In his book, which was pompously titled “My War,” as well as in numerous speeches, Hitler proclaimed that the Germans, as a superior race, needed more living space.

At the same time, he did not mean Europe, but the Soviet Union, its European part. The mild climate, fertile lands and geographical proximity to Germany - all this made Ukraine, from his point of view, an ideal place for a German colony. He took the experience of British colonization in India as a basis.

According to his plan, the Aryans should live in beautiful houses, enjoy all the benefits, while the fate of other peoples is to serve them.

Negotiations with Hitler

Although the plan was excellent, certain difficulties arose with its implementation. Hitler understood perfectly well that it would hardly be possible to conquer Russia so quickly, due to its territorial size and large population, like Europe. But he firmly hoped to carry out a military operation before the onset of the famous Russian frosts, realizing that getting bogged down in the war was fraught with defeat in it.

Joseph Stalin was not ready for the start of the war. According to some historians, he sincerely believed that Hitler would not attack the USSR until he defeated France and Great Britain. But the fall of France in 1940 made him think about the possible threat from the Germans.

Therefore, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was delegated to Germany with clear instructions - to drag out negotiations with Hitler for as long as possible. Stalin's calculation was aimed at the fact that Hitler would not dare to attack closer to the fall - after all, then he would have to fight in the winter, and if he did not have time to act in the summer of 1941, then he would have to postpone his military plans until next year.

Plans to attack Russia

Plans for an attack on Russia by Germany have been developed since 1940. Historians believe that Hitler canceled Operation Sea Lion, deciding that with the fall of the Soviet Union the British would surrender on their own.

The first version of the offensive plan was made by General Erich Marx in August 1940 - in the Reich he was considered the best specialist on Russia. In it, he took into account many factors - economic opportunities, human resources, vast territories of the conquered country. But even careful reconnaissance and development of the Germans did not allow them to discover the reserve of the Supreme High Command, which included armored forces, engineering troops, infantry and aviation. Subsequently, this became an unpleasant surprise for the Germans.

Marx developed an attack on Moscow as the main direction of attack. Secondary strikes were to be directed at Kyiv and two diversionary strikes through the Baltic states to Leningrad, as well as Moldova. Leningrad was not a priority for Marx.

The plan was developed in an atmosphere of strict secrecy - disinformation about Hitler’s plans to attack the Soviet Union was spread through all channels of diplomatic communication. All troop movements were explained by exercises or redeployments.

The next version of the plan was completed in December 1940 by Halder. He changed Marx's plan, highlighting three directions: the main one was against Moscow, smaller forces were to be concentrated on advancing towards Kyiv, and a major attack was to be made on Leningrad.

After the conquest of Moscow and Leningrad, Harold proposed moving towards Arkhangelsk, and after the fall of Kyiv, the Wehrmacht forces were to head to the Don and Volga region.

The third and final version was developed by Hitler himself, codenamed "Barbarossa". This plan was created in December 1940.

Operation Barbarossa

Hitler put the main focus of military activity on moving north. Therefore, Moscow and Leningrad remained among the strategically important targets. Units moving south were to be tasked with occupying Ukraine west of Kyiv.

The attack began early on the morning of Sunday 22 June 1941. In total, the Germans and their allies committed 3 million soldiers, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, 1,830 aircraft and 750,000 horses. In total, Germany assembled 117 army divisions for the attack, not counting the Romanian and Hungarian ones. Three armies took part in the attack: “North”, “Center” and “South”.

“You just have to kick in the front door, and the entire rotten Russian structure will fall down,” Hitler said smugly a few days after the start of hostilities. The results of the offensive were truly impressive - 300,000 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were killed or captured, 2,500 tanks, 1,400 artillery pieces and 250 aircraft were destroyed. And this is only based on the central advance of German troops after seventeen days. Skeptics, seeing the catastrophic results of the first two weeks of hostilities for the USSR, predicted the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik empire. But the situation was saved by Hitler’s own miscalculations.

The first advances of the fascist troops were so fast that even the Wehrmacht command was not prepared for them - and this jeopardized all supply and communication lines of the army.

Army Group Center stopped on the Desna in the summer of 1941, but everyone believed that this was only a respite before the inexorable movement. But in the meantime, Hitler decided to change the balance of power of the German army. He gave the order military units led by Guderian to head towards Kyiv, and the first tank group go north. was against Hitler’s decision, but could not disobey the Fuhrer’s order - he repeatedly proved his rightness as a military leader with victories, and Hitler’s authority was unusually high.

Crushing defeat of the Germans

The success of the mechanized units in the north and south was as impressive as the attack on June 22 - huge numbers of dead and captured, thousands of units of equipment destroyed. But, despite the results achieved, this decision already contained defeat in the war. lost time. The delay was so significant that the onset of winter occurred before the troops achieved the goals set by Hitler.

The army was not equipped for the winter cold. And the frosts of the winter of 1941-1942 were especially severe. And this was a very important factor that played a role in the loss of the German army.

Russians in World War II Anatoly Ivanovich Utkin

Chapter 5 PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with us. Germany is stuck up to its neck in the war in the West,” and I believe that Hitler will not risk opening a second front by attacking the Soviet Union. Hitler is not such a fool as to see Poland in the Soviet Union.

J.V. Stalin, mid-June 1941

Today I have entrusted the fate of our state and our people into the hands of our soldiers.

Hitler's decision

The conclusion of the pact with the USSR in no way changed Hitler’s attitude towards Russia as a zone of future colonization, an object of German expansion. Despite the flurry of exchanges of pleasantries that followed the fall of Poland, the general direction of Hitler's strategic thinking remained unchanged: "Drang nach Osten."

Less than two months after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty, Hitler ordered the army command to consider occupied Polish territory as a concentration zone for future German operations.

However, the nightmare of the previous war on two fronts continued to haunt him. Pushing his generals to speed up planning for operations in the West, Hitler made it clear what was on his mind: “We can only move against Russia after we have our hands free in the West.” He repeatedly promised his generals not to repeat the Kaiser's mistakes.

In the summer of 1940, Central and Western Europe became a German zone of influence. Admiring the Alpine peaks, Hitler called the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, and surprised him by dismissing English theme to the side. Brauchitsch remained in the memories of his contemporaries as a competent military leader, but his character had a defect that was fatal for Germany. The general did not know how to behave in the presence of the Fuhrer. His professional qualities lost all value when the former corporal with boundless ambitions entered the room. Perhaps Hitler even enjoyed seeing the suffering of a classic representative of the Prussian military caste, not knowing how to control himself in the presence of an unknown force.

Hitler spoke to Brauchitsch about Eastern Europe. The conversation was in no way reminiscent of staff discussions. From a historical perspective, Hitler saw the formation of new states dependent on Germany in Ukraine and Belarus, the formation of the Baltic Federation and the expansion of the territorial limits of Finland. Achieving these goals was possible only under one condition: the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

The next day, Brauchitsch's subordinate, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, listed in his diary the goals set by Hitler:

“England is relying on Russia and the United States. If hopes for Russia are not justified, then America will remain on the sidelines, because the destruction of Russia will enormously increase the power of Japan in the Far East... Russia is the factor on which England relies most... When Russia is crushed, England's last hope will crumble to dust. Then Germany will become the master of Europe and the Balkans. Solution: the destruction of Russia must be part of this fight. Spring '41. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. An attack can only achieve its goal if the roots Russian state will be blown up with one blow. Taking over part of the country does nothing... If we start in May '41, we will have five months to finish everything. It would be best to finish everything this year, but at this time it is impossible to carry out coordinated actions. Defeat the Russian army, occupy as much Russian territory as possible, protect Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from possible air attacks. It is desirable to advance our positions so far to the east that our own air forces can destroy the most important areas of Russia."

The commander of the ground forces and his staff already had their plans. In their opinion, the campaign against the USSR should last no more than four or, at most, six weeks. Brauchitsch believed that to achieve this task, 80 to 100 German divisions would be needed, and on the Soviet side they would be opposed by 50 to 75 “good divisions.” (Note that none of the German generals even expressed a hypothetical assumption that the USSR could act preventively against Germany.)

The fatal decision about the impending attack on the USSR was announced to German generals at the Berghof on July 31, 1940. General Halder reported, and he also recorded Hitler’s remarks.

The Fuhrer said at the Berghof that the operation should only be launched if Russia could be crushed with one blow. He was not interested in seizing territory: “To destroy Russia’s very will to live. This is our goal! While in one of his ecstatic states, Hitler painted a picture of the future battle in broad strokes: Russia would be crushed in two blows. One in the south, in the direction of Kyiv, the second in the north, in the direction of Leningrad. Having reached their goal, both groups turn to each other and close the ring, while the northern group takes Moscow. Hitler also spoke about the possibility of a side additional operation to capture Baku. He already knew what to do with the future conquered country. The Reich will directly include Ukraine, Belarus and the three Baltic republics. The territory up to the White Sea will go to Finland. Leaving 60 divisions in the west, the Fuhrer threw 120 divisions against Russia.

The planned operation was developed at three levels. General Warlimont led the planning at the operational headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKH), General Thomas led the work in the economic department of the OKW, Halder led the planning at the headquarters of the ground forces (OKH).

The date of the upcoming offensive was indicated by Hitler’s order to Goering: deliveries to the USSR should be carried out only until the spring of 1941. Thomas's institution meticulously determined the value of individual regions of the USSR and the location of oil production centers. With calm confidence, it was preparing not only to take control of the Soviet economy, but also to manage it.

Halder had to instruct the direct (at this stage) author of the plan for the new operation - the Chief of Staff of the Eighteenth Army, General Marx, who arrived at the main headquarters of the ground forces (OKH). General Marx on August 5 presented his views on the conduct of the campaign in the East. This grandiose operation, Marx believed, should be aimed at achieving “the defeat of the Soviet armed forces in order to make it impossible for Russia to re-emerge as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future.” The centers of industrial power of the Soviet Union are located in Ukraine, the Donetsk basin, Moscow and Leningrad, and the industrial zone to the east of these areas “is not of particular importance.” Marx's plan set the task of seizing territory along the Northern Dvina, Middle Volga and Lower Don - the cities of Arkhangelsk, Gorky and Rostov. It should be noted that Marx’s views largely determined the course of military operations in the east.

From now on, and constantly, the conversation was about achieving the above-mentioned geographical line, about the defeat of Soviet troops in the border areas. There was no thought about the destruction of the entire military power of the great country and the possibility of its complete occupation. The theoretical heirs of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen proceeded from the assumption that a powerful blow would crush everything internal structures Soviet Union.

The idea of ​​the possibility of a decisive short-term lightning strike blinded German theorists; they had the intellectual courage to look further: what would happen if Russia made the first strike. Hitler, who prided himself on the nonconformity of his military thinking, in this case was completely captured by the academic military science of monocle-wielding generals. Developed in the dazzling months after the victory over France, the ideas of war with Russia acquired an inertia that captured both the military and politicians.

The German military leadership has another important consideration these days. The Reich was confident that Soviet troops in the Baltic republics would strike the flank of German troops if they immediately rushed from the border to Moscow. From this assumption it followed that forces should be allocated to counter Soviet troops in the Baltic states. In addition, the German headquarters clearly overestimated the power of Soviet bomber aircraft, wherever possible, setting the task of conquering territory so deep that Soviet bombers could not bomb German cities.

Why did the Arkhangelsk - Rostov (later Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan) line seem “sufficient” to Hitler and his military circle? We have already talked about the Germans’ belief in the crushing nature of the first strike. But still, why weren’t plans for promotion to Far East? This is all the more strange because the German generals believed in the collapse of the enemy. Why did the German troops have to stop? What did the Wehrmacht High Command think about the fate of the rest of Russia, that which extended beyond the occupation zone desired by Germany? Some of the military vaguely hinted at the power of German bomber aircraft, but it is clear that it was then impossible to destroy Russia from the air, and the German air force did not have sufficient power.

German generals dared to ask questions. So, Field Marshal von Bock (who was to command Army Group Center) asked Hitler what would happen if German troops reached the target line and the central government of Soviet Russia still existed? Hitler said that, having suffered a defeat of this magnitude, the Communists would ask for terms of surrender. More vaguely, the Fuhrer hinted that if the Russian government did not do this, the Wehrmacht would reach the Urals. In this conversation, Hitler showed his absolute determination to oppose Russia: let those around him not bother looking for options for a different, non-forceful solution to the Russian question.

According to von Losberg, whom General Jodl assigned in July 1940 to prepare materials for planning the eastern campaign, Hitler believed that the sixty million living beyond the Volga did not pose a danger to Germany. This specialist also records Hitler’s absolute conviction that the terrible first blow would dispel faith in the Bolshevik ideology, cause interracial and ethnic contradictions, and show the whole world that Greater Russia- artificial formation. As for the ultimate fate of this country, “the Slavic bastard must be kept under the supervision of the master race.” To ensure the solution of this problem, it was necessary to deprive the conquered territories of the system of economic relations, liquidate the communist intelligentsia and Jews, and subject the entire mass of the population to the direct command of the High Commissioners of the Reich. The Russians themselves, the Great Russians, should have been subjected to the most cruel treatment.

It took the High Command of the Ground Forces only a few days to create the first version of the Wehrmacht operation against the Soviet Union. The staff officers looked at the map and saw a natural barrier - the Pripyat swamps. The offensive had to be carried out either to the north (towards Leningrad or Moscow) or to the south - against Ukraine. In the first case, the springboard for the attack was East Prussia and occupied Poland, in the second - Southern Poland and Romania. Captivated by the opening prospect, representatives of the middle officer ranks initially chose the southern direction, Ukraine, as their target. But actions almost on the periphery did not find approval from General Halder, and he demanded that the planned operations be redirected to the north. Having received the appropriate instructions, General Marx designated Orsha as the primary landmark; he envisaged the creation in the Orsha region of an offensive springboard to Moscow. The left flank of the advancing troops was supposed to cut through the Baltic republics and reach Leningrad. Marx did not forget about the opportunities in the south - there the offensive movement was supposed to take place south of Kyiv with a focus on Baku.

This is how the basic outlines of the plan emerged, the implementation of which Germany began a year later. Nobody particularly hurried the military, their imagination and scope were encouraged, this was the time when the top generals of the Wehrmacht received field marshal's batons and they had a feeling of omnipotence.

However, the euphoria did not soften the tough internal struggle. The Army High Command (OKH) (von Brauchitsch and Halder) sought to implement its strategic ideas in secret from Generals Jodl and Warlimont from the Army High Command (OKW). But Jodl understood that non-participation in the preparation of such a large-scale enterprise would weaken his position, and he instructed General Warlimont to prepare his own project, revised by Jodl in September 1940. Jodl was closer to Hitler than the arrogant guardians of caste traditions Brauchitsch and Halder, which is why his project had a special influence on Hitler’s thought process, inaccessible to anyone. Jodl's option envisaged the creation of three army groups, two of which acted north of the Pripyat marshes, and one to the south. It is important to note the following caveat of Jodl’s plan: since the ultimate goal of the offensive is Moscow, it is intended to capture the “forefield” of Moscow in the Smolensk region. Further advances to the capital will depend on the degree of success of neighbors on the left and right. This idea became quite firmly entrenched in Hitler’s consciousness, and he repeatedly turned to it subsequently.

The third version of the preliminary plan was created by the end of October 1940 by the new Assistant Chief of Operations Staff (at the OKH), General Paulus. In this option, two German groups, northern and central, were to be used north of the Pripyat swamps, and one in the south. It is necessary to defeat the Red Army near the borders, think about the destruction of enemy troops, and not about seizing this or that territory. To do this, it was necessary to prevent by any means the systematic retreat of the Red Army into the depths of its territory. The Baltic states, where, according to German information, there were only 30 Soviet divisions, received little attention in Paulus's plan. In this case, it was focused on Belarus (60 divisions) and Ukraine (70 divisions). Paulus believed that after the defeat of the enemy troops, all efforts should be devoted to capturing his capital - namely, the capital, and not industrial centers and strategically advantageous bridgeheads.

Paulus had a very low opinion of the leadership of the Red Army, but emphasized the difficulty of determining the fighting qualities of a Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions in the USSR and in its army were called a favorable element. For the first time, it is Paulus, an Austrian, who breaks away from Prussian unbridled arrogance and discusses the significance of the problem of the numerical superiority of Soviet troops. Halder was pleased with the analysis and planning of his favorite; in the future, echoes of some doubts first expressed by Paulus would be reflected in Halder's reasoning.

On the table of the German military leadership were three versions of the plan for the invasion of the USSR. In Directive No. 18 of November 18, 1940, Hitler wrote: “Political discussions were held with the aim of clarifying Russia’s position. Regardless of the outcome of these discussions, all preparations for the East that I have spoken about orally must continue. Instructions will follow as the Army's operational plans are submitted to me for approval." Options for attacking the USSR were listed, but the main one was not highlighted among them. What was new was felt in the special attention to Finland and the Balkan countries. Hitler began supplying weapons to Finland at the end of July; in September, Germany received the right of passage of its troops to Norway through Finland.

Now it was possible to conduct a general brainstorming of the problem. Between November 28 and December 3, the leadership of the German armed forces conducted a series of war games. Paulus led the battle over the maps. The basic principles (creation of three groups, striking from three bridgeheads) have already become generally accepted initial data. The leaders of the three army groups were given the task of mentally conducting operations independently of their neighbors. All three of the Wehrmacht's best commanders sensed the breathtaking scale of the upcoming battles; They also noted this feature of the front: as it moved eastward, it became more and more grandiose. The initial length of the front - 2 thousand km - quickly increased to 3 thousand.

It followed from this that if the German armed forces did not destroy the Red Army in the space between the border and the Minsk-Kyiv line, then Germany’s opportunities for active action and control over the fighting territory would decrease.

A common problem among the three commanders was roads. The task was somewhat easier in this regard for the northern group (Baltic roads), but Army Groups “Center” and “South” had to experience all the difficulties of moving three and a half million soldiers off-road. The Soviet railway gauge, wider than in Europe, also posed a problem for the Germans. The alarm was sounded in the statement of the reserve commander Fromm: he had only about half a million soldiers at his disposal - this is all that could compensate for the losses in the summer campaign. A shortage of freight transport, primarily trucks, was noted. The German command had at its disposal a three-month supply of oil and a one-month supply of diesel fuel. Truly, one had to have boundless faith in one’s fortune when starting a mortal struggle with the enemy with such equipment. A smaller shortage is tires. The figures for military production are astonishing - only 250 tanks and self-propelled guns per year by the beginning of 1941. For a country capable of producing a million engines, this was an unforgivable act of recklessness. This daring turned into arrogance: imports from the Soviet Union served as one of the main sources of solving the problems of raw materials on the eve of the war.

But the main thing that worried the German generals was the question of whether it was possible to start a war in the east without solving the British problem. We see this kind of doubt about the correctness of Hitler's strategy primarily in Brauchitsch. At an important meeting of the generals with the Fuhrer on December 5, 1940, he pointed out the shortage, first of all, of aircraft, if some of them were occupied in the skies of England. Hitler interrupted the commander of the ground forces and uttered a phrase that was remembered by everyone present: Germany can wage war against two opponents at once if the eastern campaign does not drag on.

On the eve of this meeting, Hitler had a long conversation with Goering and Jodl, who noted the Fuhrer's obvious desire to stay tough with representatives of the old Prussian school. In particular, he was very critical of Halder's proposal - the unconditional concentration of forces for a strike in one direction - against Moscow. Halder believed that the fortified flanks of this powerful group would not allow Soviet troops to launch lateral attacks from the south and north, from the Baltic states and Ukraine. Hitler objected: the economic goals of the war are as important as others. The Soviet leadership will strive with all its might to protect its industrial centers in Ukraine and the Baltic states; it needs the Baltic ports and Ukrainian industry. Moreover: “the capture of Moscow is not that important.” Army Group Center must retain the ability to turn north and south.

Brauchitsch expressed solidarity with Halder, pointing out the importance of the Smolensk-Moscow line. After all, in the minds of Russians this is the most important vital road. In response, Hitler said that only a ossified consciousness is capable of holding on to such old ideas. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to keep in mind Smolensk and Orsha as a potential springboard in Central Russia and do not fantasize about operations beyond this point. A fatal decision... The German army will pay dearly for it.

