armies
They continue to attack Khimki.
They decide at the headquarters of the Western Front -
Set up a headquarters east of Moscow,
And the sun is a wound to the Russian people
Burning among the autumn blue...
Already in Moscow the responsible persons
They don't understand only one thing:
When will He himself leave the capital -
But how can you ask yourself about this?
Yes, how can I ask? The question is extremely important
Something you won’t put off until later:
- When to send your guard regiment
To Kuibyshev? The composition of the regiment is already ready.
The glass trembled in the roar of the air,
Sparkled in the Alexander Garden...
He said calmly: - If necessary,
I will lead this regiment into the attack.
As for the fact that Stalin allegedly planned to escape from Moscow in October 1941, the myth about this was started by Goebbels. Why - it’s clear. But why was this nonsense repeated? Soviet writers(M. Pajev in the book “Through the Whole War” and after him P. Proskurin in the novel ≪ your name≫), the question is, of course, interesting. Because they lied like crazy. What if Stalin arrived at the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky dead end, where a special train stood, and in heavy thoughts walked along the platform for two hours, wondering whether he should go to Kuibyshev or stay in Moscow? Soviet writers dreamed up a great idea. But what in reality?
But in reality it was the following. According to the testimony of members of Stalin’s personal guard (A. Rybin, P. Lozgachev, A. Belekhov, P. Shitokh, V. Krutashev, S. Kashevarov, V. Tukov and others), the special train was in fact prepared in advance. There is nothing supernatural about this. Security measures for the head of state must be comprehensive and taken in advance. However, Stalin did not come there, did not see the train and did not walk along the platform, especially since it was not there. Moreover. Having accidentally noticed that the commandant of the dacha in Semenovsky, S. Solovov, was transporting things from the dacha somewhere, Stalin scolded him and said: “There will be no evacuation, we will remain here until victory.”
In addition, a special Douglas passenger plane and a flight of fighter jets for in-flight security were also prepared for Stalin. The planes were under special protection of the NKVD at the Frunze airfield. However, Stalin never came there either.”
(Martirosyan A. B. Stalin and the Great Patriotic War. M., 2007. P. 361-365).

23. Ivan : 15. Andrey: The same old chewing gum...
2012-06-26 at 17:57

//respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to free himself from that sea of ​​endless LIES..//
Father Ilya rightly drew attention to the rudeness of your comment in relation to the veteran, which (comment) you habitually call “spiritual.” Of course, mentioning repression is a guarantee of “spirituality,” and the phrase “there is a spiritual answer to this question in circulation” betrays your “spirituality” headlong.
I will draw attention to the incompetence worthy of Father Nikolai Savchenko, who mechanically add up the number of abortions with the amount of profit. The mechanical comparison of the number of tanks is INCORRECT in general. On the battlefields, it is not crowds of tanks lined up in squares that fight, but organizational structures scattered in space (motorized infantry, artillery and much more). Organizational structures, is this clear? Germany had by that time perfected this organization throughout Europe. We didn’t even have time to arm ourselves properly. Two wars and three revolutions half a century earlier and an attack by the most powerful army in the world, to which France, for example, surrendered in a month.
And why is it that among older people “the fear of reprisals was less”? Obviously it's the other way around. Young people always underestimate the danger; older people are always more afraid and cautious. And those young people who died in the first battles were replaced by the same young people who reached military age (my grandfather went to the front there in 42).
Bottom line - your post is simply a meaningless set of sentences, the main purpose of which is to insult the veteran at whose feet you should bow.
p.s. Why should someone (especially a priest) refute your figures, have you proven them? These are your unsubstantiated accusations, not Father Ilya’s.

22. Andrey : Swearing is not proof
2012-06-26 at 14:56

Dear Father Ilya! Unlike your post, which accused a number of discussion participants of rudeness, my speech did not contain anything of the kind. An unsubstantiated accusation does not make anyone look good, especially a priest, and yet not a single one of the figures I cited was refuted by you. Sorry.

21. Clerk : 18.Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:19

UV.Antony.

I know very well what secular science does.
You've already said this.
The existence of God is a matter of Faith, first of all, but not of speculative knowledge.

As for the game of “wise thoughts,” according to the ESSENCE of the war with Hitler, it was a war with the army of the Antichrist, whether you like it or not, at least that’s what W. Churchill asserted in his speech in 1940.

And so far, not a single person has been found who took Churchill’s words into question.
You are the first, not counting the truth of those who simply remain silent about this speech, because you are well aware that Churchill said not just the truth, but the Truth.
Absolute.

20. Clerk : 17.Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:01

UV.Antony.

Quite fair.
Science goes about its business - it describes historical events - facts that took place, so let it describe to itself, since no one charged secular historical science with the duty - to “invent hypotheses”, including on the subject of the essence of war, not to mention already on the subject of whether there is a God or not.
Yes, this is what science suffers from, if we are talking about science, of course...
This has been the case since the time of Newton.
...like the “equal responsibility” of Stalin and Hitler for the outbreak of the Second World War.
If you have anything to say about the ESSENCE of the Patriotic War, including, I’m ready to listen.

It’s one thing to describe an object; it’s another thing to accurately point out its ESSENCE.
The last matter is a matter of Theology, but not of secular historical science.
A very simple idea.

So, the ESSENCE of the past War is that it was a War with the army of the Antichrist, where in relation to Hitler there is strong, irrefutable, THEOLOGICAL, i.e. SCIENTIFIC, evidence and not just evidence, but the ABSOLUTE TRUTH.
And here a conflict arises - anyone who tries to distort the essence of the war or even equates Stalin and Hitler will have to confirm this nonsense, sorry, “hypothesis” about the “equality of honor” of Stalin and Giler scientifically, i.e. theologically , and this, alas, cannot be done, even through substitution and manipulation of concepts.

For those who, on principle, if I understand you correctly, Mr. Anthony, adhere to the conviction that God is in Himself, and earthly affairs are in themselves, I recommend W. Churchill’s speech from 1940, where Churchill directly points out the anti-Christian nature of Nazism and the war they, Nazism, unleashed.

18. Anthony : Reply to 14., Bondarev Igor:
2012-06-25 at 18:02

Thus, the theory of evolution justifies sin (consequences and ensuring struggle) as a way of survival

The theory of evolution is not even a hypothesis, but a false, anti-scientific myth, composed by interested parties on the basis of scientific facts with the aim of denying God

“Evolutionism does not provide an explanation for the observed fact of the unity of the laws of the world, and does not even explain why it is generally knowable.

Evolutionism directly contradicts the second law of thermodynamics. (Isaac Asimov defines it this way without the help of mathematical formulas: “Another way to formulate the second law is: “The universe is constantly becoming more disordered!” Considering the second law from this point of view, we see that it is said about us. We have to work hard to put order in the room, but it becomes disordered on its own, and much faster and easier. Even if we don’t go there, it will become dirty and dusty. How difficult it is to keep the house in order, even. our own bodies; how quickly everything deteriorates. Even if we do nothing at all, everything will deteriorate, break down, wear out on its own - that’s what the second law means.” If the theory of evolution is correct, then our everyday observations and the calculations of engineers are also incorrect. Moreover, evolutionists need to go to court against the Russian Academy of Sciences for not considering projects perpetual motion machines with 100% efficiency.

All the constructions of evolutionism are completely incredible from a mathematical point of view. So the random occurrence of our set of world constants is 1 in 103,000; random appearance of a protozoan bacterium - 1 chance in 1,040,000; random change in the desired direction of 5 proteins - 1 chance in 10275, etc.

Evolutionism does not have predictive ability, does not allow itself to be refuted by the experimental method, and therefore, even with a stretch, cannot be attributed to the sphere of science.

Darwinism (as a special case of evolutionism) is based on a logical fallacy called tautology. The statement: “survival of the fittest” does not convey any information.

The vicious circle principle is widely used in evolutionist arguments. (The rock is dated by fossils. The latter are dated by evolutionary theory, which in turn confirms their age by reference to the geological formation in which they were found).

Evolutionism cannot explain a number of facts related to its “sphere” of explaining the origin of species (the bombardier beetle, echolocation in bats, the birth of a baby whale under water, sundew, etc.), and therefore cannot be considered a scientific theory."
about Daniil Syoyev

17. Anthony : Reply to 9., Clerk:
2012-06-25 at 17:33

St. Anthony. Here are your words. “Physics does not deny God.” Physics does. Isaac Newton does not.

I repeat again, but in other words to make it clearer. The subject area of ​​the natural and human sciences is the created world, the tasks of the sciences are its description and research. Denial or proof of the existence of God is carried out by scientists interested in this, who can put forward appropriate theories and hypotheses.
In fact, in the comments to this article it is appropriate to simply thank the veteran, patriot, scientist for the wonderful article.
It would be nice to play the game “In the World of Wise Thoughts” somewhere else.

16. Priest Ilya Motyka :
2012-06-25 at 01:34

I thought it would be limited to the old guard Shakhmatov, Slava Tambov and Fr. Nikolai Savchenko. No. New eagles have appeared: Artemy and Andrey. Completely stupid and unceremoniously rude to the respected Mikhail Frolov. Comrades would-be historians, what new documents have you introduced into circulation? to draw such phenomenal conclusions. Or you just read liberal propaganda wrong. The Soviet agiprop was more talented and not particularly deceitful.

15. Andrey : Same old chewing gum...
2012-06-24 at 22:44

It is painful and shameful to read on the pages of a respected person the same old chewing gum that Soviet agitprop has treated us to for half a century - perhaps a respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to free himself from that sea of ​​endless LIES, which most of all insults the memory of the heroes of 1941, without feats of which, undoubtedly, would not have happened even in 1945.... Over the past 20 years, many worthy and competent authors have given an answer to the question about the tragedy of 1941 and now it is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Red Army formations deployed in the border districts, not only quantitatively, but often qualitatively superior to the enemy - T-34 and KV tanks alone, to which the Germans had NO equals AT ALL before 1943, we had about 1500, the number of new aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft) was in the hundreds, not to mention the thousands of automatic rifles that the Germans did not have at all at that time... There is a spiritual answer to this question, which can be briefly summarized by the fact that the cadre army, which was largely atheistic (youth and commanders who had undergone purges) , for the most part, died heroically by the beginning of the battle near Moscow, and broke the back best army in the world of that time, the army that was formed from people of older ages under the leadership of commanders whose fear of reprisals was less, and whose responsibility (at least moral) to their subordinates was much greater than before the war - it was SUCH an army that the Lord granted the Great Victory !

14. Bondarev Igor : Reply to 8., Anthony:
2012-06-24 at 11:50

More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise, we won’t understand anything. I’ll explain it in simpler words. If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the story of your relationship with God, he will throw you out the door, because that’s not what he needs from you. If you come to your confessor and If you begin to tell the story of your career growth, he will also find himself in a state of bewilderment. Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks. History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, just like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God, Isaac Newton was of the same opinion. Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers... But if a historian begins to argue who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of the Novgorodians with the Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky, or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

Science correctly describes the world, but evaluates it incorrectly, since it proceeds from what it has proven in its description of the world.
That is, science is based on itself.
Thus, the theory of evolution justifies sin (the consequences and ensuring the struggle) as a way of survival. Instead of saying that the struggle for survival is not the entelechy of life, but a consequence for its violation (when Adam violated the principles (entelechy) of Life).
Likewise, History contains the same “struggle” for survival. But how should you look at it? Either with the Spirit, or in spite of it. But the Holy Spirit is one and the same same, but a person- in the image and likeness of God. God, man, Spirit - “elements”
history is not subject to cancellation. Both in ancient times and today, these elements are unchanged. But changes in history are brought about by the spirit of struggle against the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit is infinite, therefore History is finite, and in its ending it sums up the beginning of the creation of man and the drama of his fall.
The meaning of History may well be comprehended by the consciousness of one person. This means the morality of History.

13. Alexander Vaskin, Russian priest, Soviet Army officer : Address by Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky)
2012-06-23 at 17:28

"June 22, 1941
Moscow
To the pastors and flocks of Christ's Orthodox Church.
In recent years, we, the inhabitants of Russia, have consoled ourselves with the hope that the military fire that has engulfed almost the entire world will not affect our country. But fascism, which recognizes only naked force as law and is accustomed to mocking the high demands of honor and morality, turned out to be true to itself this time too. Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of civilians is already irrigating our native land. The times of Batu, the German knights, Charles of Sweden, and Napoleon are repeated. Pathetic descendants of enemies Orthodox Christianity they want to once again try to bring our people to their knees before untruth, to force them through naked violence to sacrifice the good and integrity of their homeland, their blood covenants of love for their fatherland.
But this is not the first time that the Russian people have had to endure such tests. With God's help, this time too he will scatter the fascist enemy force into dust. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in worse situations, because they remembered not about personal dangers and benefits, but about their sacred duty to their homeland and faith, and emerged victorious. Let us not disgrace their glorious name, and we, the Orthodox, are relatives to them both in flesh and in faith. The Fatherland is defended by weapons and a common national feat, a common readiness to serve the Fatherland in a difficult hour of testing with everything that everyone can. This is a matter for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young people and old people. Everyone can and should contribute their share of labor, care and art to the common feat.
Let us remember the holy leaders of the Russian people, for example, Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, who laid down their souls for the people and homeland. And it wasn’t only the leaders who did this. Let us remember the countless thousands of simple Orthodox warriors, whose unknown names the Russian people immortalized in their glorious legend about the heroes Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, who utterly defeated the Nightingale the Robber.
Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. She endured trials with him and was consoled by his successes. She will not leave her people even now. She blesses with heavenly blessing the upcoming national feat.
If anyone, then it is we who need to remember the commandment of Christ: “No one has greater love than he who lays down his life for his friends.” Not only the one who will be killed on the battlefield for his people and their good lays down his soul, but also everyone who sacrifices himself, his health or profit for the sake of his homeland. For us, the shepherds of the Church, at a time when the fatherland calls everyone to heroic deeds, it would be unworthy to just silently look at what is happening around us, not to encourage the faint-hearted, not to console the saddened, not to remind the hesitant of duty and the will of God. And if, moreover, the pastor’s silence, his lack of concern for what his flock is experiencing is also explained by crafty considerations about possible benefits on the other side of the border, then this will be a direct betrayal of his homeland and his pastoral duty, since the Church needs a shepherd who carries out his service truly “for the sake of Jesus.” , and not for the sake of the bread,” as St. Demetrius of Rostov put it. Let us lay down our souls together with our flock. Countless thousands of our Orthodox soldiers walked the path of selflessness, laying down their lives for their homeland and faith in all times of enemy invasions of our homeland. They died without thinking about glory, they only thought that their homeland needed a sacrifice on their part, and they humbly sacrificed everything and their very lives.
The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland.
The Lord will grant us victory.
Patriarchal Locum Tenens
humble Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna"
(The Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents / Compiled by O. Yu. Vasilyeva et al. M., 2009. P. 38-40).

12. Clerk : "Either the 21st century will return to God, or there will be no 21st century at all"
2012-06-23 at 13:43

The question of the Essence of the Historical Process is, first of all, everything, - question philosophy of history.
What is the engine of history, what drives history as a dynamic process.

