Abstract

Afghan war 1979 – 1989

1. Causes of war 3

2. Goals of the war, its participants, duration 4

3. Progress of the war 5

4. Afghan war (1979-1989) 6

5. Conclusion Soviet wars from Afghanistan 10

6. Losses 11

7. Political assessment war 12

8. Consequences of the war 13

References 14

1. Causes of the war

The main reason The war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between local traditionalists and left-radical modernists. After the coup of April 27, 1978 (the so-called “April Revolution”), the left-wing military transferred power to two Marxist parties (Khalq and Parcham), united into the People’s Democratic Party.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham, taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and the defense of the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. The goals of the war, its participants, duration

The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. The “limited contingent” of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 100 thousand military personnel. A total of 546,255 took part in hostilities Soviet soldiers and officers. 71 soldiers became Hero of the Soviet Union. Government armed forces also took part in the conflict Democratic Republic Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The Mujahideen were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services. During 1980–1988 Western aid to the mujahideen amounted to $8.5 billion, half of which was provided by the United States. The war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 (2238 days).

3. Progress of the war

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. The entry of troops was relatively easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, 4 divisions, 5 separate brigades, 4 individual shelf, 4 combat aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments, 1 pipeline brigade, 1 logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.

The Soviet command hoped to entrust the suppression of the uprising to Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and were unable to cope with this task. For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics Soviet troops They tried to deal with the rebels with the help of tanks, helicopters and planes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks. The bombing of populated areas and the destruction of crops also did not produce results, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran. Supplies of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages:

Stage I: December 1979 - February 1980. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage II: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Stage III: May 1985 - December 1986. Transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage IV: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

4. Afghan war (1979-1989)

Afghan War 1979–1989 - armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied Soviet troops, who sought to maintain a pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

The war between the communist government of Afghanistan and the invading Soviet troops against Islamic insurgents.

After World War II, Afghanistan, which had the status of a neutral state, was actually in the sphere of Soviet influence. Cooperation with the USSR was very close. There was always a presence in the country large number Soviet specialists, and many Afghans studied at Soviet universities.

In 1973, the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. As a result of the coup, the brother of the last king, Zakir Shah, Muhammad Daoud, came to power and established a presidential dictatorship. The regime change had no effect on relations with the USSR.

But the overthrow and murder of Daoud during the coup of April 27-28, 1978 military units, loyal to the pro-communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), became the prologue to many years of bloody war that continues in Afghanistan to this day. The Soviet side was not directly involved in the coup, but military advisers in the country knew about its preparations, but did not receive orders to warn Daoud. On the contrary, KGB representatives made it clear to the leaders of the coup that if successful, recognition and assistance were guaranteed.

The PDPA was a small party of the intelligentsia. In addition, it split into two warring factions: “Khalq” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The leader of the Khalq, the poet Hyp Muhammad Taraki, who became president, began intensive transformations in the country. Islam ceased to be the state religion, women were allowed to remove their veils and were allowed to participate in education. A literacy campaign was launched agrarian reform, the beginning of collectivization.

All this caused discontent among the Muslim clergy and nobility. Afghan society, with the exception of a thin layer of city dwellers, remained essentially feudal and was not ready for radical transformations.

Among the main population, the Pashtuns, a tribal structure was still preserved, and tribal leaders were especially influential. Islam was declared a religion that reflected only the interests of the “exploiting classes,” and terror was launched against the clergy. The Pashtun tribes fared no better, they tried to disarm them (traditionally all Pashtuns carried weapons), and deprive the tribal elite of power and even destroy it. The peasants refused the land plots provided because they did not have the means to cultivate them, and the state was not able to provide these funds.

Since the summer of 1978, armed resistance new government Supporters of Islamic fundamentalism, who had fought against Daoud, began to provide support. They were joined by Pashtun tribal militias. By that time, Taraki's relations with the Parchamists had worsened, many of whom were executed.

