Federal troops in Chechnya. Chechen war

Reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. A variety of things are usually cited as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya that had to be urgently prevented; an eerie amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which an eerie amount of oil from the Caspian Sea had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And much more. But upon closer examination, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

They became concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they became fully involved in the war. No one had thought about this before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of exploitation of the field, now about 2 million tons are mined there per year, this is complete nonsense. Yes, in Chechnya there was a large oil refinery, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut up and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not particularly popular. As for Chechen crime, this is a myth built from our modern one. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Or rather, they are capable to the same extent as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (from about the 16th century) did not imply the construction of hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-93, Chechnya largely suited everyone in Russia. She set up the special services as a kind of offshore, where weapons could be transported to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore where it was possible to hire militants to perform a variety of tasks. For example, they fought in Abkhazia Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but detachments of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya as an offshore suited large oil (then still state-owned) companies, because it was possible to transport oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that everyone is happy, but what happened? And then a completely intra-Moscow event happened. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, intensified. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man, in general, with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it happened, became Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But what can you do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is Chechen. And then the entire propaganda machine, as part of the confrontation with Parliament, is being restructured to “attack that Chechen Khasbulatov!”

That is, if we return to the texts of 1993, it turns out that we do not have a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House security department guarded about 70 other objects, but they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to radio conversations on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the police preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune of being captured in Afghanistan, and for some reason this was blamed on him). One way or another, the campaign was raised. And that’s when conversations started about the Chechen mafia. Then a surprise happens: White House we took a little and burned a little on October 4, and on the 12th - bang! – and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Many seats in parliament were occupied by communists and Zhirinovites. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that then) came up with a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, return a fallen province to the fold of the Empire. Nothing raises ratings like that.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai’s plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and shelved), was suddenly taken out from under the cloth: a plan for negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure that should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that negotiations were very bad, but forceful pressure was very good. Various political strategists and analysts were cut off from this project after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Ministry of Nationalities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the FSB). This project was partly supervised by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take the money, but they do not overthrow Dudayev; we give weapons - Dudayev is also not overthrown; we give weapons with crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were filled with officers hired by the FSK in units near Moscow). We fought a little hybrid. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, he can be given power!” Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Then, as always, the foxes hide in the forest, and little blood can only be washed off with a lot of blood. During the year, no one addressed the analysis of errors and returning to the previous stage. Next - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that this war did not raise the rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at a background level. And the elections were won in part because it was then that his team said: “Peace!”, “Peace!” Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev flies to Moscow to negotiate, he is picked up at the ABC special facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya and says: “That’s it, peace has come.” Yeltsin is elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took a third into his team (and the third was Lebed at that time), and appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) gave his former deputy for Transnistria Tikhomirov carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. It must be said that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin’s inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that they were a superior force, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared bad news spoil the master's mood. Therefore, paralysis reigned for three days, during which time the Chechens, in surprise, fortified themselves in the city and it was no longer possible to drive them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the place, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, simple: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

I must say that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like bad dream. We did not rescue our prisoners, although this could have been done in the fall of 1996. Hostage-taking began, the situation was in turmoil, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we came to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later his remains would be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade began in Dagestan (this is not funny, at that time marines- these are the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south began. And here, even against anyone’s will, we were irresistibly heading towards war, because on the other side the machine was spinning. Why? Let's go to the other side and notice that in 1997 Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (he won convincingly), and Shamil Basayev took second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that big, but he knew how to unite very restless local comrades under him. At some point, Maskhadov gave him control for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: budget capacity fell 20 times. After which, it seemed his career was over. Having left this post, as promised, six months later, he immediately spoke at the congress of the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, having found himself political fringe, found himself on the verge of death not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the start of a war, which would inevitably lead to the unity of everyone and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.

In the summer of 1999, Basayev was already amassing his forces in the Tsumadinsky region in Dagestan. And what boomed there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have boomed a little earlier, or a little later. One way or another, a war began, which was declared a counter-terrorism operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I don’t want to say that these explosions were carried out by the special services, except for the “Ryazan exercises” the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact is that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin’s rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant background values. Every week there is some brutal statement like “to wash in the toilet.” And the rating hop - 7% jumped up until it went to stratospheric heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we don’t know who organized all this, but we know for sure who used it.

Ironically, what failed in the first war (using it as an electoral tool) succeeded perfectly in the second. Afterwards, of course, no one needed the war. For example, already before Putin’s election as president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, it's already a victory! There are battles in Komsomolskoe.” However, the terrorist attacks strongly reminded us of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen power. But attempts to claim that subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by special services are also, in my opinion, unfounded. Nevertheless, we see that the reason here turns out to be something much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop at playing with fire in order to maintain this power.

On September 6, 1991, a military coup was carried out on the territory of what was then the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The Supreme Council of the Republic was dispersed - partially. He was partially thrown out of the window (literally). It must be understood that this Armed Forces supported the State Emergency Committee - therefore Yeltsin reacted to the “local initiative”... not that he was very unkind. And, probably, everything would have gone downhill... if the Chechens of that time had shown at least a little brains in building their state. The government of New Russia for almost three years courageously turned a blind eye to all the arbitrariness that was happening in the republic. To robberies of trains traveling through the region; on de facto genocide against national minorities ("Russians - to Ryazan! Ingush - to Nazran! Armenians - to Yerevan!" (PS - "Yerevan" with soft sign I’m writing purely for the sake of rhyme)), but there the proud highlanders completely lost their shores and began to run wild in the border regions - for example, in Mineralnye Vody they took hostages in the summer of 1994. Somewhere around here the feds' patience ran relatively thin. They reached an agreement with the anti-Dudaev opposition, providing it with “vacationers” from a number of divisions near Moscow (along with tanks). In this regard, it should be noted that the “graters” in Chechnya itself were serious - for example, Dudayev forcibly dissolved the parliament of “Ichkeria”. The opposition suffered a humiliating defeat when attempting to storm Grozny at the end of November of that year. Since during the battle the Dudayevites captured Russian officers - it was impossible to continue to pretend that everything was “ok” - and Yeltsin signed the Decree “On some measures to strengthen law and order in the territory of the North Caucasus.” The second Decree - “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict” and marked the beginning of the Chechen War.

Decree_of_the_President_of_the_RF_from_09.12.1994_No._2166

Because not one country is interested in letting its region go

The Russian Federation is a big country. and multinational. If you let go of one region, everything will fall off one by one.

think. the Far East didn’t want to get into perestroika? just as I wanted. Why did they need us in their Moscow? they are half a world away from us. and in general, all the rich Siberia can easily fall away, because there are immeasurable resources there, and there are plenty of people who want to take its wealth. they will give loans and build houses and generally do anything, as long as diamonds, timber, oil, fish, caviar and so on are from there - all this is the Far East.

Our other republics (and we are still a federation, let me remind you, that is, we have semi-autonomous republics within us) could also get rid of it and go about their own business.

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war of the latest Russian history officially completed. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime in Chechnya was introduced by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with repelling the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the gangs driven back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not help but begin. The events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements that ended the previous war in 1996 left no doubt that fighting will flare up again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars was very different. In 1994, the bet on the “Chechenization” of the conflict was lost - the opposition units were unable (and were unlikely to be able) to resist Dudayev’s formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not very well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops encountered fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

The assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994, was especially costly for the Russian army. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts place the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

In the end Russian army got involved in multi-week battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs, which lost about 7,000 people and large number equipment and weapons. It should be noted that the Chechen separatists received the equipment in the early 90s, seizing the warehouses of military units located on the territory of Chechnya with the connivance of first the authorities of the USSR and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the gangs. On June 14, 1995, Basayev’s gang raided the city of Budennovsk Stavropol Territory, where she captured the city hospital, taking patients and staff hostage. The militants managed to get to Budennovsk by road. The guilt of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost universal.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and begin negotiations with the Dudayev regime. Russian special forces began an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by an order from Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to give the terrorists the opportunity to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was placed on the director of the Federal Grid Company, Sergei Stepashin, and the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Viktor Erin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. Federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the attacks by militants hiding in mountainous and wooded areas and enjoying the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar and took a group of hostages in a local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them hundreds of hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the Ministry of Internal Affairs checkpoint.

Soon, Raduev’s group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was stormed by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev’s gang on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, 78 military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Some of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in the poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, bandits recaptured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, a ceasefire agreement was signed, after which negotiations between representatives of Russia and Chechnya began on the development of “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side by Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent “agreement on peace and principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Chechnya,” signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to the independence of Chechnya. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties based on the principles international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the country’s leadership and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aircraft due to political reasons. Sorely missed modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, remained forgotten.

In addition, the army was unleashed information war- a number of media outlets and politicians conducted a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and background of the war were kept silent, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 90s. Many were killed, others were driven from their homes and were forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and imagined sins of the federal forces, but kept silent on the topic of the misfortunes of the Russian residents of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in states Eastern Europe and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting the Chechen separatists. The intelligence services of Western countries also provided assistance to the gangs. A number of countries provided asylum, medical and financial assistance militants, helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures was the gross mistakes made by both senior management, so operational command, as well as a wave of army corruption, as a consequence of the targeted and general disintegration of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number of successful operations by militants against Russian columns would have been impossible provided that Russian troops complied with the basic statutory requirements for organizing combat security, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not become a pledge peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives, working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, production and smuggling of drugs, release and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. The authorities of Ichkeria even stole the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across Russian territory.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The bandits were counting on the weakness of the Russian government and the surrender of Dagestan. The attack was carried out on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

The fighting with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted more than a month. At this time, major terrorist attacks were carried out in several Russian cities - residential buildings were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and army did not come true. The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has taken overall leadership of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large forces of militants with few losses. The militants’ individual “successes” cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Height 776, when the bandits managed to escape from encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, without due to bad weather aviation and artillery support, held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants for 24 hours. The bandits broke through the company's positions only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people remained alive). The militants' losses amounted to about 500 people. After this, the main type of action by militants becomes terrorist attacks - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively exploited the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Inside Russia itself new war also enjoyed significantly greater support than previously. IN upper echelons This time the authorities did not show the same indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. Federal Center has sent and is sending major cash. Units of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops Ministry of Internal Affairs, maintaining order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. North Caucasus is a rather restless region in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion of another, very important stage struggle for their territorial integrity.

At the beginning of the operation, the combined group of federal forces numbered over 16.5 thousand people. Since the majority of motorized rifle units and formations had a reduced composition, consolidated detachments were created on their basis. A single management body, a common system of logistics and technical support The combined group had no troops. Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin was appointed commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV) in the Chechen Republic.

On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

After this, Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the Joint Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

On February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief General Staff armed forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were also given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce was violated by both sides.

At the end of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

On March 6, 1995, a detachment of Chechen militants field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

After the capture of Grozny, troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other populated areas and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

On March 12-23, OGV troops conducted successful operation to eliminate the enemy's Argun group and capture the city of Argun. On March 22-31, the Gudermes group was liquidated; on March 31, after heavy fighting, Shali was occupied.

Having suffered a number of major defeats, the militants began to change the organization and tactics of their units; illegal armed groups united into small, highly maneuverable units and groups focused on carrying out sabotage, raids, and ambushes.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, there was a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya.

In June 1995, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov was appointed commander of the OGV.

On June 3, after heavy fighting, federal forces entered Vedeno; on June 12, the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken. By mid-June 1995, 85% of the territory of the Chechen Republic was under the control of federal forces.

Illegal armed groups redeployed part of their forces from mountainous areas to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996) .

On October 6, 1995, OGV commander Anatoly Romanov was seriously wounded in a tunnel near Minutka Square in Grozny as a result of a clearly planned terrorist attack- detonation of a radio-controlled landmine.

On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen campaign. The Khasavyurt Treaty was signed by Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of the separatist armed formations Aslan Maskhadov; the signing ceremony was attended by the head of the OSCE assistance group in the Chechen Republic, Tim Guldiman. The decision on the status of the Chechen Republic was postponed until 2001.

After the conclusion of the agreement, federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

According to data released by the OGV headquarters immediately after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded.

According to the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century" under the general editorship of G.V. Krivosheeva (2001), Armed Forces Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic lost 5,042 people killed and killed, 510 people were missing and captured. Sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including: wounded, shell-shocked, and injured 16,098 people.

Irreversible losses of personnel of illegal armed groups of Chechnya are estimated at 2500-2700 people.

According to expert assessments of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations, total number victims among civilian population amounted to 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, Ingushetia.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

(Additional

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons Soviet troops in Chechnya, right down to aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.

Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in 1994 in something like civil war. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. Storm of Grozny in New Year's Eve, which killed hundreds of Russian military personnel, was a disaster.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. A surprise for Russian politicians and the military it turned out that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering.”

Thus, oil and money steel the real reason war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported Russian society, who considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin power. Negative attitudes rose sharply after a major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic - former boss headquarters of the Chechen armed formations. He declared a course towards national independence Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. It was completely destroyed national economy Chechnya. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving there were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in short term The Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-proclaimed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content educational programs, but also determined personnel policy.

Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and in universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and wearing a burqa was required in high schools. Study was introduced Arabic, and this was not provided with personnel, methodological manuals and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only replenish criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a countermeasure Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.

She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

By nature and method of conduct;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to citizens towards the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion Western countries regarding the second Chechen war differed from all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.

At the same time Western media concealed the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and human trafficking, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to the world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed primarily at carrying out a counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces special attention began to focus on intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

IN beginning of XXI century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and others significant cities. Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. As a result of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but still no one recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means began to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal Forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky's unit won Chechen militants, who were at a height in the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.