Soviet 122 mm howitzer m 30. Military history, weapons, old and military maps

In many films about the war, on various posters dedicated to that difficult time, you can see an image of the famous 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model M-30. After defeating Nazi Germany many experts recognized it as not only the best among howitzers, but also unrivaled among all the cannon artillery of the Second World War.

The weapon did not lose its relevance even after World War II, remaining in demand in many countries. It can be found in all corners of the world, isn’t this a recognition of its perfection?

From prerequisites to creation

Even before World War I, Russia purchased 48-line howitzers for the army - guns designed to fire heavy high-explosive shells. This type of weapon was specially designed to combat enemy fortifications.

For infantry hidden in trenches or behind a rampart, heavy shells flying along a steep trajectory are very dangerous. It should be clarified that in Russian units of measurement - 48 lines correspond to 4.8 inches or 121.92 mm, reduced to the usual 122 mm, this caliber is still considered optimal for light field howitzers.

Howitzers of the 1909 - 1910 model, developed by the Krupp concern and the French company Schneider, respectively, coped well with the responsibilities and tasks assigned to them. Moreover, the mass production of ammunition for them subsequently played a role in equipping the Soviet army.

At the end of the twenties, the artillery park of the Red Army became morally and physically obsolete.

The modernizations carried out in 1930 of the Krupp howitzers, and in 1937 of the French howitzers, could not satisfy all the requirements for modern artillery. The government's policy of mechanization in the army clearly showed all their imperfections.

Even moving without suspension and on wooden wheels faster than 10 km/h was impossible. And the firing range increased during modernization remained below the required one.

The “Journal of the Artillery Committee” in 1928 was the first to formulate the requirements for the next generation divisional howitzer. After publication, on August 11, 1929, technical specifications for its development were issued. It was decided to make the caliber within the range of 107-122 mm, based on the performance characteristics of English and German howitzers that have a similar purpose.

In addition, the gun had to be adapted for towing by mechanized means.

A separate point included the possibility of maneuvering a gun on the battlefield using crew forces.

The theme of creating a new weapon was called “Lubok”. There were not enough of our own developers; the Civil War greatly undermined competent engineering personnel. It was necessary to entrust the work on "Lubok" to German specialists from the Weimar Republic who served in KB-2, which structurally belonged to the All-Union Weapons and Arsenal Association of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

It should be noted that the help of German specialists was invaluable at that time, since the country of the Soviets lacked not only engineers, but also production capacity. There were difficulties even with machine workers.

The result of the work was a 122 mm howitzer on a single-beam carriage. Sprung metal wheels made it possible to reach speeds of up to 10 km/h, because the use of tires was not provided. The vertical angle of the barrel (length 23 caliber) did not exceed +50°, and the horizontal angle – 7°. In the stowed position the system weighed 2.8 tons, in combat - 2.25 tons. For those times, a pretty good result.

However, the material and technical capabilities of the factories were not taken into account. Only 11 howitzers were produced. The Nazis' rise to power in Germany led to the liquidation of KB-2. In 1936, the project was closed because the requirements for modern guns changed.

The artillery department demanded the creation of a howitzer with rubber wheels for the Red Army.

The carriage must be designed with sliding frames. The rubber travel and suspension made it possible to increase the speed of towing the gun; the sliding frames, in turn, made the structure heavier, but gave the gun greater fire maneuverability.

Again we considered calibers 107 and 122 mm, but with the requirement to increase all aiming angles. It was assumed that it was even possible to make a howitzer-gun. The 122 mm caliber won, although the production of 107 mm guns would have been much cheaper.

The fact is that the arsenals had accumulated a large stock of shells for 122 mm guns; in addition, unlike the 107 mm shell, which had to be developed and created almost from scratch, for the production of 122 mm shells and charges there were ready-made and operating production lines.

Such weapons have more power. A new concrete-piercing projectile was also required large caliber. Thus, the next step was the creation of the legendary M-30.

Creation, introduction into service and production of the M-30

Three groups of designers received the development task at once:

1. F.F. Petrov, with the design group of the Motovilikha plant in Perm, this team had extensive experience in the design of heavy artillery systems. Until 1917, the plant was engaged in the production of guns for tsarist army. The project received the index - M-30.
2. Plant No. 92, under the leadership of the talented and young designer V.G. Grabin at that time. Initiative development for the competition. Internal index of the F-25 plant.
3. Plant No. 9, known as the Ural heavy engineering plant with the U-2 howitzer (the weapon, by the way, turned out to be quite successful). Attempts were made to arm tanks and heavy self-propelled guns with it.

In a difficult competition, the M-30 project won. U-2 failed the tests (frame deformation) and dropped out of further participation in the competition. Despite several rather interesting solutions and findings.

With the F-25, not everything is so simple. The gun was practically equivalent to the M-30. The design used developments from the Lubok, in addition, a muzzle brake was used, the bolt was of a horizontal wedge type. The weight is slightly lower than that of the M-30, but, nevertheless, the F-25 was rejected.

Perhaps the commission was guided by the following advantages of F. F. Petrov’s brainchild:

• barrel without a muzzle brake (less unmasking and improves crew working conditions);
• many well-developed components (piston bolt, barrel bore, recoil brake and front end are similar to the Lubok);
• the possibility of using the carriage for more powerful systems (later it was used for).

Based on the results of the competition and testing, a howitzer designed by F.F. was selected. Petrova.

In 1939, the gun was put into mass production under the name 122 mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938.

Since 1940, the howitzer has been mass-produced by two factories. The first one is No. 92 in the mountains. Gorky and No. 9, known as the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant.

The Gorky people produced the M-30 for only one year and produced 500 pieces; in 1941-1942, the plant mastered the production of the M-30S, a howitzer variant for installation in the SU-122, but after its production ceased, the gun was no longer produced. UZTM continued production until 1955.

Design features and changes during production

Like most classical-type guns, the divisional howitzer mod. 1938 consists of the following elements:

1. The barrel is a metal monoblock pipe, there is no muzzle brake. The barrel has 36 grooves.
2. Breech, with piston lock. The barrel is screwed into a massive breech. A mounting system to the carriage is also installed on it.
3. Carriage (M-30S – stand)

Components of the carriage:

• cradle;
• recoil devices;
• upper machine;
• aiming mechanisms;
• balancing mechanism;
• lower machine with sliding frames, there are also fastenings for entrenching tools and spare parts;
• chassis, wheels with stamped discs and solid rubber tires;
• leaf springs;
• sighting devices;
• shield cover, made of several elements.

The frame cradle is placed with trunnions into special sockets of the upper machine. The socket of the lower machine includes a pin from the upper one, made with shock absorbers that hang the upper machine and make it easier to turn. The upper machine has rotating (left) and lifting (right) mechanisms.

Recoil devices consist of a hydraulic recoil brake (under the barrel) and a hydropneumatic knurler (above the barrel).
A Hertz panorama was inserted into a special socket of an independent (two arrows) sight, through which direct fire and indirect fire were fired.

Over the entire production period, the howitzer underwent minor changes.

This is reflected in the 1948 Service Manual, but without issue numbers or dates. Changes were introduced to simplify and reduce the cost of production as much as possible. So around 1945, riveting on frames was replaced by welding. After modernization, the breech was increased in size and its strength was increased.

The trigger travel stop and the loading mechanism were removed. The grease fittings of the cradle rollers and the oil seals of the recoil and retractor brakes have undergone changes.

After the start of production of the 152 mm D-1, the carriage for two systems was unified. The design of sights and panoramas changed.

Combat use and performance characteristics of the M-30

Performance characteristics:

Caliber	121.92 mm
Total issued	19 266
Calculation	8 people
Rate of fire	5 - 6 rounds/min
Permissible highway speed	50 km/h
Fire line height	1200 mm
Barrel length	2800 mm \ 22.7 cal.
Bore length	2278 mm \ 18.7 cal.
Weight in stowed position,	2900 - 3100 kg
Weight in firing position	2360-2500 kg
Length	5900 mm (with front end 8600)
Width	1975mm
Height	1820 mm
Clearance	330-357 mm
Elevation angle	from −3 to +63.3°
Horizontal angle	49°

Types of ammunition:

Index shot	Index projectile	Weight Projectile (kg)	Weight of explosives/explosives (kg)	Fuse brand	Initial projectile speed, (m/s)	Maximum firing range, (km)
Cumulative
53-VBP-463	53-VBP-463	14,83	2,18	State Bills	570	4
53-VBP-463A	53-BP-460A	13,34		B-229	335	2
3VBK1	53-BK-463(M)(U) (UM)	21,26	2,15	GPV-1, GPV-2, GKN	500
3VBK11	53-BK-463U (M)	21,26	2,15	GPV-2	515
Fragmentation
53-VO-462A	53-О-462А	21,76	3,0	D-1, RGM(-2), RG-6, GVZM	380	9,34
53-VO-463A	53-О-460А	21,76		D-1-U, RGM-2, MGNS-2	458	10,77
53-VO-463AM	53-О-462А	21,76	3,0	D-1, RGM(-2), RG-6, GVZM	458	10,77
High-explosive fragmentation
53-VOF-462	53-OF-462(Zh)	21,76	3,67	D-1, RGM(-2), RG-6, GVZM	380	9,34
53-VOF-463	53-OF-462(Zh)	21,76	3,67	D-1, RGM(-2), RG-6, GVZM	515	11,8
53-VOF-463M	53-OF-462(Zh)	21,76	3,67	D-1-U, RGM-2(M), V-90, AR-5	515	11,8
3VOF7	3OF7/3OF8	21,76	2,98	AR-30	515	11,8
3VOF31	3OF24(W)	21,76	3,97	RGM-2(M), V-90, AR-5	515	11,8
3VOF46	53-OF-462(Zh)	21,76	3,67	RGM-2(M), V-90, AR-5	515	11,8
3VOF80	3OF56(-1)	21,76	4,31	RGM-2(M), V-90, AR-5	515	11,8
Shrapnel
3VSh1	3VSh1	21,76	2,075	DTM-75	515
Chemical
	53-ХН-462		3,1
	53-ХС-462У		1,9
	53-ХСО-462		1,9
	53-ХСО-462Д	23,1	3,3
	53-ХСО-463Б	22,2	1,325
Smoke
3-VD-462	53-D-462	22,55	3,6	KT(M)-2	380	9,34
53-VD-463	53-D-462	22,55	3,6	KT(M)-2	515	11,8
53-VD-463A	53-D-462A	22,77	3,6	RGM-2(M)	458	10,77
53-VD-463M	53-D-462S	22,55	3,6	KTM-2, RGM-2(M)	515	11,8
3VD1	3D4(M)	21,76	3,6	RGM-2(M)	515	11,8
Lighting
53-VS-462	53-VS-462	22,3	0,02	T-6	361	7,12
53-VS-463	53-VS-462	22,3	0,02	T-6	479	8,5
53-VS-463M	53-S-463(Zh)	22,0	0,02	T-7	515	11,0
3ВС10	3S4(Zh)	21,8	-	T-90	515
Propaganda
53-VA-462	53-A-462	21,5	-	T-6	366	7,2
53-VA-463	53-A-462	21,5	-	T-6	431	8,0
3VA1	3A1(D)(W)(J)	21,5	-	T-7	515

According to the requirements of artillery science, divisional howitzers were assigned the following tasks:

• destruction of field-type fortifications;
• combating enemy fire weapons;
• counter-battery shooting;
• destruction of enemy manpower and means of delivering it to the front line.

