DPRK nuclear weapons: threat or blackmail. In a nutshell
And in its vicinity there are seven nuclear charges. After this, in 1956, the DPRK and the USSR signed an agreement on the training of nuclear specialists. Researchers often point to the beginning of North Korea's nuclear activities in 1952, when the decision was made to create the Atomic Energy Research Institute. The actual creation of nuclear infrastructure began in the mid-1960s.
In 1959, the DPRK entered into agreements on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the USSR of the PRC and began construction of a research center in Nyongbyon, where in 1965 the Soviet IRT-2000 reactor with a capacity of 2 MW was installed. The IRT-2000 reactor is a research light-water pool type reactor with a water-beryllium neutron reflector. This reactor uses relatively highly enriched uranium as fuel. Apparently, such a reactor cannot be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons - for example, to produce plutonium.
Work on the creation of nuclear weapons began in the 1970s. In 1974, the DPRK joined the IAEA. That same year, Pyongyang asked China for help in developing nuclear weapons; North Korean specialists were allowed to visit Chinese training grounds.
DPRK and IAEA
In April 1985, under pressure from the USSR and counting on the construction of a nuclear power plant with its help, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a reward for this, in 1986, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea (with some probability, all the plutonium at the disposal of the DPRK was produced on it). An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.
In 1990, this agreement was clarified, and instead of four light water reactors, it was decided to supply three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors. A supply contract was also signed Soviet Union fuel assemblies worth about 185 thousand dollars. In June of the same year, IAEA inspections began at the country's nuclear facilities after the United States announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korean territory. In the period from 1992-1994. Six inspections were carried out, the results of which raised some doubts on the part of the IAEA.
"North Korean Nuclear Crisis"
On February 11, 1993, IAEA Director General H. Blix took the initiative to conduct a “special inspection” in the DPRK. Ten days later, North Korea's Minister of Atomic Energy informed the IAEA of his country's refusal to allow this inspection, and on March 12, the decision to abandon the NPT. In June of the same year, North Korea, in exchange for a US promise not to interfere in its affairs, suspended its withdrawal from the treaty, but a year later, on June 13, 1994, it withdrew from the IAEA.
According to declassified data, in 1994, US President Clinton, together with Secretary of Defense William Perry, considered the possibility of missile strike on the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, however, after analytical data was requested from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, General John Shalikashvili, it became clear that such a strike could lead to a full-scale war with a large number American and South Korean losses, as well as huge losses among the civilian population, as a result of which the Clinton administration was forced to enter into unfavorable, from its point of view, “Framework Agreements” with North Korea.
USA and North Korea
The processes of preparing the United States for military action against the DPRK were “slowed down” by the visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in 1994, at which an agreement was reached to freeze the North Korean nuclear program. This event was a turning point that brought the crisis into negotiations and ensured its diplomatic resolution. In October 1994, after lengthy consultations, the DPRK signed a Framework Agreement with the United States, under which North Korea assumed certain obligations, for example:
- cessation of construction and use of reactors and uranium enrichment enterprises;
- refusal to extract plutonium from reactor fuel assemblies;
- removal of spent nuclear fuel outside the country;
- taking measures to dismantle all objects whose purpose in one way or another indicates the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In turn, the US authorities have committed themselves to:
The coming to power of the 43rd US President Bush (Jr.) led to a worsening of relations between the two countries. Light water reactors were never built, which did not stop the United States from putting forward more and more demands to the DPRK. Bush included North Korea as a “rogue state,” and in October 2002, US Deputy Secretary of State James Kelly said that the DPRK was enriching uranium. After some time, the United States suspended fuel supplies to North Korean power plants, and the DPRK on December 12 officially announced the resumption of its nuclear program and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors. By the end of 2002, North Korea, according to the CIA, had accumulated from 7 to 24 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. On January 10, 2003, the DPRK officially withdrew from the NPT.
Six Party Talks
In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan. The first three rounds (August 2003, February and June 2004) did not bring much results. And Pyongyang avoided participating in the fourth, scheduled for September, due to another deterioration in American-Korean and Japanese-Korean relations.
At the first round of negotiations (August 2003), the United States began to seek not only the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program, but also the elimination of the nuclear infrastructure already created in the DPRK. In exchange, the United States agreed to guarantee the security of the DPRK and provide economic assistance to Pyongyang, supplying it, in particular, with two light water reactors. However, the United States and Japan demanded that the DPRK's nuclear program be curtailed under the control of the IAEA or the Five Power Commission. The DPRK did not agree to such conditions.
In the second round (February 2004), the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program under the control of the IAEA and in exchange for supplies of fuel oil. However, now the United States, with the support of Japan, demanded not a freeze, but the complete elimination of North Korea's nuclear facilities under the control of the IAEA. North Korea rejected such proposals.
Hopes for a successful resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula first appeared in the third round of six-party talks, which took place from June 23 to 26, 2004, when the United States agreed to a “freeze reward.” In response, North Korea stated that it was ready to refrain from the production, testing and transfer of nuclear weapons and to freeze all objects related to WMD. The United States has put forward a project to transfer North Korea's nuclear facilities under the temporary international management of the Five Powers Commission or the IAEA. Subsequently, it was proposed to eliminate North Korean nuclear facilities under international control. But North Korea did not agree with this option either. The DPRK Foreign Ministry expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the negotiations.
Explosion
On September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite detected a powerful explosion in a remote area of the DPRK (Yangang Province) near the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.
On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom with explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station (two of them originate in Yangangdo). largest rivers this region Amnokkan and Tumangan).
South Korean experts doubt that it was a nuclear explosion. In their opinion, there might not have been an explosion at all, and the release of smoke into the atmosphere was a consequence of a large fire. According to some reports, there may be a plant producing rocket components in the area, and the explosion could have been caused by ignition rocket fuel or detonation of warheads.
According to other information, military-strategic facilities are concentrated in this area, in particular the recently built Yonjori missile base, which is an underground missile test site where ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japanese territory are stored and tested in deep tunnels.
Official American sources believe that there was no nuclear explosion. At the same time, American intelligence services noted strange activity in the area of the country's nuclear facilities.
Refusal to negotiate
On September 16, 2004, the DPRK announced that it would not participate in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue until the situation with secret uranium and plutonium developments in South Korea is clarified. In early September, South Korea admitted that in 2000 it received small quantity enriched uranium. According to officials, all experiments were purely scientific in nature and were soon completely curtailed.
On September 28, 2004, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister told the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the DPRK had no other choice in creating nuclear deterrence forces in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.
At the same time, the diplomat rejected reports of North Korea’s preparations to resume missile tests as “unverified rumors.” North Korea's unilateral moratorium on ballistic missile tests was introduced in 1999 and was extended in 2001 until 2003. In 1998, North Korea tested a ballistic missile that flew over Japan and fell into the Pacific Ocean.
On October 21, 2004, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that “intelligence cannot say whether the DPRK has nuclear weapons.”
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time openly announced the creation of nuclear weapons in the country: “We are for the six-party negotiations, but we are forced to interrupt our participation in them for an indefinite period - until we are convinced that sufficient conditions and atmosphere have been created to allow hope for the results of the dialogue. The negotiation process has reached a dead end due to the US's hostile anti-Korean policy. As long as America brandishes the nuclear baton, determined to eliminate our system at any cost, we will expand our stockpile of nuclear weapons to defend our people’s historic choice, freedom and socialism.”
International reaction
At that time, there was no real evidence that the DPRK was actually carrying out a military nuclear program and, moreover, had already created a nuclear bomb. Therefore, it was suggested that the DPRK leadership with such a statement simply intended to demonstrate that it is not afraid of anyone and is ready to resist a potential threat from the United States, including nuclear weapons. But since the North Koreans did not provide evidence of its existence, Russian experts considered this statement to be another manifestation of the policy of “blackmail with elements of bluff.” As for the Russian Foreign Ministry, its representatives called the DPRK’s refusal to participate in the six-party talks and its intention to build up its nuclear arsenal “not consistent with Pyongyang’s expressed desire for a nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula.”
In South Korea, in connection with the DPRK's statement, an urgent meeting of the country's Security Council was convened. The South Korean Foreign Ministry called on North Korea to “resume participation in negotiations without any conditions.”
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in March 2005 proposed that China put economic pressure on Pyongyang by cutting off oil and coal supplies, which would be tantamount to a trade and economic blockade. According to experts, the PRC's share in providing economic assistance to North Korea is, according to various sources, from 30 to 70%.
South Korea was against resorting to sanctions and refusing to provide assistance to the DPRK humanitarian aid or from joint economic projects. An official representative of the ruling Uridan Party even demanded that the United States provide evidence of its accusations that the DPRK is exporting nuclear materials, or stop “engaging in propaganda,” since such a policy could cause serious problems between South Korea and the USA.
It subsequently emerged that the United States had distorted data it had previously provided to other countries regarding the North Korean nuclear program. In particular, in early 2005, the United States informed Japan, South Korea and China that the DPRK had supplied Libya with uranium hexafluoride, a source material in the uranium enrichment process that can also be used to create a combat nuclear warhead. However, as the Washington Post reported, North Korea actually supplied uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan - without knowing about its further shipment to Libya.
The main thing that Japan was able to do was to block the flow of foreign exchange earnings to the DPRK from Koreans living in Japan by creating a number of bureaucratic barriers. On March 22, 2005, Pyongyang demanded that Japan be excluded from participating in the six-party talks because Japan “fully follows American policy and does not make any contribution to the negotiations.”
At the same time, the DPRK hastened to express its solidarity with Seoul, whose relations with Japan have deteriorated sharply due to Japan's territorial claims to the South Korean island of Dokdo, even emphasizing the possibility of military support from Seoul.
Resumption of negotiations
In July 2005, after lengthy informal consultations, the DPRK agreed to return to the table of six-party talks on the nuclear program in Beijing. As a condition, the DPRK put forward one demand - that the United States “recognize North Korea as a partner and treat it with respect.”
The fourth round of negotiations took place in July-August 2005, when the participants for the first time managed to agree on the adoption of a joint document. On September 19, 2005, the Joint Statement on the Principles of Denuclearization was adopted. North Korea's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was recognized, and all participants in the negotiations agreed to discuss the issue of supplying the DPRK with light water nuclear reactor. In addition to the DPRK's confirmation of its commitments to curtail its nuclear program, return to the NPT and under IAEA inspections, the document contained statements of intention to normalize relations between the DPRK and the United States, and between North Korea and Japan.
During the fifth round of negotiations (November 9-11, 2005), North Korea announced its readiness to suspend nuclear weapons tests. Pyongyang has promised to postpone nuclear weapons tests as the first step in a program to gradually make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone.
However, after the US Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow said on December 10, 2005 that the communist system in North Korea could be called a “criminal regime,” the DPRK said it was considering the words American Ambassador as a "declaration of war" and called on South Korea to expel Vershbow from the country. Pyongyang also said that the ambassador’s statement could nullify all previously reached agreements regarding the DPRK’s nuclear program.
Already on December 20, 2005, the Korean Central News Agency reported that North Korea intends to intensify nuclear development based on graphite reactors, which can be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The Pyongyang authorities explained their actions by the termination in 2003 of the nuclear power plant construction program at two light water reactors in Sinpo (east coast of the DPRK) by the international consortium “Korean Peninsula Nuclear Development Promotion Organization” (KEDO) under the auspices of the United States: “In conditions when the Bush administration stopped the supply light water reactors, we will actively develop independent nuclear energy based on graphite reactors with a capacity of 50 and 200 megawatts.”
At the same time, North Korea planned to build its own light water nuclear reactor and reconstruct two plants that could produce large quantities nuclear fuel.
With this statement, North Korea effectively denounced its previous promises to abandon all nuclear programs in exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance.
The statement was a reaction to the introduction of US sanctions against North Korean companies that were accused of supplying missiles and manufacturing counterfeit dollars, as well as the adoption of a UN resolution on human rights in the DPRK.
At the beginning of 2006 official representative The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Kun Quan confirmed the position of the Chinese side: it is impossible to abandon the further advancement of the negotiation process, the fundamental goal - the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the principles of achieving this goal through peaceful negotiations.
On March 19-22, 2007, the first stage of the sixth round of negotiations took place in Beijing, and from September 27 to 30, 2007, meetings of the second stage of the sixth round were held in Beijing.
Nuclear testing
At the end of September 2006, a bill was sent to US President George W. Bush for signature, approved by both houses of the US Congress. The bill introduced sanctions against North Korea and companies collaborating with it, which, according to the United States, are assisting the DPRK in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles and other WMD delivery technologies. The sanctions also included a ban on financial transactions and the refusal to issue export licenses.
