Soviet lunar program. How the USSR covered the landing of man on the moon

These photographic materials are some of the remaining evidence today that the USSR also tried to land a man on the Moon - obviously, after they could not do this, or, more precisely, did not have time to do it, the program was forgotten.

However, fortunately, few things disappear irrevocably and without a trace. The photographs that we can see show one of the laboratories of the Moscow Aviation Institute, as well as aerospace equipment, including a spacecraft and a lunar landing module.

The “Moon Race” is well known to many contemporaries: before American President John Kennedy initiated the launch of the Apollo program, the Soviet Union was noticeably ahead of the United States in matters of lunar exploration. In particular, in 1959 the automatic interplanetary station “Luna-2” was delivered to the surface of the Moon, and in 1966 a Soviet satellite entered its orbit.

Like the Americans, Soviet scientists developed a multi-step approach to accomplishing the task. They also had two separate modules for orbit and landing.

While the Apollo 11 crew included three members, the entire burden of the Soviet lunar program had to rest on the shoulders of one cosmonaut - thus, the weight of the equipment was significantly reduced. In addition, there were other differences that made the Soviet apparatus lighter. First of all, these include the comparative simplicity of the design, the use of the same engine for landing and takeoff, as well as the lack of a direct connection between the orbital and lunar module. This meant that the astronaut would need to do a spacewalk to transfer to the lander before landing and, later, to climb back into the orbital module after returning from the Moon. After this, the lunar module was disconnected, and the spacecraft was sent to Earth without it.

The main reason that prevented the Soviet side from landing a man on the Moon was failures with launch vehicles. Although the first two test launches were successful, the rocket crashed during the third. In the fourth test, conducted in 1971, the test spacecraft returned to Earth along the wrong trajectory, ending up in Australian airspace, which could have caused an international scandal: Soviet diplomats allegedly had to convince the Australians that the object falling on them was a test spacecraft. the Kosmos-434 module, not a nuclear warhead.

After several failures, the program became too expensive, and after the Americans presented the world with documentary evidence of the success of the Apollo 11 mission, it made no sense at all. As a result, space equipment has become something of a museum piece.

Why didn't we end up on the moon? Most often you can hear about the imperfection of the technological base of Soviet industry, which was unable to create a rocket and spacecraft for the lunar project. It was reported that the Soviet Union was doomed to lose to the United States in the lunar race. But it is not so. The main reason for the failure of the most expensive space project (4 billion rubles in 1974 prices) was the inconsistency of the actions of various departments and the ambitions of a number of leaders of that period.

Why did we need the Moon?

In reality, the Soviet lunar program was a symmetrical response to the American lunar program. The leaders of OKB-1 were absolutely not interested in the moon. Korolev and the N-1 rocket project were a modernized version of an earlier royal project. Intended for the delivery of a hydrogen super-bomb and for the launch of large-sized orbital complexes, the dimensions of which were supposed to be several times larger than the Soyuz and Mir that appeared later. It was completely unfeasible to implement the lunar program.

But the CPSU Central Committee decided to accept the challenge of the Americans. In 1960, a decree was issued by the Government Decree of June 23, 1960 “On the creation of powerful launch vehicles, satellites, spacecraft and the development outer space in 1960-1967." was planned to take place in the 1960s. design development and the necessary amount of research in order to create a new spacecraft in the coming years missile system with a launch mass of 1000-2000 tons, ensuring the launch of heavy interplanetary spacecraft into orbit around the Earth

ship weighing 60-80 tons, powerful liquid rocket engines with high performance, liquid hydrogen rocket engines, nuclear and electric propulsion engines, high-precision autonomous and radio control systems, space radio communication systems, etc. But already in 1964, the CPSU Central Committee set a new goal - to carry out a manned expedition to the Moon before how the United States will deliver its astronaut to the moon.

Blows of fate

First ordeal The project was affected by a personal conflict between Korolev and Glushko and the latter’s refusal to develop engines for a lunar rocket. An urgent decision was made to entrust the development of engines to the design bureau under the leadership of Kuznetsov.

According to Glushko, the creation of an engine of the required size using oxygen could be delayed, encountering problems with pulsating combustion and protecting the chamber walls and nozzle from overheating. In turn, the use of long-lasting components that provide stable combustion in the LRE chamber with a temperature of 280 - 580 degrees. C lower than oxygen fuel will speed up engine burnout. In addition, the liquid rocket engine turned out to be structurally simpler.

Assessing Glushko’s arguments, Korolev wrote the following in a memorandum addressed to the head of the expert commission: “The entire argument about the difficulties of testing an oxygen engine is based on the experience of the V. Glushko Design Bureau in working with an open circuit rocket engine. It should be especially emphasized that these difficulties have nothing to do with the engines of the closed circuit adopted for the N-1 rocket, in which the oxidizer enters the combustion chamber in a hot and gaseous state, and not in cold and liquid, as with the usual, open circuit. Indeed, when starting closed circuit engines, thermal ignition of the components in the combustion chamber occurs due to the heat of the hot gaseous oxidizer - oxygen or AT. This method of starting a closed-circuit oxygen-kerosene engine was experimentally tested in OKB-1 engines and adopted for the last stage of the Molniya launch vehicle, as well as in the N. Kuznetsov OKB when developing oxygen-kerosene engines NK-9V and NK-15V for the N- rocket 1". Expert commission The Queen took the side. Glushko did not forgive the Queen for this. He supports general designer Chelomey in his project of the giant UR-700 rocket, an alternative to the N-1 using engines of his own design. But the scientific commission led by Academician Keldysh gave preference to the N-1 OKB-1 project, since by that time the design work on the N-1 had already been practically completed.

In the Resolution of August 3, 1964, it was first determined that the most important task in the exploration of outer space using the N1 launch vehicle is the exploration of the Moon with the landing of expeditions on its surface and their subsequent return to Earth.

The main developers of the L3 lunar system were:

— OKB-1 is the lead organization for the system as a whole, the development of rocket blocks G and D, engines for block D and the development of lunar (LK) and lunar orbital (LOK) ships;

— OKB-276 (N.D. Kuznetsov) — for the development of the G block engine;

- OKB-586 (M.K. Yangel) - for the development of the rocket block E of the lunar ship and the engine of this block;

— OKB-2 (A.M. Isaev) — for the development of the propulsion system (tanks, PG systems and engine) of block I of the lunar orbital ship;

— NII-944 (V.I. Kuznetsov) — on the development of a control system for the L3 system;

- NII-885 (M.S. Ryazansky) - on the radio measuring complex;

— GSKB Spetsmash (V.P. Barmin) — for the complex of ground equipment of the L3 system.

The dates for the start of the LCT were also determined - 1966 and the implementation of the expedition in 1967-1968.

