From ambush to ambush. Attack on Argun and Shali

“Ambush is a method of action of troops (forces) in which they, positioned secretly, wait for the enemy, and then suddenly attack him with the aim of destroying (incapacitating), capturing weapons, documents and prisoners, as well as causing disorganization and panic in communications in his rear."

Glossary of military terms

Once, in a conversation with special forces officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I heard from one of them something like the following: “It’s an ambush, it’s an ambush in Africa too, what else can you come up with that’s new?” I strongly disagree. Ambush tactics are a highly creative matter, and a commander who begins to repeat himself risks, at best, not completing the task, and at worst, putting his own life and that of his subordinates at risk.

For trophies

Afghanistan made the first adjustments to the classic ambush tactics. The main criterion for assessing military activity here was trophies. Only they were considered indisputable proof of the successful actions of the scouts. And since the Mujahideen formed quite large caravans and convoys, it was impossible for the group to remove the captured weapons and had to remain in place until helicopters or an armored group arrived. Therefore, ambush tactics were born, in which the battle formation consisted only of a fire subgroup, and sometimes mining and support subgroups. The capture subgroup was replaced by a caravan inspection subgroup. The task of the support subgroup became different: it was supposed to cover the rear of the fire subgroup, since the group (on average 20–25 people) occupied a perimeter defense in an ambush. However, according to the usual “allied” concepts, this was rather a detachment or, at a minimum, a reinforced group. It included the crew of the AGS-17, and since 1986, the NSV-12.7 “Utes”.

Carrying out the task, the group secretly landed, went out to the ambush area, hid during daylight hours, and when the caravan appeared, they struck, clinging to the prey with a death grip. Often, reconnaissance officers had to fight a difficult battle surrounded by a significantly superior enemy, repelling numerous attacks (typical of 1984-1985) and hiding from the fire of mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and snipers. The motto is like on the Volga in 1942: “Not a step back.” However, in such a situation there was often nowhere to go.

Twelve Apostles

Last year, I met one of the most successful, thoughtful and therefore effective commanders, Dmitry L., serving in the 173rd separate special forces detachment, and inquired about ambush tactics in Chechnya. In his opinion, the order of their organization and conduct since the Second World War and the Afghan campaign (they are apparently equally distant in time for him) was influenced by the emergence of silent weapons, night vision devices and reliable means of communication. Since the groups in Chechnya worked in the VHF range, there was no need for a radio operator of a low-power HF radio station. Sometimes, as a means of communication, even a cell phone was used, on which, as Dmitry said, while in an ambush, he could call his wife at home and tell all sorts of nonsense about the fact that he was basking in the bathtub, drinking Coke.

How was Dmitry L.'s company formed?

“Usually, when recruiting, we did not take civilians. Our sources of reinforcement were units that were already engaged in combat operations. This is the well-known 205th brigade, and the 166th, and 245th regiment, and others, through which we traveled and selected people. Many came on their own. This is how the backbone was formed. Some died, some left, unable to withstand our conditions, some who did not meet the requirements were removed from the company. One way or another, there were always 20-30 reliable guys in it. Half of them went through two or three wars. There was one Uighur. He managed to fight in Tajikistan both for the spirits and for ours, went to Azerbaijan, then went to Russia, from there he enlisted in the army, ended up in the 205th brigade, and then to us. Sniper is from God. Once I took down a single spirit with the second shot at a distance of about 800 meters. He died stupidly. The special forces went to work ahead, and in their place the infantry sat down, placing mines in front of them, which, as always, did not warn anyone about. When returning, the guy blew himself up.

Approximately half of the company has higher education. Berdsk, Novosibirsk, where defense factories shut down and men who had a good education, young, healthy, were looking for how to feed families who found themselves on the brink of complete poverty. Those who were more courageous and predisposed to military service were recruited as contract soldiers. Many did not like the attitude towards them in the infantry, for example, in the 205th brigade: they were deceived, they were not paid. That's why they happily came to us.

Unfortunately, after the end of the war, these people mostly quit. They went to earn money, even if they risked their lives to go to war. Their families are in Siberia, and our part is in the Rostov region. They pay little money and irregularly, not like in Chechnya. There, a contract soldier received 2300-2800, depending on his rank and position. If the salary here was at least 1200, people wouldn’t run away. An officer, in order for him to feel that he is an officer, must receive three thousand ( the conversation is about the second half of the 1990s. – approx. "Courage"). And, of course, regular payments are necessary. When the war was going on, the delay in payments per week caused sincere concern among the commanders, but here..."

The targets of ambushes in Chechnya, according to Dmitry, were mainly single off-road passenger cars with a small number of guards. I argue that this last thing, and only it, influenced the order of operations of special forces groups, since in Afghanistan we had both night sights and silent weapons. But they did not “make the difference” in the fight against large forces of the Mujahideen. Tactics are dictated by the target of the ambush, that is, the task that the scouts have to solve.

Dmitry interestingly explained the preferred size of his group: “When I went out on ambush missions, I took 12 people with me. Firstly, this is not 13, secondly, Christ has 12 apostles, and most importantly, this is the most convenient number for division. Divided into six pairs, four threes, three fours and two sixes. That is, the most convenient number of people for operational use.”

In the PPD, before leaving, he practiced the group’s actions on the march to the ambush area and especially carefully trained the patrolmen. “As a rule, I had three people in my head and rear patrols - one in front, two behind, or vice versa. I appointed three to the head patrol, because if one of the patrolmen is wounded, the second one will be able to pull him out under the cover of the third, but it is highly controversial that he will be able to do this if there is no cover.”

Hit – gone

The terrain also greatly influenced the organization of the ambush. In Chechnya, we had to operate on a plain among open fields, where the only shelter was the plantings along the roads. Sometimes the terrain did not allow us to position ourselves and wait for the target in battle formation. The group hid in a secluded place, jumped out at the observer’s command and took pre-designated positions.