On October 3, 2006, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement stating North Korea's intention “conduct a nuclear test provided that its safety is reliably guaranteed”. As a justification for this decision, a threat was stated nuclear war from the United States and economic sanctions aimed at strangling the DPRK - in these conditions, Pyongyang sees no other choice but to conduct a nuclear test. At the same time, as noted in the statement, “the DPRK does not intend to use nuclear weapons first,” but on the contrary, “will continue to make efforts to ensure the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula and make comprehensive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and a complete ban on nuclear weapons.”
At the point with coordinates 41°18′ N. w. 129°08′ E. d. HGIOL An earthquake with a magnitude of 4.2 was recorded. The earthquake was recorded in South Korea, Japan, USA, Australia and Russia.
As the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported the next day, “Pyongyang informed Moscow about the planned timing of the tests through diplomatic channels two hours before the explosion.” The PRC, which Pyongyang warned about the test only 20 minutes before the explosion, almost immediately informed its partners in the six-party talks - the United States, Japan and South Korea - about this.
According to the statement of the DPRK authorities and monitoring of the relevant services of surrounding countries, no radiation leaks have been detected.
All leading world powers, including Russia and (for the first time) China, as well as the leadership of NATO and the European Union condemned the nuclear test in the DPRK. Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with members of the government, said: “Russia, of course, condemns the tests carried out by the DPRK, and this is not only about Korea itself - it is about the enormous damage that has been caused to the process of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world.”
South Korea canceled the shipment of another batch of humanitarian aid to the DPRK and brought its armed forces into a state of high alert.
What do they think? American experts, North Korea has enough plutonium to produce 12 nuclear weapons. At the same time, experts believe that the DPRK does not have the technology to create ammunition that could be placed in the head of a missile.
Second test
On May 25, 2009, North Korea again conducted nuclear tests. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons. On May 27, the North Korean radio station for foreign countries “Voice of Korea”, in all 9 languages of its foreign broadcasting (including Russian), reported on the “mass public meeting” that had taken place the day before in Pyongyang, at which the Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, Chae Tae-bok, gave the official justification for conducting a nuclear test : “The nuclear tests carried out are a decisive measure to protect the highest interests of the republic to protect the sovereignty of the country and nation in conditions where the threat from the United States of America of a nuclear preventive strike and their machinations to apply sanctions are increasing.” The broadcast then included a statement from the “representative office of the Korean People's Army in Panmunjeong,” which stated that “despite the Korean Armistice Agreement, which prohibits any blockade of the warring parties, South Korea has joined the initiative to limit nuclear weapons, and the United States has introduced sanctions against North Korea. The statement indicated that if there are attempts to forcefully extend the initiative to limit nuclear weapons to the DPRK, such as attempts to inspect the country’s maritime transport, then the DPRK will consider this a declaration of war.”
Third test
In the article we will talk about the testing of nuclear weapons in North Korea, as well as other countries that may pose a threat. We will consider this issue in detail from all sides, and also study nuclear tests in Korea and talk about the potential of other countries.
North Korea's nuclear missile program
This is the conventional name for a set of research works on the creation of nuclear charges in All data are based on official documents or statements by the government of the country, since the developments are hidden. The authorities assure that all tests are exclusively peaceful in nature and are aimed at space exploration. In the winter of 2005, it officially announced nuclear weapons and a year later carried out its first explosion.
It is known that after the war, the United States regularly threatened North Korea that it could use nuclear weapons. Ruler Kim Il Sung, being under the protection of the USSR, was calm in this regard until he learned that the United States planned to drop 7 nuclear warheads on Pyongyang during Korean War. This served as a powerful impetus for nuclear energy research to begin in Korea. It is generally accepted that 1952 marked the beginning of North Korea's nuclear activities. The country acted together with the USSR, which provided considerable assistance. Since the 1970s, the development of nuclear weapons began in North Korea. Agreements were concluded with China, which allowed researchers to visit its testing grounds.
In 1985, under strong pressure from the USSR, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
First test
In the fall of 2006, the country's authorities announced that the first nuclear test had been successfully carried out. The official statement said that this was an underground test that would serve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The study took place at the Pungeri test site, which is located in the northeast of the republic, less than 200 km from the border with Russia. The tremor caused earthquakes in Japan, the USA, Australia, South Korea and Russia.
After this, the question of whether North Korea had nuclear weapons was no longer raised. The Chinese authorities were warned 2 hours before the explosion. World powers including Russia and China, as well as upper echelons EU and NATO authorities were critical of nuclear weapons testing. Political leaders openly expressed their dissatisfaction. Because of this, the weapons, which deserve attention, immediately came into combat readiness.
Second test
In the spring of 2009, a second test took place, the power of which was much greater. After the explosion, Korea's international radio broadcast in 9 languages that their people came out in support of the weapons test, as the threat from the United States regularly appears. Korea, in turn, is simply taking decisive measures to possibly protect its territory.
At the same time, South Korea joined the countries that reacted negatively to this state of affairs. The US government even imposed sanctions against the DPRK. In response, the authorities said that if mass searches were carried out, Korea would perceive this as the start of war.
Third test
In the winter of 2013, the republic publicly announced that it intended to conduct another test. In February, researchers from the United States noticed tremors located approximately in the area of the North Korean nuclear test site. The UN announced the discovery of a strange seismic phenomenon with signs of an explosion. On the same day, North Korean authorities announced a successful experiment. On December 12, 2012, North Korean researchers launched a new satellite into orbit, which began a crisis in the country. Relations between the United States, South Korea, Japan and North Korea have become very tense.
Still wondering if North Korea has nuclear weapons and how many of them? It will be useful to know that in 2015 it was officially announced that the country has a hydrogen bomb. Analysts said with confidence that, most likely, developments in this direction are underway, but there are no ready-made warheads yet.
In January 2016, South Korean authorities shared information that the DPRK was allegedly preparing to test a hydrogen bomb. Intelligence officers said that North Korea had established the production of tritium, which is necessary to create a bomb, and that a new underground tunnel was being built. In the winter of 2017, on the orders of Kim Jong-un, the first explosion of a thermonuclear bomb was carried out near the Chinese border. This information was confirmed by Chinese researchers. In the fall of the same year, information was officially confirmed that the DPRK possesses a hydrogen bomb.
Fourth test
In the winter of 2016, North Korea reminded itself again. The nuclear power carried out another explosion and soon announced that the first one had been successful. However, experts from around the world showed some distrust of these words and doubted that it was a hydrogen bomb that had been detonated. They insisted that the explosion should have been more powerful, several hundred thousand million tons. It was equivalent to what happened in 2009. Its power was compared to the bomb that exploded in Hiroshima.
