Medium tank Pz Kpfw III
and its modifications

In total, during the period from 1937 to August 1943, 5,922 Pz Kpfw III tanks of various modifications were produced, of which 700 units were produced with a 75-mm gun and more than 2,600 with a 50-mm gun. Based on the Pz Kpfw III, and other combat vehicles: assault guns, flamethrowers and command tanks. Some of the tanks in 1943-1944. was converted into armored observer vehicles and ARVs.

The crew consisted of 5 people. This number of crew members, starting with the Pz Kpfw III, became standard on all subsequent German medium and heavy tanks. This number determined the functional division of duties of the crew members: commander, gunner, loader, driver, radio operator.

All Pz Kpfw III battle tanks were equipped with the FuG5 radio.

Medium tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf A, B, C, D(Sd Kfz 141)

Pz Kpfw III Ausf B Pz Kpfw III Ausf D

Combat weight - 15.4–16 tons. Length - 5.67...5.92 m. Width - 2.81...2.82 m. Height - 2.34...2.42 m.
Armor 15 mm.
Engine - Maybach HL 108TR. Speed ​​- 40 km/h. Cruising range is 165 km on the highway and up to 95 km on the ground.
Armament: 37 mm KwK L/46.5 cannon and three 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns (two in the turret).

Pz Kpfw III Ausf A: 10 cars were produced in 1937.

Pz Kpfw III Ausf B: 15 cars were produced in 1937.

Pz Kpfw III Ausf C: 15 vehicles were produced at the end of 1937 and January 1938.

Pz Kpfw III Ausf D: 30 vehicles were produced from January to June 1938.

The Pz Kpfw III Ausf A tanks had five large diameter road wheels. In the following modifications B and C, the chassis was completely different. These tanks had 8 small road wheels and 3 support rollers. On the Pz Kpfw III Ausf D tanks, the shape of the commander's cupola, which had five viewing slots, was changed, and its armor was increased to 30 mm.

Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf A, B, C, D participated in the Polish campaign. Pz Kpfw III Ausf A and Ausf B were withdrawn from service in February 1940 combat personnel. Pz Kpfw III Ausf D tanks took part in the occupation of Norway in April 1940, then were withdrawn from service.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf E(Sd Kfz 141)

96 tanks were produced from December 1938 to October 1939.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf E

Pz Kpfw III Ausf E - the first mass series. They used a new 12-cylinder carburetor engine "Maybach" HL 120TR (3000 rpm) with a power of 300 hp. With. and a new gearbox. The frontal and side armor was increased to 30 mm, while the mass of the tank reached 19.5 tons, and the pressure on the ground increased from 0.77 to 0.96 kg/cm 2. The hull was made from solid armor plates instead of composite ones, as on previous models. Emergency hatches were made on both sides, and a radio operator's viewing device was installed on the starboard side of the hull. The chassis of the tank of this modification had six rubber-coated road wheels and an individual torsion bar suspension with hydraulic shock absorbers, which did not undergo significant changes in subsequent modifications.

Combat weight - 19.5 tons. Length - 5.38 m. Width - 2.94 m. Height - 2.44 m.

Many vehicles were re-equipped with a 50-mm cannon from August 1940 to 1942. At the same time, the frontal and rear parts of the hull were shielded with 30-mm armor plates.

Production was carried out at the factories of three companies - Daimler-Benz, Henschel and MAN.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf F(Sd Kfz 141)

435 vehicles were produced from September 1939 to July 1940.

The Pz Kpfw III Ausf F tank had the same dimensions and armor as the Pz Kpfw III Ausf E and minor design improvements, including a new type of commander's cupola. Added air intakes on the roof.

Combat weight - 19.8 tons.
Armor: turret, front and sides of the superstructure and hull – 30 mm, rear of the superstructure and hull – 21 mm.
Engine - Maybach NL 120TR. Speed ​​- 40 km/h. Cruising range - 165 km.
Armament: 37 mm KwK L/46.5 cannon and three 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns (two in the turret).
The gun's ammunition capacity is 131 shots.

The last 100 tanks were armed with the 50 mm KwK38 L/42 cannon, and later most of the previously produced tanks in this series were also rearmed with these guns. At the same time, additional armor plates 30 mm thick were installed.

The last Pz Kpfw III Ausf F were in full service in June 1944.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf G(Sd Kfz 141)

600 vehicles were produced from April 1940 to February 1941.

Tanks of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf G modification received the 50-mm KwK38 L/42 tank gun, developed by Krupp in 1938, as their main armament. At the same time, the re-equipment of previously produced tanks of modifications E and F with a new artillery system began. The ammunition load of the new gun consisted of 99 rounds. The thickness of the rear hull armor was increased to 30 mm. The tank's weight reached 20.3 tons. The turret design was changed: an exhaust fan was installed on the roof and a new commander's cupola was installed. A rotating driver's viewing device is used.

Combat weight - 20.3 tons. Length - 5.41 m. Width - 2.95 m. Height - 2.44 m.
Armor of the turret, superstructure and hull – 30 mm.
Engine - Maybach NL 120TR. Speed ​​- 40 km/h. Cruising range - 165 km.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf H(Sd Kfz 141)

308 vehicles were produced from October 1940 to April 1941.

The Pz Kpfw III Ausf H received a new transmission, an improved turret, a new commander's cupola, additional 30-mm armored front and rear hull screens and frontal superstructures (30+30 mm). In 1941, the frontal armor of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf H tank was not penetrated by shells from Soviet 45 mm anti-tank guns of the 1937 model, American 37 mm M5 guns and British 40 mm guns.

Combat weight - 21.8 tons. Dimensions are the same.
The armor of the turret, superstructure and hull is 30 mm, additional armor plates on the forehead and rear of the hull and on the forehead of the superstructure are 30 mm.
Armament: 50 mm 5cm KwK38 L/42 cannon and two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns.
The gun's ammunition capacity is 99 rounds.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf J(Sd Kfz 141)

1549 vehicles were produced from March 1941 to July 1942.

Pz Kpfw III Ausf J with short-barreled 5cm KwK38 L/42 cannon

Armament: 50 mm 5cm KwK38 L/42 cannon and two 7.92 mm MG34 machine guns.
The gun's ammunition capacity is 99 rounds.

The Pz Kpfw III Ausf J tank was protected by even thicker armor - 50 mm. A new type of installation for the radio operator's machine gun has been introduced - ball. The first 1,549 tanks were armed with a 50-mm short-barreled KwK38 L/42 cannon. Beginning in December 1941, the new 50-mm long-barreled gun KwK39 L/60 began to be installed on Pz III Ausf J tanks for the first time.

The first Pz Kpfw III Ausf J tanks with a short-barreled gun entered service with a separate tank regiment sent to the Eastern Front in September 1941. The rest went to make up for losses on the Eastern Front and North Africa.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf J(Sd Kfz 141/1)

1067 vehicles were produced from December 1941 to July 1942.

Pz Kpfw III Ausf J with 5cm KwK39 L/60 long-barreled gun

These tanks were equipped with a more powerful 50-mm long-barreled KwK39 L/60 gun. The need for this arose from the experience of fighting on the Eastern Front. In tanks with the new L/60 cannon, the ammunition load was reduced due to the new cartridge (shot) length from 99 to 84 pieces.

Combat weight - 21.5 tons. Length - 5.52 m. Width - 2.95 m. Height - 2.50 m.
Armor: front and rear of superstructure and hull – 50 mm, turret and sides – 30 mm.
Engine - Maybach NL 120TR. Speed ​​- 40 km/h. Power reserve - 155 km.
Armament: 50 mm 5cm KwK39 L/60 cannon and two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns.
The gun's ammunition capacity is 84 rounds.

Pz Kpfw III J tanks with a 50-mm L/60 long-barreled gun entered service with five new tank battalions formed for and. The rest came to make up for high losses on the Eastern Front. Tanks with the L/60 gun fought very successfully in North Africa with British tanks, but were ineffective in battle with the Soviet T-34 and KV.

In June 1942, there were about 500 Pz Kpfw III Ausf J tanks with a 50 mm cannon at the fronts and in reserve. Before the start of the offensive near Kursk, 141 Pz Kpfw III Ausf J were located in Army Groups “Center” and “South”.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf L(Sd Kfz 141/1)

653 vehicles were produced from June to December 1942.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf L

Combat weight - 22.7 tons. Length - 6.28 m. Width - 2.95 m. Height, m ​​- 2.50 m.
Frontal armor of the turret – 57 mm, superstructure – 50+20 mm, hull – 50 mm. The armor of the sides and stern of the turret and the sides of the superstructure and hull is 30 mm. Armor of the stern of the superstructure and hull – 50 mm.
Engine - Maybach NL 120TR. Speed ​​- 40 km/h. Power reserve - 155 km.
Armament: 50 mm 5cm KwK39 L/60 cannon and two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns.

The first Pz Kpfw III Ausf L tanks entered service, and and.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf M(Sd Kfz 141/1)

250 vehicles were produced from October 1942 to February 1943.

Performance characteristics similar to Pz Kpfw III Ausf L.

Three grenade launchers for smoke grenades were installed on the sides of the turret. The width of the vehicle with the eastern caterpillar increased to 3.27 m. When installing screens on the sides of the hull, the width of the tank reached 3.41 m.

Medium support tank Pz Kpfw III Ausf N(Sd Kfz 141/2)

663 vehicles were produced from June 1942 to August 1943. Another 37 vehicles from Pz Kpfw III J were converted.

Performance characteristics are the same as modifications L, M.

Armament: 75mm 7.5cm KwK L/24 cannon and two 7.92mm MG 34 machine guns.

Intended to provide support to the Tigers or to perform functions in tank regiments that were performed by tanks Pz Kpfw IV with a short-barreled 75 mm cannon.

Medium flamethrower tank Pz Kpfw III (F1)(Sd Kfz 141/3)

100 vehicles were produced from February to April 1943. Created on the basis of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf M tank.

Crew – 3 people.
Combat weight - 23 tons.
Armament: flamethrower (1000 liters of fire mixture) and 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun.
Flame throwing range – up to 60 m.

Command tanks based on Pz Kpfw III

Medium command tank Pz Bef Wg(Sd Kfz 141)

81 vehicles were produced from August to November 1942.

This tank is based on the Pz Kpfw III Ausf J tank. The frontal machine gun was removed and the gun's ammunition load was reduced to 75 rounds.

Armament: 50 mm 5cm KwK L/42 cannon and 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun in the turret.
Radio stations – FuG5 and FuG7 (or FuG 8).

Medium command tank Pz Bef Wg Ausf K

50 vehicles were produced from December 1942 to February 1943. This command tank is based on the Pz Kpfw III Ausf M tank.

