Battalion Division. How many people are in a company: how the number of military units is formed

Now let's look at the question, what changes have occurred in the Russian army over the two years of Serdyukov’s reform?
The main visible manifestation of this military reform for some reason, it was not social transformations, not measures to improve the situation in the troops, but the organizational “shrinking” of the Armed Forces to a three-tier structure: battalion - brigade - operational command , in which the brigade became the main operational-tactical unit. Such traditional levels as regiments, divisions, corps and armies were completely eliminated.

To date Ground forces are consolidated into 85 brigades:
- 39 combined arms brigades,
- 21st brigade missile forces and artillery,
- 7 army air defense brigades,
— 12 communications teams,
— 2 electronic warfare brigades,
— 4 air assault brigades.

To manage them, from one to three operational commands have been formed in each district.
This disruption was presented to the Russian public as an “optimization” of a chaotic military structure, left over to Russia as a legacy from Soviet times. The figure 1890 was cited as confirmation military units, listed in the Armed Forces in 2008. After “optimization,” there should have been 172 of them left. It was emphasized that all of them would be 100 percent staffed with people and weapons and fully combat-ready. That the brigades will become universal combat units from Kamchatka to Pskov.

But the plans, beautiful on staff papers, turned out to be very far from their real implementation in life. Least a third of the brigades in the end it turned out to be formed according to some “easy” states. According to one of them, the number of motorized rifle brigades - the main operational-tactical unit of the ground forces - is 3,500 people. But there are “brigades” with a total strength of 2,200 people, although it was initially stated that all brigades would have a strength of 4,600 people.

Further more. The presence or absence of weapons and geographical features forced the “reformers” to change existing states in relation to a specific region and basic set weapons. As a result, today there are no less SIX approved brigade staffs. But in reality, taking into account various “amendments” to the staffing levels, in today’s Armed Forces you cannot even find two identical brigades.
That is There is no talk of any “unification” that the “reformers” strived for and used to justify the abandonment of the divisional structure. The resulting brigades are extremely diverse in numbers, organization and weapons. At the same time, no one remembers the promised equipping them with new weapons. “New” now simply means operational. We achieved this most in a simple way- all serviceable kits were removed from storage bases and reserve warehouses and sent to staff these brigades.

On the one hand, of course, it is wonderful that now the “new look” brigades contain only functional and serviceable weapons and equipment, but on the other hand, what will happen to this equipment after its service life is over and it suffers the fate of those kits? , which were in service before? If the Ministry of Defense does not have the money to restore the equipment that was in the “old look” regiments and divisions, then where will it come from to repair the new one?
And wouldn’t it be wiser in this case to repair the “old” one? After all, the current “rearmament” is not a transition to qualitatively new weapons and equipment, but merely “eating” the mobilization reserve, without which Russia simply cannot win a single more or less large-scale war.

As an example it is worth taking Far Eastern theater of military operations(TVD). In 1986-1997 the number of divisions in the Far Eastern theater of operations decreased from 57 to 23, tanks - from 14,900 to 10,068, surface-to-surface missiles - from 363 to 102, combat helicopters - from 1,000 to 310, combat aircraft - from 1,125 to 500. Process reductions continued after 1997, although at a slightly slower pace.
As a result, before the start of the Serdyukov reform, 23 divisions were located here, but more than half of these formations were “staffed” - that is, reduced in strength, and the general group Ground Forces numbered about 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

In the Shenyang and Beijing military districts of the PLA opposing us, directly bordering Russia on Far East and in Transbaikalia, 22 divisions (4 tank, 6 mechanized, 6 motorized infantry, 3 airborne, 3 artillery) and 38 brigades (6 tank, 12 motorized infantry, 1 infantry, 7 artillery, 1 anti-tank, 11 air defense) are concentrated. In reserve - 7 infantry divisions and 3 air defense divisions, total more than 500,000 soldiers and officers, 3,000 tanks and more than 1,000 airplanes and helicopters.

To transport reinforcements from the west, we have only one communication line - Transsib. Its length (from the Yaroslavsky station in Moscow to the Vladivostok station) is 9288 km. Wherein more than 1500 kilometers of this railway They go in close proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border, sometimes approaching it within line of sight. Therefore in Soviet time The high military command never counted on it as a route for transporting reserves in the event of an aggravation of the situation in this region.

The bet was placed on something else - in case of war, the Far Eastern group had in its warehouses and bases the storage of equipment, weapons, ammunition and ammunition for almost a million-strong military group. In the event of a military threat, the ground military group deployed here could be increased to almost 500 thousand in thirty days, and up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers in forty-five days, which would already qualitatively change the balance of power in the region, given the ongoing technical superiority, and most importantly - superiority in command and control at the operational-strategic level. Considering the strategic superiority of the USSR in nuclear weapons and the covering of the main economic centers with fortified areas, this made the war against the USSR a senseless adventure.

After Serdyukov’s “optimization,” the number of deployed troops in this region even increased by about 20 thousand people. It would seem that one can only rejoice, but at the same time, the entire mobilization part of our military group has been virtually completely eliminated. All “cadre” regiments and divisions were reduced and disbanded. According to the plans of Makarov - Serdyukov, only a few can be deployed here in case of war separate brigades. Moreover, after Putin signed agreements with China on a hundred-kilometer demilitarized zone along the border and territorial concessions to China all our fortified areas were disarmed and blown up.

