Weakness and failure of the brigade structure

Today it is already quite obvious that the initiated organizational reform had no other content than a large-scale reduction of the officer corps and the maximum “compression” of the existing structure of the Armed Forces to a size that allowed it to function more or less effectively within the allocated budget.

. Why in the Ground Forces, the divisions that existed before 2008 were reorganized into brigades, reducing the entire command and control as much as possible and distributing the existing regiments into battalions and divisions, while at the same time reducing the entire mobilization structure to zero.

At the same time, the “reformers” did not even try to test their proposals in any way experimentally. First everything Armed forces were thrown under the steamroller of total reform, which cost tens of billions of dollars, and then, when the old army was dismantled, new brigades were formed, the “reformers” finally began studying the combat capabilities of what they had obtained.
. And here they were very much expected unpleasant discoveries. It turned out that the “optimized” brigades in their combat effectiveness did not even reach the regiments of the old state. Hanging with all sorts of weapons, advertised as “the latest” and “unique”, during all past exercises they with sad consistency show their unacceptably low combat effectiveness. Not once during the past exercises did higher headquarters and numerous advisers and inspectors manage to achieve coordinated, confident, energetic actions of a new type of motorized rifle brigade.

. If at the first stage - extension and deployment It is still possible to manage it somehow, but as the tactical situation becomes more complicated and inputs are received, control of the brigade as a single combat mechanism is lost by the brigade command and chaotic impulsive movement of troops begins.

As one of the generals of the Ground Forces headquarters sadly joked: the actions in the exercises of the new brigades are very good for studying in academies the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in the first days of the war. Lots of chaotic movements, constant delays, loss of control and, as a result, the conduct of combat operations by hastily put together combined combat groups.

There are many reasons for this.

. Firstly, in brigades, compared to regiments, the number of officers sharply decreased. If a regiment of 2,000 soldiers had 250 officers and 150 warrant officers, then the new brigade of 4,000 soldiers had 327 officers.
. The number of officers has decreased and, accordingly, management has become weaker. The officers simply cannot cope with command. Especially at the brigade headquarters level. The brigade's combat command is simply not capable of managing such a bloated structure. In addition, massive dismissals of officers with combat experience and length of service have led to a sharp decline in the already not very high level of training of today's officers.

As confirmation, we can quote words from an interview with the commander of the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, Andrei Kazachenko, who was the first to enter South Ossetia in August 2008:

“Reforms had to be carried out. I completely agree here. Another question is how to carry them out? For example, I will say from my point of view, from the commander’s side. What difference does it make whether you command a regiment or a brigade? On the contrary, a regiment is not such a cumbersome organization as a brigade is. In my regiment there were 48 officers and warrant officers of the regiment's management. This is for 2200 people. And now in the brigade, where there are 3500-4000 people, there are 33 people. What kind of optimization are we talking about? Have our officers changed, or have they become gold? Or did they all immediately become professionals? As it was, so it remains...”

. Secondly, the brigades turned out to be “blind” - the reconnaissance units available in the brigade do not provide full-fledged reconnaissance in the zone of its operations. Their strength and technical means are absolutely insufficient. Reconnaissance platoons of battalions are not capable of providing full-fledged reconnaissance in the battalion's zone of action, and the scanty "reconnaissance battalion" of the brigade is not capable of not only providing them effective assistance, but simply conduct reconnaissance to the depth necessary in the interests of the brigade.

And even the information received cannot be processed in a timely manner and brought to the command of the brigade, since the brigade management does not provide for any intelligence and information structure: neither a department, nor even a department that could analyze the incoming information, check it, systematize it and bring it to the commander .
. All reconnaissance in the brigade's combat command is represented only by the chief of reconnaissance, the instructor-sergeant major and a civilian translator. All!

All this does not allow the brigade command, even during exercises, to receive a sufficient amount of information to correctly assess the enemy, and as a result, does not allow it to correctly assess it and develop it accordingly. the right decision to fight.
. And this is while conducting combat operations against a potential enemy technologically equal to the level of our army. What can we say about conducting battles against similar units of technologically advanced armies? The capabilities of their reconnaissance, target designation and combat use exceed the meager capabilities of the “new-look brigades” by an order of magnitude!

To understand the weakness and inconsistency of the resulting structure, you just need to put next to a similar US or NATO brigade, which, in fact, should be “balanced” by our brigades, and compare their capabilities. But not by the number of barrels or heads, which no longer reflects the real combat effectiveness of modern troops, but by combat capabilities:
— depth and density of exploration,
— information support,
— speed and accuracy of target designation,
— reaction time,
- communications and combat control.

In addition to problems with the combat effectiveness of the new brigades, it was revealed another no less acute group of problems — "weight" of logistics support. Having copied the brigade principle from the US Army, the “reformers” for some reason forgot to copy the American logistics system. And it is precisely this that makes the “brigade” organization in the US Army work. According to it, logistical support for brigades is carried out by the divisions to which these brigades are organizationally included. The brigades themselves are structures that are focused only on conducting combat operations.

With the liquidation of the divisions, all rear support was assigned to the same brigades. As a result, as the chairman of the board of military experts, Major General Vladimirov, aptly described the resulting monster, Instead of combat brigades, we ended up with “ugly bloated regiments”. Which completely lost the mobility and unitarity of the regiments, but never reached the power of the division.

One of the arguments in favor of the transition from a divisional to a brigade structure was the experience of advanced countries. However, here too the reformers got something wrong. In the US armed forces there were divisions (mechanized, armored, infantry, etc.), and they remain the same. The divisional structure also forms the basis of the ground forces of the People's Liberation Army of China.

If we remember that war involves an armed clash with the enemy, then the combat potentials of the opposing military formations should be mutually comparable. In other words, the brigade is fighting with the brigade of the opposing side, and not with its division or army. But this just doesn’t work. For some reason, the standard defense (offensive) zone of our “compact” ground brigade turned out to be equal to the zone of employment of a “non-compact” mechanized division - 20 km along the front.

In the event of a military conflict with an enemy whose armed forces structure coincides with the American one, in this lane they will converge:
from the Russian side:
- two motorized rifle battalions

- two tank battalions

Tank battalion of the Russian mechanized brigade

(perspective structure)

Two artillery battalions
- one reactive battery

from the enemy:
- two heavy brigades
- two brigade groups
- one army aviation brigade
- one artillery brigade.

TOTAL:
- against 170 enemy tanks we will field 84 tanks;
- against 394 of his infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers - 263 of his own;
- 16 thousand soldiers and officers of the mechanized division will meet on the battlefield with 4.5 thousand soldiers and officers of the motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Ground Forces.

And let’s add to what has been said that against 118 army aviation helicopters regularly located in the division American army(including 24 drummers), we will not exhibit anything due to their categorical absence from the staff of the new look brigade. Let's add some small details to this:
- threefold superiority of the alleged enemy in artillery pieces and mortars;
- sixfold superiority in jet systems volley fire, etc.

/ V. Shurygin “BIG REFORM OR BIG LIE?”, zavtra.ru /

Rearmament that will not happen

Night launch of missiles by S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems.

What will actually prevent the Russian army from being modernized on time?

Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin doubts that the rearmament program of the Russian army will be completed on time. And the main obstacle here is not corruption, but the replacement of military science with propaganda.

The number of state weapons programs adopted in post-Soviet Russia is now even difficult to establish. At the same time, all programs without exception, both in the “dashing 90s” and in the “blessed 2000s”, suffered the same fate. Not only were they not completed, but they were all abandoned in the middle of the term - precisely because of the obvious failure. And in return, new programs were adopted with new deadlines and plans. After which everything repeated itself. In particular, this happened with the 2007-2015 program. Just recently, all state media widely advertised it as “ new stage in the development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation,” and now no one remembers about it. According to established tradition, this unfulfilled program “hit the ground” and turned into another new state armament program (GAP) for 2011-2020.

20 trillion rubles is the minimum for rearming the army

On new program It is planned to allocate approximately 20 trillion rubles. As one might expect, the liberal public raised a loud cry about “exorbitant military spending” and “militarization of the country” about this. This cry, to put it mildly, is beside the point.

But the fact is that the armed forces have practically exhausted Soviet resources, and they require total rearmament. So total that in fact these 20 trillion will obviously not be enough. This is the bare minimum, not an “exorbitant expense.” Without total rearmament, we simply will not have an army. The international situation, as is easy to see, does not stimulate disarmament in any way.

PAK FA fighter during takeoff at the opening ceremony of the international aviation festival in Zhukovsky. Photo: Lystseva Marina / ITAR-TASS

In this regard, it should be noted that the “compact professional army” is another liberal myth, if not more harshly, amateurish nonsense. The experience of European armies irrefutably demonstrates this. Their long-term permanent reductions are beautifully called optimization, but in reality it is simply a loss of combat effectiveness. In particular, the production of equipment and weapons in microscopic series is completely pointless. Firstly, this is extremely unprofitable economically: the smaller the series, the more expensive each sample is. Secondly, this is extremely irrational from a military point of view. If there is very little equipment, then it is almost impossible to use it in battle, both because of the lack of quantity itself, and because of the inadmissibility of losses: it will simply run out. Moreover, now Europeans are running short not only of equipment, but also of ammunition, which has also become very complex and expensive, so very little of it is purchased. As a result, as experience shows recent years, almost all European armies are losing the ability to fight not only independently, but even collectively.

What saves Europe is that there is no one to attack it, and intervention is voluntary. Iron NATO discipline exists only in the imagination of Kremlin propagandists. Russia's geopolitical position is fundamentally different; it needs a large army with a large number technology. It is obvious that humanity is very quickly sliding into the chaos of the “new Middle Ages,” which will obviously be accompanied by many wars between old and new “centers of power” for the complete redivision of the world. It is strange to imagine that this process will bypass a country with the largest territory in the world and a huge amount of natural resources and not the largest population. Therefore, either complete amateurs or people carrying out someone’s order can talk about a “compact professional army”.

Industry is not ready

The GPV 2020 faces a lot of serious problems. The first of them is the state of the military-industrial complex, which should produce these same weapons. During the post-Soviet period, it lost many important technologies, and never had some at all. In addition, production capacity and personnel have been catastrophically lost. During the post-Soviet period, many military-industrial complex enterprises ceased to exist; those that survived, as a rule, had severely worn-out machinery. There is nothing to say about the loss of personnel. As a result, a situation is now beginning to emerge where industry, even with normal funding, is physically unable to fulfill domestic orders and, especially, export orders. Firstly, she often cannot master production for real modern technology, because of which we have to return to modernized Soviet models (Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, Mi-35 helicopters, frigates of Project 11356, submarines of Project 636). Yes and how new technology it often turns out, upon careful examination, to be, again, a slightly improved Soviet one (for example, the S-400 today is, in fact, a kind of S-300PM+, since the “long-range” 40N6 missile defense system for it has never been adopted for service).

Anti-aircraft missile system S-400 at a military parade on Red Square. Photo: Alexandra Mudrats / ITAR-TASS

Secondly, there is not enough production capacity to produce equipment in adequate quantities. Now, factories are being urgently built in Nizhny Novgorod and Kirov to produce components of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. True, it is not very clear where the personnel for these factories will come from. All branches of the military-industrial complex, without exception, are experiencing similar problems. Consequently, building and equipping new enterprises and training personnel for them can take a lot of time and money. Funding for the construction and modernization of factories may be needed no less than for the re-equipment program itself.

On the other hand, military-industrial complex enterprises charge exorbitant prices for their products, and the pricing scheme is not always clear. Because of such prices, the Ministry of Defense acquires such a small amount of equipment that it would be better not to buy it at all. Moreover, an increase in price is by no means accompanied by an increase in quality; more often the opposite happens. And, of course, all this is superimposed by a powerful corruption factor, both from the Armed Forces and from the military-industrial complex.

However, defense enterprises are not to blame for everything. Often the customer, represented by the Ministry of Defense, is simply not able to clearly formulate the tactical and technical specifications for the weapons and equipment he requires. In general, over the two post-Soviet decades, the military-political leadership of the country has not decided on external threats in different time perspectives. And without this, the military construction of the army in general and rearmament in particular become actually impossible. Because of this, various “miracles” like the Mistrals arise: it is still unclear whether their purchase is outright madness or banal corruption. The extremely expensive fifth-generation fighter program T-50 (or PAKFA) is being made for the sole consideration - “to be like the people,” that is, like the United States. At the same time, American experience so far suggests that the entire concept of fifth-generation fighters may turn out to be a dead-end branch of the development of combat aviation.

The reform was carried out without any scientific study

Also, following the United States, Russia really wants to create a network-centric army, which in itself is reasonable. But since the essence of this concept is completely not realized by the state, the ones being created now automated systems management for different types armed forces and military branches turn out to be incompatible with each other, and accordingly, the money spent on their creation is simply thrown away. Due to a lack of understanding of what exactly the Armed Forces need, a completely paradoxical situation is emerging: the money has already been allocated, but what equipment and in what quantity they will buy with it have not yet been decided. Naturally, a fierce struggle is unfolding for this money using various lobbying and corruption schemes; as a rule, no one here remembers the interests of the army.

This sad state of affairs is largely explained by the state of Russian military science, which today, with rare exceptions, is not only unable to create new concepts, but has practically lost the ability to even analyze foreign ones. Moreover, even the descriptive function of military science is almost no longer fulfilled, with the exception of individual issues of a technical nature. In fact, most works in the field of military science in Russia have nothing to do with science at all, but are low-level propaganda.

A soldier with an AK-12 assault rifle. Photo: Pavel Lisitsyn / RIA Novosti

maybe someday there will be

Accordingly, for military construction there is simply no scientific basis. A good example in this case, it is the military reform of ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov. As a result of this reform, the armed forces underwent tremendous changes (mostly negative, although there were also positive aspects), but neither its authors nor its real goals, nor the criteria by which the transformations were carried out. In fact, the then Chief of the General Staff Makarov openly admitted that the reform was carried out without any scientific study.