At this point, an important adjustment is made to the development of the rocket. In order to ensure the delivery of an astronaut in one launch, Korolev adapts the N-1 to new conditions almost “from the knees.” Project L3 takes on the form that does not change until the lunar program is closed. Compared to the previous scheme (with direct landing without separation into orbital and landing modules), the new version differed favorably in its mass. Now one launch of the N 1 was enough, although for this it was necessary to increase its carrying capacity by 25 tons. The 91.5-ton L3 complex would be launched into an intermediate near-Earth orbit with an altitude of 220 km and an inclination of 51.8 o. The device could remain here for up to 1 day, during which final preparations were made. Gradually an understanding of the complexity of the task at hand came.

The next blow is funding restrictions. Korolev was unable to obtain funding for a number of important elements of the project, one of which was a ground stand for testing the first stage engine block - the country's leadership considered this unnecessary, while in the Apollo project this stand was available. The head of the testing department of the Saturn-5 - Apollo project, K. Muller, was able to prove that to successfully solve the problem there is only one way: complete ground testing of the entire system in all possible standard and emergency situations. He gave his all to ensure that 2/3 of the funds allocated for the project were invested in the creation of testing stands and achieved a positive result: virtually all Saturn-5 launches were successful. The engines of the first stage of the N-1 (and there were 30 of them!) were tested separately and never in a single block on a test bench. Testing the engines “live” would certainly delay the implementation of the project.

Engine adjustments are being made immediately to reduce problems during test flights. An automatic engine thrust correction system was developed, which made it possible, if one or more of the engines fail, to transfer the load in a balanced manner to the others. Subsequently, lattice aerodynamic rudders were also used (this technology found application 10 years later in missiles for interceptor fighters). Distinctive feature N-1 was unique for our launch vehicles of that time in terms of mass payload payload. The supporting structure worked for this (the tanks and the frame did not form a single whole), the relatively low density of the arrangement due to the huge spherical tanks led to a decrease in the payload. On the other hand, the extremely low specific gravity of the tanks, extremely high performance engines and design solutions made it possible to increase it.

In 1966, Korolev dies on the operating table - OKB-1 is headed by his permanent deputy, Mishin. It is already clear to everyone that in 1968 it will not be possible to get to the moon and, apparently, in 1969 too. Calculations were made already for 1970.

The first stage had 30 engines installed along two concentric circles. Although the engine proved to be quite reliable in bench tests, most of the problems were caused by vibrations and other unaccounted-for effects associated with the simultaneous operation of so many engines (this was due to the lack of a comprehensive test bench, for which no money was given).

Academician Vasily Mishin (part of the interview):

– Vasily Pavlovich, they say that at one time Korolev promised: “In the year of the fiftieth anniversary Soviet power soviet man will be on the moon! Do you remember under what circumstances this happened?

- Yes, Korolev never said anything like that about the Moon. We would never have been able to land there before the Americans. Our guts were thin and we had no money. We were only able to launch vehicles into orbit. And a flight to the Moon is an order of magnitude more expensive! Yes, we were the first in orbit by accident. This is all propaganda... The fact is that America is rich country, the Americans could have surpassed us a long time ago. But they needed to regain the lost prestige - after the first satellites and Gagarin. And Kennedy spoke to Congress in 1961 and asked for 40 billion dollars for this event in order to land Americans on the Moon and return them to Earth before the year 70. The United States at that time could go to such huge expenses, but our country, exhausted after the war, could not allocate such funds in such a time frame. That's all.

– So they specifically chose the goal and timing so that they would definitely get ahead of us?

– Well, yes... And moreover, it was the Saturn 5-Apollo program that pushed us. Before that, we were working on the N-1 rocket for completely different purposes, not for the Moon. They planned to launch a heavy orbital station with a capacity of 75 tons into orbit. And then, when the American single-launch scheme became known (the Saturn 5-Apollo project), the leadership of our country instructed the three leading design bureaus, headed by Korolev, Yangel and Chelomey, to develop a project for such an expedition to the Moon with a return to Earth. As a result of consideration of these projects, the N 1-LZ project, developed by OKB-1 under the leadership of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, was chosen. In particular, and because the N-1 rocket had already been developed and put into production, it only had to be “increased” a little - the launch mass was increased from 2200 tons to 3000 and 30 engines were installed instead of 24 on the first stage.

At the same time, work was underway to fine-tune the spacecraft. The most developed project was the Korolev Design Bureau L1, according to which a number of unmanned test flights were carried out. This ship was similar to the Soyuz-7K-OK (“orbital ship”) designed for flights in low-Earth orbit, known general public just like "Soyuz". The main differences between the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft and the Soyuz-7K-OK spacecraft are the absence of an orbital compartment and enhanced thermal protection of the descent vehicle for re-entry into the atmosphere at the second escape velocity. The Proton launch vehicle was used to launch the spacecraft.

It was planned to enter the atmosphere over the southern hemisphere of the Earth, and due to aerodynamic forces, the descent vehicle would again rise into space, and its speed would decrease from the second cosmic speed to suborbital speed. Re-entry into the atmosphere took place over the territory Soviet Union. The Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft made five unmanned test flights under the names Zond-4 – 8. At the same time, the Zond-5 – 8 spacecraft flew around the Moon. Four more ships could not be launched into space due to accidents of the Proton launch vehicle during the launch phase. (Prototypes of the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft were also launched, as well as several of its research modifications not related to the manned lunar flyby program.) In three of the five Zond flights, accidents occurred that would have led to the death of crew members or they would be injured if these flights were manned. There were turtles on the Zond-5 ship. They became the first living beings in history to return to Earth after flying around the Moon - three months before the Apollo 8 flight.

In the USSR, there were a number of different projects for landing on the Moon: several launches and assembly of a lunar ship in low-Earth orbit, direct flight to the Moon, etc., but only the Korolev Design Bureau N1-L3 project was brought to the stage of test launches. The N1-L3 project was basically the same as the American Apollo project. Even the layout of the system at the launch stage was similar to the American one: the lunar ship was located in an adapter below the main ship, just like the Apollo lunar module.

The main parts of the rocket and space system for landing on the Moon according to the N1-L3 project were the Soyuz-7K-LOK lunar orbital ship, the LK lunar spacecraft and the powerful N1 launch vehicle.

The crew of the Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft consisted of two people. One of them had to go through outer space to the lunar ship and land on the Moon, and the second had to wait for the return of his comrade in lunar orbit.

The Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft was installed for flight testing on the N1 launch vehicle in its fourth (and last) launch, but due to the launch vehicle accident it was never launched into space.

Lunar ship "LK": 1 - lunar landing unit, 2 — missile unit “E”, 3 — cosmonaut cabin, 4 — blocks of the vital activity system, 5 - observation device during landing, 6 - attitude control engine block, 7 — radiator of the thermal control system, 8 - docking point, 9 — aiming sensor, 10 - adjustment sensors, 11 — instrument compartment, 12 - television camera, 13 - omnidirectional antennas, 14 - power supplies, 15 - support stand with shock absorber, 16 - strut with shock absorber, 17 - landing radar, 18 — hinged instrument compartment, 19 - weakly directional antennas, 20 — antennas of the rendezvous system, 21 - television antennas, 22 - pressing motor, 23 - main engine, 24 - reflector, 25 - backup engine.