If absolutely necessary, divisional reinforcement systems could also operate at direct fire. In this case, 122 mm howitzer shells simply broke through the armor of enemy medium tanks, the lungs turned over and overturned from nearby explosions.

Subsequently, in order to combat heavily armored enemy vehicles, cumulative projectiles were introduced into the ammunition load of the M-30S, and subsequently the towed versions of the gun.

During the Second World War, they towed a three-ton howitzer in a variety of ways. Horses, and all kinds of trucks, tractors “Stalinets” STZ-5 or Y-12. In battle, the gun was simply rolled by hand.

M30 service abroad

The quality of our guns can be judged by the fact that several hundred M-30 howitzers captured by the Germans in 1941 were put into service by them and, under the name 12.2 cm s.F.H.396(r), were actively used both on the eastern front and and in France. Even mass production of ammunition for them was established in 1943.

In total, German factories produced 12,573,000 shells for the M-30.

According to some reports, the Germans even installed our guns on captured French armored vehicles.

During the battles, 41 guns were left to the Finns; without their own artillery production, the Finnish army creatively and fully used all the trophies. Renamed 122 H/38, the guns were used against the Red Army, and in 1944, the gun barrels were turned against Germany.
As a reserve, the Finns kept it until the 80s of the last century.

The Chinese howitzer type 54 almost completely replicates the M-30 device. The changes are minor and concern only the standardization of production.
In the post-war period, the howitzer was supplied to more than thirty countries around the world. Most of them continue to be in service today.

An entire era In the history of artillery, one can name the legendary 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model M-30. Having taken part in almost all wars, starting with World War II, she proved her reliability and unpretentiousness, receiving the highest praise from Marshal of Artillery G. F. Odintsov: “Nothing can be better than her.”

Video

The hardest thing to talk about are the tools that for a long time were heard. In the pre-war period, in terms of this indicator, first place should be given, without hesitation, to the 122-mm divisional howitzer of the 1910/30 model.

There is probably no military conflict of that time where these howitzers would not appear. And in the footage of the chronicles of the Great Patriotic War, these guns are constant heroes of battles. Moreover, you can see them from both sides of the front. The command "fire" sounds in Russian, German, Finnish, Romanian. Opponents did not hesitate to use trophies. Agree, this is a fairly important indicator of the reliability, quality and good combat characteristics of a weapon.

First of all, it is necessary to explain the historical necessity of the appearance of this particular weapon. We have already talked about the problems of the Red Army of that time. As well as about the problems of the entire USSR. Worn-out guns, lack of ability to produce high-quality spare parts, moral and technical obsolescence of weapons.

Add to this the lack of engineering and design personnel in industry, the obsolescence of production technologies, the absence of much of what was already used in the defense industry Western countries.

And all this against the backdrop of an openly hostile environment in the country. Against the backdrop of the West's open preparation for war with the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the leadership of the Red Army and the USSR understood perfectly well that without taking urgent measures to rearm the Red Army, the country in the fairly near future would not only be an outsider to the world artillery powers, but would also be forced to spend huge amounts of money on the purchase of obviously outdated Western weapons. artillery systems. Modern artillery was needed here and now.

In the 1920s, the Red Army was armed with two 48-line (1 line = 0.1 inches = 2.54 mm) field howitzers: the 1909 and 1910 models. Developments of the companies “Krupp” (Germany) and “Schneider” (France). In the mid-20s, after the final transition to the metric system, it was these guns that became 122 mm howitzers.

Comparing these howitzers is beyond the scope of the authors of this article. Therefore, the answer to the question of why the 1910 model howitzer was chosen for modernization will be answered with only one comment. This howitzer was more promising and had greater potential for further modernization in terms of range.

With equal, and sometimes better (for example, in terms of the mass of a heavy high-explosive grenade - 23 kg versus 15-17 for Western models) indicators, the howitzer was significantly inferior in firing range to Western models (the German 10.5 cm Feldhaubitze 98/09 system or the British Royal Ordnance Quick Firing 4.5 inch howitzer): 7.7 km versus 9.7 km.

In the mid-20s, the understanding of the possible imminent lag of Soviet howitzer artillery was transformed into a direct order to begin work in this direction. In 1928, the design bureau of the Perm gun factory (Motovilikha) was given the task of modernizing the howitzer and increasing its range to the level of the best models. At the same time, the advantage in weight of grenades must be preserved.

The head of the design team was Vladimir Nikolaevich Sidorenko.

What is the difference between a 1930 model howitzer and a 1910 howitzer?

First of all, the new howitzer is distinguished by its chamber, which was lengthened by boring the rifled part of the barrel by one caliber. This was done in order to ensure the safety of firing new grenades. The required initial velocity of a heavy grenade could only be obtained by increasing the charge. And this, in turn, increased the length of the ammunition by 0.64 caliber.

And then simple physics. In the standard case there was either no room left for all the beams, or there was not enough volume to expand the gases formed during the combustion of gunpowder if an increased charge was used. In the latter case, an attempt to fire led to the rupture of the gun, since due to the lack of volume for the expansion of gases in the chamber, their pressure and temperature greatly increased, and this led to a sharp increase in the rate of the chemical reaction of gunpowder combustion.

The next change in the design is caused by a decent increase in recoil when firing the new grenade. The recoil devices, the lifting mechanism and the carriage itself were strengthened. The old mechanisms could not withstand firing with long-range ammunition.

This is where the next modernization came from. Increasing the range required the creation of new sighting devices. Here the designers did not reinvent the wheel. A so-called normalized sight was installed on the modernized howitzer.

The same sights were installed on all modernized guns at that time. The only differences were in the cutting of the distance scale and fastenings. In the modern version, the sight would be called single or unified.

As a result of all modernizations, the total weight guns in firing position - 1466 kilograms.

Modernized howitzers, which today are in various museums around the world, can be recognized by their markings. Embossed inscriptions on the trunks are required: “Extended chamber.” On the carriage - “strengthened” and “model 1910/30.” on the spindle, adjusting ring and recoil back cover.

It was in this form that the howitzer was adopted by the Red Army in 1930. Produced at the same plant in Perm.

Structurally, the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 (main series according to drawings “letter B”) consisted of:
- a barrel made of a pipe, fastened with a casing and a muzzle, or a monoblock barrel without a muzzle;
- a piston valve that opened to the right. Closing and opening the shutter was done by turning the handle in one step;
- a single-beam carriage, which included a cradle, recoil devices assembled in a sled, a machine tool, guidance mechanisms, a chassis, sighting devices and a shield cover.

The gun was towed by horse (six horses) or mechanical traction. The front end and charging box were required. The transportation speed was only 6 km/h on wooden wheels. Springs and metal wheels appeared after they were put into service, and accordingly, the towing speed increased.

There is one more merit of the modernized 122-mm howitzer. She became the “mother” of the Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-5-2. The vehicle was created as part of the design of a divisional artillery triplex. The SU-5 installations were created on the basis of the T-26 tank chassis.

SU-5-1 is a self-propelled gun with a 76 mm cannon.
SU-5-2 is a self-propelled gun with a 122 mm howitzer.
SU-5-3 - self-propelled gun with a 152 mm mortar.

The machine was created at the Experimental Mechanical Engineering Plant named after S. M. Kirov (plant No. 185). Passed factory and state tests. It was recommended for adoption. 30 self-propelled guns were built. However, they were used to solve problems completely unusual for them.

Light tanks were intended for offensive operations. This means that tank units do not need howitzers, but assault guns. The SU-5-2 was used as an artillery support weapon. And in this case, the need for rapid movements disappeared. Transportable howitzers were preferable.

Nevertheless, these vehicles, even with such small numbers, are combat vehicles. In 1938, five self-propelled howitzers fought with the Japanese near Lake Khasan as part of the 2nd mechanized brigade, reviews from the brigade command were positive.

SU-5-2s also took part in the 1939 campaign against Poland. But no information about the fighting has been preserved. Most likely (considering that the vehicles were part of the 32nd Tank Brigade), it did not come to fighting.

But in the first period Patriotic War The SU-5-2 fought, but did not make any special weather. Total in western districts there were 17 cars, 9 in the Kiev district and 8 in the Western Special District. It is clear that by the autumn of 1941, most of them were destroyed or taken as trophies by the Wehrmacht.

How did “classic” howitzers fight? It is clear that any weapon is best tested in combat.

In 1939, modernized 122-mm howitzers were used during the events at Khalkhin Gol. Moreover, the number of guns was constantly increasing. This is largely due to the excellent results of the work of Soviet artillerymen. According to Japanese officers, Soviet howitzers were superior to anything they had encountered before.

Naturally new Soviet systems became the subject of "hunting" by the Japanese. The defensive fire of Soviet howitzers completely discouraged Japanese soldiers from attacking. The result of this “hunt” was quite significant losses of the Red Army. 31 guns were damaged or lost forever. Moreover, the Japanese managed to capture a fairly large number of trophies.

Thus, during a night attack on the positions of the 149th Infantry Regiment, on the night of July 7–8, the Japanese captured Lieutenant Aleshkin’s battery (6th battery of the 175th Artillery Regiment). When trying to recapture the battery, the battery commander died, and the personnel suffered significant losses. Subsequently, the Japanese used this battery in their own army.

The finest hour of the 122-mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model was the Soviet-Finnish war. For various reasons, it was these guns that were used to represent the howitzer artillery of the Red Army. According to some sources, the number of howitzers in the 7th Army (first echelon) alone then reached almost 700 (according to others 624) units.

Just as happened at Khalkhin Gol, howitzers became a “tidbit” for Finnish army. The losses of the Red Army in Karelia, according to various estimates, ranged from 44 to 56 guns. Some of these howitzers also became part of the Finnish army and were subsequently used by the Finns quite effectively.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the guns we describe were the most common howitzers in the Red Army. According to various estimates, the total number of such systems reached 5900 (5578) guns. And the completeness of parts and connections was from 90 to 100%!

At the beginning of the war, in the western districts alone there were 2,752 122-mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model. But at the beginning of 1942, there were less than 2,000 of them left (according to some estimates, 1,900; no exact data).

Such monstrous losses played a negative role in the fate of these honored veterans. Naturally, new production was created for more advanced tools. Such systems were the M-30. They became the main howitzers already in 1942.