Armament: 50mm long-barreled 5cm KwK39 L/60 cannon and 7.92mm MG 34 machine gun in the turret.
Radio stations – FuG 5 and FuG 8 (or FuG7).

In the period from June 1938 to September 1941, command tanks of the D, E, H series with one machine gun in the turret (a mock-up instead of a cannon) were also produced. A total of 220 vehicles of these series with various radio stations were built.

Combat use of medium tanks Pz Kpfw III

By the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, the Wehrmacht and SS troops had about 1,550 Pz Kpfw III tanks. The troops intended to attack the USSR numbered 960 tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E, F, G, H, J.

In 1935, the Armaments Directorate, following Guderian's concept of mat. units of tank divisions, issued a number of companies with assignments to medium tank weighing 15 tons. The project presented by Daimler-Benz turned out to be the best. It was this company that was assigned the right to be the main developer of the machine. In the period from 1937 to 1938, the company produced small batches of experimental tanks of modifications A, B, C and D. All vehicles in this series had armor thickness of only 14.5 millimeters. In 1938, real mass production began with the release of modification E. The maximum speed of the vehicle, which had a combat weight of 19,500 kg, was 40 km/h. The crew of the combat vehicle included 5 people (driver, commander, gunner-radio operator, gunner and loader). The layout of the Pz Kpfw III was traditional for German tank building - the power compartment was in the stern, the combined control and transmission compartments were in the bow, the fighting compartment was in the turret and in the middle of the hull. The front wheels were driving. The turret and hull are welded, made from surface-hardened chrome-nickel armor steel sheets. The armor of the turret and hull was the same - 30 millimeters.

The armament included a 37 mm caliber semi-automatic tank gun and three machine guns (two in the turret and the front one).

A. Hitler, after the French campaign, demanded to rearm the Pz Kpfw III with a 50-mm long-barreled L/60 cannon (this designation is the length of the barrel in bulbs). Reason this decision was the appearance of the British Matilda tanks with thick armor. However, the arms department made a different decision and gave preference to a gun with a 42-caliber length and low initial speed. The cannon was equipped with Pz Kpfw III tanks of modifications E, F, G. It was with these vehicles german army started the war with the USSR. Subsequently, the initiative of the Armaments Directorate was very costly for the tank units - a 50-mm cannon shell could hardly penetrate the armor of the Soviet T-34 and KB.

On modification N, which appeared in 1940, due to the screens, the thickness of the armor of the stern and frontal parts of the hull was increased to 60 millimeters. The combat weight, which increased to 21,800 kg, required wide tracks in order to maintain a sufficiently high specific ground pressure at the same level.

German tank crews on PzKpfw III in northern Africa

Unloading German equipment at the port of Tripoli. In the foreground is a PzKpfw III Ausf G tank.

German tank PzKpfw III Ausf. L on a flatbed trailer, which was most often used with the 18-ton FAMO half-track tractor

Modification J tanks (created in the second half of 1941) were finally equipped with the long-barreled gun that A. Hitler spoke about. An armor-piercing projectile penetrated an armor plate 75 millimeters thick at a range of 500 meters, and a sub-caliber projectile penetrated 115 millimeters. The mass of the tank was 21,500 kg.

In July 1942, serial production of modification L began, and in October - modification M, which was distinguished by enhanced armor protection of the frontal part of the hull. The total thickness of the armor plates and 20 mm screens reached 70 mm.

The latest modification N was armed with the same short-barreled 75 mm caliber gun, which was previously installed on the Pz Kpfw IV tank. This modification should be classified as assault tanks, not linear tanks. Between 1942 and 1943, 660 tanks were built.

In total, twelve modifications of the Pz Kpfw III were produced in the amount of 5,691 units. In addition, 220 command vehicles were built without cannon armament, 50 with a long-barreled gun and 81 with a short-barreled gun. In 1943, they produced 100 Pz Kpfw III Flamm flamethrowing vehicles. From February 43rd to April 44th - 262 artillery observation tanks Sd Kfz 143 (Pz Beob Wg III). There are 150 tanks in repair and evacuation areas.

From a technical point of view, this medium tank was an interesting vehicle. The Pz Kpfw III featured many innovations: the road wheels had a torsion bar suspension, control was carried out using planetary turning mechanisms and servos, and so on.

On the other hand, the “troika” was characterized by low cross-country ability and insufficient mobility. Attempts at modernization did not bring significant results, except for a partial increase in armor and strengthening of weapons. The engine group was never revised, and therefore, as the mass increased, the specific power decreased.

The Germans, even if they wanted to, were unable to equalize the combat qualities of the Pz Kpfw III with the T-34, mainly due to the lack of structural reserves. Production of these tanks ceased in August 1943. The freed up factory capacity was used to produce assault guns based on these vehicles.

Combat and technical characteristics of medium tanks Pz Kpfw III (Ausf E/Ausf G/Ausf M/Ausf N):
Year of manufacture – 1938/1940/1942/1942;
Combat weight - 19500/20300/22700/23000 kg;
Crew – 5 people;
Body length – 5380/5410/5410/5650 mm;
Length with gun forward – 5380/5410/6410/5650 mm;
Width – 2910/2950/2950/2950 mm;
Height – 2440/2442/2500/2500 mm;
The thickness of the armor plates of the frontal part of the hull (angle of inclination to the vertical) is 30 mm (21 degrees)/30 mm (21 degrees)/50 mm (21 degrees)/50 mm (21 degrees);
The thickness of the armor plates on the sides of the hull is 30 mm (the angle of inclination to the vertical is 0 degrees);
The thickness of the armor plates of the front part of the turret is 30/30/57/57 mm (the angle of inclination to the vertical is 15 degrees);
The thickness of the armor plates of the roof and bottom of the hull is 17 and 16/18 and 16/18 and 16/18 and 16;
Gun brand – KwK/KwK38/KwK39/KwK37;
Gun caliber – 37/50/50/75 mm;
Barrel length – 46.5/42/60/24 klb.;
Ammunition, rounds – 131/99/92/64 pcs.;
Number of machine guns – 3/3/2/2;
Machine gun caliber - 7.92 mm;
Ammunition, cartridges - 4500/2700/3750/3750 pcs.;
Engine type and brand – “Maybach” HL120TR/“Maybach” HL120TRM/“Maybach” HL120TRM/“Maybach” HL120TRM;
Engine power – 300 l. With.;
Maximum speed on the highway – 40 km/h;
Fuel capacity – 320/320/318/318 l;
Cruising range on the highway – 165/165/155/155 km;
Average ground pressure – 0.95/0.93/0.94/0.94 kg/cm2.

German tank PzKpfw III and its crew

German medium tank PzKpfw III Ausf.J. This modification had a lighter hull, and the thickness of the frontal armor was increased to 50 mm

Modern battle tanks of Russia and the world photos, videos, pictures watch online. This article gives an idea of ​​the modern tank fleet. It is based on the principle of classification used in the most authoritative reference book to date, but in a slightly modified and improved form. And if the latter in its original form can still be found in the armies of a number of countries, then others have already become museum pieces. And just for 10 years! The authors considered it unfair to follow in the footsteps of the Jane’s reference book and not consider this combat vehicle (very interesting in design and fiercely discussed in its time), which formed the basis of the tank fleet of the last quarter of the 20th century.

Films about tanks where there is still no alternative to this type of weapon ground forces. The tank was and will probably remain a modern weapon for a long time due to its ability to combine such seemingly contradictory qualities as high mobility, powerful weapons and reliable crew protection. These unique qualities tanks continue to be constantly improved, and the experience and technology accumulated over decades predetermine new frontiers in combat properties and achievements of the military-technical level. In the eternal confrontation between “projectile and armor”, as practice shows, protection against projectiles is increasingly being improved, acquiring new qualities: activity, multi-layeredness, self-defense. At the same time, the projectile becomes more accurate and powerful.

Russian tanks are specific in that they allow you to destroy the enemy from a safe distance, have the ability to make quick maneuvers on off-road, contaminated terrain, can “walk” through territory occupied by the enemy, seize a decisive bridgehead, cause panic in the rear and suppress the enemy with fire and tracks . The war of 1939-1945 became the most difficult test for all of humanity, since almost all countries of the world were involved in it. It was a clash of the titans - the most unique period that theorists debated in the early 1930s and during which tanks were used in large numbers by almost all belligerents. At this time, a “test for lice” and a deep reform of the first theories of application took place. tank troops. And it is the Soviet tank forces that are most affected by all this.

Tanks in battle have become a symbol of the past war, the backbone of the Soviet armored forces? Who created them and under what conditions? How did the USSR, which had lost most of its European territories and had difficulty recruiting tanks for the defense of Moscow, was able to release powerful tank formations onto the battlefields already in 1943? This book is intended to answer these questions, telling about the development of Soviet tanks “during the testing days ", from 1937 to the beginning of 1943. When writing the book, materials from Russian archives and private collections of tank builders were used. There was a period in our history that was deposited in my memory with some oppressive feeling. It began with the return of our first military advisers from Spain, and only stopped at the beginning of forty-three,” said former general designer of self-propelled guns L. Gorlitsky, “some kind of pre-storm state was felt.

Tanks of the Second World War It was M. Koshkin, almost underground (but, of course, with the support of “the wisest of the wise leaders of all nations”), who was able to create the tank that a few years later would shock the German tank generals. And not only that, he not only created it, the designer managed to prove to these military fools that it was his T-34 that they needed, and not just another wheeled-tracked "motor vehicle." The author is in slightly different positions, which were formed in him after his acquaintance with the pre-war documents of the Russian State Military Academy and the Russian State Academy of Economics. Therefore, working on this segment of the history of the Soviet tank, the author will inevitably contradict something “generally accepted.” This work describes the history of Soviet tank building in the most difficult years - from the beginning of a radical restructuring of the entire activity of design bureaus and people's commissariats in general. during the frantic race to equip new tank formations of the Red Army, transfer industry to wartime rails and evacuation.

Tanks Wikipedia, the author would like to express his special gratitude to M. Kolomiets for his assistance in selecting and processing materials, and also thank A. Solyankin, I. Zheltov and M. Pavlov, the authors of the reference publication “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905 - 1941” , since this book helped to understand the fate of some projects that was previously unclear. I would also like to remember with gratitude those conversations with Lev Izraelevich Gorlitsky, the former chief designer of UZTM, which helped to take a fresh look at the entire history of the Soviet tank during the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War Soviet Union. For some reason, today it is common for us to talk about 1937-1938. only from the point of view of repression, but few people remember that it was during this period that those tanks were born that became legends of the wartime...” From the memoirs of L.I. Gorlinky.