Fifth test
In the fall of 2016, in the morning, a powerful seismic explosion occurred across the country. The epicenter was in a populated area, not far from the Punggeri test site. US geologists classified the seismic tremors as an explosion. A little later, the DPRK officially announced the successful conduct of its fifth nuclear weapons test.
Sixth test
On September 3, 2017, powerful tremors were recorded in North Korea. They were noticed by seismic stations in many countries. This time, scientists agreed that the explosion was ground-based. It occurred in the afternoon local time in the area of the Punggeri training ground. Officially, the Korean authorities announced the successful testing of a nuclear warhead. The power of the explosion was incredible and 10 times higher than what it was in the fall of 2016. A few minutes after the first shock, the US Geological Survey recorded another one. Multiple landslides were visible from the satellite.
Countries
When North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, it joined the so-called “Nuclear Club,” consisting of states that own varying amounts of such weapons. List of countries that legally own capacity: France, China, UK, Russia and USA. Illegitimate owners are Pakistan, India and North Korea.
It should be mentioned that Israel is not officially considered the owner of nuclear weapons, but many world experts are confident that the country has its own secret developments. However, many states at one time were engaged in the development of such weapons. Moreover, not everyone signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and many of those who signed it did not ratify it. This is why the threat still exists.
USA
Let's start the list of countries with nuclear weapons with the United States. The basis of its power lies in ballistic missiles on submarines. It is known that the United States currently has more than 1,500 warheads. After World War II, weapons production increased sharply, but was stopped in 1997.
Russia
So, the list of countries with nuclear weapons continues with the Russian Federation, which owns 1,480 warheads. It also has ammunition that can be used by naval, strategic, missile and aviation forces.
Over the past decade, the number of weapons in Russia has decreased significantly due to the signing of a mutual disarmament treaty. The Russian Federation, like the United States, signed the 1968 treaty, so it is included in the list of countries that legally possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, the presence of such a threat allows Russia to adequately defend its political and economic interests.
France
We already understand how strong the North Korean army is, but what about European countries? France, for example, has 300 warheads that can be used on submarines. The country also has about 60 multiprocessors that can be used for military aviation purposes. This country's stockpile of weapons seems negligible compared to the volumes of the United States and Russia, but this is also significant. France has been fighting for independence for a very long time in terms of developing its own weapons. Researchers tried to invent a supercomputer and tested nuclear weapons. But all this lasted until 1998, after which all developments were destroyed and stopped.
United Kingdom
This country has approximately 255 nuclear weapons, of which more than 150 are fully operational for use on submarines. Inaccuracies in the number of UK weapons are due to policy guidelines prohibiting detailed information on the quality of weapons. The country is not trying to increase its nuclear potential, but in no case is it going to reduce it. There is an active policy here to curb the use of lethal weapons.
China, India, Pakistan
We will talk about how many nuclear weapons North Korea has later, but for now let’s turn our attention to China, which owns approximately 240 nuclear weapons. According to unofficial data, it is believed that there are about 40 intercontinental missiles and about 1,000 short-range missiles. The government does not provide any precise data on the number of weapons, assuring that they will be kept at a minimum level to guarantee security.
The Chinese authorities also claim that they will never be the first to use weapons of this type, and if they have to use them, they will not be aimed at countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Needless to say, the world community reacts very positively to such statements.
We have already looked at North Korea's nuclear weapons, but what about such a multifaceted country as India? Experts believe that it belongs to states that possess lethal weapons illegally. The military stockpile is believed to consist of thermonuclear and nuclear warheads. There are also ballistic missiles, short- and medium-range missiles. Despite the fact that the country has nuclear weapons, this is not discussed on the world stage and no information is provided, which upsets the international community.
Pakistan, according to experts, has about 200 warheads. However, this is only unofficial data, since there is no exact information. The public reacted very harshly to all nuclear weapons tests in this country. Pakistan received a lot of economic sanctions from almost all countries of the world, except Saudi Arabia, since she was bound to him by oil supply agreements.
The weapons, which are clearly sufficient, continue to be the main global threat. The government does not want to provide any approximate information on the number of weapons. It is known that there are medium-range missiles and the Musudan mobile missile system. Due to the fact that the DPRK regularly tests its weapons and even publicly declares that the country has them, economic sanctions are regularly imposed on it. Six-party negotiations between the countries have been ongoing for a long time, but despite all this, Korea is not going to stop its research.
As for the aforementioned negotiations, they began back in 2003. The participants were the USA, Russia, Japan, South Korea. The first three rounds of negotiations, which took place in 2003-2004, did not bring any practical results. The fourth round took place without the participation of Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK. This happened due to a new crisis in relations between the DPRK and America and Japan.
At all stages of negotiations we're talking about about the same thing - for the country to curtail its nuclear program and destroy the weapons it has created. The United States offered Korea economic benefits and a full guarantee that there would be no more aggression and threats from them. However, when all participating countries demanded that the DPRK completely curtail all its activities, and even under the supervision of the IAEA, Korea resolutely refused.
Later, the country nevertheless softened its conditions and agreed to temporarily freeze its research in exchange for the supply of fuel oil on the most favorable terms for Korea. However, by this point the US and Japan were no longer satisfied with the freeze; they wanted a complete end to the nuclear program. Naturally, the DPRK did not accept such conditions.
Subsequently, the United States managed to agree with Korea to temporarily freeze all tests for a good reward. However, after this, the participating countries began to demand the most desirable thing - to completely stop and destroy all developments. Once again Korea rejected such conditions.
The negotiations are still ongoing, and similar situations occur: as soon as the DPRK makes concessions, even more is demanded from it. Korea, in turn, does not agree to curtail its nuclear missile program under any pretext.
Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world at all nuclear developments, but creates a real nuclear missile arsenal.
Explosion for the holiday
On September 9, 2017, North Korea celebrated the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear weapons test.
First, several countries immediately recorded increased seismic activity in North Korea, which could mean a nuclear explosion.
Then the fact of nuclear testing was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen the national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of increasing nuclear threat from the US side,” said a statement released by the official North Korean news agency KCNA.
South Korea, the United States and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, at which the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang is expected to be raised.
The problem, however, is that sanctions on North Korea have virtually no effect. Moreover, there has been significant progress in North Korea's nuclear missile program.