When moving along the road to land, if necessary, the marching order easily turned into a combat one. The head patrol was transformed into observers, who also performed the task of a support subgroup, the rear patrol acted similarly, and a scout from each patrol returned to the core of the group. The remaining 8 people were divided as follows: a fire subgroup - 3 people, a capture subgroup - 3 people, a commander and a radio operator covering the rear. Almost everyone took part in the fire raid. They retreated in the following sequence: the capture subgroup, observers, then the fire subgroup, which assumed the functions of the support subgroup and covered the retreat.

All ambushes were carried out according to the “hit and leave” principle: the high population density did not allow getting involved in a long battle. How quickly self-defense forces gathered in case of danger is demonstrated by the following example.

Ambush near Grushev

On the night of May 8, 1996, two kilometers south of Grushevoy, part of the forces of RGSpN No. 322 of the 173rd Special Operations Forces carried out an operation, the official report of which, submitted by the command to the headquarters of the OGV, read: “RGSpN No. 322, under the command of Senior Lieutenant S., organized an ambush in the ford area. As a result, a UAZ car and 5 militants were destroyed. The car contained: RPO-A - 8 pcs., TM-62 mines - 4 pcs., F-1 grenades - 1 box, RGD-5 grenades - 1 box, AK assault rifles - 20 pcs. One of the killed was in a NATO camouflage uniform with shoulder straps of a colonel of the Russian Defense Ministry, wearing a Borz beret, and had photographs and individual notes with him... During the battle, Akaev Zaindym Magametovich was killed, registered in the village. Alkhazurovo, Urus-Martan district, and Chupalaev Saidamin Sudaevich, registered in the village. Alkhazurovo, Urus-Martan district. The other three militants did not have any documents with them.

During the seizure of weapons and documents at the site of the ambush from the settlement. Up to 80 militants, BMP-2, and 4 UAZ vehicles advanced in our direction from Grushevoe. The group directed artillery fire at the advancing militants, but was forced to retreat to the base area. The vehicle with weapons and ammunition was destroyed. Five small arms were seized. During the battle, squad leader V. was wounded - a perforating gunshot wound to the right half of the chest. By 5.00 on 05/08/96, the group arrived at the base area of the reconnaissance detachment, where the evacuation of the wounded, weapons samples and captured documents was organized.”

And here is what ensign V., who commanded the ambush, said.

“On May 7, we, as part of a detachment, moved along the ridge from the Bamut area. We walked around the settlement and stood on the “bald spot”, opposite Grushevoy. As it got dark, we took up a perimeter defense and began to dig in, although this is said loudly. The deepest of all the trenches is mine with my brother. With the onset of darkness, the movement of spirits under our hill intensified. They walk with flashlights about 150 meters away, but we lie down and don’t reveal ourselves. By this time, Goyskoye had not yet been taken, and the spirits from there were taking prisoners towards Urus-Martan, and columns with equipment were being driven from Grushevoye. The artillery commander was with us. We asked the artillerymen to cover these columns, and at the same time the spirits right below us, to which we received the go-ahead. The mortars covered the spirits well. They began to rush about, groans were heard. We are lying down and introducing amendments. The mortar men continue to work...

In the morning we got the fighting itch. We knocked out the commander, saying they were going to inspect engineering structures. Let's go with five of us, just double basses, we won't take conscripts. We figured from the map that it wouldn’t be a bad idea to organize an ambush in the area of the ford, so at dawn we set out. The descent to the river was very steep, but we still followed the goat paths. Along the road, we mapped out escape routes - the main one and the backup one. Near the ford they found the most traveled road, dispersed and sat in ambush.

My brother is in the rear, in support, and we decided on the tasks of who does what: who covers the flanks, who goes for inspection. Based on the fact that our strength is small, we decided that if there are a lot of spirits, we will let them through, but if the prey is tough, we will bring them all down.

We decided to sit for an hour. There were 7 minutes left before it ended. And then Boris crawls towards us from the right flank. As soon as he crawled, the UAZ was coming, it was too late to return. We started working. Brother BZshkami immediately put it in the engine. The engine jammed, the car stopped dead before reaching me. According to my calculations, it should have rolled by inertia, but the calculations did not come true. The guys in the UAZ, great fellows, immediately started hitting us through the windows. We shot at the store, the spirits are still shooting back, and just from the back of the car, that is, from the Borino sector. I replaced the store, yelling: “Group, for inspection!” – and I start moving towards the car. And the spirit continues to shoot. I looked closer and there was another fire. I adjust the fire and slowly move closer to the UAZ. Because of his stern, the fire stopped. I thought that the spirit jumped off the cliff and left. There are 15 meters to the car, and then I see: the one behind the stern is standing, and another one is sitting next to him, but you can see in his eyes that he is already leaving for another world. I didn't expect such a situation. It was then that the spirit got ahead of me with a shot, hitting me in the chest. I fell, jumped up... We shoot again: I shoot at him, he shoots at me. Let's smear both. Finally, I killed this one with one burst and finished off the sitting man. Yelling again: “Group, for inspection!” They began to inspect. The guys are sleek, handsome, all wearing Borzov berets, well dressed. There are a lot of weapons in the car. And I’m already bleeding from my nose and throat, but I keep quiet, I think: “If I tell the boys, they’ll be scared for me, they won’t really look at anything.” I collected documents, the guys collected weapons. I feel everything, I can’t really talk anymore. All I had time to say was: “I’m hooked.” And then the spirits come. The BMP roars. We grabbed everything we could. I said to my bro: “Mahmoud, set it on fire!” Gasoline was leaking from the broken tank. It puffed normally. We retreated along pre-selected paths, and when the spirits arrived at the car, the ammunition in it had already begun to explode. The darlings are on our tail. While the guys were carrying me, I had already lost consciousness. We thought they wouldn’t drag us out, but it’s okay, he’s alive...”