The control system was built on the basis of an on-board computer and had a manual control system that allowed the astronaut to independently select the landing site visually through a special window. The lunar landing device was a four-legged original design with honeycomb residual vertical landing speed absorbers.

The lunar spacecraft was successfully tested three times in low-Earth orbit in unmanned mode under the names “Cosmos-379”, “Cosmos-398” and “Cosmos-434”.

Unfortunately, for many reasons, the testing dates were constantly shifted “to the right”, and the time for the implementation of the lunar program was constantly shifted “to the left”. This, naturally, affected the work, which in the last quarter of the 1960s took on a completely abnormal pace. However, it was assumed that by launching the rocket every three to four months, flight tests would be completed and the complex would begin scheduled operation in 1972-1973.

The first launch of the N1-L3 rocket and space complex occurred on February 21, 1969. As a result of a fire in the tail compartment and a malfunction of the engine control system, which at 68.7 seconds issued a false command to turn off the engines, the rocket died. The second launch of the N1-L3 complex was carried out four months later and also ended abnormally due to the abnormal operation of engine No. 8 of block A. As a result of the explosion, the launch complex was almost completely destroyed. And although voices were again heard in favor of the unreliability of Kuznetsov’s engines and the rocket design itself, the cause of the disasters was the haste to prepare flight tests.

The commission found out the following: even during bench testing, the susceptibility of NK-15 to the ingress of large (tens of mm) metal objects into the oxidizer pump was registered, which led to damage to the impeller, fire and explosion of the pump; small metal objects (shavings, sawdust, etc.) burning in the gas generator led to the destruction of the turbine blades. Non-metallic objects (rubber, rags, etc.) that got into the TNA input did not cause the engine to stop. This reliability result was not achieved even much later! Instance 5L belonged to the first batch of flight products, which did not provide for the installation of filters at the inlet to the pumps. They were supposed to be installed on the engines of all rockets, starting with the 8L carrier, which was supposed to be used during the fifth launch.

The reliability of the rocket engine seemed insufficient to Kuznetsov himself. Since July 1970, the OKB began to create qualitatively new engines, virtually reusable and with a significantly increased service life. However, they were ready only by the end of 1972, and flight tests were supposed to continue until that time on rockets with old liquid-propellant engines, the control over which had been increased.

Due to damage to the launch complex and a slowdown in the pace of work, preparations for the third flight test were delayed for two years. Only on Sunday, June 27, 1971, the 6L rocket launched at 2:15:70 Moscow time from the second, recently built, launch facility of site 110 of the Baikonur Cosmodrome. All engines worked stably. From the moment of liftoff, telemetry recorded abnormal operation of the roll control system.

Starting from the 39th second, the control system was unable to stabilize the carrier along its axes. At the 48th second, due to reaching supercritical angles of attack, the destruction of the launch vehicle began in the area of ​​​​the junction of block “B” and the nose fairing. The head unit separated from the rocket and, collapsing, fell not far from the launch. The “decapitated” carrier continued its uncontrolled flight. At the 51st second, when the roll angle reached 200 degrees, all engines of block “A” were switched off on command from the end contacts of the gyroplatform. Continuing to disintegrate in the air, the rocket flew for some time and fell 20 km from the launch, leaving a crater on the ground with a diameter of 30 m and a depth of 15 m.

On November 23, 1972, 17 months after the unsuccessful third attempt, the fourth took place. Instance 7L started from position No. 2 at 9:11:52 Moscow time. For outside observers, up until the 107th second, the flight was successful. The engines operated stably, all rocket parameters were within normal limits. But some cause for concern emerged at the 104th second. They didn’t even have time to attach any significance: 3 seconds later, in the tail section of block “A,” a strong explosion scattered the entire peripheral propulsion system and destroyed the lower part of the spherical oxidizer tank. The rocket exploded and fell into pieces in the air. But the program performers themselves did not lose heart. They understood: everything is natural, the rocket is learning to fly, accidents are inevitable. In the 8L carrier, the developers tried to take into account all the previously obtained flight test results. The rocket became significantly heavier, but its creators had no doubt that there would be no more explosions or fires in block “A” and that the fifth attempt would solve the problem of flying the L-3 unmanned expedition using a simplified scheme without landing on the lunar surface.

By the beginning of 1974, the 8L rocket was assembled. The installation of new, reusable liquid propellant engines has begun at all its stages. Thus, the NK-33 engine of block “A” was a modernized version of the NK-15 with significantly increased reliability and performance. Trouble-free ground testing of all liquid-propellant rocket engines gave confidence in the successful fifth launch of the rocket, scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1974. A working version of the lunar spacecraft with all the necessary automation was installed on the rocket. It was planned to fly around the moon and it was possible to send an expedition on the next flight.

Sad end

The removal of Academician V. Mishin from the post of head of OKB-1 and the appointment of V. Glushko in his place in May 1974 was unexpected for the entire team. Work on N-1 in the newly formed NPO Energia in the shortest possible time completely abandoned, the official reason for the closure of the project was “the lack of heavy payloads corresponding to the carrying capacity of the carrier.” The production capacity of the rocket units, almost all the equipment of the technical, launch and measuring complexes was destroyed. At the same time, costs in the amount of 6 billion rubles were written off. (in prices of the 70s) spent on the topic.

Glushko himself proposed at that time an alternative project “Energy” using new, not yet created engines. Therefore, he was afraid of the successful launch of the N-1 rocket with a lunar ship on board - this could ruin all the plans of his team. Later, it took another 13 years to create a rocket of similar power and 14.5 billion rubles were spent.

The Energia complex was created much later - in 1987 and launched after the death of the chief designer. By that time, the rocket turned out to be unnecessary and expensive due to the collapse of the USSR, and by technical solution The Energia-Buran combination is outdated, because the Americans launched a similar complex 8 years earlier. There were no longer any tasks for its use. The cost and implementation time of the project significantly exceeded those compared to Korolev’s “lunar” project. “Energia”, after several launches, two of which were partially successful, ceased to exist.

LV "Energia" at the launch

Kuznetsov did not accept his removal from work on liquid propellant engines and continued bench testing of his engines. Ground tests were carried out in 1974-1976 until January 1977 new program, requiring confirmation of the operability of each rocket engine within 600 s. However, usually fire tests single engines in the OKB lasted 1200 s. Forty liquid-propellant rocket engines operated from 7,000 to 14,000 seconds, and one NK-33 operated for 20,360 seconds. Until 1995, 94 engines of blocks “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” of the N-1 rocket were stored in the warehouses of NPP Trud until 1995. It turned out to be surprising that Kuznetsov’s engines for the N-1 rocket still exist and are still ready to operate as they were in that distant time.

The “D” upper stage, developed by the Korolev Design Bureau for the N-1 rocket, is still used when launching vehicles using the Proton rocket.

Subsequently, Glushko also proposed a project for an expedition to the Moon, including the creation of a long-term habitable base, but the time for ambitious dreams had already passed. Complete absence economic effect the program affected the opinion of the country's leadership - no one was going to fly to the moon in the Soviet Union. Although he could have - in July 1974.