Ultimately, the high command of the ground forces abandoned the “dangerous” attempts to firmly determine the main goal of the upcoming military operations. The professionals submitted to Hitler. Perhaps the world's finest team of military theorists was now consciously making "the ultimate goal nothing," trusting that in the course of the unfolding hostilities it would be able to find the optimal choice between time and space, between the task of defeating enemy forces and chasing enemy territory. Strategists in officer uniforms now pinned their hopes on the fact that wartime demands would force Hitler to come down to earth and realistically assess the situation.

On August 9, 1940, General Warlimont gave the first orders for the deployment of troops on the approaches to the USSR. According to the Aufbau Ost plan, on August 26, two motorized divisions were moved to Poland. Ten infantry divisions followed. According to Hitler's plan, tank divisions should have been concentrated in southern Poland in order to quickly reach the Romanian oil fields.

The movement of large masses of troops could not go unnoticed. Therefore, the German military attache in Moscow, E. Kestring, was authorized to notify the Soviet General Staff that we were talking about a massive replacement of skilled workers with younger soldiers. All the basic methods of camouflage and disinformation were contained in the instructions given to Jodl on September 6: “These regroupings should not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing for an offensive in the East.”

Soviet intelligence

At the end of 1940 new manager Soviet military intelligence GRU Philip Golikov reviewed the most important links of the intelligence network.

Of all the Soviet residencies, the Berlin one was perhaps the most important. There were the largest number of agents here, and they had unique information. The residency was headed by the military attache of the Soviet embassy, ​​Major General Vasily Tupikov (code name Arnold). Direct assistants were air attaché Colonel N.D. Skornyakov (“Meteor”), Khlopov, Bazhanov, Zaitsev. The latter was responsible for contacts with “Alta” (Ilse Stöbe) and “Aryan”. "Aryan" worked in the information section of the German Foreign Ministry.

Before Hitler had time to make the decision to attack the Soviet Union, on September 29, 1940, “Aryan” reported on the deterioration of relations between Germany and the USSR. "Hitler intends to solve problems in the east in the spring of 1941." As a source, he named Karl Schnurre, head of the Russian sector of the economic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And on December 29, 1940, “Aryan” reported from “the highest-ranking circles” that Hitler gave the order to prepare for war against the USSR. "War will be declared in March 1941." Golikov wrote down this message to People's Commissar Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff. Stalin received two copies, and the Chief of the General Staff, Kiril Meretskov, was also notified. Voices were heard: who is the source?

According to the request, the Aryan reported on January 4, 1941 that “he received this information from a friend in military circles. Moreover, it is not based on rumors, but on a special order from Hitler, extremely secret and known only to very few people.” On February 28, 1941, “Aryan” sent a report on German preparations for war against the USSR: “People involved in the project confirm that the war against the USSR will begin this year (1941).” Three army groups are organized under the leadership of Field Marshals von Bock, von Rundstedt and von Leeb to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The offensive begins tentatively on May 20. Forces of 120 German divisions are concentrated in the Pinsk area. During the preparatory measures, Russian-speaking persons are appointed commanders. Trains with a wide gauge, like in Russia, have been prepared.”

From a person close to Goering, The Aryan heard that “Hitler intends to take three million slaves out of Russia in order to use them in industry - to increase its capacity.

Golikov and a number of GRU department heads were new, and they did not attach due importance to the Aryan's messages.

IN AND. Tupikov arrived in Berlin in December 1940 as a military attaché. At the end of April 1941, having looked around Berlin and studied the reports of agents (including “Aryan”), Tupikov addressed an unusual personal letter to Golikov:

"1. Current German plans involve war against the USSR as the next enemy.

2. The conflict will occur this year.” Golikov distributed Tulikov's report to the proper recipients (including Zhukov), but omitted Tulikov's conclusions above. But they fully confirmed the conclusions of “The Aryan”. On May 9, Tupikov personally sent letters to Zhukov and Timoshenko, describing German plans. “The defeat of the Red Army will be achieved within one and a half months - with the Germans reaching the meridian of Moscow.”

The resident of the GRU in Helsinki was Colonel I.V. Smirnov (“Ostwald”), his assistant was Major Ermolov. In reports dated June 15 and 17, 1941, they talk about Finnish military preparations, mobilization, the evacuation of children and women from big cities, and anti-aircraft guns arriving in Helsinki.

The GRU recruited the head of Czech military intelligence, Colonel Frantisek Moravec. In France, Leopold Treper (aka Jean Gilbert) informed resident General Susloparov on June 21, 1941 that “the Wehrmacht command has completed the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders and tomorrow, June 22, will launch a surprise attack against the Soviet Union.” Stalin read this report and wrote in the margin: “This information is a British provocation. Find the author and punish him.”

From Switzerland, the head of the intelligence network, Alexander Rado (“Dora”), sent a report to Moscow on February 21, 1941, based on data from the Swiss General Staff: “Germany has 150 divisions in the east... The German offensive will begin at the end of May.” One gets the impression that Golikov knew for sure that Stalin was skeptical about the warnings about the attack in 1941 and therefore did not publish reports contradicting the views of the leader. April 6, 1941 Dora reports that all German motorized divisions are in the east. The message of June 2 is of interest: “All German motorized divisions are on the border of the USSR in a state of constant readiness... Unlike the April-May period, preparations along the Russian border are carried out less demonstratively, but with greater intensity.”

Richard Sorge's first report came to Moscow on November 18, 1940 - about German preparations for war against the Soviet Union. On December 28, he reports that the Germans have created a reserve army consisting of 40 divisions in the Leipzig area. 80 German divisions were located on the Soviet border with Romania.

On May 1, 1941, Sorge reports that twenty German divisions left France for the Soviet borders. On May 5, 1941, Sorge handed over a microfilm of Ribbentrop's telegram to the German Ambassador to Japan Ott, which states that "Germany will begin war against Russia in mid-June 1941." June 13: “I repeat: nine armies with a total strength of 150 divisions will begin the offensive on the morning of June 22.” Ambassador Ott told Sorge on June 20 that "war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable." Stalin's notes in the margins of Sorge's reports do not suggest that he believed his the best intelligence officer. Proskurov at one time demanded that Sorge be rewarded, and Golikov cut his monthly subsidies in half.

(In the early 1960s, when the leading military commanders were shown the Franco-German film “Who are you, Doctor Sorge?”, an angry Zhukov approached Golikov. “Why, Philip Ivanovich, didn’t you show his reports to me? Don’t report such information to your boss General Staff?” Golikov replied: “What should I report to you if Sorge was a double agent - both ours and theirs?”

Since the beginning of the war, the Soviet leadership was interested in one main question: what would Japan's behavior be like during the Soviet-German war?

Diplomatic preparations

Hitler showed the closest interest in the Balkans - after the second Vienna Arbitration, Romania, which had significantly decreased in territory, asked Berlin for guarantees. Germany (and after it Italy) gave guarantees to the new Romania, which entered the zone of influence of the Axis countries. According to a secret directive dated September 20, 1940, Hitler ordered military missions to be sent to Romania. “To the outside world, their task will be to help friendly Romania in the organization and management of its armed forces. The real task, which should not be known either to the Romanians or to our own troops, will be the defense of the oil field areas... preparing the deployment of German and Romanian troops from Romanian bases in the event of war with Soviet Russia.”