But still, at the beginning of 1943, howitzers of the 1910/30 model made up more than 20% (1400 units) of the total number of such weapons and continued their combat path. And we finally reached Berlin! Outdated, damaged by shrapnel, repaired many times, but they got there! Although it is difficult to see them on the victory chronicle. And then they also showed up on the Soviet-Japanese front.

Many authors claim that 122-mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model were outdated by 1941. And they were used by the Red Army "out of poverty." But a simple but logical question arises: what criteria are used to determine old age?

Yes, these howitzers could not compete with the same M-30, which will be our next story. But the weapon performed its assigned tasks quite well. There is such a term - necessary sufficiency.

So, these howitzers had exactly the required effectiveness. And in many ways, the possibility of increasing the M-30 fleet in the Red Army was facilitated by the heroic work of these old but powerful howitzers.

Performance characteristics of the 122-mm howitzer model 1910/30:

Caliber, mm: 122 (121.92)

Maximum fire range of the OF-462 grenade, m: 8,875

Weight of gun
in stowed position, kg: 2510 (with front end)
in combat position, kg: 1466

Time to transfer to combat position, sec: 30-40

Firing angles, degrees.
- elevation (max): 45
- reduction (min): -3
- horizontal: 4.74

Calculation, persons: 8

Rate of fire, rds/min: 5-6

We express our gratitude to the Museum of the Patriotic Military in Padikovo for the information provided.

The M-30 howitzer is probably known to everyone. The famous and legendary weapon of the workers' and peasants', Soviet, Russian and many other armies. Any documentary about the Great Patriotic War almost necessarily includes footage of an M-30 battery firing. And even today, despite its age, this weapon is in service in many armies of the world.

By the way, it’s like 80 years...

So, today we will talk about the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model M-30. About the howitzer, which many artillery specialists call an era. And foreign experts say it is the most common weapon in artillery (about 20 thousand units). A system where old solutions, tested by many years of operation of other tools, and new, previously unknown solutions were combined in the most organic way.

In the article preceding this publication, we talked about the most numerous howitzer of the Red Army of the pre-war period - the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model. It was this howitzer that was already replaced in number by the M-30 in the second year of the war. According to data from various sources, in 1942 the number of M-30s was already greater than its predecessor.

There is a lot of material on creating the system. Literally all the nuances of competition between different design bureaus, the tactical and technical characteristics of guns, design features, etc. are discussed. The points of view of the authors of such articles are sometimes diametrically opposed.

I would not like to go into all the details of such disputes. Therefore, we will “denote the historical part of the story with a dotted line,” leaving readers the right to own opinion about this question. The authors' opinion is just one of many and cannot serve as the only correct and final one.

So, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was outdated by the mid-30s. That “small modernization” that was carried out in 1930 only extended the life of this system, but did not return its youth and functionality. That is, the weapon could still serve, the whole question is how. The niche of divisional howitzers would soon be empty. And everyone understood this. The command of the Red Army, state leaders and the designers of artillery systems themselves.

In 1928, there was even quite a heated discussion on this issue after the publication of an article in the Journal of the Artillery Committee. Disputes took place in all directions. From combat use and gun design, to the necessary and sufficient caliber of howitzers. Based on the experience of the First World War, several calibers were quite reasonably considered at once, from 107 to 122 mm.

The designers received the task of developing an artillery system to replace the outdated divisional howitzer on August 11, 1929. In studies on the issue of howitzer caliber, there is no clear answer regarding the choice of 122 mm. The authors are inclined to the simplest and most logical explanation.

The Red Army had enough ammunition of this caliber. Moreover, the country had the opportunity to produce these ammunition in the required quantities at existing factories. And third, the logistics of delivering ammunition was simplified as much as possible. The most numerous howitzer (model 1910/30) and the new howitzer could be supplied “from one box.”

There is no point in describing the problems during the “birth” and preparation for mass production of the M-30 howitzer. This is beautifully described in the “Encyclopedia of Domestic Artillery”, probably the most authoritative artillery historian A. B. Shirokorad.

The Red Army Artillery Directorate announced the tactical and technical requirements for the new divisional howitzer in September 1937. The requirements are quite strict. Especially in the shutter part. The AU required a wedge valve (promising and having big potential for modernization). Engineers and designers understood that this system was not reliable enough.

The development of the howitzer was carried out by three design bureaus at once: the Ural Machine-Building Plant (Uralmash), Plant No. 172 named after Molotov (Motovilikha, Perm) and Gorky Plant No. 92 (Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant).

The howitzer samples presented by these factories were quite interesting. But the Ural development (U-2) was significantly inferior to the Gorky (F-25) and Perm (M-30) in ballistics. Therefore, it was not considered promising.

Howitzer U-2

Howitzer F-25 (highly likely)

We will look at some performance characteristics of the F-25/M-30.

Barrel length, mm: 2800 / 2800
Rate of fire, rpm: 5-6 / 5-6
Initial projectile speed, m/sec: 510 / 515
HV angle, degrees: -5...+65 / -3...+63
Firing range, m: 11780 / 11800
Ammunition, index, weight: OF-461, 21, 76
Weight in firing position, kg: 1830 / 2450
Calculation, persons: 8 / 8
Issued, pcs: 17 / 19 266

It is no coincidence that we have listed part of the performance characteristics in one table. It is in this version that one can clearly see the main advantage of the F-25 - the weight of the gun. Agree, the difference of more than half a ton is impressive. And, probably, it was this fact that became the main one in Shirokorad’s definition of this design as the best. The mobility of such a system is undeniably higher. It is a fact.

True, there is a “buried dog” here too, in our opinion. The M-30s provided for testing were somewhat lighter than the serial ones. Therefore, the gap in mass was not so noticeable.

The question arises about the decision made. Why M-30? Why not the lighter F-25.

The first and main version was voiced back on March 23, 1939 in the same “Journal of the Artillery Committee” No. 086: “The 122-mm F-25 howitzer, developed by Plant No. 92 on its own initiative, is currently of no interest to the AU, since it is already Field and military tests of the M-30 howitzer, more powerful than the F-25, have been completed."

Agree, such a statement at that time puts a lot into place. There is a howitzer. The howitzer has been tested and there is no point in wasting people’s money on developing a weapon that no one needs. Continuing further work in this direction was fraught for the designers with “moving to some kind of sharashka” with the help of the NKVD.

By the way, the authors in this regard agree with some researchers on the issue of installing not a wedge valve on the M-30, but the good old piston valve. Most likely, the designers committed a direct violation of the AU requirements precisely because of the reliability of the piston valve.

At that time, problems with the semi-automatic wedge bolt were also observed in smaller caliber guns. For example, the F-22, a universal divisional 76-mm gun.

The winners are not judged. Although, this is how you look at it. Of course they took risks. In November 1936, the head of the Motovilikha plant design bureau, B.A. Berger, was arrested and sentenced to 5 years in prison; a similar fate befell the leading designer of the 152-mm ML-15 howitzer-gun, A.A. Ploskirev, in January of the following year.

After this, it is understandable that the developers want to use a piston valve that has already been tested and debugged in production in order to avoid possible accusations of sabotage if problems arise with its wedge-type design.

And there is one more nuance. The lighter weight of the F-25 howitzer compared to its competitors was ensured by the machine and the carriage of the 76-mm cannon. The gun was more mobile, but had a shorter service life due to a more “flimsy” carriage. It is quite natural that the 122 mm projectile gave a completely different recoil impulse than the 76 mm one. The muzzle brake, apparently, at that time did not provide adequate reduction in impulse.

It is obvious that the lighter and more mobile F-25 was preferred to the more durable and longer-lasting M-30.

By the way, we found further confirmation of this hypothesis in the fate of the M-30. We often write that structurally successful field guns were soon “transplanted” onto already used or captured chassis and continued to fight as self-propelled guns. The same fate awaited the M-30.

Parts of the M-30 were used to create the SU-122 (on the captured StuG III chassis and on the T-34 chassis). However, the cars turned out to be unsuccessful. The M-30, for all its power, turned out to be quite heavy. The cabinet installation of weapons on the SU-122 took up a lot of space in the fighting compartment of the self-propelled gun, creating significant inconvenience for the crew. The large forward reach of the anti-recoil devices with their armor made it difficult for the driver to see from the driver's seat and did not allow a full-fledged manhole for him to be placed on the front plate.

But the main thing is that the base of the medium tank was too fragile for such a powerful weapon.

The use of this system was abandoned. But the attempts did not end there. In particular, in one of the variants of the now famous airborne self-propelled gun "Violet" the M-30 was used. But they preferred the universal 120 mm gun.

The second disadvantage for the F-25 could just be its lower mass in combination with the already mentioned muzzle brake.

The lighter the weapon, the greater its chances of being used to directly support friendly forces with fire.

By the way, it was in this role that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the M-30, poorly suited for such purposes, played more than once or twice. Not from a good life, of course.

Naturally, powder gases deflected by the muzzle brake, raising dust, sand, soil particles or snow, will more easily give away the position of the F-25 compared to the M-30. And even when firing from closed positions at a short distance from the front line at a low elevation angle, the possibility of such unmasking had to be taken into account. Someone in the AU may well have taken all this into account.

Now directly about the design of the howitzer. Structurally, it consists of the following elements:

A barrel with a free pipe, a casing covering the pipe approximately to the middle, and a screw-on breech;

A piston valve that opened to the right. Closing and opening the shutter was done by turning the handle. A striking mechanism with a linearly moving firing pin, a screw mainspring and a rotating hammer was mounted in the bolt; to cock and lower the firing pin, the hammer was pulled back with a trigger cord. The spent cartridge case was ejected from the chamber when the bolt was opened using an ejector in the form of a cranked lever. There was a safety mechanism that prevented premature unlocking of the bolt during prolonged shots;

The carriage included a cradle, recoil devices, an upper machine, aiming mechanisms, a balancing mechanism, a lower machine with sliding box frames, combat travel and suspension, sighting devices and shield cover.

The cage-type cradle was placed with pins in the sockets of the upper machine.

Recoil devices included a hydraulic recoil brake (under the barrel) and a hydropneumatic knurler (above the barrel).

The upper machine was inserted with a pin into the socket of the lower machine. A pin shock absorber with springs ensured the hanging position of the upper machine relative to the lower one and facilitated its rotation. A screw rotary mechanism was mounted on the left side of the upper machine, and a sector lifting mechanism was mounted on the right side.

Combat drive - with two wheels, shoe brakes, switchable transverse leaf spring. The suspension was switched off and on automatically when the frames were moved apart and moved.

Sights included a gun-independent sight (with two shooters) and a Hertz panorama.

There are still many blank spots in the history of this legendary howitzer. The story continues. Contradictory, largely incomprehensible, but history. The brainchild of the design team under the leadership of F. F. Petrov is so harmonious that it still serves today. Moreover, it fits perfectly not only into rifle formations, but also into tank, mechanized and motorized units.