Soviet tanks, a detailed assessment of them at that time was heard from many lips. Many old people recalled that it was from the events in Spain that it became clear to everyone that the war was getting closer and closer to the threshold and it was Hitler who would have to fight. In 1937, mass purges and repressions began in the USSR, and against the backdrop of these difficult events, the Soviet tank began to transform from “mechanized cavalry” (in which one of its combat qualities was emphasized at the expense of others) into a balanced combat vehicle, simultaneously possessing powerful weapons, sufficient to suppress most targets, good maneuverability and mobility with armor protection capable of maintaining its combat effectiveness when fired upon by the most massive anti-tank weapons of a potential enemy.

It was recommended that large tanks be supplemented with only special tanks - amphibious tanks, chemical tanks. The brigade now had 4 individual battalions 54 tanks each and was strengthened by moving from three-tank platoons to five-tank ones. In addition, D. Pavlov justified the refusal to form three additional mechanized corps in addition to the four existing mechanized corps in 1938, believing that these formations were immobile and difficult to control, and most importantly, they required a different rear organization. The tactical and technical requirements for promising tanks, as expected, were adjusted. In particular, in a letter dated December 23 to the head of the design bureau of plant No. 185 named after. CM. Kirov, the new boss demanded that the armor of the new tanks be strengthened so that at a distance of 600-800 meters (effective range).

The newest tanks in the world, when designing new tanks, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of increasing the level of armor protection during modernization by at least one stage...” This problem could be solved in two ways: Firstly, by increasing the thickness of the armor plates and, secondly, by “using increased armor resistance." It is not difficult to guess that the second way was considered more promising, since the use of specially strengthened armor plates, or even two-layer armor, could, while maintaining the same thickness (and the mass of the tank as a whole), increase its durability by 1.2-1.5 It was this path (the use of especially hardened armor) that was chosen at that moment to create new types of tanks.

Tanks of the USSR at the dawn of tank production, armor was most widely used, the properties of which were identical in all areas. Such armor was called homogeneous (homogeneous), and from the very beginning of armor making, craftsmen sought to create just such armor, because homogeneity ensured stability of characteristics and simplified processing. However, at the end of the 19th century, it was noticed that when the surface of an armor plate was saturated (to a depth of several tenths to several millimeters) with carbon and silicon, its surface strength increased sharply, while the rest of the plate remained viscous. This is how heterogeneous (non-uniform) armor came into use.

For military tanks, the use of heterogeneous armor was very important, since an increase in the hardness of the entire thickness of the armor plate led to a decrease in its elasticity and (as a consequence) to an increase in fragility. Thus, the most durable armor, all other things being equal, turned out to be very fragile and often chipped even from the explosions of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Therefore, at the dawn of armor production, when producing homogeneous sheets, the task of the metallurgist was to achieve the maximum possible hardness of the armor, but at the same time not to lose its elasticity. Surface-hardened armor with carbon and silicon saturation was called cemented (cemented) and was considered at that time a panacea for many ills. But cementation is a complex, harmful process (for example, treating a hot plate with a jet of illuminating gas) and relatively expensive, and therefore its development in a series required large expenses and improved production standards.

Wartime tanks, even in operation, these hulls were less successful than homogeneous ones, since for no apparent reason cracks formed in them (mainly in loaded seams), and it was very difficult to put patches on holes in cemented slabs during repairs. But it was still expected that a tank protected by 15-20 mm cemented armor would be equivalent in level of protection to the same one, but covered with 22-30 mm sheets, without a significant increase in weight.
Also, by the mid-1930s, tank building had learned to harden the surface of relatively thin armor plates by uneven hardening, known since the end of the 19th century in shipbuilding as the “Krupp method.” Surface hardening led to a significant increase in the hardness of the front side of the sheet, leaving the main thickness of the armor viscous.

How tanks fire video up to half the thickness of the slab, which was, of course, worse than cementation, since while the hardness of the surface layer was higher than with cementation, the elasticity of the hull sheets was significantly reduced. So the “Krupp method” in tank building made it possible to increase the strength of armor even slightly more than cementation. But the hardening technology that was used for thick naval armor was no longer suitable for relatively thin tank armor. Before the war, this method was almost not used in our serial tank building due to technological difficulties and relatively high cost.

Combat use of tanks The most proven tank gun was the 45-mm tank gun model 1932/34. (20K), and before the event in Spain it was believed that its power was quite sufficient to perform most tank tasks. But the battles in Spain showed that a 45-mm gun can only satisfy the task of fighting enemy tanks, since even shelling of manpower in the mountains and forests turned out to be ineffective, and it was only possible to disable a dug-in enemy firing point in the event of a direct hit . Firing at shelters and bunkers was ineffective due to the low high-explosive effect of a projectile weighing only about two kg.

Types of tanks photos so that even one shell hit can reliably disable an anti-tank gun or machine gun; and thirdly, to increase the penetrating effect of a tank gun on the armor of a potential enemy, since using the example of French tanks (which already had an armor thickness of about 40-42 mm), it became clear that the armor protection of foreign combat vehicles tends to be significantly strengthened. There was a sure way for this - increasing the caliber of tank guns and simultaneously increasing the length of their barrel, since a long gun larger caliber fires heavier projectiles with a higher initial velocity over a greater distance without aiming correction.

The best tanks in the world had a cannon large caliber, also has large sizes breech, significantly greater weight and increased recoil response. And this required an increase in the mass of the entire tank as a whole. In addition, placing large-sized rounds in a closed tank volume led to a decrease in transportable ammunition.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that at the beginning of 1938 it suddenly turned out that there was simply no one to give the order for the design of a new, more powerful tank gun. P. Syachintov and his entire design team were repressed, as well as the core of the Bolshevik design bureau under the leadership of G. Magdesiev. Only the group of S. Makhanov remained in the wild, who, since the beginning of 1935, had been trying to develop his new 76.2-mm semi-automatic single gun L-10, and the staff of Plant No. 8 was slowly finishing the “forty-five”.

Photos of tanks with names The number of developments is large, but mass production in the period 1933-1937. not a single one has been accepted..." In fact, none of the five tank diesel engines air cooling, work on which was carried out in 1933-1937. in the engine department of plant No. 185, was not brought to series. Moreover, despite decisions at the highest levels to switch tank building exclusively to diesel engines, this process was constrained by a number of factors. Of course, diesel had significant efficiency. It consumed less fuel per unit of power per hour. Diesel fuel is less susceptible to fire, since the flash point of its vapors was very high.

New tanks video, even the most advanced of them, the MT-5 tank engine, required a reorganization of engine production for serial production, which was expressed in the construction of new workshops, the supply of advanced foreign equipment (they did not yet have their own machines of the required accuracy), financial investments and strengthening of personnel. It was planned that in 1939 this diesel would produce 180 hp. will go to production tanks and artillery tractors, but due to investigative work to determine the causes of tank engine failures, which lasted from April to November 1938, these plans were not implemented. The development of a slightly increased six-cylinder engine was also started. gasoline engine No. 745 with a power of 130-150 hp.

Brands of tanks had specific indicators that suited tank builders quite well. The tanks were tested according to new technique, specially developed at the insistence of the new head of ABTU D. Pavlov in relation to combat service in wartime. The basis of the tests was a run of 3-4 days (at least 10-12 hours of daily non-stop movement) with a one-day break for technical inspection and restoration work. Moreover, repairs were allowed to be carried out only by field workshops without the involvement of factory specialists. This was followed by a “platform” with obstacles, “swimming” in water with an additional load that simulated an infantry landing, after which the tank was sent for inspection.

Super tanks online, after improvement work, seemed to remove all claims from the tanks. And the general progress of the tests confirmed the fundamental correctness of the main design changes - an increase in displacement by 450-600 kg, the use of the GAZ-M1 engine, as well as the Komsomolets transmission and suspension. But during testing, numerous minor defects again appeared in the tanks. Chief designer N. Astrov was removed from work and was under arrest and investigation for several months. In addition, the tank received a new turret with improved protection. The modified layout made it possible to place on the tank more ammunition for a machine gun and two small fire extinguishers (previously there were no fire extinguishers on small tanks of the Red Army).

US tanks as part of modernization work, on one production model of the tank in 1938-1939. The torsion bar suspension developed by the designer of the design bureau of plant No. 185 V. Kulikov was tested. It was distinguished by the design of a composite short coaxial torsion bar (long monotorsion bars could not be used coaxially). However, such a short torsion bar did not show good enough results in tests, and therefore the torsion bar suspension was further work did not immediately pave the way for itself. Obstacles to overcome: climbs of at least 40 degrees, vertical wall 0.7 m, covered ditch 2-2.5 m."

YouTube about tanks, work on the production of prototypes of D-180 and D-200 engines for reconnaissance tanks are not being carried out, jeopardizing the production of prototypes." Justifying his choice, N. Astrov said that a wheeled-tracked non-floating reconnaissance aircraft (factory designation 101 or 10-1), as well as a variant of an amphibious tank (factory designation 102 or 10-1 2), are a compromise solution, since it is not possible to fully satisfy the requirements of the ABTU. Option 101 was a tank weighing 7.5 tons with a hull-type hull, but with vertical side sheets of cemented armor 10-13 mm thick, since. : “The inclined sides, causing serious weighting of the suspension and hull, require a significant (up to 300 mm) widening of the hull, not to mention the complication of the tank.

Video reviews of tanks in which the tank’s power unit was planned to be based on the 250-horsepower MG-31F aircraft engine, which was being developed by industry for agricultural aircraft and gyroplanes. 1st grade gasoline was placed in the tank under the floor of the fighting compartment and in additional onboard gas tanks. The armament fully corresponded to the task and consisted of coaxial machine guns DK 12.7 mm caliber and DT (in the second version of the project even ShKAS is listed) 7.62 mm caliber. The combat weight of the tank with torsion bar suspension was 5.2 tons, with spring suspension - 5.26 tons. Tests took place from July 9 to August 21 according to the methodology approved in 1938, with special attention being paid to tanks.

In 1934, the Army Armament Service (Heereswaffenamt) issued an order for a combat vehicle with a 37 mm cannon, which received the designation ZB (Zugfuhrerwagen - company commander's vehicle). Of the four companies that participated in the competition, only one - Daimler-Benz - received an order for the production of a pilot batch of 10 cars. In 1936, these tanks were transferred to military testing under the army designation Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.A (or Pz.IIIA). They clearly bore the mark of the influence of W. Christie's designs - five large-diameter road wheels.

The second experimental batch of 12 Model B units had a completely different chassis with 8 small road wheels, reminiscent of the Pz.IV. On the next 15 experimental Ausf.C tanks, the chassis was similar, but the suspension was noticeably improved. It should be emphasized that all other combat characteristics of the mentioned modifications, in principle, remained unchanged.