On December 5, 1978, a Soviet-Afghan treaty on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation was concluded, providing for mutual assistance of the parties in repelling an external threat. Gradually, the Taraki administration, despite the terror, increasingly lost control over the country. There are about 2 million Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan. Due to the failures, the president’s relations with the second person in the Khalq faction, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, who enjoyed influence in the army, sharply worsened. Amin was a more decisive leader and tried to strengthen the weakening power by searching for allies among various social and ethnic groups(Both Amin and Taraki were Pashtuns). But Moscow decided to bet on Taraki and advised him to eliminate his opponent.

The Kremlin hoped to find a springboard in Afghanistan for a push to the Indian Ocean. In neighboring Pakistan, tribes of Pashtuns and Baluchis, related to the Afghans, lived, and the leaders of the PDPA made territorial claims to their neighbor, hoping to occupy most of Pakistani territory with the support of the USSR.

General D. A. Volkogonov recalled that on September 8, 1978, in the presidential palace, Taraki’s guards tried to kill Amin, but only his bodyguard was killed. Amin survived, raised the loyal units of the Kabul garrison and displaced Taraki. Soon the hapless president was strangled. Amin intensified the terror, but did not achieve his goal. They decided to remove him.

Both Taraki and Amin repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send troops to Afghanistan. We were talking about small units designed, in particular, to provide protection for Afghan leaders and help conduct operations against Mujahideen rebels.

The Kremlin decided differently. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo approved the removal of Amin, and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. KGB agents slipped poison into Amin's food. An unsuspecting Soviet doctor literally pulled the dictator out of the other world. Then the special KGB group “Alpha” went into action. Its fighters, together with special forces from the Main Intelligence Directorate, freely arrived in the Afghan capital, ostensibly to guard Amin, and on the night of December 27, 1979, stormed the presidential palace on the outskirts of Kabul, destroying Amin along with his family, associates and several dozen security soldiers. TASS later announced that the dictator was killed by “the healthy forces of the Afghan revolution.”

The next morning, Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul. Their arrival was justified by external aggression against Afghanistan, expressed in the support of Afghan rebels by Pakistan, Iran, China and the United States, and by urgent requests from the “legitimate Afghan authorities.” There is a problem with the legality. After all, before Soviet invasion The “legitimate authority” was Amin, who was posthumously declared a CIA agent. It turned out that he himself invited his death, and besides, he was “not entirely legal”, since he had to be eliminated and urgently replaced by the leader of the Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, who had returned to the convoy of Soviet troops.

Soviet propaganda was never able to clearly explain to the world community who exactly invited our “limited contingent,” whose number at times reached 120 thousand people. But in the USSR, rumors were spread that Soviet soldiers were only a few hours ahead of the American landing force, which was supposed to land in Kabul (although there were no US troops or bases within a thousand miles of Afghanistan) In connection with the deployment of units Soviet Army In Afghanistan, a joke was born in Moscow. "What should we call now? Tatar-Mongol yoke? “The introduction of a limited contingent of Tatar-Mongol troops into Rus' to protect against the Lithuanian threat.”

The limited contingent was unable to change the situation in the country, although by the beginning of 1980 there were 50 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers in the country, and in the second half of the year the contingent reached its maximum number. The majority of the population perceived Karmal as a puppet sitting on Soviet bayonets. The Afghan government army, melting from desertion, held only the capital and provincial centers with Soviet support. The rebels controlled the countryside, which was mountainous and difficult to access. The Mujahideen received help from the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, and it was almost impossible to close the Afghan-Pakistani border, which was a conventional line on rough terrain with many mountain paths. Fleeing from the war, over 4 million refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran. Raids of Soviet troops against partisans, like As a rule, the Mujahideen did not achieve success and disappeared into the mountains. The Soviet 40th Army suffered losses; the rebels fired at Soviet transports and attacked small detachments and garrisons. Some groups, in particular the Tajik army concentrated in the Panjshir Valley field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, fought successful battles with entire Soviet divisions, which repeatedly tried to destroy the “lion of Panjshir”.

