Invasion of the USSR. The invasion of the Soviet Union as a struggle of ideologies

Alexander Vasilevsky
Konstantin Rokossovsky
Ivan Konev
Alexey Antonov
Ivan Bagramyan
Semyon Budyonny
Kliment Voroshilov
Leonid Govorov
Andrey Eremenko
Mikhail Kirponos
Rodion Malinovsky
Kirill Meretskov
Ivan Petrov
Markian Popov
Semyon Timoshenko
Ivan Tyulenev
Fedor Tolbukhin
Ivan Chernyakhovsky
Michal Zymierski
Ludwik Svoboda
Constantin Vasiliu-Raşcanu
Emmanuel Ionascu
Nicolae Cambria
Damyan Velchev
Vladimir Stoychev
Josip Broz Tito Adolf Gitler

Name

Name « The Great Patriotic War» began to be used in the Russian-language tradition after Stalin's radio address on July 3, 1941. The term " Patriotic War"was consolidated by the introduction of the military order of the Patriotic War, established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 20, 1942. Outside the Soviet zone of influence, foreign language equivalents of this term are practically not used. The term “Eastern Front of the Second World War” is mainly used; in German historiography the terms “Russian campaign” (German. Russlandfeldzug) and “eastern campaign” (German. Ostfeldzug) .

Background to the war

Situation by June 22, 1941

By June 22, 1941, three army groups (a total of 181 divisions, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, and 18 brigades), supported by three air fleets, were concentrated and deployed near the borders of the USSR. In the zone from Goldap to Memel - Army Group North (29 German divisions supported by the 1st Air Fleet); in the zone from the Pripyat marshes to Goldap - Army Group Center (50 German divisions and 2 German brigades, supported by the 2nd Air Fleet); in the zone from the Black Sea to the Pripyat marshes - Army Group "South" (44 German, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades, which were supported by the 4th Air Fleet and Romanian aviation. They were tasked with advancing in the general direction, respectively to Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. 2 Finnish armies were concentrated on the territory of Finland with the task of reaching Leningrad, in the territory of northern Norway - a separate German army “Norway” (a total of 5 German and 16 Finnish divisions, 3 Finnish brigades, the goal of which was Murmansk.

There were 24 divisions in the OKH reserve. In total, over 5.5 million people, 3,712 tanks, 47,260 field guns and mortars, and 4,950 combat aircraft were concentrated to attack the USSR.

	Red Army	Enemy	Ratio
Divisions	190	166	1,1: 1
Personnel	3 289 851	4 306 800	1: 1,3
Guns and mortars	59 787	42 601	1,4: 1
Tanks and assault guns	15 687	4 171	3,8: 1
Aircraft	10 743	4 846	2,2: 1

On June 1st In 1941, the Red Army had 1,392 new types of tanks - T-34 and KV (Table 57). Another 305 tanks were produced in June 1941. Thus, the number of heavy and medium tanks in the Red Army, which had no analogues in the Wehrmacht in terms of their striking power, was at least 1,392 units on June 22, 1941.

Similar data for Wehrmacht tank groups (excluding Pz-1 wedges and Pz.Bef command tanks):

	1st TGr	2nd TGr	3rd TGr	4th TGr	Total
Tanks and assault guns	66	919	780	563	2 928

As of June 22, 1941, out of 5,807 long-term defensive structures being built by the USSR along the western borders as part of 13 fortified areas of the Molotov Line, construction of only 880 had been completed. The Stalin Line, covering the line of the old border, consisted of 3,817 DOS, of which 538 were unfinished, and was mothballed and partially disarmed. The fortifications on the new border are comparable in both quality and quantity of DOS to the best defensive lines of World War II. They did not play a significant role, since the construction was not completed and the Soviet lines were not provided with field filling. Some bunkers of the Molotov Line resisted for up to two weeks.

Taking into account the fact that the attack occurred on Sunday, government organizations had a day off, military warehouses with weapons, ammunition and equipment were closed and sealed, and employees and many officers were on layoffs or on summer leave. Due to confusion with orders and loss of communication and control, entire armies found themselves surrounded and, without any support from the central command, died or were captured. A significant number of Soviet tanks, often superior in power to German ones, and other weapons fell into the hands of the Germans and were subsequently used by them against the Soviet troops.

According to historian A. Isaev, the main problem was the lagging pace of mobilization and deployment of USSR troops. The Red Army was torn into three echelons, which could not help each other in any way and before each of which the Wehrmacht had a numerical advantage. This is how Isaev explains the disaster of the summer of 1941.

Other historians note that in the fall of 1941 and 1942 the actions of the Soviet troops were no less unsuccessful than in the summer of 1941, despite the fact that the problem of echelons no longer existed. In this regard, the opinion has been put forward that the matter is not so much in the echelons, but in the different tactical and operational levels of the Soviet and German armies.

Nazi plans for the USSR

The following documents testify to the military-political and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa:

The chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, after appropriate corrections, returned the draft document “Instructions regarding special problems Directive No. 21 (variant of the “Barbarossa” plan)”, making a note that this project could be reported to the Fuhrer after finalization in accordance with its following provision:

The upcoming war will be not only an armed struggle, but also at the same time a struggle between two worldviews. To win this war in conditions where the enemy has a huge territory, it is not enough to defeat his armed forces, this territory should be divided into several states, headed by their own governments, with which we could conclude peace treaties.

The creation of such governments requires great political skill and the development of well-thought-out general principles.

Every large-scale revolution brings to life phenomena that cannot simply be cast aside. It is no longer possible to eradicate socialist ideas in today's Russia. These ideas can serve as an internal political basis for the creation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, which represents the oppressor of the people, must be removed from the scene. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, if it still exists, primarily among emigrants, should also not be allowed to come to power. It will not be accepted by the Russian people and, moreover, it is hostile towards the German nation. This is especially noticeable in the former Baltic states. Moreover, we must under no circumstances allow the Bolshevik state to be replaced by a nationalist Russia, which ultimately (as history shows) will again oppose Germany.

Our task is to create these socialist states dependent on us as quickly as possible with the least amount of military effort.

This task is so difficult that one army cannot solve it.

30.3.1941 ... 11.00. Big meeting with the Fuhrer. Almost 2.5 hour speech...

The struggle of two ideologies... The huge danger of communism for the future. We must proceed from the principle of soldierly camaraderie. The communist has never been and will never be our comrade. We are talking about a fight of destruction. If we don't look at it this way, then even though we defeat the enemy, in 30 years the communist danger will arise again. We are not waging war in order to mothball our enemy.

Future political map Russia: Northern Russia belongs to Finland, protectorates in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus.

The fight against Russia: the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and communist intelligentsia. The new states must be socialist, but without their own intelligentsia. A new intelligentsia should not be allowed to form. Here only the primitive socialist intelligentsia will be sufficient. The fight must be waged against the poison of demoralization. This is far from a military judicial issue. Commanders of units and units are required to know the goals of the war. They must lead in the struggle..., keep the troops firmly in their hands. The commander must give his orders taking into account the mood of the troops.

The war will be very different from the war in the West. In the East, cruelty is a blessing for the future. Commanders must make sacrifices and overcome their hesitations...

Forces that fought on the German side

Blue color - Germany and its satellites. Pink - territories controlled by Great Britain. Green - USSR.

The Russian Corps of General Shteifon and a number of separate units formed from citizens of the USSR also acted on the German side.

Territories of military operations

USSR

According to G.K. Zhukov, with the receipt of direct data from various sources about the upcoming attack on the USSR, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov on the evening of June 21, 1941, proposed that Stalin send a directive to the districts on the deployment of troops in full combat readiness. The answer was: “Premature,” and there were no more than 5 hours left before the start of the war. However, other sources do not confirm this information.

Only at 23:30 on June 21, the military-political leadership of the state made a decision aimed at partially bringing the five border military districts to combat readiness. The directive prescribed the implementation of only part of the measures to bring them to full combat readiness, which were determined by operational and mobilization plans. The directive, in essence, did not give permission to put the cover-up plan into effect in full, since it ordered “not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.” These restrictions caused bewilderment, and requests were made to Moscow, while only a few minutes remained before the start of the war.

The miscalculation in time aggravated the existing shortcomings in the combat readiness of the army and thereby sharply increased the objectively existing advantages of the aggressor. The time available to the troops to bring them to full combat readiness was clearly not enough. Instead of 25-30 minutes, it took an average of 2 hours and 30 minutes to notify the troops to put them on alert. The fact is that instead of the signal “Proceed with the implementation of the cover plan of 1941.” associations and connections received an encrypted directive with restrictions on entering a cover plan.