It is believed that the Soviet lunar program ended without success. So we lost this race to the Americans and wasted a lot of time and effort? Only today, when the “Top Secret” stamp on these developments has finally been removed, we can be convinced that the opinion about the lunar program as a failure is false, because almost all of our achievements: the launch of the first satellite, the first cosmonaut, the first interplanetary stations were one way or another connected with it and worked for the main thing - preparing for the landing of man on the surface of the Moon. PROJECT "NORTH"
On January 2, 1959, the USSR carried out the first successful launch of the three-stage Vostok launch vehicle, created as part of the R-7 family of rockets. The rocket launched the Luna-1 automatic station onto the flight path to the Moon, which 34 hours after launch passed six thousand kilometers from the target. Communication with the station was maintained for more than 60 hours.

In March of the same year, under the leadership of Sergei Korolev, preparations began for the creation of a new spacecraft designed for near-Earth flights and flights to the Moon. Initially, the project, called "North", did not provide for the landing of an astronaut on the surface of our planet. natural satellite- we were talking only about a manned flight around the Moon. By the summer, the constructors had developed the parameters that formed the basis for the design of the future ship.

The Soyuz 7K-L1 program was conceived as a preliminary stage. The spacecraft within this program was intended for a manned flight around the Moon lasting 6-7 days. Since it was not planned to enter lunar orbit, the ship did not have a powerful propulsion system, and the return to Earth was ensured by maneuvering in the gravitational field of the Moon. With accurate calculations and correct output, turning on the engine for return was not required at all. The Soyuz 7K-L1 spacecraft weighed approximately 5,600 kilograms and was created on the basis of the Soyuz project. Externally, L1 resembled the Soyuz, but was two-seater and did not have a spherical orbital module.


However, already at the first stage of work it became clear that in order to implement the project it was necessary to put into mass production a completely new type of launch vehicle. Therefore, on July 23, 1960, the USSR government set OKB-1 the task of creating a new launch vehicle with a launch mass of more than 2000 tons for launch into low orbit payload over 80 tons. The rocket was supposed to use conventional chemical fuel, and 7 years were allotted for the entire development. The program was called N-1 (presumably from the word “carrier”) and had a special designation -11A52.


On July 28 of the same year, the start of work on the Apollo project was officially announced in the United States, which included a manned flyby of the Moon and landing a man on its surface. The Battle for the Moon has begun.
TO THE MOON THE ROYAL WAY
Almost immediately with the start of work on the new carrier, serious disagreements on the issue emerged between two leading Soviet designers, Valentin Glushko (OKB-456) and Sergei Korolev (OKB-1). further development rocket science. Glushko believed that the best fuel components were nitric acid and heptyl. The combustion characteristics of these substances are quite high, but they are extremely toxic and dangerous to use. Korolev adhered to the approach according to which traditional kerosene could be used for the first stage, and hydrogen engines should be developed for the second and third.
The American designer Wernher von Braun, when creating a carrier for the Apollo program, also followed the path of using kerosene and hydrogen. It was planned to place 5 F-1 engines with a thrust of 690 tons on the first stage of the Saturn-V rocket. Work on the F-1 began back in 1955, and the first fire tests took place in August 1961.

Since such power could not be achieved in the USSR, Korolev decided to use engines with a thrust of 150 tons. Similar engines could have been created at OKB-456 (Glushko) or OKB-276 (Nikolai Kuznetsov). Since Korolev and Glushko adhered to different views to this problem, the development was entrusted to Kuznetsov. In August 1964, in response to the American plan for landing on the Moon, a decision was made to develop a similar program based on the N-1 launch vehicle according to a scheme that provided for the presence of an orbital and landing modules.
The program provided for the launch into lunar orbit of the two-seat space orbital vehicle Soyuz 7K-LOK and the single-seat lunar spacecraft LK-T2K. Rocket block D was intended for braking near the Moon. In orbit, one of the astronauts had to move through outer space into the lunar ship and, using the same block D, begin landing on the Moon. Immediately before landing, block D was discarded, and the ship, using its own propulsion system (block E), smoothly lowered onto four supports. The astronaut left the ship in the Krechet spacesuit and worked on the surface of the Moon for about a day. Upon completion of work on the surface, the lunar ship was supposed to return to orbit using block E and dock with the orbital module. The astronaut went through outer space into the orbital module and transferred samples of lunar soil into it, after which the lunar ship separated. To return to Earth, the orbital propulsion system (block I) had to be activated. The landing was carried out according to the same scheme as in the Soyuz 7K-L1 project.


According to calculations, the approximate mass of the fueled orbital module was 20 tons, and the takeoff and landing module was approximately 6 tons. The total load placed on the flight path to the Moon was 30 tons. In order to accelerate from the reference orbit to the second escape velocity, an additional stage was required, weighing 40-50 tons together with fuel. This means that the launch vehicle was supposed to deliver 75-100 tons of cargo into low Earth orbit. Only the N-1 rocket could solve this problem in a short time. On October 12, 1964, the first flight of the three-seater Voskhod spacecraft, piloted by cosmonauts Komarov, Feoktistov and Egorov, took place. The ship was launched into orbit new rocket"Union". For the first time, three cosmonauts were on the ship without spacesuits. Flights under the Voskhod program were carried out with the aim of practical testing of the systems of the future orbital vehicle for the lunar expedition. Due to the rush, the project did not provide for an emergency rescue system, and the risk of flying on Voskhod was very high. Fortunately, the flight went smoothly and the astronauts returned safely to Earth.
VICTIMS OF THE SPACE RACE
In December 1965, the lunar flyby project was completely transferred to Sergei Korolev's OKB-1. The new scenario provided for the use of a single series of Soyuz spacecraft for the flight around the Moon (modification Soyuz 7K-LK1) and for landing on the Moon (modification Soyuz 7K-LOK), and for the flight the one developed by the leading designer of OKB-52 Vladimir was to be used We fly the Proton rocket, and for landing we use the N-1 Korolev rocket.

Both projects involved the design developed at OKB-1 accelerating block D. On January 14, 1966, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev died during a surgical operation. His place was taken by Vasily Mishin, who had less experience and personal connections. Nevertheless, the overall leadership of the lunar program remained with him.
In February, the N-1 rocket project was redesigned. To implement the program, it was necessary to increase the weight launched into low-Earth orbit from 75 to 95 tons. The first launch was scheduled for March 1968.
In November 1966, the stage of flight testing of Soyuz series spacecraft began (modification 7K-OK for near-Earth flights). The Soyuz rocket was used as a carrier. The first launch on November 28 revealed big number problems. The ship spontaneously ran out of fuel for its attitude control engines and was spinning uncontrollably. There were also problems with the automatic descent system. On December 14, during the launch of the next Soyuz, a fire and explosion occurred in the launch vehicle. The launch complex was heavily damaged.


In January 1967, pre-launch tests of the Proton-K launch vehicle began with a Soyuz series spacecraft capable of circling the Moon (two-seat modification 7K-L1). After flying around the Moon, the spacecraft's descent module was supposed to make a two-stage reentry into the atmosphere and a soft landing on the territory of the USSR. It was assumed that the manned flight of this complex would take place in June 1967, but the first unmanned launches revealed shortcomings in the ship's control systems and upper stage D, as well as problems in the Proton-K rocket.


At this time, the US lunar program received a heavy blow. On January 27, the crew of the first Apollo series ship died as a result of a fire that broke out during pre-launch tests. The cause of the fire was a short circuit, which proved fatal in the oxygen-rich atmosphere of the ship. In less than a minute, the fire completely filled the space of the command module, and, despite the crew's attempts to open the exit hatch, the flames covered the astronauts. The investigation into the incident revealed imperfections in many systems, and subsequent modifications to the ship led to a delay in the implementation of the American program for 18 months. The USSR had a chance to close the gap and win the race. For this reason, a risky step was taken. On April 23, 1967, despite the fact that none of the previous four unmanned flights of the Soyuz 7K-OK spacecraft had passed without accidents, Soyuz-1 went into space with Vladimir Komarov on board. The Soyuz rocket launched the ship into low-Earth orbit, where it was supposed to dock with the Soyuz-2 launching the next day (crew: Bykovsky, Khrunov and Eliseev). Two of the three crew members of Soyuz 2 were to transfer to Soyuz 1, after which both ships would return to Earth. In this way, the basic operations that needed to be done in lunar orbit to ensure landing on the Moon were worked out. However, immediately after the start on “Cora z e - 1” one did not open solar battery, and there was not enough energy to carry out rendezvous and docking operations. The launch of Soyuz-2 was canceled and it was decided to land Soyuz-1 ahead of schedule. Due to automatic failure, Komarov landed the ship manually. During descent into the atmosphere, the main brake parachute did not come out and the reserve parachute did not open, resulting in a descent speed of about 600 km/h. Vladimir Komarov died when the descent module hit the ground.
Nevertheless, work on the lunar program did not stop, and already in October, two unmanned spacecraft of the Soyuz 7K-OK series successfully performed automatic docking in orbit for the first time.
THE BRIGHT AND POVERTY OF THE LUNAR PROGRAM
In March 1968, the Proton-K - Soyuz 7K-L1 complex was launched. Upper stage D worked without any problems, the unmanned spacecraft flew along a highly elliptical trajectory, but due to the failure of the orientation system, instead of a smooth two-stage entry into the atmosphere, the descent vehicle made a ballistic descent to an off-design point and was destroyed on command from the Earth. Newspapers reported the successful flight of the Zond-4 apparatus. Subsequently, other unmanned ships of this series, which flew in 1968-70, were also called probes. Despite the accident of the Proton launch vehicle on April 22, the first Soviet manned flight around the Moon was scheduled for November. This rush was explained by the desire to overtake the American spacecraft Apollo-8, whose launch to the Moon was planned for the end of December. The CIA officially warned NASA management about the USSR's readiness for a manned flight around the Moon. In May, the new super-heavy rocket N-1 was installed at the launch site for the first time. The test flight was planned for September, but due to damage to the oxygen tank of the first stage, the rocket had to be returned to the assembly and test complex. On September 15, Soyuz 7K-L1, called Zond-5, was successfully launched. After flying around the Moon, the spacecraft was unable to complete a two-stage reentry into the atmosphere and landed along a ballistic trajectory far from the calculated point. On October 26, the Soyuz-3 orbital ship, piloted by cosmonaut Beregov, launched.


In this first flight after the death of Vladimir Komarov, it was planned to dock with the Soyuz-2 unmanned spacecraft, which had launched the day before. Automatic system docking brought the ships closer to 200 meters, after which the astronaut switched to manual control. However, due to a mistake made in this case and the resulting excessive fuel consumption, the docking had to be abandoned. The landing of both ships was successful.
On November 10, Zond-6 set off for the Moon. If this flight were successfully completed, the next ship would have to take off with a crew on board. After flying around the Moon and a two-stage entry into the atmosphere, the ship began to descend to the USSR design point, but crashed due to the premature separation of the parachute. Later it turned out that the descent module had depressurized while still in space. Despite the risks associated with operating Soyuz-class spacecraft, lunar program-trained cosmonauts wrote to the Politburo asking for permission to conduct a manned flight to the Moon in December. They reasoned that having an astronaut on board would increase the likelihood of success. A few days before the launch of Saturn-V - Apollo-8 at Baikonur, the Proton-K - Soyuz 7K-L1 complex was prepared for launch, and on December 8 the cosmonauts were ready for the flight, but the high probability of a disaster did not allow the management to make a decision about launching before the Americans. On December 21, 1968, astronauts Borman, Lovell and Anderson launched to the Moon aboard Apollo 8. For the first time people left near-Earth space. For the first time they did not observe sunsets and sunrises and for the first time they saw the far side of the Moon with their own eyes. After making several orbits in lunar orbit, the spacecraft successfully returned to Earth. The United States won the first stage of the battle for the Moon.
THE FINAL PUSH
After the Apollo-8 mission, the relevance of a manned flight around the Moon within the framework of the Soyuz7K-L1 program disappeared, and the next launch in January was unmanned. During the launch phase, the Proton-K rocket crashed, and the emergency rescue system did not work. This completely cooled interest in the program, which faded into the background. The USSR still had a chance to beat the United States with the first landing of a man on the surface of the Moon. On February 21, 1969, the first launch of the N-1 rocket took place. The purpose of the flight was to launch the Soyuz 7K-L1A unmanned spacecraft (modification 7K-L1) into lunar orbit. However, due to the high-frequency vibrations that arose, the pipelines in the first stage were destroyed. After a fire broke out, damaging the control system, the first stage engines were turned off at the 69th second of flight, and the rocket fell 52 kilometers from the launch.

On July 3, the second launch of the N-1 rocket took place. The changes made to the design of the first stage did not help. Immediately after the start, a foreign metal object entered the fuel pump of one of the engines, after which the pump collapsed and a fire broke out. 23 seconds after launch, a fully fueled rocket hit the launch complex and practically destroyed it. The nearby second launch pad was slightly damaged. It took two years to restore what was destroyed and make new changes to the design of the rocket.
On July 13, the last attempt is made to at least in some way overtake the Americans. Using the Proton-K launch vehicle, the new generation automatic station Luna-15 launched to the Moon, which was supposed to deliver samples of the lunar pound to Earth for the first time. After entering lunar orbit, problems were discovered, however, it was decided to land. But already on July 16, the flight of the American spacecraft Apollo 11 began with a crew consisting of astronauts Armstrong, Collins and Aldrin. The flight program included the first landing of a man on the Moon.

On July 20, 1969, the landing of the Luna 15 automatic station and the lunar module piloted by Armstrong and Aldrin began almost simultaneously. And here again luck was on the side of the Americans: Luna 15 crashed, and the lunar module made a successful landing. Astronaut Neil Armstrong became the first person to set foot on the surface of the Moon. Thus, the United States, in all respects, won the eight-year race and restored its prestige. However, work on the Soviet lunar program did not stop there. On August 7, it successfully launched and 5 days later, after flying around and photographing the Moon, the unmanned Zond-7 landed in the Kustanai area. This was the first and only flight under the Soyuz 7K-L1 program, which passed without any comments. Since the landing on the Moon was postponed after the July explosion, it was decided to carry out a manned flyby of the Moon on the Soyuz 7K-L1 spacecraft in 1970, as well as to test the Soyuz 7K-LOK and 7K-T2K spacecraft in unmanned mode in low-Earth orbit. The goals of the N1-LZ program have also changed. Instead of a short stay on the Moon, it was planned to ensure a long-term presence of astronauts on its surface. In this regard, the project became known as N1-LZM.



However, these plans were not destined to come true. New accidents and unsuccessful launches put an end to the Soviet program to conquer the Moon.

In January 1969, the CIA received information from informants in Moscow that the USSR was preparing to conduct a special operation to disrupt the flight. American astronauts to the moon. The Soviets allegedly intend to help powerful generators electromagnetic radiation cause interference with the on-board electronic equipment of the Apollo spacecraft during its takeoff and lead to disaster. President Richard Nixon ordered the top-secret Operation Crossroads to prevent any suspicious activity by Soviet ships off the coast of the United States during the Apollo launches.

At that time, the “moon race” was nearing its conclusion, and it was already obvious that the United States would win it. In December 1968, F. Borman, J. Lovell and W. Anders made a triumphal flyby of the Moon on Apollo 8. In May 1969, T. Stafford, J. Young and Y. Cernan circled the Moon several times on Apollo 10, working through all stages of undocking and docking, descent and ascent of the lunar cabin, except for landing on the Moon and taking off from it. While in the USSR any launch into space was announced only after the fact, the Americans set the launch days of their ships in advance, inviting the press and television from all over the world. Therefore, everyone already knew that Apollo 11, which would fly to the Moon, was scheduled to launch from the J. Kennedy Space Center on July 16, 1969.

The Soviet lunar program was hopelessly behind. When Apollo 8 flew around the Moon, the USSR was just preparing a ship for such a flight, and there was no ship at all for landing on the Moon. After the successful flight of the Americans around the Moon, the Soviet leadership decided to abandon the manned flight of the Moon, which now could not have much effect. But the US administration was not sure that the USSR had decided to simply give up without a fight in the “moon race”, and expected some kind of “dirty trick” from it to prevent the Americans from triumphantly winning it. After all, in the United States, the moon landing became a fixed idea of ​​national prestige for the entire 1960s.

At that time, Soviet electronic reconnaissance ships that plied the world's oceans and intercepted NATO communications signals were disguised as fishing seiners. This trick had long been known to NATO, and they, in turn, constantly monitored the movements of these “fishing fleets” under the red flag. At the beginning of 1969, an increase in the activity of the Soviet fleet was noted near American shores. There were now two Soviet RER ships constantly on duty there, and in May 1969, during the Apollo 10 flight, there were already four. “This is not without reason,” the American intelligence services decided. During the Apollo 11 mission in July, large-scale measures were planned to counter possible “Russian machinations.”

American intelligence agencies believed (or pretended to believe) that the strong electromagnetic pulse, aimed at a taking off rocket, can cause irreparable failure of its equipment and, ultimately, its disaster. Theoretically, this seems possible, although no one has conducted practical experiments of this kind (more precisely, no one has reported them). By the appointed day of takeoff—July 16—US Navy ships and Coast Guard aircraft were put on alert. Seven American troops were on duty in the Cape Canaveral area. submarines. American electronic warfare ships had to, in addition to constantly monitoring the activities of Soviet ships, powerfully interfere with them at different frequencies. Combat ships and aircraft were ordered to open fire if there was any suspicious activity from Soviet ships. President Nixon had before him a prepared draft directive on the use of strategic nuclear forces against the USSR. He had to sign it in the event that Apollo 11 crashed due to the use of electromagnetic superweapons by the Soviets.

The American measures did not seem unnecessary. By the announced day, seven Soviet seiners were already “fishing” off the coast of Florida!

So, the Apollo launch was scheduled for 8:32 a.m. Atlantic time. At exactly 8 a.m., American radars recorded the inclusion of radar equipment on Soviet ships at full power. At 8:05 a.m., an order was received from Washington for the US 2nd Fleet to put everything on full alert. combat systems. At 8:10 American planes The Orion electronic warfare systems began to fly over Soviet ships, and the warships began to approach the seiners in order to be ready to open fire at any moment.

At 8:20, intensive jamming of the equipment of Soviet ships began by creating interference. From 8:32 to 8:41, two stages of the Saturn 5 successfully launched the third stage, along with the Apollo 11 spacecraft, into low-Earth orbit. At 8:45 a.m., the Soviet vessels reduced their radar activity to normal levels. In two minutes American services Electronic warfare received a clear signal. At 8:50 American ships and the planes began to leave the scene.

Since the details Soviet operation are still classified, no one can say what it was. After all, Soviet RER ships really showed increased activity at this time! If this wasn't an attempt to throw Apollo off course, what could it be? Two versions are put forward.

According to one, Soviet electronic intelligence vessels collected information about the Apollo flight in order to establish whether it really went into space (after all, it is possible that the conspiracy theory about the possibility of staging American flights, so popular today, was born even then!). According to another, the USSR deliberately imitated its activity in order to make the Americans twitch once again. The twitching, by the way, was not cheap for the US budget: the costs of Operation Crossroads amounted to 230 million then dollars - almost 1% of the total cost of the Apollo program. Sometimes they add that information about the special operation being prepared by the Soviets against Apollo was skillful disinformation, specially launched from Moscow. Whether this is so is still anyone's guess.

Today is the anniversary of the American landing on the moon. 40 years have passed since this significant event, but controversy still rages over whether it really happened. Meanwhile, the Soviet lunar program is surrounded by a veil of darkness, oblivion and baseless rumors. Many believe that the USSR did not have a lunar program at all. Meanwhile, there was a program, and not even one. The following is a brief popular summary of the two lunar programs of the USSR, whose creation time approximately coincided with the Apollo program.

N1-L3 - Moon landing (1964-1970)

The Lunar Ship (LK) of the N1-L3 program became the device that could be the first to deliver a man to the Moon. This did not happen for various reasons that are not discussed here. Now let's focus on the technical side of the project.

The lunar ship is similar to the Lunar Module (LM) of the Americans' Apollo, although, of course, it differs from it in many ways. The USA used the Saturn-5 launch vehicle, whose engines ran on cryogenic fuel (hydrogen + oxygen), which made it possible to deliver 30% more cargo to the Moon than the N1, which ran on kerosene + oxygen, i.e. less efficient fuel.

Because of this, it was necessary to save on the LM (the mass of the orbital part could not be reduced): it was three times lighter than the American LM. Therefore, the crew of the lunar ship was limited to one person. In addition, there was no transition compartment between the lunar orbital vehicle and the lunar spacecraft: to move from one vehicle to another it was necessary to go into outer space.

Another difference: on Apollo, a separate braking unit (DU) was used for a soft landing; on the lunar spacecraft, it was combined with a DU, which ensured launch from the Moon. The lunar ship consisted of four different modules. The first was called the “lunar landing device” (LPU). It was supposed to provide a soft landing on the Moon and be used as a launch pad during takeoff. The second compartment was supposed to ensure the launch from the Moon and the launch of the ship into lunar orbit. The third module, the lunar cabin, was intended to accommodate the astronaut. For precise orientation, a special orientation engine module was used.

Program overview.

On August 3, 1964, the CPSU Central Committee sets a goal for Chief Designer Korolev to land one Soviet cosmonaut on the Moon before the United States delivers its own astronaut to the Moon.

In September 1964, work began on this project. The first option provided for the launch of three super-heavy N1 launch vehicles, which would launch components of the lunar spacecraft into low-Earth orbit. The first module of the spacecraft, weighing 138 tons, was an upper stage. The Moon was reached by a 40-ton module, which, after making several trajectory corrections along the way, was immediately launched to the desired point on the lunar disk for a direct landing.

The safety of the selected location had to be confirmed by the operation of the lunar rover according to the L2 program, which was previously launched to the selected point and carried out detailed studies of the landing site. The Lunokhod was also supposed to be used as a radio beacon for precise orientation of the lunar ship of the L3 program.

So, the 40-ton vehicle was approaching the Moon, at an altitude of 300-400 km the braking engine was turned on, which ensured a soft landing of the LC, whose mass on the surface would be 21 tons. After a 10-day stay on the lunar surface, the cosmonauts in the Soyuz left the Moon and returned to Earth (according to the scheme that was used for L1). The crew consisted of three people. After some time, it becomes clear that although this option is relatively simple, its cost will be prohibitively high. To reduce it, the L3 project is completely changed: it is cheaper and faster to create what the Americans have already begun to implement under the Apollo project: a complex consisting of an orbital part and a landing vehicle.

Now the L3 project takes on the form that practically does not change until the closure of the lunar program. Compared to the previous scheme (with direct landing without separation into orbital and landing modules), the new version differed favorably in its mass. Now one launch of the N1 was enough, although for this it was necessary to increase its payload capacity by 25 tons, which was achieved by reducing the intermediate orbit from 300 to 220 km, increasing the mass of the first stage by 25% (by 350 tons), and stronger cooling of the fuel components ( kerosene and oxygen), an increase in engine thrust at all stages by 2% and a decrease in orbital inclination from 65 ° to 51.8 °). The 91.5-ton L3 complex would be launched into an intermediate low-Earth orbit with an altitude of 220 km and an inclination of 51.8°. The device could remain here for up to 1 day, during which final preparations were made.

By turning on the upper stage, a 21-ton apparatus was launched to the Moon, which reached it in 3.5 days. During this time, block D was switched on briefly to correct the trajectory. Block D was then turned on at the Moon, transferring the entire apparatus into a lunar orbit at an altitude of 110 km. With its second inclusion near the Moon, migrations (the point of minimum distance from its surface) decreased to 14 km. This unit could be launched for possible orbital adjustments several more times over the course of 4 days.

After this, the pilot of the lunar ship went into outer space, checked the serviceability of all external systems and went into the landing vehicle (there was no direct hatch from the orbital module into this compartment). Block D, connected to the landing stage, was disconnected from the lunar orbiter. Block D was used for the last time: it would reduce the vertical speed to 100 m/s, the height above the surface at this moment is 4 km, after which it separates and falls to the Moon. At an altitude of 3 km, the radar altimeter is turned on, which controls the soft landing engine of block E, which was turned on at the same altitude and ensures a smooth contact with the surface.

The fuel supply allowed it to “hover” over the Moon for 50 seconds, at which point the pilot had to make the final decision: to land or not. The choice depended on what kind of relief would be at the intended landing site. If it was unsuitable (for example, it would be filled with large rocks), the astronaut could return to the orbiter and then to Earth, or choose new point, located no further than a few hundred meters from the originally selected location. After landing, the astronaut goes to the surface, plants the flag of the Soviet Union on it, takes soil samples and returns to the lunar ship. After a relatively short stay on the Moon (from 6 to 24 hours), part of the LC (LPU - lunar landing device) remains on the surface, and the lunar cabin, after turning on block E, launches from the Moon and docks with the lunar orbital ship. The astronaut again goes into outer space, this time with samples of lunar soil and goes into the orbital vehicle (well, there is no transfer hatch, what can you do about it). The lunar cabin is thrown away.

The ship remains in lunar orbit for about one more day, after which the propulsion system is turned on, transferring the vehicle to the trajectory of return to Earth. During the 3.5 days of flight, two trajectory corrections are carried out to ensure the required angle of entry into the atmosphere. Immediately before the entrance, two astronauts move into the descent module, which flies over south pole and slows down its speed in the atmosphere from 11 km/s to 7.5 km/s, after which it “jumps” back into space and re-enters the landing after several thousand km, already over the territory of the USSR.

Working out the LC

After the design of the lunar ship was developed, testing of its individual components had to begin, after which it was possible to create a working version of the lunar ship. Stands were made that made it possible to test individual components under conditions of vacuum, strong vibration, etc. Some parts had to be tested in space.

The following LC mock-ups and test benches were created:


  • A full-scale mock-up (by the way, this is the first mock-up of the spacecraft in general) for testing access to the surface of the Moon and into outer space.
  • Electric stand. It was used to test the electronics of the spacecraft and the control logic that was supposed to guide the ship near the Moon.
  • Electrical layout. It was used to test the placement of electronics on the LC itself.
  • Test bench of block E for testing its operation in various conditions.
  • Breadboard for testing the antenna.
  • Three layouts of block E.
  • Landing simulators on which astronauts trained. These included various stands, a specially converted Mi-4 helicopter, etc.

Flight tests of the LC

To practice maneuvers that were to be carried out in lunar orbit, versions of the LOK-LK (lunar orbital ship - lunar ship) complex were developed: T1K and T2K. The first was launched by the Soyuz LV, the second by the Proton LV. During their launches, more than 20 different systems were tested (for example, solar and star sensors of attitude control systems), which were supposed to be used in the lunar program.

During the flights of the T1K vehicles, propulsion systems were tested. The T2K devices were manufactured in quantities of 3 and had the following purposes: during the first flight the propulsion system was tested, during the second flight various emergency situations, and a third launch was planned to duplicate some of the testing that might have been left undone during the first two flights.

The T2K devices were still manufactured with delays; during pre-launch tests at Baikonur, ten microscopic holes were discovered in the first ship, which would have led to the depressurization of the device, but these faults were minor and could be eliminated quickly. The first T2K launched in November 1970, followed by the next two ships. Previously, the program for these test flights was carefully developed; after each maneuver, the resulting telemetry was carefully studied, which made it possible to successfully carry out flights of the devices under this program.

Below is a chronicle of launches:

11/24/1970 - T2K (s/n 1).
Cosmos 379. The device was initially launched into an orbit with an altitude of 233x192 km, after which it was transferred to an orbit with parameters of 196 km x 1206 km by increasing its speed by 263 m/s. This maneuver simulated the operation of block D, which transferred the lunar ship from an orbit of 188 km x 1198 km to an orbit of 177 km x 14 km.