By the mid-80s, the futility of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan became obvious. In 1985, after the rise of Gorbachev, Karmal was replaced by the former head of the security service, Dr. Najibullah, who had a reputation as a cruel but cunning man, representing the larger Khalq faction. He tried to find support for the regime both among part of the Pashtun tribes and among the peoples of the north. Here, however, he was able to rely only on the Uzbek division of General Rashid Dostum.

The Kabul government was completely dependent on Soviet military and food aid. The United States has stepped up assistance to the rebels by starting to supply them with anti-aircraft missiles"Stinger". Several planes and helicopters were shot down and absolute Soviet air supremacy was called into question. It became clear that we had to leave Afghanistan

On April 14, 1988, an agreement was concluded in Geneva between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA on a political settlement. It was announced that Soviet troops would leave the country. On February 15, 1989, the commander of the limited contingent, General Boris Gromov, was the last to transfer border river Panj. According to official data, the losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 14,433 military personnel and 20 civilians killed, 298 missing, 54 thousand wounded and 416 thousand sick. There are also higher estimates of Soviet losses at 35, 50, 70 and 140 thousand dead. Afghan casualties, mainly among civilians, were significantly higher. Many villages were leveled by aircraft, and residents were shot as hostages for the actions of the partisans. Sometimes they talk about a million dead Afghans, but no one has accurately counted the Afghan losses.

After the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet side continued to provide massive military assistance to Najibullah. Gorbachev said: “It is important that this regime and all its cadres are not swept away to the ground. We cannot appear before the world wearing only panties or even without them...” After the August putsch and the collapse of the USSR, a denouement came.

In March 1992, Dostum rebelled against Najibullah, who had lost Soviet support, and occupied Kabul. The former dictator took refuge in the UN mission. In Afghanistan, a war began between various ethnic and political groups, previously united in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime. It continues to this day.

In 1996, the Taliban, led by madrassa students and relying on the Pashtun population, occupied Kabul. Najibullah was captured at the mission premises and hanged.

At the beginning of 2000, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, with the exception of the Panjshir Valley and some adjacent areas with a predominantly Tajik population. During the offensive launched in the fall of 2000, the Taliban movement established control over almost the entire territory of the country, with the exception of a few internal enclaves and a narrow border strip in some northern regions.

5. Withdrawal of Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership during the period of “perestroika” contributed to a political settlement of the situation. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a phased peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. The Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

6. Losses

According to updated official data, irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in Afghan war amounted to 14,433 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. Over 53 thousand people were injured and concussed. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. Exact number Afghans killed in the war are unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

7. Political assessment of the war

In the Soviet Union long time The actions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were characterized as “international assistance.” The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989) declared the Afghan war criminal.

8. Consequences of the war

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986–1992) lasted another 3 years and, having lost Russian support, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of mujahideen field commanders. During the war in Afghanistan there appeared terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, and groups of Islamic radicals grew stronger.

References

1. Encyclopedia of the history of Ukraine. Article “Afghan War 1979–1989” (Ukrainian);

2. Historical dictionary on the World of Dictionaries website. Article "Afghan War";

3. “War in Afghanistan 1979–1989.” (RIAN reference);

4. Zgursky G.V. Dictionary of historical terms. M.: EKSMO, 2008;

5. V. Grigoriev. Afghan War 1979–1989: server for Afghan war veterans;

6. B. Yamshanov. The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed.

In 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. For 10 years, the USSR was drawn into a conflict that finally undermined its former power. “Echo of Afghanistan” can still be heard.

Contingent

There was no Afghan war. There was a deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. It is fundamentally important that Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at the invitation. There were about two dozen invitations. The decision to send troops was not easy, but it was nevertheless made by members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on December 12, 1979. In fact, the USSR was drawn into this conflict. A short search for “who benefits from this” clearly points, first of all, to the United States. Today they are not even trying to hide the Anglo-Saxon trace of the Afghan conflict. According to the memoirs of former CIA Director Robert Gates, on July 3, 1979, American President Jimmy Carter signed a secret presidential order authorizing funding for anti-government forces in Afghanistan, and Zbigniew Brzezinski directly said: “We did not push the Russians to interfere, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would will do."

Afghan axis

Afghanistan is geopolitically a pivot point. It is not in vain that wars have been waged over Afghanistan throughout its history. Both open and diplomatic. Since the 19th century between Russian and British Empire There is a struggle for control over Afghanistan, called " Big game" The Afghan conflict of 1979-1989 is part of this “game”. Mutinies and uprisings in the “underbelly” of the USSR could not go unnoticed. It was impossible to lose the Afghan axis. In addition, Leonid Brezhnev really wanted to act as a peacemaker. He spoke.

Oh sport, you are the world

The Afghan conflict “quite by accident” caused a serious wave of protest in the world, which was fueled in every possible way by “friendly” media. Voice of America radio broadcasts began daily with military reports. By all means, people were not allowed to forget that the Soviet Union was waging a “war of conquest” on territory that was foreign to itself. The 1980 Olympics were boycotted by many countries (including the USA). The Anglo-Saxon propaganda machine was working at full capacity, creating the image of an aggressor from the USSR. The Afghan conflict greatly helped with the change of poles: by the end of the 70s, the popularity of the USSR in the world was enormous. The US boycott did not go unanswered. Our athletes did not go to the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

The whole world

The Afghan conflict was Afghan in name only. In essence, the favorite Anglo-Saxon combination was carried out: the enemies were forced to fight each other. The US authorized “economic assistance” to the Afghan opposition in the amount of $15 million, as well as military assistance - supplying them with heavy weapons and training military training groups Afghan Mujahideen. The United States did not even hide its interest in the conflict. In 1988, the third part of the Rambo epic was filmed. Sylvester Stallone's hero this time fought in Afghanistan. The absurdly tailored, openly propaganda film even received the Golden Raspberry Award and was included in the Guinness Book of Records as a film with maximum number violence: the film contains 221 scenes of violence and a total of more than 108 people die. At the end of the film there are credits “The film is dedicated to the valiant people of Afghanistan.”

The role of the Afghan conflict is difficult to overestimate. Every year the USSR spent about 2-3 billion US dollars on it. The Soviet Union could afford this at the peak of oil prices, which was observed in 1979-1980. However, between November 1980 and June 1986, oil prices fell almost 6 times! Of course, it was not by chance that they fell. A special “thank you” to Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign. There was no longer a “financial cushion” in the form of income from the sale of vodka on the domestic market. The USSR, by inertia, continued to spend money on creating a positive image, but funds were running out within the country. The USSR found itself in economic collapse.

Dissonance

During the Afghan conflict, the country was in a kind of cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, everyone knew about “Afghanistan,” on the other, the USSR painfully tried to “live better and more fun.” Olympics-80, XII World Festival of Youth and Students - The Soviet Union celebrated and rejoiced. Meanwhile, KGB General Philip Bobkov subsequently testified: “Long before the opening of the festival, Afghan militants were specially selected in Pakistan, who underwent serious training under the guidance of CIA specialists and were brought into the country a year before the festival. They settled in the city, especially since they were provided with money, and began to expect to receive explosives, plastic bombs and weapons, preparing to carry out explosions in places mass gathering people (Luzhniki, Manezhnaya Square and other places). The protests were disrupted thanks to the operational measures taken.”

Goals:

• to find out the causes, course and results of the war in Afghanistan, showing the role of Soviet internationalist soldiers in this military event;
• draw attention to the consequences of the war for the USSR, emphasizing the heroism of our internationalist soldiers;
• to instill in students a sense of love for the Fatherland, loyalty to duty, and patriotism;
• promote the development of students’ skills in obtaining information from various sources, analyzing historical source, systematize information, draw conclusions.

Preparation for the lesson:

1. The student is given the advanced task “April Revolution in Afghanistan.”
2. If possible, you can use fragments of the feature film “The Ninth Company”, directed by F.S. Bondarchuk, 2005.
3. Handouts.
4. If possible, it is advisable to invite a participant in the war.
5. Map.