This cannot be said about the D series tanks (50 units), the frontal and side armor of which was increased to 30 mm, while the mass of the tank reached 19.5 tons, and the pressure on the ground increased from 0.77 to 0.96 kg/cm2 .

In 1938, at the factories of three companies at once - Daimler-Benz, Henschel and MAN - production of the first mass modification - Ausf.E - began. 96 tanks of this model received a chassis with six rubber-coated road wheels and a torsion bar suspension with hydraulic shock absorbers, which was no longer subject to significant changes. The combat weight of the tank was 19.5 tons. The crew consisted of 5 people. This number of crew members, starting with the Pz.III, became standard on all subsequent German medium and heavy tanks. Thus, already from the mid-1930s, the Germans achieved a functional division of duties among crew members. Their opponents came to this much later - only in 1943–1944.

The Pz.IIIE was armed with a 37-mm cannon with a 46.5-caliber barrel and three MG 34 machine guns (131 rounds of ammunition and 4,500 rounds of ammunition). Maybach HL120TR 12-cylinder carburetor engine with a power of 300 hp. at 3000 rpm it allowed the tank to reach a maximum speed on the highway of 40 km/h; The cruising range was 165 km and 95 km on the ground.

The layout of the tank was traditional for the Germans - with a front-mounted transmission, which shortened the length and increased the height of the vehicle, simplifying the design of control drives and their maintenance. In addition, the prerequisites were created for increasing the size of the fighting compartment. Characteristic of the hull of this tank, as indeed of all German tanks of that period, was the uniform strength of the armor plates on all main planes and the abundance of hatches. Until the summer of 1943, the Germans preferred ease of access to units over the strength of the hull.

The transmission deserves a positive assessment, which was characterized by a large number of gears in the gearbox with a small number of gears: one gear per gear. The rigidity of the box, in addition to the ribs in the crankcase, was ensured by a “shaftless” gear mounting system. To facilitate management and improve average speed movements, equalizers and servomechanisms were used.

Pz.III Ausf.D. Poland, September 1939. Theoretically, the driver and gunner-radio operator could use access hatches to the transmission units to enter the tank. However, it is quite obvious that it was almost impossible to do this in a combat situation.

The width of the track chains - 360 mm - was chosen mainly based on road driving conditions, significantly limiting off-road capability. However, the latter still had to be found in the conditions of the Western European theater of military operations.

The next modification was the Pz.IIIF (440 units produced), which had minor design improvements, including a new type of commander's cupola.

600 tanks of the G series received the 50-mm KwK 38 tank gun with a barrel length of 42 calibers, developed by Krupp in 1938, as their main armament. At the same time, the re-equipment of the previously produced E and F tanks with a new artillery system began. The ammunition load of the new gun consisted of 99 rounds, and 3,750 rounds of ammunition were intended for two MG 34 machine guns. After rearmament, the tank's weight increased to 20.3 tons.

The H variant received an improved turret, a new commander's cupola, and later additional 30 mm frontal armor and a new 400 mm track. From October 1940 to April 1941, 310 Ausf.H tanks were produced.

Pz.III Ausf.G tanks of the 5th Tank Regiment of the 5th Light Division before being sent to North Africa. 1941

The Pz.III Ausf.J was protected by even thicker armor. Among the minor improvements, the most significant was the new type of machine gun mounting. The first 1,549 Ausf.J tanks were still armed with a 50-mm KwK 38 cannon with a 42-caliber barrel. Starting in January 1942, the new 50-mm KwK 39 gun with a barrel length of 60 calibers began to be installed on Ausf.J tanks for the first time. 1067 tanks of this modification received such guns.

Front-line experience forced us to move on to the next modification - L, in which the front of the hull and the front of the turret were protected by additional 20-mm armor plates. The tanks also received a modernized mask installation, which simultaneously served as a counterweight to the 50 mm gun. The tank's weight increased to 22.7 tons. From June to December 1942, 653 (according to other sources - 703) tanks of the L modification were manufactured.

Pz.III Ausf.J from the 6th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division. Eastern Front, winter 1941.

On the M variant, a 1350 kg “eastern” caterpillar appeared. With it, the width of the car increased to 3266 mm. Since March 1943, these tanks were produced with bulwarks - 5-mm steel sheets that protected the vehicle from cumulative shells. The initial order was 1,000 units, but the low effectiveness of 50-mm guns in the fight against Soviet tanks forced the Wehrmacht Ground Forces Armament Service to reduce the order to 250 vehicles. Another 165 already completed chassis were converted into StuGIII assault guns, and another 100 into flamethrower tanks Pz.III(Fl).

The absence of tungsten in the Reich reduced the effectiveness of the long-barreled 50-mm cannon (its sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core, which had an initial speed of 1190 m/s, penetrated 94-mm armor at a distance of 500 m); Therefore, it was decided to re-equip some of the tanks with a “short” 75-mm KwK 37 cannon with a barrel length of 24 calibers - for use as assault weapons. 450 L-series vehicles were rearmed, and later another 215 M-series tanks. The frontal armor of the turrets on these vehicles was increased to 57 mm, and the turret weight was 2.45 tons. These tanks - Ausf.N - became the last modification of the Pz.III, mass-produced.

In addition to combat, so-called linear tanks, 5 types of command tanks were produced with a total of 435 units. 262 tanks were converted into artillery fire control vehicles. A special order - 100 Pz.III Ausf.M with flamethrowers - was completed by Wegmann in Kassel. For a flamethrower with a range of up to 60 m, 1000 liters of fire mixture were required. The tanks were intended for Stalingrad, but only reached the front at the beginning of July 1943, near Kursk.

At the end of the summer of 1940, 168 tanks of models F, G and H were converted for movement under water and were to be used in the landings on the English coast. The immersion depth was 15 m; fresh air was supplied by a hose 18 m long and 20 cm in diameter. In the spring of 1941, experiments were continued with a 3.5-m pipe - a “snorkel”. The Pz.III and Pz.IV submarine tanks and Pz.II amphibious tanks formed the 18th tank regiment, which was deployed into a brigade in 1941, and then into the 18th tank division. Some Tauchpanzer III vehicles entered service with the 6th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division. These units were trained at the Milovice training ground in the protectorate of the Czech Republic and Moravia.

Since July 1944, the Pz.III was also used as an ARV. At the same time, a square wheelhouse was installed in place of the tower. In addition, small batches of vehicles for transporting ammunition and engineering were produced. There were prototypes of a minesweeper tank and options for converting it into a railcar.

Pz.III Ausf.J during unloading from a railway platform. Eastern Front, 1942. On the right wing of the vehicle is the tactical badge of the 24th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

It should be noted that a significant number of tank turrets released as a result of the conversion were installed as firing points on various fortifications, in particular on the Atlantic Wall and in Italy on the Ready Line. In 1944 alone, 110 towers were used for these purposes.

Production of the Pz.III was discontinued in 1943, after about 6 thousand tanks had been produced. Subsequently, only the production of self-propelled guns on its basis continued.

Pz.III Ausf.N during testing at the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka near Moscow. 1946

It must be said that all German tanks created in pre-war years, had a rather monotonous fate. Like the Pz.IV, the first “troikas” formally entered service with the troops in 1938. But not to combat units! New machines were concentrated in training centers Panzerwaffe, staffed by the most experienced tank instructors. Throughout 1938, essentially military tests took place, during which it became clear, in particular, that the chassis of the first modifications was unreliable and futile.

A number of foreign and domestic sources indicate the participation of the Pz.III in the Anschluss of Austria in March and the occupation of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia in October 1938. However, their presence in the units of the 1st and 2nd Wehrmacht tank divisions that participated in these operations is not confirmed by German sources. Perhaps the Pz.III tanks were delivered there a little later in order to demonstrate the German military power. In any case, the first 10 Pz.III tanks were transferred to combat units in the spring of 1939 and could actually only participate in the occupation of the Czech Republic and Moravia in March of this year.

The total order for tanks of this type was 2,538 units, of which 244 were to be produced in 1939. However, the Armament Service was able to accept only 24 vehicles. As a result, on September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had only 98 of the 120 Pz.IIIs produced by that time and 20–25 command tanks at its base. Only 69 vehicles took direct part in the hostilities against Poland. Most of them were concentrated in the 6th Tank Training Battalion (6 Panzer Lehr Battalion), attached to the 3rd Panzer Division, which was part of the XIX tank corps General G. Guderian. The 1st Tank Division also had several vehicles.

Unfortunately, there is no information about combat clashes between Pz.III and Polish tanks. We can only say that the “troika” had better armor protection and maneuverability than the most powerful Polish tank 7TR. Different sources give different figures for German losses: according to some, they amounted to only 8 Pz.IIIs, according to others, 40 tanks were out of action, and irrecoverable losses amounted to 26 units!

By the beginning of active hostilities in the West - May 10, 1940 - the Panzerwaffe already had 381 Pz.III tanks and 60-70 command tanks. True, only 349 vehicles of this type were immediately ready for combat.

After the Polish campaign, the Germans increased the number of tank divisions to ten, and although not all of them had the standard structure with two tank regiments, it was not possible to fully equip them with a regular number of all types of tanks. However, the “old” five tank divisions were not much different from the “new” ones in this regard. The tank regiment was supposed to have 54 Pz.III and Pz.Bg.Wg.III tanks. It is not difficult to calculate that there should have been 540 Pz.III in ten tank regiments of five divisions. However, this number of tanks was not simply physical. Guderian complains about this: “Re-equipment of tank regiments with tanks type T-III and T-IV, which was especially important and necessary, progressed extremely slowly due to the weak production capacity of the industry, as well as as a result of the mothballing of new types of tanks by the main command of the ground forces." The first reason expressed by the general is indisputable, the second is highly doubtful. The presence of tanks in the troops was quite consistent with the number of vehicles produced by May 1940.

Be that as it may, the Germans had to concentrate scarce medium and heavy tanks in formations operating in the directions of the main attacks. Thus, in the 1st Panzer Division of Guderian’s corps there were 62 Pz.III tanks and 15 Pz.Bf.Wg.III tanks. The 2nd Panzer Division had 54 Pz.IIIs. Other divisions had smaller numbers of combat vehicles of this type.

The Pz.III turned out to be quite suitable for fighting French light tanks of all types. Things were much worse when meeting with medium D2 and S35 and heavy B1bis. German 37 mm cannons did not penetrate their armor. Guderian himself also drew personal impressions from this situation. This is what he writes, recalling the battle with French tanks south of Junivville on June 10, 1940: “During tank battle I tried in vain to knock out the French tank “B” (B1bis. – Note auto); all the shells bounced off the thick armored walls without causing any harm to the tank. Our 37- and 20-mm cannons were also not effective against this vehicle. Therefore, we were forced to suffer losses.” As for losses, the Panzerwaffe lost 135 Pz.III tanks in France.

