The progress of the defense of the Brest Fortress. How did the defense of the Brest Fortress take place?
Defense of the Brest Fortress (defense of Brest) is one of the very first battles between the Soviet and German armies during the Great Patriotic War.
Brest was one of the border garrisons on the territory of the USSR; it covered the path to the central highway leading to Minsk. That is why Brest was one of the first cities to be attacked after the German attack. The Soviet army held back the enemy's onslaught for a week, despite the numerical superiority of the Germans, as well as support from artillery and aviation. As a result of a long siege, the Germans were still able to take possession of the main fortifications of the Brest Fortress and destroy them. However, in other areas the struggle continued for quite a long time: small groups remaining after the raid resisted the enemy with all their might.
The defense of the Brest Fortress became important battle, in which Soviet troops were able to show their readiness to defend themselves to the last drop of blood, despite the enemy’s advantages. The defense of Brest went down in history as one of the bloodiest sieges and at the same time as one of the greatest battles that showed all the courage of the Soviet army.
Brest Fortress on the eve of the war
The city of Brest became part of Soviet Union shortly before the start of the war - in 1939. By that time, the fortress had already lost its military significance due to the destruction that had begun and only reminded of past battles. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century. and was part of the defensive fortifications of the Russian Empire on its western borders, but in the 20th century. it ceased to have military significance.
By the time the war began, the Brest Fortress was mainly used to house garrisons of military personnel, as well as a number of families of the military command; there was also a hospital and utility rooms. By the time of Germany’s treacherous attack on the USSR, about 8,000 military personnel and about 300 command families lived in the fortress. There were weapons and supplies in the fortress, but their quantity was not designed for military operations.
Storming of the Brest Fortress
The assault on the Brest Fortress began on the morning of June 22, 1941, simultaneously with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The barracks and residential buildings of the command were the first to be subjected to powerful artillery fire and air strikes, since the Germans wanted, first of all, to completely destroy the entire command staff located in the fortress, and thereby introduce confusion into the army and disorient it.
Although almost all the officers were killed, the surviving soldiers were able to quickly find their bearings and create a powerful defense. The surprise factor did not work as expected, and the assault, which was supposed to end by 12 noon, lasted for several days.
Even before the start of the war, the Soviet command issued a decree according to which, in the event of an attack, military personnel must immediately leave the fortress itself and take positions along its perimeter, but only a few managed to do this - most of the soldiers remained in the fortress. The defenders of the fortress were in a deliberately losing position, but they did not give up their positions and did not allow the Germans to quickly and unconditionally take possession of Brest.
The progress of the defense of the Brest Fortress
Soviet soldiers, who, contrary to plans, were unable to quickly leave the fortress, quickly organized a defense and within a few hours drove the Germans out of the territory of the fortress, who managed to get into its central part. The soldiers occupied barracks and various buildings located along the perimeter in order to most effectively organize the defense of the fortress and be able to repel enemy attacks from all flanks. Despite the absence of a commanding staff, volunteers were quickly found from among ordinary soldiers who took charge of the operation.
On June 22, the Germans made 8 attempts to break into the fortress, but they did not yield results. Moreover, the German army, contrary to all forecasts, suffered significant losses. The German command decided to change tactics: instead of an assault, a siege of the Brest Fortress was now planned. The troops that had broken through were recalled and deployed around the perimeter of the fortress to begin a long siege and cut off the Soviet troops' path to exit, as well as disrupt the supply of food and weapons.
On the morning of June 23, the bombardment of the fortress began, after which an assault was attempted again. Groups of German army forced their way in, but encountered fierce resistance and were destroyed - the assault again failed, and the Germans were forced to revert to siege tactics. Extensive battles began, which did not subside for several days and greatly exhausted both armies.
Despite the onslaught of the German army, as well as shelling and bombing, Soviet soldiers held the line, although they lacked weapons and food. A few days later supplies were stopped drinking water, and then the defenders decided to release women and children from the fortress so that they would surrender to the Germans and remain alive, but some women refused to leave the fortress and continued to fight.
On June 26, the Germans made several more attempts to break into the Brest Fortress; they succeeded partially - several groups broke through. Only by the end of the month was the German army able to capture most of the fortress, killing Soviet soldiers. However, the groups, scattered and having lost a single line of defense, still continued to put up desperate resistance even when the fortress was taken by the Germans.
The significance and results of the defense of the Brest Fortress
Resistance separate groups soldiers continued until the fall, until these groups were destroyed by the Germans and the last defender of the Brest Fortress died. During the defense of the Brest Fortress, Soviet troops suffered colossal losses, but at the same time the army showed genuine courage, thereby showing that the war for the Germans would not be as easy as Hitler had hoped. The defenders were recognized as war heroes.
The attack on our country in June 1941 began along the entire western border, from north to south, each border outpost took on its own battle. But the defense of the Brest Fortress became legendary. The fighting was already taking place on the outskirts of Minsk, and rumors were passed from fighter to fighter that somewhere there, in the west, a border fortress was still defending itself and not surrendering. According to the German plan, eight hours were allotted for the complete capture of the Brest fortification. But neither a day later, nor two days later, the fortress was taken. It is believed that the last day of its defense is July 20. The inscription on the wall is dated this day: “We are dying, but we are not giving up...”. Witnesses claimed that even in August the sounds of gunfire and explosions were heard in the central citadel.
On the night of June 22, 1941, cadet Myasnikov and private Shcherbina were in a border secret in one of the shelters of the Terespol fortification at the junction of the branches of the Western Bug. At dawn they noticed a German armored train approaching the railway bridge. They wanted to inform the outpost, but realized it was too late. The ground shook underfoot, the sky darkened with enemy aircraft.
Head of the chemical service of the 455th rifle regiment A.A. Vinogradov recalled: |
“On the night of June 21-22, I was appointed operational duty officer at the regiment headquarters. The headquarters was located in the ring barracks. At dawn there was a deafening roar, everything was drowned in fiery flashes. I tried to contact the division headquarters, but the phone did not work. I ran to the units of the unit. I found out that there are only four commanders here - Art. Lieutenant Ivanov, Lieutenant Popov and Lieutenant Makhnach and political instructor Koshkarev who arrived from military schools. They have already begun to organize defense. Together with soldiers from other units, we knocked out the Nazis from the club building and the command staff canteen, did not give the opportunity to break into the central island through the Three-Armed Gate" |
Cadets of the school of drivers and border guards, soldiers of the transport company and sapper platoon, participants in the training camps for cavalrymen and athletes - everyone who was in the fortification that night took up defensive positions. The fortress was defended by several groups in different parts of the citadel. One of them was headed by Lieutenant Zhdanov, and next door groups of Lieutenants Melnikov and Cherny were preparing for battle.
Under the cover of artillery fire, the Germans moved towards the fortress.. At this time there were about 300 people at the Tepespol fortification. They responded to the attack with rifle and machine gun fire and grenades. However, one of the enemy assault troops managed to break through to the fortifications of the Central Island. The attacks occurred several times a day, and it was necessary to engage in hand-to-hand combat. Each time the Germans retreated with losses.
On June 24, 1941, in one of the basements of the building of the 333rd engineering regiment, a meeting of commanders and political workers of the central citadel of the Brest Fortress was held. A unified defense headquarters for the Central Island was created. Captain I.N. Zubachev became the commander of the combined combat group, his deputy was regimental commissar E.M. Fomin, and chief of staff was senior lieutenant Semenenko.
The situation was difficult: there was not enough ammunition, food, and water. The remaining 18 people were forced to leave the fortification and hold the defense in the Citadel.
Private A.M. Fil, clerk of the 84th Infantry Regiment: |
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On June 30, 1941, a bomb hit the basement where the Citadel defense headquarters was located. Fomin was seriously wounded and shell-shocked, lost consciousness and was captured. The Germans shot him at the Kholm Gate. And the defenders of the fortress continued to hold the defense.
When the Germans captured women and children at the Volyn fortification and drove them ahead of them to the Citadel, no one wanted to go. They were beaten with rifle butts and shot. And the women screamed Soviet soldiers: “Shoot, don’t spare us!”.
Lieutenants Potapov and Sanin led the defense in the two-story barracks of their regiment. Nearby there was a building where the 9th border outpost was located. Soldiers fought here under the command of the head of the outpost, Lieutenant Kizhevatov. Only when only ruins remained of their building did Kizhevatov and his soldiers move to the basements of the barracks and continued to lead the defense together with Potapov.