PROGRESS OF THE LESSON

Motivational talk:

On March 2, 2011, Russian President D.A. Medvedev signed a decree awarding M.S. Gorbachev the highest award of the Russian Federation, the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called Apostle. Historians assess the activities of the first president of the USSR differently, but one cannot deny the fact that under him our country emerged from the debilitating Afghan war. Today in class we will learn more about this event and try to answer the problematic question: “What are the consequences of the USSR’s participation in the Afghan war?”

Information block:

1. Student message: April Revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan On April 27 in Afghanistan, under the leadership of a group of officers, a top military coup was carried out, supported by the army and part of the petty bourgeoisie. The country's president, M. Daoud, was killed. Power passed into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (created in 1965). It was announced to the whole world that a socialist revolution had occurred. In terms of economic development, Afghanistan was in 108th place among 129 developing countries of the world, at the stage of feudalism with deep vestiges of tribal foundations and a communal-patriarchal way of life. The leaders of the revolution were N. Taraki and H. Amin.

2. Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Teacher: On September 15, PDPA leader N.M. Taraki was removed from power. On October 8, on the orders of Amin, he was killed. Opposition protests began in Afghanistan. December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Brezhnev L.I., Suslov M.A., V.V. Grishin, A.P. Kirilenko, A.Ya. Pelshe, D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko , Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, N.A. Tikhonov, B.N. Ponomarenko) the decision was made alone: ​​to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. A.N. Kosygin was not present at the meeting, whose position was negative.

On December 25 at 15:00 the entry of Soviet troops began. The first dead appeared two hours later. On December 27, the storming of Amin’s palace began by special forces from the “Muslim battalion”, KGB groups “Grom”, “Zenith” and its physical elimination.

Next, the teacher invites students to get acquainted with an excerpt from the work of the famous orientalist A.E. Snesarev. “Afghanistan” and try to answer the question: What are the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan?

“Afghanistan itself has no value. This mountainous country, devoid of roads, with a lack of technical amenities, with a scattered, precarious population; And this population, moreover, is also freedom-loving, proud, and values ​​its independence. The latter circumstance leads to the fact that even if this country can be captured, it is very difficult to keep it in your hands. Establishing an administration and establishing order will require so many resources that the country will never return these expenses; she has nothing to return from.

Therefore we must speak with all sincerity. that in the history of the hundred-year struggle between England and Russia, Afghanistan itself did not play any role, and its value was always indirect and conditional. If you think about the essence of its political value, then it mainly comes down to the fact that Afghanistan includes operational routes to India, and there is no other. This is confirmed by thousands of years of history and the conquerors of India, who always came through Afghanistan.”

“Taking into account the military-political situation in the Middle East, the latest appeal from the Afghan government was considered positively. A decision was made to introduce some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions to prohibit possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of neighboring states”

After the discussion, a note is made in the notebook.

Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

1) Instability in Afghanistan, which was considered a zone of Soviet influence.
2) The threat of loss of stability in the Central Asian regions of the USSR due to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
3) The desire to maintain the course taken by the Afghan regime towards building socialism.
4) Prevent American influence in Afghanistan.
5) The leaders of the USSR wanted to test the effectiveness of military equipment and the level of training of troops in a real, but local war.

3. Progress of hostilities

Students get acquainted with the stages of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (the printed text is on the students’ desks)

First: December 1979-February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of security of deployment points.

Second: March 1980-April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, as, for example, in the province of Kunar in March 1983. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Third: April 1985-January 1987. The transition from active operations primarily to supporting Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. The use of motorized rifle, airborne and tank units mainly as reserves and to increase the morale and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Special forces units continued to fight to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Fourth: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's implementation of the policy of national example. Active activities to strengthen the position of the Afghan leadership, providing assistance in the formation of the armed forces of the DRA. Preparation of Soviet troops for withdrawal and their complete withdrawal.

Conversation with students

– What stages stand out in the Afghan war?
– What methods did the Soviet troops use?

Students briefly record the stages of the war.

Teacher: Everyone who fulfilled their international military duty with dignity and honor has earned national respect.

Students watch an excerpt from the film “The Ninth Company” or listen to the memories of a participant in those events.

The student reads K. Savelyev’s poem “And the world is not very fair...”

And the world is not very fair:
people come home
one brings checks from the war.
the other is jaundice or typhus.
And the third in stuffy silence
squeaks with prosthetic straps
and anger rolls in its nodules. when he hears about the war...
Taking train stations into circulation.
breathing army fuel industry,
The people are not old, coming back from the war.
not very affectionate people.
...I remember the fury of shame,
when the shiny warehouse manager
sitting on a suitcase next to him,
He whispered to me: “If only I could go there...”
And motorized riflemen walked by
in sun-burnt Panama hats -
fried veterans
walked into a world broken into pieces.
We went into a world tired of tirades.
not believing other people's crying,
no longer remembering what they mean
soldier chest patches...
Accustomed to hard work,
people come home
some only bring checks,
others - conscience and trouble.
In the twenty-year spring
the conscience came - a boy and a Skoda,
grown a little in two years...
Yes, aged during the war.

4. Results of the war

Teacher:“What are the results of the Afghan war?”
During the conversation and reading the text of the textbook on pp. 392-393 (Zagladin N.V., Kozlenko S.I.

History of Russia XX – beginning of XXI century) students make notes in notebooks.

– political defeat of the USSR
– withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
– OKSV did not defeat the armed opposition of the Mujahideen
– civil war in Afghanistan has resumed.

5. Mistakes of Soviet troops in Afghanistan(discussion with students)

– discrepancy between the existing organizational structure of combined arms formations and the conditions of the theater of military operations. The military formations were too cumbersome.
– an attempt to resolve the conflict with “small forces”, insufficient number of troops.
- Soviet troops were unable to cut off supplies to the rebels from abroad.
– underestimation of the opposing side (at the initial stage)
– insufficient effective use of the latest weapons, especially high-precision ones

6. Consequences of the Afghan War

Students review loss data and draw conclusions.

The losses of the limited contingent of Soviet troops were:
total - 138,333 people, of which 1979 were officers,
combat losses - 11381 people,
Sanitary losses amounted to 53,753 people,
Of these, 38,614 were returned. 6,669 people became disabled.
417 people went missing or were captured, of which 130 people returned as of January 1, 1999.
Losses of equipment and weapons:
tanks – 147
BTR, BMP, BRDM – 1314
guns and mortars - 233, mammoth aircraft - 114, helicopters - 322.

Students write down the following:

Consequences of the Afghan War for the USSR:

– great loss of life
– large material losses
– decline in the prestige of the Soviet armed forces
– the fall of the authority of the USSR in the Muslim world
– decline in the international authority of the USSR
– strengthening the US position

Final control

1. The Afghan war has begun

2. One of the reasons for the Afghan War was:

1) maintain a bridgehead beneficial for the USSR and prevent US influence in Afghanistan
2) raise the international authority of the USSR
3) fulfill the allied duty to the countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization

3. The leaders of the Afghan revolution were:

1) M. Gaddafi
2) A. Sadat
3) N. Taraki

4. The Afghan war led to:

1) new aggravation of international tension
2) allied relations with Muslim countries
3) reduction of strategic weapons

Reflection

1. How I learned the training material

a) very good, I remembered and understood everything
b) good, but need to be repeated
c) I didn’t understand the main questions of the topic well

2. How I worked in class

a) very active
b) actively
c) preferred not to raise his hand

Homework.§41 pp. 392-393. Write an answer to the question. Do you agree with the opinion of some historians that the Afghan War became “Soviet Vietnam” for our country?

Literature.