How it all began
Even during the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of nuclear strikes across the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.
The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.
Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.
In the 1970s, Pyongyang, with the support of China, began the first work on creating nuclear weapons.
In 1985, the Soviet Union obtained the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.
President Clinton's Failed War
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it in hopes of liberalization political system and its dismantling according to the Eastern European version.
The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang the provision of economic and technical assistance in the development of peaceful atoms. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.
Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected that a certain amount of plutonium was being hidden. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities that had not been declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities were in no way connected with the nuclear program and were of a military nature.
As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the agreement, but also withdrew from the IAEA.
During this period, as Newsweek magazine stated in 2006, the administration of US President Bill Clinton ordered the study of a military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would require expenditures of $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, with the losses of the US Army amounting to at least 100,000 people killed.
As a result, the United States returned to negotiation tactics.
Threats and promises
At the end of 1994, with the assistance of former US President Jimmy Carter, a “framework agreement” was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for supplies of fuel oil and the creation of two new light water nuclear reactors, which cannot be used for work on nuclear weapons.
Stability was established for several years. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States to other problems ensured a stable situation.
A new escalation began in 2002, when President George W. Bush came to power in the United States.
In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called “axis of evil.” Coupled with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.
In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan.
No real progress was achieved on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it could only ensure its own security if it had its own atomic bomb.
North Korea has made no secret of the fact that nuclear research continues.
Bomb: birth
Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite recorded a powerful explosion in a remote area of the DPRK (Yangang Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.
On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom as explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.
Neither South Korean nor American experts confirmed that it was indeed a nuclear explosion.
Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential, not an immediate danger.
On September 28, 2004, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK stated at the session General Assembly UN that North Korea has already turned into a nuclear weapon enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrent force in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation of atomic weapons in the country. The world treated this statement as another bluff by Pyongyang.
A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation had been publicly announced before. The low charge power (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a atomic device, and not about ordinary TNT.
North Korean acceleration
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.
Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.
Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang is far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.
On December 10, 2015, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK declared to be a test of a hydrogen bomb.
South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests was the shortest in all years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in improving technology.
Most importantly, North Korea stated that this test was carried out as part of the development of nuclear warheads that can be placed on ballistic missiles.
If this is indeed the case, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating real military nuclear weapons, which will radically change the situation in the region.
The rockets are flying further and further
Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.
People talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - they exploded again, missed the target again, fell again.
Military experts monitoring the situation claim that North Korean specialists have made a powerful technological leap in recent years.
By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.
In the summer of this year, the Pukkyukson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid propellant missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was carried out precisely from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.
This does not at all fit with the idea of North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet planes and Chinese tanks.
Experts point out that the number of tests in the DPRK has been rapidly increasing in recent years, and the technology is becoming more and more complex.
Within a few years, North Korea is capable of creating a missile with a flight range of up to 5,000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.
What to do with North Korea?
There is little doubt that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened. But previous experience shows that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.
Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.
Moreover, he is not stopped even by the outright irritation of his main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region.
The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who have an extremely negative perception of Comrade Kim’s regime are convinced that it will not be possible to shake up the situation from within. Neither friends nor enemies can convince Pyongyang to “behave well.”
A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war on their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.
In theory, Pyongyang could be satisfied with guarantees that would ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.
But recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in the modern world is the “nuclear baton”, which North Korea is working to create.
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Means mass media USA and several other countries Western Europe, clearly at the instigation of the US intelligence services, began to draw the attention of the world community to the state and potential consequences of the development of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).
During the scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK in the field of nuclear production, the Soviet side trained a significant number of North Korean specialists. True, it should be noted that they were trained exclusively for work in the nuclear industry. In addition, in 1965, the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a small pool-type IRT-2000 uranium research reactor with a capacity of 2 MW. After being put into operation in 1966, at the insistence of the USSR, it was placed under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Again, at the insistence of the USSR, the DPRK had to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed on December 12, 1985. In response to this “concession,” the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a 5 MW gas-graphite uranium research reactor (installed in Nenbyon and put into operation in 1986 after becoming under IAEA guarantees), and also signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type. By the way, in 1992 this agreement was clarified - instead of four VVER-440 reactors, it was decided to supply three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors, which were considered the safest.
In addition, in 1991, a contract was signed by the Soviet Union for the supply of fuel assemblies (fuel rods) to the DPRK for a total amount of $185 thousand. Such assistance from the Soviet Union contributed to significant progress in the North Korean nuclear program.
However, Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy unexpectedly underwent dramatic changes. And the subsequent rapprochement between the USSR and the United States since 1987, and in particular the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Soviet Union with South Korea in 1990, dealt a serious blow to Pyongyang’s nuclear plans. In addition, the USSR began to transfer relations with the DPRK into an economic direction. As a result, Pyongyang's hopes of receiving free nuclear reactors from the USSR failed. At the same time, Pyongyang’s strategic alliance with Beijing began to crack.
In the late 1980s, the Kim Il Sung regime, deprived of traditional allies and, it would seem, opportunities for further maneuver, found itself backed into a corner. But according to an ancient Chinese proverb, a "scared cat" can "turn into a tiger."
Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?
Back in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung made a political decision to begin work on the creation of nuclear weapons - largely based on information about the presence of a military nuclear program in South Korea obtained by North Korean intelligence. And also based on Pyongyang’s confidence that Seoul’s economic war is lost, and the diplomatic war is also fraught with defeat.
Indeed, as it has now become known, in the 1970s, South Korea carried out independent and fairly successful developments to create nuclear weapons, by the way, being a member of the NPT (it signed this treaty on June 1, 1968, and ratified it on April 23, 1975) . South Korea was supposed to have nuclear weapons in 1981. The project was close to implementation, but the assassination of South Korean President Park Jong Hee (October 1979) and strong pressure from the United States prevented it.
The CIA received the first confirmation of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions in 1982. It was then that the United States raised the question with the USSR about the need to develop joint approaches to the DPRK’s nuclear plans. But the Soviet leadership did not share American concerns and intensified joint activities with the DPRK in the field of nuclear energy. Gorbachev's fatal mistake was agreeing to supply North Korea with a 5 MW graphite reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium
In 1989, the Americans expressed suspicion that the North Koreans had rebooted the nuclear reactor operating at Nyeongbyon, then processed the nuclear fuel and, most likely, obtained up to 12 kg of weapons-grade plutonium - an amount sufficient to make two nuclear explosive devices. On March 12, 1993, the North Korean side sent a letter to the NPT depository countries about the decision to withdraw from this treaty - this is how the first crisis surrounding the North Korean nuclear program began.