After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the garrison of the Brest Fortress heroically held back the onslaught of the 45th German Infantry Division, which was supported by artillery and aviation, for a week.
After a general assault on June 29–30, the Germans managed to capture the main fortifications. But the defenders of the fortress continued to fight courageously for almost three more weeks in certain areas in conditions of shortage of water, food, ammunition and medicine. The defense of the Brest Fortress became the first, but eloquent lesson that showed the Germans what awaited them in the future.
Fighting in the Brest Fortress
The defense of an old fortress that had lost its military significance near the city of Brest, incorporated into the USSR in 1939, is an undoubted example of perseverance and courage. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century as part of a system of fortifications created on the western borders of the Russian Empire. By the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union, it could no longer carry out serious defensive tasks and its central part, consisting of the citadel and three adjacent main fortifications, was used to house a border detachment, border covering units, NKVD troops, engineering units, a hospital and auxiliary units. At the time of the attack, there were about 8 thousand military personnel in the fortress, up to 300 families of command personnel, a number of people undergoing military training, medical personnel and economic service personnel - in all, in all likelihood, more than 10 thousand people.
At dawn on June 22, 1941, the fortress, primarily the barracks and residential buildings of the command staff, was subjected to powerful artillery fire, after which the fortifications were attacked by German assault troops. The assault on the fortress was led by battalions of the 45th Infantry Division.
The German command hoped that the surprise of the attack and powerful artillery preparation would disorganize the troops stationed in the fortress and break their will to resist. According to calculations, the assault on the fortress should have ended by 12 noon. However, the German staff officers miscalculated.
Despite the surprise, significant losses and death large quantity commanders and garrison personnel showed courage and tenacity unexpected for the Germans. The position of the fortress defenders was hopeless.
Only part of the personnel managed to leave the fortress (according to plans, in the event of a threat of hostilities, troops were to take positions outside it), after which the fortress was completely surrounded.
They managed to destroy the detachments that broke into the central part of the fortress (citadel) and take up defense in strong defensive barracks located along the perimeter of the citadel, as well as in various buildings, ruins, basements and casemates both in the citadel and on the territory of adjacent fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command.
During June 22, the defenders of the fortress repelled 8 enemy attacks. The German troops suffered unexpectedly high losses, so by the evening all the groups that had broken through to the territory of the fortress were recalled, a blockade line was created behind the outer ramparts, and military operations began to take on the character of a siege. On the morning of June 23, after artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, the enemy continued to attempt an assault. The fighting in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the Germans did not expect. By the evening of June 23, their losses amounted to more than 300 people killed alone, which was almost double the losses of the 45th Infantry Division during the entire Polish campaign.
In the following days, the defenders of the fortress continued to resist steadfastly, ignoring the calls for surrender transmitted through radio installations and the promises of the envoys. However, their strength gradually dwindled. The Germans brought up siege artillery. Using flamethrowers, barrels of flammable mixtures, powerful explosive charges, and, according to some sources, poisonous or asphyxiating gases, they gradually suppressed pockets of resistance. The defenders experienced a shortage of ammunition and food. The water supply was destroyed, and it was impossible to get to the water in the bypass channels, because... the Germans opened fire on everyone who came into view.
A few days later, the defenders of the fortress decided that the women and children who were among them should leave the fortress and surrender to the mercy of the victors. But still, some women remained in the fortress until the last days of hostilities. After June 26, several attempts were made to break out of the besieged fortress, but only a few small groups were able to break through.
By the end of June, the enemy managed to capture most of the fortress; on June 29 and 30, the Germans launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress, alternating attacks with artillery shelling and aerial bombardment using heavy aerial bombs. They managed to destroy and capture the main groups of defenders in the Citadel and the Eastern Redoubt of the Kobrin fortification, after which the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of separate centers. A small group of fighters continued to fight in the Eastern Redoubt until July 12, and later in the caponier behind the outer rampart of the fortification. The group was headed by Major Gavrilov and deputy political instructor G.D. Derevianko, being seriously wounded, was captured on July 23.
Individual defenders of the fortress, hiding in the basements and casemates of the fortifications, continued their personal war until the autumn of 1941, and their struggle is covered in legends.
The enemy did not get any of the banners of the military units fighting in the fortress. The total losses of the 45th German Infantry Division, according to the divisional report, on June 30, 1941, were 482 killed, including 48 officers, and over 1,000 wounded. According to the report, German troops captured 7,000 people, which apparently included everyone who was captured in the fortress, incl. civilians and children. The remains of 850 of its defenders are buried in a mass grave on the territory of the fortress.
Battle of Smolensk
In mid-summer - early autumn 1941, Soviet troops carried out a complex of defensive and offensive operations, aimed at preventing an enemy breakthrough in the Moscow strategic direction and known as the Battle of Smolensk.
In July 1941, the German Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal T. von Bock) sought to fulfill the task set by the German command - to encircle the Soviet troops defending the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, to capture Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk and open the way to Moscow .
In order to thwart the enemy's plans and prevent his breakthrough to Moscow and the central industrial regions of the country, the Soviet High Command, since the end of June, concentrated troops of the 2nd strategic echelon (22nd, 19th, 20th, 16th and 21st). I army) along the middle reaches of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. At the beginning of June, these troops were included in the Western Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko). However, only 37 of the 48 divisions were in position at the start of the German offensive. 24 divisions were in the first echelon. Soviet troops were unable to create a strong defense, and the density of troops was very low - each division had to defend a strip 25–30 km wide. The second echelon troops deployed 210–240 km east of the main line.
By this time, formations of the 4th Tank Army had reached the Dnieper and Western Dvina, and the infantry divisions of the 16th German Army from Army Group North had reached the section from Idritsa to Drissa. More than 30 infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd armies of the German Army Group Center, delayed by the fighting in Belarus, lagged behind the mobile forces by 120–150 km. Nevertheless, the enemy began the offensive in the Smolensk direction, having a 2-4 times superiority in manpower over the troops of the Western Front
and technology.
The offensive of German troops on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front began on July 10, 1941. A strike force consisting of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions broke through the Soviet defenses. The enemy's mobile formations advanced up to 200 km, surrounded Mogilev, captured Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelnya, and Krichev. The 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front found themselves in an operational encirclement in the Smolensk region.
From July 21, the troops of the Western Front, having received reinforcements, launched a counter-offensive in the direction of Smolensk, and in the zone of the 21st Army a group of three cavalry divisions made a raid on the flank and rear of the main forces of Army Group Center. From the enemy side, the approaching infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd German armies entered the fight. On July 24, the 13th and 21st armies were united into the Central Front (commander - Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov).
It was not possible to defeat the enemy’s Smolensk group, but as a result of intense battles, Soviet troops thwarted the offensive of German tank groups, helped the 20th and 16th armies escape from encirclement across the Dnieper River and forced Army Group Center to go on the defensive on July 30. At the same time, the Soviet High Command united all reserve troops and the Mozhaisk defense line (39 divisions in total) into the Reserve Front under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukov.
On August 8, German troops resumed their offensive, this time to the south - in the zone of the Central and then the Bryansk Front (created on August 16, commander - Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko), in order to protect their flank from the threat of Soviet troops from the south. By August 21, the enemy managed to advance 120–140 km and wedge itself between the Central and Bryansk fronts. In view of the threat of encirclement, on August 19, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the troops of the Central and the troops of the Southwestern Front operating to the south beyond the Dnieper. The armies of the Central Front were transferred to the Bryansk Front. On August 17, the troops of the Western Front and two armies of the Reserve Front went on the offensive, which inflicted noticeable losses on the Dukhshchina and Elninsky enemy groups.
The troops of the Bryansk Front continued to repel the advance of the 2nd German Tank Group and the 2nd German Army. A massive air strike (up to 460 aircraft) on the enemy’s 2nd Tank Group was unable to stop its advance to the south. On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy launched a strong tank attack on the 22nd Army and captured Toropets on August 29. The 22nd and 29th armies retreated to the eastern bank of the Western Dvina. On September 1, the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies launched an offensive, but did not achieve significant success. By September 8, the defeat of the enemy group was completed and the dangerous protrusion of the front in the Yelnya area was eliminated. On September 10, the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts went on the defensive on the lines along the Subost, Desna, and Western Dvina rivers.
Despite the significant losses suffered during the Battle of Smolensk, the Soviet army managed to force German troops to go on the defensive in the main direction for the first time during World War II. The Battle of Smolensk became important stage disruption of the German plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet army gained time to prepare the defense of the capital of the USSR and subsequent victories in the battles near Moscow.
Tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area
From June 23 to June 29, 1941, during border clashes in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area, a counter tank battle took place between the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, which launched a counterattack, together with the combined arms formations of the front.
Already on the first day of the war, three corps that were in reserve received orders from front headquarters to move northeast of Rivne and strike, together with the 22nd Mechanized Corps (which was already there), on the left flank of von Kleist’s tank group. While the reserve corps was approaching the concentration site, the 22nd Corps managed to suffer heavy losses during battles with German units, and the 15th Corps, located to the south, was unable to break through the dense German anti-tank defense. The reserve corps approached one by one.
The 8th Corps was the first to arrive at the new location with a forced march, and it immediately had to go into battle alone, since the situation that had developed by that time in the 22nd Corps was very difficult. The approaching corps included T-34 and KV tanks, and the military contingent was well prepared. This helped the corps maintain combat effectiveness during battles with superior enemy forces. Later the 9th and 19th mechanized corps arrived and also immediately entered into fighting. The inexperienced crews of these corps, exhausted by 4-day marches and continuous German air raids, found it difficult to resist the experienced tank crews of the German 1st Panzer Group.
Unlike the 8th Corps, they were armed with old T-26 and BT models, which were significantly inferior in maneuverability to modern T-34s, and most of the vehicles were damaged during air raids on the march. It so happened that the front headquarters was unable to gather all the reserve corps simultaneously for a powerful strike, and each of them had to engage in battle in turn.
As a result, the strongest tank group of the Red Army lost its striking power even before the truly critical phase of the fighting on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front arose. Nevertheless, the front headquarters managed to preserve the integrity of its troops for a while, but when the strength of the tank units was running out, the headquarters gave the order to retreat to the old Soviet-Polish border.
Despite the fact that these counterattacks did not lead to the defeat of the 1st Panzer Group, they forced the German command, instead of attacking Kyiv, to turn its main forces to repel the counterattack and use its reserves prematurely. The Soviet command gained time to withdraw the Lvov group of troops that was under threat of encirclement and prepare defense on the approaches to Kyiv.
Having unexpectedly attacked the Soviet Union, the fascist command expected to reach Moscow in a few months. However, the German generals met resistance as soon as they crossed the border of the USSR. The Germans took several hours to capture the first outpost, but the defenders of the Brest Fortress held back the power of the huge fascist army for six days.
The siege of 1941 became
For the historical Brest Fortress, however, it had been attacked before. The fortress was built by the architect Opperman in 1833 as a military structure. The war reached it only in 1915 - then it was blown up during the retreat of Nikolaev’s troops. In 1918, after the signing, which took place in the Citadel of the fortress, it remained under German control for some time, and by the end of 1918 it was in the hands of the Poles, who owned it until 1939.
Real hostilities overtook the Brest Fortress in 1939. The second day of World War II began for the fortress garrison with a bombing. German aircraft dropped ten bombs on the citadel, damaging the main building of the fortress - the Citadel, or White Palace. At that time, there were several random military and reserve units stationed in the fortress. The first defense of the Brest Fortress was organized by General Plisovsky, who, from the scattered troops he had, managed to assemble a combat-ready detachment of 2,500 people and evacuate the officers' families in time. Against the armored corps of General Heinz, Plisovsky was able to oppose only an old armored train, several of the same tanks and a couple of batteries. Then the defense of the Brest Fortress lasted three full days.
From September 14 to 17, while the enemy was almost six times stronger than the defenders. On the night of September 17, the wounded Plisovsky took the remnants of his detachment south, towards Terespol. After this, on September 22, the Germans handed over Brest and the Brest Fortress to the Soviet Union.
The defense of the Brest Fortress in 1941 fell on the shoulders of nine Soviet battalions, two artillery divisions and several separate units. In total this amounted to about eleven thousand people, excluding three hundred officer families. The infantry division of Major General Schlieper stormed the fortress, which was reinforced with additional units. In total, about twenty thousand soldiers were subordinate to General Schlieper.
The attack began early in the morning. Due to the surprise of the attack, the commanders did not have time to coordinate the actions of the fortress garrison, so the defenders were immediately divided into several detachments. The Germans immediately managed to capture the Citadel, but they were never able to gain a foothold in it - the invaders were attacked by the Soviet units remaining behind, and the Citadel was partially liberated. On the second day of defense, the Germans proposed
surrender, to which 1900 people agreed. The remaining defenders united under the leadership of Captain Zubachev. The enemy forces, however, were immeasurably higher, and the defense of the Brest Fortress was short-lived. On June 24, the Nazis managed to capture 1,250 fighters, another 450 people were captured on June 26. The last stronghold of the defenders, the East Fort, was crushed on June 29 when the Germans dropped an 1,800 kg bomb on it. This day is considered the end of the defense, but the Germans cleared the Brest Fortress until June 30, and the last defenders were destroyed only by the end of August. Only a few managed to go to Belovezhskaya Pushcha to join the partisans.
The fortress was liberated in 1944, and in 1971 it was preserved and turned into a museum. At the same time, a memorial was erected, thanks to which the defense of the Brest Fortress and the courage of its defenders will be remembered forever.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Far Eastern state university
Branch in Ussuriysk
Faculty of Higher Professional Education
Topic: Brest Fortress
Completed: Zueva E.N.
Checked: Borisevich S.P.
Ussuriysk, 2010
Plan
Introduction
1. Brest Fortress. Construction and device
2.Defense Brest Fortress
3. Causes of military defeats at the first stage of the war (1941-1942)
Conclusion
List of sources and literature used
Application
Introduction
In June 1941, there were many indications that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union. German divisions were approaching the border. The preparations for war became known from intelligence reports. In particular, the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge even reported the exact day of the invasion and the number of enemy divisions that would be involved in the operation. In these difficult conditions, the Soviet leadership tried not to give the slightest reason for starting a war. It even allowed “archaeologists” from Germany to search for “the graves of soldiers killed during the First World War.” Under this pretext, German officers openly studied the area and outlined routes for a future invasion.
At dawn on June 22, one of the longest days of the year, Germany went to war against the Soviet Union. At 3:30 a.m., units of the Red Army were attacked by German troops along the entire border. In the early pre-dawn hours of June 22, 1941, night guards and patrols of border guards who guarded the western state border of the Soviet country noticed a strange celestial phenomenon. There, ahead, beyond the border line, above the land of Poland captured by the Nazis, far away, on western region slightly brightening pre-dawn sky, among the already dimmed stars of the shortest summer night suddenly some new, unprecedented stars appeared. Unusually bright and multi-colored, like the lights of fireworks - sometimes red, sometimes green - they did not stand still, but slowly and non-stop sailed here, to the east, making their way among the fading night stars. They dotted the entire horizon as far as the eye could see, and along with their appearance, from there, from the west, came the roar of many engines.
On the morning of June 22, Moscow radio broadcast the usual Sunday programs and peaceful music. Soviet citizens learned about the beginning of the war only at noon, when Vyacheslav Molotov spoke on the radio. He said: “Today, at 4 o’clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country.
Three powerful groups of German armies moved east. In the north, Field Marshal Leeb directed the attack of his troops through the Baltic states to Leningrad. In the south, Field Marshal Runstedt aimed his troops at Kyiv. But the strongest group of enemy troops deployed its operations in the middle of this huge front, where, starting at the border city of Brest, a wide ribbon of asphalt highway goes into east direction- through the capital of Belarus Minsk, through the ancient Russian city of Smolensk, through Vyazma and Mozhaisk to the heart of our Motherland - Moscow.
In four days, German mobile formations, operating on narrow fronts, broke through to a depth of 250 km and reached the Western Dvina. The army corps were 100–150 km behind the tank corps.
The command of the North-Western Front, at the direction of the Headquarters, made an attempt to organize defense on the line of the Western Dvina. The 8th Army was to defend from Riga to Liepaja. The 27th Army advanced to the south, whose task was to cover the gap between the inner flanks of the 8th and 11th armies. The pace of deployment of troops and occupation of defense at the line of the Western Dvina was insufficient, which allowed the enemy's 56th motorized corps to immediately cross to the northern bank of the Western Dvina, capture Daugavpils and create a bridgehead on the northern bank of the river. The 8th Army, having lost up to 50% of its personnel and up to 75% of its equipment, began to retreat to the northeast and north, to Estonia. Due to the fact that the 8th and 27th armies were retreating in diverging directions, the path for enemy mobile formations to Pskov and Ostrov was open.
The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was forced to leave Liepaja and Ventspils. After this, the defense of the Gulf of Riga was based only on the islands of Sarema and Hiuma, which were still held by our troops. As a result of the fighting from June 22 to July 9, the troops of the Northwestern Front did not complete the tasks assigned to them. They abandoned the Baltic states, suffered heavy losses and allowed the enemy to advance up to 500 km.
The main forces of Army Group Center were advancing against the Western Front. Their immediate goal was to bypass the main forces of the Western Front and encircle them with the release of tank groups to the Minsk region. The enemy's offensive on the right wing of the Western Front in the direction of Grodno was repulsed. The most difficult situation developed on the left wing, where the enemy attacked Brest and Baranovichi with the 2nd Tank Group.
With the start of the shelling of Brest at dawn on June 22, the units of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions located in the city were alerted. At 7 o'clock the enemy broke into the city. Part of our troops retreated from the fortress. The remainder of the garrison, which by this time totaled up to an infantry regiment, organized the defense of the citadel and decided to fight encircled to the end. The heroic defense of Brest began, which lasted over a month and was an example of the legendary valor and courage of Soviet patriots.
1. Brest Fortress. Construction and device
Brest Fortress, a monument of defensive architecture of the 19th century. Located in the western part of Brest. It was erected in the mid-19th century on the site of an ancient settlement, on islands formed by the Western Bug and Mukhavets rivers, their branches and artificial canals. The important military-strategic position of Brest-Litovsk in western Russia determined its choice as a place for the construction of a fortress. The creation of fortifications precisely at the confluence of the Western Bug and Mukhavets was proposed in 1797 by the military engineer Devalan. The fortress project, developed by Russian military engineers K. Opperman, Maletsky and A. Feldman, was approved in 1830. The construction of 4 fortifications began (temporary at first). The central one (Citadel) was built on the site of the trade and craft center of the city, which in connection with this was moved to the right bank of the Mukhavets.
The Volyn (Southern) fortification was built on the site of the ancient Detinets, where at the beginning of the construction of the Brest Fortress there was the Brest Castle (dismantled during this period). The Kobrin (Northern) fortification was erected on the site of the Kobrin suburb, where hundreds of townspeople's estates were located. Terespolskoye (Western) was built on the left bank of the Western Bug. There were many churches, monasteries, and churches in the built-up area. Some of them were rebuilt or adapted to the needs of the fortress garrison. On the Central Island, in the Jesuit Collegium, built in the 18th century, the office of the commandant of the fortress was located; The Basilian monastery, later known as the White Palace, was rebuilt as an officers' meeting. At the Volyn fortification in the Bernardine monastery, which existed since the beginning of the 17th century, in 1842-54. there was the Brest Cadet Corps, later a military hospital.
The reconstruction of temporary fortifications was carried out in 1833-42. The first stone of the fortress was laid on June 1, 1836. It was opened on April 26, 1842. The total area of all fortifications is 4 square kilometers, the length of the main fortress line is 6.4 km. The main defensive unit was the Citadel - a curved in plan, closed 2-story barracks 1.8 km long with walls almost two meters thick. Its 500 casemates could accommodate 12 thousand people with the equipment and food supplies necessary for combat. Niches in the barracks walls with loopholes and embrasures were adapted for firing rifles and cannons. The compositional center of the Citadel is the St. Nicholas Church built on the highest place of the garrison (1856-1879, architect G. Grimm). Gates and bridges connected the Citadel with other fortifications. Communication with the Kobrin fortification was carried out through the Brest and Brigitsky gates and bridges over Mukhavets, with Terespolsky - through the gates of the same name and the largest cable bridge across the Western Bug in Russia at that time, with Volynsky - through the Kholmsky gate and a drawbridge over Mukhavets. The Kholmsky and Terespolsky gates have been partially preserved. Kholmsky previously had 4 towers with battlements. Above the entrance doorway of the Terespolskys there were 4 tiers of loophole windows, over which a three-tiered tower with a watch platform was later built.
Terespol, Kobrin, Volyn bridgehead fortifications with reduits (forts), a system of bastions, ramparts and water barriers protected the Citadel. Along the outer line of the fortress there was an earthen rampart up to 10 m high with stone casemates, behind it there were canals with bridges thrown across them that led outside the fortress. At the beginning of its existence, the Brest Fortress was one of the most advanced fortifications in Russia. In 1857, General E.I. Totleben proposed modernizing Russian fortifications in accordance with the increased power of artillery. In 1864, the reconstruction of the Brest Fortress began. The Western and Eastern reduits were built - horseshoe-shaped fortifications with casemates, traverses, powder magazines, in 1878-1888. - 10 more forts, after which the defensive line reached 30 km. As a result of the 2nd reconstruction (1911-1914), in which military engineer D.M. Karbyshev took part, the fortification line was completely modernized. At a distance of 6-7 km from the Brest Fortress, a 2nd line of forts was created. But the construction and reconstruction of the forts of the fortress was not completed before the start of the 1st World War. During the Revolution of 1905-1907. in the fortress there were performances of the Brest-Litovsk garrison in 1905-1906. In August 1915, the Russian command, in order to avoid encirclement, evacuated the garrison and blew up some fortifications. With the beginning of World War I, the fortress was intensively prepared for defense, but on the night of August 13, 1915, during a general retreat, it was abandoned and partially blown up by Russian troops. On March 3, 1918, in the citadel, in the so-called “White Palace” (former Basilian monastery, then officers’ meeting) Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The fortress was in German hands until the end of 1918; then under Polish control; in 1920 it was occupied by the Red Army, but was soon recaptured by the Poles and in 1921, according to the Treaty of Riga, it was transferred to Poland. Used as barracks, military depot and political prison; in the 1930s Opposition political figures were imprisoned there. In September 1939, when the troops of Nazi Germany attacked Poland, part of the Citadel barracks was destroyed, and the buildings of the White Palace and the engineering department were damaged. With increased mobility and improvement technical weapons armies, the Brest Fortress as a military-defensive complex lost its significance. It was used for quartering units of the Red Army. On June 22, 1941, the fortress garrison was one of the first to take the blow of the Nazi invaders.
2. Defense of the Brest Fortress
Brest Fortress is one of 9 fortresses built in the 19th century. to strengthen Russia's western border. On April 26, 1842, the fortress became one of the operating fortresses of the Russian Empire.
All Soviet people were well aware of the feat of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. As the official version stated, a small garrison fought for a whole month against an entire division of Germans. But even from the book by S.S. Sergeev’s “Brest Fortress” you can find out that “in the spring of 1941, units of two rifle divisions of the Soviet Army were stationed on the territory of the Brest Fortress. These were persistent, seasoned, well-trained troops. One of these divisions - the 6th Oryol Red Banner - had a long and glorious battle history. The other - the 42nd Infantry Division - was created in 1940 during the Finnish campaign and has already managed to show itself well in battles on the Mannerheim Line.” That is, in the fortress there were still not several dozen infantrymen armed only with rifles, as many had the impression Soviet people, who watched feature films about this defense.
Indeed, on the eve of the war, more than half of the units were withdrawn from the Brest Fortress to training camps - 10 of 18 rifle battalions, 3 of 4 artillery regiments, one of two anti-tank and air defense divisions each, reconnaissance battalions and some other units. On the morning of June 22, 1941, the fortress actually had an incomplete division - without 1 rifle battalion, 3 sapper companies and a howitzer regiment. Plus the NKVD battalion and border guards. On average, the divisions had about 9,300 personnel, i.e. 63%. It can be assumed that in total there were more than 8 thousand soldiers and commanders in the fortress on the morning of June 22, not counting the staff and patients of the hospital.
The German 45th Infantry Division (from the former Austrian army), which had combat experience in the Polish and French campaigns, fought against the garrison. The staff strength of the German division was supposed to be 15–17 thousand. So, the Germans probably still had a numerical superiority in manpower (if they had a full staff), but not 10-fold, as Smirnov claimed. It is hardly possible to talk about superiority in artillery. Yes, the Germans had two 600-mm self-propelled mortars 040 (the so-called “Karls”). The ammunition capacity of these guns is 8 shells. One mortar jammed on the first shot. But the two-meter walls of the casemates were not penetrated by divisional artillery.
The Germans decided in advance that the fortress would have to be taken only by infantry - without tanks. Their use was hampered by forests, swamps, river channels and canals surrounding the fortress. Based on aerial photographs and data obtained in 1939 after the capture of the fortress from the Poles, a model of the fortress was made. However, the command of the 45th Wehrmacht Division did not expect to suffer such high losses from the defenders of the fortress. The division report dated June 30, 1941 states: “the division took 7,000 prisoners, including 100 officers. Our losses were 482 killed, including 48 officers, and over 1,000 wounded.” It should be taken into account that the number of prisoners undoubtedly included medical staff and patients of the district hospital, and this is several hundred, if not more, people who were physically unable to fight. The proportion of commanders (officers) among prisoners is also indicatively small (military doctors and patients in the hospital are obviously counted among the 100 captured). The only senior commander (senior officer) among the defenders was the commander of the 44th regiment, Major Gavrilov. The fact is that in the first minutes of the war, the houses of the command staff came under artillery fire - naturally, they were not as strong as the structures of the citadel.
For comparison - during Polish campaign in 13 days, the 45th division, having covered 400 kilometers, lost 158 killed and 360 wounded. Moreover, the total losses of the German army on the eastern front by June 30, 1941 amounted to 8886 killed. That is, the defenders of the Brest Fortress killed more than 5% of them. And the fact that there were about 8 thousand defenders of the fortress, and not a “handful” at all, does not detract from their glory, but, on the contrary, shows that there were many heroes. More than what the government for some reason tried to convince. And to this day, in books, articles and websites about the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, the words “small garrison” are constantly encountered. Another common option is 3,500 defenders. 962 soldiers are buried under the slabs of the fortress.
Of the troops of the first echelon of the 4th Army, those who were stationed in the citadel of the Brest Fortress suffered the most, namely: almost the entire 6th Infantry Division (with the exception of the howitzer regiment) and the main forces of the 42nd rifle division, its 44th and 455th rifle regiments.
At 4 a.m. on June 22, heavy fire was opened on the barracks and the exits from the barracks in the central part of the fortress, as well as on the bridges and entrance gates of the fortress and the houses of the command staff. This raid caused confusion among the Red Army personnel, while the commanding personnel, who were attacked in their quarters, were partially destroyed. The surviving part of the command staff could not penetrate the barracks due to strong barrage fire. As a result, Red Army soldiers and junior command staff, deprived of leadership and control, dressed and undressed, in groups and individually left the fortress on their own, overcoming the bypass canal, the Mukhavets River and the rampart of the fortress under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. It was impossible to take into account the losses, since the personnel of the 6th Division mixed with the personnel of the 42nd Division. Many could not get to the conditional gathering place, since the Germans fired concentrated artillery fire at it. Some commanders still managed to get to their units in the fortress, but they were unable to withdraw the units and remained in the fortress themselves. As a result, the personnel of units of the 6th and 42nd divisions, as well as other units, remained in the fortress as its garrison, not because they were assigned tasks to defend the fortress, but because it was impossible to leave it.
Almost simultaneously, fierce battles broke out throughout the entire fortress. From the very beginning, they acquired the character of a defense of individual fortifications without a single headquarters and command, without communications and almost without interaction between the defenders of different fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command.
In the shortest possible time, they rallied their forces and organized a rebuff to the Nazi invaders. After just a few hours of fighting, the command of the German 12th Army Corps was forced to send all available reserves to the fortress. However, as the commander of the German 45th Infantry Division, General Schlipper, reported, this “also did not change the situation. Where the Russians were thrown back or smoked out, after a short period of time new forces appeared from basements, drainpipes and other shelters and fired so excellent that our losses increased significantly." The enemy unsuccessfully broadcast calls for surrender through radio installations and sent envoys.
The resistance continued. The defenders of the Citadel held an almost 2-kilometer ring of defensive 2-story barracks belt in the face of intense bombing, artillery shelling and attacks by enemy assault groups. During the first day, they repulsed 8 fierce attacks by enemy infantry blocked in the Citadel, as well as attacks from outside, from bridgeheads captured by the enemy on the Terespol, Volyn, Kobrin fortifications, from where the Nazis rushed to all 4 gates of the Citadel. By the evening of June 22, the enemy entrenched himself in part of the defensive barracks between the Kholm and Terespol gates (later used it as a bridgehead in the Citadel), and captured several sections of the barracks at the Brest Gate.
However, the enemy's calculation of surprise did not materialize; Through defensive battles and counterattacks, Soviet soldiers pinned down the enemy's forces and inflicted heavy losses on them. Late in the evening, the German command decided to pull back its infantry from the fortifications, create a blockade line behind the outer ramparts, and begin the assault on the fortress again on the morning of June 23 with artillery shelling and bombing.
The fighting in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the enemy did not expect. The stubborn heroic resistance of Soviet soldiers was met by the Nazi invaders on the territory of each fortification. On the territory of the border Terespol fortification, the defense was held by soldiers of the driver courses of the Belarusian Border District under the command of the head of the course, senior lieutenant F.M. Melnikov and course teacher Lieutenant Zhdanov, transport company of the 17th border detachment, led by commander Senior Lieutenant A.S. Cherny together with soldiers from cavalry courses, a sapper platoon, reinforced units of the 9th border outpost, a veterinary hospital, and a training camp for athletes. They managed to clear most of the territory of the fortification from the enemy who had broken through, but due to a lack of ammunition and large losses in personnel, they could not hold it. On the night of June 25, the remnants of the groups of Melnikov, who died in battle, and Cherny, crossed the Western Bug and joined the defenders of the Citadel and the Kobrin fortification.
At the beginning of hostilities, the Volyn fortification housed the hospitals of the 4th Army and the 28th Rifle Corps, the 95th medical battalion of the 6th Rifle Division, and there was a small part of the regimental school for junior commanders of the 84th Rifle Regiment, detachments of the 9th th border posts. On the earthen ramparts at the South Gate, the defense was held by the duty platoon of the regimental school. From the first minutes of the enemy invasion, the defense acquired a focal character.
The enemy tried to break through to the Kholm Gate and, having broken through, connect with the assault group in the Citadel. Soldiers of the 84th Infantry Regiment came to the rescue from the Citadel. Within the boundaries of the hospital, the defense was organized by battalion commissar N.S. Bogateev, military doctor 2nd rank S.S. Babkin (both died). German machine gunners who burst into hospital buildings brutally dealt with the sick and wounded. The defense of the Volyn fortification is full of examples of the dedication of soldiers and medical personnel who fought to the end in the ruins of buildings. While covering the wounded, nurses V.P. died. Khoretskaya and E.I. Rovnyagina. Having captured the sick, wounded, medical staff, and children, on June 23 the Nazis used them as a human barrier, driving the submachine gunners ahead of the attacking Kholm gates. "Shoot, don't spare us!" - Soviet patriots shouted. By the end of the week, the focal defense at the fortification faded. Some fighters joined the ranks of the Citadel’s defenders; a few managed to break out of the enemy ring.
By decision of the command of the combined group, attempts were made to break through the encirclement. On June 26, a detachment (120 people, mostly sergeants) led by Lieutenant Vinogradov went on a breakthrough. 13 soldiers managed to break through the eastern boundary of the fortress, but they were captured by the enemy.
Other attempts at a massive breakthrough from the besieged fortress were also unsuccessful; only individual small groups were able to break through. The remaining small garrison of Soviet troops continued to fight with extraordinary tenacity and tenacity. Their inscriptions on the fortress walls speak about the unshakable courage of the soldiers: “There were five of us Sedov, Grutov, Bogolyub, Mikhailov, Selivanov V. We took the first battle on June 22, 1941. We will die, but we will not leave here...”, “June 26, 1941 There were three of us, it was difficult for us, but we did not lose heart and die like heroes,” this is evidenced by the remains of 132 soldiers discovered during the excavations of the White Palace and the inscription left on the bricks: “We do not die in shame.”
Since the military operations, several areas of fierce defense have developed at the Kobrin fortification. On the territory of this fortification, the largest in area, there were many warehouses, hitching posts, artillery parks, personnel were housed in the barracks, as well as in the casemates of the earthen rampart (with a perimeter of up to 1.5 km), and the families of command personnel were housed in the residential town. Through the Northern and Northwestern, Eastern gates of the fortification in the first hours of the war, part of the garrison, the main forces of the 125th Infantry Regiment (commander Major A.E. Dulkeit) and the 98th separate anti-tank artillery division (commander Captain N.I. Nikitin).
Tough cover of the exit from the fortress through the North-Western Gate of the garrison soldiers, and then the defense of the barracks of the 125th Infantry Regiment was led by battalion commissar S.V. Derbenev. The enemy managed to transfer a pontoon bridge across the Western Bug from the Terespol fortification to Kobrinskoye (the defenders of the western part of the Citadel fired on it, disrupting the crossing), seized a bridgehead in the western part of the Kobrinskoye fortification and moved infantry, artillery, and tanks there.
The defense was led by Major P. M. Gavrilov, Captain I. N. Zubachev and regimental commissar E. M. Fomin. The heroic defenders of the Brest Fortress successfully repelled the attacks of Nazi troops for several days. On June 29 - 30, the enemy launched a general assault on the Brest Fortress. He managed to capture many fortifications; the defenders suffered heavy losses, but continued to resist in incredibly difficult conditions (lack of water, food, medicine). For almost a month, the heroes of the BK pinned down an entire German division, most of them fell in battle, some managed to break through to the partisans, and some of the exhausted and wounded were captured.
As a result of bloody battles and losses, the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of isolated centers of resistance. Until July 12, a small group of fighters led by Gavrilov continued to fight in the Eastern Fort, later breaking out of the fort in a caponier behind the outer rampart of the fortification. The seriously wounded Gavrilov and the secretary of the Komsomol bureau of the 98th separate anti-tank artillery division, deputy political instructor G.D. Derevianko was captured on July 23. But even after the 20th of July, Soviet soldiers continued to fight in the fortress.
The last days of the struggle are covered in legends. These days include the inscriptions left on the walls of the fortress by its defenders: “We will die, but we will not leave the fortress,” “I am dying, but I am not giving up. Farewell, Motherland. 11/20/41.” Not a single banner of the military units fighting in the fortress fell to the enemy. The banner of the 393rd Independent Artillery Battalion was buried in the Eastern Fort by Senior Sergeant R.K. Semenyuk, privates I.D. Folvarkov and Tarasov. On September 26, 1956, it was dug up by Semenyuk.
The last defenders of the Citadel held out in the basements of the White Palace, the Engineering Department, the club, and the barracks of the 333rd regiment. In the Engineering Department building and the Eastern Fort, the Nazis used gases, and flamethrowers against the defenders of the barracks of the 333rd regiment and the 98th division, and the caponier in the area of the 125th regiment. Explosives were lowered from the roof of the barracks of the 333rd Infantry Regiment to the windows, but Soviet soldiers wounded by the explosions continued to shoot until the walls of the building were destroyed and leveled. The enemy was forced to note the steadfastness and heroism of the fortress’s defenders.
It is in these black ones, full of bitterness During the days of retreat, the legend of the Brest Fortress was born in our troops. It is difficult to say where it first appeared, but, passed from mouth to mouth, it soon passed along the entire thousand-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea steppes.
It was a moving legend. They said that hundreds of kilometers from the front, deep behind enemy lines, near the city of Brest, within the walls of an old Russian fortress standing on the very border of the USSR, our troops had been heroically fighting the enemy for many days and weeks. They said that the enemy, having surrounded the fortress with a dense ring, was furiously storming it, but at the same time suffering huge losses, that neither bombs nor shells could break the tenacity of the fortress garrison and that the Soviet soldiers defending there took an oath to die, but not to submit to the enemy and respond with fire to all Nazi proposals for surrender.
It is unknown how this legend originated. Either it was brought with them by groups of our soldiers and commanders who were making their way from the Brest area behind German lines and then making their way through the front. Perhaps one of the captured fascists told about this. They say that the pilots of our bomber aviation confirmed that the Brest Fortress was fighting. Going at night to bomb enemy rear military installations located on Polish territory and flying near Brest, they saw below the flashes of shell explosions, the trembling fire of firing machine guns and flowing streams of tracer bullets.
However, all these were just stories and rumors. It was impossible to verify whether our troops were really fighting there and what kind of troops they were: there was no radio contact with the fortress garrison. And the legend of the Brest Fortress at that time remained only a legend. But, full of exciting heroism, people really needed this legend. In those difficult, harsh days of retreat, she penetrated deeply into the hearts of the soldiers, inspired them, gave birth to vigor and faith in victory. And many who heard this story then, as a reproach to their own conscience, asked the question: “What about us? Can’t we fight just like they did there in the fortress? Why are we retreating?”
It happened that in response to such a question, as if guiltily looking for an excuse for himself, one of the old soldiers would say: “After all, it’s a fortress! It’s easier to defend in a fortress. There are probably a lot of walls, fortifications, and cannons.
According to the enemy, “it was impossible to approach here with only infantry means, since perfectly organized rifle and machine-gun fire from deep trenches and a horseshoe-shaped courtyard mowed down everyone approaching. There was only one solution left - to force the Russians to surrender by hunger and thirst...” . The Nazis methodically attacked the fortress for a whole week. Soviet soldiers had to fight off 6-8 attacks a day. There were women and children next to the fighters. They helped the wounded, brought ammunition, and took part in hostilities. The Nazis used tanks, flamethrowers, gases, set fire to and rolled barrels of flammable mixtures from the outer shafts. The casemates were burning and collapsing, there was nothing to breathe, but when the enemy infantry went on the attack, hand-to-hand combat broke out again. During short periods of relative calm, calls to surrender were heard from the loudspeakers.
Being completely surrounded, without water and food, and with an acute shortage of ammunition and medicine, the garrison courageously fought the enemy. In the first 9 days of fighting alone, the defenders of the fortress disabled about 1.5 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. By the end of June, the enemy captured most of the fortress; on June 29 and 30 the Nazis launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress using powerful (500 and 1800 kg) aerial bombs. On June 29, he died while covering the breakthrough group, Kizhevatov, with several fighters.
In the Citadel on June 30, the Nazis captured the seriously wounded and shell-shocked Captain Zubachev and Regimental Commissar Fomin, whom the Nazis shot near the Kholm Gate. On June 30, after a long shelling and bombing, which ended in a fierce attack, the Nazis captured most of the structures of the Eastern Fort and captured the wounded.
In July, the commander of the 45th German Infantry Division, General Schlipper, in his “Report on the Occupation of Brest-Litovsk” reported: “The Russians in Brest-Litovsk fought extremely stubbornly and persistently. They showed excellent infantry training and proved a remarkable will to resist.”
Stories like the defense of the Brest Fortress would become widely known in other countries. But the courage and heroism of the defenders of the Brest Fortress remained unsung. Until the death of Stalin in the USSR, it was as if they did not notice the feat of the citadel garrison. The fortress fell, and many of its defenders surrendered - in the eyes of the Stalinists this was seen as a shameful phenomenon. And therefore there were no heroes of Brest. The fortress was simply erased from the annals military history, erasing the names of privates and commanders.
In 1956, the world finally learned who led the defense of the citadel. Smirnov writes: “From the found combat order No. 1, we know the names of the commanders of the units defending the center: Commissar Fomin, Captain Zubachev, Senior Lieutenant Semenenko and Lieutenant Vinogradov.” The 44th Infantry Regiment was commanded by Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov. Commissioner Fomin, Captain Zubachev and Lieutenant Vinogradov were part of the battle group that escaped from the fortress on June 25, but it was surrounded and destroyed on the Warsaw Highway. Three officers were captured. Vinogradov survived the war. Smirnov tracked him down in Vologda, where he, unknown to anyone in 1956, worked as a blacksmith. According to Vinogradov: “Before making the breakthrough, Commissar Fomin put on the uniform of a killed private. In the prisoner of war camp, the commissar was betrayed to the Germans by one soldier, and Fomin was shot. Zubachev died in captivity. Major Gavrilov survived captivity, despite being seriously wounded. He did not want to surrender, threw a grenade and killed a German soldier." Much time passed before the names of the heroes of Brest were inscribed in Soviet history. They earned their place there. The way they fought, their unwavering tenacity, devotion to duty, the courage they showed against all odds - all this was quite typical of Soviet soldiers.
The defense of the Brest Fortress was an outstanding example of the exceptional tenacity and courage of Soviet soldiers. This was a truly legendary feat of the sons of the people, who loved their Motherland infinitely and gave their lives for it. The Soviet people honor the memory of the brave defenders of the Brest Fortress: captain V.V. Shablovsky, senior political instructor N.V. Nesterchuk, lieutenants I.F. Akimochkin, A.M. Kizhevatov, A.F. Naganov, junior political instructor A.P. Kalandadze , deputy political instructor S. M. Matevosyan, senior sergeant Abdullaev D. Abdulla ogly, regiment graduate P. S. Klypa and many others. In memory of the feat of the heroes of the Brest Fortress, on May 8, 1965 she was awarded the honorary title “Fortress Hero” with the award of the order Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
3. Causes of military defeats at the first stage of the war (1941-1942)
Why did the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR become so unexpected for the military and political leadership of the country that it led to catastrophic losses and the retreat of the Red Army troops in 1941-1942, at the first stage of the war? One of the main reasons for what happened is that Nazi Germany turned out to be more prepared for war. Its economy was fully mobilized. Germany seized huge reserves of metal, construction materials and weapons in the West. The Nazis had an advantage in the number of troops mobilized and deployed in advance at the western borders of the USSR, in automatic weapons, and the presence large number vehicles and mechanized equipment significantly increased the mobility of military units. On the tragic outcome of the first military operations for the Red Army troops significant influence was influenced by the war experience gained by the Nazi troops in 1939-1941 in the Western theater of military operations.
The combat effectiveness of the Red Army was greatly weakened by unjustified repressions of military personnel in the pre-war years. In this regard, the command staff of the Red Army, in its own way, vocational training was actually thrown back to the level of the end of the civil war. Huge number experienced and educated Soviet military leaders who thought in categories modern warfare, was shot on false charges. Because of this, the level of combat training of the troops dropped sharply, and it was no longer possible to increase it in a short time. The results of the bloody war with Finland, which was unsuccessful for the USSR, became the main symptom of the emerging threatening situation. The deplorable state of the Red Army, and, above all, its command personnel, was well known to the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany. During the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the process of strengthening the Soviet officer corps was further complicated by the fact that many mid- and even senior-level commanders who failed to cope with their duties during the first period of difficult retreat and defeats of the Red Army were tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death. The same commanders who were captured by the enemy were indiscriminately declared traitors and enemies of the people.
In 1935-1939 more than 48 thousand commanders and political workers were dismissed from the Red Army, and a significant part of them were arrested. About 11 thousand, including the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky, who spent almost three years in prison on the absurd charge of spying for Poland, returned to the troops, but on the eve and in the first days of the war another group of senior Soviet military leaders were arrested. including the former Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union Meretskov, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, who distinguished himself in battles in Spain and Khalkhin Gol Y.V. Smushkevich, head of department Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union P.V. Rychagov, head of department air defense, participant in the battles of Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, Hero of the Soviet Union G.M. Stern, commander of the Baltic Military District K.D. Loktionov, intelligence chief I.I. Proskurova. Only Meretskov survived; all the rest were shot in October 1941. By the summer of 1941, about 75% of commanders and 70% of political workers had been in their positions for less than one year. In such a short period of time, they could not fully get used to their new responsibilities and perform them successfully. The new cadres promoted to replace the repressed were often brave, energetic and capable, but due to the level of training and experience of previous service, they could not successfully lead the units entrusted to them.
The highest military command often did not have a systematic military and general education. Having reached high positions and ranks, they often retained the habits of their soldier’s youth - they controlled their subordinates with the help of obscenities and sometimes punching (this, according to N.S. Khrushchev, was sinned, for example, by front commanders Marshal S.M. Budyonny and generals A. .I. Eremenko and V.N. Gordov). Some suffered from heavy drinking, like the commander of the Northern Front, General M.M. Popov. Both People's Commissars of Defense of the pre-war period: the famous political figure close to Stalin K.E. Voroshilov and S.K., who replaced him in 1940. Timoshenko, a dashing cavalryman during the Civil War, had only a primary education. The share of people with higher education in the command staff of the Red Army was in 1940. only 2.9%. Some military leaders compensated for their lack of education and experience in modern warfare with great self-confidence. Thus, the commander of the Western Special Military District (the future Western Front), General Pavlov, argued before the war that one “Soviet tank corps capable of solving the problem of destroying one or two tank and four or five infantry divisions." Chief of the General Staff Meretskov at a meeting in the Kremlin on January 13, 1941 said: "Our division is much stronger than the fascist German division": "in a meeting battle it will certainly will defeat the German division. In defense, one of our divisions will repel the attack of two or three enemy divisions."
Germany had a significant superiority over the forces of the border districts - 1.4 times. The technical equipment of the Red Army was inferior to the German one. German planes and the tanks had radio communications and were far superior to the bulk of Soviet aircraft and tanks in speed, armament and maneuverability. New models of tanks and aircraft created in the USSR on the eve of the war were not inferior to German ones, but there were few of them. In the border districts there were only 1,475 new tanks and 1,540 new types of combat aircraft, and only a portion of the crews mastered their control. German troops moved primarily by vehicle and were controlled by radio, while Soviet troops often moved on foot or horse-drawn. They had few radio stations, and wired communications turned out to be unreliable. Most of the Red Army soldiers were armed with rifles (and sometimes there weren’t enough of them), and the German soldiers were armed with machine guns. The Red Army had little anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery; the fighters had to go against tanks with Molotov cocktails, which for some reason were called “Molotov cocktails” abroad.
Of great importance was the fact that the German army had two years of experience in modern warfare, while the Red Army had no such experience. The German command has already carried out a number of successful operations in Europe; German headquarters gained more practice in leading troops and interacting with each other; German pilots, tank crews, artillerymen, and specialists from all branches of the military received good training and were fired upon in battle. On the contrary, the leaders of the Red Army participated only in Civil War and relatively small-scale local military conflicts in Spain, Khalkhin Gol and Finland.
Another set of reasons that influenced the catastrophic situation for the Red Army at the beginning of the war was that the Soviet military and especially political leadership made a serious miscalculation in assessing the military-political situation on the eve of the German invasion. Thus, the defense plan of the USSR was based on Stalin’s erroneous assumption that in the event of war, Germany’s main blow would be directed not in the Minsk direction against Moscow, but in the south, against Ukraine with the aim of further advancing towards the oil-bearing Caucasus. Therefore, the main group of Red Army troops was located in the southwestern direction, while it was considered by the German command at first as secondary. The weakness and inadequacy of the armament and organization of the Red Army troops in the conditions of modern war, so clearly revealed during the Soviet-Finnish conflict, led the Soviet leadership to the decision on the need to rearm and reorganize them.
But this process dragged on and was not completed until the attack by Nazi troops. The fact is that such a large-scale reorganization without taking into account the real possibilities of providing troops with weapons and military equipment, as well as well-trained command personnel, turned out to be impossible. For example, in March 1941 it was decided to create 20 mechanized corps, disbanded in 1939 as a result of an erroneous decision by the then leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. This required about 32 thousand tanks, of which 16.6 thousand were new. However, the industry could not deliver such a quantity of equipment in such a short time, especially the latest designs.
The leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who were promoted to high positions after 1938, could not always correctly assess the advantage of the new types of weapons presented to them for consideration and accept them for service. Thus, it was believed that machine guns had no significance for modern warfare, as a result of which the Red Army still had a three-line rifle (albeit modernized) of the 1891 model in service. Were not assessed on time combat capabilities rocket weapons. Only in June 1941, after the attack on the USSR, was the decision made to launch mass production of the later famous Katyushas.
The country's leadership did not have a strong opinion about the latest Soviet tanks KV and T-34. True, they were already in the troops, but they industrial production Due to the indecisiveness of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, it was delayed. For the same reason, the production of cannon artillery and new machine guns was reduced, and little anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns were produced. The combat advantages of 45 and 76 mm artillery guns were not assessed. Not a single issue related to arming the Red Army and supplying it with military equipment was resolved without Stalin’s personal consent, and it very often depended on his mood, whims and low competence in problems of quality assessment modern weapons. A lot depended on the command-bureaucratic methods of managing the country's economy that developed during the 30s. Many serious issues of industrial development and agriculture were decided subjectively, without scientific analysis and justification. Stalin's repressions The leaders of industry and agriculture and leading designers of new military equipment were not spared either. The aviation industry experienced a major reconstruction in the pre-war years, but it was carried out slowly, and the established deadlines were often violated. Although aircraft production increased by almost 20% in 1940, the army received mostly only outdated models; new ones were still assembled by hand in design bureaus in single, experimental samples. Before the start of the war, the government never accepted mobilization plans for the deployment of industry in wartime; all the work on planning the restructuring of the economy on a war footing, and this restructuring itself had to be carried out during the war.
Significant forces and means available in the border districts of the USSR to repel fascist aggression were not brought to bear in a timely manner. combat readiness. Only a small part of the divisions was mobilized according to wartime conditions; the troops of the western border districts were dispersed over a vast territory - up to 4,500 km along the front and 400 km in depth. A fairly powerful system of fortified areas, built in the 30s on the old state border of the USSR, after the territorial expansion of the country to the west in 1939-1940, found itself deep in the rear of the Red Army troops. Therefore, the fortified areas were mothballed, and almost all weapons were removed from them. Under the conditions of the dominance of the then Soviet military doctrine, which provided for the conduct of war in the event of a war " little blood"And exclusively on the territory of the aggressor, fortified areas on the new state border were not built, and most of the combat-ready troops of the Red Army were moved directly to the borders. It was they who, in the first days of the fascist attack, despite heroic resistance, were surrounded and destroyed.
A disastrous role was played by Stalin’s personal prohibition to bring the troops of the western border districts into combat readiness, despite the repeated demands of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, which was informed by the border guards about the concentration of enemy forces, already ready to rush to the east. Stalin was maniacally confident that the leadership of Nazi Germany would not dare to violate the non-aggression treaty in the near future, although the timing of such an attack was repeatedly received through intelligence channels. Based on these erroneous assumptions, Stalin forbade the country's military leadership to take any actions that Hitler could use as a pretext for starting a war with the USSR. Nothing can justify the tragedy of the first period of the Great Patriotic War, however, when figuring out the reasons for it, one should see the main one - this is the regime of Stalin’s personal power, blindly supported by his inner circle, his repressive policy and incompetent decisions in foreign policy and military fields. On his conscience lie hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet soldiers and officers who honestly gave their lives on the fields of border battles in the first hours and days of the bloody Patriotic War Soviet people against the Nazi invaders.
Conclusion
For a long time, the country knew nothing about the defense of the Brest Fortress, as well as about many other exploits of Soviet soldiers in the first days of the war, although, perhaps, it was precisely such pages of its history that were able to instill faith in a people who found themselves on the verge of mortal danger. The troops, of course, talked about border battles on the Bug, but the very fact of defending the fortress was perceived rather as a legend. Surprisingly, the feat of the Brest garrison became known thanks to that very report from the headquarters of the 45th German division. How combat unit it did not last long - in February 1942 this unit was defeated in the Orel area. The entire archive of the division also fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers. For the first time, the defense of the Brest Fortress became known from a German headquarters report, captured in the papers of a defeated unit in February 1942 in the Krivtsovo area near Orel during an attempt to destroy the Bolkhov group of German troops. At the end of the 1940s. the first articles about the defense of the Brest Fortress appeared in newspapers, based solely on rumors; in 1951, the artist P. Krivonogov painted the famous painting “Defenders of the Brest Fortress.” The credit for restoring the memory of the heroes of the fortress largely belongs to the writer and historian S. S. Smirnov, as well as K. M. Simonov, who supported his initiative. The feat of the heroes of the Brest Fortress was popularized by Smirnov in the book “Brest Fortress” (1957, expanded edition 1964, Lenin Prize 1965). After this, the theme of the defense of the Brest Fortress became an important symbol of official patriotic propaganda.
Sevastopol, Leningrad, Smolensk, Vyazma, Kerch, Stalingrad are milestones in the history of the Soviet people's resistance to Hitler's invasion. The first on this list is the Brest Fortress. It determined the entire mood of this war - uncompromising, persistent and, ultimately, victorious. And the main thing, probably, is not the awards, but about 200 defenders of the Brest Fortress were awarded orders and medals, two became Heroes of the Soviet Union - Major Gavrilov and Lieutenant Andrei Kizhevatov (posthumously), but the fact that it was then, in the first days of the war, Soviet soldiers proved to the whole world that courage and duty to their country and people can withstand any invasion. In this regard, it sometimes seems that the Brest Fortress is a confirmation of Bismarck’s words and the beginning of the end of Hitler’s Germany.
On May 8, 1965, the Brest Fortress was awarded the title of hero fortress. Since 1971 it has been a memorial complex. On the territory of the fortress, a number of monuments were built in memory of the heroes, and there is a museum of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
"Brest Hero Fortress", a memorial complex created in 1969-71 on the territory of the Brest Fortress to perpetuate the feat of the participants in the defense of the Brest Fortress. The master plan was approved by a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR dated November 6, 1969.
The memorial was inaugurated on September 25, 1971. The sculptural architectural ensemble includes surviving buildings, preserved ruins, ramparts and works of modern monumental art.
The complex is located in the eastern part of the Citadel. Each compositional element of the ensemble carries a great meaning and has a strong emotional impact. The main entrance is designed as an opening in the form of a five-pointed star in a monolithic reinforced concrete mass, resting on the shaft and walls of the casemates. The star's chips, intersecting, form a complex dynamic shape. The propylaea walls are lined with black labradorite. On the outer side of the base there is a board with the text of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 05/08/1965 on awarding the Brest Fortress the honorary title “Hero-Fortress”.
From the main entrance, a ceremonial alley leads across the bridge to the Ceremonial Square. To the left of the bridge is the sculptural composition "Thirst" - a figure Soviet warrior, who, leaning on a machine gun, reaches with a helmet towards the water. In the planning and design of the memorial, an important role belongs to Ceremonial Square, where mass celebrations take place. It is adjacent to the building of the Museum of Defense of the Brest Fortress and the ruins of the White Palace. The compositional center of the ensemble is the main monument “Courage” - a chest-length sculpture of a warrior (made of concrete, height 33.5 m), on its reverse side there are relief compositions telling about individual episodes of the heroic defense of the fortress: “Attack”, “Party Meeting”, "The Last Grenade", "Feat of the Artillerymen", "Machine Gunners". The vast space is dominated by the obelisk bayonet (an all-welded metal structure lined with titanium; height 100 m, weight 620 tons). In the 3-tier necropolis, compositionally connected with the monument, the remains of 850 people are buried, and the names of 216 are on the memorial plaques installed here. In front of the ruins of the former engineering department, in a recess lined with black labradorite, the Eternal Flame of Glory burns. In front of him are the words cast in bronze: “We fought to the death, glory to the heroes!” Not far from the Eternal Flame is the Memorial Site of the Hero Cities of the Soviet Union, opened on 05/09/1985. Under the granite slabs with the image of the Gold Star medal, there are capsules with the soil of the hero cities, delivered here by their delegations. On the walls of the barracks, ruins, bricks and stones, on special stands there are memorial plaques in the form of tear-off sheets of the 1941 calendar, which are a kind of chronicle of heroic events.
The observation deck displays artillery weapons from the mid-19th century and the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The ruins of the barracks of the 333rd Infantry Regiment (former arsenal), the ruins of the defensive barracks, and the destroyed clubhouse of the 84th Infantry Regiment have been preserved. Along the main alley there are 2 powder magazines, in the ramparts there are casemates and a field bakery. On the road to the Northern Gate, the Eastern Fort, the ruins of a medical unit and residential buildings stand out.
The pedestrian paths and the area in front of the main entrance are covered with red plastic concrete. Most of the alleys, the Ceremonial Square and partly the paths are lined with reinforced concrete slabs. Thousands of roses, weeping willows, poplars, spruces, birches, maples, and thujas were planted. In the evening, artistic and decorative lighting is turned on, consisting of many spotlights and lamps in red, white and green. At the main entrance, the song “Holy War” by A. Alexandrov and the government, a message about the treacherous attack on our homeland by the troops of Nazi Germany (read by Y. Levitan), is heard, at the Eternal Flame - the melody of R. Schumann “Dreams”.
List of sources and literature used
1. In preparation, materials from the site LEGENDS AND MYTHS OF MILITARY HISTORY were used
2. Anikin V.I. Brest Fortress is a hero fortress. M., 1985.
3. Heroic defense / Sat. memories of the defense of the Brest Fortress in June - July 1941. Mn., 1966.
4. Smirnov S.S. Brest Fortress. M., 1970.
5. Smirnov S.S. In search of the heroes of the Brest Fortress. M., 1959.
6. Smirnov S.S. Stories about unknown heroes. M., 1985.
7. Brest. Encyclopedic reference book. Mn., 1987.
8. Polonsky L. In besieged Brest. Baku, 1962.
9. “HISTORY OF THE USSR” by J. Boffe. M., International relations, 1990.
Application
Scheme map of the Brest Fortress and the forts surrounding it. 1912
Brest. Encyclopedic reference book. Mn., 1987. (p. 287)
Smirnov S.S. Brest Fortress. M., 1970. (p. 81)
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