This is how human thought answers this question.

“Ideas rule the world” (Hegel).
“Ideas then become material force when they take possession of the masses.” (K. Marx).
I hope no one will deny that this is so.
However, neither Hegel nor Marx were able to say anything about the Essence of these “ideas” that rule “this world”; moreover, it took nineteen centuries to reach this thought and the twentieth to be convinced in one’s own skin that that's exactly how it is.

So, it takes nineteen centuries to figure it out and the twentieth to state a fact.

But this is what St. Apostle Paul wrote two thousand years ago, both in form and in essence, of these most ill-fated ideas that rule this world...

“Our struggle is not against flesh and blood (against people), but against the rulers, against the powers, against the world rulers of the darkness of this age (demons), against the spirits (thoughts that this public throws up - about their own exclusivity, genius, predestination for dominion over the World and other rubbish) malice (false teachings - "ideologies") under heaven ("air" is the sphere of abstract, meaningless ideas - banal demagoguery on the subject of universal freedom, equality and fraternity).
Eph.6:12.

So, it took man two whole millennia to reach with his mind what little children who listen to the Words of the Apostle know.

So why do I need this Human science, developing at such a snail’s pace, and on blood, and even posing as God knows what wisdom, when the Lord gives me everything and immediately just accepted it, not in the sense of containing it, but as the Absolute Truth and more I had no doubt about it.
I didn’t doubt God, but I doubted myself.
When starting to study history at school, at university, in the archives, dealing with any specific problem.

In other words, history, like Science, and not only history, can and should FURTHER develop, exclusively as Divine-human creativity, then it will bring true and worthy fruits.
Knowledge of the Truth is Salvation.
Here and now, in this century and in the future.
To the extent due and necessary, for every person and in accordance with the age in which the person happened to be born.

11. Clerk : 8.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 12:59

“If a historian begins to speculate who was the Antichrist in the battle in 1170 between the Novgorodians and Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign...”.

UV.Antony.

The essence of the Historical Process comes down to the relationship between Man and God.
With God, but not with the "Antichrist".
The coming of the Antichrist is their result, this relationship.
The Matter of Human Free Will.
A very simple idea.
And the assessment of the essence of the event is not given by a historian.
Lord.
The head of the Orthodox Church, through the mouth of Her Primate.
And the assessment is always the same.
Moral or not.
Whether people acted according to their conscience or not.
Fratricidal war is always an immoral matter.
If a historian goes into this kind of “reasoning”, then, in fact, this is an attempt to speak out on the ESSENCE, however, in your case, the attempt is unsuccessful - “from the wind of your head.”
From reason.
This is no longer a historian-“thinker”, but an “industrialist of thought” (St. Patriarch Pimen) - a charlatan.
This is the same “mysticism and priesthood”.
This is no longer a historian, but a “pathfinder” equal to those of today, busy searching for “seals of the Antichrist” in markets and supermarkets.
More in history...
This, for example, was Merezhkovsky.
What is the goal?
This is a matter of judgment, not judgment.
...Thus he puts God in the place, making the enemy of the human race equal to God, recognizing, in fact, the enemy of the human race as having legal capacity.
The ability to create.
This is what Blasphemy is.

As for the inadmissibility of substituting mathematics (history) for the Psalter and the Psalter for mathematics (history) and the necessity of both for man as a Personality and for science, as the result of this Personality’s work, these are not my words.
Mikhail Lomonosov, founder of Russian Science.
On what Russian Science has stood and will stand.
On the Stone of Faith.
As an objectively existing reality.
And now and ever and unto ages of ages.
Amen.
Don't hesitate.

10. Sergiy Agapov : "...And, denying the Lord who bought them, they will bring upon themselves speedy destruction."
2012-06-23 at 12:09

In general, when you read about all these shortcomings, miscalculations, and mistakes of our command, you get the impression that the military leadership of that time consisted only of former furniture makers or half-educated seminarians. Therefore, I agree with the main idea of ​​the respected Clerk:

Strategic.
Fatal blindness.
Both in this century and in the future.

The only thing I would like to add to the comments of my respected colleague is that after saying “A”, he did not finish the following. It is not enough to see in the causes of the war and in the reasons for its bitter failures an underestimation of the devilish cunning and ingenuity of the forces of Antichrist; we must also admit that this terrible tragedy was allowed to us by the Lord. Here, of course, in my opinion, the assessment of these events given by Igor Bondarev is more correct: “It is characteristic that in the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, in the person of Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) has a huge mass of idols and idols...” We must admit that demonism is rampant on our side. Otherwise, how can you explain the punishment the Lord sent to our country? Even until recently. We already have a generation growing up that, perhaps, does not even suspect that just recently their fathers and mothers had to dismantle the toilets in the altars, from where priests now take out the cups with the Holy Gifts for them. Let's all get rid of “fatal blindness” together and tell our children the whole truth. And here I again agree with the respected Clerk: “This rule knows no exceptions.”

9. Clerk : 8.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 11:24

UV.Antony.
Here are your words.
"Physics does not deny God."

