Reasons for failures in the initial period of the Second World War. The reasons for the temporary failures of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War - abstract

Alarming messages about an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked as a German journalist in Japan) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

From other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he feared provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, and believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and would first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - a special TASS message appeared, saying that all rumors about the war with Germany are lies. The troops were not put on combat readiness, although Zhukov, who was appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War began June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided advantages. German aviation dominated the air - bombing strikes were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of the scale of the invasion, and conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed their offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North was advancing on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group Center was advancing on Moscow and advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the loss ratio was 1:8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely destroyed, 70 lost up to half of their strength. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met desperate resistance. The border outposts were the first to take the enemy's blow - Lieutenant Lopatin's outpost fought for 11 days, 1 month - Brest Fortress, rams in the air, oncoming tank battle near Rivne.

When the situation became clear, it was accepted strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles took place in all three directions:

June - August - defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended itself for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - defense of Smolensk (September 5, near the city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counter-offensive, the Soviet Guard was born).

Kyiv defended itself for 2 months.

Odessa defended itself for 73 days.

250 days - defense of Sevastopol (German losses were greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is fighting stubborn defensive battles. Hitler concentrates his main forces in the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy:

1. General military mobilization of men born in 1905 - 1918 was announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law was introduced in the western regions of the country.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special evacuation council was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ since May 5 headed the government + head of the party).

6. The State Defense Committee was created to guide the activities of all government departments and institutions in war conditions.

7. Militia units are formed.

8. A mobilization economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, vacations were canceled, and mandatory overtime was introduced.

9. The country's leadership calls for deployment various forms socialist competition, fundraising for the defense fund, donation.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing resistance to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, militia, volunteers for the Red Army, duty to help air defense, collecting funds and things for the defense fund.

Results of the initial period of the war:

Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic states, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - loss of areas with large enterprises in various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers changed (the war in Russia is not a stroll through Europe).

Reasons for failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The surprise of the attack for the army, which is not in full combat readiness, and for the population, who are confident that there will be no war with Germany in the near future.

2. The superiority of the German army (in numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer personnel, there were plans, allies, huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. Miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

The timing of the attack was incorrectly determined,

Intelligence data and reports about the possible outbreak of war were ignored,

Flawed military doctrine

The direction of the main strike is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level of officers (due to repression).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to keep large armed forces on Far East(against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to guard prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period the war turned out extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the situation around, but everything possible is being done to achieve this.

1. Sudden attack by the enemy.

Early in the morning, exactly at half past four, on June 22, 1941, German aircraft attacked airfields, military camps, railway junctions, settlements Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. This took most of the divisions and regiments of the border military districts by surprise. The defensive lines were not occupied by troops who were withdrawn to summer camps. The artillery was located at the district training grounds far from the borders and their divisions. Aviation was not dispersed among field airfields. Only ships and naval bases of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, by order of the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, were put on high alert in advance. Also in constant readiness there were border troops.
Taking advantage of surprise and weak anti-aircraft artillery cover of airfields, German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft from border districts and seized complete air supremacy. Communication centers and bridges were captured, troop control was disrupted, etc. As a result of the sudden attack, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, wounded, captured or disappeared.
G.K. Zhukov says in his memoirs: “The main reasons for the defeat of our troops at the beginning of the war were that the war found our armed forces at the stage of their reorganization and rearmament with more advanced weapons; the fact that our border troops were not brought to wartime states in a timely manner, were not brought into full combat readiness and were not deployed according to all the rules of operational art to conduct active defense... These shortcomings further increased the advantages of the enemy, who was already superior to ours troops in quantitative and qualitative terms, and since the enemy had the strategic initiative, all these factors played a decisive role in the beginning of the war.”

2. Numerical superiority of the enemy .

The number of troops of Germany and its allies near the borders of the USSR amounted to 5.5 million people. This formidable army The invasion was opposed by Soviet troops from the western districts with a total number of 2.6 million people.

3. Hitler's army was mobilized, had two years of experience in modern warfare, while the professional level Soviet troops, especially the command staff, decreased after mass repressions in the army. By the beginning of the war, only 7% of the Red Army commanders had a higher military education, and 37% did not even complete the full secondary military course educational institutions.

As a result of mass repressions in 1937-1938. the country lost more than 40 thousand commanders, political workers, military engineers and specialists. “Without the year thirty-seven, there might not have been a war at all in the year forty-one. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war in 1941, a large role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that occurred in our country. There were a number of divisions commanded by captains, because everyone who was higher was completely arrested,” Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky says about this. At the end of the 30s, the following were repressed: M. N. Tukhachevsky (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War, creator of works that had a significant influence on the development of Soviet military science), V. K. Blucher (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War, leader of the Special Far Eastern Army until 1937), A. I. Egorov (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War), I. E. Yakir (commander of the 1st rank, participant in the First World War, October revolution and civil war) and others.
Unlike the USSR, in Germany there were many commanders who went through the First World War: H. Guderian, W. Keitel, F. Paulus, E. Manstein, etc. Although some military leaders were not repressed, many of them did not show special abilities. Among them are USSR Marshals Voroshilov and Budyonny.
Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, in February 1918, formed a cavalry detachment, with which he began military operations against the whites. Although a brilliant cavalry tactician, Budyonny had no talents outstanding commander, could not think big, which was reflected during the Second World War. After mass purges in the army in 1926-35 and repressions in 1930-38, a situation arose in the army when the highest positions were held by people from the 1st Cavalry Army, and Budyonny and K.E. Voroshilov was turned by Stalinist propaganda into almost the only heroes of the Civil War. Occupying high positions, Budyonny, being a convinced cavalryman and a fan of tactics civil war, is largely responsible for the fact that the country’s leadership slowed down the development of tank and motorized forces, and many new strategic developments were also “sheltered.” At all posts B. showed complete absence the commander's talents and inability to adapt to the new, changed strategy of war. In 1942 he was finally removed from command positions and never received them again.
During the hostilities, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov was always distinguished by the “purity” of his party views, but did not achieve much success. Together with S.M. Budyonny was among the main organizers of the 1st Cavalry Army (November 1919) and became a member of the Army's Revolutionary Military Council. After the death of M.V. Frunze Voroshilov, as a loyal and consistent supporter of Stalin, was appointed by him on November 6, 1925, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Voroshilov became the most celebrated commander of the Civil War. In Aug. 1939 headed the Soviet delegation in negotiations with France and Great Britain, and showed himself to be an incompetent diplomat. 7.5.1940, after after the unsuccessful actions of the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish War it became clear that Voroshilov was absolutely unable to lead the armed forces, Stalin removed him from the post of People's Commissar and made him deputy. prev Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and others Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (was there until May 1941). On June 10, 1941, Stalin appointed Voroshilov as commander-in-chief of the forces of the North-Western direction, but already on August 31. he, having shown his complete inability to lead troops in modern warfare, was removed from command. On Sept. 1941 Voroshilov was sent to Leningrad as front commander, suffered a crushing defeat, but Stalin, having learned that Voroshilov personally tried to lead the troops into the attack, immediately recalled him and replaced him with G.K. Zhukov. In September - November 1942 Voroshilov held the purely formal post of commander in chief partisan movement.
In subsequent years, the damage caused to personnel was compensated numerically, but qualitatively this did not happen. Many command and staff positions were filled by insufficiently experienced and trained people. Finding themselves in the most difficult conditions of the initial period of the war, they naturally made many mistakes.

The professional skills of sappers and engineers were clearly insufficient. The Air Force and Navy specialists were poorly trained and knew neither new nor old military equipment. Communication facilities at the tactical level were almost completely absent, so troops even at the army-corps level did not have stable communications. Air defense troops and facilities did not meet the requirements of its time due to the lack of detection and communication equipment. The reasons could be listed endlessly.

4. Major miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in assessing the role of mechanized formations. There was no developed automobile industry in the USSR. A significant part of the guns was moved by horses or old tractors. High degree of motorization
The German army allowed strike groups to rapidly develop an offensive, overcome water obstacles on the move, bypass Soviet formations from the flanks, and disrupt or weaken their counterattacks.

5. The ongoing modernization of military equipment and the reorganization of the main branches of the Soviet Armed Forces were not completed, so a number of old weapons were discontinued, and there were still few new ones in the army.

6. The old system of recruiting the army weakened the preparation of the army. In 1939, the Law “On General military duty" He consolidated the personnel principle of forming the armed forces and abolished class restrictions on conscription.

7. One of the main reasons for the initial failures of the Red Army in the fight against Nazi Germany was a miscalculation in assessing the military-strategic situation on the eve of the war.

German troops attacked suddenly, violating the non-aggression pact. Based on an erroneous assessment of the intentions of the fascist leadership, Stalin forbade the Soviet military command to carry out the necessary mobilization measures, regroup troops in the border districts and put them on combat readiness.
L.P. Beria rejected all information coming from intelligence agencies. In his memo to Stalin (06/21/41), he insists on the recall and punishment of the ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who assured the Soviet leadership that Hitler planned to launch an attack on the USSR on 06/22/41. Beria is also critical of the messages of the military attache in Germany, V.I. Tupikov, who claimed that Wehrmacht groups would attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv.
“Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, while still the Chief of the General Staff, based on an analysis of historical, geographical and operational strategic factors, concluded that in the event of a war with Germany, its command would deliver the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction. Stalin said that Germany needed bread to wage war. Therefore, the main blow may be delivered in Ukraine. “It is clear that Stalin’s opinion has become a directive for our military command,” says N. G. Pavlenko.
Vasilevsky, in his work, partially justifies Stalin, saying that he did not dare to begin the regrouping of the armed forces. The party wanted to delay the timing of entry into the war, and Stalin could not correctly grasp turning point when forced mobilization should have begun. Like Pavlenko, he argues that if troops were prepared in a timely manner, the enemy could be inflicted big losses, which would not allow him to advance so far across the territory of the USSR.

It was Stalin who made the biggest mistakes in the strategic level of troop leadership. He, according to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, both before the war and at the beginning of it had a very vague idea of military affairs. However, for over a year and a half (starting in the spring of 1941), he paid little attention to the opinions of military experts, believing himself to be the only strategist. Only the harsh reality of the autumn of 1942 diminished his ambitions as a “commander”.
Main feature The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense during the Civil War was that it did not replace or replace party and government bodies. Fundamental issues of conducting military operations were then considered at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, and at the Politburo and plenums of the Central Committee, and at congresses of the RCP (b). During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, much less party congresses, were held; all cardinal military issues were resolved in the State Defense Committee, or, more precisely, by Stalin personally. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the statement that the GKO, headed by Stalin, had its prototype as the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, which was under the leadership of V.I. Lenin.
Stalin actually discarded the experience of the civil war in the field of organizing the strategic leadership of the armed forces. Although at Headquarters it was listed as different periods from six to eight members, in fact two or three people worked in it. According to Vasilevsky, Stalin attached little importance to the affiliation of certain military leaders to Headquarters.
As is known, during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin held a number of important party and government posts. He was Secretary General Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In addition, he was assigned other senior leadership functions: to head the Transport Committee, deal almost daily with the People's Commissars responsible for the production of weapons and ammunition, resolve issues of improving military equipment with the People's Commissars and designers, etc. Naturally, such an overload of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief could not but affect negatively on the quality of his own military activities, prevented him from delving into the essence of the problems.

The offensive doctrine imposed by the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1939 on the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army aroused almost no objections - and who could object if the district commanders commanded for 1-2 years, the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko a little more. The leadership selected personnel who would not dare to object to the general line of the party. Therefore, the order of the Central Committee to prepare offensive operations was carried out, despite the fact that from 1939 to 1941 the situation changed radically, and the General Staff stupidly carried out those directives that were developed two years before the war.

The General Staff closely monitored the course of the two-year war in Europe, but the conclusions were drawn superficially. The achievements of the German command in concentrating the forces of tank formations in the direction of the main attacks, the use of operational and tactical landings, the rapid transfer of force, and the interaction of the forces of the ground forces, aviation, and navy were not noticed. It was denied that the main forces would enter into battle with the start of a particular campaign at the same time. The adoption by the Politburo in June 1941 of the “Resolution on the deployment of troops of the second strategic echelon” (“second line”) mainly along the river was also belated. Dnieper. The same Resolution outlined the construction of a state defense line on the approaches to Moscow.

A series of replacements of people's commissars and chiefs of the General Staff led to the fact that the General Staff, two, one, six months before the start of the war, made miscalculations in the timing of its probable start, in the operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon, and most importantly - they miscalculated in the direction of the main blows. Two years of the European war showed that the Germans were planning operations in areas of maximum throughput railways, because the organization of supplies and 90% of the movement of troops were carried out mainly along them. And as post-war analysis showed, the Barbarossa plan was based on the presence of railways in the direction of the main attacks. Despite the fact that the tracks in Europe are narrower, it would have been easier to use existing railways. Therefore, the first direction was chosen to Leningrad, the second - Minsk-Moscow and the third - to Vinnitsa, since the terrain was favorable for the use of tanks.

People's Commissariat of Defense in pre-war years to please Stalin's political ambitions, the assessment of one's own troops was overestimated, and the enemy's troops were underestimated. Thus, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D. Pavlov, argued on December 28, 1940 that our domestic tank corps is capable of solving the problem of destroying 1-2 mechanized divisions or 4-5 infantry divisions, and on January 13, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff, commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov stated: “When developing the field regulations, we proceeded from the fact that our division is much stronger than the German division and in an oncoming battle it will defeat the German one. In defense, one of our divisions will repel the attack of 2-3 enemy divisions.”

8.Negative impact on military action was influenced by the fact that Stalin tried to hide his guilt in the initial defeats of the Red Army in the Second World War, thereby punishing military leaders, generals and others for his misdeeds.

To deflect blame from himself and his inner circle, Stalin organized a trial. A large group of generals were convicted and executed on the basis of falsified verdicts. Among them are the commander of the troops of the Western Front D. G. Pavlov, the chief of staff of the same front V. E. Klimovskikh, the commander of the troops of the 4th Army A. A. Korobkov and other military leaders.
Under conditions of strict control over various kinds of “conversations,” those military leaders who tried to understand the reasons for the defeats came under suspicion and were subjected to repression. Thus, for confidential conversations with colleagues about possible mistakes of the command on strategic issues, a major military researcher, General V. A. Melikov, was accused of “defeatism” and imprisoned, where he died.
Along with repressions for attempts to analyze the causes of the defeats, the version about the surprise of the enemy attack and other half-truths was intensively spread.

9. By June 1941, the troops of the border districts were scattered over too large areas. Meanwhile, most of the Wehrmacht forces concentrated in advance and secretly directly near the Soviet borders.

10.The military-economic potential of Germany significantly exceeded the potential of the USSR at the initial stage of the war. In 1940, the USSR produced 18.3 million tons of steel, produced 31 million tons of oil and 166 million tons of coal. In Germany and the regions controlled by it, 32 million tons of steel were smelted per year, 400 million tons of coal and 6.5 million tons of oil were mined.

The USSR lagged behind Germany both in professional training (the army was mobilized and had two years of experience in warfare) and in weapons (Germany transferred its economy to the production of the latest military equipment and, in addition, it used the resources of almost all Western Europe, captured the weapons of more than 200 divisions of defeated and capitulated armies: France - 4930 tanks, armored personnel carriers, 3 thousand aircraft).

The Red Army also failed to turn into modern army, despite the delivery of new combat aircraft and tanks. The aircraft industry and tank building looked most characteristic. A comparative analysis of the production of combat aircraft of the USSR and Germany shows that the non-belligerent USSR before the war, in 1939 and 1940, produced more combat aircraft than Germany (see Table 1). At the request of May 13, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov Politburo, the aviation industry was placed under martial law with simultaneous restructuring and expansion.

Table 1

year		Combat aircraft	Total aircraft	Aircraft losses
	USSR	6 460 2
Germany	1 645	2 518 3
	USSR	8 233 2
Germany	7 180	10 247 3	5 324 4
	USSR	3 950 2	11 500 1	21 200 4
Germany	8 703	12 401 3	2 160
	USSR	19 772 2	25 400 1	14 700 4
Germany	11 137 3	15 409 3	13 769
	USSR	28 205 2	34 900 1	26 700 4
Germany	18 813 3	24 807 3	17 495
	USSR		40 200 1	30 500 4
Germany	2 287 3	40 593 3	32 280
	USSR		10 100 1	13 300 4
Germany	-	7 540 3
Total	USSR	106 400 4
Germany	71 065

9 new ones were built and 9 existing aircraft manufacturing plants were reconstructed; 6 new engine factories were built and all existing factories were reconstructed. At the beginning of the war, the aviation fleet amounted to 15,990 combat aircraft, of which 9,917 were stationed in the western strategic direction. Germany by June 22 had 1820 and 770 allied aircraft. Thus, the Soviet side has a 4.5:1 superiority in aircraft. But on the first day of fighting alone, 1,811 aircraft were lost, of which 1,489 were burned on the ground, and by July 10, 1941, 2,516 aircraft remained in the Soviet Air Force, one third of the existing ones. Almost the entire aircraft industry was lost in 1941. In addition, 22,150 aircraft were delivered under Lend-Lease from the USA and Great Britain.

The ratio between Soviet and German aircraft shot down was 5:1 (for the first month of fighting), and for the entire war - 1.5:1. All pre-war efforts to develop aviation turned out to be meaningless and ruinous due to poor personal training (pilots had 4 hours of flight time in the Kiev Special Military District, and pilots of the Baltic Military District spent only 15 hours in the air), overcrowding at field airfields, lack of control and lack of preparedness of the airfield network. The advantage in numbers was lost immediately, and in terms of air combat we were inferior to the Germans until the end of the war.

The situation was approximately the same with tanks. By the beginning of the war, the USSR had 22,600 tanks. During the war years, industry produced 96,500 tanks; under Lend-Lease, 38,100 tanks were received in the USSR from the USA and Great Britain; by May 9, 8,100 tanks remained at the front. At the same time, the USSR lost 96,500 tanks during the war years, and the Germans on all fronts lost 48,000 tanks. It turned out that the Germans, with one knocked out tank, destroyed two Soviet ones. There are many reasons for this. Before the war, more than half of all tanks were light. With approximate equality in firepower, maneuverability and armor protection of both light and medium tanks, soviet tanks were not radio-fed, unlike total radiofication German tanks, self-propelled guns and armored vehicles. Until 1943, only the vehicles of company and battalion commanders, i.e., were radio-equipped. one tank out of ten. Therefore, the Germans sought to knock out tanks with antennas first, while the rest became deaf and uncontrollable. The optics were also inferior to the German ones, which, coupled with a small overview, after the destruction of vehicles with radios of company and battalion commanders, turned the tanks into blind boxes. The requirement to fire on the move was a pointless waste of ammunition and rather a hope for the psychological instability of the enemy, but it made the tanks unarmed after a while. Many tanks were disabled due to inept operation. The driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of driving practice. Tankers were mainly horsemen and infantrymen who had absolutely no shooting, driving or control skills.

11.The German army had strong weapons and rich combat experience. She was psychologically well prepared for war and aimed at victory.

Conclusion

Summing up, the main reason for the first defeats of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War becomes obvious. It is not a significant superiority in the number of the German army, not a sudden attack by the Nazis, not border troops not brought to the wartime states in a timely manner. The main reason After the war, the militarily illiterate government of the USSR still remains.

Incompetent political and military leadership The USSR was preparing the country for war, but not for defense, as many authors of the Soviet formation, defenders of everything Soviet, are trying to convince and prove; to an offensive, aggressive war, on foreign territory, and, knowing the actual combat readiness of the Red Army, not little blood. Having knocked out a completely professional core from the army in 1937-1939, the CPSU (b) and the NKVD under the leadership of I.V. Stalin did as much to reduce the country's combat capability as even the Nazis did not do. The professional training of commanders of districts, armies, divisions, and battalions could not be compared with the German one. The frightened, downtrodden commanders blindly fulfilled the requirements of the field regulations, trying not to deviate one iota from the demands of the party, because retribution could follow immediately. That is why patterns in operational art were noted during the war years, and at the tactical level, attacks were carried out in a straight line, in crowds of 500-1000 people, across minefields, since there were barrage detachments and penal companies behind them, because those who doubted their urgent need were immediately shot.

Only the Politburo, the government of the USSR and the NKVD are to blame for the fact that the country's strategic reserves were transferred to the rear of the border districts. Stored stocks were not only not sufficiently stocked by rail, which was practically impossible, but their destruction was also not envisaged - due to the lack of both specialists and means of detonation. Only the Airborne Commissariat is to blame for the fact that, despite the warnings of military experts, simultaneous reconstruction work began at all airfields to increase the length of the runways, and aircraft accumulated at a limited number of airfields that were pushed closer to the border, which made them vulnerable to aviation Nazis.

References

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Dolutsky I.I. Domestic history. XX century. textbook for grades 10-11. Part II. M., 1996, p. 112

Russia in the 20th century. Textbook for 10 - 11 grades. Levandovsky A.A., Shchetinov Yu.A.
2002. p. 74

History of Russia, XX - early XXI centuries. Shestakov Vladimir Alekseevich. Education, 2011 p. 215

Vasilevsky A. M. The work of a lifetime. M.: Voenizdat, 1984. p. 86

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Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G. History of the 20th century: Textbook for senior classes of secondary schools and institutions. M.: Yakhont, 1998. p. 94

History of Russia. 1917–2009. Barsenkov A.S., Vdovin A.I. 2010. p. 56

Zhukov G.K. . Memories and reflections. In 2 volumes. T. 1. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.

History of Russia. Soviet era (1917-1993). Khutorskoy V.Ya. 2005 p. 126

Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. History of Russia. XX century: Textbook. book For 9th grade. educational institutions. Page 131.

There was a war. Reflections of a military man. historian / [N. G. Pavlenko]. M. IR "Spring" 1994

Kulakov E., Myatkov M., Rzheshevsky O., War 1941-1945. Facts and documents M.: Olma-Press, 2001., P.46

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How did the name USSR come about?
Back in 1913, Lenin dreamed of “a huge historical step from medieval fragmentation to the future socialist unity of all countries.” In the first years after the collapse of the empire, the question of such unity became especially acute.
Stalin proposed that the independent republics formed after the revolution be included in the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy; Lenin, on the contrary, showing “national liberalism”, called for a federation of equal republics.

Delegates of the First Congress of Soviets in the conference hall. Moscow.
On December 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress of Soviets took place in Moscow, which, based on Lenin’s version, adopted a declaration on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which included the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR and Transcaucasian SFSR.
It is interesting that formally, according to the Constitution, each of the republics retained the right to secede from the USSR; they could also independently enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states.
Who financed industrialization?
The leadership of the USSR, having just restored the destroyed economy, set the task of catching up with the Western countries that had gone ahead. This required accelerated industrialization, which required considerable funds.
In 1928, Stalin approved an accelerated approach, which envisaged eliminating the backlog in two five-year plans. The costs of the economic miracle were supposed to be paid by the peasantry, but this was not enough.

The country needed currency, which the party leadership mined in various ways, for example, the sale of paintings from the Hermitage. But according to economists, there were other sources.
According to some researchers, the main source of industrialization was loans from American bankers, who subsequently counted on the creation of the Jewish Republic in Crimea.
Why did Stalin abandon Bolshevism?
Soon after gaining sole power, Stalin moved away from the revolutionary values of Bolshevism. A clear indication of this is his fight against the “Leninist Guard”.
Many landmarks marked October Revolution, turned out to be unattainable, and the ideas were unviable. Thus, communism became a distant prospect that could not be realized without the establishment of socialism.

The Bolshevik slogan “All power to the Soviets!” has also undergone changes. Stalin came to new formula, where socialism is power concentrated in one hand.
The ideas of internationalism are now being replaced by state patriotism. Stalin promotes rehabilitation historical figures and prohibits the persecution of believers.
Historians are divided on the reasons for Stalin's departure from Bolshevik slogans. According to some, this is caused by the desire to unite the country, others explain this by the need to change the political course.
Why did Stalin start the purges in 1937?
"Great Terror" 1937-1938 still raises many questions among historians and researchers. Today, few people doubt Stalin’s involvement in the “mass purge”; opinions differ only when counting the victims. According to some reports, the number of people executed in political and criminal cases can reach up to 1 million people.
Researchers also disagree on the reasons for mass repressions. According to historian Yuri Zhukov, the repression was caused by the confrontation between Stalin and regional party bodies, which, fearing to lose their posts, prevented elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

But another Russian historian, Alexei Teplyakov, is confident that the “Great Terror” was an action planned and prepared by Stalin.
For the French historian Nicolas Werth, repression became a mechanism of “social engineering” that completed the policy of dispossession and deportations. And German expert Karl Schlögel believes that “terror, initiated by the elite in the name of the great goal of getting rid of enemies, was readily picked up and used by many structures and citizens to solve their problems.”
Why did the powerful Red Army suffer defeats in the first months of the war?
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War was catastrophic for the Red Army. By July 10, 1941, the Red Army, according to some sources, had lost about 850 thousand people. Historians explain the reasons for the defeats as a complex various factors, which came together and led to disaster.
A special place among such reasons is occupied by the deployment of Soviet troops, which, according to the September 1940 version of the “Fundamentals of Deployment”, was designed not for border defense, but for preventive strikes on Germany. The Red Army formations, divided into echelons, favored the successful advance of German troops.

Lately, much emphasis has been placed on the miscalculations of the General Staff, which used an outdated doctrine of warfare. Some researchers, in particular V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, also find direct culprits - Stalin, Zhukov, Voroshilov, who “did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops "
Why did Khrushchev condemn Stalin's personality cult?
On February 25, 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev delivered a report “On the cult of personality and its consequences,” in which he mercilessly criticized the former leader. Today, many historians, in general, see behind a correct, albeit biased assessment of Stalin’s personality, not only a desire to restore historical justice, but to solve their own problems.

In particular, by shifting all responsibility onto Stalin, Khrushchev to some extent absolved himself of part of the blame for participating in mass repressions in Ukraine. “The charges brought against Stalin, coupled with the rehabilitation of victims of unjustified executions, could soften the anger of the population,” writes American historian Grover Furr.
But there are other hypotheses according to which criticism of Stalin was a weapon in the fight against members of the Presidium - Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, who could prevent the implementation of Khrushchev’s plans for the reorganization of the state apparatus.
Why was Crimea given to Ukraine?
The transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 became a resonant event that resonated many years later. Now the emphasis is not only on legality. Opinions on this matter vary: some claim that in this way the USSR avoided transferring Crimea to the Jewish Republic due to its “credit history” with American bankers, others suggest that it was a gift to Ukraine in honor of the 300th anniversary Pereyaslavl Rada.
Among the reasons mentioned are unfavorable conditions for farming in the steppe regions of the peninsula and the territorial proximity of Crimea to Ukraine. Many people support the version according to which the “Ukrainization” of Crimea should have contributed to the restoration of the destroyed national economy.
Why did they send troops to Afghanistan?
The question of the advisability of sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan began to be raised already during perestroika. Was given and moral assessment decision of the Soviet leadership, which cost the lives of more than 15 thousand internationalist soldiers.

Today it is already obvious that, along with the declared justification for the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the territory of the DRA, as assistance to the “friendly Afghan people,” there was another, no less compelling reason.
The former head of the Illegal Intelligence Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Yuri Drozdov, noted that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity, since US actions intensified in the country, in particular, technical observation posts were put forward to the southern borders of the USSR.
Why did the Politburo decide to carry out Perestroika?
By the mid-1980s, the USSR came close to economic crisis. Devastation in agriculture, chronic shortages of goods and lack of industrial development required immediate measures.
It is known that the reforms were developed on the instructions of Andropov, but Gorbachev initiated them. “Apparently, comrades, we all need to rebuild,” Gorbachev’s words were picked up by the media and quickly became the slogan of the new ideology.

Today, the organizers of Perestroika are accused of the fact that, consciously or not, the transformations they initiated led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some researchers argue that the reforms were conceived in order to seize property by the Soviet elite. But Sergei Kara-Murza sees the victory of Perestroika as a result of the activities of Western intelligence services.
The ideologists of Perestroika themselves repeatedly stated that the reforms were exclusively socio-economic in nature.
Who was behind the 1991 coup?
On August 20, 1991, Gorbachev scheduled the signing Union Treaty, in which the new position of the Soviet republics was to be outlined. But the event was disrupted by the putsch. The conspirators then cited the need to preserve the USSR as the main reason for the coup.
According to the State Emergency Committee, this was done “in order to overcome a deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy.”

But today, many researchers call the August coup a farce and consider the main directors to be those who benefited from the collapse of the country. Thus, former member of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail Poltoranin claims that “the 1991 putsch was staged by Boris Yeltsin together with Mikhail Gorbachev.”
However, some researchers still believe that the goal of the State Emergency Committee was to seize power, for which they wanted to “overthrow Gorbachev” and “prevent Yeltsin from coming to power.”
Taras Repin

1. Miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack;

3. Qualitative military superiority of the enemy;

4. Repressions in the Red Army;

Conclusion;

References.

In the first months of the war, serious mistakes made by the country's leadership in the pre-war years were revealed.

Analysis wide range Historical literature allows us to identify the following main reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first months of the Great Patriotic War:

miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack;

qualitative military superiority of the enemy;

the delay in the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces on the western borders of the USSR;

repressions in the Red Army;

1. Miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack

One of serious mistakes The Soviet leadership should be considered a miscalculation in determining the possible time of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact concluded with Germany in 1939 allowed Stalin and his inner circle to believe that Germany would not risk violating it in the near future, and the USSR still had time to systematically prepare for the possible repulsion of aggression from the enemy. In addition, I.V. Stalin believed that Hitler would not start a war on two fronts - in Western Europe and on the territory of the USSR. The Soviet government believed that until 1942. will be able to prevent the USSR from being drawn into the war. As you can see, this belief turned out to be wrong.

Despite obvious signs approaching war, Stalin was confident that he could, through diplomatic and political measures, delay the start of Germany's war against the Soviet Union. Stalin's views were fully shared by Malenkov, who was the secretary of the party's Central Committee in those years. 18 days before the start of the war, at a meeting of the Main Military Council, he sharply criticized the draft directive on the tasks of party political work in the army. Malenkov believed that this document was drawn up taking into account the imminent possibility of an attack and therefore was not suitable as a guideline for troops:

“The document is presented in a primitive manner, as if we are going to fight tomorrow”

Intelligence from numerous sources was not taken into account. Due importance was not given to reliable reports from Soviet intelligence officers, including the famous communist, hero of the Soviet Union R. Sorge. But at the same time, it should be noted that the information was often contradictory, made it difficult to analyze the information and could not contribute to the disclosure main goal disinformation of the Nazi intelligence services - to achieve surprise in the first strike of the Wehrmacht.

Intelligence came to the government from sources such as

foreign intelligence of the Navy;

The conclusion of the head of the GRU, Lieutenant General F.I., had a very negative impact. Golikov dated March 20, 1941. that information about the impending German attack on the USSR should be considered false and coming from the British or even from German intelligence.

A lot of misinformation came through diplomatic channels. The Soviet ambassador to France sent him to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on June 19, 1941. this message:

“Now all the journalists here are chatting about the general mobilization in the USSR, that Germany has presented us with an ultimatum to secede Ukraine and transfer it under German protectorate, and so on. These rumors come not only from the British and Americans, but also from their German circles. Apparently, the Germans, taking advantage of this agitation, are preparing a decisive attack on England.”

The USSR hoped that the declaration of war would occur closer to 1942. and from the presentation of an ultimatum, i.e. diplomatically, as was the case in Europe, and now the so-called “game of nerves” was being waged.

The most truthful data came from the 1st Directorate of the NKGB. On the channel of this body on June 17, 1941. Stalin was presented with a special message from Berlin, which said:

“All German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time.” Thus, the information about Germany’s imminent attack on the USSR, being reported in a disjointed form, did not create a convincing picture of the events taking place, and could not answer the questions: when could a border violation occur and war break out, what are the goals of the aggressor’s conduct of hostilities, it was regarded as provocative and aimed at aggravating relations with Germany. The USSR government was afraid that an active build-up of armed forces in the area of the western borders could provoke Germany and serve as a reason for starting a war. It was strictly forbidden to hold such events. June 14, 1941 A TASS message was broadcast in the press and on the radio. It said: “... Rumors about Germany’s intention to undermine the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis, and the recent transfer of German troops... to the eastern and north-eastern regions of Germany is connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with to Soviet-German relations."

This message could only further disorient the population and the Armed Forces of the USSR. June 22, 1941 showed how deeply mistaken the state leaders were about the plans of Nazi Germany. Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky notes: “what happened on June 22 was not foreseen by any plans, so the troops were taken by surprise in the full sense of the word.

Another miscalculation of the leadership of the USSR and General Staff The Red Army incorrectly determined the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht forces. The main blow of Nazi Germany was considered not the central direction, along the Brest-Minsk-Moscow line, but the southwestern direction, towards Kyiv and Ukraine. In this direction, literally before the war itself, the main forces of the Red Army were transferred, thereby exposing other directions.

Thus, conflicting information about the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR, the hopes of the country’s political leadership that the enemy would comply with previously reached agreements, and underestimation of the Wehrmacht’s plans for its own state did not allow us to prepare in time to repel the attack.

2. Delay in the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces

The strategy covers the theory and practice of preparing the country and armed forces for war, planning and conducting war and strategic operations.

Many authors, researchers of military operations during the war of 1941-1945, note that the amount of equipment and personnel of the armies at the beginning of the attack was approximately equal, in some positions there is some superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces.

What prevented us from using all the equipment and weapons to repel the attack of the fascist army?

The fact is that an erroneous assessment of the time of a possible German attack on the Soviet Union caused a delay in the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Union, and the surprise of the attack destroyed a lot of military equipment and ammunition depots.

Lack of preparation in repelling an attack was primarily manifested in poor organization of defense. The significant length of the western border also determined the stretching of the Red Army's forces along the entire line of the border.

Annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states to the USSR in 1939-1940. led to the disbandment of the old, well-organized border outposts and defense lines. The border structure has moved to the west. We had to hastily build and re-form the entire border infrastructure. This was done slowly, and there was a shortage of funds. In addition, it was necessary to build new highways and lay railway lines for the transport of material resources and people. Those railway tracks, which were on the territory of these countries, were narrow-gauge, European. In the USSR, the tracks were wide gauge. As a result, the supply of materials and equipment, equipment of the western borders lagged behind the needs of the Red Army.

The defense of the borders was poorly organized. The troops that were supposed to cover the borders were at an extreme disadvantage. Only individual companies and battalions were located in the immediate vicinity of the border (3-5 km). Most of the divisions intended to cover the border were located far from it and were engaged in combat training by peacetime standards. Many formations conducted exercises far from facilities and their home bases.

It should be noted that before the war and at its very beginning, the army leadership made mistakes in manning the formations with personnel and equipment. Compared to pre-war standards, the staffing level of most units was no more than 60%. The operational formation of the front was single-echelon, and reserve formations were small in number. Due to a lack of funds and manpower, it was not possible to create the connections required by the standards.

In Belarus, out of 6 mechanized corps, only one was equipped with materiel (tanks, vehicles, artillery, etc.) according to standard standards, and the rest were significantly understaffed.

Divisions of the 1st echelon (a total of 56 divisions and 2 brigades) were located at a depth of up to 50 km, divisions of the 2nd echelon were 50-100 km from the border, reserve formations were 100-400 km away.

Border cover plan developed by the General Staff in May 1941. did not provide for the equipment of defensive lines by troops of the 2nd and 3rd echelons. They were tasked with taking positions and being ready to launch a counterattack. The battalions of the 1st echelon were supposed to prepare engineering and take up defensive positions.

In February 1941 at the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, a plan was adopted to expand the ground forces by almost 100 divisions, although it would have been more expedient to complete and transfer the existing divisions to wartime levels and increase their combat readiness. All tank divisions were part of the 2nd echelon.

The deployment of mobilization reserves was extremely unsuccessful. A large number were located near the borders, and, therefore, were the first to be attacked by German troops, depriving some of their resources.

Military aviation by June 1941 relocated to new western airfields, which were insufficiently equipped and poorly covered by air defense forces.

Despite the increase in German troop groups in the border areas, only on June 16, 1941. The transfer of 2 echelons of covering armies from places of permanent deployment to the borders began. The strategic deployment was carried out without leading the covering troops to repel the aggressor's preemptive strike. The deployment did not meet the objectives of repelling a sudden enemy attack.

A miscalculation of the Red Army General Staff in assessing the direction of the enemy’s main attack played a negative role. Literally on the eve of the war, strategic and operational plans were revised, and this direction was recognized not as the central one, along the Brest-Minsk-Moscow line, but as the southwestern one, towards Kyiv and Ukraine. Troops began to gather in the Kiev Military District, thereby exposing the central and other directions. But, as you know, the Germans delivered the most significant blow precisely in the central direction.

Analyzing the pace of the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, most historians come to the conclusion that the full deployment could have been accomplished no earlier than the spring of 1942. Thus, the delay in the strategic deployment of our troops did not allow us to sufficiently organize the defense of the western borders and give a worthy rebuff to the forces of Nazi Germany.

3. Qualitative military superiority of the enemy

Despite the non-aggression agreements between the USSR and Germany, no one doubted that sooner or later the Soviet Union would become the target of an attack by the Nazis. It was only a matter of time. The country tried to prepare to repel aggression.

By mid-1941 The USSR had a material and technical base that, when mobilized, ensured the production of military equipment and weapons. Were carried out important events By restructuring industry and transport, ready to fulfill defense orders, the armed forces were developed, their technical re-equipment was carried out, and the training of military personnel was expanded.

Allocations for military needs increased significantly. The share of military expenditures in the Soviet budget was 43% in 1941. versus 265 in 1939 The output of military products exceeded the rate of industrial growth by almost three times. Factories were urgently relocated to the east of the country. New defense plants were built at a rapid pace and existing defense plants were reconstructed; they were allocated more metal, electricity, and new machine tools. By the summer of 1941 one fifth of defense plants operated in the eastern regions of the USSR.

New warehouses with fuel and ammunition were built everywhere, new airfields were built and old airfields were reconstructed.

The armed forces were equipped with new rifle, artillery, tank and aviation weapons and military equipment, samples of which were developed, tested and introduced into mass production.

The quantitative superiority of the Red Army in military equipment in many positions did not mean qualitative superiority. Modern combat required modern weapons. But there were many problems with him.

Resolving issues regarding new types of weapons was entrusted to the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kuliku, L.Z. Mehlis and E.A. Shchadenko, who, without sufficient grounds, removed existing models from service and for a long time did not dare to introduce new ones into production. Senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, based on incorrect conclusions from the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, urgently pushed large-caliber guns and ammunition into production. Anti-tank weapons, 45 mm and 76 mm guns, were discontinued. Before the start of the war, production of anti-aircraft artillery guns had not begun. Ammunition production fell sharply behind.

There were too few new models of aircraft and tanks, especially T-34 tanks and heavy KV tanks, and they did not have time to fully master their production by the beginning of the war. This was led to by a rash decision to eliminate large formations of armored forces and replace them with more maneuverable and controllable individual brigades, based on the specific experience of military operations in Spain in 1936-1939. This reorganization was carried out on the eve of the war, but it must be admitted that the Soviet command soon realized the mistake and began to correct it. Large ones began to form again mechanized corps, but by June 1941 they were unprepared for war.

Supply of troops in border districts modern types armament was 16.7% for tanks and 19% for aircraft. The old material was significantly worn out and required repair. The new technology was not fully mastered by the personnel of the Armed Forces. The old equipment was not used to train newly recruited military personnel and those coming from the reserves in order to preserve the remaining motor and flight resources. As a result, by the beginning of the war, many tank driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving vehicles, and the pilots' flight time was approximately 4 hours (in the Kyiv Special Military District).

Bombers of old models were used - SB, TB-3, which flew on combat missions without the necessary fighter cover and in small groups, which led to significant losses.

TO small arms there were also complaints. The 50mm caliber mortars supplied to the Red Army turned out to be practically unsuitable for use. The combat capabilities of artillery were reduced due to a lack of mechanical propulsion, communications and reconnaissance equipment.

The weak motorization of the Red Army sharply reduced the maneuverability of its units and formations. They moved untimely to deployment lines and left positions untimely when it was necessary to escape from enemy attack.

Among other things, there was a lack of modern radio stations, telephones, and cable. The beginning of the war revealed the insufficient preparedness and vulnerability of the fixed lines and nodes used by the Supreme High Command from enemy influence. This greatly complicated the command and control of troops and required the necessary measures to be taken. The warning about the appearance of enemy aircraft was poorly organized. Therefore, fighters often took to the air to cover their targets late.

Thus, the country’s leadership’s miscalculations in determining the most important types of weapons to successfully resist the aggressor and equipping troops with new types of equipment could not but affect the defense of state borders and allowed the enemy to advance deeper into the USSR. This point of view is shared by many historians.

In general, assessing the combat capabilities of the Soviet border districts at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we can state their good combat capabilities, although inferior in some components of the aggressor army, which correct use could help repel Germany's first strike.

4. Repressions in the Red Army

Mass repressions of the late 30s significantly weakened the command and officer corps of the USSR Armed Forces; by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political instructors had been in their positions for no more than one year.

According to the calculations of modern war researchers, only for 1937-1938. Over 40 thousand commanders of the Red Army and the Soviet Navy were repressed, of which more than 9 thousand were senior and senior command personnel, i.e. approximately 60-70%.

It is enough to provide the following data to understand how the army command staff suffered:

out of five available by 1937. Three marshals were repressed (M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.I. Egorov, V.K. Blyukher), all were shot;

of the four commanders of the 1st rank - four (I.F. Fedko, I.E. Yakir, I.P. Uboevich, I.P. Belov);

of the two flagships of the fleet of 1st rank - both (M.V. Viktorov, V.M. Orlov);

out of 12 commanders of 2nd rank - all 12;

out of 67 corps commanders - 60;

out of 199 division commanders - 136 (including the head of the Academy of the General Staff D.A. Kuchinsky);

out of 397 brigade commanders - 211.

Many other military leaders were under threat of arrest; incriminating material was collected on S.M. Budyonny, B.M. Shaposhnikova, D.G. Pavlova, S.K. Timoshenko and others, on the eve and at the very beginning of the war, the NKVD authorities arrested a group of prominent military leaders of the Red Army: K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.M. Stern and others. With the exception of Meretskov, they were all shot in October 1941.

As a result, by the summer of 1941. Among the command staff of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a specialized secondary education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses for junior lieutenants or were called up into the army from the reserve.

IN modern history The issue of repressions in the Red Army is interpreted ambiguously. Most researchers believe that the repressions were carried out with the aim of strengthening Stalin's personal power. Repressed military leaders were considered agents of Germany and other countries. For example, Tukhachevsky, who owes a lot to

L. Trotsky's career, was accused of treason, terrorism and military conspiracy, because he did not exalt the name of Stalin, and thus was a person disliked by him.

But on the other hand, Trotsky declared abroad that not everyone in the Red Army was loyal to Stalin, and it would be dangerous for the latter to leave his friend Tukhachevsky in the high command. The head of state dealt with them according to the laws of war.

W. Churchill notes: “The cleansing of the Russian army from pro-German elements caused severe damage to its combat effectiveness,” but at the same time notes that “a control system based on terror can be strengthened by the merciless and successful assertion of its power.”

Unlike Wehrmacht officers who had a special military education and gained enormous experience in fighting the war of the Polish and French military companies of 1939-1940, and some officers also had experience of the First World War, our commanders in the overwhelming majority did not have it.

In addition, as noted earlier, the time of a possible attack on the USSR was incorrectly determined. Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not risk attacking the Soviet Union, waging a war on two fronts. Propaganda was carried out among the troops about the superiority of the communist system and the Red Army, and the soldiers became increasingly convinced of a quick victory over the enemy. For many ordinary soldiers, the war seemed like a “promenade.”

The deep conviction of the Red Army that its troops would fight only on foreign territory and with “little bloodshed” did not allow them to prepare in a timely manner to repel aggression.

In May 1940 a specially created commission headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Zhdanov conducted an inspection of the People's Commissariat of Defense, as a result of which it was noted that the People's Commissariat did not know the true state of affairs in the army, did not have an operational plan for the war, and did not attach due importance to the combat training of soldiers.

The Red Army was left without battle-hardened, experienced commanders. The young cadres, although they were devoted to Stalin and the Soviet state, did not have the talent and proper experience. Experience had to be gained during the outbreak of war.

Thus, mass repressions created a difficult situation in the army, affected the fighting qualities of soldiers and officers, who turned out to be poorly prepared for a serious war, and weakened moral principles. In the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated December 28, 1938. “On the fight against drunkenness in the Red Army” it was said:

“... the tarnished honor of a Red Army soldier and the honor of the military unit to which you belong is of little concern to us.”

There was no necessary experience and the Headquarters, therefore, had serious miscalculations at the beginning of the war.

Conclusion

Great Patriotic War 1941-1954. was a difficult test for the entire country and the entire Soviet people. The courage and heroism of our soldiers and home front workers, perhaps, has no analogues in world history. The Soviet people endured the difficulties of the war years, learned the bitterness of loss and the joy of Victory. Although more than 60 years have passed since the end of the war, its lessons should not pass unnoticed for future generations.

We must remember the lessons of history and try to prevent them from happening in the future. The victory of the Soviet people in the last war came at a heavy price. From the first days of the war, the country suffered significant losses. Only the mobilization of all forces made it possible to turn the tide of the war.

Analyzing the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first days and months of the war in a broad aspect, we can conclude that they were largely the result of the functioning of the totalitarian political regime that formed in the USSR by the end of the 30s.

The main, most important reasons the failures of the first stage of the war - repression in the Red Army, miscalculations by the top leadership of the state in determining the time of Germany's attack on the USSR, the delay in the strategic deployment of armed forces on the western borders, errors in the strategy and tactics of the first battles, the qualitative superiority of the enemy, were determined by the cult of personality.

Repressions in the Red Army, political, scientific, and economic circles contributed to the underestimation of the situation in the country and the world and jeopardized the combat capability of the state. The lack of qualified personnel, especially senior management, in almost all areas did not allow us to respond in a timely and proper manner to the constantly changing situation in the world. Ultimately, this led to colossal losses in the Great Patriotic War, especially at the initial stage.

References

1. E. Kulkov, M. Malkov, O. Rzheshevsky “War 1941-1945.” World history. War and Peace / M.: “OLMA-PRESS”, 2005 - 479 p. 2. A.I. Balashov, G.P. Rudakov “History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)”

2. Recent history fatherland. XX century: Textbook. A manual for university students; in 2 volumes - T.2 / ed. A.F. Kiseleva, E.M. Shchagina.- M.: Humanitarian Publishing Center VLADOS, 1998 - 448 p.

3. Zuev M.N. Domestic history: A textbook for high school students and those entering universities in 2 books. : Book. 2: Russia of the 20th - early 21st centuries. - M. Publishing house "ONICS 21st century", 2005. - 672 p.

4. Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Brief history. Moscow. : Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense. - 1965 - 632 p.

5. The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia. . -.ch. ed. MM. Kozlov-M.: “Soviet Encyclopedia”, 1985. - 832 p. from illus.

6. E.M. Skvortsova, A.N. Markov “History of the Fatherland.” - M. Ed. UNITY.- 2004.

7. Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M., History of Russia: Textbook for universities. - 3rd ed., rev. and additional - M.: Publishing house NORMA (Publishing group NORMA-INFRA-M), 2002. -768 p.

8. Rokossovsky K.K. "Soldier's Duty" M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002

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Abstract on the history of Russia

June 22, 1941. fascist Germany with its allies unleashed a carefully prepared blow on the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. A new period has begun in the life of the Soviet state - the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.

Germany pursued the following goals in this war:

Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;

Imperialist - achieving world domination;

Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;

Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of those who remained into slaves.

The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:

Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;

Providing assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;

Elimination of fascism and creation of conditions excluding the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.

The nature of the war naturally followed from the goals of the war. On the part of Germany it was an unjust, aggressive and criminal war. From the USSR side - liberation and fair.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.

June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repel the enemy.

November 1942 - December 1943 was the period of a radical turning point in the war.

January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious end of the war in Europe.

Reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:

Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;

Insufficient vocational training a significant part of the command cadres of the Red Army;

Weakening the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army through unjustified repressions against the leadership of the country's armed forces;

Miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;

Germany's advantage over the USSR in economic potential;

Germany's significant superiority in military terms. Its army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped modern means struggle, had two years of experience in combat operations. At the same time, in Soviet army work on its technical equipment has not yet been completed. The balance of forces on the eve of the war.

Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153+37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Germany's allies: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1,400 combat aircraft.

And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aircraft, in terms of quality they were still inferior to the enemy.

German offensive strategy.

In accordance with the strategy of “blitzkrieg” war, it was envisaged the invasion of powerful groups of tank formations and aviation, in cooperation with ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops in the border districts, and within 3-5 months reach the Arkhangelsk-r. line. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group North advanced in the direction of the Baltic states, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group South strikes Western Ukraine, captures Kyiv, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German Army of Norway operated in the direction of Murmansk. Two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also took part in the fighting.

Mobilization activities.

A) Creation of the country's highest defense management bodies.

June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the Main Command was created, which on August 8 was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Its members included People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.

June 30, 1941 - formed State Committee Defense (GKO), endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, and later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, and Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.

B) Directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the procedure:

Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;

Organization of resistance in occupied territory.

July 3, 1941 - Stalin’s address to the people on the radio, where for the first time the mortal threat hanging over the country was openly announced and an appeal was made to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.