Pz.III Ausf.N, knocked out by Soviet artillery in the Sinyavino area. Winter 1943.

Like other types of German tanks, the Troikas took part in the operation in the Balkans in the spring of 1941. In this theater, the main danger to German tanks was not the small number of Yugoslav and Greek tanks and anti-tank guns, but the mountainous, sometimes unpaved roads and poor bridges. Serious clashes, leading to losses, albeit minor, occurred between the Germans and British troops who arrived in Greece in March 1941. The largest battle took place when the Germans broke through the Metaxas Line in northern Greece, near the city of Ptolemais. Tanks from the 9th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment here. The British A10 cruiser tanks were powerless against the Pz.III, especially the H modification, which had 60 mm frontal armor and a 50 mm gun. The situation was saved by the Royal Horse Artillery - 15 German tanks, including several Pz.IIIs, were shot down by fire from 25-pounder guns. However, this did not affect the development of events as a whole: on April 28, the regiment’s personnel, abandoning all their tanks, left Greece.

Pz.III Ausf.J, knocked out in the summer of 1941. The Soviet shell literally broke through the frontal armor of the tower.

In the spring of 1941, the “troikas” had to master another theater of operations - North African. On March 11, units of the 5th Light Division of the Wehrmacht, numbering up to 80 Pz.III, began to unload in Tripoli. These were mainly cars of the G modification in a tropical version (trop) with reinforced air filters and a cooling system. A couple of months later they were joined by combat vehicles of the 15th Panzer Division. At the time of its arrival, the Pz.III was superior to any British tank in Africa, with the exception of the Matilda.

First large battle in the Libyan desert, with the participation of Pz.III, there was an attack by the 5th Tank Regiment of the 5th Light Division of the British positions near Tobruk on April 30, 1941. The offensive undertaken German tank crews after lengthy aviation training, it turned out to be ineffective. The 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment suffered especially heavy losses. Suffice it to say that 24 Pz.IIIs alone were knocked out. True, all the tanks were evacuated from the battlefield and 14 vehicles soon returned to service. It must be said that the commander of the German Afrika Korps, General Rommel, quickly drew conclusions from such failures, and in the future the Germans did not undertake frontal attacks, preferring the tactics of flank attacks and envelopments. This was all the more important because by the end of the autumn of 1941, neither the Pz.III nor the Pz.IV had such a decisive superiority over the majority of British tanks as in the spring. During Operation Crusader, for example, in November 1941, the British advanced with 748 tanks, including 213 Matildas and Valentines, 220 Crusaders, 150 older cruiser tanks and 165 American Stuarts. production. The Afrika Korps could oppose them with only 249 German (of which 139 Pz.III) and 146 Italian tanks. At the same time, the armament and armor protection of most British combat vehicles were similar to, and sometimes superior to, German ones. As a result of two months of fighting, British troops were missing 278 tanks. The losses of the Italian-German troops were comparable - 292 tanks.

The British 8th Army drove the enemy back almost 800 km and captured all of Cyrenaica. But she was unable to solve her main task - to destroy Rommel’s forces. On January 5, 1942, a convoy arrived in Tripoli, delivering 117 German (mainly Pz.III Ausf.J with a 50-mm 42-caliber gun) and 79 Italian tanks. Having received this reinforcement, Rommel launched a decisive offensive on January 21. In two days, the Germans advanced 120–130 km east, while the British rapidly retreated.

Command tank Pz.Bf.Wg.III Ausf.Dl. Poland, September 1939.

The natural question is: if the Germans had neither quantitative nor qualitative superiority over the enemy, then how can their success be explained? This is the answer to this question given by Major General von Mellenthin (at that time, with the rank of major, he served on Rommel’s headquarters): “In my opinion, our victories were determined by three factors: the qualitative superiority of our anti-tank guns, the systematic application of the principle of interaction combat arms and - last but not least - our tactical methods. While the British limited the role of their 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns (very powerful guns) to fighting aircraft, we used our 88-mm guns to fire at both tanks and aircraft. In November 1941 we had only thirty-five 88 mm guns, but moving with our tanks, these guns inflicted huge losses on British tanks. In addition, our 50-mm anti-tank guns with a high muzzle velocity were significantly superior to the British two-pounder guns, and batteries of these guns always accompanied our tanks in battle. Our field artillery was also trained to cooperate with tanks. In short, the German tank division was a highly flexible formation of all types of troops, always relying on artillery both in attack and defense. The British, on the contrary, considered anti-tank guns to be a defensive weapon and failed to adequately use their powerful field artillery, which should have been trained to destroy our anti-tank guns.”

Everything that von Mellenthin said, especially concerning the interaction of all types of troops with tanks, was also typical for another theater of military operations - the Eastern Front, which became the most important for the Pz.III, as well as for all other German tanks.

Command tank Pz.Bf.Wg.III Ausf.E and command and staff armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.251/3 of the headquarters of the 9th Tank Division. Eastern Front, 1941.

As of June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 235 Pz.III tanks with 37 mm guns (another 81 vehicles were under repair). There were significantly more tanks with 50 mm guns - 1090! Another 23 vehicles were in the process of being re-equipped. During June, the industry was expected to receive another 133 combat vehicles. From this amount directly for the invasion Soviet Union 965 Pz.III tanks were intended, which were distributed more or less evenly among 16 German tank divisions out of 19 that participated in Operation Barbarossa (the 6th, 7th and 8th tank divisions were armed with Czechoslovak-made tanks). So, for example, the 1st Tank Division had 73 Pz.III and 5 command Pz.Bf.Wg.III, the 4th Tank Division had 105 combat vehicles of this type. Moreover, the vast majority of tanks were armed with 50-mm L/42 cannons.

Since the landing on the shores of Foggy Albion did not take place, Tauchpanzer III underwater tanks were also transferred to the east. In the first hours of Operation Barbarossa, these tanks, which were part of the 18th Panzer Division, crossed the Western Bug along the bottom. Here is how the German historian Paul Karel describes this extraordinary event for those years: “At 03.15, in the sector of the 18th Panzer Division, 50 batteries of all calibers opened fire to ensure the crossing of the river by submarine tanks. The division commander, General Nehring, described the operation as a magnificent spectacle, but at the same time rather pointless, since the Russians were smart enough to withdraw their troops from the border areas, leaving only a few units of border guards who fought bravely.

At 04.45, non-commissioned officer Virshin plunged into the Bug on tank No. 1. The infantry watched what was happening in amazement. The water closed over the roof of the tank turret.

“Tankers give in!” They're playing submariners!"

Where Virshin’s tank was now could be determined by the thin metal pipe sticking out of the river and by the bubbles from the exhaust on the surface that were carried away by the current.

So, tank by tank, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Tank Regiment, led by battalion commander Manfred Count Strachwitz, disappeared to the bottom of the river. And then the first of the strange “amphibians” crawled ashore. There was a quiet bang, and the gun barrel was freed from the rubber plug. The loader lowered the motorcycle camera around the turret ring. They did the same in other cars. The tower hatches opened, from which the “captains” appeared. The battalion commander’s hand flew up three times, which meant “Tanks, forward!” 80 tanks crossed the river under water. 80 tanks rushed into battle. The appearance of armored vehicles on the coastal bridgehead was very opportune; enemy armored reconnaissance vehicles were approaching. Immediately the leading tanks received an order:

“Towers for one hour, load with armor-piercing, range 800 meters, at a group of enemy armored vehicles, rapid fire!”

Panzerbeobachtungswagen III forward artillery observer vehicle. 20th Panzer Division. Eastern Front, summer 1943.

The muzzles of the “amphibious” cannons spewed out flames. Several armored vehicles caught fire. The others hastily retreated. The tank fist of Army Group Center rushed towards Minsk and Smolensk.”

In the future, there were no more similar episodes of crossing water barriers, and the Pz.III was used underwater as ordinary tanks.

It must be said that the “troikas” as a whole were an equal opponent of most Soviet tanks, surpassing them in some ways, but inferior in some ways. In three main evaluation parameters - armament, maneuverability and armor protection - the Pz.III was significantly superior only to the T-26. The German vehicle had an advantage over the BT-7 in armor protection, and over the T-28 and KB in maneuverability. In all three parameters, the “troika” was inferior only to the T-34. At the same time, the Pz.III had an undeniable superiority over all Soviet tanks in the quantity and quality of observation devices, the quality of sights, the reliability of the engine, transmission and chassis. An important advantage was the 100% division of labor among the crew members, which most Soviet tanks could not boast of. The latter circumstances, in the absence of a pronounced superiority in performance characteristics, generally allowed the Pz.III to emerge victorious in tank duels in most cases. However, when meeting with the T-34, and even more so with the KB, it was very difficult to achieve this - good optics or bad, but the German 50-mm cannon could penetrate their armor only from a very short distance - no more than 300 m. It is no coincidence that that during the period from June 1941 to September 1942, only 7.5% of the total number of T-34 tanks hit by artillery became victims of fire from these guns. At the same time, the main burden of the fight against Soviet medium tanks fell on the shoulders of anti-tank artillery– 54.3% of T-34 tanks were hit by fire from 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns during the specified period. The fact is that the anti-tank gun was more powerful than a tank gun, its barrel had a length of 56.6 calibers, and the initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile was 835 m/s. And she had a better chance of meeting a Soviet tank.

After the turret was dismantled, some of the tanks were converted into Munitionsschlepper III ammunition carriers.

From the above it follows that the most popular Wehrmacht tank at that time, the Pz.III, which also had the greatest anti-tank capabilities, in 1941 was in most cases absolutely powerless against the Soviet T-34 and KV. If we take into account the lack of quantitative superiority, it becomes clear how, perhaps without knowing or understanding it, Hitler was bluffing when attacking the USSR. In any case, on August 4, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, he told General G. Guderian: “If I knew that the Russians really have the number of tanks that were given in your book, I would probably I didn’t start this war.” (In his book “Attention, Tanks!”, published in 1937, G. Guderian indicated that at that time the USSR had 10,000 tanks, but Chief of the General Staff Beck and the censorship objected to this figure. - Note auto)

However, let's return to the Pz.III. In six months of 1941, 660 tanks of this type were irretrievably lost, and in the first two months of 1942, another 338. Given the then existing rate of production of armored vehicles in Germany, it was not possible to quickly make up for these losses. Therefore, the Wehrmacht tank divisions constantly maintained a chronic shortage of combat vehicles.