Physics denies.
Isaac Newton - no.
Science, as a field of human knowledge, denies.
A person as a Personality is not.
Don't confuse one with the other - different things.
Science denies the Existence of God in Fact.
METHODOLOGICALLY.
This is a matter of worldview.
How science looks at the world and how He Who Created It, the World, including science.
Who is the Cause of Everything.
The emergence of science, among other things.
Your reasoning is further confirmation of this.
The real picture of the World as it really is is only partially accessible to science or is distorted.

This is not about EXPOSING the history of HUMANITY’s relationship with God, as you believe.
This is not required - to expound Scripture every time and for every reason.
If a person, when applying for a job, begins to expound Scripture - the history of Mankind’s relationship with God, instead of his own, or begins to calculate who was the Antichrist during the time of A. Bogolyubsky, this person is definitely crazy.

It’s one thing - your own ideas about what a person’s relationship with God is in their Essence; another thing is that it really is.
And what to do about it.

What is a “history of a person’s relationship with God” as applied to a resume and job application?
How does it manifest itself?
In relation to your neighbor.
In the business with which a person is busy and the people with whom, together, he does the same thing.

Not a single person will ever indicate this in its entirety in a resume, but this is what always and first of all needs to be clarified.

A person’s relationship with God is primarily a moral category.
This is a question of whether a person has Conscience or lack thereof.
What is Conscience?
This is the Voice of God in the Heart of Man.
People have one conscience for all - Christ.

If the employer reasons according to your logic, without showing interest in WHAT IS THE PERSON he is hiring, he risks hiring a scoundrel or that very “holy simplicity that is worse than theft.”
In both cases it will take people's work which has no Heart, means no mind.
One "reason".
Not crazy, no, crazy.
The employer will graduate in any case -
Badly.

uv.Antony.
The spiritual side - the moral side of any action - is a matter of whether a person has Conscience or lack thereof.
This is true both for the individual and for the whole society.

You should not mix the categories of Rational and Moral, much less replace one with the other, otherwise you can end up in unconsciousness, mysticism, madness, or simply do something stupid or, at best, write.

Rational, in relation to hiring, is the degree of proficiency in the craft.
Accounting, for example.
Moral is a matter of purpose.
Why does an accountant apply for employment?
For what?
This question is always asked and I have seen few people who are able to clearly and briefly formulate the answer to this question so as not to cause mistrust or confusion.

Why do you want to work in our company?
A rationally thinking person, strictly following the logic of rationalism, must say what he thinks - well, for example...
“Drink some tea and steal your tablecloth...”

The answer to this question, “What is the GOAL,” will determine whether the person will be accepted for the position or not.
And first of all, no matter what anyone says, they will be primarily interested in whether the Goal is Moral or Not?
Bastards, brawlers, scoundrels and swindlers are not needed by anyone anywhere, even if they are “seven spans in the forehead.”
Even professional bank robbers.

Yes, this never happens.
A person who is unscrupulous always falls short professionally, anyone can see that if they look at it, it means they are unreliable.
While everything is going more or less stable, you can still put up with his level of preparation, but as soon as an emergency situation arises, he will let you down.
Don't hesitate.

8. Anthony : Reply to 7., Clerk:
2012-06-23 at 05:32

More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise we won’t understand anything.

I'll explain in simpler terms.
If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the story of your relationship with God, he will throw you out the door, because that is not what he needs from you.
If you come to your confessor and begin to outline the story of your career growth, he will also find himself in a state of bewilderment.
Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks.
History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, just like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God; Isaac Newton was of the same opinion.
Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers...
But if the historian begins to speculate about who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of the Novgorodians with the Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky, or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

7. Clerk : 3.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 01:33

UV.Antony.

You see, history is not astrology and does not suffer from providentialism.
In addition, history, as a science, has never set itself the goal of testing the Ways of God.
The point is that history as a science understands the essence of the historical process.

Anything other than what actually exists, since it denies the Existence of God as an Objective Reality.
This means being methodologically atheistic, although a historian may personally be a believer.
It is bad both for history and for the historian, since there is no completeness of perception of the historical process possible for a person.
In this way, objective conditions are created for the transformation of history into myth.
Typically destructive.
This is true both for the individual and for the whole society.

P.S.
History, in its ESSENCE, comes down to the history of the relationship between Man and God.
In particular, Russian.
Which does not at all negate the need to know Russian history well, replacing it with knowledge of the Psalter - rather, on the contrary.
More precisely, both are needed.
Otherwise we won't understand anything.
In History, and in the Psalter too.
In the 13th century, the Hagarians did not attack Rus'.
The Mongols were pagans.

6. Ivan : Thanks to the author for the article!
2012-06-23 at 00:20

Thank you very much, dear Mikhail Ivanovich! Everything is written to the point and the way one SHOULD write about the war, the way those who KNOW write. In such a short journalistic article there are 40(!) links to sources and which ones! Our scientific treatises are written more easily.
Health and many years life to you!