After a round of negotiations with the United States, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 (one day before the expiration of the 90-day period established by paragraph I of Article X of this treaty). But at the same time, the DPRK stated that it does not consider itself a full member of the IAEA and does not recognize its right to carry out inspections of its nuclear facilities. On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement was concluded in Geneva between the United States and the DPRK, according to which Pyongyang first “froze” and then dismantled its graphite uranium reactors. The United States, in turn, pledged to provide KEDR with modern power light water reactors with a total capacity of 2000 MW, and before their commissioning (in 2003) - to supply oil for heating and electricity production in the amount of 500 thousand tons annually.
According to experts, the total amount of weapons-grade plutonium in the DPRK at the end of 2002 could be 15-20 kg, which is enough to manufacture 3-4 nuclear warheads. Some experts do not rule out the possibility that the DPRK is also developing high-tech methods of uranium enrichment. In particular, US experts are paying increased attention to the activities of the Laser Institute of the DPRK Academy of Sciences in Pyongyang, believing that appropriate uranium enrichment technology is being developed here.
However, based on the available information, it is not possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion not only about the possible scale of the North Korean uranium enrichment program, but also about the location of enterprises engaged in uranium enrichment. If we assume that these enterprises are intended to meet the fuel needs of the two light water reactors of the Sinpo Nuclear Power Plant under construction, then their capacity will be sufficient to produce weapons-grade uranium in quantities sufficient to produce six nuclear warheads annually.
North Korea's missile program is on the brink of crisis
North Korea's military nuclear program is not the only headache for the world community. The development of the DPRK's missile program in conjunction with its nuclear program has created a threat to the national security of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and to a number of other states. North Korea was one of the first countries in this region to begin work on mastering missile technology. In the 1960s, the DPRK purchased from the USSR unguided tactical solid-propellant missiles with warheads in conventional equipment, “Luna” and “Luna-M” (North Korean designation “Frog-5” and “Frog-7”). Their range did not exceed 50-70 km, and the weight of the warhead was 400-420 kg.
Lacking the necessary scientific and technical potential, the DPRK tried to use the opportunities for fairly close cooperation with China. In the second half of the 1990s, North Korean specialists took an active part in the Chinese program to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 600 km and a payload of about 600 kg.
In 1980, three operational-tactical missile systems with the 8K14 (Scud-B) missile were purchased from Egypt. In this case, a twofold problem was solved. In 1984, the first flight tests of the North Korean-made Scud-B missile were carried out, and a year later they began to enter service with the army. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with an integral warhead has a launch weight of 5.9 tons, a length of 11.25 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m and provides delivery of a payload weighing 1000 kg over a range of up to 300 km with an accuracy of about 450 m .
A new incentive to expand missile production was given shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iran offered to finance the development of an upgraded Scud-B missile to North Korea with the condition of supplying it with 100 missiles of this type. Financial injections helped to quickly solve the problem of modifying the Scud-B rocket. Its range was increased to 340 km, and its payload increased by 15%. However, it was not possible to overcome the traditional disadvantage of North Korean missiles - low accuracy.
Another attempt to modernize the Scud-B missile was made after Iran transferred the wreckage of the Iraqi Al-Hussein ballistic missile to North Korea. Using Iraqi technology, the DPRK defense industry, with the help of China, created in 1989 an improved model of an operational-tactical missile, called Scud-C. Its tests were carried out in 1990, and after that it was put into service. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket has a launch weight of 6.4 tons, a length of 12 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m, a payload of 750 kg and a range of 600-650 km. The accuracy of the hit is 700-1000 m. North Korea began developing its own missile in 1988-1989. The goal of the new program was to create a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a detachable warhead. Iran and Libya participated in the implementation of this missile project, called Nodon-I. These countries purchased various necessary materials and technical equipment from Western countries through intermediaries.
The first successful test launch of the Nodong-I IRBM was carried out in May 1993 at the Taipoteng test site at east coast DPRK. This missile was put into service in 1997. "Nodon-I BRSD" is a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a detachable warhead and an inertial control system. Its launch weight is ~ 16 tons, length - 16 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Maximum range - 1300-1500 km with a payload of 700-1000 kg. Firing accuracy is 2000-3000 m. When creating the Nodon-I IRBM, Scud missile technology was used. Its propulsion system is a combination of 4 liquid rocket engines of the Scud-B rocket. The energy capabilities of the Nodon-I IRBM make it possible to hit targets in Japan, Eastern China (including Beijing) and the Russian Far East (including Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Chita).
The North Korean army has formed three separate missile brigades armed with missile systems with Scud-B, Scud-C and Nodong-I missiles. Total 54 launchers. Assessing the capabilities of the DPRK missile industry, it can be argued that the North Korean army does not experience a shortage of missiles. As for missile systems with tactical missiles, their number can be 60-90 units.
Currently, North Korea is developing new long-range ballistic missiles (over 2000 km). The design of the two-stage Nodon-2 IRBM uses the Nodon-I missile's sustainer stage as the first stage, and the Scud-C missile's sustainer stage as the second stage. It is assumed that this rocket will have a launch mass of 21-22 tons, length - 27 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Its range should be 2200-2300 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 3000 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy is 3,700 m. This IRBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan (including the islands of Okinawa), China, Mongolia, and Russia (including the territory up to Krasnoyarsk).
The three-stage version of this missile, called Taepodong-I, uses solid fuel rocket engine as a third step. This rocket can have a launch weight of 24 tons, a length of 30 m, and a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range will be 3200 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 5700 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy is 3700-3800 m. The Taepodong-I missile is capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Russia (up to the Urals), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii, and reaching Alaska.
The adoption of the Nodong-2 MRBM and its three-stage modification, Taepodong-I, was expected in 2003-2004. However, to date only one test has been carried out. The Taepodong-2 ICBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Russia (all the way to Moscow), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii and reaching not only Alaska, but also California.
On modern stage The pause taken by Pyongyang in the development of long-range ballistic missiles indicates a certain crisis in the North Korean missile program. The industry has encountered a number of objective difficulties, primarily related to the lack of qualified scientists and engineers. Therefore, the moratorium on missile tests announced by North Korea should be regarded as a forced measure, and not the good will of Pyongyang.