And not only our army in the past, but also at the present time. More than two dozen countries continue to have the M-30 in service. Which indicates that the weapon was more than successful.

Having taken part in almost all wars, starting with World War II, the M-30 has proven its reliability and unpretentiousness, having received the highest praise from Marshal of Artillery G. F. Odintsov: “Nothing can be better than it.”

Of course it can.

After all, all the best that was in the M-30 howitzer was embodied in the 122-mm howitzer D-30 (2A18), which became a worthy successor to the M-30. But, naturally, there will be a separate conversation about it.

We thank the administration of the Museum of Russian Military History in Padikovo for providing a copy of the howitzer.

An order was issued to develop such a weapon.

However, due to the loss of design and engineering personnel during the Civil War and subsequent devastation, the development of a new divisional howitzer on our own turned out to be impossible. It was decided to borrow advanced foreign experience to complete the task. KB-2, led by German specialists, began design work. In 1932, testing began on the first experimental model of a new howitzer, and in 1934 this weapon was put into service as “122-mm howitzer mod. 1934". It was also known as "Lubok", from the name of the theme combining two projects to create a 122 mm divisional howitzer and a 107 mm light howitzer. Barrel of a 122 mm howitzer mod. 1934 had a length of 23 calibers, the maximum elevation angle was +50°, the horizontal aiming angle was 7°, the mass in the traveling and combat position was 2800 and 2250 kg, respectively. Like the guns of the First World War, the new howitzer was mounted on a single-beam carriage (although carriages of a more modern design with sliding frames had already appeared at that time). Another significant drawback of the gun was its wheel travel (metal wheels without tires, but with suspension), which limited the towing speed to 10 km/h. The gun was produced in 1934-1935 in a small series of 11 units, of which 8 entered trial operation (two four-gun batteries), and the remaining three were sent to a training platoon for Red commanders.

According to some sources, in March 1937, at a meeting on further development Soviet artillery equipment, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal A. I. Egorov, strongly spoke out for the creation of a 122-mm howitzer. His arguments were more high power 122 mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, as well as the availability of a large number of 122 mm ammunition and production facilities for their production. Although the very fact of the marshal’s speech has not yet been confirmed by other sources, the decisive argument in the dispute could well be the experience of using Russian artillery in the First World War and Civil wars. Based on it, the 122 mm caliber was considered the minimum sufficient for the destruction of field fortifications, and in addition, it was the smallest allowing the creation of a specialized concrete-piercing projectile for it. As a result, the divisional projects of a 107-mm light howitzer and a 107-mm howitzer-gun never received support, and all the GAU’s attention was focused on the new 122-mm howitzer with a barrel group of the “Lubka” type, but on a carriage with sliding frames.

Already in September 1937, a separate design group of the Motovilikha plant under the leadership of F. F. Petrov received the task of developing such a weapon. Their project had the factory index M-30. Almost simultaneously, in October 1937, on its own initiative, but with the permission of the GAU, the design bureau of plant No. 92 (chief designer - V. G. Grabin, howitzer index F-25) took on the same work. A year later, a third design team joined them - the same task was also given to the design bureau of the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (UZTM) on September 25, 1938, on his initiative. The howitzer, designed by the UZTM Design Bureau, received the U-2 index. All designed howitzers had a modern design with sliding frames and sprung wheels.

The U-2 howitzer entered field testing on February 5, 1939. It had a 21-caliber barrel, a chamber volume of 3.0 liters, and was equipped with a muzzle brake and a horizontal wedge breech from the Lubok howitzer. The mass of the gun in firing position was 2030 kg. The gun was a duplex, since the 95-mm U-4 divisional gun was designed on the same carriage. The howitzer did not withstand the tests due to deformation of the frames that occurred during firing. Refinement of the gun was considered inappropriate, since it was inferior in ballistics to the alternative M-30 project, although it was superior to its competitor in fire accuracy.

The F-25 howitzer project was received by the GAU on February 25, 1938. The gun had a 23-caliber barrel with a muzzle brake, a chamber volume of 3.7 liters and was equipped with a horizontal wedge breech from the Lubok howitzer. The mass of the howitzer in combat position was 1830 kg, a number of its parts were unified with the F-22 divisional gun. The gun was also a duplex, since the 95-mm F-28 divisional gun was designed on the same carriage. The F-25 howitzer successfully passed factory tests, but was not sent to field tests, since on March 23, 1939, the GAU decided:

The 122-mm F-25 howitzer, developed by Plant No. 92 on its own initiative, is currently of no interest to the GAU, since field and military tests of the M-30 howitzer, more powerful than the F-25, have already been completed.

The M-30 howitzer project was received by the GAU on December 20, 1937. The gun borrowed a lot from other types of artillery weapons; in particular, the design of the barrel bore was close to a similar unit of the Lubok howitzer, and the recoil brake and limber were taken from it. Despite the GAU requirement to equip the new howitzer with a wedge breech, the M-30 was equipped with a piston breech, borrowed unchanged from the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 The wheels were taken from the F-22 cannon. The M-30 prototype was completed on March 31, 1938, but factory testing was delayed due to the need to modify the howitzer. Field tests of the howitzer took place from September 11 to November 1, 1938. Although, according to the commission's conclusion, the gun did not withstand ground tests (during the tests the frames broke twice), it was nevertheless recommended to send the gun for military trials.

Refinement of the gun was difficult. On December 22, 1938, three modified samples were submitted for military testing, which again revealed a number of shortcomings. It was recommended to modify the gun and conduct repeated field tests, and not to conduct new military tests. However, in the summer of 1939, military tests had to be repeated. Only on September 29, 1939, the M-30 was put into service under the official name “122-mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938" .

According to the famous author of books on the history of artillery A. B. Shirokorada, the F-25 was a more successful design, despite the fact that the M-30 subsequently proved itself to be excellent. In his texts, he claims that, contrary to the above decision of the GAU, these howitzers were practically no different in power (his argumentation includes the same barrel length, chamber volume and initial speed of both howitzers). However, to claim that the internal ballistics of these guns are identical, it is also necessary to know the exact characteristics of the propellant charges, since even with equal volume chambers, the density of gunpowder and the filling of the chamber with them can vary significantly. Since there is no data on this issue in available sources, this statement (which directly contradicts the official document) can be disputed. The undoubted advantages of the F-25 were almost 400 kg less weight compared to the M-30, a 10° greater horizontal guidance angle and better mobility due to greater ground clearance. In addition, the F-25 was a duplex, and if it was adopted for service, the possibility arose of creating a very successful artillery system - a duplex of a 122 mm howitzer and a 95 mm cannon. Taking into account the long development of the M-30, the F-25 could well have passed tests in 1939.

Although there is no official document detailing the advantages of the M-30 over the F-25, we can assume the following arguments that influenced final decision GAU:

• Lack of a muzzle brake, since spent powder gases deflected by the muzzle brake raise clouds of dust from the surface of the earth, which unmask the firing position. In addition to the unmasking effect, the presence of a muzzle brake leads to a higher intensity of the sound of a shot from behind the gun compared to the case when there is no muzzle brake. This to some extent worsens the operating conditions of the calculation.
• Use in construction large quantity spent nodes. In particular, the choice of a piston valve improved reliability (at that time there were great difficulties in producing wedge valves for guns of sufficiently large caliber). In anticipation of the upcoming large-scale war, the possibility of producing new howitzers using already debugged components from old guns became very important, especially taking into account the fact that almost all new types of weapons with complex mechanics created in the USSR from scratch had low reliability.
• The possibility of creating more powerful types of artillery pieces on the M-30 carriage. The F-25 carriage, borrowed from the divisional 76-mm F-22 cannon, was already at the limit of its strength properties - the 122-mm barrel group had to be equipped with a muzzle brake. This potential of the M-30 carriage was later used - it was used in the construction of the 152-mm howitzer mod. 1943 (D-1).

Production

Factory production of M-30 howitzers began in 1940. Initially, it was carried out by two plants - No. 92 (Gorky) and No. 9 (UZTM). Plant No. 92 produced the M-30 only in 1940; in total, this enterprise produced 500 howitzers.

In addition to the production of towed guns, M-30S barrels were produced for installation on SU-122 self-propelled artillery mounts (SAU).

Serial production of the gun continued until 1955. The successor to the M-30 was the 122 mm howitzer D-30, which was put into service in 1960.

Production of M-30
Year	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	Total
Manufactured, pcs.	639	2762	4240	3770	3485	2630	210	200	19 266
Year	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Manufactured, pcs.	200	250	-	300	100	100	280	100

Organizational and staffing structure

The howitzer was a divisional weapon. According to the 1939 staff, the rifle division had two artillery regiments - a light one (a division of 76-mm guns and two mixed divisions of two batteries of 122-mm howitzers and one battery of 76-mm guns in each) and a howitzer (a division of 122-mm howitzers and a division 152 mm howitzers), a total of 28 122 mm howitzers. In June 1940, another division of 122-mm howitzers was added to the howitzer regiment, making a total of 32 in the division. In July 1941, the howitzer regiment was expelled, the number of howitzers was reduced to 16. Soviet rifle divisions spent the entire war in this state. Since December 1942, the Guards Rifle Divisions had 3 divisions with 2 batteries of 76 mm cannons and one battery of 122 mm howitzers each, for a total of 12 howitzers. Since December 1944, these divisions had a howitzer artillery regiment (5 batteries), 20 122-mm howitzers. Since June 1945, rifle divisions were also transferred to this state.

In the mountain rifle divisions in 1939-1940 there was one division of 122-mm howitzers (3 batteries of 3 guns each), a total of 9 howitzers. Since 1941, a howitzer artillery regiment (2 divisions of 3 four-gun batteries each) has been introduced instead, and the number of howitzers becomes 24. Since the beginning of 1942, only one two-battery division remains, with a total of 8 howitzers. Since 1944, howitzers have been excluded from the staff of mountain rifle divisions.

The motorized division had 2 mixed divisions (a battery of 76 mm cannons and 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers each), with a total of 12 howitzers. The tank division had one division of 122 mm howitzers, 12 in total. Until August 1941, cavalry divisions had 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers, a total of 8 guns. Since August 1941, divisional artillery from the composition cavalry divisions was excluded.

Until the end of 1941, 122 mm howitzers were in rifle brigades - one battery, 4 guns.

122-mm howitzers were also part of the howitzer artillery brigades of the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) (72-84 howitzers).

Combat use

The M-30 was used for firing from closed positions at entrenched and openly located enemy personnel. It was also successfully used to destroy enemy field fortifications (trenches, dugouts, bunkers) and to make passages in wire fences when it was impossible to use mortars. M-30 battery defensive fire high-explosive fragmentation shells posed a certain threat to enemy armored vehicles. The fragments formed during the explosion were capable of penetrating armor up to 20 mm thick, which was quite enough to destroy armored personnel carriers and the sides of light tanks. For vehicles with thicker armor, shrapnel could damage chassis components, guns, and sights.

M-30 abroad

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a significant number (several hundred) of M-30s were captured by the Wehrmacht. The weapon was adopted by the Wehrmacht as a heavy howitzer. 12.2 cm s.F.H.396(r) and was actively used in battles against the Red Army. Since 1943, the Germans even launched mass production of shells for this gun (as well as a number of earlier captured Soviet howitzers of the same caliber). In 1943, 424 thousand shots were fired, in 1944 and 1945. - 696.7 thousand and 133 thousand shots, respectively. Captured M-30s were used not only on the Eastern Front, but also in the defenses of the Atlantic Wall on the northwestern coast of France. Some sources also mention the use by the Germans of M-30 howitzers to arm self-propelled guns, created on the basis of various captured French armored vehicles.

In the post-war years, the M-30 was exported to a number of countries in Asia and Africa, where it is still in service. It is known about the presence of such weapons in Syria, Egypt (accordingly, this weapon took Active participation in the Arab-Israeli wars). In turn, some of the Egyptian M-30s were captured by the Israelis. One of these captured guns is on display at the Beit Hatothan artillery museum. The M-30 was also supplied to countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland. At the Poznań Citadel Memorial, this weapon is included in the museum's weapons display. The People's Republic of China has launched its own production of the M-30 howitzer called Type 54.

The Finnish Artillery Museum in Hämeenlinna has an M-30 howitzer on display. Finnish army in 1941-1944. captured 41 guns of this type. Captured M-30s under the designation 122H/38 Finnish artillerymen used it in light and heavy field artillery. They really liked the gun; they did not find any flaws in its design. During the fighting, Finnish M-30s expended 13,298 rounds; three howitzers were lost. The Finnish M-30s remaining after the war were used as training howitzers or were in the mobilization reserve in the warehouses of the Finnish army until the mid-1980s.

In service

• USSR
• Algeria - 60 M-30, as of 2007
• Afghanistan 2007
• Bangladesh- 20 Type 54, as of 2007
• Bulgaria- 195 M-30, as of 2007
• Bolivia- 36 M-30, as of 2007
• Vietnam- a certain amount, as of 2007
• Guinea-Bissau- 18 M-30, as of 2007
• Egypt- 300 M-30, as of 2007
• Iran - 100 Type 54, as of 2007
• Yemen- 40 M-30, as of 2007
• Cambodia- a certain amount, as of 2007
• DR Congo- a certain amount, as of 2007
• Kyrgyzstan- 35 M-30, as of 2007
• China:
• DPRK 2007
• Cuba - some, as of 2007
• Laos - some, as of 2007

  

  Croatian M-30

• Lebanon- 32 M-30, as of 2007
• Macedonia- 108 M-30, as of 2007
• Moldova- 17 M-30, as of 2007
• Mongolia- a certain amount, as of 2007
• Pakistan- 490 Type 54, as of 2007
• Poland- 227 M-30, as of 2007
• Russia - 3750 M-30, as of 2007.
• Romania- 41 M-30, as of 2007
• Tanzania- 80 Type 54, as of 2007
• Ukraine- 3 M-30, as of 2007
• Croatia- 43 M-30, as of 2007
• Ethiopia- about 400 M-30, as of 2007

Modifications and prototypes based on the M-30

During production, the design of the gun as a whole did not change significantly. The following types of artillery pieces were produced on the basis of the M-30 howitzer barrel group:

Self-propelled artillery units with M-30

Self-propelled gun SU-122

The M-30 was installed on the following self-propelled guns:

Project evaluation

The M-30 was certainly a successful weapon. A group of developers led by F. F. Petrov managed to harmoniously combine in one model of artillery weapons the reliability and ease of use by personnel characteristic of old howitzers from the First World War era, and new design solutions designed to improve the mobility and firing capabilities of the gun. As a result, the Soviet divisional artillery received a modern and powerful howitzer, capable of successfully operating as part of highly mobile tank, mechanized and motorized units of the Red Army. The widespread use of the M-30 howitzer in the armies of many countries around the world and the excellent reviews of the artillerymen who worked with it serve as additional confirmation of this.

When comparing the M-30 howitzer with contemporary artillery weapons, one should keep in mind the fact that in the armies of Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States there are practically no artillery weapons close in caliber to the M-30. Howitzer artillery of the Second World War of the divisional level in the armies of the countries mentioned above used mainly 105 mm caliber; a notable but successful exception was the 25-pound English howitzer QF 25 pounder, but its caliber was even smaller and equal to 87.6 mm. Following 105 mm, the standard calibers of howitzer artillery in Western countries were 150, 152.4 and 155 mm. Accordingly, the traditional Russian (and subsequently Soviet) caliber 121.92 mm turned out to be intermediate between the calibers of light (87.6-105 mm) and heavy (150-155 mm) howitzers of other countries. Of course, howitzers of non-Russian (and non-Soviet) origin close to 122 mm caliber were used in World War II, but the vast majority of them were old guns from the First World War, for example, the 114 mm Vickers howitzer in the Finnish army.

Therefore, comparison of the M-30 with other howitzers is possible only with a similar range of combat missions to be solved and a similar organizational and staffing structure for use in the troops (samples for comparison should be guns assigned to units similar in number and organization to the Soviet rifle, motorized or tank divisions). However, even under these conditions the comparison will be to a certain extent conditional. The closest to the M-30 are the 105-mm howitzers, since guns in the 150-155 mm caliber range are much heavier in mass and firepower, and among them there is a worthy Soviet representative - the 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model (D-1 ) . The English 25-pounder clearly falls into the lighter weight category, and its comparison with the M-30 (despite the similar organizational structure of the units that operated it) would be incorrect. For a typical representative of 105-mm howitzers, you can take the German 10.5-cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18 (le.FH.18) gun with a mass of 1985 kg, an initial speed of a 15-kg projectile of 470 m/s, elevation angles from −5 to +42 °, a horizontal aiming angle of 56° and a maximum firing range of 10,675 m.

The M-30 has a maximum firing range comparable to the leFH 18 (the excess is not significant, especially since the modified le.FH.18/40 version with an initial projectile speed of 540 m/s and a maximum elevation angle of +45° had a maximum firing range of 12,325 m). Some prototypes of German 105-mm howitzers could hit targets at distances exceeding 13 km, but by their design they were already to a greater extent were cannon howitzers rather than classic short-barreled howitzers. The greater elevation angle of the M-30 made it possible to achieve better projectile trajectory steepness compared to the le.FH.18, and therefore better efficiency when firing at enemy personnel hidden in trenches and dugouts. In terms of power, a 122-mm projectile weighing about 22 kg clearly outperformed a 105-mm projectile weighing 15 kg, but the price for this was the 400 kg greater mass of the M-30 in the firing position, which negatively affected the mobility of the gun. The large mass of the M-30 howitzer also required more metal for its construction. From a technological point of view, the M-30 was a fairly advanced design - for 1941-1945. The USSR built 16,887 howitzers of this type, while Nazi Germany built 15,388 units of 105 mm le.FH.18 and le.FH.18/40 howitzers during the same period.

As a result overall rating the M-30 howitzer project will be approximately as follows: this weapon was the Soviet implementation of a common one for the mid-1930s. the concept of a mobile field howitzer on a carriage with sliding frames and sprung wheels. In terms of firing range, it was on a par with the most common 105-mm howitzers of other countries (some of them it was superior to, some inferior to others), but its main advantages were the reliability traditional for Soviet guns, manufacturability in production and greater firepower compared to 105 mm howitzers.

The emotional assessment of the M-30 howitzer based on the results of its combat use by Soviet artillerymen, given by Marshal G. F. Odintsov, is also known: “Nothing could be better than her” .

Description of design

The M-30 howitzer had a fairly modern design for its time, with a carriage with sliding frames and a sprung wheel drive. The barrel was a prefabricated structure consisting of a pipe, a casing and a screw-on breech with a bolt. The M-30 was equipped with a single-stroke piston bolt, a hydraulic recoil brake, a hydropneumatic knurler, and had separate cartridge loading. The bolt has a mechanism for forced extraction of the spent cartridge case when it is opened after a shot. The descent is made by pressing the trigger on the trigger cord.

The gun was equipped with a Hertz artillery panorama for firing from closed positions; the same sight was also used for direct fire.

Characteristics and properties of ammunition

The M-30 fired a full range of 122mm howitzer shells, including a variety of old Russian and imported grenades. After the Great Patriotic War, new types of ammunition were added to the range of projectiles listed below, for example, the 3BP1 cumulative projectile.

The 53-OF-462 steel high-explosive fragmentation grenade, when the fuse was set to fragmentation action, when it exploded, created about 1000 lethal fragments, the effective radius of destruction of manpower was about 30 m (data obtained using the Soviet measurement method of the mid-20th century). When the fuse was set to the high-explosive action of the grenade, after the explosion it left craters up to 1 m deep and up to 3 m in diameter.

The 53-BP-460A cumulative projectile penetrated armor up to 100-160 mm thick at an angle of 90° (in different sources different data are given). The target firing range for a moving tank is up to 400 m. The post-war 3BP1 cumulative projectile penetrated at an angle of 90° - 200 mm, 60° - 160 mm, 30° - 80 mm.

Ammunition nomenclature
Type	GAU Index	Projectile weight, kg	Explosive weight, kg	Initial speed, m/s (at full charge)	Table range, m
HEAT shells
Cumulative (in service since May 1943)	53-BP-460A			335 (on charge no. 4)	2000
High-explosive fragmentation shells
Steel high explosive fragmentation grenade	53-OF-462	21,76	3,67	515	11 720
Steel cast iron fragmentation grenade with screw head	53-О-462А	21,7		458	10 800
Steel cast iron fragmentation grenade	53-О-460А
Old grenade	53-F-460
Old grenade	53-F-460N
Old grenade	53-F-460U
Old grenade	53-F-460K
Shrapnel
Shrapnel with tube 45 sec.	53-Sh-460
Shrapnel with T-6 tube	53-Sh-460T
Lighting shells
Lighting	53-С-462		-	479	8500
Propaganda shells
Propaganda	53-A-462			431	8000
Smoke shells
Smoke steel	53-D-462	22,3		515	11 800
Smoke steel cast iron	53-D-462A			515	11 800
Chemical shells
Fragmentation-chemical	53-OX-462			515	11 800
Chemical	53-X-462	21,8	-
Chemical	53-X-460		-

Interesting facts about the M-30

• In the film “Soldier Ivan Brovkin” the part in which he serves main character, armed specifically with M-30 howitzers. The work of the crew when firing and servicing the gun is well shown.

Where can you see

Due to the large number of guns produced, M-30 howitzers very often end up on display in military museums or are used as memorial weapons. In Moscow, it can be seen in the Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaya Hill, in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces and near the building of the Ministry of Defense. In St. Petersburg - in the Museum of Artillery and Engineering Troops, in Sevastopol - in the Museum of the Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol on Sapun Mountain (the Sevastopol exhibit was made in 1942, by August 21, 1958 the howitzer fired 1380 shots), in Bryansk - on display military equipment in the “Partisan Glade”, as well as as a weapon-monument to the “Artillerymen”, in Verkhnyaya Pyshma (Sverdlovsk region) - in the museum “Military Glory of the Urals”, in Tolyatti - in the Technical Museum, in Perm - in the museum of Motovilikha Plants. Nizhny Novgorod, where Plant No. 92, which produced the M-30 in 1940, is located, until recently did not have this howitzer either in city museums or as a monument weapon. However, in 2004, a new memorial complex was opened on Marshal Zhukov Square, where the M-30 was installed as a monument weapon. Along with other exhibits (BTR-60, ZiS-3 and D-44 guns), it enjoys constant interest from children (since the memorial is located inside a large residential area next to a children's clinic). In Finland, this weapon is exhibited in the artillery museum in Hämeenlinna, in Poland - in the Poznan Citadel, in Israel - in the artillery museum Beit Hatothan, in Kazakhstan - in the Museum of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana). Two guns adorn the facade of the Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) Suvorov Military School. One gun manufactured in 1943 is installed in the Glory Square in Novosibirsk.

M-30 in computer games

Unlike tanks, a variety of artillery weapon models are found in a very limited number of computer games. One such game is the turn-based strategy game Panzer General III. In its edition of “Scorched Earth”, where the action takes place on the Eastern Front, the player can equip Soviet artillery units with the M-30 howitzer (in the game it is simply called “12.2 cm”). There it has been available to the player since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but has become obsolete since mid-1943, after the appearance of the ML-20 howitzer-cannon, which is very much untrue - the production of both of these guns and the acquisition of new parts with them continued throughout the war.

The M-30 can also be seen in Russian games, in particular, in the real-time strategies “Blitzkrieg”, “Stalingrad” and “Sudden Strike” (“Confrontation 4”, “Confrontation. Asia on Fire”) “Behind Enemy Lines 2: Assault " It is worth noting that the reflection of the features of using the M-30 in these games is also far from reality.

Literature

	122 mm howitzer model 1938 (M-30) on Wikimedia Commons

• Shirokorad A. B. Encyclopedia of domestic artillery. - Mn. : Harvest, 2000. - 1156 pp.: ill. With. - ISBN 985-433-703-0
• Shirokorad A. B. God of War of the Third Reich. - M.: AST, 2002. - 576 pp.: 32 l. ill. With. - ISBN 5-17-015302-3
• Shirokorad A. B. The genius of Soviet artillery. - M.: AST, 2002. - 432 p.: 24 l. ill. With. - ISBN 5-17-013066-X
• Ivanov A. USSR artillery in World War II. - St. Petersburg. : Neva, 2003. - 64 p. - ISBN 5-7654-2731-6
• Shunkov V. N. Weapons of the Red Army. - Mn. : Harvest, 1999. - 544 p. - ISBN 985-433-469-4
• Zheltov I. G., Pavlov I. V., Pavlov M. V., Solyankin A. G. Soviet medium self-propelled artillery mounts 1941-1945. - M.: Eksprint, 2005. - 48 p. -

122-mm howitzer M-30 in historical retrospective

Anatoly Sorokin

Service and combat use

Before a detailed consideration of the aspects of the service and combat use of the M-30 in the Red Army, we present an excerpt from the “Divisional Artillery Battery Commander’s Handbook,” released in 1942. In this publication, the main tasks facing 122 mm howitzers are summarized in the following list:

"1. destruction of enemy personnel both in open areas and behind cover;

2. suppression and destruction of infantry fire weapons;

3. destruction of field-type structures;

4. fight against enemy artillery and motorized vehicles.”

The main projectile of howitzers is a high-explosive fragmentation grenade. This grenade can also be used to shoot at tanks. Therefore, in addition to the tasks listed above, 122-mm howitzers are also tasked with combating enemy tanks and armored vehicles. For shooting at enemy personnel, the most effective means is shrapnel. In addition, the howitzers’ ammunition includes glow and smoke grenades.”

In general, this was consistent with previous views on the use of divisional howitzers (the mention of smoke and lighting shells indicated the preservation of “special tasks”), but experience was also taken into account initial period Great Patriotic War.

We have already provided assessments of the success of using the 122-mm M-30 howitzer in the Red and Soviet Army. Yes, and in the Armed Forces Russian Federation it is still used for training purposes, not to mention a number of countries where guns of this type are still in service. We can only briefly summarize the four most important aspects of the service system in the Red Army. These include ammunition, means of propulsion, the necessary measuring and reconnaissance equipment, and tactically and technically competent personnel in the operating units. History shows that at least for the first three positions the situation was not so bad from the very beginning, and for the last position the situation was corrected during the Great Patriotic War and after it.

122-mm long-range howitzer ammunition has been produced by industry in large quantities since the modernization of howitzers of this caliber of the old design. They could also be used by the 122 mm A-19 gun. In addition, there were significant stocks of old high-explosive grenades and shrapnel. Although the latter has largely lost its significance, in a number of cases it could still be effective, acting against openly located enemy manpower, and also be used when installing a tube “on buckshot” in the self-defense of guns from massive attacks by his infantry and cavalry. Naturally, with the adoption of the M-30, another reason appeared to continue their production and improvement. In 1941, steel cast iron fragmentation grenades 0-462 were introduced into its ammunition (it was from this year that they were mentioned in firing tables), and the following year they began to develop a 122-mm cumulative projectile. On the development of ammunition for the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 has already been mentioned, but here we will focus only on the quantitative indicators of their release.

The ZIS-Zb all-terrain vehicle tows a 122-mm M-ZO howitzer with an artillery limber. February 1941

The 122-mm M-30 howitzer with an artillery limber is prepared for towing by car.

As of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 6,561 thousand howitzer rounds of all types, of which 2,482 thousand were lost after the start of the war until January 1, 1942. However, the industry managed to compensate for the losses by firing 3,423 thousand howitzer rounds during this period. But this was not enough to compensate not only for losses, but also for the consumption of ammunition in battles (1,782 thousand pieces). As a result, the number of 122-mm howitzer rounds of all types decreased to 2,402 thousand pieces. as of January 1, 1942. During 1942, consumption increased significantly (4,306 thousand units), but losses decreased by an order of magnitude (166 thousand units) and 4,571 thousand howitzer rounds were received from factories. This was a positive development, since the industry was already able to provide the army with the necessary amount of ammunition for 122 mm howitzers. Subsequently, the production of the latter only increased and in 1944 amounted to 8538 thousand rounds, which was almost a million more than the number of shells spent in battle (7610 thousand units) during the reporting period. The main thing is that 122-mm howitzers did not experience “ammunition starvation,” unlike a number of other artillery systems. However, according to A.V. Isaev, the enemy’s consumption of 105-mm howitzer shells was several times (4–5 times, depending on the year) greater than that of domestic 122-mm howitzers. Moreover, it even slightly exceeded the total fire of the divisional 122 mm howitzers and 76 mm guns.

The lack of specialized means of traction for artillery at all levels of subordination was a headache for the GAU leadership throughout the war years. The artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), which also used M-30s, was relatively tolerable in this regard, but even there it was necessary to use national economic tractors and trucks due to the lack of suitable tractors.

As for the primary “recipient” of the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 - divisional artillery, then for it the GAU initially considered horse-drawn artillery to be the main means of traction. The guns were equipped with limbers and charging boxes, which, although allowed for mechanical traction, was generally redundant. Horse traction had its own advantages, and in some cases it could even be more advantageous than mechanical traction. But it was not at all suitable for mechanized units and formations intended for maneuverable combat operations. In addition, horses suffered from high vulnerability to any type of enemy weapon and, most importantly, were a difficult-to-replenish resource. The truck in this regard also did not look the best, but not all hits from rifle bullets and small fragments led to the loss of traction functionality, and supplies from the domestic industry and Lend-Lease, together with the use of captured automotive equipment, made it possible to compensate for the losses.

The optimal solution could be a light and fast tracked tractor (especially with bulletproof armor for the most critical parts), but for divisional artillery it remained largely a dream until the end of the war. The Yaroslavl I-12 machine was somewhat close to it, but its production volumes were small.

Therefore, the use of various types of trucks as artillery tractors was widely practiced. The mass-produced domestic ZIS-5, in terms of its characteristics, was suitable for transporting divisional guns on roads - the weight of the trailer allowed in such conditions was 3.5 tons. In off-road conditions it was worse, but Lend-Lease supplies played a big role here: three-axle all-wheel drive General Motors The CCKW-353 and Studebaker US6 could tow division artillery howitzers (carrying crews and ammunition at the same time), although with some restrictions. Naturally, tractors such as Komintern, S-2 or national economic tractors could be used with the M-30 different types, however, in this case one of the main advantages of the gun was lost - the ability to transport it at high speed (up to 50 km/h) along a hard-surface road.

Damaged STZ-5-NATI tractor with a 122 mm M-30 howitzer with an artillery limber. Summer 1941

M-30 howitzer, abandoned during the retreat of Soviet troops in the summer of 1941.

Artillery limber for the M-30 howitzer. Right: Rear view with door open.

The LO-5 ski mount was intended to provide the ability to tow the M-30 howitzer behind a tracked tractor in deep snow or in marshy areas.

Artillery limber for the M-30 howitzer for horse traction.

Placing a pick-hoe, bucket and ax on the front end of the M-30 howitzer.

With supplies from domestic industry and Lend-Lease, the problem of equipping all artillery of the Red Army with means of observation, measurement, technical reconnaissance and communications was generally solved. Firing techniques were improved and the data in the shooting tables was clarified. Suffice it to say that in 1943 their fifth edition was published! Since the author is an artillery calculator by his military specialty, the nomenclature and content of the firing tables published at that time are of considerable interest to him in terms of what fire control was like in units armed with the M-30.

To begin with, the shooting tables were printed in two versions - full and short. The first of them provided, in principle, all the same information as in modern publications the same type for artillery systems currently in service. But the brief shooting tables lacked a lot of information that required a high degree of preparation - there were no corrections for elevation angle, auxiliary tables such as the decomposition of ballistic wind into components, information about ammunition, and the main part was given in a very compressed form. Instead of fairly detailed charge selection tables for various conditions shooting, in a brief version, only a general nomogram was given for solving this problem.

It can be assumed that the complete firing tables were intended for the artillery of the RVGK and the most “advanced” division officers, who could boast of having reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, as well as competent personnel. Brief tables firing was apparently required for hastily trained wartime artillerymen at the division level of the Army hierarchy, who found it difficult or impossible to use the full fire data preparation method. And, guided by the phrase “personnel decide everything,” you can smoothly move from the “supply, technical and management” aspects of the service to the personal ones.

In the second and third periods of the war, the 122-mm M-30 howitzers remained the most powerful weapon of divisional artillery and proved themselves excellent both in the “classical” application (mounted shooting in field battles) and in direct fire in street battles.

For towing the M-30 howitzer, American all-wheel drive vehicles supplied under Lend-Lease turned out to be indispensable.

122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 entered the army at a very alarming time for the USSR. The Second World War has already begun in Europe, and the threat of our country being drawn into it has become more than likely. Accordingly, there was a need to sharply increase the number of the Red Army and train the required number of specialists for various branches of the military. All responsibility for organizing the competent tactical use of artillery then fell on the officers - commanders of batteries, divisions and regiments. They were required, in addition to the excellent physical training and discipline traditional for the army, to have a good knowledge of mathematics, including higher mathematics, topography, and preferably also a number of applied branches of physics and chemistry. It is clear that future commanders from non-cadre mass mobilization personnel could only obtain this knowledge in secondary and higher civilian schools. An 18-year-old conscript or volunteer in 1940 entered school around 1929, when the situation in domestic education was still characterized by one word - “ruin.” And even then it was good if a potential artilleryman completed ten grades, because many teenagers then limited themselves to seven years and then went to work in industry or agriculture. Few working-class families, especially outside Moscow or Leningrad, could afford a student. Seven then-classes for correct use weapons such as the M-30 (with full disclosure of all capabilities) were clearly lacking: at best, with such a knowledge base, it was only possible to passably master direct fire shooting*.

Therefore, oddly enough, at first the M-30s were better suited for the artillery of the RVGK, since they had the opportunity to massively use these howitzers with fewer trained personnel and technical means of observation and reconnaissance per gun. It is possible that more powerful systems would be desirable there instead of the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938, but there were also problems with the volume of production of heavy guns. Nevertheless, the ability to concentrate the fire of numerous 122-mm RVGK artillery guns, including M-30 howitzers, in narrow breakthrough areas was very important in the success of the offensive operations of 1944–1945. According to the recollections of a number of enemy military leaders, for example F. von Mellenthin, such a concentration of artillery, together with its low mobility (according to the German general), sometimes led to the complete collapse of German flank counterattacks at the base of the “wedge” of Soviet advancing forces. But you have to pay for everything, and the work of G.F. Krivosheev and his colleagues mentions the fact that the concentration and active use of artillery in the last two years of the war led to an inevitable increase in its losses. For 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 is perhaps of particular significance. With almost the same power of a high-explosive fragmentation grenade in comparison with another 122-mm system in the ranks of the RVGK artillery - the A-19 gun - the M-30 needed to be located much closer to the front line due to its almost half the firing range. This made it much easier for the enemy to counter-battery fire; he also had a chance to “catch” 122-mm howitzers on the march while changing firing positions caused by the need to move forward to provide fire support for his troops. The much longer-range A-19 guns could accomplish this task while remaining in their original position.

[* In combat conditions, direct fire shooting from 122 mm howitzers was practiced more widely than expected - not only for shooting at tanks and armored vehicles, but also for destroying and suppressing bunkers and bunkers. This made it possible to solve the problem faster and with less ammunition consumption, but sharply increased the vulnerability of the crews. It is no coincidence that it was noted that “for firing at bunkers, a 122 mm caliber is not necessary, since this task is successfully accomplished by 76 mm guns” (Colonel D.S. Zrazhevsky, “Artillery Journal”, No. 4, 1943). Direct fire from 122-mm howitzers was practiced especially extensively in street battles.]

Captured Soviet M-30 howitzers were readily used by Wehrmacht artillerymen under the designation 12.2 cm s.FH. 396(r).

British soldiers inspect guns captured from the Germans in France. Among them are M-30 howitzers.

The crew of the howitzer prepares it for battle in position. From the post-war service of the M-30.

After the war, M-30 howitzers were in service with the armies of countries for a long time Warsaw Pact. This implement is equipped with truck tires.

As for the divisional level, not only before the war, but also in its first phase, things were not in the best way, and this is a rather diplomatic expression. During personal correspondence with M.N. Svirin, whose father served in the divisional artillery during the Great Patriotic War, the author of this article was very surprised to learn that in his battery only four people (besides the commander) had knowledge of mathematics corresponding to today's 9th grade and the then ten-year-old. And this battery was considered the best in the regiment. The use of logarithms in calculations was considered " aerobatics" And M-30 or 122-mm howitzers of old types were fired at direct fire in approximately a third of cases. In addition to the objective reasons for such use (the small depth of the division’s combat formations, difficulties with organizing communications and ammunition supply, frequent access to the firing positions of enemy tanks and infantry, fighting in dense buildings, etc.), the lack of competent personnel also played a certain role in this. Accordingly, the losses of divisional 122-mm howitzers, both in absolute and relative terms, turned out to be significantly higher compared to guns at higher levels of the army hierarchy.

In the first volume of the work “Artillery in offensive operations Great Patriotic War,” published in 1964, the following features of artillery and rifle training of divisional artillery on the eve of the war are given: according to the results of firing training conducted in 1939–1941, the visual method of preparing initial installations was used in 51–67% of cases; in 85–90 cases out of a hundred, shooting was carried out based on the observation of signs of explosions; “lower training” of commanders of secondary formations was noted.

A very useful source of information is the book “Artillery”, published in 1953. It gives an example of typical combat operation of the 122 mm M-30 howitzer from indirect firing positions. Here the main method is sighting, and the observation device is binoculars or a stereo scope. Sound meters, processing of aerial photography results, accurate calculations for the method of complete preparation of fire data and other things usual for today's artilleryman are mentioned only for heavy systems at the army level of subordination or units of the RVGK, and only due to the need to save expensive shells. For comparison: in the staff of an artillery regiment of a German tank or infantry division, all this was provided for, and in the Third Reich, among conscripts or reservists there were enough people with the necessary level of education to train artillery specialists.

But towards the end of the war, the situation began to improve, as the understanding came that it was people who fought, and successes or defeats on the battlefield were determined by their level of professionalism. A graduate of an artillery school in 1944, aged 18–23, with a good knowledge of mathematics and topography, was no longer a rarity: before conscription or voluntary enlistment in the army, he was a junior student or schoolboy with good or excellent grades in subjects relevant to artillery. In the post-war period, the situation in this regard has already completely normalized. Also, in order to disseminate the experience gained in battles, front-line printing houses printed information sheets and manuals describing technical, computing and tactical innovations that were successfully applied by artillerymen in practice.

Thus, the potential of the M-30 howitzer in 1940–1945. was not fully disclosed. Towards the end of the war, significant progress was made in this matter, but its partial implementation turned out to be so successful that it became the basis for the phrases of Marshal G.F. quoted in the introduction to the article. Odintsov and the opinions of historian Ian Hogg. The M-30 was exceptionally suitable for service in the post-war Soviet Army, and it also became a step in the training of artillerymen for later and more advanced systems, which, due to their high cost and complexity, are difficult to entrust to inexperienced military personnel. All this characterizes the work done by F.F. Petrov and his employees work only from the best side. Former enemies and allies who used the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938, often under other names (for example, the German designation - 12.2 cm schwere Feldhaubitze 396 (g) or Finnish - 122 N/38), this weapon was also highly rated.

A battery of M-30 howitzers with tracked tractors on the march. Howitzers are on a trailer on the AT-L light tractor and semi-armored AT-P. The use of tractor-transporters made it possible to eliminate the front end. Howitzers are on tires with spongy rubber.

An American GMC CCKW 352 truck is towing an M2A1 howitzer.

Foreign analogues

Comparison technical characteristics- a thankless thing, since the effectiveness of the use of artillery systems rarely depends only on them. First of all, it is determined by the training of the artillerymen; when assessing it, one should not neglect the issues of quality and supply of ammunition, as well as external conditions such as the state of the atmosphere in a particular combat episode. But the comparison tactical and technical characteristics may be useful in the sense that it still gives an idea of ​​what type of weapon turned out to be optimal in the armed forces or for the industry of a particular country.

By and large, the 122-mm M-30 howitzer, according to its data, finds itself in a separate category of field howitzer artillery of the World War II era, which the author would call “medium.” Into a light group of these similar design features systems on carriages with sliding frames include numerous 105-mm guns from other countries, and the heavy ones include samples in the caliber range 149–155 mm. It just so happened that from the very beginning, the military of the Russian Empire preferred a heavier and more powerful version of the 122 mm caliber field howitzer, and the successful experience of combat use of such weapons led to continuity in their development already in Soviet times. A light domestic howitzer of 107 mm caliber, which would be fully consistent with its foreign counterparts, was considered before the war only in the guise of a specialized mountain weapon. Therefore, on the battlefields of 1939–1953. in divisional artillery, the “medium” M-30 took the place of 105-mm systems in the armies of other countries (with the exception of Great Britain, where a 25-pound howitzer gun of 87.6 mm caliber was preferred for this purpose).

The tactical and technical characteristics of the 105-mm “rivals” M-30 are given in the table. It does not include the small-scale French howitzer model 1935B produced by the Bourges Arsenal of this caliber, since its production was completed before the surrender of the Third Republic to the Third Reich. The M-30 was used with the other guns mentioned in the table in battles of World War II and the Korean War. Obviously, with a much more powerful projectile, the M-30 was practically not inferior to its peers in firing range. Only the German modernized versions of le.FH.18 managed to surpass it in this indicator, and even then not by much. Moreover, with a barrel length of 28 calibers, in Soviet terminology they were closer to cannon howitzers than to classic howitzers. Only the American M2A1 howitzer had the ability to fire mortars. In terms of mobility, the brainchild of F.F. Petrova also looks decent, despite the large mass in the combat position. Naturally, with lighter ammunition and wedge bolts, the 105-mm systems are somewhat superior to the M-30 in maximum rate of fire. In terms of service life and geographic coverage, the M-30 paired with the Chinese Type 54 clone far surpassed its closest rival - the American 105-mm howitzer M2A1 (later redesignated M101), which also earned great respect from its users.

122-mm M-30 howitzer with the wheel drive replaced during repairs in the post-war period.

An original demonstration by the Chinese People's Liberation Army - tanks and ground artillery guns fire from the deck of a ship. In the foreground is a 122 mm Type 54 (or Type 54-1) howitzer.

Japanese 105 mm howitzer "Type 91" for mechanical traction.

Abandoned 105 mm light field howitzer le.FH.18. Winter 1941–1942

Tactical and technical characteristics of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer and foreign analogues

Feature/System	M-30	10.5 cm le.FH.18	10.5 cm le.FH. 18M	10.5 cm le.FH. 18/40	105mm M2A1	Type 91
State	USSR	Germany	Germany	Germany	USA	Japan
Years of development	1937–1938	1928–1929	1941	1942	1920–1940	1927–1931
Years of production	1940–1955	1935–1945	1942–1945	1943–1945	1941–1953	1931–1945
Built, units	19266	11831	10265	10200	1100
Weight in firing position, kg	2450	1985	2040	1900	2260	1500
Weight in stowed position, kg	3100	3490	3540	?	?	1979
Caliber, mm	121,92	105
Barrel length, club	22,7	28	22	24
Model of HE grenade (projectile)	OF-462	10.5-cm-SprGr	M1	?
Weight of HE grenade (projectile), kg	21,78	14,81	14,97	15,7
Max. initial speed, m/s	515	470	540	472	546
Muzzle energy, MJ	2,9	1,6	2,2	1,7	2,3
Max. range, m	11800	10675	12325	11160*	10770
Max. fire rate, rds/min	5-6	6-8
Vertical aiming angles, degrees.	- 3…+63.5	- 5…+42	- 5..	+45	- 1…+65	- 5…+45
Sector horizon, interference, hail.	49	56	46	40

* Firing range in the USA was determined using different normal conditions(temperature, Atmosphere pressure etc.) than in the USSR, Germany or Great Britain, therefore, other things being equal, this indicator for American guns is overestimated relative to analogues from the mentioned countries.

122-mm howitzer M-30 manufacturer. No. 4861, produced in 1942, in Nizhny Novgorod’s Victory Park.

Installation of lighting equipment on the gun shield (side light and brake light) during post-war repairs.

Comparative characteristics of high-explosive fragmentation shells of field howitzers

Projectile	OF-462	10.5-cm-SprGr	M1	Mk 16	Schneider's "Normal"
A country	USSR	Germany	USA	Great Britain	France
Caliber, mm	122	105	105	114	105
Projectile weight, kg	21,78	14,81	14,97	15,87	15,5
Weight of explosive charge, kg	3.67 (TNT)	1.4 (TNT)	2.18 (TNT)	1.95 (TNT or ammotol)	2.61 (TNT)
Filling factor	0,17	0,09	0,15	0,12	0,17

Afterword

To summarize, it can be noted that there are still many questions left in the history of the M-30 howitzer. It is too early to put an end to its last page, and the author hopes that a detailed monograph about this weapon will appear, where it will be possible to find answers to questions that arose during the work on this article. To accurately formulate the problem along the search path is to take the first step in solving it. If this article turned out to be useful in this regard, then the author will consider his task completed.

Photo from the archive of M. Grif.

Applications

1. Nomenclature of ammunition for 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)

The nomenclature of shells is given according to the status set out in the service manual published in 1948 and in the fifth updated edition of firing tables No. 146 and 146/140D 1943 with the addition of the BP-463 cumulative projectile, which was adopted for service after 1948. For reasons of secrecy, information about chemical shells of the OX-462, X-462 and X-460 types was not provided in these books. The gun could also fire old high-explosive grenades and shrapnel of the 460 family. However, in the above-mentioned firing tables, information about firing with old ammunition was no longer available, although the official naming of high-explosive fragmentation and fragmentation grenades of the 462nd family “long-range” remained a kind of reminder of them. The 1948 and later editions of the service manual omit this adjective. In addition, some types of shells from the 122 mm caliber ammunition directory for howitzer artillery are listed in the firing tables, but are not in the service manual and vice versa.

Type	Designation	Projectile weight, kg	Explosive mass, kg	Initial speed, m/s	Table range, m
HEAT projectile	BP-460A	13,4	?	335 (charge No. 4)	2000
HEAT projectile 1 2	BP-463	?	?	570(full charge)	?
High explosive steel howitzer grenade	OF-462	21,71–21,79	3,675	515 (full charge)	11800
Steel cast iron fragmentation howitzer grenade with screw head	0-462A	21,71–21,79	3,000	458 (charge No. 1)	10700
Solid-body fragmentation howitzer grenade made of steel cast iron.	0-460A	?	?	515 (full charge)	11 800
Smoke steel howitzer shell	D-462	22,32–22,37	0,155/3,600	515 (full charge)	11 800
Steel cast iron smoke howitzer shell 1	D-462A	?	?	458 (charge No. 1)	10 700
Lighting projectile 2	S-462	22,30	0,100	479 (full charge)	8 500
Propaganda shell 2	A-462	21,50	0,100	431(first charge)	8 000

1 The 1943 edition is not mentioned in the Shooting Tables.

2 The Service Manual does not mention the 1948 edition.

2. Armor penetration tables for the 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)

The armor penetration of 122-mm howitzer cumulative shells is not indicated in the service manual and firing tables published during the war or a short time after it. Other sources provide values ​​with a fairly large scatter. Therefore, the author provides estimated calculated data based on the general penetration properties of this type of Soviet ammunition of various generations. The first Soviet cumulative shells, developed in 1942, penetrated armor thicknesses of about their caliber, and adopted into service in the 1950s. - about one and a half of its calibers.

Armor penetration table for 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)

The given data were calculated taking into account the conditions of the Soviet methodology for determining penetration ability. It should be remembered that penetration rates can vary noticeably when using different batches of shells and different armor manufacturing technologies.

Availability of 122 mm howitzers in the troops

Number of guns Date	22.VI.1941	1.1.1942	1.1.1943	1.1.1944	1.1.1945	10.V.1945
All types, thousand pcs.	8,1	4,0	7,0	10,2	12,1	11,7
M-30, thousand units	1,7	2,3	5,6	8,9	11,4	11,0
M-30, share of the total, %	21	58	80	87	94	94

Ammunition consumption of 122 mm howitzers

1 According to the book “Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.”

2 Consumption of ammunition for Soviet artillery in 1942 - TsAMO, F. 81, on. 12075, no. 28. Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/1718/1718985.htm).

3 Consumption of ammunition for Soviet artillery in 1943 Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/2/archive/1706/1706490.htm).

4 Consumption of ammunition for Soviet artillery in 1944–1945. Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http:// vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/arhprint/1733134).

5 Proportional to the share of M-30s from the total number of 122 mm howitzers.

3. Availability in the troops, ammunition consumption and losses of 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30)

In the available statistics, data on all types of 122-mm howitzers are combined into one group, so their isolation for the M-30 is calculated based on the losses of guns of all types and the receipt of only new M-30s from industrial plants. It should be borne in mind that due to the rounded values ​​of losses, availability and supply of guns in the initial data and addition and subtraction operations in the calculations, the initial absolute error of 0.05 thousand pieces. triples. The resulting number of M-30s in the troops has an absolute error of 0.15 thousand units, the corresponding relative error determines the possible spread in the number of lost guns and ammunition consumption.

It should be borne in mind that information about the presence of 122-mm howitzers in the Red Army is not the same in different sources of information. The tables on the left are compiled according to those given in the work of G.F. Krivosheev data. However, in the book “Artillery in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War” similar figures are noticeably lower (see the corresponding table).

During 1945, Plant No. 9 delivered 2,630 howitzers, of which by May 10, 1945, only about 300 guns had reached the troops. By the end of the year, the Red Army should have had about 14.0 thousand units at its disposal. 122-mm howitzers, 13.3 thousand of which (95%) were M-30, if you do not take into account the decommissioning of old types of guns and the transfer of some M-30 to other states.

Losses of 122 mm howitzers

1 5952, according to the book “Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.”

2 1522, according to the same source.

3 Proportional to the share of M-30s from the total number of 122 mm howitzers.

4. Ammunition for 122 mm divisional howitzers 1

	Main projectile mass, kg	Shot weight, kg	Number of shots, ammunition	The amount of ammunition that fits in a 16.5-ton wagon
122 mm howitzer mod. 1910/30	21,8	24,9	80	500
122 mm howitzer mod. 1938	21,8	27,1	80	480

Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. In 2 vols.-M.: Voenizdat, 1964.

5. The work “Artillery in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War” (1964–1965) provides figures for the receipt of 122-mm howitzers and howitzer ammunition from industry during the Great Patriotic War by month:

Year	1941
Month	Available on 06/22/41	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
122 mm howitzers, pcs.	7923	240	314	320	325	308	349
	6561	288	497	479	350	135	873

Year	1942
Month	Jan.	Feb.	March	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
122 mm howitzers, pcs.	77	299	604	321	380	381	408	430	420	420	420	345
122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs.	379	216	238	131	121	132	120	328	285	339	383	351

Year	1943
Month	Jan.	Feb.	March	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
122 mm howitzers, pcs.	130	308	282	330	350	350	370	330	330	330	330	330
122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs.	253	345	354	274	369	386	403	547	647	693	685	700

Year	1944
Month	Jan.	Feb.	March	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
122 mm howitzers, pcs.	305	310	310	300	305	310	285	285	265	265	265	280
122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs.	707	656	695	710	685	720	690	690	765	755	655	805

Year	1945
Month	Jan.	Feb.	March	Apr.	Available as of 05/01/45
122 mm howitzers, pcs.	300	320	350	360	9940 1
122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs.	840	870	913	1000

1 - Of these: as part of the artillery of divisions and brigades - 6544, corps artillery - 73, artillery of the RVGK - 3323 pieces.

Literature

1. 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 Service Manual. - M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 1948.

2. Directory of the commander of a battery of divisional artillery. Material and ammunition. - M.: Military publishing house. People's Commissariat of Defense, 1942.

3. Firing tables for 122 mm howitzers mod. 1938 TS/GAUKA No. 146i 146/140D. Ed. 5, additional-M.: Military edition. People's Commissariat of Defense, 1943.

4. 152 mm howitzer mod. 1943 Service Manual. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1958.

5. Firing tables for 152 mm howitzers mod. 1943 TS/GRAU No. 155. Ed. 6. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1968.

6. 122 mm howitzer D-30 (2A18). Technical description and instruction manual. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1972.

7. Firing tables for the 122-mm howitzer D-30. TS No. 145. Ed. 4. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1981.

8. Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. In 2 volumes - M.: Voenizdat, 1964.

9. Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. - Moscow-Tula, ed. GAU, 1977.

10. Ivanov A. Artillery of the USSR in the Second World War. - St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003. - 64 p.

11. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Statistical research / Ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - 608 p.

12. Kolomiets M.V. KV. "Klim Voroshilov" - breakthrough tank. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2006. - 136 p.

13. Kolomiets M.V. Captured tanks of the Red Army. - M.: Eksmo, 2010.

14. Nikiforov N.N., Turkin P.I., Zherebtsov A.A., Galienko S.G. Artillery / Under the general. ed. Chistyakova M.N. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1953.

15. Svirin M. N. Tank power of the USSR. - M.: Eksmo, Yauza, 2008.

16. Svirin M.N. Self-propelled guns of Stalin. History of the Soviet self-propelled guns 1919–1945. - M.: Eksmo, 2008.

17. Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. Soviet medium self-propelled artillery installations 1941–1945. - M.: LLC Publishing Center "Exprint", 2005. - 48 p.

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