In the event of a hypothetical war with China, the half-million Chinese group will be opposed by a thin defensive chain of three dozen brigades numbering just over 100 thousand people. Moreover, stretched over more than 1,500 kilometers along the Chinese border, without reserves and without any hope of strengthening. Since the transfer of one brigade from the European part of Russia here will take no less than a month, unless, of course, the Chinese cut the Trans-Siberian Railway earlier.

The permanent deployment point of the northernmost MSBR in Primorye has been determined in Sibirtsevo, and the southernmost MSBR in the Khabarovsk Territory in Bikin. Between them there are more than 400 km of border strip, protected electronic system observations of border posts with 15% staffing and abandoned military camps: Salskoye, Grafskoye, Vedenka, Dalnerechensk, Lazo, Filino, Koltsevoye, Panteleimonovka, Lesozavodsk, Sungach, Knoring, Spassk, Chernigovka.
At the same time, fully understanding the state of our Far Eastern group, the current chief General Staff General Makarov cheerfully hypnotizes the public:

« Now the new brigades are ready not only for the immediate use of force, but are also capable of holding off any enemy for 45 days. This time is quite enough to mobilize and reinforce them with additional forces if necessary...«

I remember that in our history there were already military leaders who promised Comrade Stalin to defeat any enemy with one powerful blow, quickly and on foreign territory. And then it was forty-one...
I'm afraid that General Makarov remembers very poorly military history his army and the fate of these “optimists” in the general’s stripes.
How sadly Far Eastern officers joke today: after the Serdyukov-Makarov “optimization”, it will not be a difficult problem for the Chinese army to defeat the Russian army. The problem will be to find it...

Battalions are the main combined arms tactical units of brigades, within which they perform various combat missions. Also, according to experts, battalions can act independently. Motorized rifle troops (MSV) are among the most combat-ready. You will find information about the organizational structure of a motorized rifle battalion in this article.

Story

The battalion was introduced into the Russian army as an integral part of the regiment by Peter I. The term “battalion” comes from the word “battles”. Previously, it designated a certain order in the formation of troops. In the 15th century, a battalion began to be called cavalry or infantrymen, who were placed on the battlefield in the form of a closed square. The number of soldiers in the battalion was not constant and varied from 1 to 10 thousand people. In the 17th century, the number was 800-1000 soldiers. One battalion was equipped with 8 or 9 companies.

Over time, new types of weapons appeared, combat missions became more complex and varied - with the use of heavy machine guns, mortars and artillery pieces, as a result of which the battalion structure became more complex. The staff was supplemented by headquarters and units providing combat and logistics support (economic, transport, communications, etc.).

After World War I, the army was replenished with tank, self-propelled artillery, mortar, motorcycle, sapper, engineer, machine-gun and artillery, motorized infantry and other battalions. During the Great Patriotic War, when balancing forces and calculating density, motorized rifle battalions were used as the main unit. The structure and description of such a military formation is given below in the article.

Compound

The regular structure of a motorized rifle battalion is represented by the following combat units:

Three motorized rifle companies (MSR). It is a tactical unit that primarily operates as part of a motorized rifle brigade (MSB). However, according to military experts, in such areas as reconnaissance and security, a company can act autonomously. In addition, Msr is a fairly effective tactical airborne assault force or a special detachment behind enemy lines.
One mortar battery.
One anti-tank platoon.
Grenade launcher and anti-aircraft missile platoons.

Also in the organizational structure of a motorized rifle battalion there is:

Medical Center.
A platoon that provides communications with the command and other military formations and formations.
Support platoon.

In the structure of a motorized rifle battalion, each of the above units performs specific tasks.

About the command

The organizational structure of a motorized rifle battalion provides for the presence of a commander, his deputy responsible for personnel, and a deputy in charge of weapons. The location of the deputy battalion commander is the headquarters, where he holds the position of chief. In addition to him, the headquarters includes a signal commander, a warrant officer and a clerk.

About the structure of a signal platoon

Such a formation has at its disposal two command armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, 8 thousand meters of cable and 22 radio stations. The staffing structure of a separate communications battalion of a motorized rifle brigade is presented:

Squad commander. He is also a senior radiotelephonist-mechanic-driver of an armored personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle.
Two radio sections (with a commander, a senior radio master of the first section and a senior radiotelephone operator of the second).
The driver of the second vehicle.

In total, the total strength of the communications platoon is 13 military personnel.

About the mortar battery

In the structure of a motorized rifle battalion, such a combat unit is equipped with:

Battery management. Management is carried out by the commander and his deputy for work with personnel. In addition, the presence of a foreman, a medical instructor and a senior driver is provided.
A management platoon with an intelligence section and signalmen.
Two fire platoons, each equipped with four 120mm mortars.

There are 66 people serving in the mortar battery. This military formation has four radio stations, a cable (4 thousand meters), 8 mortars and 8 tractor units. Sometimes a battalion includes a self-propelled battery of Nona mortars. The unit is equipped with two platoons, each of which has Nona-S installations of 4 guns.

According to experts, it was previously planned to use Khosta 2S34 self-propelled howitzers, a modernized version of the Gvozdika 2S1, instead of mortars. On this moment this issue is under consideration by the military leadership.

The task of a mortar battery is to suppress and destroy enemy manpower and its fire weapons, which are located in open positions, trenches and dugouts. Such a formation can operate effectively on areas of up to 4 hectares.

About the grenade launcher platoon

The structure of a motorized rifle battalion has a platoon whose tasks include the destruction of enemy personnel and firepower outside of shelters. The staff includes a platoon commander and his deputy. In addition, a grenade launcher platoon has three squads with their own commanders, two senior gunners, two grenade launchers, armored personnel carrier machine gunners and drivers. The number of personnel is 26 military personnel. The platoon has at its disposal 30 mm AGS-17 grenade launchers (6 units) and infantry fighting vehicles (3 vehicles).

Anti-tank platoon

Due to the fact that this unit stops the advancing enemy by firing its guns, their fire capabilities are taken into account as the main indicator. They are expressed in the number of destroyed enemy objects.

On average, a motorized rifle battalion destroys 130 enemy infantry fighting vehicles and 80 tanks. The figure can increase to 120 tanks and 170 combat vehicles if the SME includes a tank company and a platoon of guided anti-tank missiles. Today Russia has the most modern weapons systems.

About the composition of the battalion on infantry fighting vehicles

About the composition on armored personnel carriers

In the motorized rifle battalion, 539 people serve on armored personnel carriers.

The formation is equipped with 6 9K111 "Fagot" (ATGM "F") and 9 9K115 "Metis" (ATGM "M").

The personnel on the armored personnel carrier have at their disposal mortars "Vasilek" 2B9 and 2B9M, and three automatic 82-mm mortars. There are also 6 mortars of 82 mm caliber.

Number of vehicles - 43 armored personnel carriers.

About the anti-aircraft missile platoon

Such a formation within the structure of a motorized rifle battalion of the RF Armed Forces destroys enemy aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and airborne troops. Range - low to medium altitudes. The platoon includes:

The platoon commander and his deputy (he also leads the unit).
Three branches. Each has its own commander, anti-aircraft gunners (2 people), an armored personnel carrier machine gunner, a senior driver and his assistant.

The number of personnel is 16 military personnel. The fighters have at their disposal the Igla or Strela-2M launch systems in the amount of 9 guns. The platoon has three armored personnel carriers.

About the battalion first aid station

To collect the wounded and evacuate them, the structure of the motorized rifle battalion of the Russian Federation provides a medical center. The staff of this unit is represented by the head of the first-aid post (warrant officer), a medical instructor, two orderlies, a senior driver and three driver-orderlies. There are 4 UAZ-469 vehicles and one trailer at our disposal.

About the support platoon

The unit's tasks include maintenance and ongoing repairs of battalion equipment. A support platoon with a staff of 19 people operates under the leadership of a warrant officer (who is also the platoon commander) and his deputy - the squad commander. The platoon structure includes a maintenance department, an automobile department and a utility department.

Over the years, this unit was equipped with reconnaissance and engineer platoons. Today such a composition is not provided. The structure of such a unit is limited only to the following formations:

Finally

In combat conditions, all the forces and means of the most diverse military branches interact. A clear example of this is the complex organizational structure MSR and tank units.

In 2009, during the reform Russian army The main ideologists of the reforms informed the military personnel, and indeed all citizens of the country, that the military doctrine had undergone major changes, and that the army needed significant internal restructuring. At the same time, the main threat to Russia was identified, to counter which it was supposedly not necessary to conduct large-scale military operations, but could be limited to solving local combat missions. They say that we should no longer expect major external aggression against Russia, but we should expect attacks by bearded men with grenade launchers and Kalash guns.

Due to the metamorphosis of military doctrine, it was decided to switch to the use of brigades, almost completely abandoning the concept of a division. The main argument in favor of switching to a brigade composition of the army was as follows: a brigade has a smaller staff and, therefore, may be better organized than a division. This was supposed to give the entire Russian army greater mobility and flexibility, which would meet new challenges from a security point of view.

However, after the divisions urgently began to be cut down and shrunk, it became clear that the brigade formation option had its own significant drawbacks. One of these disadvantages can be considered that it was not always possible to achieve full interaction between individual components of the same brigade. If we take into account that the brigade was conceived as a kind of middle line between the regiment and the division, which was supposed to absorb all the best from both sides: the power of the division and the mobility of the regiment, then the result of such an idea was clearly blurred. Numerous exercises in which updated military formations took part showed that the brigades did not absorb divisional power and, at the same time, were unable to accumulate regimental coherence and mobility. It turned out that the brigades were organizationally stuck between the regiment and the division, not realizing all the positive things that they actually wanted from them.

Another undoubted disadvantage of brigades is that, unlike the same divisions, if they were forced to take part in combat (combat training) operations, then in full force. A situation emerged in which a brigade consisting of a couple of regiments, several separate battalions, including a battalion (company) of logistics support, was removed from its location to carry out combat missions, leaving this very place virtually empty and completely unprotected. In the divisional version, for conducting active combat operations there was always special group military personnel, which was determined to solve military-practical problems of countering the attacking side. This group could be larger or smaller depending on the conditions and scale of hostilities. In any case, the rear remained covered. In the case of a brigade, to strengthen the rear, you need to use either another brigade (and this is nonsense), or somehow isolate separate units from it, which in itself is a contradiction in using the brigade as a single and mobile whole.

An additional headache was (is) added by the fact that a hypothetically probable military confrontation may not always fit into the framework of local counteraction, where it would be appropriate to use a brigade. After all, in the same Far East, one cannot exclude the possibility of a clash between the Russian army and the armies of its neighbors (with all due respect to China, Japan and other states in the region). If, God forbid, such a military clash occurs, then it is hardly worth harboring the illusion that it will be limited to a certain limited area (very small) territory... There have been a sufficient number of examples in the country of how even the most seemingly insignificant border conflict resulted in a large-scale military confrontation. And it is precisely in the event of large-scale confrontations that the brigades should hardly be considered effective.

Despite this, all segments of the Russian Armed Forces switched to the brigade system with the exception of the Strategic Missile Forces and Airborne troops. At the same time, none of the major military powers decided to make such a large-scale transition to the brigade principle of forming the Armed Forces. In particular, the armies of the USA, Germany, China and other countries use brigades only as additions to existing divisions, which form the basis of the army. Moreover, in the USA, brigades are generally parts of divisions in the vast majority of cases. It turns out that only Russia, among the countries with a significant military power relies exclusively on brigades and takes into account the option of military conflicts only at the level of local skirmishes. Potential adversaries do not discount the scenario of a full-scale war using solid formations.

Numerous military experts, who increasingly began to raise the issue of the inexpediency of an almost 100% transfer of the RF Armed Forces to the brigade version, seem to have been heard by the new leaders of the Ministry of Defense. Despite the fact that not so long ago President Putin announced that the reform was almost completed and that it was time to abandon “shying around” from side to side, information has appeared that in the near future several divisions that were lost could be recreated in Russia at once this status was about 3-4 years ago. In particular, information has appeared that in less than a couple of months, namely at the Victory Parade (May 9, 2013), soldiers of the Taman and Kantemirovskaya divisions will march along Red Square. Namely divisions, since this status will be returned by the famous military formation of the Moscow region, along with the red banners with which the divisions were once awarded for the military exploits of soldiers and officers.

In addition to restoring the Taman and Kantemirovskaya divisions, the Ministry of Defense plans to begin creating several divisions in the Far East at once, which indirectly confirms the concerns shared by military experts regarding the need to cover Russia’s distant borders. It is possible that the division may be revived again in Tajikistan - on the basis of the 201st military base of the Russian Federation. Indeed, in this region, after the withdrawal of the NATO contingent from Afghanistan, another large-scale armed conflict, which, no matter the hour, is capable of spreading throughout Central Asia.

But if the Ministry of Defense decided to again turn to the divisional option of recruiting the army, then what will happen to the created brigades? There is no clear answer to this question yet, but most likely, brigades will be left as the main combat units where their use is truly more effective than the use of divisions. Regions where brigades may remain in their current form include, for example, North Caucasus. Using large divisions here to conduct counter-terrorist operations is simply pointless. This district needs mobile groups that could fight gangs with maximum efficiency.

It turns out that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is revising its military doctrine, pointing out that local wars are certainly dangerous for Russia, but it is also necessary to insure against more significant external aggression. It is naive to hope that we have no major enemies, just as it is naive to believe that if big enemies and yes, they will not provoke Russia into an armed conflict. Reasonable restoration of divisions is a good insurance policy.

A motorized rifle company is a tactical unit that performs tasks, usually as part of a motorized rifle battalion, but sometimes independently.

Historically, a company was considered an infantry unit of maximum strength that could be effectively commanded in battle by voice, whistle, gesture, or personal action. This number at all times was approximately 100 fighters. The concept of “detachment” is close to the concept of “company” in function and tactical meaning.

According to his functions in battle, a company commander is one of the fighters capable of simultaneously leading a battle and commanding a unit. Unlike the company commander, the battalion commander, as a rule, does not participate directly in battle.

In defense, companies and platoons are assigned strong points, a battalion is assigned a defense area, and a regiment is assigned a defense area. In this case, the company occupies 1–1.5 km along the front, and up to 1 km in depth. In an offensive, the company occupies a line of responsibility 1 km wide, in the breakthrough area - up to 500 m.

To better understand the tactical meaning of the staff structure and weapons of modern motorized rifle company Russian army, it is necessary to trace the evolution of infantry and motorized rifle units since the end of the Second World War. Their appearance changed repeatedly depending on the views of the command on combat use motorized rifles, weapons development and military equipment, practices of real armed conflicts. Each war left its mark on the appearance of motorized rifle units. However, there are features characteristic of motorized rifle companies of the Soviet Army (and the Russian Army, as its successor), which were developed precisely during the Great Patriotic War. It provided enormous experience in ground battles, allowing the effectiveness of pre-war concepts and regulations to be tested in practice. The Soviet infantry of the 1944 model was significantly superior in efficiency and combat power to its counterparts of the 1941 model, becoming the prototype of modern motorized rifle units.

The Soviet Union inherited the experience of infantry battles of 1941-1945. and created the most powerful ground forces weapons system in the world. This fully applies to infantry weapons.

Compared to the states of 1941, the following changes were approved:

the number of companies was reduced to 100 people without a noticeable loss of combat effectiveness. To reduce losses in battle formations, all companies not engaged in combat were removed from the company staff;
the intermediate cartridge of the 1943 model was established as ammunition for the rifle chain, and the AK assault rifle as an individual weapon;
Each department has been equipped with a close combat anti-tank weapon - the RPG-2 rocket-propelled anti-tank gun (grenade launcher);
mounted fire weapons (50-mm mortars) were removed from the company due to low firing efficiency in line-of-sight conditions;
In order to increase maneuverability and reduce vulnerability, heavy machine guns in companies were replaced with machine guns without a machine gun.

The structure of a Soviet motorized rifle company in 1946-1962. included:

Management department – 4 people. (commander, deputy commander, foreman, sniper with SV 891/30).
Three motorized rifle platoons of 28 people each. (22 AK, 3 RPD, 3 RPG-2);
Machine gun platoon (3 RP-46, 8 AK).

Total: 99 people, 77 AK, 9 RPD, 9 RPG-2, 3 RP-46, 1 SV.

The strength and armament of a rifle squad, platoon and company of motorized rifle troops Soviet army 1946-1960

In the Soviet Army, the post-war structure of a motorized rifle squad in terms of the quality and range of weapons resembled the structure of a Wehrmacht grenadier company squad. One soldier in the squad was armed with an RPG-2 grenade launcher, seven more with AK assault rifles, and a machine gunner - RPD machine gun chambered for 7.62x39 (in terms of ballistics and accuracy, the RPD differed little from the machine gun). There is an average of one sniper rifle left per company.

The machine gun platoon was equipped with company machine guns of the 1946 model, which combined the rate of fire of a heavy machine gun with the maneuverability of a manual machine gun. Company machine gun crews were located 200 m behind the attacking chain, quickly changed positions and provided the company with continuous fire support. The use of company machine guns on a bipod is a domestic structural and tactical technique, established during many fruitless attacks and bloody battles of 1941-1945. Create a sample with the necessary properties there were no more difficulties.

The introduction of an intermediate cartridge, corresponding weapons and rocket-propelled grenade launchers into the troops was borrowed from the Wehrmacht.

Despite its apparent simplicity, the post-war weapon system had exceptional firing efficiency, fire density and flexibility, especially at ranges up to 400 m.

The squad moved on foot or on trucks such as BTR-40, BTR-152. The driver of the armored personnel carrier, by analogy with the cavalry, performed the function of a horse guide in battle - he drove the vehicle to a safe place. The Goryunov SGMB machine gun, mounted on an armored personnel carrier, ready for battle and pointed forward, served as a means of combating the enemy who suddenly appeared along the way.

STRUCTURE OF A MOTORIZED COMPANY BY STATE IN THE 1960s – 1970s.

Structure and armament of a motorized rifle company on an armored personnel carrier

Further rearmament and motorization led to the emergence of a motorized rifle company in 1962, in which the number of squads was reduced by armored personnel carrier crews. The vehicle was an armored personnel carrier BTR-60PB, armed with a 14.5-mm KPV machine gun.

The grenade launcher and machine gun were replaced by next-generation models that were equivalent in purpose (but not in properties). One of the machine gunners served as an assistant machine gunner, but was not the number two on staff. A sniper appeared in the squad as an assistant commander, acting on his instructions.

The strength and armament of a rifle squad, platoon and company of motorized rifle troops of the Soviet Army in 1962.

The advantage of this state was high mobility within the road network. The ability of infantry to appear unexpectedly in areas of terrain weakly defended by the enemy and occupy them almost without a fight began to be considered more valuable. This state still exists in a slightly modified form.

The new composition of the motorized rifle company provided better mobility, but it came at the cost of firepower and numbers.

The shortcomings of the structure and armament of the state motorized rifle company in 1962 were:

manual RPK machine gun practically no longer differs from a machine gun in terms of combat properties;
the sniper, being in the front line, could not provide accurate fire due to large aiming errors and the inability to prepare data for shooting;
a sniper rifle in battle turned into an ordinary self-loading rifle of the SVT or FN/FAL type;
the crew of the armored personnel carrier (two people) was excluded from the rifle chain and combat on the ground.

The BTR-60PB armored personnel carrier (and BTR-70, BTR-80) was a truck covered with thin armor and served vehicle, and not a fighting machine. The armored personnel carrier could support the squad only from distances where it remained invulnerable to enemy machine-gun fire (1000...1500 m), for which it was used heavy machine gun 14.5 mm KPVT.

The combat order of a motorized rifle platoon during an offensive is: a) without dismounting; b) on foot; c) panorama of the battle.

The fatal shortcoming of the staff of the motorized rifle company in 1960-1970. It turned out that the armored personnel carrier was unable to advance in the chain of its squad. Upon closer contact with the enemy, armored personnel carriers were hit in the wheels by riflemen and grenade launcher fire. This is evidenced by the experience of fighting on the Damansky Peninsula. The works devoted to this conflict describe in detail the battles of March 2 and 15, 1969, during which the BTR-60 was revealed to be unsuitable for combat, even in the absence of artillery from the enemy.

Structure and armament of a motorized rifle company on the BMP-1

In the 1960s, motorized rifle troops received combat vehicles infantry (BMP-1). Due to the likely use of tactical nuclear weapons a technique appeared for advancing behind tanks without dismounting from combat vehicles. The tactical method of attacking on foot was also preserved in the regulations.

The staff of the rifle squad on the BMP-1 included eight people. Motorized rifle units on the BMP-1 are even more specialized in tank escort and rely mainly on the power of the 73-mm 2A28 gun (grenade launcher) of the BMP-1 and the combat training of the gunner-operator.

Structure and armament of a motorized rifle company on the BMP-2

Fighting in the Middle East in 1970-1980. showed the weakness of the ammunition of the BMP-1 gun (both cumulative and fragmentation). It turned out that the squad countered in most cases dispersed manpower and enemy firing points. It was necessary to use the destructive potential of artillery weapons more flexibly. The infantry fighting vehicles were re-equipped with automatic weapons.

The strength of the BMP-2 squad was the new BMP artillery weapon - the 2A42 cannon with 500 rounds of ammunition. It was the BMP that began to solve the vast majority of problems on the battlefield. The presence of large ammunition and the “machine gun” method of firing made the infantry fighting vehicle a means of threat and deterrence. Like heavy machine gun from the Second World War, the BMP-2 can influence the enemy without firing, only by presence. Another positive factor of the adopted system is the potentially large ammunition capacity of 5.45 mm cartridges.

Disadvantages new system weapons have become common disadvantages of the 5.45 mm caliber - low penetration and blocking effect of bullets. A bullet from a 7N6, 7N10 cartridge from an AK74 assault rifle does not penetrate half a red brick (120 mm) and a 400 mm earthen barrier at a distance of 100 m. The RPK74 machine gun differs even less from an assault rifle in terms of practical rate of fire than its predecessor RPK. A common drawback of the staff of a motorized rifle company on an infantry fighting vehicle is the small number and weakness of the fire of the rifle chain.

Features of the regular structure of motorized rifle companies of the 60s - 70s.

The infantry fighting vehicle has become a fire weapon for the rifle chain on a par with the infantry line. Its cross-country ability is comparable to that of a walking person, and its speed on the highway is equal to the speed of a car.
Formally, a squad on an infantry fighting vehicle has become weaker than a squad on an armored personnel carrier due to its small numbers, but in reality the opposite is true, since the infantry fighting vehicle is not a means of support, but a means of combat, which solves most of the tasks of the infantry chain and, in addition, the task of fighting tanks.
Motorized rifle squad on an infantry fighting vehicle in to a greater extent follows group tactics, reminiscent of a machine gun group from the First World War. The "machine gun" in the group became self-propelled and received artillery caliber. The BMP crew - gunner-operator and driver - turned out to be numerically smaller than the machine gun crew.
The squad's penchant for group tactics weakened the rifle chain. In combat, the rifle chain performs to a greater extent the function of protecting infantry fighting vehicles from being hit by enemy infantry and, to a lesser extent, is occupied with fire impact on the enemy. In the event of the loss of an infantry fighting vehicle, the department becomes unable to carry out its statutory tasks.
In the evolution of the squad, platoon and company, there is a tendency towards a decrease in the human component. Infantry combat is gradually being reduced to a fight between weapons, armored vehicles and other inanimate material means of the battlefield.

COMPOSITION AND ARMAMENT OF A MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY WITH A MODERN ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFF STRUCTURE

States motorized rifle companies of limited contingent in Afghanistan

Afghan war 1979-1989 became one of the wars of modern times. It was distinguished by limited tasks, disproportionate capabilities of the parties and almost complete absence fights, as defined by the regulations. In accordance with the tasks and characteristics of the landscape, the staffing of units of a limited contingent was approved Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

In the armored personnel carrier companies, each squad (six people, on the BTR-70) consisted of a machine gunner with an RPK and a sniper with an SVD. The KPVT machine gun gunner simultaneously served as a grenade launcher (RPG-7). The motorized rifle platoon consisted of 20 people, three BTR-70s. The machine-gun and grenade launcher platoon (20 people, two BTR-70s) was armed with three PKM machine guns on a bipod and three AGS grenade launchers. In total, the company consisted of 80 (81 - from August 1985) people on 12 armored personnel carriers. Since May 1985, one AGS was replaced with an NSV-12.7 machine gun, capable of destroying fortifications made of rocky soil and rocks.

In BMP companies, each squad (six people per BMP-2D) included a sniper with an SVD and a grenade launcher with an RPG. A machine gunner with an RPK relied on every third squad. The motorized rifle platoon consisted of 20 people (three BMP-2D). The machine-gun and grenade launcher platoon (15 people, two BMP-2D) was armed with three AGS grenade launchers and two NSV-12.7 machine guns. PKM machine guns were transferred to platoons. In total, the company consisted of 82 people and 12 infantry fighting vehicles.

The positive aspects of the above-described composition of a motorized rifle company are obvious: the companies are small in number, the number of weapons exceeds the number of soldiers and officers. In the mountainous landscape, artillery and mortars could not provide full support to the infantry, so the machine-gun and grenade launcher platoon was the artillery unit of the company commander and was distinguished by a variety of fire capabilities: mounted (AGS), penetrating (NSV-12.7), dense fire (PKM).

In the plain theater of operations, companies had a more conventional structure, which did not include large-caliber weapons, but included ATGMs.

States of motorized rifle companies 1980-1990s

In the 1980-1990s, squads on armored personnel carriers and BMP-1 and -2 consisted of nine people, but without a sniper.

The company on the BTR-80 (110 people) consisted of a control group (five people), three platoons (30 people each) and a fourth anti-tank machine-gun platoon (15 people). In service were 66 machine guns, 9 RPGs, 9 RPKs, 3 SVDs, 3 PCs, 3 ATGMs, 12 armored personnel carriers.

The company on the BMP had a similar structure and strength. The fourth platoon was entirely machine gun. In service were 63 assault rifles, 9 RPGs, 9 RPKs, 3 SVDs, 6 PCs, 12 infantry fighting vehicles.

Composition of motorized rifle companies of the RF Armed Forces in 2005-2010.

In the Russian Armed Forces in 2005-2010. In parallel, there were several staff structures of the same type of units. Motorized rifle troop units were built according to three organizational options:

Motorized rifle company on an armored personnel carrier.
A motorized rifle company on a BMP-2 from a regiment subordinate to the division.
A motorized rifle company on a BMP-2 from a battalion subordinate to the brigade.

We do not consider the organizational structure and armament of motorized rifle units on the BMP-3 due to the small number of vehicles that entered service with the troops.

A motorized rifle squad on an armored personnel carrier can contain eight or nine people, while a squad on a BMP-2 consists of eight people. At the same time, the sniper from the squad was transferred to larger units.

A motorized rifle platoon on an armored personnel carrier contains a control group, two squads of nine people and one squad of 8 people. All personnel are housed in three armored personnel carriers.

A means of qualitatively strengthening a platoon is a PKM machine gun with a crew of two soldiers and a sniper with SVD rifle subordinate to the platoon commander.

Composition of a motorized rifle company on an armored personnel carrier of the state 2000-2010:

Company management – 8 people. (commander, assistant commander for l/s, foreman, senior driver, machine gunner, senior technician, medical instructor, RBU operator; weapons: AK74 - 7, PKM - 1, BTR -1, KPV - 1, PKT - 1).
3 motorized rifle platoons of 32 people each. (each has a control of 6 people, including a commander, a deputy, a PKM machine gun crew of 2 people, a sniper with an SVD and a medic; two squads of 9 and one squad of 8 people; platoon weapons: AK74 - 21, PKM - 1 , SVD – 4, RPK74 – 3, RPG-7 – 3, BTR – 3, KPV – 3, PKT – 3).
Anti-tank squad of 9 people. (ATGM "Metis" - 3, AK74 - 6, armored personnel carrier - 1, KPV - 1, PKT - 1).

Total: 113 people, PKM - 4, SVD - 12, RPK74 - 9, AK74 - 76, RPG-7 - 9, ATGM - 6, BTR - 11, KPV - 11, PKT - 11.

Composition and armament of a motorized rifle company on an armored personnel carrier in 2000-2010.

A company on an infantry fighting vehicle can have two structures depending on its subordination. In regiments of rifle divisions, companies with infantry fighting vehicles have smaller numbers and an emphasis on small arms, since they are supported by the division's artillery regiment.

Structure of a motorized rifle company on an infantry fighting vehicle from a regiment:

Company management – 10 people. (commander, deputy commander for l/s, foreman, medical instructor, SBR radar operator, infantry fighting vehicle commander, 2 senior driver mechanics, 2 gunner-operators; weapons: AK74 - 10, BMP-2 - 2, 2A42 - 2 , PKT – 2, ATGM – 2).
3 motorized rifle platoons of 30 people each. (each has a control of 6 people, including a commander, a deputy, a PKM machine gun crew of 2 people, a sniper with an SVD and a medic; three sections of 8 people each; platoon weapons: PKM - 1, SVD - 1, RPK74 - 3 , AK74 – 22, RPG-7 – 3, BMP – 3, 2A42 – 3, PKT – 3, ATGM – 3).

Total: 100 people, PKM - 3, SVD - 3, RPK74 - 9, AK74 - 76, RPG-7 - 9, BMP - 11, 2A42 - 11, PKT - 11, ATGM - 11.

In brigades with battalion subordination, poor in artillery, companies largely provide themselves with fire support through their own grenade launcher platoon.

Motorized rifle companies on infantry fighting vehicles from brigades have the following structure:

Company management – 10 people. (staff and weapons are the same as in the command of a motorized rifle company on an infantry fighting vehicle from the regiment).
3 motorized rifle platoons of 30 people each. (in terms of staff and weapons, they are similar to platoons of motorized rifle companies from the regiment).
Grenade launcher platoon of 26 people. (each - commander, deputy commander and three squads of 8 people; weapons: AK74 - 20, AGS-17 - 6, BMP - 3, 2A42 - 3, PKT - 3, ATGM - 3).

Total: 126 people, PKM - 3, SVD - 3, RPK74 - 9, AK74 - 96, RPG-7 - 9, AGS-17 - 6, BMP - 14, 2A42 - 14, PKT - 14, ATGM - 14.

The numerical composition and armament of a motorized rifle company on infantry fighting vehicles from motorized rifle brigades in 2000-2010.

General comments on the composition and armament of motorized rifle units in 2000-2010.

1. Platoon commanders have own funds high-quality reinforcement of PKM machine guns (not quite company-level in terms of fire capabilities) and sniper rifles.

2. In a company with infantry fighting vehicles from the regiments, for reinforcement there is a full-fledged department from the company management.

3. In a company on an infantry fighting vehicle from the brigade, for reinforcement there is a full-fledged platoon capable of fighting without mounted grenade launchers, like an ordinary infantry one. Under other conditions, it is used for support by means of anti-aircraft guns, both from closed positions and direct fire.

4. Weapons of 5.45 caliber do not have sufficient penetration, and machine guns of this caliber are not capable of maintaining the required fire regime.

5. Weapons chambered for a rifle cartridge have established themselves as a means of strengthening a platoon (PKM, SVD). PKT machine guns on infantry fighting vehicles in the first line have insufficient target detection capabilities.

6. 12.7 caliber weapons are not represented in any state.

7. Weapons of 14.5 caliber are used on armored personnel carriers for shooting from safe distances (1000... 1500 m).

8. Automatic grenade launchers are rarely used and, in fact, are analogues of company mortars and machine guns of earlier organizational structures.

9. SPG-9 grenade launchers are not used at company level.

Disadvantages of the staff of motorized rifle companies of the RF Armed Forces (2000-2010):

1) companies on armored personnel carriers have lower combat capabilities than companies with infantry fighting vehicles: due to the lack of combat vehicles, they cannot perform the same tasks as companies with infantry fighting vehicles;

2) the sniper in the squad on the armored personnel carrier in the first line is not able to fully realize the capabilities of his weapon;

3) there are almost no reinforcement means subordinate to the commander (a machine gun and one armored personnel carrier that does not belong to the platoons); the anti-tank squad rather fills a gap in the meager range of fire weapons than serves as a means of reinforcement even in defense;

4) the number of weapons is small and its range is poor.

Advantages of motorized rifle companies of the RF Armed Forces (2000-2010):

1) departments consist of eight to nine people - fewer people are involved in fighting, which helps reduce losses;

2) a sniper was excluded from squads on infantry fighting vehicles;

3) the platoon commander has his own means of reinforcement;

4) the presence of a fourth platoon in a company from a brigade significantly expands the company commander’s ability to maneuver forces and fire.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFF WAYS OF INCREASING THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF MOTORIZED RIFLE SECTIONS, PLATOONS AND COMPANIES

At the squad level, strengthening the rifle chain is achieved by increasing the practical rate of fire light machine gun. The low penetrating effect of 5.45 and 7.62 caliber bullets of the 1943 model requires equipping the squad with a second rifle-caliber machine gun weighing up to 7.5 kg with dispersion at the RPD level and rate of fire at the DP level, with magazine feed. In addition, the rifle chain can be strengthened by introducing multi-channel fire weapons, adding one shooter to the chain, at least at the expense of the operator or driver of the infantry fighting vehicle, using remote weapon control in the infantry fighting vehicle, equipping the driver of the infantry fighting vehicle with a weapon - a PK-type machine gun.

At the platoon level, reinforcement is possible by using a fourth vehicle with fundamentally different weapons and armor, at least without increasing the size of the platoon, introducing supernumerary weapons (mine, grenade launcher) and assigning two weapons to one soldier.

At the company level, reinforcement is achieved by introducing a full-fledged fourth platoon heavy weapons(guided intelligent weapon), which is capable of fighting as a fourth infantry, and, if necessary, being a support or assault weapon (like a grenade launcher platoon of brigade structures). At the same time, the platoon must perform combat engineering support and combat work with guided and intelligent weapons.

It is undesirable to increase the number of personnel in units due to a possible increase in losses. A company of more than 100-115 people. handles worse in battle. It is possible to increase the fire capabilities of units due to the dual armament of some specialists who own different types weapons.

Thus, an increase in the number of weapons, combat vehicles, and equipment, even if not all of these assets will be used in combat at the same time, increases the effectiveness of the units’ actions.

The content of this page was prepared for the portal " Modern army» based on the book by A.N. Lebedinets “Organization, armament and combat capabilities of small-scale motorized rifle units.” When copying content, please remember to include a link to the original page.

Organization of a motorized rifle (tank) brigade

Motorized Rifle (Tank) Brigade ( MSBR, TBR)- the main combined arms tactical formation of the Ground Forces.

Designed to carry out tactical tasks independently or in cooperation with formations and units of other branches of the military and special forces, with aviation, and in coastal areas with Navy forces.

The following elements are distinguished in the organizational and staffing structure of brigades:

- management;

- main (combat) units;

- combat support units;

- logistics and technical support units.

Control as an element of the organizational structure, it is intended for organizing and conducting events aimed at:

Maintaining constant combat readiness of brigade units;

Preparing units for battle;

Control of units in battle.

Main (combat) units- designed for combat operations. They include units of the military branches of the Ground Forces:

Motorized rifle units;

Tank units;

Artillery units;

Military units air defense.

Combat support units– are intended for organizing and implementing measures aimed at preventing a surprise attack by the enemy, reducing the effectiveness of his attacks on our troops, creating for our troops favorable conditions for an organized and timely entry into battle and its successful conduct.

They include special forces units:

Intelligence units;

Divisions engineering troops;

Signal Corps units;

Electronic warfare units;

Radiation, chemical, biological protection units.

Logistics and technical support units intended for logistics and technical support of troops. These include:

Material support units;

Medical units;

Repair and restoration units.

Brigade organization ( MSBR, TBR)

1. Management consisting of: