NATO aircraft weapons control radar. Air defense and more troops
Not long ago, the head of the operational department of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Viktor Poznikhir, told reporters that the main goal of creating American system Missile defense is a significant neutralization of Russia's strategic nuclear potential and the almost complete elimination of the Chinese missile threat. And this is not the first sharp statement by Russian high-ranking officials on this matter; few US actions cause such irritation in Moscow.
Russian military officers and diplomats have repeatedly stated that the deployment of the American global missile defense system will lead to a disruption of the fragile balance between nuclear states that developed during the Cold War.
The Americans, in turn, argue that global missile defense is not directed against Russia, its goal is to protect the “civilized” world from rogue countries, for example, Iran and North Korea. At the same time, the construction of new elements of the system continues at the very Russian borders - in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania.
Experts' opinions on missile defense in general and the US missile defense system in particular vary widely: some see America's actions as a real threat to Russia's strategic interests, while others talk about the ineffectiveness of the American missile defense system against the Russian strategic arsenal.
Where is the truth? What is the US missile defense system? What does it consist of and how does it work? Does Russia have a missile defense system? And why does a purely defensive system cause such a mixed reaction among the Russian leadership - what's the catch?
History of missile defense
Missile defense is a whole range of measures aimed at protecting certain objects or territories from damage by missile weapons. Any missile defense system includes not only systems that directly destroy missiles, but also complexes (radars and satellites) that provide missile detection, as well as powerful computers.
In the public consciousness, a missile defense system is usually associated with counteraction nuclear threat, which is carried by ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead, but this is not entirely true. In fact, missile defense is a broader concept; missile defense is any type of defense against missile weapons enemy. This includes active protection of armored vehicles from ATGMs and RPGs, and means air defense, capable of destroying enemy tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. So it would be more correct to divide all missile defense systems into tactical and strategic, and also to separate self-defense systems against missile weapons into a separate group.
Rocket weapons first began to be used en masse during World War II. The first anti-tank missiles, MLRS, and German V-1 and V-2 appeared, killing residents of London and Antwerp. After the war, the development of missile weapons accelerated. It can be said that the use of missiles has radically changed the methods of warfare. Moreover, very soon missiles became the main means of delivering nuclear weapons and turned into the most important strategic tool.
Having appreciated the experience of the Nazis in the combat use of V-1 and V-2 missiles, the USSR and the USA almost immediately after the end of World War II began creating systems capable of effectively combating the new threat.
In 1958, the United States developed and adopted the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missile system, which could be used against enemy nuclear warheads. Their defeat also occurred due to the nuclear warhead of the anti-missile missile, since this air defense system was not particularly accurate. It should be noted that intercepting a target flying at enormous speed at an altitude of tens of kilometers is a very difficult task even at modern level technology development. In the 60s, it could only be solved with the use of nuclear weapons.
A further development of the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules system was the LIM-49A Nike Zeus complex, its testing began in 1962. The Zeus anti-missile missiles were also equipped with a nuclear warhead; they could hit targets at an altitude of up to 160 km. Were held successful tests complex (without nuclear explosions, of course), but still the effectiveness of such a missile defense system was very much in question.
The fact is that in those years the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA were growing at an unimaginable pace, and no missile defense could protect against an armada of ballistic missiles launched in the other hemisphere. Moreover, in the 60s nuclear missiles learned to throw out numerous decoys, which were extremely difficult to distinguish from real warheads. However, the main problem was the imperfection of the anti-missile missiles themselves, as well as target detection systems. The Nike Zeus program would cost the American taxpayer $10 billion to deploy, a huge sum at the time, and did not provide sufficient protection against Soviet ICBMs. As a result, the project was abandoned.
At the end of the 60s, the Americans began another missile defense program, which was called Safeguard - “Precaution” (originally it was called Sentinel - “Sentinel”).
This missile defense system was supposed to protect the deployment areas of American silo-based ICBMs and, in the event of war, provide the ability to launch a retaliatory missile strike.
"Safeguard" was armed with two types of anti-missile missiles: heavy "Spartan" and light "Sprint". The Spartan anti-missiles had a radius of 740 km and were supposed to destroy nuclear combat units the enemy is still in space. The task of the lighter Sprint missiles was to “finish” those warheads that were able to get past the Spartans. In space, warheads were to be destroyed using streams of hard neutron radiation, more effective than megaton nuclear explosions.
In the early 70s, the Americans began the practical implementation of the Safeguard project, but only built one complex of this system.
In 1972, one of the agreements was signed between the USSR and the USA. important documents in the field of nuclear arms control – the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Even today, almost fifty years later, it is one of the cornerstones of the global nuclear safety system in the world.
According to this document, both states could deploy no more than two missile defense systems, the maximum ammunition capacity of each of them should not exceed 100 missile defense systems. Later (in 1974) the number of systems was reduced to one unit. The United States covered the ICBM deployment area in North Dakota with the Safeguard system, and the USSR decided to protect the capital of the state, Moscow, from a missile attack.
Why is this treaty so important for the balance between the largest nuclear weapons states? The fact is that from about the mid-60s it became clear that a large-scale nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA would lead to the complete destruction of both countries, so nuclear weapons became a kind of deterrent tool. Having deployed a sufficiently powerful missile defense system, any of the opponents could be tempted to strike first and protect themselves from the “response” with the help of anti-missiles. Refusal to defend their own territory in the face of imminent nuclear destruction guaranteed an extremely cautious attitude of the leadership of the signatory states to the “red” button. This is also why the current deployment of NATO missile defense is causing such concern in the Kremlin.
By the way, the Americans did not begin to deploy the Safeguard missile defense system. In the 70s, they acquired Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles, so the US military leadership considered it more appropriate to invest in new submarines and SLBMs than to build a very expensive missile defense system. A Russian units and today they protect the skies of Moscow (for example, the 9th Missile Defense Division in Sofrino).
The next stage in the development of the American missile defense system was the SDI program (Strategic Defense Initiative), initiated by the fortieth US President Ronald Reagan.
This was a very large-scale project for a new US missile defense system, which was absolutely contrary to the 1972 Treaty. The SDI program provided for the creation of a powerful, layered missile defense system with space-based elements, which was supposed to cover the entire territory of the United States.
In addition to anti-missile missiles, this program provided for the use of weapons based on other physical principles: lasers, electromagnetic and kinetic weapons, railguns.
This project was never realized. Its developers faced numerous technical problems, many of which have not been resolved to this day. However, the developments of the SDI program were later used in the creation of the US national missile defense, the deployment of which continues to this day.
Immediately after the end of World War II, the USSR began creating protection against missile weapons. Already in 1945, specialists from the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy began work on the Anti-Fau project.
The first practical development in the field of missile defense in the USSR was “System A”, work on which was carried out in the late 50s. A whole series of tests of the complex were carried out (some of them were successful), but due to the low efficiency, “System A” was never put into service.
In the early 60s, the development of a missile defense system began to protect the Moscow Industrial District; it was named A-35. From that moment until the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was always covered by a powerful anti-missile shield.
The development of the A-35 was delayed; this missile defense system was put on combat duty only in September 1971. In 1978, it was upgraded to the A-35M modification, which remained in service until 1990. The radar of the Danube-3U complex was on combat duty until the beginning of the 2000s. In 1990, the A-35M missile defense system was replaced by the A-135 Amur. The A-135 was equipped with two types of anti-missile missiles with a nuclear warhead and a range of 350 and 80 km.
The A-135 system should be replaced by the newest A-235 “Samolet-M” missile defense system; it is currently at the testing stage. It will also be armed with two types of anti-missile missiles with a maximum destruction range of 1 thousand km (according to other sources - 1.5 thousand km).
In addition to the above-mentioned systems, work was carried out in the USSR at different times on other projects for protection against strategic missile weapons. We can mention Chelomeyev’s Taran missile defense system, which was supposed to protect the entire territory of the country from American ICBMs. This project involved installing several powerful radars in the Far North that would monitor the most possible trajectories of American ICBMs - through North Pole. It was supposed to destroy enemy missiles with the help of powerful thermonuclear charges (10 megatons) mounted on anti-missiles.
This project was closed in the mid-60s for the same reason as the American Nike Zeus - the missile and nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA were growing at an incredible pace, and no missile defense could protect against a massive strike.
Another promising Soviet system The missile defense system that never entered service was the S-225 complex. This project was developed in the early 60s; later one of the S-225 anti-missile missiles found use as part of the A-135 complex.
American missile defense system
Currently, several missile defense systems are deployed or are being developed in the world (Israel, India, Japan, the European Union), but all of them have a short or medium range. Only two countries in the world have a strategic missile defense system – the USA and Russia. Before moving on to a description of the American strategic missile defense system, a few words should be said about general principles operation of such complexes.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (or their warheads) can be shot down at different parts of their trajectory: at the initial, middle or final stages. Hitting a missile during takeoff (Boost-phase intercept) looks like the simplest task. Immediately after launch, an ICBM is easy to track: it has a low speed and is not covered by decoys or interference. With one shot you can destroy all warheads installed on an ICBM.
However, interception at the initial stage of a missile’s trajectory also has significant difficulties, which almost completely neutralize the above advantages. As a rule, deployment areas strategic missiles located deep in enemy territory and reliably covered by air and missile defense systems. Therefore, it is almost impossible to approach them at the required distance. In addition, the initial stage of a missile's flight (acceleration) is only one or two minutes, during which it is necessary not only to detect it, but also to send an interceptor to destroy it. It's very difficult.
Nevertheless, intercepting ICBMs at the launch stage looks very promising, so work on means of destroying strategic missiles during acceleration continues. Space-based laser systems look most promising, but operational systems of such weapons do not yet exist.
Missiles can also be intercepted in the middle section of their trajectory (Midcourse intercept), when the warheads have already separated from the ICBMs and continue to fly in outer space by inertia. Mid-flight interception also has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of destroying warheads in space is the large time interval that the missile defense system has (according to some sources, up to 40 minutes), but the interception itself is associated with many complex technical issues. Firstly, the warheads are relatively small in size, have a special anti-radar coating and do not emit anything into space, so they are very difficult to detect. Secondly, to further complicate the work of missile defense, any ICBM, except for the warheads themselves, carries a large number of false targets, indistinguishable from real ones on radar screens. And thirdly: anti-missiles capable of destroying warheads in space orbit are very expensive.
Warheads can also be intercepted after they enter the atmosphere (Terminal phase intercept), or in other words, at their last stage of flight. There are also pros and cons here. The main advantages are: the ability to deploy a missile defense system on its territory, the relative ease of tracking targets, and the low cost of interceptor missiles. The fact is that after entering the atmosphere, lighter false targets are eliminated, which makes it possible to more confidently identify real warheads.
However, intercepting warheads at the final stage of their trajectory also has significant disadvantages. The main one is the very limited time available to the missile defense system - on the order of several tens of seconds. Destroying warheads at the final stage of their flight is essentially the last line of missile defense.
In 1992, American President George W. Bush initiated a program to protect the United States from a limited nuclear strike - this is how the non-strategic missile defense (NSMD) project appeared.
The development of a modern national missile defense system began in the United States in 1999 after President Bill Clinton signed the corresponding bill. The declared goal of the program was to create a missile defense system that could protect the entire US territory from ICBMs. In the same year, the Americans conducted the first test within the framework of this project: over Pacific Ocean A Minuteman missile was intercepted.
In 2001, the next occupant of the White House, George W. Bush, said that the missile defense system would protect not only America, but also its main allies, the first of which was named Great Britain. In 2002, after the Prague NATO summit, the development of a military-economic feasibility study began for the creation of a missile defense system for the North Atlantic Alliance. Final decision The creation of a European missile defense was adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon, held at the end of 2010.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the program is to protect against rogue countries like Iran and North Korea, and it is not directed against Russia. Later, a number of Eastern European countries joined the program, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania.
Currently, NATO's missile defense is a complex complex consisting of many components, which includes satellite systems for tracking ballistic missile launches, land-based and sea-based missile launch detection systems (radars), as well as several systems for destroying missiles at different stages of their trajectory: GBMD, Aegis, THAAD and Patriot.
GBMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) is a ground-based complex designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles in the middle section of their trajectory. It includes an early warning radar that monitors the launch of ICBMs and their trajectory, as well as silo-based interceptor missiles. Their range is from 2 to 5 thousand km. To intercept ICBM warheads, the GBMD uses kinetic warheads. It should be noted that at the moment GBMD is the only fully deployed US strategic missile defense system.
The kinetic warhead for the rocket was not chosen by chance. The fact is that to intercept hundreds of enemy warheads, a massive use of anti-missiles is necessary; the activation of at least one nuclear charge in the path of the warheads creates a powerful electromagnetic pulse and is guaranteed to blind missile defense radars. However, on the other hand, a kinetic warhead requires much greater guidance accuracy, which in itself represents a very difficult technical task. And given that modern ballistic missiles are equipped with warheads that can change their trajectory, the effectiveness of interceptors is further reduced.
So far, the GBMD system can boast of 50% accurate hits - and only during exercises. It is believed that this missile defense system can only work effectively against monoblock ICBMs.
Currently, GBMD interceptor missiles are deployed in Alaska and California. Perhaps another area for the deployment of the system will be created in Atlantic coast USA.
Aegis (“Aegis”). Usually, when people talk about American missile defense, they mean the Aegis system. Back in the early 90s, the idea was born in the United States to use the shipborne Aegis command and control system for missile defense needs, and to intercept medium- and medium-range ballistic missiles. short range adapt the excellent Standard anti-aircraft missile, which was launched from a standard Mk-41 container.
In general, the placement of missile defense system elements on warships is quite reasonable and logical. In this case, the missile defense becomes mobile, gaining the opportunity to operate as close as possible to the areas where enemy ICBMs are deployed, and, accordingly, to shoot down enemy missiles not only in the middle stages, but also in the initial stages of their flight. In addition, the main flight direction of Russian missiles is the Arctic Ocean, where there is simply nowhere to place anti-missile silos. 
In the end, the designers managed to place more fuel in the anti-missile missile and significantly improve the homing head. However, according to experts, even the most advanced modifications of the SM-3 missile defense system will not be able to intercept the latest maneuvering warheads Russian ICBMs— they simply don’t have enough fuel for this. But these anti-missile missiles are quite capable of intercepting a conventional (non-maneuvering) warhead.
In 2011, the Aegis missile defense system was deployed on 24 ships, including five Ticonderoga-class cruisers and nineteen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. In total, the American military plans to equip 84 US Navy ships with the Aegis system by 2041. Based on this system, the Aegis Ashore ground system has been developed, which has already been deployed in Romania and will be deployed in Poland by 2019.
THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense). This item The American missile defense system should be classified as the second echelon of the US national missile defense system. This is a mobile complex that was originally developed to combat medium and short-range missiles; it cannot intercept targets in outer space. The warhead of the THAAD missiles is kinetic.
Part THAAD complexes located on the US mainland, which can only be explained by the ability of this system to fight not only against medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, but also to intercept ICBMs. Indeed, this missile defense system can destroy warheads of strategic missiles at the final stage of their trajectory, and does so quite effectively. In 2013, a national American missile defense exercise was held, in which Aegis, GBMD and THAAD systems took part. The latter showed the greatest efficiency, shooting down 10 targets out of ten possible.
One of the disadvantages of THAAD is its high price: one interceptor missile costs $30 million.
PAC-3 Patriot. "Patriot" is a tactical-level anti-missile system designed to cover military groups. The debut of this complex took place during the first American war in the Persian Gulf. Despite the extensive PR campaign of this system, the effectiveness of the complex was considered not very satisfactory. Therefore, in the mid-90s, a more advanced version of the Patriot appeared - PAC-3.
.The most important element of the American missile defense system is the SBIRS satellite constellation, designed to detect ballistic missile launches and track their trajectories. The deployment of the system began in 2006 and should be completed by 2019. Her full composition will consist of ten satellites, six geostationary and four in high elliptical orbits.
Does the American missile defense system threaten Russia?
Will a missile defense system be able to protect the United States from a massive nuclear strike from Russia? The clear answer is no. The effectiveness of the American missile defense system is assessed differently by experts, but it certainly cannot ensure the guaranteed destruction of all warheads launched from Russian territory.
The ground-based GBMD system is insufficiently accurate, and only two such systems have been deployed so far. The ship's Aegis missile defense system can be quite effective against ICBMs at the accelerating (initial) stage of their flight, but it will not be able to intercept missiles launched from deep within Russian territory. If we talk about intercepting warheads in the mid-flight phase (outside the atmosphere), then it will be very difficult for SM-3 anti-missile missiles to deal with maneuvering warheads of the latest generation. Although outdated (unmaneuverable) units may well be hit by them.
Domestic critics of the American Aegis system forget one very important aspect: the deadliest element of the Russian nuclear triad are ICBMs located at nuclear submarines. A missile defense ship may well be on duty in the area where missiles are launched from nuclear submarines and destroy them immediately after launch.
Hitting warheads during the mid-flight phase (after they have separated from the missile) is a very difficult task; it can be compared to trying to hit another bullet flying towards it with a bullet.
At present (and in the foreseeable future), the American missile defense system will be able to protect US territory from only a small number of ballistic missiles (no more than twenty), which is still a very serious achievement, given the rapid spread of missile and nuclear technologies in the world.
If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them
Said Aminov, editor-in-chief of the website “Vestnik PVO” (PVO.rf)
Key points:
Today, a number of companies are actively developing and promoting new air defense systems, the basis of which is air-to-air missiles used from ground launchers;
Considering the large number of aircraft missiles in service different countries, the creation of such air defense systems can be very promising.
The idea of creating anti-aircraft missile systems based on aircraft weapons is not new. Back in the 1960s. The United States has created the Chaparral short-range self-propelled air defense system with the Sidewinder aircraft missile and the Sea Sparrow short-range ship-based air defense system with the AIM-7E-2 Sparrow aircraft missile. These complexes became widespread and were used in combat. At the same time, the Spada ground-based air defense system (and its ship-based version Albatros) was created in Italy, using Aspide anti-aircraft guided missiles similar in design to the Sparrow.
These days, the United States has returned to designing “hybrid” air defense systems based on the Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM aircraft missile. The SLAMRAAM air defense system, which has been created for a long time, is designed to complement the ground forces ah and body Marine Corps The US Avenger complex could theoretically become one of the best-selling missiles on foreign markets, given the number of countries armed with AIM-120 aircraft missiles. An example is the already popular American-Norwegian air defense system NASAMS, also created on the basis of AIM-120 missiles.
The European MBDA group is promoting a vertical launch air defense system based on the French MICA aircraft missile, and the German company Diehl BGT Defense - based on the IRIS-T missile.
Russia also does not stand aside - in 2005, the Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (KTRV) presented at the MAKS air show information on the use of the RVV-AE medium-range aircraft missile in air defense. This missile with an active radar guidance system is designed for use from fourth-generation aircraft, has a range of 80 km and was exported in large quantities as part of the Su-30MK and MiG-29 family of fighters to China, Algeria, India and other countries. True, there has been no information recently about the development of the anti-aircraft version of the RVV-AE.
Chaparral (USA)
The Chaparral self-propelled all-weather air defense system was developed by Ford on the basis of the Sidewinder 1C (AIM-9D) aircraft missile. The complex was put into service American army in 1969, and has been modernized several times since then. In combat conditions, Chaparral was first used by the Israeli army on the Golan Heights in 1973, and was subsequently used by Israel in 1982 during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. However, by the beginning of the 1990s. The Chaparral air defense system was hopelessly outdated and was withdrawn from service by the United States and then Israel. Nowadays it remains in operation only in Egypt, Colombia, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Taiwan.
Sea Sparrow (USA)
Sea Sparrow is one of the most popular ship-based short-range air defense systems of the NATO navies. The complex was created on the basis of the RIM-7 missile, a modified version of the AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air missile. Tests began in 1967, and from 1971 the complex began to enter service with the US Navy.
In 1968, Denmark, Italy and Norway reached an agreement with the US Navy on joint work on the modernization of the Sea Sparrow air defense system within the framework of international cooperation. As a result, a unified air defense system for surface ships of NATO countries, NSSMS (NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System), was developed, which has been in mass production since 1973.
Now a new anti-aircraft missile RIM-162 ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles), the development of which began in 1995 by an international consortium led by the American company Raytheon, is being offered for the Sea Sparrow air defense system. The consortium includes companies from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Holland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Turkey. The new missile can be launched from both inclined and vertical launchers. The RIM-162 ESSM anti-aircraft missile has been in service since 2004. The modified RIM-162 ESSM anti-aircraft missile is also planned to be used in the American land-based air defense system SLAMRAAM ER (see below).
RVV-AE-ZRK (Russia)
In our country, research work (R&D) on the use of aircraft missiles in air defense systems began in the mid-1980s. At the Kleenka research and development project, specialists from the State Design Bureau Vympel (today part of KTRV) confirmed the possibility and feasibility of using the R-27P missile as part of the air defense system, and in the early 1990s. The Elnik research project demonstrated the possibility of using an air-to-air missile of the RVV-AE (R-77) type in a vertical launch air defense system. A prototype of the modified missile under the designation RVV-AE-ZRK was demonstrated in 1996 at the Defendory international exhibition in Athens at the stand of the State Design Bureau "Vympel". However, until 2005, no new mentions of the anti-aircraft version of the RVV-AE appeared.
Possible launcher of a promising air defense system on an artillery cart of the S-60 anti-aircraft gun GosMKB "Vympel"
During the MAKS-2005 air show, the Tactical Missiles Corporation presented an anti-aircraft version of the RVV-AE missile without external changes from the aircraft missile. The RVV-AE missile was placed in a transport and launch container (TPC) and had a vertical launch. According to the developer, the missile is proposed to be used against air targets from ground launchers that are part of anti-aircraft missile or anti-aircraft artillery systems. In particular, schemes for placing four TPK with RVV-AE on the cart of the S-60 anti-aircraft gun were distributed, and it was also proposed to modernize the Kvadrat air defense system (export version of the Kub air defense system) by placing a TPK with RVV-AE on a launcher.
Anti-aircraft missile RVV-AE in a transport and launch container at the exposition of the State Design Bureau "Vympel" (Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation) at the MAKS-2005 exhibition Said Aminov
Due to the fact that the anti-aircraft version of the RVV-AE is almost no different from the aviation version in terms of equipment and there is no starting accelerator, the launch is carried out using a main engine from a transport and launch container. Because of this, the maximum launch range decreased from 80 to 12 km. The anti-aircraft version of the RVV-AE was created in collaboration with the Almaz-Antey air defense concern.
After MAKS 2005, there were no reports about the implementation of this project from open sources. Now the aviation version of the RVV-AE is in service with Algeria, India, China, Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries, some of which also have Soviet artillery and air defense missile systems.
Pracka (Yugoslavia)
The first examples of the use of aircraft missiles in the role of anti-aircraft missiles in Yugoslavia date back to the mid-1990s, when the Bosnian Serb army created an air defense system on a TAM-150 truck chassis with two guides for Soviet-developed R-13 infrared-guided missiles. This was a "makeshift" modification and appears to have never had an official designation.
A self-propelled anti-aircraft gun based on the R-3 missile (AA-2 "Atoll") was first shown in public in 1995 (Source Vojske Krajine)
Another simplified system, known as Pracka ("Sling"), was an infrared-guided R-60 missile on an improvised launcher based on the carriage of a towed 20 mm M55 anti-aircraft gun. The actual combat effectiveness of such a system seems to have been low, given the disadvantage of a very short launch range.
Towed homemade air defense system "Sling" with a missile based on air-to-air missiles with an R-60 IR homing head
The start of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 prompted that country's engineers to create urgently anti-aircraft missile systems. Specialists from the VTI Military Technical Institute and the VTO Air Test Center quickly developed self-propelled air defense systems Pracka RL-2 and RL-4, armed with two-stage missiles. Prototypes of both systems were created on the basis of the chassis of a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun with a 30-mm double-barreled gun of the Czech type M53/59, more than 100 of which were in service with Yugoslavia.
New versions of the "Sling" air defense system with two-stage missiles based on the R-73 and R-60 aircraft missiles at an exhibition in Belgrade in December 2004. Vukasin Milosevic, 2004
The RL-2 system was created on the basis of the Soviet R-60MK rocket with a first stage in the form of an accelerator of a similar caliber. The booster appears to have been created by a combination of a 128mm rocket engine volley fire and large tail stabilizers mounted crosswise.
Vukasin Milosevic, 2004
The RL-4 rocket was created on the basis of the Soviet R-73 rocket, also equipped with an accelerator. It is possible that boosters for RL-4
were created on the basis of Soviet 57-mm aircraft unguided missiles of the S-5 type (a package of six missiles in a single body). An unnamed Serbian source, in a conversation with a representative of the Western press, stated that this air defense system was successful. The R-73 missiles are significantly superior to the R-60 in terms of homing sensitivity and range and altitude reach, posing a significant threat to NATO aircraft.
Vukasin Milosevic, 2004
It is unlikely that RL-2 and RL-4 had a great chance of independently conducting successful firing at targets that suddenly appeared. These SAMs depend on air defense command posts or a forward observation post to have at least some idea of the direction of the target and the approximate time of its appearance.
Vukasin Milosevic, 2004
Both prototypes were created by VTO and VTI personnel, and open sources there is no information on how many test runs were carried out (or whether any were carried out at all). The prototypes remained in service throughout the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. Unofficial reports suggest that the RL-4 may have been used in combat, but there is no evidence that RL-2 missiles were fired at NATO aircraft. After the conflict ended, both systems were withdrawn from service and returned to VTI.
SPYDER (Israel)
Israeli companies Rafael and IAI have developed and are promoting SPYDER short-range air defense systems on foreign markets based on Rafael Python 4 or 5 and Derby aircraft missiles, respectively, with infrared and active radar guidance. First new complex was presented in 2004 at the Indian arms exhibition Defexpo.
Experienced launcher of the SPYDER air defense system, on which Rafael tested the Jane's complex
The SPYDER air defense system is capable of hitting air targets at ranges of up to 15 km and at altitudes of up to 9 km. SPYDER is armed with four Python and Derby missiles in a TPK on a Tatra-815 all-terrain chassis with an 8x8 wheel arrangement. Launch rockets inclined.
Indian version of the SPYDER air defense system at the Bourges air show in 2007 Said Aminov
Derby, Python-5 and Iron Dome missiles at Defexpo-2012
The main export customer of the SPYDER short-range air defense system is India. In 2005, Rafael won the corresponding tender Indian Air Force, while the competitors were companies from Russia and South Africa. In 2006, four SPYDER air defense missile launchers were sent to India for testing, which were successfully completed in 2007. The final contract for the supply of 18 SPYDER systems for a total of $1 billion was signed in 2008. It is planned that the systems will be delivered in 2011-2012. The SPYDER air defense system was also purchased by Singapore.
Singapore Air Force SPYDER air defense system
After the end of hostilities in Georgia in August 2008, evidence appeared on Internet forums of the presence of one SPYDER air defense system battery among the Georgian military, as well as their use against Russian aviation. For example, in September 2008, a photograph of the warhead of a Python 4 missile with serial number 11219 was published. Later, two photographs dated August 19, 2008, appeared of a SPYDER air defense missile launcher with four Python 4 missiles on the chassis captured by the Russian or South Ossetian military Romanian made Roman 6x6. Serial number 11219 is visible on one of the missiles.
Georgian SPYDER air defense system
VL MICA (Europe)
Since 2000, the European concern MBDA has been promoting the VL MICA air defense system, the basis of which is the MICA aircraft missile. The first demonstration of the new complex took place in February 2000 at the Asian Aerospace exhibition in Singapore. And already in 2001, tests began at the French training ground in Landes. In December 2005, the MBDA concern received a contract to create the VL MICA air defense system for the French armed forces. It was planned that these complexes would provide object-based air defense for air bases, units in combat formations of the ground forces and be used as ship-based air defense. However, to date, procurement of the complex by the French armed forces has not begun. The aviation version of the MICA missile is in service with the French Air Force and Navy (the Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighters are equipped with them), and MICA is also in service with the UAE, Greek and Taiwanese air forces (Mirage 2000).
Model of the shipborne PU air defense system VL MICA at the LIMA-2013 exhibition
The land version of the VL MICA includes a command post, three-dimensional detection radar and three to six launchers with four transport and launch containers. VL MICA components can be installed on standard off-road vehicles. The complex's anti-aircraft missiles can be equipped with an infrared or active radar homing head, completely identical to the aviation versions. The TPK for the land version of the VL MICA is identical to the TPK for the ship version of the VL MICA. In the basic configuration of the VL MICA shipborne air defense system, the launcher consists of eight TPKs with MICA missiles in various combinations of homing heads.
Model of the VL MICA self-propelled PU air defense system at the LIMA-2013 exhibition
In December 2007, VL MICA air defense systems were ordered by Oman (for three Khareef project corvettes being built in the UK), and subsequently these systems were purchased by the Moroccan Navy (for three SIGMA project corvettes being built in the Netherlands) and the UAE (for two small missile corvettes contracted in Italy project Falaj 2) . In 2009, at the Paris Air Show, Romania announced the acquisition of VL MICA and Mistral complexes for the country's Air Force from the MBDA concern, although deliveries to the Romanians have not yet begun.
IRIS-T (Europe)
As part of the European initiative to create a promising short-range aircraft missile to replace the American AIM-9 Sidewinder, a consortium of countries led by Germany created the IRIS-T missile with a range of up to 25 km. Development and production is carried out by Diehl BGT Defense in partnership with enterprises in Italy, Sweden, Greece, Norway and Spain. The missile was adopted by the participating countries in December 2005. The IRIS-T missile can be used by a wide range of fighter aircraft, including Typhoon, Tornado, Gripen, F-16, F-18 aircraft. The first export customer for IRIS-T was Austria, and later the missile was ordered by South Africa and Saudi Arabia.
Model of the Iris-T self-propelled launcher at the exhibition in Bourges 2007
In 2004, Diehl BGT Defense began developing a promising air defense system using the IRIS-T aircraft missile. The IRIS-T SLS complex has been undergoing field tests since 2008, mainly at the South African Overberg test site. The IRIS-T missile is launched vertically from a launcher mounted on the chassis of a light-duty off-road truck. Detection of air targets is provided by the Giraffe AMB all-round radar developed by the Swedish company Saab. The maximum destruction range exceeds 10 km.
In 2008, a modernized PU was demonstrated at the ILA exhibition in Berlin
In 2009, Diehl BGT Defense presented a modernized version of the IRIS-T SL air defense system with a new missile, the maximum engagement range of which should be 25 km. The rocket is equipped with an improved rocket engine, as well as automatic data transmission and GPS navigation systems. Tests of the improved complex were carried out at the end of 2009 at the South African test site.
Launcher of the German air defense system IRIS-T SL 25.6.2011 at Dubendorf Miroslav Gyürösi airbase
In accordance with the decision of the German authorities, the new version of the air defense system was planned to be integrated into the promising MEADS air defense system (created jointly with the USA and Italy), as well as to ensure interaction with the Patriot PAC-3 air defense system. However, the announced withdrawal of the United States and Germany in 2011 from the MEADS air defense system program makes the prospects of both MEADS itself and the anti-aircraft version of the IRIS-T missile that was planned to be integrated into it extremely uncertain. The complex can be offered to countries operating IRIS-T aircraft missiles.
NASAMS (USA, Norway)
The concept of an air defense system using the AIM-120 aircraft missile was proposed in the early 1990s. the American company Hughes Aircraft (now part of Raytheon) when creating a promising air defense system under the AdSAMS program. In 1992, the AdSAMS complex entered testing, but this project was not further developed. In 1994, Hughes Aircraft entered into a contract to develop the NASAMS (Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense system, the architecture of which was largely the same as the AdSAMS project. The development of the NASAMS complex together with Norsk Forsvarteknologia (now part of the Kongsberg Defense group) was successfully completed, and in 1995 its production began for the Norwegian Air Force.
The NASAMS air defense system consists of a command post, a Raytheon AN/TPQ-36A three-dimensional radar and three transportable launchers. The launcher carries six AIM-120 missiles.
In 2005, Kongsberg received a contract for the full integration of the Norwegian NASAMS air defense systems into the NATO joint air defense command and control system. The modernized air defense system under the designation NASAMS II entered service with the Norwegian Air Force in 2007.
SAM NASAMS II Norwegian Ministry of Defense
In 2003, four NASAMS air defense systems were delivered to the Spanish ground forces, and one air defense system was transferred to the United States. In December 2006, the Dutch Army ordered six upgraded NASAMS II SAM systems, with deliveries beginning in 2009. In April 2009, Finland decided to replace three battalions of Russian Buk-M1 SAM systems with NASAMS II. The estimated cost of the Finnish contract is 500 million euros.
Currently, Raytheon and Kongsberg are jointly developing the HAWK-AMRAAM air defense system, using AIM-120 aircraft missiles on universal launchers and Sentinel detection radar in the I-HAWK air defense system.
High Mobility Launcher NASAMS AMRAAM on Raytheon FMTV chassis
CLAWS/SLAMRAAM (USA)
Since the beginning of the 2000s. In the United States, a promising mobile air defense system is being developed based on the AIM-120 AMRAAM aircraft missile, similar in its characteristics to the Russian medium-range missile RVV-AE (R-77). The lead developer and manufacturer of missiles is Raytheon Corporation. Boeing is a subcontractor and is responsible for the development and production of the command post for air defense missile control.
In 2001, the US Marine Corps entered into a contract with Raytheon Corporation to create the CLAWS (Complementary Low-Altitude Weapon System, also known as HUMRAAM) air defense system. This air defense system was a mobile air defense system, which was based on a launcher based on an army all-terrain vehicle HMMWV with four AIM-120 AMRAAM aircraft missiles launched from inclined guides. Development of the complex has been extremely delayed due to repeated cuts in funding and the Pentagon’s lack of clear views on the need to acquire it.
In 2004, the US Army ordered Raytheon Corporation to develop the SLAMRAAM (Surface-Launched AMRAAM) air defense system. Since 2008, testing of the SLAMRAAM air defense system began at test sites, during which interaction with the Patriot and Avenger air defense systems was also tested. At the same time, the army eventually abandoned the use of the lightweight HMMWV chassis, and the latest version of SLAMRAAM was tested on the FMTV truck chassis. In general, development of the system was also sluggish, although it was expected that the new complex would enter service in 2012.
In September 2008, information appeared that the UAE had submitted an application to purchase a number of SLAMRAAM air defense systems. In addition, this air defense system was planned for acquisition by Egypt.
In 2007, Raytheon Corporation proposed to significantly improve the combat capabilities of the SLAMRAAM air defense system by adding two new missiles to its armament - the AIM-9X short-range infrared-guided aircraft missile and the longer-range SLAMRAAM-ER missile. Thus, the modernized complex should have been able to use two types of short-range missiles from one launcher: AMRAAM (up to 25 km) and AIM-9X (up to 10 km). Due to the use of the SLAMRAAM-ER missile, the maximum range of destruction of the complex increased to 40 km. The SLAMRAAM-ER missile is being developed by Raytheon on its own initiative and is a modified ESSM ship-based anti-aircraft missile with a homing head and a control system from the AMRAAM aircraft missile. The first tests of the new SL-AMRAAM-ER missile were carried out in Norway in 2008.
Meanwhile, in January 2011, information appeared that the Pentagon had finally decided not to purchase the SLAMRAAM air defense system for either the army or the Marine Corps due to budget cuts, despite the lack of prospects for modernizing the Avenger air defense system. This apparently means the end of the program and makes its possible export prospects doubtful.
Tactical and technical characteristics of air defense systems based on aircraft missiles
| Name of the air defense system | Development company | Anti-aircraft missile | Homing head type | SAM engagement range, km | Damage range of the aviation complex, km |
| Chaparral | Lockheed Martin (USA) | Sidewinder 1C (AIM-9D) - MIM-72A | IR AN/DAW-2 rosette scanning (Rosette Scan Seeker) - MIM-72G | 0.5 to 9.0 (MIM-72G) | Up to 18 (AIM-9D) |
| SAM based on RVV-AE | KTRV (Russia) | RVV-AE | ARL | From 1.2 to 12 | From 0.3 to 80 |
| Pracka - RL-2 | Yugoslavia | R-60MK | IR | n/a | Up to 8 |
| Pracka - RL-4 | R-73 | IR | n/a | Up to 20 | |
| SPYDER | Rafael, IAI (Israel) | Python 5 | IR | 1 to 15 (SPYDER-SR) | Up to 15 |
| Derby | ARL GOS | From 1 to 35 (to 50) (SPYDER-MR) | Up to 63 | ||
| VL Mica | MBDA (Europe) | IR Mica | IR GOS | To 10 | From 0.5 to 60 |
| RF Mica | ARL GOS | ||||
| SL-AMRAAM/CLAWS/NASAMS | Raytheon (USA), Kongsberg (Norway) | AIM-120 AMRAAM | ARL GOS | From 2.5 to 25 | Up to 48 |
| AIM-9X Sidewinder | IR GOS | To 10 | Up to 18.2 | ||
| SL-AMRAAM ER | ARL GOS | Up to 40 | No analogue | ||
| Sea Sparrow | Raytheon (USA) | AIM-7F Sparrow | PARL GSN | Up to 19 | 50 |
| ESSM | PARL GSN | Up to 50 | No analogue | ||
| IRIS-T SL | Diehl BGT Defense (Germany) | IRIS-T | IR GOS | Up to 15 km (estimated) | 25 |
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 2/1991
IN FOREIGN ARMIES
(Based on materials from foreign press)
Major GeneralI. F. LOSEV ,
candidate of military sciences
Lieutenant colonelA. Y. MANACHINSKY ,
candidate of military sciences
The article, based on materials from the foreign press, the experience of local wars, and the practice of combat training, reveals the main directions for improving the air defense of NATO ground forces, taking into account new achievements in the development of means of armed warfare.
BASED on the experience of local wars and military conflicts of recent decades, NATO military experts focus on the ever-increasing role of air defense of troops in modern combat (operations) and in this regard highlight the emerging trend of involving all more forces and means to suppress it. Therefore, in recent years, the military-political leadership of the bloc has been clarifying its tasks and revising its views on its organization, construction and development of means.
The main tasks of the air defense of ground forces are considered to be: interdiction of enemy reconnaissance aircraft in the areas of combat formations of friendly troops and on the immediate approaches to them; protection from air strikes of the most important objects, artillery firing positions, launch positions of missile units, control points (CP), second echelons, reserves and rear units; preventing the other side from gaining air superiority. It is noted that a new task, the solution of which already in the 90s may largely determine the course and outcome of hostilities, will be the fight against tactical missiles (TR), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles (CR) and precision weapons (WTO), used from air carriers.
A significant place in publications is given to the analysis of methods of breaking through and suppressing air defense and, on this basis, identifying it weak points. In particular, its insufficient effectiveness is noted at high altitudes and in the stratosphere. This is explained by the fact that, firstly, with increasing altitude, the density of fire from air defense systems decreases; secondly, due to the constantly increasing flight speeds of aircraft, the time they spend in the affected areas of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) is decreasing; thirdly, the ground forces do not have a sufficient number of systems capable of effectively hitting air targets at these altitudes. All this is manifested in the presence of a flight corridor in the area of high altitudes, which is the safest for breaking through the air defense system and suppressing it. Therefore, it is concluded that when developing military means Air defense More attention should be paid to the development of anti-aircraft systems capable of forcing an air enemy to descend to extremely low altitudes (less than 100 m), where it is very difficult to break through the air defense system. Here are the most difficult conditions for aviation operations: the flight range is reduced, piloting and navigation become more complicated, and the possibilities of using on-board weapons are limited. Thus, the probability of detecting targets by an aircraft flying over flat terrain at an altitude of about 60 m at a speed of 300 m/s is 0.05. And this is unacceptable for combat operations by aircraft, since only one out of every 20 targets will be detected and possibly fired upon. In this case, according to NATO experts, even if not a single aircraft is shot down by air defense systems, their combat operations can be considered effective, because they force the air enemy to descend to a height at which he is practically unable to hit ground targets. In general, the conclusion is that it is advisable to “tightly close” large heights and leave small ones “partially open.” Reliable covering of the latter is a complex and expensive matter.
Taking into account the above, as well as the fact that in a theater of military operations it is practically impossible to create continuous and highly effective air defense at all altitudes, the emphasis is on reliable cover of the most important groupings of troops and objects through multi-layered destruction zones. To implement this principle in NATO countries, it is planned to use long-, medium- and short-range air defense systems, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and anti-aircraft artillery systems(ZAK). Based on the high mobility of troops and the maneuverability of combat operations, all fire weapons and the means that support them are subject to fairly stringent requirements regarding mobility, noise immunity, operational reliability, and the ability to conduct prolonged autonomous combat operations in any weather conditions. Air defense groups created on the basis of such complexes, according to the NATO military leadership, will be capable of hitting air targets at distant approaches to covered objects in a wide range of altitudes and flight speeds. In this case, an important role is assigned to portable air defense systems, which have high mobility, quick response and are a means of direct cover from air strikes from extremely low and low altitudes. Units armed with them can be used to cover combined arms units and subunits, firing (launching) positions of artillery, missile units and subunits, command posts and rear facilities, both independently and in combination with other air defense systems. Being in the battle formations of battalions (divisions) primarily of the first echelon, they provide cover for them on the battlefield.
The main provisions for combat use are also clarified anti-aircraft units and units of army corps. Since air defense systems are not enough to simultaneously and reliably protect all objects, priority in providing cover is set based on their operational-tactical importance, which can change in each specific situation. Their most typical ranking is as follows: troops in areas of concentration and on the march, command posts, rear facilities, airfields, artillery units and subunits, bridges, gorges or passes on movement routes, moving reserves, forward points of ammunition supply and fuel and lubricants. In cases where the corps’ facilities are not covered by the senior commander’s air defense systems or he is operating in an important operational direction, additional units armed with long- and medium-range air defense systems may be assigned to him operationally.
According to foreign press reports, recently at NATO ground forces exercises Special attention is devoted to improving the methods of combat use of air defense systems. When advancing formations and units to the line of an expected meeting with the enemy, it is recommended, for example, that anti-aircraft units be distributed among columns in such a way as to ensure the concentration of their efforts while covering the main forces on the march, in halt areas and at probable deployment lines in battle formation. In marching formations of units, air defense systems are distributed so as to create destruction zones with dimensions exceeding the depth of the columns. It is believed that if enemy aircraft carry out group strikes on moving units (up to 4-6 aircraft), then up to 25-30 percent are allocated for reconnaissance. anti-aircraft weapons, ready to immediately open fire. At rest stops, air defense missile systems and air defense missile systems occupy launching and firing positions near the covered units, where aircraft are most likely to appear. The interaction of air defense systems with each other is carried out by assigning to each of them responsible sectors for reconnaissance and fire, and with the covered troops - by allocating them places in columns in such a way as to create conditions for timely detection and firing primarily of low-flying targets from any direction. When conducting an oncoming battle, firing and starting positions are located so that the open flanks of units and subunits are reliably protected from air strikes. Great importance is attached to the maneuver of fire and units in order to timely concentrate air defense efforts on the main direction. The NATO command believes that in the context of the transience of combat and the constantly changing situation in the organization and conduct of air defense, a clear, specific statement of tasks from a senior commander to a junior commander is important. Under no circumstances should the latter’s initiative be hampered, especially in matters of organizing interaction with neighboring air defense units and covered troops, choosing combat positions for assets, and regulating the degree of their combat readiness to open fire. In the event of repelling massive strikes by air attack weapons (AEA), preference is given to centralized fire control. In this case, the ammunition consumption per destroyed target is reduced by 20-30 percent.
Analyzing the experience of local wars, military experts note that the air defense of troops must acquire a new quality: become anti-helicopter. The foreign press emphasized that solving “this problem is very difficult. This is due to the significant difficulty and short detection range of helicopters, the limited time (25-50 s, and in the future - 12-25 s) of their stay in the zones of destruction of anti-aircraft weapons, the inability of the fighter aviation to combat them. Abroad they came to the conclusion that the task of reliable protection of troops on the battlefield and on the march from helicopter attacks can be solved through the widespread use of anti-aircraft self-propelled guns with high mobility, combat readiness, and rate of fire (600-2500 rounds). /min) and reaction time (7-12 s). In addition, a tendency was noted to create special air defense systems capable of combating rotary-wing aircraft.
Continuous improvement and equipping of troops with MANPADS began, and special anti-helicopter shells for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles began to be developed. To realize the advantages of air defense systems and air defense systems in one installation, hybrid systems are created, equipped with anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft missiles. Foreign military experts believe that only complex use mobile air defense systems and air defense systems, attack aircraft and helicopters armed with air-to-air missiles, and clear coordination of the actions of all forces and means make it possible to effectively fight combat helicopters and other aircraft at low and extremely low altitudes.
It is believed that after 2000, the main means of attack will be maneuverable aircraft launching guided missiles outside the air defense zone, and aircraft operating at extremely low and low altitudes. Therefore, to increase the capabilities of anti-aircraft weapons to combat promising air targets, existing weapons are constantly being modernized and new models are being created (Table 1). US specialists developed concept of an integrated divisional system Air defense FAADS (Fig. 1), which includes: multi-purpose forward-based systems CAI - improved models of armored vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) capable of hitting helicopters and other low-flying targets at a range of up to 3 km, in the future - up to 7 km; heavy weapons first echelon LOSF-H, operating within line of sight and designed to engage low-flying targets at a distance of at least 6 km (for this purpose it is planned to use air defense systems of the Roland-2, Paladin A2 (A3) and ADATS type with a firing range of 6 -8 km, as well as air defense systems “Shakhine”, “Liberty” With firing range up to 12 km); anti-aircraft weapon NLOS, capable of destroying targets beyond the line of sight and protecting objects from helicopters, as well as fighting tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (preference is given to the FOG-M missile system, which uses fiber optics for visual guidance at a target at a distance of up to 10 km optical cable); anti-aircraft air defense weapon of the second echelon LOS-R, the main purpose of which is to cover control points, division rear facilities and other objects that have insufficient mobility (it is planned to use an Avenger-type air defense system with a firing range of 5 km). Such a system, which has effective command and control and reconnaissance means, according to the developers, will be able to provide cover for troops from enemy air strikes from extremely low and low altitudes throughout the entire division zone. The cost of the program is estimated at $11 billion. It is planned to be completed in 1991.
To combat operational-tactical and tactical missiles in the United States, the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system has been improved: the software, anti-aircraft guided missile and its targeting system have been improved. This allows for missile defense of an object over an area of 30X30 km. Used for the first time by multinational forces in combat operations in the Persian Gulf, the complex showed high efficiency in defeating Scud missiles.
By the end of the 90s, we should expect the entry into service of anti-aircraft units and subunits of laser weapons, which will affect the optical-electronic guidance systems of guided weapons and the visual organs of aircraft and helicopter crews at ranges of up to 20 km and disable them, as well as destroy them. designs of airplanes, helicopters, UAVs at ranges up to 10 km. Foreign experts believe that it will be widely used against cruise missiles and guided bombs.
table 2
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF GROUND AIR DEFENSE UNITS AND UNITS
NATO TROOPS
With the advent of new weapon systems and their adoption into service, we should expect changes in the organizational structure of air defense units and units. Currently, for example, they include divisions (batteries) of mixed composition, consisting of short-range air defense systems and air defense systems, as well as platoons of MANPADS (Table 2). According to foreign experts, a set of such measures will strengthen the air defense system of the ground forces.
NATO military leadership attaches particular importance to increasing the survivability of anti-aircraft units and units. Already at the stages of design and development of weapons, technical solutions are laid out that would partially solve this problem. These, for example, include strengthening the armor protection of the main elements of air defense systems and air defense systems, the creation of noise-immune radio-electronic equipment (RES), the placement of complexes on a mobile and highly cross-country base, etc. The regulations and manuals for the combat use of air defense systems provide for various ways to preserve survivability. However, priority is given to the tactical aspect.
The most important event is the rational choice of starting and firing positions. It is recommended to avoid the standard construction of unit battle formations. Reconnaissance, control and communications equipment is placed, whenever possible, at the maximum permissible distance from fire units. The order of engineering equipment is established in such a way that the most important elements of the air defense system and air defense system are covered first. The terrain is widely used for these purposes.
An effective way to increase survivability is to periodically change combat positions. It has been established that it needs to be carried out at a distance of 1-2 km as soon as possible after a reconnaissance aircraft has flown over, after firing, and also in cases where the unit has been in position for a relatively long time. For example, for the Chaparral - Vulcan divisions it should not exceed 4-6 hours, and for the Hawk divisions - 8-12.
To mislead the enemy and reduce losses of air defense forces and means, it is planned to equip false positions. For this purpose, manufactured industrially simulation models of military equipment. Although the creation and maintenance of a network of such positions require significant costs, however, according to NATO experts, they are justified. As the experience of local wars and military conflicts testifies, if there are 2-3 false positions and the probability of the enemy mistaking them for real ones is 0.6-0.8, the expected damage from its impact on starting (firing) positions can be reduced by 2-2.5 times.
One of the most important ways to solve the problem of survivability is considered to be the systematic, active and timely implementation of radio and electronic camouflage measures in order to hide the air defense system from the enemy. Ensuring the secrecy of the RES operation is achieved by changing various characteristics of the emitted channels, regulating their operating time and constantly monitoring it. The use of camouflage nets with properly selected material and aerosol formations, changing the outline of military equipment through special painting, and skillful use of the natural cover of the terrain significantly reduce the enemy’s ability to detect air defense forces and means in positions.
In the context of the widespread use of anti-radar missiles by enemy aircraft, direct cover of medium and medium-sized anti-aircraft missile systems plays an important role. long range. To do this, it is recommended to use the ship's Vulcan-Phalanx ZAK, placed on a truck chassis. It is believed that the timely destruction of the most dangerous targets (electronic warfare aircraft, reconnaissance and relay of RUK, air control posts, etc.), a decisive role in which should be given to long- and medium-range air defense systems and fighter aircraft, will preserve the survivability of anti-aircraft units and units and thereby prevent or significantly weaken enemy attacks on covered troops. An equally important area of ensuring the survivability of air defense forces and means is reducing the recovery time of weapons. For this purpose, it is planned to eliminate malfunctions and damage on site.
An analysis of the views of the NATO command on the role and place of air defense of ground forces in the system of armed warfare shows that the closest attention is paid to it, and measures are being planned and constantly taken to improve it. It is believed that the implementation of such measures as equipping anti-aircraft units and subunits modern means Air defense, the transition of anti-aircraft formations to a new organizational structure, as well as the improvement of techniques and methods for conducting combat operations will significantly increase the ability to cover troop groups, command posts and rear facilities from enemy air strikes.
Military Technology. - 1986, - V. 10. - No. 8. - P. 70-71.
NATO"S fifteen Nations.- 1982.-Jfe.-5*-P. 108-113.
Armed Forces Journal. - 1986. - 10.- P. 34-35.
Europaische Wehrkunde. - 1986. - No. 10.
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The recent development of the situation in Europe (the Balkan events) is very dynamic in both the political and military fields. As a result of the implementation of the principles of new thinking, it became possible to reduce NATO armed forces in Europe, while simultaneously increasing the quality of the NATO system, as well as the beginning of the reorganization of the system itself.
A significant place in these reorganization plans is given to the issues of combat and logistical support for combat operations, as well as the creation of reliable air defense (air defense), without which, according to foreign experts, one cannot count on success in combat in modern conditions. One of the manifestations of NATO’s efforts in this direction was the unified air defense system created in Europe, which included active forces and assets allocated by NATO countries, as well as the automated “Nage” system.
1. Organization of a unified NATO air defense system
NATO Command The purpose of the joint air defense system is definitely the following:
prevent the intrusion of possible enemy aircraft into the airspace of NATO countries in peacetime;
to prevent them from striking as much as possible during military operations in order to ensure the functioning of the main political and military-economic centers, strike forces of the armed forces, strategic forces, aviation assets, as well as other objects of strategic importance.
To perform these tasks it is considered necessary:
provide advance warning to the command of a possible attack through continuous monitoring of the airspace and obtaining intelligence data on the state of the enemy’s attack weapons;
protection from air strikes of nuclear forces, the most important military-strategic and administrative-economic facilities, as well as areas of concentration of troops;
maintaining high combat readiness of the maximum possible number of air defense forces and means to immediately repel an attack from the air;
organization of close interaction of air defense forces and means;
in the event of war, the destruction of enemy air attack means.
The creation of a unified air defense system is based on the following principles:
covering not individual objects, but entire areas, stripes
allocation of sufficient forces and means to cover the most important areas and objects;
high centralization of control of air defense forces and means.
The overall management of the NATO air defense system is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe through his Deputy for the Air Force (also known as the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Air Force), i.e. commander in chief The Air Force is the Air Defense Commander.
The entire area of responsibility of the NATO joint air defense system is divided into 2 air defense zones:
northern zone;
southern zone.
Northern air defense zone occupies the territories of Norway, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and coastal waters countries and are divided into three air defense regions (“North”, “Center”, “Northeast”).
Each district has 1–2 air defense sectors.
Southern air defense zone occupies the territory of Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Mediterranean and Black Seas and is divided into 4 air defense regions
"Southeast";
"South Center";
"Southwest;
Air defense areas have 2–3 air defense sectors. In addition, 2 independent air defense sectors have been created within the boundaries of the Southern zone:
Cypriot;
Maltese;
For air defense purposes the following is used:
fighter-interceptors;
Long, medium and short range air defense systems;
anti-aircraft artillery (ZA).
A) In service NATO air defense fighters The following fighter groups consist of:
group - F-104, F-104E (capable of attacking one target at medium and high altitudes up to 10,000m from the rear hemisphere);
group - F-15, F-16 (capable of destroying one target from all angles and at all altitudes),
group - F-14, F-18, "Tornado", "Mirage-2000" (capable of attacking several targets from different angles and at all altitudes).
Air defense fighters are entrusted with the task of intercepting air targets at the highest possible altitudes from their base over enemy territory and outside the SAM zone.
All fighters are armed with cannons and missiles and are all-weather, equipped with a combined weapons control system designed to detect and attack air targets.
This system typically includes:
Interception and targeting radar;
counting device;
infrared sight;
optical sight.
All radars operate in the range λ=3–3.5 cm in pulse (F–104) or pulse-Doppler mode. All NATO aircraft have a receiver indicating radiation from radar operating in the range λ = 3–11.5 cm. Fighters are based at airfields 120–150 km away from the front line.
B)Fighter tactics
When performing combat missions, fighters use three methods of combat:
interception from the position “Duty at the airport”;
interception from the “Air duty” position;
free attack.
"Duty officer at the airport"– the main type of combat missions. It is used in the presence of a developed radar and ensures energy savings and the availability of a full supply of fuel.
Flaws: shifting the interception line to one’s own territory when intercepting low-altitude targets
Depending on the threatening situation and the type of alarm, the duty forces of air defense fighters can be in the following degrees of combat readiness:
Ready No. 1 – departure 2 minutes after the order;
Ready No. 2 – departure 5 minutes after the order;
Ready No. 3 – departure 15 minutes after the order;
Ready No. 4 – departure 30 minutes after the order;
Ready No. 5 – departure 60 minutes after the order.
The possible line for a meeting between military and technical cooperation with a fighter from this position is 40–50 km from the front line.
"Air duty" – used to cover the main group of troops in the most important objects. In this case, the army group zone is divided into duty zones, which are assigned to air units.
Duty is carried out at medium, low and high altitudes:
–In PMU – in groups of aircraft up to a flight;
-At SMU - at night - by single planes, changeover. produced in 45–60 minutes. Depth – 100–150 km from the front line.
Flaws: – the ability to quickly detect enemy duty areas;
forced to adhere to defensive tactics more often;
the possibility of the enemy creating superiority in forces.
"Free Hunt" – for the destruction of air targets in a given area that does not have continuous air defense missile coverage and a continuous radar field. Depth - 200–300 km from the front line.
Air defense and air defense fighters, equipped with detection and targeting radars, armed with air-to-air missiles, use 2 methods of attack:
Attack from the front HEMISPHERE (at 45–70 0 to the target's heading). It is used when the time and place of interception are calculated in advance. This is possible when tracking the target longitudinally. It is the fastest, but requires high pointing accuracy both in location and time.
Attack from the rear HEMISPHERE (within the heading angle sector 110–250 0).
Can be used against all targets and with all types of weapons. It provides a high probability of hitting the target. Having good weapons and moving from one method of attack to another, one fighter can carry out 6–9 attacks , which allows you to shoot down
5–6 BTA aircraft. Significant disadvantage
Air defense fighters, and in particular fighter radars, is their work based on the use of the Doppler effect. So-called “blind” heading angles arise (angles of approach to the target), in which the fighter’s radar is not able to select (select) the target against the background of interfering reflections of the ground or passive interference. These zones do not depend on the flight speed of the attacking fighter, but are determined by the target’s flight speed, heading angles, approach and the minimum radial component of the relative approach speed ∆Vbl., specified by the performance characteristics of the radar.
The radar is capable of selecting only those signals from the target that have a certain Doppler ƒ min. This ƒ min is for radar ± 2 kHz. 2 In accordance with the laws of radar ƒ =2 ƒ 0
V
where ƒ 0 – carrier, C–V light. Such signals come from targets with V 2 =30–60 m/s. To achieve this V 2 the aircraft must fly at a heading angle q=arcos V 2 /V c =70–80 0, and the sector itself has blind heading angles => 790–110 0, and 250–290 0, respectively.
The main air defense systems in the joint air defense system of NATO countries are:
Long-range air defense systems (D≥60km) – “Nike-Hercules”, “Patriot”;
Medium-range air defense system (D = from 10–15 km to 50–60 km) – improved “Hawk” (“U-Hawk”);
Short-range air defense systems (D = 10–15 km) - “Chaparral”, “Rapier”, “Roland”, “Indigo”, “Crotal”, “Javelin”, “Avenger”, “Adats”, “Fog-M”, “ Stinger", "Blowpipe". NATO air defense systems principle of use
are divided into: Centralized use, applied according to the plan of the senior boss in , zone area
and air defense sector;
Military air defense systems are part of the ground forces and are used according to the plan of their commander. To funds used according to plans senior managers
include long- and medium-range air defense systems. Here they operate in automatic guidance mode.
The main tactical unit of anti-aircraft weapons is a division or equivalent units.
Long- and medium-range air defense systems, with a sufficient number of them, are used to create a continuous cover zone.
When their number is small, only individual, most important objects are covered. used to cover ground forces, roads, etc.
Each anti-aircraft weapon has certain combat capabilities for firing and hitting a target.
Combat capabilities – quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing the capabilities of air defense missile systems units to carry out combat missions in set time and in specific conditions.
The combat capabilities of an air defense missile system battery are assessed by the following characteristics:
Dimensions of shelling and destruction zones in vertical and horizontal planes;
Number of simultaneously fired targets;
System response time;
The ability of the battery to conduct long-term fire;
The number of launches when firing at a given target.
The specified characteristics can only be predetermined for a non-maneuvering purpose.
Firing zone - a part of space at each point of which a missile can be aimed.
Affected area - part of the firing zone within which the missile meets the target and defeats it with a given probability.
The position of the affected area in the firing zone may change depending on the direction of flight of the target.
When the air defense system is operating in the mode automatic guidance the affected area occupies a position in which the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area in the horizontal plane always remains parallel to the direction of flight towards the target.
Since the target can approach from any direction, the affected area can occupy any position, while the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area rotates following the turn of the aircraft.
Hence, a turn in the horizontal plane at an angle greater than half the angle limiting the affected area is equivalent to the aircraft leaving the affected area.
The affected area of any air defense system has certain boundaries:
along N – lower and upper;
on D from leave. mouth – far and near, as well as restrictions on the course parameter (P), which determines the lateral boundaries of the zone.
Lower limit of the affected area – Nmin of firing is determined, which ensures the specified probability of hitting the target. It is limited by the influence of the reflection of radiation from the ground on the operation of the RTS and the closing angles of positions.
Position closing angle ( α ) – is formed when the terrain and local objects exceed the position of the batteries.
Upper and data bounds affected areas are determined by the energy resource of the river.
Near border the affected area is determined by the time of uncontrolled flight after launch.
Lateral borders affected areas are determined by the course parameter (P).
Exchange rate parameter P – the shortest distance (KM) from the point where the battery is located and the projection of the aircraft track.
The number of simultaneously fired targets depends on the number of radars irradiating (illuminating) the target in the air defense missile system batteries.
The system reaction time is the time that passes from the moment an air target is detected until the missile is launched.
The number of possible launches on a target depends on the long-range detection of the target by the radar, the course parameter P, H of the target and Vtarget, T of the system reaction and the time between missile launches.
Foreign military experts note that if previously the main weapons of anti-aircraft missile units and air forces of NATO countries were long- and medium-range air defense systems developed in the USA, now in addition to them short-range air defense systems () and "( ).
Rice. 1 Control position of the Nike-Hercules air defense system. In the foreground is a target tracking radar, in the background is a target detection radar.
Long and medium range air defense systems
The NATO command plans to use these complexes for air cover of large industrial facilities and troop concentration areas.All-weather long-range air defense system "Nike-Hercules"(USA) is designed to combat subsonic and supersonic aircraft flying mainly at medium and high altitudes. However, as reported in the foreign press, as a result of the tests it was established that this complex in some cases can be used to combat tactical ballistic missiles.
The fire unit (battery) includes: anti-aircraft guided missiles; five radars located at the control position (low power detection radar, target tracking radar, missile tracking radar, radio range finder, high power radar for detecting small targets); control point for launching missiles and guiding them to the target; up to nine stationary or mobile launchers; power supplies; auxiliary equipment (transport and loading, control and testing, etc.). The control position of the Nike-Hercules air defense system is shown in Fig. 1.
In total, a division can include up to four batteries. According to foreign press reports, the Nike-Hercules complex has been repeatedly modernized in order to increase the reliability of its elements and reduce operating costs.
All-weather long-range air defense system "Bloodhound" Mk.2(UK) designed to combat subsonic and supersonic aircraft. Composition of the fire unit (battery): missile defense; Target illumination radar (stationary and more powerful or mobile, but less powerful “Firelight”); 4-8 launchers with one guide each; missile launch control point. Bloodhound Mk.2 batteries are organized into squadrons.
Information about air targets is transmitted directly to the target illumination radar from its own detection radar or from a radar from the general detection and warning system deployed in a given area.
The Bloodhound air defense systems are in service with units and units of the British Air Force, which are based in the territories of this country and. In addition, they are equipped with the air forces of Sweden, Switzerland and Singapore. Serial production of these systems has been discontinued, and to replace them, a new air defense system is being developed in the UK and France.
All-weather medium-range air defense system "Hawk"(USA) designed to combat subsonic and supersonic aircraft flying at low and medium altitudes.
Rice. 2. Medium and short-range air defense systems: a - self-propelled launcher of anti-aircraft guided missiles "Hawk" (based on the XM-727 tracked transporter); b - air defense missile system guidance and control post with a launcher in position; c - anti-aircraft missile system mounted on a tracked armored personnel carrier; d - launcher of the Krotal air defense system (left) and target tracking radar (right)
The fire unit (battery) includes: missile defense systems; Detection radar operating in pulse mode; Detection radar operating in continuous radiation mode; two target illumination radars; radio rangefinder; command centre; six PU (each has three guides); power supplies and auxiliary equipment. Low and high power radars are used to illuminate the target (the latter is used when shooting at small air targets).
The Air Force is also armed with a self-propelled version of the Hawk air defense system, created on the basis of the XM-727 tracked transporters (Fig. 2, a). This complex includes conveyors, each of which has a control unit with three guides. While on the move, these transporters tow on trailers all the radar and auxiliary equipment necessary for deploying the battery.
The foreign press reports that the improved Hawk air defense system has now been put into service in the United States. Its main difference from the basic version is that the new missile (MIM-23B) has increased reliability, a more powerful warhead and a new engine. Ground control equipment was also improved. All this, according to American experts, made it possible to increase the range of the air defense system and the probability of hitting a target. It is reported that the US NATO allies are planning to launch licensed production of all the necessary hardware and equipment to modernize their existing Hawk air defense systems.
Short-range air defense system
These are mainly designed to combat low-flying aircraft in the defense of air bases and other individual facilities.Clear-weather air defense system "Tiger Cat"(Great Britain) is designed to combat subsonic and transonic low-flying aircraft (can also be used to fire at ground targets). It was created on the basis of the ship version of the ZURO, which has been repeatedly modernized in recent years.
Composition of the fire unit: missile defense; guidance and control station with a binocular sight, radio command transmitter, computer and control panel; PU with three guides; SAM launch preparation software unit; generator; auxiliary and spare equipment (Fig. 2, b).
The Tiger Cat complex is highly mobile. All equipment of the fire unit is placed on two Land Rover vehicles and two trailers towed by them. Combat crew of five people. It is possible to place this air defense system on various armored vehicles. Recently, the ST-850 radar has been included in the complex, which, according to British experts, will allow it to be used in any meteorological conditions.
According to foreign press reports, the Tiger Cat air defense system is also in service with the air forces of Iran, India, Jordan and Argentina.
Clear-weather air defense system "Rapier"(UK) designed to combat subsonic and supersonic low-flying aircraft.
Composition of the fire unit: missile defense system, removable visual tracking unit, air target detection radar (includes an identification system and a radio command transmitter), an integrated launcher (four guides), a removable litany unit. Calculation of five people.
The complex is highly mobile. All equipment of the fire unit is placed on two Land Rover vehicles and two trailers towed by them. It is possible to place air defense systems on tracked armored vehicles (Fig. 2, c).
The main version of the complex is clear weather. However, to operate the complex in any weather conditions, a special radar was created and tested. The first air defense systems, which include this radar, have already entered service with some units of the RAF ground defense regiment. The Rapier air defense system is also in service with the Air Forces of Iran and Zambia.
All-weather air defense system "Krotal"(France) is designed to combat subsonic and supersonic low-flying aircraft.
Composition of the fire unit: target tracking radar, launcher with four directing radio command transmitter, infrared tracking device and auxiliary equipment. The three fire units are controlled from the command vehicle, where the pulse-Doppler radar for detecting air targets is located. The detection range of a typical target is reported to be 18.5 km. The radar, equipped with a special computer, detects up to 30 air targets simultaneously, but in auto-tracking mode it can only work on 12 targets. All equipment of the fire unit is placed on an armored vehicle (Fig. 2, d).
The US Department of Defense, in the ongoing arms race, is conducting great work to improve existing and create new air defense systems, for example, the SAM-D type (developed for the US ground forces) and the SLIM type (for the US Air Force).
Complex SAM-D (Surface to Air Missile-Development) all-weather, long range; designed to combat subsonic and supersonic aircraft at all altitudes (excluding extremely low ones). In the early 80s, they are planned to replace the Nike-Hercules air defense systems in service.
American experts believe that the data sampling method used in the radar with time multiplexing of channels will make it possible to simultaneously aim several missiles at different targets or select one target from a group.
Work on the air defense missile system is at the stage of testing experimental samples of missile defense systems and launchers. Testing of the guidance system has begun. At the same time, experts are looking for ways to simplify and reduce the cost of air defense systems.
It will be all-weather with a range of up to 1300 km. It is intended to combat mainly supersonic air targets in the US air defense system. According to preliminary calculations maximum speed flight of the SLIM missile defense system (Fig. 3) will correspond to the number M = 4 - 6. The guidance system is combined. Possible methods combat use: from fortified ground or underground structures and from carrier aircraft. Launch and guidance can be carried out either from an aircraft equipped with a detection and control system, or from the ground.
The American press reported that preliminary theoretical calculations for the creation of the SLIM air defense system have now been completed in the United States.
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