Under these conditions, even formations and units of the first echelon of the covering armies, which had constant combat readiness within 6-9 hours (2-3 hours for alert and assembly, 4-6 hours for advancement and organization of defense), did not receive this time. Instead of specified period they had no more than 30 minutes, and some connections were not notified at all. The delay, and in some cases the disruption of the transmission of command, was also due to the fact that the enemy managed to significantly disrupt wire communications with troops in the border areas. As a result, district and army headquarters were unable to quickly transmit their orders.
The same Zhukov states that the commands of the western (Western Special, Kiev Special, Baltic Special and Odessa) border military districts at that time were moving to field command posts, which were supposed to arrive on June 22.

Summer-autumn campaign 1941

In the early morning of June 22, 1941, after artillery and air preparation, German troops crossed the border of the USSR. After this, at 5:30 in the morning, the German Ambassador to the USSR V. Schulenburg appeared before the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and made a statement, the content of which was that the Soviet government was pursuing a subversive policy in Germany and in the occupied countries countries, pursued a foreign policy directed against Germany, and “concentrated all its troops on the German border in full combat readiness.” The statement ended with the following words: “The Fuehrer has therefore ordered the German armed forces to counter this threat with all means at their disposal.”

Soviet airfield after a German air raid

On the same day, war was declared on the USSR (Italian troops began hostilities on July 20) and. June 23 - Slovakia, and June 27 - .

At 12 noon on June 22, 1941, Molotov made an official address on the radio to the citizens of the USSR, reporting the German attack on the USSR and announcing the beginning of the Patriotic War.

On August 10, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1904-1890 and conscripts born in 1922-1923 in the territory of the Kirovograd, Nikolaev, Dnepropetrovsk regions and areas west of Lyudinovo-Bryansk-Sevsk, Oryol region. On August 15, this mobilization was extended to the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on August 20 - to the Zaporozhye region, on September 8 - to a number of districts of the Oryol and Kursk regions, on October 16 - to Moscow and the Moscow region. In total, by the end of 1941, over 14 million people were mobilized.

Meanwhile, German troops seized the strategic initiative and air supremacy and in border battles defeated the Soviet troops, who lost 850 thousand people killed and wounded and about 1 million people captured.

Main events of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941:

• Battle of Bialystok-Minsk (June 22 - July 8, 1941),
• Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody (1941) (June 24 - June 30, 1941),
• Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10),
• Battle of Uman (end of July - August 8, 1941),
• Battle of Kyiv (August 7 - September 26, 1941),
• Defense of Leningrad and the beginning of its blockade (September 8, 1941 - January 27, 1944),
• Defense of Odessa (August 5 - October 16, 1941),
• Beginning of the defense of Sevastopol (October 4, 1941 - July 4, 1942),
• Defensive period of the Battle of Moscow (September 30 - December 4, 1941),
• Encirclement of the 18th Army of the Southern Front (October 5-10, 1941),
• Battles for Rostov (November 21-27, 1941),
• Kerch landing (December 26, 1941 - May 20, 1942).

If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as many as possible, although I do not want to see Hitler as the winner under any circumstances .

Original text(English)

If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.

After Germany attacked the USSR, the latter became an ally of Great Britain. On June 22, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said:

... the danger threatening Russia is the danger threatening us and the United States, just as the cause of every Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free people and free peoples in all corners of the globe.

Stalin's position in the war

On the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the “formation of the Red Army,” Joseph Stalin, in his order No. 55, issued the following reproach to the National Socialist press, which allegedly claims that the Soviet Union is seeking the destruction of the German people:

We can say with all confidence that this war will lead either to fragmentation or to the complete destruction of the Hitler clique. Attempts to identify the entire German people and the German state with this clique are ridiculous. History teaches us that all kinds of “Hitlers” come and go, but the German people and the German state remain. The strength of the Red Army lies in the fact that it does not know racial hatred, which is the source of Germany's weakness... All freedom-loving peoples oppose National Socialist Germany... We are fighting the German soldier not because he is a German, but because he is carrying out an order to enslave our people"

The USSR lost its most important raw materials and industrial centers: Donbass, Krivoy Rog ore basin. Minsk, Kyiv, Kharkov, Smolensk, Odessa, and Dnepropetrovsk were abandoned. Leningrad found itself under siege. The most important sources of food in Ukraine and southern Russia fell into the hands of the enemy or were cut off from the center. Millions of Soviet citizens ended up in the occupied territories. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died or were taken into slavery in Germany. The German army, however, was stopped near Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov-on-Don; The strategic goals outlined by the Barbarossa plan could not be achieved.

Winter campaign 1941-1942

During the winter campaign of 1941-1942, a counteroffensive was carried out near Moscow. The threat to Moscow was lifted. The offensive developed into a strategic offensive by Soviet troops. Its most important part was the Rzhev-Vyazma operation. Despite its incompleteness, the operation was important during the general offensive of the Red Army. Soviet troops pushed back the enemy in the western direction by 80-250 km, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, and liberated many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

Summer - autumn 1942

Map of military operations 1941-1942.

Based on incorrect data on Wehrmacht losses during the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Supreme Command of the USSR in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 gave the troops an impossible task: to completely defeat the enemy and liberate the entire territory of the country. The main military events took place in the southwestern direction: the defeat of the Crimean Front, the disaster in the Kharkov operation (12-25.05), the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad strategic defensive operation (28.06-24.07), the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (17.07-18.11), the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation (25.07-31.12). The enemy advanced 500-650 km, reached the Volga, and captured part of the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. At the same time, a number of major operations took place in the central direction: the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation (30.7-23.8), which merged with the counterattack of the Western Front troops in the Sukhinichi region, Kozelsk (22-29.8), a total of 228,232 casualties); as well as in the northwestern direction: the Lyuban offensive operation (7.1-30.4), which merged with the operation to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement (13.5-10.7), which was surrounded as a result of the first operation; total losses - 403,118 people.

For the German army, the situation also began to take a threatening turn: although its losses continued to be significantly lower than the Soviet ones, the weaker German military economy did not allow it to replace lost aircraft and tanks at the same speed as the other side did, and the extremely inefficient use of human resources in the army did not allow the divisions operating in the East to be replenished to the required extent, which led to the transition of a number of divisions to a six-battalion staff (from a nine-battalion one); the personnel of the combat companies in the Stalingrad direction was reduced to 27 people (out of 180 in the state). In addition, as a result of operations in the South of Russia, the already very long eastern front of the Germans lengthened significantly; the German units themselves were no longer enough to create the necessary defensive densities. Significant sections of the front were occupied by troops of Germany's allies - the Romanian 3rd and emerging 4th armies, the 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian. It was these armies that turned out to be the Wehrmacht's Achilles heel in the autumn-winter campaign that soon followed.

Occupation regime

Hitler viewed his attack on the USSR as a “Crusade” to be waged through terrorist methods. Already on May 13, 1941, he released military personnel from all responsibility for their actions in carrying out the Barbarossa plan:

“No actions of Wehrmacht employees or persons acting with them, in the event of hostile actions against them by civilians, are subject to suppression and cannot be considered as misconduct or war crimes...”

“We must again emphasize that we are obliged to occupy the territory, begin to manage it and ensure security within its borders... And it is impossible to say in advance what measures will have to be used to finally take possession of the territory: executions, evictions, etc. The task is to properly divide the giant pie lying in front of us in order to: firstly, take possession of it, secondly, subjugate it and, thirdly, use it. And there can be no question of maintaining any enemy armed formations west of the Urals...”

On this occasion Guderian remarked:

“Hitler managed to unite all Russians under the Stalinist banner”

During the war, the territories of the Belarusian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian SSR, and 13 regions of the RSFSR were subject to German occupation.

The Third Reich's war against the Soviet Union was aimed from the very beginning at the seizure of territory up to the Urals, the exploitation of the natural resources of the USSR and the long-term subordination of Russia to German domination. Not only the Jews, but also the Slavs who inhabited the territories captured by Germany in 1941-1944 faced a direct threat of systematic physical extermination. Soviet territories. Only recently has the subject of research by German historians become “another Holocaust,” directed against the Slavic population of the USSR, which, along with the Jews, was proclaimed a “lower race” and was also subject to extermination.

The regions began to be called provinces, counties (since January 1943 - districts) and volosts were established, and population registration was carried out. Along with the German military and administrative authorities (military commandant's offices, district and regional departments, agricultural departments, Gestapo, etc.), there were institutions of local government with the police. Burgomasters were appointed at the head of cities and counties, volost administrations were headed by volost elders, and headmen were appointed in villages. Magistrates' courts operated to deal with criminal and civil cases that did not affect the interests of the German army. The activities of local institutions were aimed at carrying out the orders and instructions of the German command, implementing Hitler’s policies and plans regarding the occupied population.