02/26/1971 - T2K (s/n 2).
Cosmos 398. Second test flight of the lunar program. The device was launched into an orbit with an altitude of 189 km x 252 km, after which, during several maneuvers, it moved into an orbit with parameters of 200 km x 10905 km.

08/12/1971 - T2K (s/n 3).
Cosmos 434. The last flight of the T2K series apparatus. The device was launched into an orbit with an altitude of 188 km x 267 km, after which, during several maneuvers, it moved into an orbit with parameters of 180 km x 11384 km.

Death of the lunar ship

The N1-L3 lunar program gradually lost its relevance and significance. This project could not ensure the leadership of the Soviet Union in space, however, there were other reasons for this. It was planned for the Zvezda program to develop a modification of the lunar ship that could deliver not one, but two people to the Moons. However, it turned out that with the mass of the LC being 5500 kg, this was impossible to do. To implement such an idea, it is necessary to create a lunar apparatus completely new.

With the death of Korolev and Yangel, the country is losing outstanding designers capable of completing the program to the end. It ends as quietly as it began: the public learns about the existence of lunar programs in the USSR only in the late 80s. Despite the presence of a lot of other similar programs in our country, only N1-L3 reached the implementation phase, without reaching the end. All that remains of it are models of the lunar spacecraft in the MAI museums (Moscow and St. Petersburg), in the NPO Energia (Korolev) and in the Yuzhnoye design bureau (Dnepropetrovsk).

LK-700 - Moon landing (1964)

Korolev was not the only creator of lunar ships. Vladimir Chelomey, an equally famous designer, begins to create an alternative project. He proposed creating a launch vehicle UR-700, which was capable of launching 50 tons of cargo onto the flight path to the Moon: a spacecraft with a crew of two people.

He felt main danger project N1-L3, which was developed by Korolev. In it, the entire expedition consisted of several stages: the spacecraft was launched into an intermediate near-Earth orbit, from which it was sent towards the Moon, where it decelerated and entered the orbit of its artificial satellite. After this, the landing module was undocked from the orbital compartment, which landed on the Moon; after some stay on its surface, it took off, docked with the orbital compartment, where the crew moved, after which the lunar module was disconnected, and the astronauts returned in the orbital vehicle, from which just before reaching The descent module with people was separated from the earth, going home.

This scheme was implemented by the Americans during the Apollo program. But such a scheme was quite complex for that time. The spacecraft might not enter lunar orbit, and the landing module might not dock with the orbital compartment. Now docking in space seems like something commonplace, but in the 60s, methods for bringing spacecraft together were just being worked out. Due to the imperfection of the spacecraft during the rendezvous and docking flight, Komarov died (during landing), and the Soviet space program fell behind by several years.

For these reasons, a direct landing on the Moon made a lot of sense at the time. The spacecraft was launched onto a trajectory of a direct hit at the desired point of our satellite, and without any complex operations was landing. This scheme was less effective, but it was simpler and, therefore, more reliable. There were other advantages too. Now it was possible to land at almost any point on the visible disk of the Moon (more precisely, on 88% of the lunar surface), in contrast to projects using lunar orbiters, which imposed restrictions on the choice of landing site by the inclination of their orbit.

Chelomey creates the UR700-LK700 project, consisting of a powerful heavy launch vehicle and a lunar ship. Its main points were the following facts: long-stored components (hydrazine/nitrogen tetroxide) were used as a fuel/oxidizer, the entire system had to be as simple (and reliable) as possible, the development of the launch vehicle had to be built using already proven technologies. The chosen type of trajectory made it possible to significantly expand the “launch windows” during which the launch could be carried out. In addition, the lunar module in Korolev’s project could dock with the orbital vehicle only if it launched from the Moon at a strictly defined time, deviation from which could be catastrophic. Chelomey's project had no such drawback.

The rocket could be assembled at the cosmodrome from parts delivered by railway(unlike the huge N1, assembled in Baikonur), which somewhat reduced the cost of the project. The crew would consist of two astronauts. Since the launch vehicle could be constantly improved, it was possible in the future to increase the crew to 3 people. For increased reliability, most of the systems were duplicated, and at the launch site an emergency rescue system was used, which managed to remove the capsule with astronauts in the event of destruction or other malfunctions of the launch vehicle. A notable aspect of the project was that the UR-700 could be used for many other purposes, for example, for launching components into low-Earth orbit orbital stations. Do not forget that today's "workhorse" of Russia, "Proton", is Chelomeev's UR-500, i.e. from the same series as the UR-700. Maybe if this project had been implemented, we would now have a unique medium.

But let's return to the lunar topic. The mass of the LK-700 lunar spacecraft in a near-Earth intermediate orbit at an altitude of 200 km would be 151 tons. At this moment its total length would be 21.2 meters. The LK-700 itself would consist of several parts. The first part is the upper stage, which ensured the launch of the entire complex to the Moon; its mass would be 101 tons. The second part provided braking near the Moon, providing almost zero speed at an altitude of several kilometers above the Moon. The mass of the braking part was 37.5 tons. The third part was the landing apparatus itself, which landed on the surface.

Due to the special structure of the lunar compartment, six long, unique skis were used as supports. This made it possible to land with high vertical (up to 5 m/s) and horizontal speeds(up to 2 m/s) on a surface with an inclination of up to 15 o. After contact with the Moon, the landing module was leveled: each support had an electric motor, which ensured the desired alignment.

After working on the surface, the spacecraft (weighing already 9.3 tons) with the crew was launched into an intermediate lunar orbit or onto a direct return trajectory. Landing on Earth was carried out in the same way as in the L1 or Apollo projects. The device entered the Earth's atmosphere at the second escape velocity (11 km/s) over Antarctica, “jumped” out of the atmosphere and re-entered it in a given area of ​​the Soviet Union. The descent vehicle would weigh 1.5-2 tons.

The UR-700-LK700 project was presented on November 16, 1966 to the commission headed by Keldysh as an alternative to the N1-L3 project, which was led by Korolev and Mishin. And although Glushko supported Chelomey, and not Korolev, who, unfortunately, was dying at this time, nevertheless, the N1-L3 project remains more important than the UR-700. In general, it was planned to carry out five flights of the UR-700/LK-700; after two unmanned ones, three manned expeditions were to follow. It was assumed that when funding began in 1968, in the second quarter of 1969, cosmonauts would begin training under this program; in 1970, the design of a prototype lunar spacecraft would be completed, testing of which would be completed by 1971; in November of the same year, the first LK-700 (lunar module) and UR-700 (launch vehicle) would be ready. In May 1972, the first unmanned launch could take place, the second unmanned flight was planned to take place in November of the same year, a possible third - in April 1973. In the same month, the first manned flight was already possible, which were planned to be repeated in August and October of the same year. If the project had been opened, say, in 1961, then perhaps we would have been ahead of the Americans.

taken from http://kuasar.narod.ru