1. N.V. Zagladin, S.I. Kozlenko. S.T.Minakov, Yu.A.Petrov History of Russia of the XX-XXI centuries. “Russian Word”, M., 2011.
2. V. Andreev. Unexpected war. Voronezh, 2004.
3. You are in my memory and in my heart, Afghanistan. Materials of the military-practical conference dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Voronezh, 2004.
4. Encyclopedia for children Avanta. History of Russia, volume 3. Astrel Publishing House 2007.

The military conflict on the territory of Afghanistan, called the Afghan War, was essentially one of the stages of the civil war. On the one hand were government forces that had secured the support of the USSR, and on the other were numerous Mujahideen formations, which were supported by the United States and the majority of Muslim states. For ten years there was a senseless struggle for control over the territory of this independent state.

Historical context

Afghanistan is one of the key regions for ensuring stability in Central Asia. For centuries, in the very center of Eurasia, at the junction of South and Central Asia, the interests of the world's leading states have intersected. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called “Great Game” for dominance in South and Central Asia was waged between the Russian and British empires.

At the beginning of the last century, the king of Afghanistan declared the state's independence from Great Britain, which became the cause of the third Anglo-Afghan war. The first state to recognize the independence of Afghanistan was Soviet Russia. The Soviets provided economic and military assistance to the ally. At that time, Afghanistan was a country with a complete absence of an industrial complex and an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

In 1973, a republic was proclaimed in Afghanistan. The head of state established a totalitarian dictatorship and tried to carry out a number of reforms, which ended unsuccessfully. In fact, the country was dominated by the old order, characteristic of the era of communal-tribal system and feudalism. This period in the history of the state is characterized by political instability and rivalry between Islamist and pro-communist groups.

The April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan on April twenty-seventh, 1978. As a result, the People's Democratic Party came to power, and the former leader and his family were executed. The new leadership attempted to carry out reforms, but ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. Civil war began, and the government officially asked the USSR to send Soviet advisers. Specialists from the USSR left for Afghanistan in May 1978.

Causes of the war in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union could not allow a neighboring country to leave its sphere of influence. The coming to power of the opposition could lead to the strengthening of the position of the United States in a region located very close to the territory of the USSR. The essence of the war in Afghanistan is that this country has simply become a place where the interests of two superpowers collide. It is interference in domestic policy(both the obvious intervention of the USSR and the hidden one of the USA) became the cause of a destructive ten-year war.

The decision to send USSR troops

At a meeting of the Politburo on March 19, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said that the USSR “does not have to be drawn into a war.” However, the rebellion forced an increase in the number of Soviet troops along the border with Afghanistan. The memoirs of the former CIA director mention that in July of the same year, US Secretary of State John Carter signed a (secret) decree according to which the United States provided assistance to anti-government forces in Afghanistan.

Further events of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) caused concern among the Soviet leadership. Active armed protests by the opposition, mutinies among the military, internal party struggle. As a result, it was decided to prepare to overthrow the leadership and replace it with a more loyal USSR. When developing an operation to overthrow the Afghan government, it was decided to use requests for help from the same government.

The decision to send troops was made on December 12, 1979, and the next day a special commission was formed. The first attempt to assassinate the leader of Afghanistan was made on December 16, 1979, but he remained alive. At the initial stage of the intervention of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan, the actions of the special commission consisted of the transfer of military personnel and equipment.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December twenty-seventh, Soviet soldiers stormed the palace. The important operation lasted for forty minutes. During the assault, the leader of the state, Amin, was killed. The official version of events is somewhat different: the Pravda newspaper published a message that Amin and his henchmen, as a result of a wave of popular anger, appeared before citizens and were executed by a fair people's court.

In addition, USSR military personnel took control of some units and military units of the Kabul garrison, the radio and television center, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and state security. On the night of December twenty-seventh to twenty-eighth, the next stage of the revolution was proclaimed.

Chronology of the Afghan War

Officers of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who were engaged in summarizing the experience of the military, divided the entire war in Afghanistan into the following four periods:

1. The entry of USSR troops and their deployment to garrisons lasted from December 1979 to February 1980.
2. From March 1980 to April 1985, active hostilities were carried out, including large-scale ones.
3. The Soviet military moved from active operations to supporting Afghan troops. From April 1985 to January 1987, USSR troops were already partially withdrawn from Afghanistan.
4. From January 1987 to February 1989, troops participated in the policy of national reconciliation - this is the course of the new leadership. At this time, preparations for the withdrawal of troops and the withdrawal itself were carried out.

That's how short stroke war in Afghanistan, which lasted ten years.

Results and consequences

Before the start of the withdrawal of troops, the Mujahideen had never managed to occupy a large locality. They did not carry out a single major operation, but by 1986 they controlled 70% of the state's territory. During the war in Afghanistan, USSR troops pursued the goal of suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the legitimate government. The goal of unconditional victory was not set before them.

Soviet soldiers called the war in Afghanistan a “sheep war” because the Mujahideen, in order to overcome border barriers and minefields installed by the USSR troops, drove herds of sheep or goats in front of their troops so that the animals would “pave” the way for them, blowing up mines and landmines.

After the withdrawal of troops, the situation on the border worsened. There were even shelling of the territory of the Soviet Union and attempts to penetrate, armed attacks on Soviet border troops, and mining of the territory. Just before May 9, 1990, border guards removed seventeen mines, including British, Italian and American.

USSR losses and results

Over ten years, fifteen thousand Soviet troops died in Afghanistan, more than six thousand became disabled, and about two hundred people are still listed as missing. Three years after the end of the war in Afghanistan, radical Islamists came to power, and in 1992 the country was declared Islamic. Peace and tranquility never came to Afghanistan. The results of the war in Afghanistan are extremely ambiguous.

| Participation of the USSR in conflicts of the times cold war. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Brief results of the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Colonel General B.V. Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, in his book “Limited Contingent” expressed the following opinion about the results of the actions of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

“I am deeply convinced: there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. Soviet troops entered the country unhindered at the end of 1979, fulfilled - in contrast from the Americans in Vietnam - their tasks and returned home in an organized manner. If we consider the armed forces of the opposition as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only that. what they could."

Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops began in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operational department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR (in 1989 alone there were about 250 attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR), armed attacks on Soviet border guards, mining Soviet territory(in the period until May 9, 1990, border guards removed 17 mines: British Mk.3, American M-19, Italian TS-2.5 and TS-6.0).

Losses of the parties

Afghan casualties

June 7, 1988, in his speech at the meeting General Assembly UN, Afghan President M. Najibullah reported that “from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present” (that is, until June 7, 1988), 243.9 thousand government troops, security agencies, government officials and civilians were killed in the country , including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under 10 years of age; Another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years. According to other sources, 18 thousand military personnel were killed.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to a researcher of the Afghan war from the United States, Professor M. Kramer: “During nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

Ahmad Shah Masood in his letter Soviet ambassador in Afghanistan, Yu. Vorontsov wrote on September 2, 1989 that the Soviet Union’s support for the PDPA led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. At the same time, during this period there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment In particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, and 169 helicopters were lost.

USSR losses

1979 86 people 1980 1484 people 1981 1298 people 1982 1948 people 1983 1448 people 1984 2343 people 1985 1868 people 1986 1333 people 1987 1215 people 1988 759 people 1989 53 people

Total - 13,835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people.

Sanitary losses - 53,753 wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 415,932 cases. Of those sick with infectious hepatitis - 115,308 people, typhoid fever- 31,080, other infectious diseases - 140,665 people.

Out of 11,294 people. 10,751 people dismissed from military service due to health reasons remained disabled, of which 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people.

According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing (of which 130 were released before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan). The Geneva Agreements of 1988 did not stipulate the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations for the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the DRA and Pakistani governments.

Losses in equipment, according to widely circulated official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM-2), 510 engineering machines, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopter losses of the 40th Army only, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V.S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to his data, in 1980-1989, Soviet troops irretrievably lost 385 tanks and 2,530 units of armored personnel carriers, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and infantry fighting vehicles (rounded figures).