The entire working population was obliged to work in enterprises opened by the Germans, in the construction of fortifications for German army, on the repair of highways and railways, clearing them of snow and debris, in agriculture, etc. In accordance with the “new order of land use,” collective farms were liquidated and communal farms were formed, instead of state farms, “state farms” were formed - state farms of the German government . The population was ordered to unquestioningly comply with the extortionate standards for the supply of meat, milk, grain, fodder, etc., established by the Germans. for the German army. German soldiers robbed and destroyed state and public property, and drove civilians out of their homes. People were forced to live in unsuitable premises, dugouts, and their warm clothes, food, and livestock were taken away from them.

The Germans organized political schools - a special institution for propaganda and agitation. Public lectures on political topics were held compulsorily at enterprises and organizations of the city and in rural areas. Lectures and reports were given through local radio broadcasting. D. Malyavin also reports on propaganda calendars.

Since December 1941, the German newspaper “Rech” began to be published in Orel three times a week in Russian with pronounced anti-Soviet publications. Illustrated brochures, leaflets, posters were distributed among the population: “Who is Adolf Hitler”, “Is this a patriotic war for the peoples of Russia”, “The new land order is the basis of prosperity”, “Now get to work restoring your homeland” and others - about German politics in occupied countries, about the “happy life” of Soviet prisoners of war and citizens sent to work in Germany, etc.

The Germans opened churches, schools and other cultural and educational institutions. The repertoire of theaters was also determined by German propagandists; the vast majority of cinemas showed only German films with Russian translations.

Compulsory schooling was introduced using Soviet textbooks, from which everything that did not correspond to Nazi ideology was removed. Parents who did not send their children to school were forced to do so by imposing fines. Teachers were interviewed by the Gestapo and two-week political courses were organized. From April 1943, the teaching of history was prohibited and so-called “lessons on current events” were introduced, which required the use of German newspapers and special German political brochures. Children's groups were organized in church schools to teach the Law of God. At the same time, the occupiers destroyed a huge number of books in libraries.

For most places subject to occupation, this period lasted two to three years. The invaders introduced here strict labor conscription for Soviet citizens aged 18 to 45 years (for Jews from 18 to 60 years old). Moreover, the working day, even in hazardous industries, lasted 14-16 hours a day. For refusal and evasion of work, failure to follow orders, the slightest disobedience, resistance to robbery and violence, assistance to partisans, membership in the Communist Party and Komsomol, belonging to Jewish nationality and simply for no reason, executions, hangings, beatings and fatal torture followed. Fines were applied, imprisonment in concentration camps, requisition of livestock, etc. Primarily Slavs, Jews and gypsies, as well as all the rest, according to the fascists, were “subhumans” who were subjected to repression by the fascist invaders. Thus, in Belarus every fourth inhabitant was killed.

Death camps were created in the occupied territories, where, according to general estimates, about 5 million people died.

In total, more than 7.4 million people were deliberately exterminated in the occupied territory. civilian population.

The forcible deportation of the most able-bodied part of it to forced labor in Germany and occupied industrialized countries caused great damage to the Soviet population under occupation. Soviet slaves were called there “ostarbeiters” (eastern workers).

From total number Soviet citizens forcibly taken to work in Germany (5,269,513 people); after the end of the war, 2,654,100 people were repatriated to their homeland. They did not return for various reasons and became emigrants - 451,100 people. The remaining 2,164,313 people. died or died in captivity.

Period of radical change (November 19 -)

Winter campaign 1942-1943

On November 19, 1942, a counteroffensive of Soviet troops began; on November 23, units of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts united near the city of Kalach-on-Don and surrounded 22 enemy divisions. During Operation Little Saturn, which began on December 16, Army Group Don under the command of Manstein suffered a serious defeat. And although offensive operations, undertaken in the central sector of the Soviet-German front (Operation Mars), ended unsuccessfully, but even the success in itself in the southern direction ensured the success of the winter campaign of the Soviet troops as a whole - one German and four armies of Germany’s allies were destroyed.

Other important events of the winter campaign were the North Caucasus offensive operation (in fact, the pursuit of forces withdrawing from the Caucasus to avoid encirclement of the Germans) and the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad (January 18, 1943). The Red Army advanced 600-700 km to the West in some directions and defeated five enemy armies.

On February 19, 1943, the troops of Army Group South under the command of Manstein launched a counteroffensive in the southern direction, which was able to temporarily wrest the initiative from the hands of the Soviet troops and throw them back to the east, in certain directions by 150-200 km. A relatively small number of Soviet units were surrounded (on the Voronezh front, due to the mistakes of the front commander Golikov, who was removed after the battle). However, measures taken by the Soviet command already at the end of March 1943 made it possible to stop the advance of German troops and stabilize the front.

In the winter of 1943, the German 9th Army of V. Model left the Rzhev-Vyazma salient. The operation to withdraw troops to previously prepared positions was called "Buffalo" (Buffel). Tactically competent actions of the German command made it possible to preserve German troops and withdraw them from the threat of encirclement (Operation "Buffel" is still studied in military schools in many countries as an example of a competently conducted retreat operation). Having gone on the offensive, the Red Army troops found an empty city, in which only the rearguard of the 9th Army remained, which created the appearance of the presence of German troops. Soon the headquarters of the 9th Army led the troops on the northern front of the Kursk salient.

Soviet troops of the Kalinin (A. M. Purkaev) and Western (V. D. Sokolovsky) fronts began pursuing the enemy; this persecution was called Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1943( -March 31). As a result, Soviet troops moved the front line away from Moscow by another 130-160 km.

Summer-autumn campaign 1943

The decisive events of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 were

On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn the troops fascist Germany without declaring war, they suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and launched air strikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

The Great Patriotic War began. They were waiting for her, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin’s distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates for the start of the war were given, for example May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to more late date. There is another factor that is extremely rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. Thus, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the main attack directed in an area where this was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like misinformation, so it was on this day that the attack was least expected.
And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic states this date is considered positive, giving “hope for liberation.”

Russia

§4. Invasion of the USSR. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War
At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, relied mainly on the surprise attack factor, the tactics of blitzkrieg (“lightning war”). The defeat of the USSR was planned within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
In the first days of the war, the German army caused serious damage to the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic states. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July 5 million people had been drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps that had formed at the front.

V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. 9th grade. Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, Ventana-Graf Publishing House, 2013.

Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
While fulfilling the grandiose tasks of Stalin's third five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government did not for a minute forget about the possibility of a new "attack by the imperialists on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 in his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try to carry out a military attack on the USSR on occasion.”
Comrade Stalin demanded strengthening the defense capability of our country. “We need,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, and Osoaviakhim in every possible way. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies can take us by surprise...”
Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, forced them to more vigilantly monitor the machinations of their enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were seeking to unleash a new bloody war, with the help of which they hoped to conquer world domination. Hitler declared the Germans to be the “superior race” and all other peoples to be inferior, inferior races. The Nazis treated with particular hatred Slavic peoples and first of all to the great Russian people, who more than once in their history fought against the German aggressors.
The Nazis based their plan on the plan for a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and a rapid advance deep into Russia, right up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
The monstrous war machine of the Hitlerite imperialists began its movement in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.

Textbook “History of the USSR”, 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Fokht, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

Austria, Germany

Chapter “From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat”
After careful preparation, which lasted many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany began a “war of total annihilation” against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the German Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called Barbarossa. It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of the trained German military machine, Soviet troops would not be able to provide worthy resistance. Within a few months, the Nazi command seriously expected to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would completely demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, within a few weeks the Nazis were driven back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

Textbook “History” for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

Holt McDougal. The World History.
For high school high school, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

Hitler began planning an attack on his ally the USSR in the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeastern Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a bridgehead in Southeastern Europe for an attack on the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
In order to prepare for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threat of force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis powers. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, resisted. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell 11 days later. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early on the morning of June 22, 1941, the roar of German tanks and the drone of airplanes signaled the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not prepared for this attack. Although he had the most big army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans were 500 miles (804.67 kilometers) inside the Soviet Union. Retreating, Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the enemy's path. The Russians used this scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

Section 7. World War II
The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. The German army, which numbered about three million soldier, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - towards Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - towards Moscow and in the south - towards Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans besieged Leningrad and Sevastopol and came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main goal of the Nazis - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - was never realized. Vast spaces and the early Russian winter, with fierce resistance from Soviet troops and ordinary residents of the country, thwarted the German plan for a lightning war. At the beginning of December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and pushed back enemy troops 200 kilometers from Moscow.

History textbook for the 8th grade of primary school (Klett Publishing House, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

Never before had our people reacted to a German invasion except with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov, in a trembling voice, reported the German attack, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
Russian soldiers disliked the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and passionate about music; from the places where they gathered, laughter and playing of the piano could be heard. musical instruments.

Lauri Vakhtre. Textbook “Turning moments in Estonian history.”

Bulgaria

Chapter 2. Globalization of the conflict (1941–1942)
Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Having begun the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of “living space”, proclaimed in the book “My Struggle” (“Mein Kampf”). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet Pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating “Jewish Marxists.”
However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shocked by the sudden attack, drained of blood Stalin's repressions and the ill-prepared Soviet army was quickly driven back. In a few weeks, German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht was unable to defeat the enemy in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership developed plans to attack the USSR and develop the territory and use its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was supposed to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

Plan for a “lightning war” against the USSR
The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against “Asian Russia” by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary participation in the Red Army became widespread. The people's militia became widespread. In the front-line zone, fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and material assets began from territories threatened by occupation.
The military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The headquarters was headed by J. Stalin. Italy
June 22, 1941
Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for graduating 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for 11th grade of high school "Our New History", Dar Aun Publishing House, 2008.
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. A broad front opened in eastern Europe. Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the end of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 took an ambiguous position of condemning “opposing imperialisms,” revised it in favor of an alliance with democracy and the fight against fascism.
The fact that the USSR represented the main target of Hitler's expansionist intentions was not a mystery to anyone, including the Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Great Britain. So when the German offensive (codenamed Barbarossa) began on June 22, 1941, along a 1,600-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, a lack of preparedness reinforced by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red Army of the army of its best military leaders, initially made the task of the aggressor easier.
The offensive, which also included the Italian expeditionary force, which was sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in a crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltic states, in the south through Ukraine, with the aim of reaching the oil regions of the Caucasus .

Main articles: The Great Patriotic War, Operation Barbarossa, Battle of Moscow (1941-1942)

The Motherland is calling! - poster of the first days of the Great Patriotic War
Created before December 1940.

Early on Sunday morning, June 22, 1941, Germany, with the support of its allies - Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland and Slovakia - suddenly and without warning attacked the USSR. The Soviet-German war began, in Soviet and Russian historiography called the Great Patriotic War.

German troops launch a powerful surprise attack along the entire western Soviet border with three army groups: North, Center and South. On the very first day, a significant part of Soviet ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed or captured; About 1,200 aircraft were destroyed. On June 23-25, the Soviet fronts tried to launch counterattacks, but failed.

By the end of the first ten days of July, German troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, a significant part of Ukraine, Moldova and Estonia. The main forces of the Soviet Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk.

The Soviet Northwestern Front was defeated in a border battle and driven back. However, the Soviet counterattack near Soltsy on July 14-18 led to the suspension of the German offensive on Leningrad for almost 3 weeks.

On June 22, at 6.05 am, Soviet planes bombed Finnish battleships at the Sottunga naval base, at 6.15 - the fortifications of Alsher Island in the archipelago in front of the city of Turku, and at 6.45 - transport ships in the port of Korpo. At 7.55, Soviet artillery batteries from Cape Hanko began operating. In Petsamo, one of the ships was fired upon across the border.

On June 25, Soviet planes bomb Finnish airfields. On June 26, Finland declares war on the USSR, Finnish troops launch a counter-offensive and soon regain the Karelian Isthmus, previously captured by the Soviet Union, without crossing the old historical Russian-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (north of Lake Ladoga, the old border was crossed to great depth). On June 29, German-Finnish troops launched an offensive in the Arctic, but advance deeper Soviet territory stopped.

In Ukraine, the Soviet Southwestern Front is also defeated and driven back from the border, but the counterattack of the Soviet mechanized corps does not allow German troops to make a deep breakthrough and capture Kyiv.

In a new offensive on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, launched on July 10, Army Group Center captured Smolensk on July 16 and encircled the main forces of the recreated Soviet Western Front. In the wake of this success, and also taking into account the need to support the offensive on Leningrad and Kyiv, on July 19, Hitler, despite the objections of the army command, gave the order to shift the direction of the main attack from the Moscow direction to the south (Kyiv, Donbass) and north (Leningrad). In accordance with this decision, the tank groups advancing on Moscow were withdrawn from the Center group and sent to the south (2nd tank group) and north (3rd tank group). The attack on Moscow was to be continued by the infantry divisions of Army Group Center, but the battle in the Smolensk area continued, and on July 30 Army Group Center received orders to go on the defensive. Thus, the attack on Moscow was postponed.

Residents of besieged Leningrad collect water from holes in the asphalt after artillery shelling

On August 8-9, Army Group North resumed its offensive on Leningrad. The front of the Soviet troops is dissected, they are forced to retreat in diverging directions towards Tallinn and Leningrad. The defense of Tallinn pinned down part of the German forces, but on August 28, Soviet troops were forced to begin evacuation. On September 8, with the capture of Shlisselburg, German troops encircled Leningrad.

September 4 Chief of General Staff armed forces In Germany, General Jodl receives a categorical refusal from Marshal Mannerheim to advance on Leningrad.

On September 6, Hitler, by his order (Weisung Nr.35), stops the advance of the North group of troops on Leningrad and orders Field Marshal Leebu to hand over all tanks and a significant number of troops in order to “as quickly as possible” launch an attack on Moscow. Having abandoned the assault on Leningrad, Army Group North launched an offensive in the Tikhvin direction on October 16, intending to link up with Finnish troops east of Leningrad. However, a counterattack by Soviet troops near Tikhvin liberates the city and stops the enemy.

In Ukraine, in early August, troops of Army Group South cut off the Dnieper and encircle two Soviet armies near Uman. However, they failed to capture Kyiv again. Only after the troops of the southern flank of Army Group Center (2nd Army and 2nd Tank Group) turned south did the position of the Soviet Southwestern Front sharply deteriorate. The German 2nd Tank Group, having repelled a counterattack from the Bryansk Front, crossed the Desna River and on September 15 united with the 1st Tank Group, advancing from the Kremenchug bridgehead. As a result of the battle for Kyiv, the Soviet Southwestern Front was completely destroyed.

The disaster near Kiev opened the way for the Germans to the south. On October 5, the 1st Panzer Group reached Sea of ​​Azov at Melitopol, cutting off the troops of the Southern Front. In October 1941, German troops captured almost all of Crimea, except for Sevastopol.

The defeat in the south opened the way for the Germans to Donbass and Rostov. On October 24, Kharkov fell, and by the end of October the main cities of Donbass were occupied. On October 17, Taganrog fell. November 21st 1st tank army entered Rostov-on-Don, achieving the goals of the Barbarossa plan in the south. However, on November 29, Soviet troops knocked out the Germans from Rostov, and until the summer of 1942, the front line in the south was established at the turn of the river. Mius.

On September 30, 1941, German troops begin an attack on Moscow. As a result of deep breakthroughs by German tank formations, the main forces of the Soviet Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts found themselves surrounded in the area of ​​Vyazma and Bryansk. In total, more than 660 thousand people were captured.

On October 10, the remnants of the Western and Reserve Fronts united into a single Western Front under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukov.

On November 15-18, German troops, with the end of the thaw, resumed their attack on Moscow, but by December they were stopped in all directions.

On December 1, the commander of the Center Group, General Field Marshal von Bock, reports that the troops are exhausted and are not able to continue the offensive.

On December 5, 1941, the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts launched a counteroffensive. The successful advance of Soviet troops forces the enemy to go on the defensive along the entire front line. In December, as a result of the offensive, troops of the Western Front liberated Yakhroma, Klin, Volokolamsk, Kaluga; Kalinin Front liberates Kalinin; Southwestern Front - Efremov and Yelets. As a result, by the beginning of 1942, the Germans were thrown back 100-250 km to the west. The defeat near Moscow was the first major defeat of the Wehrmacht in this war.

The success of Soviet troops near Moscow prompts the Soviet command to launch a large-scale offensive. On January 8, 1942, the forces of the Kalinin, Western and Northwestern Fronts went on the offensive against the German Army Group Center. They fail to complete the task, and after several attempts, by mid-April, they have to stop the offensive, suffering heavy losses. The Germans retain the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead, which poses a danger to Moscow. Attempts by the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts to release Leningrad were also unsuccessful and led to the encirclement of part of the forces of the Volkhov front in March 1942.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the war, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to Barbarossa's plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
Number	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29th Division + Army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kyiv. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the dislocation and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

Chapter 24

Early in the morning of June 22, on the streets of Berlin, the Fuhrer's address to the people was broadcast over loudspeakers and special editions of newspapers were sold. Although people were stunned by the attack on an ally, most Germans felt a sense of relief. Few people could understand the very fact of concluding an agreement with the Reds. Goebbels took up explanatory work. The propaganda chief immediately began to give instructions to his subordinates: “Now that the Fuhrer has exposed the betrayal of the Bolshevik rulers, National Socialism and, therefore, the German people are returning to the principles that inspired them - to the struggle against plutocracy and Bolshevism.” The Fuehrer, he added, was confident that the Russian campaign would be over in four months. “But I tell you: it will end in eight weeks,” Goebbels said arrogantly.

He repeated this forecast at a reception at the Ministry of Propaganda. Turning to movie star Olga Chekhova, the niece of the great Russian writer, he said: “We have an expert on Russia here. Do you think we will be in Moscow for Christmas? Annoyed by his impudence, the actress coldly replied: “You know, Russia is a lawless country. Even Napoleon was forced to leave there.” From surprise, Goebbels was speechless. Ten minutes later, his adjutant approached the actress: “I think, madam, you are ready to leave. The car is waiting."

Stalin was at a loss. In a few hours, Soviet aviation lost 1,200 aircraft, and the defense was disorganized. Refusing to believe the seriousness of the first reports coming from the combat area, Stalin ordered the Red Army not to enter German territory and the air force to limit its operations to the border strip. He was convinced that the Nazi attack was just an unfortunate mistake and that the war could be stopped through diplomatic means, and therefore he left open radio communication with the German Foreign Ministry and asked Japan to mediate in resolving political and economic differences between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet ambassador to England had no such illusions. Maisky visited Foreign Minister Eden and asked directly whether the British government was going to relax its war efforts and perhaps listen to Hitler’s “peace offensive.” Eden answered with a categorical “no.” In the evening, Churchill confirmed this in a passionate address to the country: “We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. We will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his clique." Churchill promised to provide all possible assistance to the USSR.

President Roosevelt condemned Stalin's dictatorial policies and his thirst for territorial acquisitions. But he was wary of Hitler and did not hesitate to endorse the State Department's claim that aiding communism was in the interests of American security.

The Pope took a different position. Although he did not speak out directly about Germany's aggressive actions, he made it clear that he supported the Nazi struggle against Bolshevism, describing it as "noble courage in defense of the foundations of Christian culture." And a number of German bishops, as expected, openly supported the attack on the USSR. One of the church ministers called him “European crusade", a mission similar to the exploits of the Teutonic Knights. He called on Catholics to fight for “victory that will allow Europe to breathe freely again and open up a new future for all countries.”

Literally a day later, Germans’ interest in the war began to decline. Citizens went about their daily business as if this was just another of Hitler's military campaigns. At 12.30 on June 23, the Fuhrer and his retinue left the capital. The train took him to the "Wolf's Lair", a new headquarters in the forest a few kilometers from Rastenburg in East Prussia. When, upon arrival at the site, everyone began to settle down in wooden houses and concrete bunkers, confidence in a quick victory reigned at the Fuhrer's headquarters. However, Hitler was overcome by mixed feelings. “We just have to push the door, and the rotten structure will collapse,” he told Jodl. But he soon remarked to the adjutant: “At the beginning of every campaign you push the door into a dark room. Nobody knows what awaits you inside."

The first victories seemed to justify the most optimistic hopes. In two days, a huge number of prisoners of war were captured. Everywhere, German tanks broke through Soviet defenses. There seemed to be no organized enemy resistance. No further details were provided in the first week. But on Sunday, June 29, ten special messages personally approved by Hitler were read out on the radio at one-hour intervals. Goebbels objected to excessive doses of information, but Hitler thought it was a brilliant idea. When Otto Dietrich reported the dissatisfaction of people who were forced to sit in front of radios all Sunday afternoon, Hitler replied that he knew the way of thinking and emotions of the masses better than all intellectuals combined.

Column of captured Red Army soldiers. Minsk, 1941

The troops advanced rapidly. By June 29, almost half a million Red Army soldiers had surrendered. Halder wrote in his diary on July 3: “It would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won in fourteen days.” The Fuhrer was sure that the Soviets were finished. “How fortunate,” he enthused, “that we destroyed Soviet tank power and aviation at the very beginning.” Many Western military experts shared this assessment, and the Pentagon debated when the Red Army would be finished: in a month or less.

The leading German units were followed by four Einsatzgruppen SS units of three thousand men each. Their task was to ensure the security of the operational zone, in other words, to repress the civilian population in order to suppress their resistance to the occupiers. This was a special kind of police, subordinate directly to Reinhard Heydrich. “Special forces” were supposed to capture not only active Bolsheviks, but also all Jews, as well as gypsies, “Asian subhumans” and “parasites” - the insane and hopelessly ill.

To carry out mass murders, Heydrich and Himmler personally selected officers, including a Protestant priest and a doctor, Opera singer and lawyer. It was difficult to imagine that they were suitable for such work. But these people lived up to the hopes of their bosses and, despite remorse, became skilled executioners.

Most of the victims were Jews. They had no idea about Hitler's program of "racial cleansing": little was reported in the Soviet press about the anti-Semitic atrocities of the Germans. Therefore, many Jews became easy prey for the Einsatzgruppen.

The extermination of Jews was carried out with cold calculation. The work of SS units rarely encountered resistance. “Oddly enough, the condemned allow themselves to be shot calmly,” one commander reported. “This applies to both Jews and non-Jews.”

Heydrich's most serious problem was mental disorders among the SS men. Some of them suffered nervous shocks, went on a drinking binge, and suffered from gastrointestinal diseases. And there were those who carried out their task with excessive zeal and sadistically beat those arrested, violating Himmler’s order that the liquidation must be carried out “humanely.”

Himmler himself witnessed more than once the demoralizing effect of daily killings. During his summer trip to Minsk, he asked the commander of the Einsatzgruppe to shoot one hundred arrestees in his presence. When the squad of soldiers raised their rifles, the SS chief noticed one blond-haired young prisoner with blue eyes, who seemed to him a typical Aryan. Himmler asked if he was a Jew. Yes, a Jew, he answered. “And the parents are Jews?” Himmler continued to interrogate. “Yes,” replied the condemned man. “But maybe one of the ancestors was not a Jew?” - the chief executioner did not back down. Hearing a negative answer, he stamped his foot: “In that case, I can’t help…”

Shots rang out. Himmler stared at the ground and nervously shifted from foot to foot. A second salvo was heard. Looking up, he saw that the two women were still writhing on the ground. “Don’t torture these women!” he shouted. “Finish them off, quickly!” Accompanying Himmler, SS Obergruppenführer von Bach-Zelewski, commander of the “special forces” in Central Russia, asked the chief to look at the firing squad. “They are already finished people. Who are we raising? Neurotics or brutes!

Himmler ordered everyone to gather and made a speech. Your work is disgusting, he said, but no one should feel remorse: soldiers are obliged to unquestioningly carry out any order. He alone bears responsibility before God and the Fuhrer. Everyone, of course, noticed that this bloody work was very unpleasant for him, it shook him to the core. But he also obeys the higher law, fulfilling his duty.

Rosenberg received orders from Hitler to develop a control scheme eastern territories. The Reich Minister wanted to introduce limited self-government here. Since the Führer had previously agreed to the establishment of “weak socialist states” in the conquered lands of Russia, Rosenberg optimistically believed that Hitler approved in principle his plan, which was to be discussed at a special meeting in the Wolf’s Lair on July 16. “We must not inform the world of our intentions,” Hitler said. – The main thing is that we ourselves know what we want. We will take all necessary measures that we deem necessary - executions, resettlement and the like. Basically, we have to cut the giant pie according to our needs in order to firstly dominate, secondly manage and thirdly exploit. The Russians began to wage guerrilla warfare behind the front line. Such actions give us the right to exterminate anyone who opposes us.” Rosenberg's plans for "weak socialist states" collapsed like a house of cards.

What a tragedy, he thought, that Hitler retained the false image of the Slavs that he had formed in his youth in Vienna on the basis of incendiary pamphlets that portrayed the Slavs as a lazy, primitive, hopelessly second-class race. Hitler's complete misunderstanding of the structure of the Soviet Union would also turn into a disaster. Ukrainians and other nationalities under the yoke of the Great Russians were potential allies of the “Third Reich” and could become a bulwark in the fight against Bolshevism if treated properly. But Bormann and Goering convinced the Fuhrer that these were enemies who could only be controlled with the help of a whip.

In the early summer of 1941, Hitler fell ill. The stomach cramps returned again. His body was undermined by an excessive dose of drugs: 120-150 anti-gas tablets per week, as well as a dozen injections of the powerful drug Ultraseptil. Then the Fuhrer began to suffer from dysentery, a common disease in the swampy area where the Wolf's Lair was located. He suffered from diarrhea and nausea, and was alternately feverish and sweating... During a sharp argument with Ribbentrop at the end of July, Hitler suffered a heart attack. The Foreign Minister, who had been opposed to Barbarossa from the very beginning, could not restrain himself and began to loudly express his disapproval of the Fuhrer’s Eastern policy. Hitler turned pale and tried to object, but stopped mid-sentence, grabbed his heart and collapsed into a chair. Everyone fell silent in fear. “Don’t talk to me anymore,” Hitler finally said.

Dr. Morel was so alarmed that he sent the Fuhrer's cardiogram to the director of the Heart Institute, Professor Karl Weber. He did not know that the patient was the Fuhrer himself. The diagnosis was disappointing: rapidly progressing coronary sclerosis, practically incurable heart disease. Morel probably did not tell Hitler about this; on the contrary, he said that the Fuhrer’s heart was in excellent condition.

Hitler fell ill in the midst of a conflict with his military leaders. He ordered the attack on Moscow to be stopped, taking away the most powerful armored formations from Army Group Center. One of them was sent to the north for the operation to capture Leningrad, the other to the south to facilitate the capture of Ukraine. In Hitler's opinion, these two areas were more important than Moscow. Leningrad, this large industrial center, was considered a symbol of the Bolshevik revolution. Ukraine was the country's breadbasket, and Crimea was the unsinkable Soviet aircraft carrier for raids on the Ploiesti oil region in Romania. It could also be used as a springboard for a breakthrough to the Caucasus.

Hitler's illness gave Brauchitsch and Halder the opportunity to make adjustments to the Fuhrer's strategy. Only in mid-August, when Hitler felt better, did he fully realize what was going on behind his back: neither his directives nor Halder’s plan were implemented, a certain compromise was being carried out. To clarify the situation, on August 21, Hitler issued an unambiguous order: “The most important goal to be achieved by winter is not Moscow, but Crimea.” The attack on Moscow, according to the Fuhrer, cannot begin until Leningrad is isolated and the enemy’s 5th Army in the south is defeated. The order was followed within hours by a lengthy memorandum on how to conduct the war. It accused unnamed commanders of being motivated by “selfish desires” and “despotic tendencies.” The army command was characterized as a bunch of empty heads, "ossified in outdated theories."

“A dark day for the army!” Engel wrote in his diary. “Unbearable!” Halder echoed him. - Unheard of! This is the limit! On August 22, he had a long conversation with Brauchitsch about the Fuhrer’s “unacceptable” interference in army affairs. The result of this conversation was a proposal to both of them to resign. But the depressed, sick field marshal refused to follow the advice of the chief of the general staff. Moreover, he did everything to suppress the “rebellion” at his headquarters, assuring Halder that the Fuhrer had personally promised: as soon as victory was secured in Ukraine, all forces would rush to Moscow. The "riot", if you can call it that, ended on a note of dull grumbling.

This crisis faded into the background when Mussolini's well-publicized trip to the front took place. The Duce intended to convince Hitler that it was necessary to increase the size of the Italian expeditionary force. The Roman dictator wanted in this way to get his share of the glory in the destruction of communism. But he was in bad shape and could not argue with Hitler. The recent death of his son in a plane crash greatly traumatized Mussolini.

Hitler met the Duce at a small station not far from his headquarters and did not allow him to open his mouth for almost the entire day. The Fuhrer talked continuously about the impending victory in the East, about the stupidity of France and the malicious machinations of the Jewish clique surrounding Roosevelt. When the guest finally mentioned that he wanted to send more troops to the Eastern Front, Hitler changed the topic of conversation. His protracted monologue continued for several more days, and Mussolini was so tired of tirades about the glory and exploits of Germany that he tried to turn the conversation to the victories of Ancient Rome...

Later, near Uman in the Ukraine, they inspected an Italian division, and as feathered helmeted Bersaglieri raced by on motorcycles shouting “Il Duce!”, Mussolini beamed. But after dinner, Hitler left his guest and went to military units. The Duce felt insulted and on the way back he decided to “repay” the unceremonious owner. He went into the pilot's cabin and had a long conversation with Hitler's pilot Baur. He was touched by the attention of the distinguished guest and allowed him to sit at the controls of the plane. Hitler was shocked.

The results of the visit upset Mussolini. He was worried that the war in the East was going to be long and bloody. The Duce's depression turned to rage when he learned that Ribbentrop did not want to publish a joint communique about his visit. This time Hitler gave in to Mussolini and put Ribbentrop in his place. The Duce perked up. He summoned his ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, and gave him instructions on how to publicize his trip to ? front. “Don’t forget to mention,” the vain Duce emphasized, “that for a significant part of the journey I myself piloted the Fuhrer’s four-engine plane!”

In The Wolf's Lair, Hitler reconsidered his strategy, concluding that the time had come to launch an offensive on Moscow. Over a cup of tea, he told his secretaries and adjutants: “In a few weeks we will be in Moscow. There is no doubt about it. I will wipe this damned city off the face of the earth and build an artificial lake in its place. The name “Moscow” will disappear forever.” On September 5, he told Halder: “Start the offensive on the Central Front in eight to nine days.” His statements were recorded by Werner Koeppen, Rosenberg’s liaison at the Fuhrer’s headquarters. From the beginning of July this year, at the request of his boss, he quietly recorded Hitler's table conversations. Koeppen furtively made notes on table napkins, and in the evening, in privacy, he wrote down those parts of the conversation that he remembered well. The original and a copy of the recording were sent to Berlin by courier.

Köppen did not know that there was another chronicler at the table. Shortly after his arrival at the Wolf's Lair, Bormann suggested to his adjutant Heinrich Heim that he discreetly record everything the Fuhrer said. Heim took detailed notes on cards he held on his lap.

The records of Heim and Köppen provide rare insight into the mechanics of events that unfolded on the Eastern Front.

Hitler assured his listeners that the seizure of Russian space would ensure Germany's world domination. “Then Europe will become an impregnable fortress. Such prospects will open up that the majority of Western democrats will believe in new order. At present, the most important thing is to conquer “living space”. After that it will all be a matter of organization.” The Slavs, according to him, are born slaves who feel the need for a master, and the role of Germany in Russia will be the same as England in India. "Like England, we will rule this empire with a handful of men."

He talked at length about his plans to make Ukraine the breadbasket of Europe and to make the conquered peoples happy with scarves and glass beads, and then admitted that while everyone else dreams of international conference to ensure peace, he prefers to wage war for another ten years, but not to lose the fruits of victory.

The capture of Kyiv three days later caused jubilation in the Wolf's Lair. This means, Hitler predicted, the rapid conquest of all of Ukraine and justifies his insistence on delivering the main blow in a southern direction. At lunch on September 21, the Fuhrer beamed as he reported on the capture of 145,000 Red Army soldiers in the vicinity of Kyiv. The Soviet Union, Hitler argued, was on the verge of collapse.

During lunch on September 25, he started talking about how dangerous these “subhumans from the east” were; Europe will not be calm until these Asians are pushed beyond the Urals. “They are brutes, and neither Bolshevism nor tsarism have anything to do with it, they are brutes by nature.” In the evening, Hitler continued to rant around the table, extolling the virtues of war and comparing a soldier's first battle with a woman's first sexual experience, since both are an act of aggression. “In war, a young man becomes a man. If I myself had not been tempered by this experience, I would not have been able to take on such a grandiose mission as building an empire.”

Table conversations concerned almost exclusively the war in the East. There was no active action on the other front - in North Africa. British attempts to push Rommel back failed, and by early autumn there was a lull in the desert. Neither side was ready to attack. Hitler's energy and the might of the Wehrmacht were focused on a general offensive against Moscow, but Field Marshal von Bock warned that the timing was bad. Why not survive the winter in fortified positions? Hitler responded with a kind of allegory: “Before I became chancellor, I thought that General base“This is a dog that must be held tightly by the collar so that it does not attack anyone it sees.” But, the Fuhrer continued, this “dog” turned out to be far from ferocious. He was against rearmament, the occupation of the Rhineland, the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and even the seizure of Poland. “It is I who have to set this beast,” Hitler concluded.

He insisted on a massive attack on Moscow, and Operation Typhoon began on the last day of September. Its goal was to destroy Soviet forces on the central front using tank pincers.

The Soviet high command was taken by surprise. In the first 24 hours, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group advanced 80 kilometers. Infantry rushed into the gap, suppressing isolated pockets of resistance.

Hitler was so confident of victory that he took his special train to Berlin. The next day he gave a speech at the Sports Palace. Hitler began to list the enemy's losses: two and a half million prisoners of war, 22 thousand artillery pieces destroyed or captured, 18 thousand tanks, about 15 thousand aircraft. The numbers were impressive. German soldiers have advanced a thousand kilometers, over 25 thousand kilometers of destroyed railways in the occupied territory have been put back into operation, and most of them have already been transferred to the German, narrower gauge. At the same time, the Fuhrer expressed concern. The war in the East, he emphasized, is a war of ideologies, so all the best elements in Germany must unite and become a monolith. “Only then can we hope that Providence will be with us. Almighty God never helped the lazy. It doesn’t help a coward either,” Hitler concluded. He ended his speech with the words: “The enemy is already defeated and will never rise again.” The hall exploded with thunderous applause,

By evening, a message was transmitted that Guderian's tankers had taken Oryol.

The next day, Hitler returned to the Wolf's Lair, and all the inhabitants of the Fuhrer's headquarters noticed that he was in a particularly good mood at dinner. The conversation over lunch on October 6 focused on Czechoslovakia, where underground activity had intensified. And for this, according to the Fuhrer, the Jews were to blame: this is the source through which enemy propaganda is spread. A decision was immediately made to deport the Jews “far to the East.”

On this day, Guderian took Bryansk and completed the encirclement of its defenders. Soviet armies. Two days later, reports from the front reported that the Red Army could be “basically considered defeated.” Inspired by the impending capture of Moscow, Hitler ordered that not a single German soldier enter the capital. “The city,” he said, “will be destroyed and completely wiped off the face of the earth.”

On October 9, German newspapers reported a great victory - the encirclement of two Soviet fronts. The mood of the Germans rose sharply. The previously tense faces were now beaming. In restaurants and beer halls, people stood up in Nazi salutes as “Horst Wessel” and “Germany First” played on the radio. Rumors spread in the capital that Moscow had fallen.

On the same day, Field Marshal von Reichenau, the first general to defect to the Nazis, issued an order to the 6th Army to strengthen measures to combat the partisans. It said that there was no ordinary war going on, but a mortal struggle between German culture and the Jewish-Bolshevik system. “Therefore, the soldier must fully understand the need for cruel but fair measures against Jewish subhumans.” The same orders were issued by Rundstedt, Manstein and other military leaders.

Hitler's announcement that the Red Army had been defeated and victory was assured was not just propaganda to boost morale in the country. He believed what he said, unlike his more pragmatic propaganda chief. On October 14, Goebbels began his speech to the Propaganda Ministry with an optimistic statement: “Militarily, the war has already been won. Everything that remains to be done is predominantly political in nature, both at home and abroad.” Then he began to contradict himself, warning that the German people must be prepared to continue the war in the East for another ten years. Therefore, the task of the German press is to strengthen the resilience of the nation.

Meanwhile, reports indicated that the diplomatic corps had moved from Moscow to Kuibyshev. The evacuation of high-ranking party leaders and secret service employees from the capital began.

In Berlin, in the corridors of the Foreign Ministry on Wilhelmstrasse, they said that Stalin asked for peace through the Bulgarian Tsar Boris. Fritz Hesse asked Ribbentrop if this was true, and he told him in great confidence that Hitler rejected this proposal because he was confident of an imminent victory. Most military leaders shared his optimism. For example, Jodl had no doubt that the Soviets had used up their last reserves.

The demoralized Stalin finally began to come to his senses. Appearing in the Kremlin, he asked the chairman of the Moscow Council: “Will we defend Moscow?” And, without waiting for an answer, he declared a state of siege. Violations of law and order were to be severely punished. All spies, saboteurs and provocateurs were to be shot on the spot. These brutal measures raised the morale of Muscovites.

The Soviet troops defending Moscow held firm, and the advance of the German tank wedges, which approached the capital at a distance of sixty kilometers, slowed down. Then the weather changed suddenly. The autumn rains began, and powerful German T-4 tanks got stuck in the mud, while the more maneuverable Soviet T-34s were not afraid of off-road conditions.

Hitler's most significant victories in the last two years were achieved through massive tank attacks supported by air power. But now the powerful equipment was skidding in a sea of ​​mud, and poor visibility forced the Luftwaffe to remain on the ground. There was no more mobility or firepower, and the lightning war that Hitler had relied on fizzled out. Most military leaders believed that the main reason for the failures was Hitler’s refusal to launch an offensive a month earlier. If the Fuhrer had followed their advice, the generals argued, Moscow would have been taken and the Red Army destroyed.

At the end of October the rain gave way to snow. The offensive stopped. The situation became so desperate that the architect Giesler was ordered to interrupt his work on the reconstruction of German cities. All workers, engineers, Construction Materials and equipment were transferred to the East to lay roads, repair railway tracks, and build stations and locomotive depots.

Hitler seemed to remain confident that victory was imminent. On the eve of leaving for Munich to celebrate the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch, he enlivened the dinner with jokes and memories...

During these hours in Moscow, his personal enemy spoke at a ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution in the spacious lobby of the Mayakovskaya metro station. Stalin admitted that the losses on the battlefield amounted to almost 1,700,000 people. But the Nazis' claim that the Soviet regime was collapsing had no basis, he said. On the contrary, the Soviet rear is today more solid than ever... While the Germans are fighting with the support of numerous allies - Finns, Romanians, Italians and Hungarians, Russia faces a difficult task: not a single English or American soldier is yet able to help her. Stalin appealed to Russian national pride, mentioning in this regard the names of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Gorky and Chekhov, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Sechenov and Pavlov, Suvorov and Kutuzov. The German invaders want a war to exterminate the peoples of the Soviet Union. If they want a war of extermination, they will get it, Stalin concluded.

The next morning, November 7, Stalin gave a speech to the troops on Red Square. Artillery cannonade could be heard here, and Soviet fighter patrols roared in the sky. “How can you doubt that such a people will defeat the German invaders,” Stalin addressed the troops. - Whoever threatened the long-suffering Russian land! Teutonic knights, Tatars, Poles, Napoleon... The current enemy will face the same fate - he will be defeated. And let the images of our great ancestors inspire you to do this: Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Minin and Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov.”

On November 8, Hitler arrived in Munich. He spoke at a meeting of the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter, then made a speech in the Levenbräukeller beer hall, in which, among other things, President Roosevelt warned that if American ships will begin to fire at German ships, they will pay for it. Hitler spoke threatening words, but in reality he was alarmed. The eastern campaign has reached a dead end.

The next day, Hitler reminded his entourage about the fate of Napoleon's army in Russia. But Field Marshal von Bock was optimistic. He called for the offensive to continue. The field marshal was supported by Brauchitsch and Halder.

When the Japanese ambassador to Germany, General Oshima, who periodically paid visits to Hitler, appeared at the Wolf's Lair, he complained that winter had come much earlier than his meteorologist had predicted. Then the Fuhrer expressed doubt that Moscow would be captured this year.

The cold has intensified. Hitler at one time forbade quartermaster services to stockpile winter clothing; and the soldiers were freezing. On November 21, Guderian called Halder and reported that his troops had “reached the limit of their endurance.” He intends to visit von Bock and ask the field marshal to change the orders just issued, because “he does not see the possibility of their implementation.” But the field marshal, under direct pressure from the Fuhrer, never wanted to heed Guderian’s requests and ordered the attacks to be resumed. After little progress, the troops were again exhausted. Arriving at the front line command post, von Bock ordered a new attack on November 24. It was stopped by a snowstorm and fanatical Russian resistance.

Five days later the crisis broke out in the south. Field Marshal von Rundstedt was forced to leave Rostov, captured only a week ago. An angry Hitler ordered Rundstedt by telegraph to remain in his positions. The army group commander replied that his troops were not able to do this. If they do not retreat, they will be destroyed. The field marshal demanded that the order be canceled and warned that otherwise he would be forced to resign. The latter especially angered the Fuhrer, and he immediately informed the commander of the army group that he was granting his request. In Rundstedt's place, he appointed one of the oldest military leaders, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, and he himself flew to Mariupol to understand the state of affairs on the spot. Hitler called his old comrade, the commander of the SS division Sepp Dietrich and, to his disappointment, learned that he was completely I agree with Rundstedt in his assessment of the current situation.

Having given Reichenau the order to hold, he called Rundstedt. He was already packing his things to go home, and believed that the Fuhrer wanted to apologize to him. But Hitler did not even think about doing this. He began to scold the field marshal, saying that in the future he would not tolerate resignations. “I myself, for example, am not able to go to the Almighty and tell him: “That’s enough, that’s enough,” I’m tired of taking responsibility alone,” Hitler said irritably.

The news of the surrender of Rostov caused a gloomy mood in Berlin. But the failure in the south was soon overshadowed by the emerging disaster on the Central Front. The general offensive against Moscow ran out of steam. Although one army reconnaissance unit reached the outskirts of Moscow in early December and even saw the Kremlin towers, it was quickly dispersed by tanks and militia units. Field Marshal von Bock, suffering from stomach pains, admitted to Brauchitsch by telephone that the troops were physically exhausted. On December 3, von Bock called Halder and told him that he intended to go on the defensive.

The next day the thermometer dropped to minus 31 degrees. Tanks could only be started by warming up the engines. The cold disabled the telescopic sights. The soldiers did not have winter clothes or woolen socks. On December 5, the temperature dropped another five degrees. Guderian not only stopped the offensive, but also began to retreat to more convenient defensive positions.

On the same day, the commander of the Soviet Central Front, General Georgy Zhukov, launched a massive counteroffensive with 100 divisions along a three-hundred-kilometer front. This combined attack of infantry, tanks and aircraft took the Germans by surprise, and Hitler not only lost Moscow, but also faced the threat of repeating the fate of Napoleon in the snowy expanses of Russia. The German High Command was gripped by horror and despair. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, ill and depressed, announced his desire to resign.

Hitler was close to despair. In the First World War, Russian infantry fought poorly, now they were fighting to the death. The dejected Fuhrer admitted to Jodl on December 6 that “victory will no longer be achieved.”

For the past two years, Hitler had carefully avoided confrontation with the United States. Convinced that this country was in the grip of a “Jewish clique” that not only dominated Washington but also controlled the press, radio and cinema, he exercised extreme restraint in the face of massive American aid to England. Although Hitler had a low opinion of Americans as soldiers, he recognized the industrial power of the United States and sought to keep its overseas rival from directly participating in the war.

American military equipment flowed into the British Isles in a continuous stream, but Hitler, trying to avoid incidents, forbade attacks on US warships and merchant ships. However, on June 23, 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the acting. Secretary of State Sumner Welles made a statement that Hitler must be stopped at any cost, even if this means helping another totalitarian country. Roosevelt unfroze up to $40 million in Soviet assets and then declared that the provisions of the Neutrality Act did not apply to the Soviet Union. The port of Vladivostok remained open to American ships. Two weeks later, on July 7, American troops arrived in Iceland to replace the British landing force that had previously landed on the island.

Alarmed by these events, Hitler told the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in mid-July: the current situation changes his previous opinion that Japan should restrain England and strive for American neutrality. “The United States and England will always be our enemies,” he said. “Such an understanding should be the basis of our foreign policy.” “We must destroy them together,” the Fuhrer added. As a bait, he proposed that Japan help “capitalize the property” of the defeated Soviet Union and occupy its Far Eastern territories.

Tokyo reacted to these proposals with restraint. The Japanese had already decided not to attack Russia from the east, but to move south into Indochina, which they soon captured without a fight. The latter caused a negative reaction from the United States, which, in retaliation for this aggression, froze Japanese assets in America, thereby depriving Japan of its main source of oil. Japanese leaders perceived this move as an attempt to disarm the empire and prevent Japan from taking its “rightful” place as Asian leader.

A month later, Roosevelt met with Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland and signed the Atlantic Charter outlining the goals of England and the United States in the war. Its language not only left no doubt that Roosevelt was an unwavering opponent of Hitler, but also ironically disappointed Hitler's opponents in Germany, since the document did not clearly distinguish between Nazis and anti-Nazis. The latter considered the charter an unofficial declaration of war against all Germans. They were especially offended by the paragraph that spoke of the need to disarm Germany after the war.

Hitler's hopes of avoiding a confrontation with the United States were dashed on the last day of October when the American destroyer Reuben James, escorting a convoy 600 miles west of Iceland, was sunk by a German torpedo, killing 101 Americans. In response, the United States expropriated the French liner Normandy, loaded it with 400 aircraft and sent it to Murmansk. A wave of anti-German protests swept across America, and on November 7, the Lend-Lease Administration was ordered to do everything to provide military and economic assistance to the Soviet Union. A billion dollars were allocated for this.

The next day, November 8, Hitler gave a belligerent speech in Munich, in which he justified the sinking of the Reuben James and condemned Roosevelt's order to “shoot at German ships as soon as they are seen,” but at the same time emphasized that he himself had ordered the German ships not to fire on American ships except in self-defense. This speech was supposed to demonstrate to the whole world that the Fuhrer was seeking to avoid war with the United States.

Nevertheless, Hitler's position towards the United States became tougher, and this was reflected in Ribbentrop's behavior. On November 28, he invited General Oshima and expressed the wish that Japan declare war on the United States and England. The Japanese ambassador expressed surprise at this proposal. Ribbentrop promised that if Japan went to war with America, Germany would support it.

This information was greeted by the Japanese General Staff with a sigh of relief. The Japanese fleet was already sailing to Pearl Harbor. On the last day of November, Oshima was instructed to immediately inform Hitler and Ribbentrop that the British and Americans were planning to send military forces into East Asia, but this would be rebuffed, which could lead to war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries. On December 5, the German-Japanese Treaty was signed, under which Germany promised to join Japan in the war against the United States.

In The Wolf's Lair, Otto Dietrich was the first to learn about Japan's attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7. He hurried to Hitler's bunker, who at that moment was reading depressing reports from the Eastern Front. When Dietrich announced that he had important news, the Fuhrer looked at Dietrich warily, believing that he had brought something far from joyful. But when Dietrich read out the message he had received, Hitler beamed, grabbed the paper from him and, without a coat or cap, hurried to Keitel’s bunker. The Fuhrer solemnly declared: “We cannot lose the war. Now we have a partner who has never been defeated in three thousand years.”

Desperate reports from the Eastern Front prompted Hitler to issue a new directive on December 8th. “Severe winter conditions,” it said, “and the resulting difficulties in supplying troops force us to immediately stop all major offensive operations and go on the defensive.” Having instructed Halder to draw up more specific instructions, he went to Berlin to personally deal with the resolution of the problem related to Pearl Harbor. Relief over Japan's attack on the US naval base has turned to concern. Pearl Harbor freed Stalin from fear of attack from the east, and he could now direct almost all the forces from Asia against Germany, transferring them to the west.

One of the first to visit the Fuhrer in Berlin was Ribbentrop, who reported that Ambassador Oshima was asking for an immediate declaration of war on America. Ribbentrop considered it necessary to warn that he did not consider Germany obliged to do this, since according to the Tripartite Pact it must help its ally only in the event of a direct attack on Japan. But Hitler did not agree with this. “If we don't side with Japan,” he said, “the pact will be politically dead. But this is not the main reason. The main thing is that America is already shooting at our ships. Thus, she has already created a situation of war.”

There were also more compelling arguments in favor of the decision to declare war on the United States: the assistance received from Japan significantly exceeded the possible losses associated with America's entry into the war. From a propaganda point of view, the acquisition of such a strong ally as Japan should have significantly raised the spirit of the people after the failures in Russia. In addition, Hitler pursued ideological goals. Why not make 1941 the beginning of an all-out war against international Marxism (Russia) and international capital (America), the two hotbeds of international Jewry?

On December 11, Hitler spoke at a meeting of the Reichstag. “We always strike first,” he said. Roosevelt is as “crazy” as Woodrow Wilson. “First he provokes war, then he falsifies the causes, then he takes on the mantle of Christian hypocrisy and slowly but surely leads humanity to war...” Identifying international Jewry with Bolshevik Russia and the Roosevelt regime, Hitler declared war on the United States. This decision of the Fuhrer was met with wild jubilation. The head of the operations department listened to the speech more with alarm than with satisfaction. As soon as Jodl left the opera house, he called his deputy, General Warlimont, at the Wolf's Lair. Having learned that he had listened to the Fuhrer’s speech. Jodl ordered to predict possible US actions in the Far East and Europe and prepare options for Germany's response.

But soon the situation on the Eastern Front became sharply complicated. The German retreat from Moscow threatened to turn into a stampede. The area west of the capital and the outskirts of Tula became a cemetery for enemy guns, vehicles and tanks. The Russians regained the confidence they had lost in the first months of the war in victory. The Soviets publicly announced the failure of Hitler's attempt to encircle Moscow, and two days later the Politburo ordered major government agencies to return to the capital.

Brauchitsch wanted to continue the withdrawal of troops, but Hitler, to the horror of the generals, canceled his order: “Stand firm, not a step back!” The commander of the Central Front, Field Marshal von Bock, suffering from a stomach illness, reported that he could no longer carry out his duties. He was replaced by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge. The next day, December 19, Brauchitsch, who had just suffered a heart attack, plucked up his courage and argued privately with Hitler for two hours. He came out pale and shocked.

“I’m going home,” he told Keitel. - He fired me. I can not do it anymore.

“What will happen now?” asked Keitel.

– I don’t know, ask yourself.

A few hours later, Keitel was summoned to Hitler. The Fuhrer read him a short order, from which it followed that he was taking command of the ground forces, inextricably linking the fate of Germany with his own. “The task of the commander-in-chief is to prepare the army in the National Socialist spirit, and I do not know a single general who can take on such responsibility. For this reason I took command of the army."

In fact, Hitler led troops before, allowing the military to take the blame for all failures. Now he became the official commander-in-chief and had to be personally responsible for everything that happened.