Security interests
The second crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program erupted in October 2002. During a visit to Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, at a meeting on October 4, 2002, with the head of the DPRK Parliament, Kim Yong Nam, presented the North Koreans with intelligence information that he had, which indicated that North Korea was carrying out a secret program to obtain highly enriched uranium for the creation of nuclear weapons . According to James Kelly, the North Korean side did not even try to refute his information, but, on the contrary, calmly admitted that it was enriching uranium.
Further events developed progressively. At the end of October 2002, North Korea officially announced its right to have “nuclear and more powerful weapons” for self-defense. In response, the United States and its partners stopped supplies of heating oil to North Korea in November 2002. On December 12, 2002, Pyongyang issued a statement about the resumption of its nuclear program, and at the end of the same month it removed IAEA inspectors from all “frozen” nuclear sites and re-opened the gas-graphite uranium reactor at Nengbyon. These actions had no effect, and on January 10, 2003, the DPRK leadership made an official statement about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and termination of cooperation with the IAEA.
On April 18, 2003, Pyongyang announced that the reprocessing of 8,000 rods containing irradiated nuclear fuel from the Nengbyon reactor was in its final stages. This meant official recognition of the fact that the DPRK has a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium that is not subject to IAEA guarantees. Consultations held on April 23-25, 2003 in Beijing (China) in the trilateral China-DPRK-USA format did not lead to any agreements. According to the American delegation, the North Koreans at this meeting recognized their intention to create nuclear weapons. On May 12, 2003, Pyongyang announced its unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on declaring the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, concluded in January 1992 with South Korea.
In the summer of 2003, primarily thanks to the active work of China and Russia with the DPRK and the United States, it was possible to achieve Pyongyang’s consent to begin negotiations in a six-party format (China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the United States, Japan). The negotiations, which began in August 2003, were held in Beijing. The first two rounds of negotiations ended without any significant results.
The United States demanded that North Korea agree to the “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all nuclear programs.” North Korea rejected this approach and agreed only to “freeze” its military nuclear programs. Pyongyang also demanded immediate “reward” for freezing military nuclear projects in the form of large-scale economic assistance, primarily energy supplies (up to 2.7 million tons of heating oil annually), as well as security guarantees from the United States. The latter involve the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea, the conclusion of a bilateral non-aggression pact between them and the exclusion of the DPRK from the US list of states that support terrorism.
The situation changed slightly for the better after the third round of negotiations, which took place in June 2004. Great hopes for further progress were pinned on the fourth round of negotiations (late 2004). However, the planned plan was thwarted.
Three scenarios
At the moment, there are three possible scenarios for the development of the Korean crisis. Scenario one- "Pacification." The implementation of this scenario is real goal leadership of the DPRK in the current crisis. The North Koreans “opened their cards” and indicated both their product and the expected price for it. No less than the national security of the DPRK is now up for sale, and it is proposed to pay for it with something no less adequate - guarantees of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and recognition of the DPRK by the United States. In this case, the condition remains the unconditional elimination of all components of the DPRK's military nuclear program. The question of a peaceful nuclear program under the control of the IAEA remains open.
So that the United States would not have any illusions that Pyongyang would “surrender without a fight,” the North Koreans played their main trump card - they declared Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons.
The main result of the three rounds of the six-party talks in Beijing should be considered that they showed the possibility of resolving the crisis through negotiations, and that this has now become more likely than before. But to implement the “Pacification” scenario, a political decision by the US administration is required that the DPRK, in the event of a complete and verifiable renunciation of nuclear weapons (or all types of weapons of mass destruction), will not be considered as a state whose existence is contrary to American interests.
If George W. Bush's team has the political will to make such a decision, then the "Pacification" scenario has hope of being realized. True, for this the “five” (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan) will have to offer the DPRK a price that it could not refuse. However, it is not at all necessary that the main costs be borne by the United States. Quite the contrary.
Scenario two- increased tension with continued limited political dialogue. This scenario means that the United States refuses to carry out an armed action against the DPRK, but firmly insists on the conditions set for resolving the crisis and does not make concessions to the North Korean leadership. At the same time, it is possible to strengthen the American military presence on the territory of South Korea, and under certain conditions of the development of the situation, the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.
North Korea, for its part, will carry out actions demonstrating the seriousness of its intentions to resist American dictatorship. For example, it will resume testing ballistic missiles. A nuclear test involving the detonation of a nuclear explosive device cannot be ruled out.
That is, the situation is “frozen” until the moment when the foreign policy situation changes, as well as the situation in the United States itself. It is likely that the “unfreezing” of the situation will occur only after George W. Bush’s team leaves the scene.
This scenario seems quite dangerous. On the one hand, it allows the DPRK to conduct military nuclear research, completely removing its nuclear program from international monitoring. On the other hand, the United States, as part of achieving its goals, will increase pressure on the DPRK, seeking complete political and economic isolation of the republic. Taken together, such actions by the DPRK and the United States could become a transitional phase to the start of real hostilities.
Scenario three- US military action. This option is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although it is likely that the political legitimization of such an operation may encounter fewer difficulties than in the case of Iraq.
The main problem of implementing this scenario is that, unlike S. Hussein, the North Korean leadership, both from a military point of view and from the point of view of political will, is quite ready for a preventive invasion of the territory of South Korea in order to prevent the formation of an “army” on its territory invasion" by the United States and its allies. Although it seems obvious that Pyongyang is not clearly targeting the military option. Despite the obvious preference of the first scenario, unfortunately, the likelihood of events developing under it today is lower than under the second scenario. And the main reason for this lies in the persistently demonstrated intolerance by the George W. Bush team towards the regime of Kim Jong Il.
How to prevent global consequences?
The question of possible consequences the DPRK gaining the status of a state that actually possesses nuclear weapons.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying: “We have already taken decisive action to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have produced our own self-defense nuclear weapons in response to the policies of the administration of US President George W. Bush, which has not hidden its desire to isolate and strangle the DPRK." It also states that “North Korean nuclear weapons will remain a deterrent force under any circumstances.”
It should be noted that earlier, individual representatives of the DPRK stated that their country has “nuclear deterrent forces.” More recently, on January 24, 2005, Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kim Kye Gwan, at a meeting with American Congressman Curt Weldon, said that Pyongyang has nuclear weapons, but will use them “solely for defense purposes.” However, this time the recognition of the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons sounded like an official position.