5. Bondarev Igor : Addition.
2012-06-23 at 00:01

It is characteristic that in the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) had a huge mass of idols and idols in which the Orthodox spirit of society materialized.
That is, the Western idea in the conditions of the Antichrist is fascism. And in Russia - pagan idols, all sorts of ideological cults, but firmly united in a false spirit.
That is, the West has deviated into the idea of ​​matter, and Russia into pride. Germany into the materialization of empiricism, and Russia into a stronghold of the spirit (but false), into deception.
The war changed everything the other way around.

4. Bondarev Igor : Cause.
2012-06-22 at 23:44

June 22, 1941 - All Saints' Day.
Indeed, opposite them is the Antichrist.
I agree with the respected Clerk, with one “but”.
The Antichrist is not only Nazi Germany, but also the USSR itself. More precisely, the spirit of materialism in the world, including the USA.
Antichrist is the common spirit of humanity.
And June 22, 1941 is its apogee.
Liberation from this spirit is the Victory of 1945.
And we see the balance of power. The USSR was liberated by the spirit of will, mainly from below, because in this case the command is an attachment to the troops, and the government to the people.
And, accordingly, the countries of the world. The people did not fight in the USA. But Germany received the most bitter lesson. It is she who must act most nobly in the matter of the expected spiritual flowering of the mind in Russia.

3. Anthony : Reply to 2., Clerk:
2012-06-22 at 23:27

Strategic. Disastrous blindness. Both in this century and in the future. This rule knows no exceptions. The trouble with historical science is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic...

The knowledge that in the 13th century Rus' was attacked by the godless Hagarians did not prevent defeat.
Historical science cannot methodologically take into account the providential factor simply because the ways of the Lord are inscrutable.
Science deals exclusively with facts of a material nature, but this circumstance cannot be the basis for the conclusion that science as such is fundamentally atheistic and useless.

2. Clerk : Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 18:48

"Ignorance of God is blindness of the soul."
Strategic.
Fatal blindness.
Both in this century and in the future.
This rule knows no exceptions.

The trouble with historical science is that, being METHODOLOGICALLY atheistic, that is, being able to describe, and for the most part, reliably, the factual side of the matter, it is not able to transform the “sum of facts” into knowledge.
In other words, it cannot reveal the essence of the war against Nazism, thereby providing the broadest opportunities for all kinds of manipulation of facts.

Historical science, in general, by and large, has nothing to oppose to manipulators.
Except faith.
Faith in science and faith in it.
And this, as the practice of the last twenty years has shown, is not enough.
There is nothing to oppose to lies, since there is no access to the Truth - only guesses, partly true, partly not so much.

Of course, neither the Soviet leadership nor the people were ready for the war that befell the Fatherland.
We were not ready STRATEGICALLY.
And they couldn’t be prepared; they were spiritually blind, which is why they had no idea WHO ATTACKED.
And it was none other than the “Antichrist” who attacked.
Just imagine, J.V. Stalin gathers the Politburo and says...
“Comrades, we have been attacked by the Antichrist.
What shall we do, comrades?"...

To everyone Orthodox person the traits inherent in the Antichrist are known, and not falsely.
First of all, a tendency to pathological lies.
If anyone is interested, they can open Mein Kampf - there are several pages dedicated to lies.
This is a whole anthem.
Anthem of lies...
...and the First Epistle of St. Apostle Paul to the Corinthians.
Chapter 13.
Hymn of Love.

In other words, a Russian person cannot even imagine that it is possible to lie like that.

Perhaps we should pay attention to one more point that is being overlooked.
"At equal strength opponents, the spirit of the troops, correlates like three to one."
Napoleon.

So let’s multiply 5.5 million, who have two years of invaluable modern combat experience behind them, by three.
We get 16.5 million.

So, the 4.5 million army, brought up in the spirit of proletarian friendship towards the unfortunate oppressed German working class and not only the European one in general, was attacked not by the “proletarians of all countries”, just waiting to fraternize, as it were, but by the hordes of the Antichrist, who does not know mercy.
Not to children, not to women, not to old people.
This was after it came to war with whom, and they began to write about the “lair of the beast” in the newspapers, etc.

Stalin, thank God, was, after all, a spiritually educated person.
Russian Orthodox Church, in the person of its Primate, the future St. Patriarch Sergius, on the very first day of the war, gave a correct assessment of the essence of the events and, I believe, conveyed this essence, in its entirety, to the leadership.
Who we are dealing with - without this, no Victory would be possible.
And thank God for everything.

1. Anthony : Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 10:16

Throughout the 70 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the public consciousness has been searching for an answer to an apparently very simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having seemingly irrefutable evidence of Germany’s preparation of aggression against the USSR, was completely convinced of its possibility? didn’t believe it and was taken by surprise? What is the reason that Stalin, even having received the news from the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District on the night of June 22 that German units were already occupying the starting areas for the offensive along the border line, told People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov: there is no need to rush to conclusions; maybe everything will be settled peacefully.
One answer is that the leader was the victim of a large-scale disinformation operation carried out by German intelligence services.
On May 22, 1941, as part of the final stage of the operational deployment of the Wehrmacht, the transfer of 47 divisions, including 28 tank and motorized divisions, began to the border with the USSR.
In general, all versions of the purposes for which such a mass of troops are concentrated near the Soviet border boiled down to two main ones:
- to prepare for the invasion of the British Isles, so that here, in the distance, to protect them from attacks by British aircraft;
- to forcefully ensure a favorable course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, which, according to hints from Berlin, were about to begin.
In agreement with Hitler, Goebbels published an article “Crete as an example” in the evening edition of the newspaper “Völkischer Beobachter” dated June 12, 1941, in which he made a transparent hint about the Wehrmacht landing on the British Isles soon. To create the impression that the Reich Minister of Propaganda had made a grave mistake and revealed a secret plan, the newspaper was confiscated “by Hitler’s personal order,” and a rumor spread throughout Berlin about the imminent resignation of the minister, who had fallen out of favor with the Fuhrer. Indeed, they did not release the newspaper at retail (so as not to misinform their own military and the population), but foreign embassies received the issue.

“My article about Crete,” Goebbels wrote in his diary the next day, “is a real sensation in the country and abroad... Our production was a great success... From wiretapped telephone conversations of foreign journalists working in Berlin, we can conclude that they all fell for the bait "
Read more in the article on the website of the Strategic Culture Foundation “I look forward to meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler"
http://www.fondsk.ru...sh-adolf-gitler.html

In military historical literature and in the memoirs of participants in the Great Patriotic War, there are many different reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

Military experts say one of the main reasons for the failures was the miscalculations of the country's military-political leadership in assessing the timing of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Despite the regular receipt of information from mid-1940 Soviet intelligence about the preparation of Nazi Germany for an attack on the USSR, Stalin did not exclude the possibility that in 1941 war could be avoided and, through various political maneuvers, its start could be delayed until 1942. For fear of provoking a war, the Soviet troops were not given the task of bringing the border districts to full combat readiness, and the troops did not occupy the designated defensive lines and positions before the enemy attack began. As a result, the Soviet troops were actually in a peacetime position, which largely predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles of 1941.

Of the 57 divisions intended to cover the border, only 14 design divisions (25% of the allocated forces and assets) managed to occupy the designated defense areas, and then mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. The construction of the defense was designed only to cover the border, and not to conduct a defensive operation in order to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces.

Before the war, the military-political leadership of the USSR did not sufficiently develop and master the forms and methods of strategic and operational defense. The methods of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were incorrectly assessed. There was no provision for the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive at once with all available pre-deployed groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic directions.

Difficulties in preparing a theater of military operations (TVD) were created by the transfer of the border and the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops of the western military districts to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia. A significant part of the fortified areas on the old border was mothballed. There was a need for the urgent construction of fortified areas on the new border, expansion of the airfield network and reconstruction of most airfields.

The possibility of conducting military operations on its territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation of not only defense, but also, in general, theaters of military operations in the depths of its territory.

It also turned out to be a mistake to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops in the southwestern strategic direction at the beginning of the war, i.e. in Ukraine, while the fascist troops delivered the main blow in June 1941 in the western direction - in Belarus. The decision to bring supplies of material and technical resources closer to the border, which made them vulnerable at the outbreak of war, was also unjustified.

Not enough attention was paid to the mobilization preparation of industry. Developed translation mobilization plans national economy on military tracks were designed for too long periods.

Before the war, a major organizational and technical reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces began, which was planned to be completed before 1942. A radical restructuring of the operational, combat and political training armed forces. And here major miscalculations were made. Excessively cumbersome connections and associations were created without taking into account the real possibilities of equipping them modern weapons and staffing. The completion dates for the formation of most new compounds turned out to be unrealistic. As a result, by the beginning of the war, a significant part of them could not be formed, equipped with equipment and trained. This happened, for example, with new mechanized corps that were formed almost simultaneously, many of which turned out to be ineffective.
The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with command and rank and file personnel, as well as tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles, means of traction for artillery, delivery of fuel, repair of equipment and engineering weapons.

The Red Army did not have sufficient quantities of such important technical equipment as radio, engineering equipment, cars, and special tractors for artillery.

Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and artillery, but outnumbered them in the number of tanks and aircraft. However, qualitative superiority was on the side of Germany. It was expressed in better technical equipment, higher coherence, training and staffing of troops. The enemy had tactical and technical superiority in the main aircraft fleet.

For the most part, Soviet tanks were no worse, and the new ones (T34, KB) were better than German ones, but the main tank fleet was badly worn out.
On the eve of the war, enormous damage was caused to the personnel of the Soviet armed forces and intelligence: almost 40 thousand of the most qualified commanders and political workers were subjected to massive repression. The majority of commanders of military districts, fleets, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, members of military councils, and other party and political workers were arrested and destroyed. Instead, military personnel who did not have the necessary practical experience were hastily promoted to leadership positions.
(Military encyclopedia. Military publishing house. Moscow, in 8 volumes. 2004)

In the management system of the Armed Forces, there were continuous changes in leadership in the central apparatus and military districts. Thus, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. In the year and a half before the war (1940-1941), the heads of the air defense department were replaced five times (on average every 3-4 months); from 1936 to 1940, five heads of the intelligence department, etc., were replaced. Therefore, the majority officials did not have time to master their responsibilities associated with performing a wide range of complex tasks before the war.

By this period, the command staff of the German army had acquired the necessary practical skills in command and control, in organizing and conducting large offensive operations, and in using all types of military equipment and weapons on the battlefields. The German soldier had combat training. As the events of the first weeks of the war showed, the presence of combat experience in the German army played an important role in the first successes of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front.

As a result of the defeat suffered by the European states in the first period of World War II, the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe were in the hands of fascist Germany, which significantly strengthened its military-economic potential.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources.

Abstract on the history of Russia

June 22, 1941. Nazi Germany and its allies unleashed a carefully prepared blow on the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. A new period has begun in the life of the Soviet state - the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.

Germany pursued the following goals in this war:

Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;

Imperialist - achieving world domination;

Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;

Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of those who remained into slaves.

The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:

Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;

Providing assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;

Elimination of fascism and creation of conditions excluding the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.

The nature of the war naturally followed from the goals of the war. On the part of Germany it was an unjust, aggressive and criminal war. From the USSR side - liberation and fair.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.

June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repel the enemy.

November 1942 - December 1943 was a period of radical change in the war.

January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious end of the war in Europe.

Reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:

Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;

Insufficient vocational training a significant part of the command cadres of the Red Army;

Weakening the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army through unjustified repressions against the leading personnel of the country's armed forces;

Miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;

Germany's advantage over the USSR in economic potential;

Germany's significant superiority in military terms. Its army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped modern means struggle, had two years of experience in combat operations. At the same time, the Soviet army has not finished working on its technical equipment. The balance of forces on the eve of the war.

Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153+37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Germany's allies: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1,400 combat aircraft.

And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aircraft, in terms of quality they were still inferior to the enemy.

German offensive strategy.

In accordance with the strategy of the “blitzkrieg” war, it was envisaged that powerful groups of tank formations and aviation would invade, in cooperation with ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops in the border districts, and within 3-5 months reach line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group North advanced in the direction of the Baltic states, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group South strikes Western Ukraine, captures Kyiv, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German Army of Norway operated in the direction of Murmansk. Two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also took part in the fighting.

Mobilization activities.

A) Creation of the country's highest defense management bodies.

June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the Main Command was created, which on August 8 was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Its members included People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.

June 30, 1941 - formed State Committee Defense (GKO), endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, and later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, and Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.

B) Directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the procedure:

Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;

Organization of resistance in occupied territory.

July 3, 1941 - Stalin’s address to the people on the radio, where for the first time the mortal threat looming over the country was openly announced and an appeal was made to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.

The failures of the first months of the Great Patriotic War for the USSR were due to many objective and subjective factors. Much work has been written on this topic, and numerous studies have been conducted. Analysis of combat operations and assessment of tactical and strategic decisions of the command of the Armed Forces and the political leadership of the Soviet Union are still interesting today.

1. The Red Army is unprepared for war

Preparations for a big war, begun in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, production large quantity military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.

However, in general the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 were undermanned and poorly equipped with military equipment, and also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an impact, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and their place was taken by less competent or inexperienced commanders, in contrast to the German army, in which all the generals and most of the officers had combat experience dating back to the First World War. , as well as the experience of all campaigns of 1939-1941.

Germany's transport capabilities were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, and organize their supplies. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in the number of trucks by approximately two to one, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.

In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this training lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop its armed forces and military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal conscription was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR - only on September 1, 1939.

2. Strategic miscalculations of the Red Army command

But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war was one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, they had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (the Battle of Moscow, the liberation of Rostov, the Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht achieved its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, and Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these defeats was the overestimation by the command (and primarily Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also abandoned the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in the southern direction. The German active actions in 1942 in the southern direction were also logical - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.

Another failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand Red Army soldiers. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.

An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. Infantry and cavalry broke through the German defenses, but that was often where it all ended - there was almost no one and nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both “cauldrons” (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after reinforcements arrived. In addition, the encircled German troops in these cauldrons were supported transport aviation, which was difficult to fight due to huge losses Soviet aviation in the first months of the war.

A common mistake was incorrectly determining the directions of the enemy's main attacks. Thus, in Ukraine, the command of the Southwestern Front, led by General Kirponos, was constantly afraid of the 1st Tank Group turning south, to the rear of the Lvov salient. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kiev - more than 400 tanks.)

3. Repressions in the pre-war period

According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. was shot, arrested or fired from armed forces from 25 to 50 thousand officers. The most significant losses were suffered by the senior command staff - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of Soviet troops during the first period of the war.

The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, and the Civil War (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Egorov and many others) were subjected to repression, and young officers came to their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political instructors had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, among the command staff of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a secondary specialized education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.

But even solid military experience could not always help to win a victory. For example, General D.T. Kozlov fought since 1915, but was unable to oppose anything to the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the battles in Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same thing happened with V.N. Gordova - long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a series of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.

Thus, already stated reasons The defeats of the Red Army were also compounded by the lack of good experienced command, which together led to the horrific defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943 were the military leaders of the Red Army able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encircling and destroying large enemy forces, and powerful all-front offensives (similar to the German summer of 1941).