Romania's guarantees raised serious concerns in the Kremlin. Ribbentrop tried in lengthy dispatches to explain the meaning and results of the Vienna Arbitration; Ambassador Schulenburg had calming conversations with Molotov, but in vain. Schulenburg reported that Molotov, “unlike previous contacts, was closed.” Moreover, an oral protest followed from the Soviet side, in which the German government was accused of violating Article Three of the Soviet-German treaty, which provided for bilateral Soviet-German consultations in such cases. In the incident with Romania, the Soviet Union was confronted with a fait accompli.

Ribbentrop refused to acknowledge Germany's violation of the August Treaty. He “went on a counteroffensive” on September 3, 1940, accusing the USSR of arbitrary actions against the Baltic states and Romanian provinces. The response of the Soviet leadership on September 21 was written in harsh language. It stated that Germany had violated the treaty and that the Soviet Union was interested in Romania for many reasons. A completely new note was the proposal, not without sarcasm, to cancel or amend the clause on mutual consultations “if it contains certain inconveniences” for the German side.

The second area of ​​divergence of interests emerged in the North. The Soviet leadership was informed of the appearance of German troops in Finland. As explained, they were heading to Norway, but the fact remains: German units appeared on the territory of a country that had a huge common border with the USSR (which most recently was the front line). The German embassy reported to Berlin: “The Soviet embassy wishes to receive the text of the agreement on the passage of troops through Finland, including its secret paragraphs... to receive information about the purpose of the agreement, against whom it is directed, what purposes it serves.”

The third reason for the disagreement arose after a telegram sent to the German embassy on September 25, marked with the highest classification of secrecy: Germany, Japan and Italy intend to sign an agreement on a military alliance in Berlin. “This alliance is directed exclusively against American warmongers. Of course, this, as usual, is not expressly stated in the treaty, but such a conclusion follows unmistakably from its terms... Its sole purpose is to bring to their senses those elements who are fighting for America's entry into the war by demonstrating that if they intervene in the present conflict they will automatically have to deal with the three great powers as adversaries.”

On the wave of victories in the west, Hitler decided to strengthen ties with Italy and Japan. In September 1940, Hitler concluded that such an alliance would strengthen German positions in both the east and the west. Ribbentrop pointed out that the pact would strengthen America's isolation in the West and would have an impact on Russia - the policy of friendship with it should have clearly defined boundaries. Hitler's decision led to Mussolini's invitation to the Brenner Pass in early October 1940. An eyewitness, Ciano, wrote in his diary: “Rarely have I seen the Duce in such good mood. The conversation was cordial and definitely the most interesting I have heard. Hitler laid at least a few of his cards on the table and shared with us his plans for the future... Hitler was energetic and again took a very anti-Bolshevik position. “Bolshevism,” he said, “is the doctrine of people who stand at the lowest level of civilization.”

Germany's alliance with Italy and Japan created a bloc that opposed British Empire. A significant question arose: what was the position of the USSR under the new balance of power? On the one hand, Germany was already planning an attack on the Soviet Union; on the other hand, she tried to find ways to peacefully include him in the German orbit. The time to determine the priority of one or another trend was November 1940.

Hitler dictated a letter to Ribbentrop to Moscow: the tripartite pact of Germany, Italy and Japan, signed on September 27, was directed specifically against Britain and the United States. Stalin was invited to join him.

Stalin responded reservedly:

"I got your letter. I am sincerely grateful for your trust, as well as for your instructive analysis. latest events... V.M. Molotov considers himself obliged to make a return visit to Berlin... As for the discussion of certain problems with the participation of the Japanese and Italians, I am of the opinion (without rejecting this idea in principle) that this issue should be submitted for preliminary consideration.” On the day of Molotov’s arrival, Hitler issued a top-secret directive: “Regardless of the results of these discussions, all preparations related to the East, about which verbal orders have already been made, must continue.”

Molotov's visit

Many potentially controversial issues have accumulated between the two countries. Hitler watched without any approval as the USSR restored the “pre-Versailles” position in Eastern Europe, while Germany undid the results of Versailles in the West. The USSR and Germany were now simply obliged to draw a line demarcating their actions in the Balkans.

The American journalist Shirer wrote in his diary on November 12, 1940: “It’s a dark rainy day, Molotov has arrived, he is received extremely dryly and formally. Driving through Unter den Linden to the Soviet embassy, ​​he seemed to me like a constrained provincial schoolteacher... The Germans talk cheekily about allowing Moscow to fulfill the old Russian dream of taking over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, while they take over the rest of the Balkans: Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." There was a guard of honor along the entire distance from the border with the USSR to Berlin.

German records even contain descriptions of the clothing of those present. Molotov wore an unremarkable civilian suit, while Ribbentrop wore a blue-green uniform, high boots and a high-crowned cap (which he himself cut). The first meeting took place at a round table in the former presidential palace, which had recently been received by the Reich Minister. Molotov himself recalls Hitler’s huge, tall office, where everyone except the owner allowed themselves only remarks. Goering's office, hung with paintings and tapestries, also made an impression. The premises of the NSDAP Central Committee were much simpler. Hess, who ran the place, sat in a modest office. Molotov was impressed by Hitler's translator, Hilger, who was born in Odessa and spoke fluent Russian. Ambassador Schulenburg spoke only a little Russian. Leaving Moscow with Molotov, he forgot his embassy uniform at the embassy - he was forced to return by train and catch up with the train by car. After conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Molotov sent long telegrams to Stalin every evening.

Ribbentrop also began by declaring the end of the British Empire. The British hope only for help from America, but “the entry of the United States into the war will have no consequences for Germany. Germany and Italy will never allow the Anglo-Saxons to land on European continent... The Axis countries are now thinking not about how to win the war, but about how to end the war that has already been won.” The time has come for Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan to define their spheres of influence. The Fuehrer believes that all four powers should turn their gaze to the south. Japan to South Asia, Italy to Africa. Germany, installed in Western Europe"new order" will take over Central Africa. Ribbentrop was interested to know whether Russia would also turn in the direction south seas, “wouldn’t she turn to the south to gain access to the open sea, which is so important to her.”

The picture painted by Ribbentrop, contrary to expectation, did not arouse enthusiasm. Molotov interrupted the Reich Minister: “To which sea?” Ribbentrop's flow of eloquence suddenly dried up. He could not directly answer the question posed. Beating around the bush, the Reich Minister kept talking about the enormous changes in the world. Only when Molotov repeated his question did Ribbentrop allow greater clarity: "The most advantageous access to the sea for Russia could be found in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea." According to the notes of the translator Schmidt, Molotov, with an inscrutable face, commented on these words of Ribbentrop: “Clarity and caution are necessary in defining areas of interest.”

After lunch, Hitler made an attempt to turn the head of the extremely grounded Molotov in the Reich Chancellery. The Fuhrer greeted Molotov with a Nazi salute and shook hands with all members of the Soviet delegation. Representatives of both sides sat in a pompous reception area at a low table. Hitler began the conversation in the most pompous tone: “An attempt should be made to determine the course of development of nations for a long period of time in the future, and, if this turns out to be possible, it should be done in such a way as to avoid friction and elements of conflict as far as is humanly possible. This is especially important to keep in mind when two nations, Germany and Russia, are under the leadership of people who have sufficient power to determine the direction of their countries."

Hitler tried to divert attention from the Balkans and Finland. He proposed to bring the discussion of German-Soviet relations to the highest - global - level, “above all petty considerations” and for a long period of time. The build-up of American power, which has stronger foundations of power than Britain, should be anticipated in advance. The European powers must coordinate their policies to keep the Anglo-Saxons out of Europe. Hitler promised that as the weather improved, with the help of aviation, “England would be dealt the final blow.” America will pose a challenge, but the United States "will not be able to threaten the freedom of other nations until 1970 or 1980... It doesn't care about Europe, it doesn't care about Africa, it doesn't care about Asia."

Molotov managed to downplay the pathos of this geopolitician: “The Fuhrer’s statements are of a general nature. He (Molotov), ​​for his part, is ready to present the views of Stalin, who gave him clear instructions.” Translator Schmidt recalled: “No foreign visitor spoke to the Fuhrer in this way.” Molotov's questions dissipated Hitler's aura as the creator of a new European order. Molotov was interested in what the meaning of the tripartite pact was, what the Germans were doing in Finland, and how Hitler saw the future situation in Asia. The conversation quickly came to main topic: Balkans. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs directly stated that he was interested in “clarifying issues relating to the Balkan and Black Sea interests of Russia in relation to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.” Hitler proposed dividing the British inheritance, he pushed Russia into Asia. Stalin was interested in what was happening in the Balkans.

Perhaps for the first time, Hitler was relieved when the air raid sounded over Berlin. He suggested that the discussion be postponed until the next day.

In the morning, Molotov repeated his questions to Hitler. It was Europe, not Asia, that became the subject of detailed discussions. Hitler disputed Molotov's assertion that Finland was occupied by German troops. They are in transit there on their way to Norway. For his part, the Fuhrer insistently asserted that the USSR was preparing for war with Finland, and asked when this war would begin. The new Soviet-Finnish conflict could lead to far-reaching consequences. Molotov perked up: what does the Fuhrer mean? He then noted: “A new factor has been introduced into the debate by this statement.” The oppressive silence was interrupted by Ribbentrop, frightened by the course of the conversation: the Finnish question should not be dramatized, the tension that arose was caused by a misunderstanding. This intervention allowed Hitler to collect his thoughts and abruptly change the topic of conversation:

"Let's turn to more important issues. After the conquest of England, the British Empire will be a gigantic, world-scale, bankrupt estate measuring forty million square kilometers. Russia will gain access to ice-free and indeed open ocean. Hitherto a minority of forty-five million Englishmen had ruled over the six hundred million inhabitants of the British Empire. The day is not far off when he (Hitler) will crush this minority... Prospects of global proportions are emerging... All countries that are interested in the bankrupt possession should stop squabbling among themselves and concentrate solely on the division of the British Empire.

Molotov replied that Hitler's arguments were undoubtedly of interest, but above all it was necessary to clarify German-Soviet relations. He discovered a lack of enthusiasm on the German side when he asked to direct the discussion closer to the problems of Europe - Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania. “The Soviet government is of the view that German guarantees to Romania are directed against the interests of the Soviet Union.” Germany must cancel its guarantees. What would Germany's reaction be if the USSR provided guarantees to Bulgaria on the same terms as Germany and Italy to Romania?

Hitler darkened when he heard this question. Has Bulgaria asked for such guarantees? He had not heard of such a request. In any case, he must first consult with Mussolini. After this, Hitler, famous for his unbridled eruption of words, fell silent for a long time, then drew the guest’s attention to the late hour.

Hitler did not go to the banquet at the Soviet embassy. At the moment when Ribbentrop stood up to make a return toast, an air raid warning was announced. In the air-raid shelter, Ribbentrop, notorious for his tactlessness, took from his pocket a draft agreement that would turn the trilateral pact into a quadrilateral one. According to Article Two, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union pledged to “respect each other’s natural spheres of influence” by resolving conflicts among themselves in a “friendly manner.” Ribbentrop intended to publicize the fact of concluding an agreement with the USSR, but to keep secret the secret protocol, according to which the Soviet Union was asked to concentrate its troops in the southern direction in the area Indian Ocean. The desire to redirect the USSR to the south is transparently visible. For this, Ribbentrop promised to ensure that Moscow signed a non-aggression pact with Japan and to achieve Japanese recognition of Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang, which were in the sphere of Soviet interests.

For the third time, Molotov refused to discuss the Asian direction. The Baltic, the Balkans and the Black Sea straits - that’s what concerned him first. “Issues of interest to the Soviet Union concern not only Turkey, but also Bulgaria... The fate of Romania and Hungary is also of interest to the USSR, and under no circumstances will their fate be indifferent to it. The Soviet government would also like to know what the plans of the Axis countries are in relation to Yugoslavia and Greece, and also what Germany intends to do with Poland... The Soviet government is interested in Swedish neutrality... In addition, there is the question of exit from the Baltic Sea.” The rushed Ribbentrop asked not to ask him questions point-blank. He repeated again and again that "the main question is the readiness of the Soviet Union to take part in the coming partition of the British Empire." In response, Molotov allowed himself a harsh joke: “If Britain is finished, then why are we in this bomb shelter and whose bombs are falling on the city?” He said he was being asked to discuss “the great problems of tomorrow,” but he was most interested in current problems.

No one can say with complete certainty how the USSR’s inclusion in the tripartite pact (and agreement to the “Indian direction”) would have affected Hitler’s plans to start a war. His absolute determination is clear from the documents, from the orders already given to deploy the German military machine to the east. Perhaps only the servility of the USSR could push Hitler to “solve the British question” at the beginning. But this hypothesis also has no solid basis. Molotov's harshness did not slow down (and perhaps even accelerated) Hitler's preparations for the Eastern campaign. Obviously, the last doubts were cast aside. Stalin from Berlin was seen as ready for defensive measures, interested in the fate of Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey - the entire belt of countries between the USSR and Germany. It was not possible to make Russia a satellite through promises of access to the division of the British Empire.

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Barbarossa Fall"), the code name for Germany's war plan against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).

In 1940, after the defeat of the French army, the moment came that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. On July 22, 1940, the day of the French surrender, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Franz Halder, received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch, to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December simultaneously developed several options, each independently. One of the options was developed by the German High Command (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy, General Walter Warlimont, and was codenamed “Lossberg Study.” It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main blow in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. When making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time work on the plan options was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was tasked with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the comments made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership took place, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: “The preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was carried out under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces command in Zossen.

The main goal was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was planned to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and deprive the Russian Baltic Fleet of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later the Caucasus with its oil sources. Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow in the OKW plans. However, the capture of Moscow had to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad pursued several military goals: the liquidation of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling military industry this city and the liquidation of Leningrad as a concentration point for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.

On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a rapid collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called “colossus with feet of clay...

"The entire territory in which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern halves. The latter has a poor road network. The best highways and railways located on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, in the northern half there seem to be more favorable conditions to use a larger number of troops than in the south. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line. It must be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. The Dnieper and Western Dvina represent the easternmost line on which the Russians will be forced to give battle.

If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to protect their industrial areas. As a result, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. A particularly large strike force should advance from the Warsaw area towards Moscow. Of the three army groups envisaged, the northern one will need to be sent to Leningrad, and the southern forces will need to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kyiv. The final goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon."

“We moved through frozen swamps, often the ice cracked and icy water got into my boots. My gloves were soaked through, I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands with a towel. I wanted to howl in pain.” From a letter from a German soldier, a participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.

“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from retreating while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aircraft cannot carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aircraft can launch air strikes against the Russians military-industrial areas. To do this, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of the Russian armed forces and prevent their reconstruction. Already the first strikes must be delivered by such units that it is possible to destroy large enemy forces. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups. deliver the main blow.

In the north, it is necessary to achieve encirclement of enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will advance on Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat marshes must move out later and achieve encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north... The number of troops of 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient."

The final version of the plan is set out in the directive of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.

Directive 21) and the “Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops” of the OKH of January 31, 1941. The Barbarossa plan provided for “defeating Soviet Russia in a short-lived campaign even before the war against England is over.” The idea was “to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disunited groups of enemy troops.” At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the line Astrakhan, Volga, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan outlined in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states, etc.

It was planned to begin its implementation in May 1941, but due to operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this date was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given for the day of the attack - June 22.

A number of additional documents were developed to the OKW and OKH directives, incl.

part of the disinformation directive, which required that “the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa be presented as the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, aimed at diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England.”

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.

people, about 4,300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5,000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North" consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the zone from Memel (Klaipeda) to Gołdap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the zone from Goldap to the Pripyat marshes; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. The army groups had the task of advancing respectively in general directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The German Army "Norway" and 2 Finnish armies- a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.

They were given the task of reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. There were 24 divisions left in the OKH reserve.

Despite the initial significant successes of the German troops, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be untenable, since it was based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.

Great definition

Incomplete definition ↓

The operation was supposed to ensure a quick and unconditional victory fascist Germany over the USSR thanks to the surprise factor. However, despite preparations in secrecy, the Barbarossa plan failed, and the Germans war with domestic troops dragged on and lasted from 1941 to 1945, after which it ended in the defeat of Germany.

The Barbarossa plan got its name in honor of the medieval King of Germany, Frederick 1, who was a glorious commander and, as was previously believed, planned raids on Rus' in the 12th century. Later, this myth was debunked.

Contents of the Barbarossa plan and its significance

The attack on the USSR was supposed to be Germany's next step towards world domination. The victory over Russia and the conquest of its territories should have opened up the opportunity for Hitler to enter into an open conflict with the United States for the right to redistribute the world. Having managed to conquer almost all of Europe, Hitler was confident of his unconditional victory over the USSR.

In order for the attack to go smoothly, it was necessary to develop a plan for a military attack. This plan became Barbarossa. Before planning the attack, Hitler ordered his intelligence officers to collect detailed information about the Soviet army and its weapons. After analyzing the information received, Hitler decided that the German army was significantly superior to the Red Army of the USSR - based on this, they began to plan the attack.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to strike the Red Army suddenly, on its own territory and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the troops and the technical superiority of the German army, to conquer the USSR within two and a half months.

At first it was planned to conquer the front line located on the territory of Belarus by wedging German troops from different sides of the Soviet army. The disunited and unprepared Red Army had to quickly surrender. Then Hitler was going to move towards Kyiv in order to conquer the territory of Ukraine and, most importantly, its sea routes and cut off the paths of Soviet troops. Thus, he could give his troops the opportunity to further attack the USSR from the south and north. In parallel, Hitler's army was supposed to launch an offensive from Norway. Having surrounded the USSR on all sides, Hitler planned to move towards Moscow.

However, already at the very beginning of the war, the German command realized that the plans began to collapse.

Conducting Operation Barbarossa and its results

Hitler's first and main mistake was that he underestimated the strength and weapons of the Soviet army, which, according to historians, was superior to the German in some areas. In addition, the war took place on the territory of the Russian army, so the fighters easily navigated the terrain and could fight in different natural conditions, which was not so easy for the Germans. Another distinctive feature of the Russian army, which greatly influenced the failure of Operation Barbarossa, was the ability of Russian soldiers to mobilize in the shortest possible time to fight back, which did not allow the army to be divided into disparate units.

Hitler set the task for his troops to quickly penetrate deep into the Soviet army and divide it, not allowing Russian soldiers to carry out large operations, as this could be dangerous. The plan was to split the Soviet army and force it to flee. However, everything turned out the other way around. Hitler's troops quickly penetrated deep into the Russian troops, but they were unable to conquer the flanks and defeat the army either. The Germans tried to follow the plan and encircled the Russian detachments, but this did not lead to any results - the Russians quickly emerged from the encirclement thanks to the surprisingly clear and competent leadership of their military leaders. As a result, despite the fact that Hitler’s army still won, it happened very slowly, which ruined the entire plan of rapid conquest.

On the approaches to Moscow, Hitler's army was no longer so strong. Exhausted by endless battles that dragged on for a long time, the army could not go on to conquer the capital, in addition, the bombing of Moscow never began, although according to Hitler’s plans, by that time the city should no longer be on the map. The same thing happened with Leningrad, which was besieged, but never surrendered and was not destroyed from the air.

The operation, which was planned as a swift, victorious attack, turned into a protracted war and stretched from two months to several years.

Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa

The main reasons for the failure of the operation can be considered:

• Lack of accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Hitler and his command underestimated the capabilities of Soviet soldiers, which led to the creation of an incorrect offensive and battle plan. The Russians gave a strong resistance, which the Germans did not count on;
• Excellent counterintelligence. Unlike the Germans, the Russians were able to establish good reconnaissance, thanks to which the command was almost always aware next step enemy and could respond adequately to him. The Germans failed to exploit the effect of surprise;
• Difficult territories. It was difficult for Hitler's troops to get maps of the Soviet terrain, in addition, they were not used to fighting in such conditions (unlike the Russians), so very often impenetrable forests and swamps helped the Soviet army escape and deceive the enemy;
• Lack of control over the course of the war. The German command already in the first few months lost control over the course of military operations, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be impracticable, and the Red Army led a skillful counter-offensive.

While developing a large-scale secret military operation, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, the General Staff of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler personally main goal They aimed to defeat the army of the Soviet Union and capture Moscow as soon as possible. It was planned that Operation Barbarossa should be successfully completed even before the onset of severe Russian frosts and be fully implemented in 2-2.5 months. But this ambitious plan was not destined to come true. On the contrary, it led to the complete collapse of Nazi Germany and dramatic geopolitical changes throughout the world.

Prerequisites for the emergence

Despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, Hitler continued to hatch plans to seize the “eastern lands,” by which he meant the western half of the Soviet Union. This was a necessary means of achieving world domination and eliminating a strong competitor from the world map. Which, in turn, gave him a free hand in the fight against the USA and Great Britain.

The following circumstances allowed Hitler’s General Staff to hope for a quick conquest of the Russians:

• powerful German war machine;
• rich combat experience gained in the European theater of operations;
• advanced weapons technology and impeccable discipline among the troops.

Since powerful France and strong Poland very quickly fell under the blows of the steel German fist, Hitler was confident that the attack on the territory of the Soviet Union would also bring rapid success. Moreover, the constantly conducted in-depth multi-echelon reconnaissance at almost all levels showed that the USSR was significantly losing in the most important military aspects:

• quality of weapons, equipment and equipment;
• capabilities for strategic and operational-tactical command and control of troops and reserves;
• supply and logistics.

In addition, the German militarists also counted on a kind of “fifth column” - people dissatisfied with the Soviet regime, nationalists of various kinds, traitors, and so on. Another argument in favor of a speedy attack on the USSR was the long process of rearmament carried out at that time in the Red Army. Well-known repressions also played a role in Hitler’s decision, practically decapitating the top and middle command staff of the Red Army. So, Germany had all the prerequisites for developing a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Plan Description

The essence

As Wikipedia quite rightly points out, the development of a large-scale operation to attack the Land of the Soviets began in 1940, in July. The main emphasis was placed on strength, speed and the effect of surprise. Using the massive use of aviation, tank and mechanized formations, it was planned to defeat and destroy the main backbone of the Russian army, then concentrated on the territory of Belarus.

Having defeated the border garrisons, high-speed tank wedges were supposed to systematically encircle, encircle and destroy large units and formations of Soviet troops, and then quickly move on according to the approved plan. Regular infantry units were supposed to finish off the remaining scattered groups that had not stopped resisting.

In order to gain undeniable air supremacy in the very first hours of the war, it was planned to destroy soviet planes still on the ground until confusion prevented them from taking off. Large fortified areas and garrisons offering resistance to advanced assault groups and divisions were simply to be bypassed, continuing rapid advance.

The German command was somewhat constrained in choosing the direction of attacks, since the network of high-quality roads in the USSR was poorly developed, and the railway infrastructure, due to the difference in standards, had to undergo a certain modernization in order for the Germans to use it. As a result, the choice was made on the following main general directions (of course, with the possibility of certain adjustments):

• northern, whose task was to attack from East Prussia through the Baltic states to Leningrad;
• central (the main and most powerful), designed to advance through Belarus to Moscow;
• southern, whose tasks included the capture of Right Bank Ukraine and further advancement towards the oil-rich Caucasus.

The initial implementation deadline was March 1941, with the end of the spring thaw in Russia. That's what the Barbarossa plan was in a nutshell. It was finally approved top level December 18, 1940 and went down in history under the name “Directive of the Supreme High Command No. 21.”

Preparation and implementation

Preparations for the attack began almost immediately. In addition to the gradual and well-disguised movement of a huge mass of troops to the common border between Germany and the USSR formed after the partition of Poland, it included many other steps and actions:

• constant disinformation about supposedly ongoing exercises, maneuvers, redeployments, and so on;
• diplomatic maneuvers in order to convince the top leadership of the USSR of the most peaceful and friendly intentions;
• the transfer to the territory of the Soviet Union, in addition to an additional army of spies and intelligence officers, sabotage groups.

All these and many other various events led to the attack being postponed several times. By May 1941, on the border with Soviet Union a group of troops incredible in number and power, unprecedented in the entire history of the world, had accumulated. Its total number exceeded 4 million people (although Wikipedia indicates a figure twice as large). On June 22, Operation Barbarossa actually began. In connection with the postponement of the start of full-scale military operations, the deadline for completing the operation was set for November, and the capture of Moscow was supposed to occur no later than the end of August.

It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines

The plan initially conceived by the German commanders-in-chief was implemented quite successfully. Superiority in the quality of equipment and weapons, advanced tactics and the notorious effect of surprise worked. The speed of the troops' advance, with rare exceptions, corresponded to the planned schedule and proceeded at the “Blitzkrieg” (lightning war) pace familiar to the Germans and discouraging the enemy.

However, very soon Operation Barbarossa began to noticeably slip and experience serious failures. Added to the fierce resistance of the Soviet army were unfamiliar difficult terrain, supply difficulties, partisan actions, muddy roads, impenetrable forests, exhaustion of forward units and formations that were constantly attacked and ambushed, as well as many other very diverse factors and reasons.

Almost after 2 months of hostilities, it became clear to most representatives of the German generals (and then to Hitler himself) that the Barbarossa plan was untenable. A brilliant operation, developed by armchair generals, ran into a cruel reality. And although the Germans tried to revive this plan by making various changes and amendments, by November 1941 they had almost completely abandoned it.

The Germans actually reached Moscow, but in order to take it, they had neither the strength, nor the energy, nor the resources. Although Leningrad was under siege, it was not possible to bomb it or starve the inhabitants to death. In the south, German troops were bogged down in the endless steppes. As a result, the German army switched to winter defense, pinning its hopes on the summer campaign of 1942. As you know, instead of the “blitzkrieg” on which the “Barbarossa” plan was based, the Germans received a long, exhausting 4-year war, which ended in their complete defeat, a disaster for the country and almost a complete redrawing of the world map...

Main reasons for failure

Among other things, the reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan also lie in the arrogance and pomposity of the German generals and the Fuhrer himself. After a series of victories, they, like the entire army, believed in their own invincibility, which led to the complete fiasco of Nazi Germany.

An interesting fact: the medieval German king and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, after whom the operation to rapidly capture the USSR was named, became famous for his military exploits, but simply drowned in a river during one of the Crusades.

If Hitler and his inner circle knew even a little history, they would have thought once again whether it was worth calling such a fateful campaign after “Red Beard.” As a result, they all repeated the deplorable fate of the legendary character.

However, mysticism, of course, has nothing to do with it. Answering the question, what are the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan, it is necessary to highlight the following points:

And this is not a complete list of reasons that led to the absolute failure of the operation.

The Barbarossa plan, conceived as another victorious blitzkrieg with the aim of expanding “living space for the Germans,” turned into a fatal disaster for them. The Germans were unable to derive any benefit from this adventure, bringing death, grief and suffering to a huge number of peoples, including themselves. It was after the failure of the “blitzkrieg” that a wormhole of doubt about the imminent victory and the success of the campaign in general crept into the minds of some representatives of the German generals. However, real panic and moral decay of the German army and its leadership were still far away...