Can we believe this statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry? The North Koreans did not provide evidence of possessing nuclear weapons. Visited North Korean nuclear facilities in early 2004 former manager US Los Alamos laboratory Siegfried Hacker doubts Pyongyang's ability to create nuclear weapons in the near future. In his opinion, the North Koreans have failed to solve a number of technical problems, primarily related to the creation of effective detonators to activate the main warhead.
But, on the other hand, one cannot ignore the already mentioned confession of the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.K. Khan is that the North Korean uranium program is much more advanced than the world community assumes. Moreover, this program, unlike the plutonium program, was in no way controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, it can be assumed that under the cover of the plutonium weapons project, which, albeit in doses, was still monitored by IAEA inspectors until December 2002, Pyongyang was able to implement a uranium weapons project.
Taking into account the above, it would be reckless to agree with the assessments of a number of Russian and foreign experts that the statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry of February 10, 2005 is another manifestation of a policy of blackmail with elements of bluff. The following assessment seems more balanced: it is unlikely that the North Koreans have made nuclear weapons, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
At the same time, it is quite obvious that work is underway to create nuclear weapons in the DPRK, and if the world community does not take coordinated measures that take into account the security interests of the DPRK, sooner or later this country may still have them (if they have not already appeared). And this event, if there is strong evidence of its occurrence, will have far-reaching consequences for security not only in Northeast Asia, but also on a global scale.
Firstly, the likelihood of attempts to resolve the Korean “nuclear crisis” by force is increasing, including due to the growing threat of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is trading ballistic missiles, why shouldn’t he trade in nuclear weapons and their manufacturing technologies? Secondly, crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula will significantly decrease. The United States cannot ignore the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons, albeit on the territories of South Korea and Japan, and therefore, if the crisis worsens, it can launch a preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. Pyongyang, in turn, in this situation can act on the principle of “to use or to lose.”
Thirdly, a “nuclear domino” process will begin in the North-Eastern region. In a short time, literally in 4-6 months, Japan will create its own nuclear weapons. This country has all the technologies necessary for this, and its plutonium reserves of 5.6 tons are suitable for creating 1000-1200 nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are likely to intensify their efforts to create missile defense in cooperation with the United States. The United States itself will increase its efforts to protect both its territory and the territory of its allies from nuclear missile weapons, including by deploying ships with anti-missile weapons in the waters adjacent to North Korea. Under these conditions, both China and Russia will be forced, in turn, to increase their own efforts in the nuclear missile field. A new race in the field of nuclear missiles is brewing.
Fourthly, The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the DPRK and the beginning of the “nuclear domino” process in the North-Eastern region will lead to the actual collapse of the NPT, and moreover, the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. Those states parties to the NPT that, for one reason or another, would like to acquire nuclear weapons will become convinced that a demonstrative withdrawal from this treaty remains virtually unpunished, and the leading states of the world are unable or unwilling to bring a country that is challenging the international community to reason.
What conclusions should be drawn from the analysis of North Korea's nuclear and missile policy? There are four of them. Firstly, despite all the rhetoric about the possibility of North Korea delivering an “all-crushing” strike on the territories of countries unfriendly to it, Kim Jong Il clearly understands that as a result of retaliatory actions he will lose everything at once. The presence of nuclear missile weapons is extremely important factor preserving their regime under the predicted actions of the international coalition led by the United States to put forceful pressure on totalitarian states. This refers to the one announced by Washington crusade against countries designated by the United States as part of the "axis of evil."
Secondly, it is impossible to reliably say that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. Yes, it probably has everything necessary to create nuclear weapons, primarily based on highly enriched uranium (the design of this type of nuclear charge is much simpler than that based on weapons-grade plutonium). Only one thing can be said with certainty: the DPRK has not yet carried out nuclear explosions, although it did not undertake obligations not to carry them out (it did not sign the CTBT).
Third, North Korea is ready to curtail its military nuclear program if the United States, in turn, abandons its hostile policy towards it. Whether Pyongyang will continue to have a peaceful nuclear program, which essentially does not exist now, is a matter of future agreements. There is a wide choice here possible solutions, up to the construction of nuclear power plants on the territory of other states with a share of North Korean ownership and the participation of North Korean specialists in the operation of such nuclear power plants.
Fourth, the development (or curtailment) of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs will be determined by the results of the six-party talks, including whether they will be continued after the pause in mid-2004.
Since the opening of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK in 1965, the world has been arguing about how dangerous Korea's policy is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that weapons are being developed and tested in the republic mass destruction, which will be used in the event of a threat to the formation. However, experts disagree on how great North Korea's power really is. Questions also arise over whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who is the ally in creating weapons that could cause untold casualties.
Military potential of the DPRK
North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries on the globe. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.
The needs of the army come first economically, and this is bearing fruit: North Korea’s army is the most numerous in the world.
But the number of soldiers is not a guarantee of success. Insufficient funding leads to the army using outdated equipment and weapons.
At the same time, the North Korean government has maintained since 1974 that the country is continuously working on the creation of nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this has become an additional reason for dissatisfaction among countries trying to resolve the conflict. North Korea claims that the weapons are being created solely for defensive purposes, but it is difficult to confirm the veracity of the claims.
At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermonuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, was demonstrated. The government claimed that it existed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with the DPRK. Pyongyang authorities explained this as a test of a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.
Sources of funding
The question of where North Korea got its nuclear weapons is closely related to the economic state of the country. Testing requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts about outside financial help. Official partner North Korea is considered China, but relations between the countries have deteriorated during Kim Jong-un's reign. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.
It is expected that he will enter the world political arena new union– North Korea and Russia, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more reciprocal “courtesy” from Moscow. This means that financing comes from internal sources.
Experts suggest that money for the development of nuclear weapons comes from the following industries:
- social;
- agricultural;
- energy;
- heavy industrial.
There are reports in the media that North Korea is facing an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings is turned on only for 3-4 hours a day; the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night images of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.
Claims that North Koreans are starving are unfounded. In the last decade, there has been economic growth in the country, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards that previously used to issue food rations. So the information that missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.
North Korea's nuclear potential
The times when threats about the presence of weapons of mass destruction were considered a bluff are behind us. The presence of powerful weapons in the DPRK is a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create 6 to 12 new missiles.
However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:
- the materials required to assemble nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea and must be imported into the country;
- even with the creation of new charges, the problem remains with the construction of carriers for them;
- waste generated during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for its safe storage can only be met in small volumes.
However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing its experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts countries, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Under threat from the United States, the DPRK can only afford one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un responded that the DPRK would strike if necessary.
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