Apparently, Russian economy Today, significant problems are beginning that may affect the implementation of the State Program 2020 in the direction of reduction. But for now main problem not in money, but in the state of industry and science. Importing weapons will definitely not save Russia, simply because it really modern weapons no one will sell it to her. Industry and technology can still be purchased to a certain extent, although at a very high cost; it is much more difficult to train personnel for it. But the hardest part is science. Today this is where our bottleneck lies. You won't be able to buy fundamental science. Moreover, without such science, even stealing or buying foreign technologies will be pointless; they will still not be mastered. You can give nuclear weapons to Paraguay or Mauritania, but they won’t nuclear powers, because they will not be able to reproduce it. In the 40s, the USSR actually “borrowed” nuclear weapons from the United States, but this only happened because Soviet science I instantly “mastered” this technology.

In this regard, the situation has radically worsened compared to Soviet period. The point is not only and not so much the destruction of schools and the loss of developments, but the anti-scientific public atmosphere. The current violent clericalization of society is extremely dangerous, primarily because it destroys scientific worldview; against the backdrop of a rapid decline in the level of average and higher education Agitprop does not contribute in any way to the emergence and, especially, retention of scientific personnel. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for us to fulfill the GPV-2020. Most likely, in a couple of years it will magically transform into some kind of GPV-2025.

Three-tier structure of the Russian Armed Forces

Now let's look at the question, what changes have occurred in the Russian army over the two years of Serdyukov’s reform?
. For some reason, the main visible manifestation of this military reform was not social transformations, not measures to improve the situation in the troops, but the organizational “squeezing” of the Armed Forces to a three-tier structure: battalion - brigade - operational command , in which the brigade became the main operational-tactical unit. Such traditional levels as regiments, divisions, corps and armies were completely eliminated.

To date Ground forces are consolidated into 85 brigades:
- 39 combined arms brigades,
- 21st brigade of missile troops and artillery,
- 7 army air defense brigades,
— 12 communications teams,
- 2 electronic warfare brigades,
— 4 air assault brigades.

To manage them, from one to three operational commands have been formed in each district.
This disruption was presented to the Russian public as an “optimization” of a chaotic military structure, left over to Russia as a legacy from Soviet times. As confirmation, the figure of 1,890 military units included in the Armed Forces in 2008 was cited. After “optimization,” there should have been 172 of them left. It was emphasized that all of them would be 100 percent staffed with people and weapons and fully combat-ready. That the brigades will become universal combat units from Kamchatka to Pskov.

But the plans, beautiful on staff papers, turned out to be very far from their real implementation in life. At least a third of the brigades in the end it turned out to be formed according to some “easy” states. According to one of them, the number of motorized rifle brigades - the main operational-tactical unit of the ground forces - is 3,500 people. But there are “brigades” with a total strength of 2,200 people, although it was initially stated that all brigades would have a strength of 4,600 people.

Further - more. The presence or absence of weapons and geographical features forced the “reformers” to change existing states in relation to a specific region and the basic set of weapons. As a result, today there are no less SIX approved brigade staffs. But in reality, taking into account various “amendments” to the staffing levels, in today’s Armed Forces you cannot even find two identical brigades.
. That is There is no talk of any “unification” that the “reformers” strived for so much and what they used to justify the abandonment of the divisional structure. The resulting brigades are extremely diverse in numbers, organization and weapons. At the same time, no one remembers the promised equipping them with new weapons. “New” now simply means operational. We achieved this most in a simple way— all serviceable kits were removed from storage bases and reserve warehouses and sent to staff these brigades.

On the one hand, of course, it is wonderful that now the “new look” brigades contain only functional and serviceable weapons and equipment, but on the other hand, what will happen to this equipment after its service life is over and it suffers the fate of those kits? , which were in service before? If the Ministry of Defense does not have the money to restore the equipment that was in the “old look” regiments and divisions, then where will it come from to repair the new one?
. And wouldn’t it be wiser in this case to repair the “old” one? After all, the current “rearmament” is not a transition to qualitatively new weapons and equipment, but only “eating” the mobilization reserve, without which Russia simply cannot win a single more or less large-scale war.

As an example it is worth taking Far Eastern Theater of Operations(TVD).

In 1986-1997 the number of divisions in the Far Eastern theater of operations decreased from 57 to 23, tanks - from 14,900 to 10,068, surface-to-surface missiles - from 363 to 102, combat helicopters - from 1,000 to 310, combat aircraft - from 1,125 to 500. Process reductions continued after 1997, although at a slightly slower pace.
. As a result, before the start of the Serdyukov reform, 23 divisions were located here, but more than half of these formations were “staffed” - that is, reduced in strength, and the total grouping of the Ground Forces consisted of about 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

In the Shenyang and Beijing military districts of the PLA opposing us, directly bordering Russia on Far East and in Transbaikalia, 22 divisions (4 tank, 6 mechanized, 6 motorized infantry, 3 airborne, 3 artillery) and 38 brigades (6 tank, 12 motorized infantry, 1 infantry, 7 artillery, 1 anti-tank, 11 air defense) are concentrated. In reserve - 7 infantry divisions and 3 air defense divisions, in total more than 500,000 soldiers and officers, 3,000 tanks and more than 1,000 airplanes and helicopters.

Chinese helicopter pilots

To transport reinforcements from the west, we have only one communication line - Transsib. Its length (from Moscow's Yaroslavsky station to Vladivostok station) is 9,288 km. At the same time more than 1500 kilometers of this railway They go in close proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border, sometimes approaching it within line of sight. Therefore in Soviet era The high military command never counted on it as a route for transporting reserves in the event of an aggravation of the situation in this region.

The bet was placed on something else - in case of war, the Far Eastern group had in its warehouses and bases the storage of equipment, weapons, ammunition and ammunition for almost a million-strong military group. In the event of a military threat, the ground military group deployed here could be increased to almost 500 thousand in thirty days, and up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers in forty-five days, which already qualitatively changed the balance of power in the region, given the ongoing technical superiority, and most importantly - superiority in command and control at the operational-strategic level. Considering the strategic superiority of the USSR in nuclear weapons and the covering of the main economic centers with fortified areas, this made the war against the USSR a senseless adventure.

After Serdyukov’s “optimization,” the number of deployed troops in this region even increased by about 20 thousand people. It would seem that one can only rejoice, but at the same time, the entire mobilization part of our military group has actually been completely eliminated. All “cadre” regiments and divisions were reduced and disbanded. According to the plans of Makarov and Serdyukov, only a few separate brigades can be deployed here in the event of war. Moreover, after Putin signed agreements with China on a hundred-kilometer demilitarized zone along the border and territorial concessions to China all our fortified areas were disarmed and blown up.

In the event of a hypothetical war with China, the half-million Chinese group will be opposed by a thin defensive chain of three dozen brigades numbering just over 100 thousand people. Moreover, stretched over more than 1,500 kilometers along the Chinese border, without reserves and without any hope of strengthening. Since the transfer of one brigade from the European part of Russia here will take no less than a month, unless, of course, the Chinese cut the Trans-Siberian Railway earlier.

The permanent deployment point of the northernmost MSBR in Primorye has been determined in Sibirtsevo, and the southernmost MSBR Khabarovsk Territory in Bikin. Between them there are more than 400 km of border strip, protected electronic system observations of border posts with 15% staffing and abandoned military camps: Salskoye, Grafskoye, Vedenka, Dalnerechensk, Lazo, Filino, Koltsevoye, Panteleimonovka, Lesozavodsk, Sungach, Knoring, Spassk, Chernigovka.
. At the same time, fully understanding the state of our Far Eastern group, the current chief General Staff General Makarov cheerfully hypnotizes the public:

« Now the new brigades are ready not only for the immediate use of force, but are also capable of holding off any enemy for 45 days. This time is quite enough to mobilize and reinforce them with additional forces if necessary...«

I remember that in our history there were already military leaders who promised Comrade Stalin to defeat any enemy with one powerful blow, quickly and on foreign territory. And then it was forty-one...
. I’m afraid that General Makarov remembers very poorly the military history of his army and the fate of these “optimists” in the general’s stripes.
. How sadly Far Eastern officers joke today: after the Serdyukov-Makarov “optimization”, it will not be a difficult problem for the Chinese army to defeat the Russian army. The problem will be to find it...

Armed Forces of the state- defensive and military organizations supplied by the government and used in the interests of the state. In some countries, paramilitary organizations are included in the structure of the Armed Forces.

In a number of countries, especially in the West, the military is linked to the government through a civilian agency. It may be called the Ministry of Defense, the Department of Defense, the Military Department, or otherwise.

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Subtitles

Types of aircraft

Aircraft are usually divided into different types; usually they are the army (Ground Forces), aviation ( Air Force) and military fleet (Navy/naval forces). The Coast Guard may also be part of the Armed Forces (although in many countries it is part of the police force or is a civilian agency). The French structure, copied by many countries, includes three traditional branches, and, as a fourth, the Gendarmerie.

The term consolidated forces is often used, meaning military units made up of two or more branches of the Armed Forces.

Organizational hierarchy of the Armed Forces

The minimum unit of the aircraft is a unit. The unit usually operates as a single unit, and is homogeneous in composition (for example, only infantry, only cavalry, etc.).

In the Soviet and Russian armies, the main unit is considered to be a platoon, company or battalion. These are the types of formations that are elements of the next level of the hierarchy - the military unit.

Larger units of the Russian Armed Forces are called, depending on their size, units, formations and associations (English formations). The most common (but not the only) type of military units Soviet army were regiments, and in the Russian army - brigades. An example of formations are individual brigades, divisions, wings, etc. Formations are represented in the Soviet and Russian armies by corps and armies.

Hierarchy of modern armies

Symbol	Army unit name (divisions, formations, associations)	Number of soldiers	Number of subordinate units	Command of an army unit
XXXXXXX	theater of war or armed forces	300000+	2+ fronts	supreme commander
XXXXXX	front, district	150000+	2+ army groups	army general, marshal
XXXXX	army group	80000+	2+ armies	army general, marshal
XXXX	army	40000+	2+ cases	lieutenant general, colonel general
XXX	frame	20000-50000	2-6 divisions	major general, lieutenant general
XX	division	5000-20000	2-6 brigades	colonel, major general
X	brigade	1300-8000	2-6 regiments	colonel, major general, brigadier general, brigadier
III	regiment	700-3000	2-6 battalions, divisions	major, lieutenant colonel, colonel
II	battalion, division	150-1000	2-12 mouth	senior lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel
I	company, battery, squadron	30-250	2-8 platoons, 6-10 squads	lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major
	platoon, detachment	10-50	2-6 branches	warrant officer, senior warrant officer, junior lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain
Ø	squad, crew, crew	2-10	2 groups, links	junior sergeant, sergeant, senior sergeant, sergeant major, warrant officer
Ø	unit, group, team	2-10	0	corporal, junior sergeant

Steps in this ladder can be skipped: for example, in NATO forces there is usually a battalion-brigade organization (in Russia such an organization is also used, it is an alternative to the battalion-regiment-division division). At the same time, in the Soviet army there were so-called separate brigades, the main difference of which was that, unlike modern brigades, they included separate military units (for example, two motorized rifle regiments).

An army, an army group, a region and a theater of military operations are the largest formations, which can differ greatly from each other in size and composition. At the division level, support forces are usually added (field artillery, medical service, logistics service, etc.), which may not be present at the regiment and battalion level. In the USA, a regiment with support units is called a regimental combat team, in the UK and other countries - a combat group.

In some countries, traditional names may be used, creating confusion. Thus, British and Canadian tank battalions are divided into squadrons (companies, English companies) and troops, English. troops (corresponding to platoons, English platoons), while in the American cavalry a squadron corresponds not to a company, but to a battalion, and is divided into troops ( troops, resp. companies) and platoons.

The fronts of the Red Army during World War II corresponded, according to this classification, to army groups.

Add-ons

1. The names of the listed units may vary depending on the type of troops. For example:
   1. In the Soviet army (and, accordingly, in the Russian army), a squad may be called a crew. Functionally corresponds to the crew of one combat vehicle;
   2. IN missile forces and artillery, air defense troops, a squad can be called a crew. Functionally corresponds to a crew that serves one gun or combat vehicle;
   3. In missile and artillery and air defense forces, a company is called a battery, and a battalion is called a division;
   4. In cavalry, a company was called a squadron, and a battalion was called a division (but often in cavalry regiments this unit was excluded and the regiment consisted of only several squadrons). Currently, in the armies of Anglo-Saxon countries (Britain, USA) there are so-called. armored cavalry troops, in which this name is retained;
   5. In the Russian Cossack troops there are other names - regiments of six hundred or four hundred, hundreds, fifty, squads (tens), individual artillery units. The Cossack troops also have their own system of military ranks;
2. The indicated number refers to infantry (motorized infantry, motorized rifle) troops. In other branches of the military, the number of units with the same names may be significantly smaller. For example, infantry regiment consists of 3 - 4 thousand people, artillery - of 1 thousand.
3. Any military unit in the army has not one, but two states - peacetime and wartime. The wartime workforce adds new positions in existing units, new units, and new units. Missing military personnel are called up for general mobilization in wartime. In the Soviet (and Russian) army there are:
   1. Deployed wartime staff;
   2. Reduced staff;
   3. Cadre units (in which the staff consists only of officers at the level of platoon commanders, company commanders or battalion commanders and above).

In the modern Russian army, about 85% of military units have a reduced staff, the remaining 15% are so-called. "parts constant readiness", which are deployed to a full staff. In peacetime, the Armed Forces in Russia are divided into military districts, each of which is headed by a district commander with the rank of army general. In wartime, fronts are deployed on the basis of military districts;

1. In all modern armies a “ternary” (sometimes “quaternary”) composition was adopted. This means that an infantry regiment consists of three infantry battalions (“three-battalion composition”). In addition to them, it includes other units - for example, a tank battalion, artillery and anti-aircraft divisions, repair, reconnaissance companies, commandant platoon, etc. In turn, each infantry battalion of the regiment consists of three infantry companies and other units - for example , mortar battery, communications platoon.
2. The hierarchy, therefore, may not be direct; for example, a mortar battery in an infantry regiment is not part of any battalion (division). Accordingly, separate battalions can be allocated, each of which is an independent military unit, or even separate companies. Also, each regiment can be part of a division, or (at a higher level) directly subordinate to the command of the corps (“corps subordination regiment”), or, at an even higher level, the regiment can subordinate directly to the command of a military district (“district subordination regiment”);
3. In an infantry regiment, the main units - infantry battalions - report directly to the regimental commander. All auxiliary units are subordinate to his deputies. The same system is repeated at all levels. For example, for an artillery regiment of district subordination, the chief will not be the commander of the district troops, but the chief of the district artillery. The communications platoon of an infantry battalion is subordinate not to the battalion commander, but to his first deputy - the chief of staff.
4. Brigades are a separate unit. In terms of their position, brigades stand between a regiment (the regiment commander is a colonel) and a division (the division commander is a major general). In most armies of the world there is an intermediate rank between the ranks of colonel and major general "Brigadier General", corresponding to the brigade commander (and during the Second World War the Waffen-SS had the rank of “Oberführer”). In Russia, traditionally there is no such title. In the modern Russian army, the Soviet division military district-corps-division-regiment-battalion, as a rule, is replaced by the abbreviated military district - brigade - battalion. operational-tactical [i.e. 2-7]. - M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1976-1980.
5. Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Division - Brigade - Regiment). Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow. 1985
6. Regulations on passing military service officers of the Soviet Army and Navy. Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 200-67.
7. Soviet Army Officer's Handbook and Navy. Moscow. Military publishing house 1970
8. A reference book for officers of the Soviet Army and Navy on legislation. Moscow. Military publishing house 1976
9. Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 105-77 “Regulations on the military economy of the Armed Forces of the USSR.”
10. Charter of the internal service of the USSR Armed Forces. Moscow. Military publishing house 1965
11. Textbook. Operational art. Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow. 1965
12. I. M. Andrusenko, R. G. Dunov, Yu. R. Fomin. Motorized rifle (tank) platoon in battle. Moscow. Military publishing house 1989

The Leningrad Front adopted Resolution No. 00274 “On strengthening the fight against desertion and penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad,” according to which the head of the Front’s Military Rear Security was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents.” On October 12, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. Stalin received a note in which he proposed to “organize a command group along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow” to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which would be given a “barrage detachment to stop the fleeing.”

How many people are in a company, battalion, platoon, etc.

The term of punishment was calculated from a month to three, a wound received even on the first day of stay in a penal unit automatically returned the fighter to the unit to the same position, in the same military rank, so service in the penal units when fighting was going on was not even considered a day, and for hours, it was deadly and dangerous.

Penal battalions were under the authority of the military councils of the fronts, and penal companies were under the authority of the military councils of the armies.
For the direct conduct of military operations, penal units were assigned rifle divisions, brigades, regiments.

Info

Military personnel were sent to penal battalions by order of the division (corps, army, front - in relation to units of the corresponding subordination), and to penal companies - by order of the regiment (individual unit) for a period of 1 to 3 months.

Penal military units

Attention

I.I. Maslennikov, who demanded that military personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or tried by a military tribunal.

Published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that commanders and superiors did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives.
This, as the study showed, concerned approximately 10 categories of fines: 1. Those convicted unjustly, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.
2. The so-called “surrounded people” who managed to escape from the “cauldrons” and reach their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.
3. Military personnel who have lost combat and secret documents.
4.

Commanders and superiors guilty of “criminally careless organization of the combat security and reconnaissance service.”

5. Persons who, due to their beliefs, refused to take up arms.
6.

Military ranks of the Russian Federation

However, the attentive reader can now imagine the naval and aviation hierarchy quite simply and with minor errors. Now it will be easier for us to dialogue, friends! After all, every day we are getting closer to speaking the same language.
You are learning more and more military terms and meanings, and I am getting closer and closer to civilian life!)) I wish everyone to find in this article what they were looking for, the author of the blog Army: a view from the inside.

Penal battalions and barrage detachments of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Platoon. A platoon includes from 3 to 6 sections, that is, it can reach from 15 to 60 people. The platoon commander is in charge of the platoon. This is already an officer position. It is occupied by a minimum of a lieutenant and a maximum of a captain. Company.

A company includes from 3 to 6 platoons, that is, it can consist of from 45 to 360 people.

The company is commanded by the company commander. This is a major position. In fact, the commander is a senior lieutenant or captain (in the army, a company commander is affectionately and abbreviated as a company commander). Battalion. This is either 3 or 4 companies + headquarters and individual specialists (gunsmith, signalman, snipers, etc.), a mortar platoon (not always), sometimes air defense and tank destroyers (hereinafter referred to as PTB).

The battalion includes from 145 to 500 people. The battalion commander (abbreviated as battalion commander) commands.

This is the position of lieutenant colonel.

Mistervik

Practice has shown that when implementing this order, significant violations were committed, the elimination of which was directed by Order No. 0244, signed on August 6, 1944 by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same kind of order No. 0935, concerning officers of fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar

Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov. Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties.

On November 23, 1944, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin signed order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (commander of the guard regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner. The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always carried out successfully, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K.

Since penal officers were entrusted with the most difficult combat missions, their losses among both permanent and variable penal units were quite high.

Thus, in 1944, the average monthly casualty of variable casualties in killed, deceased, wounded and sick reached 10,506 people, and permanent casualties - 3,685 people.

This is 3-6 times more than the level of casualties of conventional troops in the same offensive operations. Penalties who were wounded in battle were considered to have served their sentences, were restored to rank and all rights and, upon recovery, were sent for further service in regular units, and disabled people were given pensions from the salary of the last position before enlistment in the penal battalion.
Assault battalions were intended for use in the most active sectors of the front. The duration of stay of personnel in individual assault rifle battalions was established to be two months of participation in battles, either until they were awarded an order for valor in battle or until the first wound, after which the personnel, if they had good certifications, could be assigned to the field troops for the corresponding command positions. commanding staff."

Subsequently, the formation of assault battalions was continued.

Their combat use in principle, did not differ from penal battalions, although there were significant features. Thus, unlike penal battalions, those who were sent to assault battalions were not convicted and deprived of their officer ranks.

IN company Russian army Maybe enter from 18 to 360 Human. The branch of the military plays an important role, for example:

• IN tank company quantity soldier rarely exceeds 35 Human;
• IN motorized rifle companies Maybe be 60-110 soldier;
• IN nautical infantrye – approximately 130 Human;
• IN air— airborne troops – to 80 soldier And T. d.

A company consists of several platoons, which, in turn, consist of sections. The average department may contain from 3 to 15 Human, in platoon – from 9 to 45 Human. More often total V company included 2-6 platoons.

The company is the smallest formation that has tactical importance. Those. on the battlefield, the company is capable of performing small tactical tasks. In cavalry, companies are called squadrons, in artillery - batteries, in border troops - outposts, in aviation - aviation units. Most often, companies are part of battalions and regiments, but there are also separate formations that are not tied to larger structures.

The company is controlled by a commander, whom soldiers often call the company commander. This person must have a major position, i.e. holds the rank of senior lieutenant or captain.

As a rule, the data presented relate not only to Russian, but also to foreign armies. For example, motorized infantry companies USA have number 100-120 Human, such same companies V Germany – 120-130 Human.

The army, like any other phenomenon, has many interesting facts, which are even interesting ordinary people who have nothing to do with the army.

1. Some are interested in why the buttons on soldiers' uniforms are on the front side, and not, as they should be, on the side. This design was invented by Peter. This was explained by the fact that many soldiers of that time were simple peasants who did not know the rules and regulations of etiquette. That's why Peter 1 placed the buttons on the front side to make it inconvenient for soldiers to wipe their mouths with their uniform sleeves.
2. Are there gay guys among the soldiers? Now many people joke about it. Like, if you don’t want to serve in the army, pretend that you gay. More and more young people are resorting to this trick. In our country, such persons are not allowed to serve in the army. However, history says that ancient Greek commanders, on the contrary, created separate detachments from representatives of non-traditional orientation. Moreover, such units were considered invincible. And the whole point is that men were simply afraid of falling down in the eyes of their lovers, which forced them to give all their best on the battlefield.
3. Now it’s far from news that there are women’s groups. Today the feminist movement of women is very popular. They are trying to prove their strength and independence from men. The creation of women's groups is partly a way to achieve this goal. But still, one of the main tasks of a woman is to illuminate those around her with her beauty. That's why a vote was held on the most attractive and sexy female army. So, Romania took first place, and Russia third.