Mine war

The transience of the ambush endangered the lives of the fighters, who had to advance to the object to seize weapons and documents even before the resistance of the guards was completely suppressed. Dmitry L. commented on this circumstance as follows: “When the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of our actions changed and they stopped demanding captured guns from us as proof, but began to blame us more for losses, we switched to the active use of mines in an ambush. The main fire damage to the spirits was now inflicted by them. The fighters in the fire subgroup were needed only for backup. We especially actively used the PD-430 radio links and more modern versions that later entered service. MON-50 mines were used mainly on transport, OZM-72 - to destroy enemy personnel. There were also mines in use with a sound sensor, which began to go off when the first mine, a radio-controlled one, exploded. If everything went well, then we would only report that so many militants had been killed as a result of an explosion, and the agents would already check the information and report who had been killed.”

The events in northeastern Chechnya in January 2000 remained not very well known to the general public. Journalists constantly reported about new and new ambushes, shelling and raids, which made people in Russia simply blur their eyes. In addition, all these skirmishes were soon overshadowed by the battle for Grozny, in which the Russians took revenge for the tragic assault of 1995. Meanwhile, the battles for Argun and Shali against the detachments under the general leadership of Khattab were a brutal battle that cost the Russian military dearly, but also cost the terrorists dearly and ended in a painful defeat for the militants.

The Second Chechen War started extremely badly for the militants. Unlike the first campaign, this time Russian troops did not rely on the psychological effect of armored columns, but suppressed resistance with a hail of heavy weapons shells. The capital of the republic, Grozny, was covered from the east, west and north. The bulk of the terrorist detachments retreated to the city. Russian troops were also gathered there.

However, quite a few gangs remained outside of Grozny, including large, well-trained and armed ones. The largest force outside Grozny at that time was Khattab’s detachment. This Saudi was a professional mujahid; before Chechnya, he had already fought in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Khattab’s “cadets” were seriously superior to ordinary militants in terms of the quality of their training and weapons. In addition, many groups remained outside of Grozny, including, for example, a strong detachment of the famous slave traders the Akhmadov brothers.

Jordanian-born Chechen rebel commander Omar Ibn al-Khattab poses for photographs in the capital of the Chechen Republic, Grozny, September 13, 1999. Collage © L!FE Photo: © AP Photo

The militants' plan was quite obvious. As the Russians surrounded Grozny with barriers, they turned their backs on the densely forested mountainous Chechnya. Numerous rear columns of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs walked along the roads. Drivers, signalmen, cooks, and repairmen most often had poor combat skills. The commandant's offices were just getting used to the newly occupied towns and villages and had little control over them.

A simultaneous attack by several hundred militants on a pliable rear could force the Russians to at least temporarily abandon Grozny and go “to catch horse trampling” in villages where the militants would have already left. The militants were experts in sabotage attacks and could inflict catastrophic losses on the rear. Argun, east of Grozny, and Shali, southeast of the capital, were chosen as the main attack site. These are large enough settlements that their capture could not be ignored, moreover, they were not too far from the mountains that saved the “spirits”: if necessary, they could retreat from there quite quickly.

The militants began preparing for their counteroffensive in early January. As usual, civilians were used for preliminary reconnaissance. Subsequently, the military often recalled the attempts of some scandalous women to penetrate the checkpoints; about the watchmen who “guarded” the empty huts - by an amazing coincidence, they stood on the hills with a good view; peaceful collective farmers wandering around the neighborhood, who were found to have walkie-talkies during a search.

Detachments of militants began to descend from the mountains to Argun, Mesker-Yurt and Shali on January 5, but they walked slowly: for the sake of camouflage, the marches were carried out at night. Just then heavy snowfalls began, so the columns could remain undetected longer. However, due to the same snowfalls, Ramzan Akhmadov’s detachment went to the wrong place. Having gotten lost in the darkness, the militants went to the area of the village of Germenchuk to a pipe repair plant. This is a large industrial zone, spread over a large area and abandoned during wartime, separated from the outside world by concrete fences, so the militants came up with the idea of waiting out daylight hours inside.

By an unfortunate coincidence, just at that time, a combined criminal investigation team, riot police and special forces with three army infantry fighting vehicles left Shali for the pipe. The day before, Shali reported that there were allegedly hostages and a small detachment of terrorists at the pipe station. There were no hostages in the industrial zone, but there were plenty of terrorists.

Chechnya, 2000. Collage © L!FE Photo: © RIA Novosti / Vladimir Vyatkin

When the police and soldiers began to comb the factory, one infantry fighting vehicle separated and moved forward along the factory buildings. As soon as she went deep enough into the labyrinth of buildings, they began to shoot at her from grenade launchers. After a short battle, three soldiers were killed, three more were captured - only one of the prisoners survived and was released.

The riot police and security forces could not help their comrades: they themselves came under fire and were now desperately firing back. Fortunately for the police, there was a ditch nearby, along which the advance group was able to retreat on its own and drag away the wounded. Walking crouched waist-deep in icy slush is not the most pleasant experience, but at least this improvised trench saved the lives of the soldiers. On their way, the retreaters came across a local woman and children hiding among the remains of concrete structures. This family, by pure chance, found itself between a rock and a hard place and now could only pray for salvation and ask in vain when it would be possible to get out.

There were too few policemen to resist the militants, but help came from Argun to the ill-fated pipe. The battle continued until the evening. The next day, the industrial zone was shelled from tanks and combed, but the militants were no longer there. But the Christmas battle with heavy losses was only an overture to the main battle.