Throughout 1942, the Pz.III remained the main striking force of the Panzerwaffe, including during large-scale offensive operations on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. On August 23, 1942, Pz.III Ausf.J from the 14th Tank Corps were the first to reach the Volga north of Stalingrad. During Battle of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus Pz.III suffered the most severe losses. Moreover, “troikas” armed with both types of guns – 42 and 60 calibers – took part in these battles. The use of a long-barreled 50-mm cannon made it possible to push back the firing distance, for example, from the T-34, to almost 500 m. In combination with the rather powerful armor protection of the frontal projection of the Pz.III, the chances of victory for both tanks were largely equalized. True, the German vehicle could only achieve success in combat at such a distance using PzGr 40 sub-caliber projectiles.

In May 1942, the first 19 Ausf.J tanks with 50 mm L/60 guns arrived in North Africa. In English documents these vehicles appear as Panzer III Special. On the eve of the battle at El Ghazala, Rommel had only 332 tanks, of which 223 were “troikas”. It should be taken into account that those who appeared at the front American tanks"Grant I" were practically invulnerable to the guns of German tanks. The exceptions were the Pz.III Ausf.J and Pz.IV Ausf.F2 with long-barreled guns, but Rommel had only 23 such vehicles. However, despite the numerical superiority of the British troops, the Germans again went on the offensive, and by June 11 the entire forward line of strong points from El Ghazala to Bir Hakeim was in their hands. Over the course of several days of fighting, the British army lost 550 tanks and 200 guns, and British units began a disorderly retreat to a rear defensive position on Egyptian territory near El Alamein.

Pz.III Ausf.F of the 7th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Division. France, May 1940.

Heavy fighting on this line began at the end of August 1942. On the eve of the offensive that Rommel launched at this time, the Afrika Korps had 74 Panzer III Specials. During unsuccessful offensive battles, the Germans suffered heavy losses in equipment, which they could not replace. By the end of October, only 81 combat-ready tanks remained in the German forces. On October 23, 1029 tanks of General Montgomery's 8th Army went on the offensive. By November 3, the resistance of the German and Italian troops was broken, and they began a rapid retreat, abandoning all heavy equipment. In the 15th Panzer Division, for example, by November 10, there were 1,177 personnel left, 16 guns (of which four were 88 mm) and not a single tank. Leaving Libya, Rommel's army, which received reinforcements, was able to stop the British on the Tunisian border, on the Maret Line, in January 1943.

In 1943, a number of Pz.III tanks, mainly modifications L and N, took part in the final battles of the African campaign. In particular, Ausf.L tanks of the 15th Panzer Division took part in the defeat of American troops in the Kasserine Pass on February 14, 1943. Ausf.N tanks were part of the 501st heavy tank battalion. Their task was to protect the Tigers’ positions from attacks by enemy infantry. After the surrender of German troops in North Africa on May 12, 1943, all these tanks became Allied trophies.

The main theater of combat use of the Pz.III in 1943 remained the Eastern Front. True, the main burden of the fight against Soviet tanks passed to the Pz.IV with long-barreled 75-mm guns by the middle of the year, and the “troikas” increasingly played a supporting role in tank attacks. Nevertheless, they still made up approximately half of the Wehrmacht tank fleet on the Eastern Front. By the summer of 1943, the German tank division included a two-battalion tank regiment. In the first battalion, one company was armed with “triples”, in the second – two. In total, the division was supposed to have 66 linear tanks of this type.

The “farewell tour” of the Pz.III was Operation Citadel. The table gives an idea of ​​the presence of Pz.III tanks of various modifications in the tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops at the beginning of Operation Citadel.

AVAILABILITY OF Pz.III TANK IN GERMAN TANK AND MOTORIZED DIVISIONS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION CITADEL

In addition to these tanks, there were 56 more vehicles in the 502nd and 505th heavy tank battalions, the 656th tank destroyer division and other units. According to German data, during July and August 1943, 385 “troikas” were lost. In total, during the year, losses amounted to 2,719 Pz.III units, of which 178 were returned to service after repairs.

By the end of 1943, due to the cessation of production, the number of Pz.IIIs in first-line units had sharply decreased. A significant number of tanks of this type were transferred to various training and reserve units. They also served in secondary theaters of war, for example in the Balkans or Italy. By November 1944, a little more than 200 Pz.III remained in the first-line combat units: on the Eastern Front - 133, in the West - 35 and in Italy - 49.

As of March 1945, the following number of tanks remained in the army:

Pz.III L/42 – 216

Pz.III L/60 – 113

Pz.III L/24 – 205

Pz.Beob.Wg.III – 70

Pz.Bf.Wg.IIl – 4

Berge-Pz.III – 130.

Of the line tanks and forward artillery observer vehicles, 328 units were in the Army Reserve, 105 were used as training vehicles, and 164 vehicles located in front-line units were distributed as follows:

Eastern Front – 16

Western Front -

Italy – 58

Denmark/Norway – 90.

German statistics last year the war ends on April 28, and the figures for the presence of Pz.III in the troops on this date are almost no different from those given above, which indicates the practical non-participation of the “troikas” in the battles of the last days of the war. According to German data, from September 1, 1939 to April 10, 1945, the irretrievable losses of Pz.III tanks amounted to 4,706 units.

A few words about export deliveries of Pz.III, which were very insignificant. In September 1942, Hungary received 10 tanks of the M modification. Another 10–12 vehicles were transferred to the Hungarians in 1944. At the end of 1942, 11 Ausf.N vehicles were delivered to Romania. They were in service with the 1st Romanian Tank Division "Greater Romania" (Romania Mage). In 1943, Bulgaria ordered 10 such tanks, but in the end the Germans supplied it with Pz.38(t). Slovakia received 7 Ausf.N in 1943. Several vehicles of modifications N and L were in service with the Croatian troops. Türkiye planned to purchase 56 vehicles of the L and M variants, but these plans could not be realized. Thus, only no more than 50 Pz.IIIs entered the armies of Germany's allies.

In battles with the Red Army, the Hungarian army most actively used these tanks.

A number of captured Pz.IIIs were also used by the Red Army, mainly in 1942–1943. About 200 SU-76I self-propelled artillery mounts were manufactured on the chassis of captured tanks, which were used in battles with German troops until the end of 1943.

In 1967, in his book “Designs and Development of Combat Vehicles,” British tank theorist Richard Ogorkiewicz outlined an interesting theory of the existence of an intermediate class of “light-medium” tanks. In his opinion, the first vehicle in this class was the Soviet T-26, armed with a 45-mm cannon. In addition, Ogorkevich included in this category the Czechoslovak LT-35 and LT-38, the Swedish La-10, the British “cruisers” from Mk I to Mk IV, the Soviet tanks of the BT family and, finally, the German Pz.III.

One of 135 Pz.IIIs destroyed during the French campaign. Judging by the image of the buffalo on the side of the turret, this Pz.III Ausf.E belongs to the 7th Tank Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division. May 1940.

It must be said that Ogorkevich’s theory makes a certain sense. Indeed, the tactical and technical characteristics of all these combat vehicles are quite close to each other. This is all the more important since these tanks have become opponents on the battlefield. True, by 1939 their performance characteristics had changed slightly, mainly in the direction of strengthening the armor, but the main thing remained the same - all these combat vehicles, to a greater or lesser extent, were a kind of overgrown light tanks. They seemed to have crossed the upper bar of the light class, but did not reach the full-fledged intermediate class.

Nevertheless, in the 1930s, thanks to a successful combination of the main parameters of armament and mobility, “light-medium” tanks were considered universal, equally capable of supporting infantry and performing the functions of cavalry.

Pz.III Ausf.G from the 6th company of the 5th tank regiment in battle. North Africa. 1941

However, accompanying infantry required movement at the speed of an infantryman, and such vehicles, which had relatively weak armor protection, became easy prey for anti-tank artillery, as was clearly demonstrated in Spain. The second function, which was confirmed already at the very beginning of World War II, they also could not perform independently; they had to be supported or ultimately replaced by tanks with more powerful weapons, for example, with a 75-mm cannon, capable of not only hitting enemy equipment, but also to conduct effective fire with high-explosive fragmentation shells.

The march to the East has begun! A Pz.III unit of the 11th Panzer Division advances deep into Soviet territory. In the background is a burning BT-7. 1941

However, the need to combine “light-medium” tanks with tanks armed with a 75-mm cannon was realized already in the mid-1930s. They just solved this problem in different ways: the British installed parts of their cruiser tanks with 76-mm howitzers instead of 2-pounder guns in the standard turrets; the USSR produced several hundred BT-7A artillery tanks with a 76-mm cannon in an enlarged turret; the Germans went the other way the most radical and least simple way to create two tanks.

In fact, in 1934, four German firms received an order to develop two different tanks under the mottos ZW (“company commander’s vehicle”) and BW (“battalion commander’s vehicle”). It goes without saying that these were only nominal mottos. The technical specifications for these machines were close. Base weight, for example, 15 and 18 tons, respectively. There were significant differences only in armament: one vehicle was supposed to carry a 37-mm gun, the other – a 75-mm cannon. The similarity of the technical specifications ultimately led to the creation of two vehicles almost identical in weight, dimensions and armor, but differing in armament and completely different in design - Pz.III and Pz.IV. At the same time, the layout of the second was clearly more successful. The Pz.IV has a lower hull that is narrower than that of the Pz.III, but the Krupp builders, having expanded the turret box to the middle of the fenders, increased the clear diameter of the turret ring to 1680 mm versus 1520 mm for the Pz.III. In addition, due to the more compact and rational layout of the engine compartment, the Pz.IV has a noticeably larger control compartment. The result is obvious: the Pz.III does not have landing hatches for the driver and radio operator. What this can lead to if it is necessary to urgently leave a damaged tank is clear without explanation. In general, with almost identical overall dimensions, the reserved volume of the Pz.III was less than that of the Pz.IV.

Pz.III Ausf.J, knocked out by a tank unit of Colonel Khasin's guard. Southwestern Front, 1942.

It should be emphasized that both machines were created in parallel, each according to its own technical specifications, and there was no competition between them. It is even more difficult to explain the appearance of such similar technical specifications and the subsequent adoption of both tanks. It would be much more logical to accept one tank, but with two weapon options. Such a solution would entail significantly lower costs in the future. It is quite obvious that by launching into mass production two tanks that were practically identical in all respects, but differed in armament and different in design, the Germans made a mistake. However, we should not forget that we are talking about 1934–1937, when it was difficult to guess the path that tank building would take.

Pz.III Ausf.L tanks in Tunisia. December 1942.

In its category of “light-medium” tanks, the Pz.III turned out to be the most modern, having to the least extent inherited the shortcomings characteristic of light tanks. After its armor and armament were strengthened, and its weight exceeded 20 tons, which practically made the “troika” a medium tank, its superiority over its former “colleagues” increased even more. It was strengthened many times over by the superiority in tactical methods of using tank units and formations. As a result, the German command in the first two years of the war had no particular reason to worry about the combat qualities of the Pz.III.

A Pz.III Ausf.M from the SS motorized division "Reich" capsized as a result of unsuccessful maneuvering. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

The situation changed completely in 1941, when the Germans encountered the T-34 on the Eastern Front, and the Grant in Africa. The Pz.III also had certain advantages over them. In particular, the T-34 was superior in the quantity and quality of observation and aiming devices, crew comfort, ease of control and technical reliability. The Grant was fine with surveillance devices and reliability, but in design and layout it was inferior to the Troika. However, all these advantages were negated by the main thing: both of these vehicles were designed within the framework of the promising concept of a “universal” tank, designed to replace both “light-medium” and support tanks. In the USSR, they came to understand the need for such a replacement as a result long journey evolution of “light-medium” tanks. There was no evolution at all in the USA, but the Americans made quick and, most importantly, correct conclusions from the experience of others. What about the Germans? Apparently, by mid-1941 they fully realized the seriousness of the mistake they had made. On September 6, 1941, Hitler was presented with a report that substantiated the benefits of the “unification” of the Pz.III and Pz.IV. The case was set in motion, and several companies received the task of working on various options Panzerkampfwagen III und IV n.A. (n.A. neue Ausfuhrung - new version).

Pz.III Ausf.N, knocked out during Operation Citadel. Judging by the emblems, this vehicle is from the 3rd Tank Regiment of the 2nd Tank Division of the Wehrmacht. Oryol direction, August 1943.

The Krupp company built two prototypes, which were Pz.III with a new chassis intended for Pz.III/IV. The road wheels were staggered and the suspension was torsion bar. Both vehicles were tested at various testing sites for quite some time. Other suspension and chassis options were also tested. Design and testing led at the beginning of 1942 to the creation of a unified Geschutzwagen III/IV chassis (“gun chassis”), in which the road wheels, suspension, support rollers, idler wheels and tracks were borrowed from the Pz.IV Ausf.F tank, and the drive wheels, engine and gearbox - for Pz.III Ausf.J. But the idea of ​​a “single” tank never came to fruition. This project was buried in March 1942, after a 75-mm cannon with a 43-caliber barrel length was installed in the Pz.IV Ausf.F, turning the support tank into a “universal” one overnight and without hassle.

It was impossible to apply such a solution to the Pz.III. An indispensable condition for creating a “universal” tank was the presence of a long-barreled gun with a caliber of at least 75 mm, which could not be installed in the Pz.III turret without significant alterations in the design of the tank. And with a 50-mm cannon, even with a length of 60 calibers, the Troika remained the same “light-medium” tank. But she has no “colleagues” or opponents left. The withdrawal of the Pz.III from production in the summer of 1943 was the only and, it must be said, belated solution.

As a result, the “universal” “four” was in mass production until the end of the war; the Geschutzwagen III/IV chassis was actively used to create various self-propelled guns...And what about the “troika”? Unfortunately, the mistake made by the customer when choosing the type of tank devalued the work of the designers and manufacturers. In the Panzerwaffe tank “palette” the “troika” turned out to be superfluous.

The T-34 tank was by far the best tank of the war from the very beginning, but it had some shortcomings that made it weaker than it seemed at first glance.
In the leadership of the USSR there was a long debate about the advantages and disadvantages of this or that technology and its capabilities in comparison with German models.

At the end of the 1930s, a unique opportunity presented itself to compare German and Soviet models, as several German tanks were purchased.
So we conducted comparative shows.

TESTS
The first such comparative test was carried out in 1940.

Then the Pz.Kpfw.III tank, purchased in Germany, arrived in Kubinka near Moscow for testing.
It was tested both separately and in comparison with domestic tanks - and the results were not very flattering for the latter, including for the wheeled-tracked undercarriage, which was specially designed for high-speed driving deep into Germany along the first-class German autobahns:

German tank T-3
Tank building historian M. Svirin writes about this as follows:

“On a measured kilometer of gravel highway on the Kubinka - Repish - Krutitsy stretch, the German tank showed a maximum speed of 69.7 km/h, the best value for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h, for the BT-7 - 68.1 km/ h.
At the same time, the testers gave preference German tank due to better ride comfort, visibility, and comfortable crew work stations"

The T-34 performed well, although the BT was the fastest, but its armor was weak and it broke down more often.
The only thing in which the T-34 was superior to the German was the cannon, but this advantage was negated by the other numerous disadvantages

T-34 model 1940
As we can see, the Germans had no particular reason to envy the unsurpassed speeds of the Soviet “highway” tanks. With regard to the chassis, the situation was rather exactly the opposite.
And, alas, not only the chassis, but also the radio...
"...Radio station
In addition to report No. 0115b-ss
To study the operating features of the German tank transceiver radio station, it was decided to practically compare it with the one available in the spacecraft on the BT-7 tank (the same as on the T-34. - Author's note). To do this, a tank unit consisting of a German tank and a BT-7 tank was moved by radio commands from the communications center at the training ground, where the necessary measurements were carried out...
On the progress of these tests, report No. 0116b-ss was compiled, which, together with the dismantled radio station, was handed over to Comrade. Osintseva...
Briefly, I have the following to say:
The German tank's radio provides reliable two-way telephone communication while moving and parked, including at the maximum distance specified by the manufacturer...
The operator was able to communicate by phone even at a distance, by 30 percent. exceeding the maximum range, while the radio station of our tank at the maximum distance provides only reliable reception. The transmission range on our tank is significantly reduced compared to the passport data...
A positive quality of the German tank’s transceiver station is also that it provides reliable communication while on the move, while while the BT tank is moving, the reception quality deteriorates significantly until the connection is completely lost...
In all main characteristics, the radio station of a German tank is superior to that installed on domestic tank. I consider it advisable to develop a new type of tank radio station based on existing German models...
And in the same report, the optimistic phrase “with incredible efforts” is used to describe communication support using the Soviet radio station...
We think many readers have heard the phrase at least once:
“The Red Army is strong, but communications will destroy it.”
In the wars of the 20th century, and not only in them, communications are primarily the controllability of troops.
And without control, military formations simply fall apart....
Even in 1936, M. Tukhachevsky considered that the army did not particularly need radios and it was better for the army headquarters to be located directly... in the air.
From there, looking out the window, division commanders and army commanders would point their fingers and direct the actions of the troops... such idiocy was no longer to be found in 1940.

The statement of the fact “while the BT tank is moving, the quality of reception deteriorates significantly, up to a complete loss of communication” meant that after the start of the battle, the Soviet tank commander lost control of his unit - if on the march it is still possible to wave flags, then after the start of shooting, each tankman will see only a narrow strip of land in front of you.
If an anti-tank gun suddenly appears in this stripe, firing, the crew will duel with it one on one - he will have practically no chance to “shout out” to his fellow soldiers walking nearby.
ABOUT THE ARMOR OF THE GERMAN TANK
Finally, the tests came to the most important thing - the armor.

And the armor of the German tank also turned out to be an unexpectedly tough nut to crack.
Here is what the historian of tank forces M. Svirin writes:

“...As you should know, shelling tests of a new German tank carried out in the fall of 1940 showed that to combat it, a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 is unsuitable, as it is capable of penetrating its armor at a distance of no further than 150–300 m...”

Combined with intelligence reports that the Germans were strengthening the armor of the three-ruble gun and rearming it with a more powerful gun, the picture emerged bleak.
The Soviet 45-mm cannon could no longer be a reliable weapon against German tanks; it did not penetrate their armor at long range, limiting itself only to close combat.
It is worth noting that the tank’s armor was constantly being improved.
The relatively low hull of the tank is welded from rolled armor plates.
On modifications A-E, the frontal armor had a thickness of 15 mm, on modifications F and G it was 30 mm, on modification H it was reinforced with additional sheets up to 30 mm + 20 mm, and on modifications J-O it was already 50 -mm+20-mm.
Tests of serial T-34s in November-December 1940 added another layer of ointment to an already not-so-clean ointment.

“As a result of live firing with the solution of fire missions, the following shortcomings were identified:
1) The cramped conditions of the crew in the fighting compartment are due to the small dimensions of the turret along the shoulder strap.
2) Inconvenience of using ammunition stored in the floor of the fighting compartment.
3) Delay in transferring fire due to the inconvenient location of the turret rotating mechanism (manual and electric drive).
4) Lack of visual communication between tanks when solving a fire mission due to the fact that the only device that allows all-round visibility, the PT-6, is used only for aiming.
5) Inability to use the TOD-6 sight due to the overlap of the aiming angle scale with the PT-6 device.
6) Significant and slowly damping vibrations of the tank when moving have a negative impact on the accuracy of firing from a cannon and machine guns.
The noted shortcomings reduce the rate of fire and cause a large expenditure of time to solve the fire problem.
Determining the rate of fire of a 76 mm gun...
The resulting average practical rate of fire is two shots per minute. The rate of fire is insufficient...

FIRE CONTROL FROM THE TANK AND EASY TO USE SIGHTS, SURVEILLANCE DEVICES AND AMMUNITION
Turret rotating mechanism (manual).
The rotation of the tower is carried out right hand. The location of the flywheel and the rotating mechanism handle does not ensure rapid rotation of the turret and causes severe hand fatigue.
When simultaneously operating the rotating mechanism and observing through the PT-6 device, the flywheel and control handle rest against the chest, making it difficult to quickly rotate the turret. The forces on the handle of the rotating mechanism increase greatly as the angle of roll of the tower increases and significantly complicate the work...
Electric drive of the turret rotating mechanism.
Access to the starting flywheel of the electric drive is difficult from below by the electric motor housing, on the left by the viewing device and turret housing, on the right by the forehead and the PT-6 device.
Rotation of the turret in any direction is possible only if the head is deviated from the forehead of the PT-6 device, i.e. the rotation of the turret is actually carried out blindly...
Telescopic sight TOD-6.
The window of the aiming angle scale of the telescopic sight is blocked by the terrain angle lever of the PT-6 device... Installation of aiming data is possible at elevation angles of 4–5.5 degrees and 9–12 degrees, which actually makes it impossible to fire with the TOD-6 sight. The aiming angle scale barrel is located in the middle part of the sight and is extremely difficult to access.
Periscope sight PT-6.
At an elevation angle of 7 degrees and below, up to the maximum descent angle, access to the handle of the all-round viewing mechanism is possible with only three fingers due to the fact that the sector of the gun’s lifting mechanism does not allow the handle to be covered by the hand.
The specified position does not provide a quick view of the area.
All-round viewing device.

Access to the device is extremely difficult and observation is possible in a limited sector to the right up to 120 degrees... The limited viewing sector, the complete impossibility of observation in the rest of the sector and ... an uncomfortable position of the head during observation makes the viewing device unsuitable for use.
Tower viewing devices (side).
The location of the viewing devices relative to the observer is inconvenient. The disadvantages are significant dead space (15.5 m), a small viewing angle, the inability to clean the protective glass without leaving the tank, and a low location relative to the seat.
Driver's viewing devices...
In practical work on driving a tank with a closed hatch, significant shortcomings of viewing devices were identified. When driving on a polluted dirt road and virgin soil for 5–10 minutes, the viewing devices become clogged with dirt until visibility is completely lost.
The central instrument windshield wiper does not clean the protective glass from dirt. Driving a tank with the hatch closed is extremely difficult. When shooting safety glass viewing devices burst...

The driver's viewing devices are generally unusable.
All PT-6, TOD-6 sighting devices installed on the tank and observation devices in the fighting compartment and control compartment are not protected from atmospheric precipitation, road dust and dirt.
In each individual case of loss of visibility, it is possible to clean the devices only from the outside of the tank. In conditions of reduced visibility (fog), the PT-6 sight head fogs up after 3–5 minutes until visibility is completely lost.
Ease of use of ammunition.
Ammunition for 76 mm cannon.
Stowing cartridges in cassettes does not provide a sufficient rate of fire for the following reasons:
1) Inconvenience of removing cartridges from cassettes.
2) Access to cartridges located on the left side along the tank is extremely difficult.
3) It is difficult to place cartridges in cassettes due to the presence large quantity covers (24 pcs.) and rubber gaskets between cartridges. The time spent on stowing a full load of ammunition is determined to be 2–2.5 hours.
4) Lack of sufficient packing density of cartridges in cassettes, leading to self-unscrewing of spacer tubes and cartridge case primers.
5) The presence of sharp edges of the cassettes, causing injuries to the loader’s hands.
6) Contamination of ammunition after a run of 200–300 km in the autumn period reaches a significant level. Using a full load of ammunition is possible only after preliminary cleaning of all cartridges.
Ammunition for DT machine guns.
When firing machine guns, the following shortcomings were identified:
1) Severe contamination of stores in the control department.
2) Dust on the protruding parts of the magazines placed in the niche of the tower.
3) The impossibility of using ammunition without first cleaning it from contamination.
4) Removing individual magazines in the tower niche is difficult due to their jamming during installation.
Convenience of workplaces and lighting of the fighting compartment.
The seats of the turret commander and loader are large in size. The seat backs do not provide a comfortable position for the body, take up a lot of space and do not prevent clothes from getting into the turret shoulder strap (loader's seat).
During live firing, the loader's seat makes it difficult to remove cartridges, hampers movement and touches the side stowage of ammunition. This situation is aggravated by significant overcrowding of the crew in the control department...
A common disadvantage of the L-11 artillery systems installed in tanks is:

a) Failure of the trigger mechanism...
b) The loader is not protected from impacts by the bolt handle when the semi-automatic device is triggered.
c) Unreliability in the operation of the foot trigger, which allows, in case of untimely and incomplete removal of the toe from the trigger pedal, jamming of the trigger slider and insufficient release of the artillery system...
…Conclusion.
The installation of weapons, optics and ammunition stowage in the T-34 tank do not meet the requirements for modern combat vehicles.
The main disadvantages are:
a) The tightness of the fighting compartment;
b) Tank blindness;
c) Unsuccessfully authorized stowage of ammunition.
To ensure the normal location of weapons, shooting and observation devices and the crew, it is necessary:
Expand the overall dimensions of the tower.
For the 76 mm gun:
Replace the trigger guard with a more advanced design that ensures trouble-free operation.
Enclose the bolt handle with a shield or make it foldable.
Remove the foot trigger, replacing it with triggers on the handles of the aiming mechanisms.
For the DT machine gun:
Provide the possibility of separate firing from a machine gun connected to a cannon.
Increase visibility and shooting accuracy of a radio operator’s machine gun by installing an optical sight...
On aiming mechanisms and sights.
The turning mechanism (manual) is not suitable. Replace with a new design that provides low effort and ease of operation...
Position the trigger mechanism for the electric drive of the turret rotation so that it provides rotation while simultaneously monitoring the terrain.
Replace the TOD-6 telescopic sight with a TMF type sight with a scale of aiming angles in the field of view of the device.
According to viewing devices.
Replace the driver's viewing device, as clearly unsuitable, with a more advanced design.
Install a device in the turret roof that provides all-round visibility from the tank.
On stowing ammunition.
Stowing ammunition for a 76-mm cannon in cassettes is unsuitable. The cartridge stack should be positioned so that there is simultaneous access to a number of cartridges...

Armored body.
Conclusions.
The tank hull and turret in this design are unsatisfactory. It is necessary to increase the size of the tower by increasing the shoulder strap and changing the angle of inclination of the armor plates.
The useful volume of the hull can be increased by changing the chassis suspension and eliminating the side wells.
Communications.
Conclusions.

The installation of the radio was performed unsatisfactorily for the following reasons:
The antenna, when lowered, is not protected from damage in any way... The design and location of the antenna lifting mechanism handle does not ensure reliable lifting of the antenna.
The receiver's umformer is mounted under the radio operator's feet, the current-carrying terminal is damaged and the umformer becomes dirty.
The receiver is mounted too low and far from the radio operator, making it difficult to configure.
The radio power sockets (new type) are inconvenient to use - they have many protrusions that cling to clothes and injure your hands...
The installation as a whole does not ensure stable operation of the radio over extremely long distances.
Performance indicators and reliability of tank components.
Tank dynamics.
In difficult road conditions, when switching from 2nd to 3rd gear, the tank loses inertia so much during the shift that this leads to a stop or prolonged slipping of the main clutch. This circumstance makes it difficult to use 3rd gear in road conditions that fully allow its use.
In conditions rainy autumn, spring and snowy winter, this lack of a tank leads to a sharp decrease in driving speeds on country roads and off-road...
Conclusions.
Due to the fact that the 3rd gear, which is most necessary in military operation conditions, cannot be fully used, the dynamics of the tank as a whole should be considered unsatisfactory.
Technical speeds are low, which is due to the unreliability of the main clutch and chassis.
Patency.
Conclusion.
The cross-country ability of the T-34 tank in autumn conditions is unsatisfactory for the following reasons:
The surface of the track that engages with the ground is not sufficiently developed, which results in the tracks slipping on inclines even with slight wet cover. The effectiveness of the included spurs is negligible.
Fixation of the caterpillar in the support wheels is unreliable...
A small number of support wheels negatively affects the maneuverability in wetlands, despite the low overall specific pressure.
Reliability of operation of tank units.
Engine, fuel, lubrication, cooling systems and control devices.
Conclusions.
Engine reliability within the warranty period (100 hours) is satisfactory. The engine warranty period, especially for this heavily armored vehicle, is short. It is necessary to bring it to at least 250 hours.
Constant oil leaks and failure of control devices characterize the operation of the lubrication system and connections of control devices as unsatisfactory.
Main clutch.
The operation of the main clutch and fan assembly is generally unsatisfactory.

Gearbox.
During the run, cases of “loss of neutral” (the rocker lever is in the neutral position and the speed is on) and difficult gear shifting were repeatedly noted on all cars...
Incorrect choice of gearbox ratios causes unsatisfactory tank dynamics and reduces its tactical value.
Difficult gear shifting and “loss of neutral” make it difficult to control the tank and lead to forced stops.
The gearbox and its drive require fundamental changes.
Chassis.
The short service life and low adhesion qualities of the tracks, the deterioration of the placement of tank units in suspension wells, the high consumption of rubber on support wheels and ridge engagement characterize the structural and strength qualities of the chassis as unsatisfactory.
Electrical equipment.
The ST-200 starter and RS-371 relay, due to existing installation and manufacturing defects, are not suitable for installation on T-34 tanks.
Stowage of spare parts, tools, personal belongings, food supplies and special equipment.
The stowage of spare parts, tools, personal belongings, food supplies, engineering and chemical equipment on the T-34 tank has not been worked out."

As can be seen from the extensive quote above, the then “users” of the future “legendary thirty-fours” did not share the optimism of their descendants regarding “stronger than all of them combined.” Particularly in this sense, paragraph “c” is “pleasant” - about the impossibility of using the tank in isolation from repair bases.
Considering the situation with spare parts and the level of mastery of new tanks by personnel, this actually meant that an entire tank factory had to follow the tanks going on the offensive.

T-34 TRIED TO RECLASSIFY
In a report prepared in 1940, “The State of Tank Armament and the Need to Create New Classes of Tanks,” the author, an engineer at the Leningrad Experimental Mechanical Engineering Plant No. 185 Koloev, indicated that,

“...considering, based on practical data; that guns with an initial [projectile] speed of about 900 m/sec penetrate armor [thick] 1.6 of their caliber,” the 45-mm armor of the T-34 tank will reliably protect it from shells of anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles with a caliber of up to 25 mm.
At the same time, “events in Finland showed that armor 45 mm thick at close ranges can be penetrated by a 37 mm anti-tank gun, not to mention 45 mm and 47 mm anti-tank guns, which can easily penetrate such armor at all main distances »

On this basis, Koloev proposed classifying the T-34 tank as a lightly armored tank, protected only from fragments and fire small arms, heavy machine guns and anti-tank rifles with a caliber of no more than 20–25 mm, and assume that

“The T-34 tank with an armor thickness of 45 mm at close ranges cannot conduct a successful fight with 47 mm anti-tank artillery, therefore it does not correspond to its intended purpose, caused by an insufficiently clear understanding of the state of modern anti-tank artillery and an insufficiently substantiated approach to solving this issue »

The casket, alas, opens in a primitively simple manner: the invulnerability of the latest types of tanks to enemy anti-tank weapons turns out, alas, to be just a widespread myth.
The question of the degree to which the armor of our tanks matches the enemy’s anti-tank weapons was raised even before the war.

CONCLUSION
At one point, the amount of negativity about the T-34 became so great that NGOs and manufacturers received a demand to remove the T-34 from production.
It’s not a joke to remove it because by the end of 1940 the T-34 disappointed almost everyone, including the country’s top leadership.
The T-34 lost trials to the German T-3 tank; it was considered simply a defective model with many shortcomings that could no longer be corrected.

The last word was for senior management country, there were strong fluctuations on this issue, but still prudence prevailed.
No one could have imagined that the disappointing T-34 would become the best tank of the war, a symbol of victory, in just a few years. .