On cold roads

The false start in the industrial zone did not lead to the militants abandoning their original plans. On January 9, the main attack began - on Argun. Terrorists entered the city gradually, often disguised as civilians. The task was simplified by the almost complete lack of night vision devices among the military. Having burst into the city, Khattab's people blocked checkpoints, bridges, police departments, and the railway station. They tried with all their might to seize the department of internal affairs and positions on the railway. The militants tried to kill several birds with one stone. If successful, they would capture garrisons, weapons and prisoners. However, even the very fact of the attack led to the fact that detachments were immediately rushed to help the besieged, which could be caught in ambushes on the roads. This technique was used many times during the first war, and Khattab reasonably believed that he would be able to repeat the old trick.

The militants failed to destroy even one checkpoint, although they stormed some objects furiously, even firing anti-tank missiles at the windows. The agitators shouted calls to surrender through megaphones, they sent parliamentarians to the besieged with an offer to surrender - these calls, of course, were refused. The commander of the stronghold on the railway even had to restrain his subordinates, who were eager to shoot the agitator without any fuss: not so much out of respect for the white flag, but because it could be a civilian who was being forced to read out demands.

Russian army soldier. Photo: © AP Photo/Misha Japaridze

Although the exchange of fire was in full swing, the losses of the besieged in the police department and at the station were low. The militants tried to use classic tactics: shooting aimlessly with heart-rending screams, in the hope that the soldiers would lose their nerve and quickly shoot all the ammunition, after which the fortifications could be taken with their bare hands. However, this plan did not work, and ultimately not a single stronghold fell to the terrorists.

Things were much worse on the roads. Khattab himself settled east of Argun, across the Dzhalka River. This river itself is not such an obstacle, but the problem is that a decent forest belt has grown around the riverbed, hiding what is happening from the checkpoint closer to Argun. It was there that the rear column of internal troops was ambushed. Some vehicles broke through at top speed and went to the checkpoint, but several trucks were hit. The battle around the trucks was fierce, but short: having lost several people killed, the Khattabites approached the burning cars and finished off the wounded.

However, a detachment of special forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs immediately began to attack the militants, rushing to the rescue. Soon the helicopters arrived and the Khattab men retreated. The situation was similar to the south: there a column heading towards Argun from the south was ambushed. Despite the losses, disaster was avoided. With sufficient strength of the relief detachments, it was often possible to rescue the “ribbons” under fire - at least to get people out.

But attempts at desperate but poorly prepared raids to save comrades ended badly. In Argun itself, at this very time, the city commandant, Colonel Kushnarev, died. The battle caught him on the road, and the colonel, together with a small detachment, tried to break through to the rescue. In the city, a predictable ambush awaited them: the colonel, along with several soldiers and officers, died. His emotional reaction is understandable, but without reconnaissance and gathering forces, everything could only end in tragedy. The Khattabites mocked the dead, literally gutting the bodies. At the same time, the two surviving soldiers were hidden by local residents: despite the possible consequences for “betrayal,” they hid the soldiers and sent them to the commandant’s office when the fighting subsided.

The fighting in and around Argun looked strange. Khattab managed to inflict painful damage on the Russian military, but not a single object was captured, and only scanty forces were diverted from the assault on Grozny. It turned out to be a bloody, spectacular and ultimately meaningless demonstration of capabilities - especially since Khattab’s “cadets” themselves suffered losses. The terrorists achieved a tactical result that meant little for the entire campaign. However, not far away, another squad of militants received a knockout blow.

Shali seat

The second major target of the militants besides Argun was Shali. This town is located very close to the mountains, there were quite a lot of militant sympathizers inside, so from the point of view of the extremists, everything should have gone like clockwork. The attack on Shali was commanded by Aslambek Arsaev, a fairly well-known field commander, although not of the first rank. He entered Shali at the head of a detachment of four hundred militants, demanded immediate surrender from the commandant's office and organized a rally in the square in front of the administration, where - strike while the iron is hot - weapons were distributed. It is interesting that for some reason Arsaev was sure that “the cops were scared” and expected an early capitulation.

At this time, Shali commandant Alexander Bespalov really had something to think about. The meeting, which brought together the main forces of the militants and numerous sympathizers, took place only 200–300 meters from the commandant’s office building. It was dangerous to call out "Grads" or cannon artillery on him: there was a risk of falling under "friendly fire." Bespalov, by a happy coincidence, had powerful space communications equipment, so he could maintain contact with the command continuously and not be afraid of wiretapping by militants. A solution was found quickly.

They decided to launch a Tochka-U tactical missile against the militants. This is a very powerful weapon, the only problem was that the missile had to be perfectly aimed at the target. If the crew had accidentally hit the wrong place, with a high degree of probability the missile would have destroyed the commandant’s office itself. However, the rocket men worked brilliantly.

Missile complex "Tochka". Photo: © RIA Novosti/Igor Zarembo

The "point" exploded right above the ongoing rally. There is still no consensus on the number of terrorists killed, but if we take the average value, the fireball over the square was the last sight in their lives for about a hundred militants. Several hundred more people were injured. According to the soldiers who were under siege, even for them the explosion of the rocket left strong feelings. After this, the siege of the commandant's office stalled. Many militants immediately decided that they did not need such a war and went back to the mountains. Arsaev nevertheless tried to take the commandant’s office, but from there howitzers were aimed at the militants’ initial positions, so these attacks ended bloodily and ingloriously for the enemy. Fortunately, the besieged had enough batteries for communication equipment for another three days.

On the second day, reinforcements with tanks and artillery entered the town, and the militants simply retreated from Shali - battered and disappointed.

Against the backdrop of the events in Argun, the defense of Shali makes a rather gratifying impression. Clear and quick reaction to enemy actions, excellent communication and interaction. The terrorists suffered catastrophic losses, which erased all their successes on the roads near Argun, and in the end achieved nothing.

The fighting in eastern Chechnya in January 2000 did not become widely known for a prosaic reason: the plans of the militants were, in general, thwarted. They failed to delay the attack on Grozny for a long period of time, and they also failed to take control of at least one city. This success came at a high price for the military: in total, almost 80 Russian soldiers and officers died. However, in general, Khattab had nothing to rejoice at: the failure of his counterattack meant that a catastrophe for the militants in Grozny was becoming inevitable. The Second Chechen War was quickly approaching its climax.

Investigative documentary film produced by the television company "Tonus". On the evening of March 1, 2000, the deputy of the district Chechen department of internal affairs informed the commandant of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny that a column of militants dressed in police uniforms was about to enter the city.

The place where the militants passed strangely coincided with the place where the Sergiev Posad riot police column passed.

On March 2, 2000, a convoy transporting members of the Sergiev Posad riot police was ambushed in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny and was fired upon by militants using mortars, grenade launchers and automatic weapons.”

Five lead vehicles came under heavy crossfire: 4 Urals and a PAZ bus. 17 employees of the Sergiev Posad riot police, 2 employees of the Yekaterinburg police department, 2 employees of the Podolsk riot police, and an employee of the Blagoveshchensk police department were killed.

They buried the whole world. Businesses stopped. People went to say goodbye. The funeral service took place in the Refectory Chamber of the Holy Trinity Sergius Lavra, which was broadcast on the central channels of Russian television.

On March 26, 2000, the presidential elections of the Russian Federation took place, in which Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin won.

A new stage has begun in the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus. Within six months, the terrorists who staged the ambush were destroyed.

In memory of the fallen employees of the Sergiev Posad riot police, an icon was painted, monuments were erected and exhibitions were opened in museums, Elbrus was climbed and a street was named in the Chechen village of Shelkozavodskaya.

The video uses footage from the program

This was one of the first major clashes in . Was it a war or the establishment of constitutional order?

Of course, war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneously formed militias and peaceful shepherds who came down from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been a number of them, but the backbone of Dudayev’s army was clearly not something that arose spontaneously and was militia.

Start

On December 12, 1994, a column of the combined parachute regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade was fired upon from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. During the shelling, 6 people were immediately killed, another died later on December 29, 1994 in the hospital named after. Burdenko, 13 people were injured of varying severity.

Firstly, the data was provided by the famous Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died from wounds in 2003, when American tankers fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad).

Secondly, judging by Protsyuk’s information, the BM-21 installations were located next to the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this facility).

Thirdly, the turntables appeared later and worked. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the helicopters, but to no avail.

Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s firing machine guns, as well as a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.

What did the battle look like through the eyes of eyewitnesses?

Column composition:

Tank of the 141st separate tank battalion of the 19th MSD
Combined parachute battalion 137 RDP
Combined parachute battalion 51 RDP
Self-propelled artillery division of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-tank artillery battery of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
Combined parachute battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade

The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by a former police captain, who received the rank of division general in the ChRI. At that moment he was appointed commander of the Northwestern Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria.

On December 11, as the column of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several of Arsanov’s fighters, who collected information about the forces of the column and its route.

In particular, one of the militants in his own Zhiguli drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov turns to him to assign him BM-21 "Grad" installations and strike the moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, on the orders of Arsanov, occupied a commanding height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.

Until December 20, 1994, the Commander of the United States Military Forces in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District) was Colonel General Alexey Nikolaevich Mityukhin.

A few characteristics about Mityukhin:

Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:

“Take, for example, the district commander, General Mityukhin. This is a strong leader who knew how to get his orders carried out. He did a lot for the improvement of the district. And for a period of peace he was a good commander. But at the same time, he was a product of the era. He had no experience leading troops in war. He was easily doubted when it came to solving direct problems of the army. As a witness to its collapse, the flight (there is no other word for it) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. Having experienced all the tyranny of politicians, he saw no way to resist it. He was taught to think only about how not to set himself up..."

Head of Airborne Intelligence, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:

“The commander of the group of troops, Mityukhin, I’ll call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was honored to say to the commanders of the units that were to enter Chechnya tomorrow was: “There is no need to steal straw from the fields from the Chechens. I, I have some money, I’ll give it to you as a last resort, pay.” I swear it really happened."

Detection of positions of the ChRI detachment

On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to take advantage of the intelligence.

Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh - head of airborne intelligence in 1990-1997:

At that time, the North Caucasian Military District and the United Group of Forces were commanded by Colonel General Mityukhin. The northern group under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but walked along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the northern direction.

The convoy was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could carry out strikes with NURS. The helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bureau of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters included reconnaissance officers from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment. The head of the operational intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L., maintained radio contact with them. Ersak.

Under those conditions, this was a very effective method of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly involved in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And scouts are aimed specifically at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.

Pilots and reconnaissance officers, each through their own channels, report to the group’s command about the enemy, including the BM-21 installation and tanks, and indicate their location. General Alexey Sigutkin immediately deploys the column into battle formation and gives the command to the helicopters to engage the identified targets. But helicopter pilots have their own direct superior!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: “Wait, I’ll ask the Chief.” Ivannikov’s chief was General Mityukhin.

Literally a minute later, Ivannikov conveys Mityukhin’s order to the pilots, prohibiting them from striking identified targets, citing the presence of an oil pipeline in that place as the reason for this decision. Sigutkin gives the command to his scouts and artillerymen to conduct additional reconnaissance and suppress targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow us to immediately see the enemy directly and immediately give target designation to fire weapons.

At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should be changed every two hours, are replaced. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind cover and stands on the opposite slope of the ridge from Sigutkin, showing the crew of the BM-21 “Grad” installation the direction of fire. After all, the Chechen tank crews see our battle formations from the tower, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation over the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The crew of the installation can only turn around in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on sight. After this, the installation fires a salvo of all forty 122 mm missiles each...

If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Grad missiles always land in a highly elongated ellipse. If you cover the column lengthwise with such an ellipse, then every third projectile can find a target.

This salvo caused a direct hit by a rocket shell on the Ural vehicle and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, the chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself, and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko. So six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya.

At the CBU, Mityukhin’s general team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the helicopter radio network were recorded on tape by Major Ersak.

They clearly stated that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin’s direct order had not followed, prohibiting helicopter pilots from opening fire to kill. I was forced to present these records and show the true culprit in the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the group by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces).

However, our “disappointments” with everything that happened that day were not over yet. A few hours later, the evening news of the NTV television company broadcasts a report from Chechnya, made by a correspondent of this television company. There, the operator, accompanied by a commentator’s voice choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 “Grad” installation comes out of cover into a firing position and launches rockets at our group. The crew of the installation left the position, standing on the running board of a car driving past the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, filmed in close-up, shouting: “Allahu Akbar!”

About two weeks later I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV program I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.

By the way, three days later, scouts from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather a highway. On both sides of it there are mainly production and warehouse premises.

The scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Aleksandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one was broken, and there was no one to repair it), took a bearing on the radio station used by the crew of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was just a hangar there. They attacked it with artillery and aircraft. Everything was demolished - along with the crew...

From the description of the battle: “Having stopped 8 kilometers from Dolinskoye to decide on further actions, we suddenly saw through binoculars something similar to the installation of a multiple launch rocket system. “The Chechens are loading the Grad,” the helicopter’s crew confirmed their fears.

“The column usually walked across the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. The command “to fight” was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we saw nothing. There were about 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then we noticed fast-flying lights on the horizon - it was the next salvo, about 4 rockets. They fell behind a hill, and the road along which we were traveling led there. Everyone rushed to the heights.

The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column had stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and a GAZ-66 with a ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first crew of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second with a broken track was trying to move somewhere, while the third was completely on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, but the shishiga, on the contrary, was actively trying to leave the crater. The abandoned charger stood on wheels, there were no fighters in sight, only someone’s corpulent figure was energetically waving its arms. To the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of an oil depot could be seen. We couldn’t see much detail; we were still at a height, but a bit far away.

Our platoonman (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar) awakened our numb faces, mesmerized by the spectacle, with his cry “to fight.” We immediately deployed the rifle and within 20 seconds I was sitting behind the barrels. Through the ground camera I was able to see both the fighters and this corpulent figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (chief of air defense of the 56th Brigade). Who organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were only three volleys. The one we saw was the last one.

By that time, the Ural was able to reach our altitude, apparently with the Tula people - it was an LNG crew, and the Ural with a howitzer. The rest of the column stood still. The last one to arrive at our high-rise was a communications UAZ. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy its gun and prepare for battle. The signalman should contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.

I don’t remember it verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: Our convoy was fired upon from the direction of the oil depot, may we allow us to return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the gun. Follow him, shouted the signalman - Comrade Colonel, the order is not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said: “Shut up!” I didn't hear this order. Break your barrel organ. And turning to the howitzer - Load! There was a direct hit from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell.”

Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:

“On December 12, the unit in which Sasha Mineev served, as part of a column of several units, made a forced march to the specified area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already emerging onto a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko on the mountain, at a distance of about seven kilometers, noticed the tanks and gave the order to deploy into battle formation. But at that moment the shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and it was not visible where the shooting was coming from.

As it turned out later, the fire was carried out by four Grad launchers, which fired three salvos. One of the shells hit the second car in the direction of travel... Sasha was in the fourth car. Their car was not damaged. But during the shelling, the personnel began to leave the equipment and disperse on the ground, since it was unsafe to be in the equipment; it was too vulnerable in a convoy. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded..."

Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR:

“The lieutenant colonel’s adjustment was interrupted by the captain’s cry: “We’re being attacked!” I turned the trunks and looked down. Because of the smoke it was not very visible, but it was obvious that to the left, just where the survivors were pulling back, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered the LNG to fight, and the howitzer and I to go to direct fire. I clearly distinguished the outline of the tank; it was coming first and straight towards us. I considered the rest of the armor to be an infantry fighting vehicle, which I immediately reported. The only answer is - I see...

Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (or rather yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling, going around the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed a mine trawl in front of the tank, as was the case on ours.

And only after about 30 minutes the helicopters arrived. A pair of MI-24. We flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and released several nurses there. In general, we took up defensive positions not far from the place of shelling, and hung around there for a couple of days.”

Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine exploded (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates A. R. Latypov, A. A. Varlamov, A. A. Goncharov).

Vehicle commander Art. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place.

Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, and Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a fire battle against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.

“For four days, the 51st GvPDP fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen militant attacks, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major V.M. Kulikov destroyed three Grad installations."

There were several military vehicles parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that three Grad launchers taxied out, managing to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet me: “I am an officer just like you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who was imprisoned...”

The prisoners said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be trusted? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with the key with me, letting me go about fifteen kilometers later. How offensive it was to later find out that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December we stopped near Grozny. Ahead is a city crammed with militants, behind there are no rear lines, no supply routes...”

Dead:

Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces commander)
Beginning RViA 106 Airborne Division Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
Private 1182 AP Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12/12/94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
Private 56th Regiment Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin
Sergeant 1182 AP Leonid Vladimirovich Meshanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko Hospital)

According to the head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Colonel P.Ya. Popovskikh, 12 people were injured.

Losses of Chechen fighters

According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21

Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the Dolinsky village was restored and inaugurated in July 2015: In the Grozny region of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the Dolinsky village was opened in a solemn atmosphere.

The opening ceremony of the village on Saturday was attended by the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Adam Delimkhanov, Head of the Administration of the Head and Government of the Chechen Republic Magomed Daudov and other officials.

After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village, 300 local children received gifts from the Regional Public Foundation named after the Hero of Russia: boys received bicycles and girls received dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic rode a bicycle around the village and got acquainted with the work done.

It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been renovated. A mosque with 200 seats, a gym and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of the school, medical clinic, kindergarten for 120 children and the housing and communal services building was carried out. Intra-village roads with a length of about 6 kilometers, which are covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbstones, have been repaired. Utilities have been completely updated - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov Foundation.

The urban-type settlement Dolinsky was founded in 1972 for workers of the Grozny Gas Processing Plant (GPP). In 1989, after the earthquake, many houses were in disrepair. Since then, no major repairs have been carried out in the village. In 1994, during the fighting, the gas processing plant was destroyed, and housing facilities, road facilities, utility networks, administrative and social buildings of the village were also damaged. Currently, about one and a half thousand people live in Dolinskoye.

This was one of the first major clashes in the First Chechen War. Was it a war or the establishment of constitutional order? Of course, war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneously formed militias and peaceful shepherds who came down from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been a number of them, but the backbone of Dudayev’s army was clearly not something that arose spontaneously and was militia. If I have time and the mood, I will complete the post about the number and composition of forces before December 11, 1994 (the day the entry of troops into the Chechen Republic began).

Start.

Surprisingly, the very next day an article about the events of December 12, 1994 was published not just anywhere, but in the English edition of The Guardian. The article is still preserved and is available here (https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/dec/13/chechnya). What follows from the article. Firstly, the data was provided by the famous Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died from wounds in 2003, when American tankers fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad). Secondly, judging by Protsyuk’s information, the BM-21 installations were located next to the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this facility). Thirdly, the turntables appeared later and worked. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the helicopters, but to no avail. Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s firing machine guns, as well as a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.

What the battle looked like through the eyes of eyewitnesses.

Direction of movement in general (http://www.ljplus.ru/img4/b/o/botter/1994_12_12_14_20.jpg)

Column composition:

Tank of the 141st separate tank battalion of the 19th MSD
Combined parachute battalion 137 RDP
Combined parachute battalion 51 RDP
Self-propelled artillery division of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-tank artillery battery of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
Combined parachute battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade

The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by Vakha Arsanov, a former police captain who received the rank of division general in the Chechen Republic. At that moment he was appointed commander of the Northwestern Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria. On December 11, as the column of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several of Arsanov’s fighters, who collected information about the forces of the column and its route. In particular, one of the militants in his own Zhiguli drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov turns to Aslan Maskhadov to assign him BM-21 Grad installations and strike the moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, on the orders of Arsanov, occupied a commanding height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.

The commander of the OGV in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District) until December 20, 1994 was Colonel General Alexey Nikolaevich Mityukhin, Several characteristics

Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:

“Take, for example, the commander of the district, General Mityukhin. He is a strong leader who knew how to get his orders carried out. He did a lot for the development of the district. And for the peace period he was a good commander. But at the same time, he was a product of the era. He did not have no experience in leading troops in war. He was easily doubted when it came to solving the direct tasks of the army, as a witness of its collapse, the flight (there is no other way to call it) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. to himself all the tyranny of politicians, he did not see the opportunity to resist him. He was taught to think only about how not to expose himself..."

Head of Airborne Intelligence, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:

“The commander of the group of troops, Mityukhin, I’ll call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was honored to say to the commanders of the units that were supposed to enter Chechnya tomorrow was: “There is no need to steal straw from the fields from the Chechens.” . I, I have some money, I’ll give it to you as a last resort, pay.” I swear, it really happened.”

Detection of positions of the ChRI detachment.

On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to take advantage of the intelligence. Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh, head of airborne intelligence in 1990-1997, tells the story.

At that time, the North Caucasian Military District and the United Group of Forces were commanded by Colonel General Mityukhin. The northern group under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but walked along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the northern direction.
The convoy was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could carry out strikes with NURS. The helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bureau of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters included reconnaissance officers from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment. The head of the operational intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L., maintained radio contact with them. Ersak.
Under those conditions, this was a very effective method of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly involved in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And scouts are aimed specifically at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.
Pilots and reconnaissance officers, each through their own channels, report to the group’s command about the enemy, including the BM-21 installation and tanks, and indicate their location. General Alexey Sigutkin immediately deploys the column into battle formation and gives the command to the helicopters to engage the identified targets. But helicopter pilots have their own direct superior!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: “Wait, I’ll ask the Chief.” Ivannikov’s chief was General Mityukhin.
Literally a minute later, Ivannikov conveys Mityukhin’s order to the pilots, prohibiting them from striking identified targets, citing the presence of an oil pipeline in that place as the reason for this decision. Sigutkin gives the command to his scouts and artillerymen to conduct additional reconnaissance and suppress targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow us to immediately see the enemy directly and immediately give target designation to fire weapons.
At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should be changed every two hours, are replaced. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind cover and stands on the opposite slope of the ridge from Sigutkin, showing the crew of the BM-21 “Grad” installation the direction of fire. After all, the Chechen tank crews see our battle formations from the tower, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation over the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The crew of the installation can only turn around in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on sight. After this, the installation fires a salvo of all forty 122 mm missiles each...
If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Grad missiles always land in a highly elongated ellipse. If you cover the column lengthwise with such an ellipse, then every third projectile can find a target.
This salvo caused a direct hit by a rocket shell on the Ural vehicle and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko.

So six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya.
At the CBU, Mityukhin’s general team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the helicopter radio network were recorded on tape by Major Ersak. They clearly stated that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin’s direct order had not followed, prohibiting helicopter pilots from opening fire to kill. I was forced to present these records and show the true culprit in the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the group by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces). However, our “disappointments” with everything that happened that day were not over yet. A few hours later on the evening news
The NTV television company is hosting a report from Chechnya made by a correspondent for this television company. There, the operator, accompanied by a commentator’s voice choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 “Grad” installation comes out of cover into a firing position and launches rockets at our group. The crew of the installation left the position, standing on the running board of a car driving past the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, filmed in close-up, shouting: “Allahu Akbar!”
By the way, three days later, scouts from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather a highway. On both sides of it there are mainly production and warehouse premises.
The scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Aleksandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one was broken, and there was no one to repair it), took a bearing on the radio station used by the crew of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was just a hangar there. They attacked it with artillery and aircraft. Everything was demolished - along with the crew...

About two weeks later I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV program I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.

From the description of the battle:

At this time, the rest of the column is pulled up to the head of the column.

Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR

“The column usually walked, crossing the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. The command “to fight” was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we saw nothing. There were 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then we noticed fast-flying lights on the horizon - it was the next salvo of about 4 rockets. They fell behind the hill, the road along which we were traveling led. Everyone rushed to the height.

The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column was stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and a Gas 66 with a ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first crew of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second with a broken track was trying to move somewhere, while the third was completely on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, but the shishiga, on the contrary, was actively trying to leave the crater. The abandoned charger stood on wheels, there were no fighters in sight, only someone’s corpulent figure was energetically waving its arms. To the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of an oil depot could be seen. We couldn’t see much detail; we were still at a height, but a bit far away.

Our platoonman (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar) awakened our numb faces, mesmerized by the spectacle, with his cry “to fight.” We immediately deployed the rifle and within 20 seconds I was sitting behind the barrels. Through the ground camera I was able to see both the fighters and this corpulent figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (chief of air defense of the 56th brigade). Who organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were only 3 volleys. The one we saw was the last.

By that time, the Ural was able to reach our altitude, apparently with the Tula people - it was an LNG crew, and the Ural with a howitzer. The rest of the column stood still. The last one to arrive at our high-rise was a communications UAZ. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy its gun and prepare for battle. The signalman should contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.

I don’t remember it verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: Our convoy was fired upon from the direction of the oil depot, may we allow us to return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the gun. Follow him, shouted the signalman - Comrade Colonel, the order is not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said: - shut up! I didn't hear this order. Break your barrel organ. And turning to the howitzer - Load!

There was a direct hit from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell."

Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:

“On December 12, the unit in which Sasha [Mineev] served, as part of a column of several units, made a forced march to the indicated area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already reaching a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko was on the mountain, on about seven kilometers away, noticed the tanks and gave the order to turn into a battle formation. But at that moment the shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and it was not visible where the shooting was coming from. As it turned out later, the fire was coming from. They were firing four Grad launchers, which fired three salvos. One of the shells hit the second vehicle in the direction of travel... Sasha was in the fourth vehicle, but during the shelling the personnel began to leave the vehicle and disperse. terrain, since it was unsafe to be in the vehicle, it was too vulnerable in the convoy. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded..."

Column head withdrawal
Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR

“The lieutenant colonel’s adjustment was interrupted by the captain’s cry: “We’re being attacked!” I turned my guns and looked down. Because of the smoke it was not very visible, but it was obvious that on the left, just where the survivors were pulling back, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered LNG for battle, and the howitzer and I went for direct fire. I clearly distinguished the outline of the tank, it was coming first and I considered the rest of the armor to be an infantry fighting vehicle, which I immediately reported in response - I see...
Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (or rather yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling, going around the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed a mine trawl in front of the tank, as was the case on ours.
And only after about 30 minutes the helicopters arrived. A pair of Mi 24. We flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and released several nurses there. In general, not far from the place of shelling, we took up defensive positions and hung around there for a couple of days."17

Thus, after the shelling, federal forces took up defensive positions in the area of the village. On December 17, Dudayev’s troops attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division. The defense of the rear part of the column was organized by Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, the BMD was hit. Anikushkin covered it in an attached tank and ensured the evacuation of the crew. Fire from a combat vehicle destroyed four militants and suppressed an enemy firing point. Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine exploded (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates A. R. Latypov, A. A. Varlamov, A. A. Goncharov). Vehicle commander Art. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place. Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, and Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a fire battle against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.

“For four days, the regiment fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen militant attacks, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major V.M. Kulikov destroyed three Grad installations.”

There were several military vehicles parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that three Grad launchers taxied out, managing to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet me: “I am an officer just like you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who Dudayev imprisoned...” The prisoners said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be trusted? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with the key with me, letting me go about fifteen kilometers later. How offensive it was to later find out that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky."

At the end of December we stopped near Grozny. Ahead is a city crammed with militants, behind there are no rear lines, no supply routes...

Dead

Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces commander)
As a result of the shelling, the following were killed:
Beginning RViA 106 Airborne Division Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
Private 1182 AP Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12/12/94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
Private 56th Regiment Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin

Sergeant 1182 AP Leonid Vladimirovich Meshanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko Hospital)

According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21

During the collection of information, LiveJournal was used

Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the village of Dolinsky was restored and inaugurated in July 2015, yes. https://chechnyatoday.com/content/view/285512

In the Grozny region of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the village of Dolinsky was officially opened.

After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village from the Regional Public Foundation named after Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, 300 local children received gifts: boys - bicycles, and girls - dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic rode around the village on a bicycle and got acquainted with the work done.

It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been renovated. A mosque with 200 seats, a gym and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of the school, medical clinic, kindergarten for 120 children and the housing and communal services building was carried out. Intra-village roads with a length of about 6 kilometers have been repaired, covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbstones. Utilities have been completely updated - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the Regional Fund named after Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov.