Military program about the dead hand or perimeter. “Perimeter” or “Dead Hand” system

Perimeter system
The American magazine Wired fearfully writes:
Russia has the only weapon in the world that guarantees a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy, even in the terrible event that we no longer have anyone to decide on this strike. The unique system counterattacks automatically - and brutally.

Perimeter system(Strategic Missile Forces Airborne Forces Index - 15E601, nicknamed “Dead Hand” in the West, and “Hand from the Coffin” in the East) - control system for strategic missile forces - Strategic Missile Forces. In the documents it received the name "Perimeter". The system involved the creation of such technical means and software, which would make it possible in any conditions, even the most unfavorable, to bring the order to launch missiles directly to the launch teams. According to the creators of Perimeter, the system could prepare and launch missiles even if everyone died and there was no one to give the order. This component began to be unofficially called “Dead Hand or Hand from the Coffin.”

Operating principle of the system:
Logic of action " Dead hand" involved the regular collection and processing of a gigantic amount of information. A variety of information was received from various sensors. For example, about the state of communication lines with a higher command post: there is a connection - there is no connection. About the radiation situation in the surrounding area: normal level radiation - increased level radiation. About the presence of people at the starting position: there are people - there are no people. About registered nuclear explosions and so on and so forth.

The “Dead Hand” had the ability to analyze changes in the military and political situation in the world - the system assessed commands received over a certain period of time, and on this basis could conclude that something was wrong in the world. When the system believed that its time had come, it became active and launched a command to prepare for the launch of the rockets.
Moreover, the “Dead Hand” could not begin active operations in peacetime. Even if there was no communication, even if the entire combat crew left the starting position, there were still a lot of other parameters that would block the operation of the system.

After an order received from the highest echelons of the Strategic Missile Forces control to a special command post, the 15P011 command missile with a special 15B99 warhead is launched, which in flight transmits launch commands to all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces that have the appropriate receivers.

System concept:

The system is designed to guarantee the launch of silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a crushing nuclear strike by the enemy on the territory of the USSR, all command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of ordering a retaliatory strike are destroyed. The system is the only doomsday machine (weapon of guaranteed retribution) in existence in the world, the existence of which has been officially confirmed. The system is still classified and may still be on combat duty to this day, so any information about it cannot be confirmed as unequivocally reliable, or refuted, and should be viewed with a due degree of skepticism.

At its core, the Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the military armed with nuclear warheads. It was created as a backup system in case the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communications lines of the Strategic Missile Forces were destroyed by the first strike, in accordance with the concept of Limited Nuclear War developed in the United States. To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was initially designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is capable of making a decision on a retaliatory strike independently, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is essentially the only deterrent that provides real guarantees that a potential enemy will renounce the concept of a preventive crushing strike.

History of creation:
The development of a special command missile system, called "Perimeter", was assigned to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by USSR Government Decree N695-227 of August 30, 1974. It was initially planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) missile as the base missile; later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTH (15A16) missile. The missile, modified in terms of its control system, received the index 15A11.

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system

In December 1975 The preliminary design of the command rocket was completed. The rocket was equipped with a special warhead, indexed 15B99, which included an original radio engineering system developed by OKB LPI. To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead had to have a constant orientation in space during flight. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing the propulsion system for the Mayak SGCh), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and testing. The production of SGCh 15B99 was organized at NPO Strela in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979 LCT of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile according to orders coming from the highest echelons of the Strategic Missile Forces control. At a special technical position in the assembly building, a shielded anechoic chamber was built, equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter.

Flight tests of the 15A11 missile (see layout diagram) were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission headed by Lieutenant General V.V. Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The first launch of the 15A11 command rocket with an equivalent transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. The developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the ability of the missile to ensure the given flight path of the MC 15B99 (trajectory apex at an altitude of about 4000 km, range 4500 km), the operation of all service systems of the MC in normal mode, and the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

10 missiles were allocated for flight testing. In connection with the successful launches and the completion of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches.

During the testing of the Perimeter system, real launches of 15A14, 15A16, 15A35 missiles were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the SGCh 15B99 in flight. Previously, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed. All launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces subsequently underwent these modifications.

Launcher 15P716 - silo, automated, highly protected, "OS" type.

Along with flight tests, a ground test of the functionality of the entire complex was carried out under exposure conditions damaging factors nuclear explosion at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the testing laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas), at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the control system and SGCh equipment at levels of exposure to a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified in the TTT MO.
Even during the flight tests, a government decree set the task of expanding the functions performed by the command missile complex, with the delivery of combat orders not only to the Strategic Missile Forces facilities, but also to missile submarines strategic missions, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, control centers of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.

The flight tests of the command rocket were completed in March 1982. In January 1985 the complex was put on combat duty. For more than 10 years, the command missile complex has successfully fulfilled its important role in the defense capability of the state.

System components:

System command posts:
Apparently, they are structures similar to standard missile bunkers of the Strategic Missile Forces. They contain the control equipment and communication systems necessary to ensure the operation of the system. Presumably integrated with command missile launchers, however, most likely they are spaced at a fairly large distance to ensure better system survivability.

Command missiles:

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system. The only widely known component of the complex. They are part of the 15P011 command missile complex and have the index 15A11, developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau on the basis of the 15A16 missiles (MR UR-100U). Equipped with a special warhead 15B99, containing a radio-technical command system developed by OKB LPI, designed to ensure the delivery of combat orders from the central command post to all command posts and launchers under conditions of exposure to nuclear explosions and active electronic countermeasures, when the warhead is flying on a passive part of the trajectory. The technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base 15A16 missile. The 15P716 launcher is a silo-type, automated, highly protected OS type, most likely a modernized OS-84 launcher. The possibility of basing missiles in other types of launch silos cannot be ruled out.

The development of a command missile began under the TTT of the Ministry of Defense in 1974. Flight design tests were carried out at NIIP-5 (Baikonur) from 1979 to 1986. A total of 7 launches were carried out (6 successful, 1 partially successful). The mass of the warhead 15B99 is 1412 kg.
Receiving devices:
They ensure that the components of the nuclear triad receive orders and codes from command missiles in flight. All are equipped with them launchers Strategic Missile Forces, all SSBNs and strategic bombers. Presumably, the receiving devices are hardware connected to the control and launch equipment, ensuring autonomous execution of the launch order.

Autonomous control and command system:

The mythical component of the system is a key element of the Doomsday Machine, the existence of which there is no reliable information. Some proponents of the existence of such a system believe that it is a complex expert system equipped with a variety of communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. This system supposedly monitors the presence and intensity of conversations on air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the surrounding area, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and, possibly, the presence of living people at the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike.

Another proposed option for the system’s operation is that upon receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief switches the system to combat mode. After this, if within a certain time the system command post does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then command missiles are launched.

System location:

The automated system "Perimeter" is installed in the area of ​​Mount Kosvinsky Kamen (Ural). According to Blair, "American strategists consider him the crown jewel Russian system nuclear combat command, since from here it is possible to maintain communication through the granite layer with Russian long-range strategic aviation using a VLF radio signal (3.0 - 30.0 kHz), capable of propagating even in a nuclear war. This bunker is a critical link in the doomsday machine's communications network, designed to provide semi-automatic retaliation in response to a decapitation strike."

Operation and system status:

After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command post exercises. The 15P011 command missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the UR-100 MP) was on combat duty until June 1995, when, as part of the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. According to other sources, this happened on September 1, 1995, when the 510th missile regiment, armed with command missiles, was taken off duty in the 7th missile division (Vypolzovo village) and disbanded. This event coincided with the completion of the withdrawal from combat personnel Strategic Missile Forces with MR UR-100 missiles and the process of rearmament of the 7th RD with the Topol mobile ground missile system that began in December 1994.

In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (urban town of Yurya), a regiment (commander - Colonel S.I. Arzamastsev) with a modernized command missile system, called “Perimeter-RC”, which included a command missile, took up combat duty , created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

There is also evidence that previously the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer MRBM. Such a mobile complex with “pioneer” command missiles was called “Gorn”. The complex index is 15P656, the missiles are 15Zh56. At least one unit known Missile Forces strategic purpose, which was armed with the Horn complex - the 249th missile regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk region of the 32nd missile division (Postavy), from March-April 1986 to 1988 was on combat duty with mobile a complex of command missiles.

Organizations involved in the production of components and technical maintenance of the complex are experiencing difficulties with financing. Staff turnover is high, resulting in a decline in staff qualifications. Despite this, the Russian leadership has repeatedly assured foreign states that there is no risk of accidental or unauthorized missile launches.
In the Western press the name “Dead hand” was assigned to the system.

In Japan, military experts dubbed this system the “Hand from the Coffin.”

According to Wired magazine in 2009, the Perimeter system is operational and ready to strike back.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, stated that the Perimeter system exists and is on combat duty.

Operators:

Russia (The system is currently active).

P/N. Excerpt from an interview given by the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Viktorovich Karakaev: http://www.kp.ru/daily/25805/2785953/

WHY DOES RUSSIA HAVE A DEAD HAND?
KP: - At one time, there were publications in our and foreign press about the “Perimeter” system, which existed in the USSR. And in 2009, the American magazine Wyret told its readers that this system is functioning and is still alive. This is the rocket that, if everything is lost, takes off and gives the command to all other rockets. And they already automatically take off and strike necessary goals. This system is called “dead hand” in the West.
Sergey Karakaev: - It’s not in vain that you eat your bread! Yes, the Perimeter system exists today. She's on combat duty. And when the need arises for a retaliatory strike, when it is not possible to reach some part of the launchers with a signal, this command can come from these missiles from the Perimeter...
KP: - There was a very interesting remark from Putin at a meeting with the Valdai Club. There someone tells him: “You can destroy the United States in about half an hour.” And Putin thought and thought and replied: “Actually, faster”...
Sergei Karakaev: - I will answer briefly: Vladimir Vladimirovich is right. But I believe that today neither Russia nor the United States are going to destroy each other.

The most the best remedy would be the resuscitation of the Perimeter system

There is currently intense discussion in the media military reform. In particular, many journalists demand that all potential opponents be named.

I hasten to reassure everyone, at present there is guaranteed to be no big war. The blue dream of pacifists - “the 21st century without wars” has come true. Since 2000, not a single country in the world has been in a state of war for a single day, although not a single day has passed in which at one or more points globe there would be no fighting.

FRENCH OPTION FOR RUSSIA

Now the war is called the “fight against terrorism”, “ peacekeeping activities", "enforcement of peace", etc. Therefore, I propose to change the terminology and talk not about war or defense of the fatherland, but about the reaction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to threats national security. The illusions of some liberals, who believed that the source of the Cold War was communism and that after its disappearance peace and general prosperity would come, turned out to be a delusion.

Moreover, if before 1991 the UN Security Council and International Law contained conflicts to a certain extent, now their effect is negligible. As for the notorious world public opinion, during the August 2008 conflict everything fell into place. The entire world community supported the aggressor, not his victim. Western TV channels showed the burning streets of Tskhinvali, passing it off as Georgian cities.

It's time to remember the covenant Alexandra III Peacemaker: “Russia has only two allies - its army and navy.” Does this mean that Russia, in a crisis, should get involved in a symmetrical arms race like the USSR? Until 1991, the USSR traded mainly at a loss, selling it cheaply to “friends,” or even simply giving it away as a gift.

It’s curious why our politicians and military don’t want to remember the French phenomenon of 1946–1991? France was devastated by World War II, then took part in two dozen large and small colonial wars in Laos, Vietnam, the 1956 Suez Canal War, and the Algerian War (1954–1962). Nevertheless, the French managed, independently of other countries, to create a full range of weapons from ATGMs to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), almost not inferior to the superpowers. All French ships, including nuclear-powered ICBM submarines and aircraft carriers, were built in French shipyards and carry French weapons. And our Ministry of Defense now wants to buy French warships.

But the French people, in order to create the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, did not tighten their belts at all. The country's market economy was intensively developing, and the standard of living was steadily rising.

The casket opens simply. Between 1950 and 1990, approximately 60% of the weapons produced by France were exported. Moreover, exports were carried out in all directions. Thus, in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the Israeli army and all Arab countries were armed to the teeth with French weapons. Iran and Iraq also fought each other with French weapons. England is France's NATO ally, but in the Falklands War it was French-made aircraft and missiles that caused the greatest damage to the British fleet.

I fully admit that a refined intellectual will be indignant: “The French arms trade is immoral in all directions!” But, alas, if these weapons systems had not been sold by France, others would have been guaranteed to sell them.

A rhetorical question arises: can our nuclear submarines, sold to Iran, Venezuela, India, Chile, Argentina, etc., even hypothetically, cause damage to Russia at least in the distant future? Yes what nuclear boats? Let's take purely defensive weapons - anti-aircraft missiles. Why can’t the S-300 anti-aircraft system be sold to Venezuela, Iran, Syria and other countries?

AMERICAN MISSILE CHALLENGE

Unfortunately, our politicians and media pay very little attention to the American shipboard missile defense system created during modernization anti-aircraft complex"Aegis". The new missile is called “Standard-3” (SM-3) and after certain modifications (which ones are kept secret by the Pentagon) it can be equipped with any of the 84 US Navy ships that have the Aegis system. It's about about 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 57 Airlie Burke-class destroyers.

In 2006, the cruiser CG-67 Shiloh hit a missile warhead with an SM-3 missile at an altitude of 200 km, 250 km northwest of Kauan Island (Hawaii archipelago). It is interesting that, according to Western media reports, the warhead was targeted from the Japanese destroyer DDG-174 Kirishima (total displacement 9490 tons; equipped with the Aegis system).

The fact is that since 2005, Japan, with the help of the United States, has been equipping its fleet with SM-3 anti-missiles of the Aegis system.

The first Japanese ship equipped with the Aegis system with SM-3 was the destroyer DDG-177 Atado. He received anti-missiles at the very end of 2007.

On November 6, 2006, SM-3 missiles launched from the DDG-70 Lake Erie destroyer intercepted two ICBM warheads at an altitude of about 180 km.

And on March 21, 2008, an SM-3 missile from the same Lake Erie struck at an altitude of 247 km and shot down the American secret L-21 Radarsat satellite with a direct hit. The official designation of this secret spacecraft is USA-193.

So on Far East American and Japanese destroyers and cruisers can shoot down ballistic missiles of Russian submarines in the initial part of the trajectory, even if they are launched from their own territorial waters.

I note that American ships with the Aegis system regularly visit Chernoe, Baltic and Barents Sea. The naval missile defense system is dangerous for the Russian Federation not only during the war. The US military deliberately exaggerates its capabilities, deceiving incompetent people in the US and Europe, from presidents and ministers to shopkeepers.

The possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike from the Soviet Union scared everyone, and since 1945 there has been no direct military confrontation between the West and Russia. Now, for the first time in 60 years, politicians and ordinary people in NATO countries have created the illusion of their own impunity. Meanwhile, our media does not think of spoiling this euphoria by recalling American tests nuclear weapons at altitudes from 80 to 400 km in the summer of 1962 on Johnson Atoll. Then, after each explosion, radio communication throughout the entire water area was interrupted for several hours. Pacific Ocean.

In 2001, the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduce Agency (DTRA) attempted to assess possible consequences tests for low-orbit satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - like the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), detonated at an altitude of 125 to 300 km, “is enough to put out of action for several weeks or even months all satellites that do not have special protection against radiation." University of Maryland plasma physicist Denis Papadopoulos had a different opinion: “A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated at a specially calculated altitude could lead to the loss of 90% of all low-orbit satellites for about a month.” It is estimated that the cost of replacing equipment disabled by the consequences of a high-altitude nuclear explosion will amount to more than $100 billion. This does not include the general economic losses from the loss of capabilities provided by space technology!

Why not ask American missile defense experts to explain how the Aegis and other missile defense systems will work after the explosion of two dozen hydrogen charges in low orbits? Well, then let Western taxpayers think for themselves what the Pentagon is spending money on in times of crisis.

BROUGHT "TOMAHAWKS"

Another weapon that has created instability in the world and generated a sense of impunity among military and politicians are American Tomahawk-type cruise missiles with a firing range of 2200–2500 km. Already, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the United States and NATO countries can fire thousands of such missiles at the Russian Federation. "Tomahawks" can hit ICBM silos, mobile ICBM complexes, communications centers, and command posts. Western media argue that a surprise attack with conventional cruise missiles could completely deprive Russia of the ability to launch a nuclear strike.

In this regard, it is surprising that the issue of Tomahawk missiles is not included by our diplomats in the framework of the START negotiations.

By the way, it would be nice to remind our admirals and designers of the Novator design bureau that our analogs to the Tomahawks - various "Grenades" and others - are not suitable to hold a candle to American cruise missiles. And it’s not me who says this, but Aunt Geography.

The American Air Force and Navy will never allow our ships within 2,500 km of the shores of America. Therefore, the Russian response to the American Tomahawks can only be ship-based missiles “Meteorite” and “Bolid” or their more effective analogues with a firing range of 5-8 thousand km.

WELL FORGOTTEN OLD

The best way to rid the West of illusions about the possibility of delivering an unpunished strike on Russia would be to revive the Perimeter system.

The system so frightened the West in the early 1990s that it was called the “Dead Hand.” Let me briefly remind you of this horror story.

In the 1970s, the United States began developing the doctrine of “Limited Nuclear War.” In accordance with it, key nodes of the Kazbek command system and communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces will be destroyed by the first strike, and surviving communication lines will be suppressed by electronic interference. In this way, the US leadership hoped to avoid a retaliatory nuclear strike.

In response, the USSR decided, in addition to the existing RSVN communication channels, to create a special command missile, equipped with a powerful radio transmitting device, launched at a special period and giving commands to launch all intercontinental missiles on combat duty throughout the USSR. Moreover, this rocket was only main part big system.

To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was initially designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is capable of making a decision on a retaliatory strike independently, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The system included numerous instruments for measuring radiation, seismic vibrations, and was connected to early warning radar stations, missile attack early warning satellites, etc. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is, in fact, the only deterrent that provides real guarantees that a potential enemy will renounce the concept of a preventive crushing strike.

ASYMMETRICAL “PERIMETER”

The principle of operation of the Perimeter system is as follows. In peacetime, the main components of the system are in standby mode, monitoring the situation and processing data received from measuring posts. In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack using nuclear weapons, confirmed by data from early warning systems about a missile attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically brought into combat readiness and begins to monitor the operational situation.

If the sensor components of the system confirm with sufficient reliability the fact of a massive nuclear strike, and the system itself loses contact with the main command nodes of the Strategic Missile Forces for a certain time, it initiates the launch of several command missiles, which, flying over their territory, broadcast control signals using powerful radio transmitters installed on board signal and launch codes for all components of the nuclear triad - silo and mobile launch complexes, nuclear missile submarines and strategic aviation. The receiving equipment of both the Strategic Missile Forces command posts and individual launchers, having received this signal, begins the process of immediately launching ballistic missiles in full automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.

The development of the special command missile system “Perimeter” was assigned by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the CPSU Central Committee No. 695-227 of August 30, 1974. It was initially planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) missile as the base missile; later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTH (15A16) missile. The missile, modified in terms of its control system, received the index 15A11.

In December 1975, a preliminary design of the command rocket was completed. The rocket was equipped with a special warhead with the index 15B99, which included an original radio engineering system developed by OKB LPI (Leningrad Polytechnic Institute). To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead had to have a constant orientation in space during flight. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for the special Mayak warhead), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and testing. The production of a special warhead 15B99 was organized at NPO Strela in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions, flight design tests of the command rocket began in 1979. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental silo launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile according to orders coming from the highest echelons of the Strategic Missile Forces control. At a special technical position in the assembly building, a shielded anechoic chamber was built, equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter.

Flight tests of the 15A11 missile were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Varfolomey Korobushin.

The first launch of the 15A11 command rocket with an equivalent transmitter was successful on December 26, 1979. The interaction of all systems involved in the launch was checked; the rocket launched the 15B99 warhead onto a standard trajectory with a top of about 4000 km and a range of 4500 km. A total of 10 missiles were manufactured for flight testing. However, from 1979 to 1986, only seven launches were carried out.

During testing of the system, real launches of ICBMs were carried out different types from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the 15A11 command missile during the flight. To do this, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receiving devices of the Perimeter system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during flight development tests (FDT), six launches were considered successful, and one was considered partially successful. Due to the successful progress of the tests and the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten.

A CURE FOR POSSIBLE ILLUSIONS

Simultaneously with the LCT of the rocket, ground tests of the functioning of the entire complex were carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. The tests were carried out at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at levels of exposure to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified by the specifications of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In addition, during the tests, by resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, the task was set to expand the functions of the complex with the delivery of combat orders not only to launchers of ground-based intercontinental missiles, but also to nuclear missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, as well as control centers of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy. Flight testing of the command missile was completed in March 1982, and in January 1985 the Perimeter complex was put on combat duty.

Data on the Perimeter system is extremely classified. However, it can be assumed that the technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the basic 15A16 missile. The launcher is silo-type, automated, highly protected, most likely an OS type - a modernized OS-84 launcher.

There is no reliable information about the system, however, based on indirect evidence, it can be assumed that it is a complex expert system equipped with a variety of communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. The system monitors the presence and intensity of conversations on air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the surrounding area, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's surface. bark (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and the presence of living people at the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike. After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command post exercises.

In December 1990, a modernized system was put into service, called “Perimeter-RC”, which operated until June 1995, when, as part of the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty.

It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be modernized so that it can quickly respond to an attack by non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles.

I am sure that our scientists can come up with dozens of asymmetric responses to the military threat to the United States, and at an order of magnitude cheaper. Well, as for their immorality, if some British ladies consider anti-personnel mines to be immoral weapons, and Tomahawks - very respectable, then it’s not a bad idea to give them a good scare. And the more the ladies shout, the less desire our Western friends will have to get into trouble with Russia.


Russia has the only weapon in the world that guarantees a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy, even in the terrible event that we no longer have anyone to decide on this strike. The unique system counterattacks automatically – and brutally.

Imagine the worst possible scenario. The world, teetering on the very brink of war, collapsed. The patience of the “Western democracies” was exhausted, and a pre-emptive nuclear strike was launched on the territory of the Soviet Union. Deadly missiles were launched from silo launchers, submarines and aircraft. The full power of many thousands of warheads fell on cities and military installations. And while the Soviet leadership, in shock and panic, was figuring out what had happened, whether it was a mistake, and how to correct the situation, there was nothing left to correct.

Major cities, industrial and military centers, control and communications centers were destroyed in a single massive strike. The powerful nuclear arsenal of the USSR simply did not have time to be used: the command was not received, and in the absence of a leadership center, the dangerous rival is blind, mute and motionless.

But at the very moment when NATO generals raise their glasses of victory, something unimaginable happens. The enemy, who had been silent for what seemed like forever, seemed to come to life. Thousands of rockets rushed towards Western countries- and before the generals had time to finish off the bottle of champagne, many of them, having broken through with such efforts, built missile defense, wiped off the face of the earth major cities, military bases, command centers. Nobody won.

That's how it worked "Perimeter" system, which received a chilling name in the Western press "Dead Hand", the last argument of the Soviet (and now Russian) state. Despite the large number and variety of “Doomsday Machines” invented by science fiction writers, which guarantee retribution to any enemy and are capable of reaching and guaranteed to destroy him, only “Perimeter” apparently really exists.

However, “Perimeter” is a system kept in such strict secrecy that there are some doubts about its existence, and all information about its composition and functions should be taken with a great deal of doubt. So what do we know?

The Perimeter system launches an automatic massive nuclear strike. It guarantees the launch of submarine-, air- and silo-based ballistic missiles in the event that the enemy destroys ALL points capable of ordering a retaliatory attack. It is completely independent from other means of communication and command systems, even from the notorious “nuclear suitcase” of the Kazbek system.

The system was put on combat duty in 1985, and five years later it was modernized, received the name “Perimeter-RTs” and served for another 5 years. Then, as part of the START-1 agreement, she was removed from duty - and her current condition is unknown. According to some sources, it can be “turned on” again after START-1 expires, and according to others, it has already been returned to its current state.

This is how the system is believed to work. “Perimeter” is on constant combat duty; it receives data from tracking systems, including early warning radars for missile attacks. Apparently, the system has its own independent command posts, which are outwardly indistinguishable from many similar points of the Strategic Missile Forces. According to some reports, there are 4 such points, they are separated over a long distance and duplicate each other’s functions.

At these points, the most important - and most secret - component of the Perimeter, the autonomous control and command system, operates. It is believed that this is a complex software system created on the basis of artificial intelligence. By receiving data on communications on the air, the radiation field and other radiation at control points, information from early detection systems for launches, seismic activity, it is able to draw conclusions about the fact of a massive nuclear attack.

If “the situation is ripe,” the system itself is transferred to a state of full combat readiness. Now she needs one last factor: the absence of regular signals from the usual command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces. If signals have not been received for some time, “Perimeter” triggers the Apocalypse.

In an interview with Wired magazine, one of the system developers, Vladimir Yarynich, provides the following information about the operating algorithm of the Perimeter system: “It was designed to remain dormant until activated by a high-ranking official in a crisis situation. Then it would begin to monitor a network of sensors - seismic, radiation, atmospheric pressure - for signs of nuclear explosions.

Before launching a retaliatory strike, the system would have to check four "ifs": if the system was activated, it would first try to determine whether nuclear weapons had been used on Soviet territory. If this turned out to be true, the system would check for communication with the General Staff. If there was communication, the system would automatically shut down after some time - 15 minutes to an hour - had passed without further signs of an attack, assuming that officials capable of ordering a counterattack were still alive.

But if there had been no communication, Perimeter would have decided that Judgment Day had arrived, and immediately transferred the right to make the launch decision to anyone who was deep in a protected bunker at that moment, bypassing the usual multiple authorities.”

15A11 command missiles are released from the silos. Created on the basis of the MR UR-100 intercontinental missiles (launch weight 71 tons, flight range up to 11 thousand km, two stages, liquid-propellant jet engine), they carry a special warhead. In itself, it is harmless: it is a radio engineering system developed at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic. These missiles, rising high into the atmosphere and flying over the territory of the country, broadcast launch codes for all nuclear missile weapons. They also act automatically.

Imagine a submarine standing at the pier: almost the entire crew on the shore has already died, and only a few confused submariners on board. Suddenly she comes to life. Without any outside intervention, having received a launch signal from strictly secret receiving devices, the nuclear arsenal begins to move. The same thing happens in immobilized mine installations.

A retaliatory strike is inevitable: it is probably unnecessary to add that the Perimeter system is designed to be especially resistant to all damaging factors of nuclear weapons. It is almost impossible to reliably disable it.

After being put on combat duty, the Perimeter complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises. The command missile system with the 15A11 missile remained on combat duty until June 1995, when, as part of the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. According to other sources, this happened on September 1, 1995, when the 510th missile regiment, armed with command missiles, was taken off duty in the 7th missile division (Vypolzovo village) and disbanded.

This event coincided with the completion of the withdrawal of MR UR-100 missiles from the Strategic Missile Forces and the process of rearmament of the 7th RD with the Topol mobile ground missile system, which began in December 1994. In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (urban town of Yurya), a regiment with a modernized command missile system, which received the name “Perimeter-RC”, which includes a command missile created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

There is also evidence that previously the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer MRBM. Such a mobile complex with “pioneer” command missiles was called “Gorn”. The index of the complex is 15P656, the missiles are 15Zh56. It is known about at least one unit of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Horn complex - the 249th Missile Regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk Region, 32nd Missile Division (Postavy), from March-April 1986 to 1988 was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

Organizations involved in the production of components and technical maintenance of the complex are experiencing difficulties with financing. Staff turnover is high, resulting in a decline in staff qualifications. Despite this, Russian leaders have repeatedly assured foreign states that there is no risk of accidental or unauthorized missile launches.

In the Western press the name “dead hand” was assigned to the system. According to Wired magazine in 2009, the Perimeter system is operational and ready to strike back.

Alexey Chikurnikov, popmech.ru and ru.wikipedia.org

After us there is silence

Unofficial motto of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces

On August 6, 1945, the Little One atomic bomb with a yield of 21 kilotons of TNT was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Since then, a new era has begun in the history of mankind. And for more than seventy years now, we have been constantly living under the fear of a global catastrophe, which could not only wipe out our species from the face of the Earth, but also turn the entire planet into a lifeless radioactive ball.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the world has been on the brink of the abyss many times, and only a miracle prevented us from falling into it. At the same time, it should be recognized that the presence of nuclear weapons has become the most reliable means of deterrence - without them, the Cold War, without a doubt, would have slipped into the Third World War...

And although the era of the Great Confrontation between East and West is long behind us, the fundamental situation has remained virtually unchanged - a full-scale war between the leading nuclear powers is impossible today, because there will be no winners in it...

This status quo is maintained not only thanks to the nuclear parity that exists between Russia and the United States, but also to other creepy instruments that our country has inherited since Cold War.

The Perimeter system is the ideal weapon of retaliation

In the 80s, the Soviet Union developed an unprecedented management system strategic forces- “Perimeter”. In the West, it received the designation Dead Hand, which means “Dead Hand”. In essence, this is a parallel, redundant system for controlling the country's nuclear forces, dispersed, hidden and well protected.

However, this is not even the main thing: the Perimeter system is capable of operating in automatic mode when communication with the country’s leadership is lost or the top officials of the state have already turned into radioactive ash. In this case, the Perimeter system gives the command to launch all remaining nuclear weapons carriers and takes revenge for its burned cities and command posts...

According to the developers of Perimeter, there is no reliable and guaranteed way to disable this system, since it was designed to carry out its tasks in the very heat of a nuclear war.

In fact, “Perimeter” is an ideal weapon of retaliation, guaranteeing the aggressor a retaliatory strike even in the event of a surprise attack. It should be noted that the country's leadership, command posts and communications centers of the Strategic Missile Forces are the highest priority targets in the event of the outbreak of nuclear Armageddon.

The Perimeter system is still in service with the Russian army. Information about the principles of its operation and basic elements is one of the main military secrets of our country, therefore in open access Only the most general data is found. In 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Karakaev, told reporters that the Perimeter system was on combat duty and was capable of performing its functions at any time.

The world learned about the existence of the “Dead Hand” after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the early 90s, from designers who left for the West. There, this system was immediately dubbed the “Doomsday Machine” and called inhumane. True, at the same time, critics forgot about the American analogue of the Soviet “Perimeter”, as well as the fact that similar systems are probably in use in the USA today.

For many years almost nothing was heard about Perimeter, but in lately The "dead hand" began to appear more and more often in Russian media. They say that only this system prevents American hawks from starting World War III. And here, most likely, there is a typical transfer of one’s own desires to the opponent. For it seems extremely unlikely that today anyone in the well-fed and prosperous West would want to unleash a large-scale nuclear Armageddon.

History of the Doomsday Machine

When talking about controlling nuclear weapons, we usually imagine a red button, or, at worst, a “nuclear suitcase.” However, at the dawn of the atomic age, immediately after the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), communication between high command and launch personnel was much simpler. It was based on special packages that had to be opened after receiving the code word. And it was transmitted via regular radio or wire communication. In the USSR, the first nuclear forces control system was called “Monolith”.

Vladimir Yarynich, in the future one of the developers of Perimeter, and in the 60s an ordinary rocket scientist, described in detail the shortcomings of this system. According to him, during the announcement of the training alert, the officer was so nervous that his hands were shaking, and for a long time he could not open the envelope with scissors. The problem was noticed and the bag was equipped with a special clasp. This “know-how” saved as much as 18 seconds...

However, the main drawback of the Monolith was clearly not the design of the secret package. The overall speed of the system was unsatisfactory, and the security of communication lines also left much to be desired. In addition, with the scheme of working through sealed packages, the given order could no longer be canceled...

But the weakest link of the Monolith was the person who had to directly carry out the order. It turned out that the entire Soviet nuclear power depended on a few officers pressing the “red buttons” in missile bunkers. Moreover, they understood the consequences of a nuclear war better than others. Everyone could ask themselves the question: if half of the world has already been destroyed, then why incinerate the other?

And it must be said that the prospect of using nuclear weapons terrified not only the rocket scientists. In 1972, the Soviet military presented Kosygin and Brezhnev with their calculations of the consequences of a massive American nuclear strike on the USSR. They were staggering: 80 million dead immediately after the attack, the complete destruction of industry and the military. After reading the report, the Secretary General, who himself had once gone through a war, was shocked. Then a training launch of three ballistic missiles was organized for Brezhnev. Those present recalled that Leonid Ilyich’s hands were shaking before pressing the button, and he asked several times whether the missiles were really training missiles. Ten years later, Ronald Reagan found himself in a similar situation. The American military took him to a special bunker and showed him a model of the possible outbreak of a nuclear war. The President had not yet finished his coffee when Washington was destroyed. And it took Soviet missiles less than half an hour to completely wipe out the United States from the face of the Earth. According to the recollections of advisers, Reagan was amazed that with one nod of his head he could incinerate tens of millions of people.

The Cuban missile crisis clearly showed all the shortcomings of the Monolith, and therefore in 1967 it was replaced by the Signal system, which had greater speed and security. And more importantly, now the order given could be canceled. “Signal” did not use packets; instead, 13 pre-programmed commands were introduced, which were transmitted to the direct performers.

Later, the Signal system was modernized several times. Its latest version, Signal-A, put into service in 1985, allowed the leadership of the Strategic Missile Forces to remotely change the targets of missiles located in silos. This took from 10 to 15 seconds. That is, the development of the nuclear weapons control system proceeded through its maximum automation and reducing the influence of the human factor on its operation. At the same time, the first Soviet “nuclear suitcase”, “Cheget,” was created.

In the 70s, the development of a backup system began, which, in addition to insuring the main channel, was supposed to solve another important problem - to guarantee the protection of the system from being triggered by false alarms. It was these works that subsequently led to the emergence of the Perimeter control system.

How "Dead Hand" was created

By the end of the 60s, the rapid development of electronic warfare systems jeopardized the transmission of orders from the top leadership of the country and the armed forces to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces and individual launchers.

In 1973, the United States put forward the concept of a “decapitation strike,” according to which, in the event of a full-scale nuclear conflict with the USSR, the first strike should be delivered to command posts and communications centers using medium- and short range, and also cruise missiles, stationed in Europe. In this case, due to the gain in flight time, the leadership of the Soviet Union would have been destroyed even before it made a decision on a massive retaliatory strike on US territory.

This became a serious challenge for the USSR, to which an answer certainly had to be found. The idea was proposed to use a special command missile to control nuclear forces, which had a powerful radio transmitter installed instead of a warhead. It was supposed to be launched automatically in the event of the destruction of command posts.

Work on the creation of a command rocket was entrusted to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau; it began in 1974, after the relevant government decree. The UR-100UTTH ICBM was taken as the basis. The project was very large-scale - dozens of enterprises, institutes and research centers of the Soviet Union took part in it.

In 1979, flight development tests of the rocket began. In addition, a special command post was built, on which new control equipment was installed. A total of 10 tests of the command missile were carried out, during which, on its orders, real launches of various types of ICBMs were carried out. At the same time, the operation of the complex was tested under conditions of exposure to damaging factors of nuclear weapons. Even during testing, the designers were tasked with expanding the capabilities of the Perimeter so that it could convey orders to missile-carrying submarine cruisers, strategic aircraft, as well as Navy and Air Force control centers.

Flight testing of the missile was completed in 1982, and in 1985 the system was put into service. The first comprehensive test of the system was carried out during the large-scale exercise “Shield-82”.

In 1990, the modernized Perimeter-RC complex was put into service, in which the command missile was created on the basis of the Topol ICBM.

Until 1995, “Perimeter” was on combat duty, periodically taking part in various exercises. Then, as part of the obligations under the START-1 agreement, the system was removed from duty. However, it expired in 2009. In 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Karakaev, confirmed to journalists that Perimeter exists and is on combat duty.

What does Perimeter consist of?

We do not know too much about the elements of the Perimeter system, and it is possible that some of the available information is “misinformation”, specially disseminated to hide the truth. This complex includes:

  • command post (or posts);
  • rockets for transmitting orders;
  • receiving devices;
  • autonomous control and computing complex.

The command posts of the Perimeter system are probably similar to conventional command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces. They are equipped with communications systems and equipment necessary to launch command missiles. The “Grotto” object, which is located in the Kosvinsky Kamen mountain range in the Urals, is most often referred to as such a control point. It is unknown how many such points exist, and how integrated they are with the command missile launchers.

The Command Missile is the most famous component of the Perimeter. It was initially developed on the basis of the UR-100 ICBM, but there is information that there were also command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM, and in the late 80s the Topol was “adapted” to perform this task. The command rocket has a powerful radio transmitter through which the order “Launch!” is given. everyone ballistic missiles, having survived the first blow of the enemy.

Receiving devices. They ensure that orders are received from the command missile; accordingly, all launch silos and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, missile-carrying submarines and strategic aircraft must be equipped with them. However, nothing is known about their structure and operating principles.

The autonomous command system is, without a doubt, the most mysterious and interesting part"Perimeter". There is no official or at least any reliable data about it. Many people don’t believe in its existence at all. The main debate is about whether there is a so-called Doomsday Machine - a kind of supercomputer based on artificial intelligence - which is capable of making a decision on the use of nuclear weapons itself, without human intervention.

How does Dead Hand work?

There are two hypotheses regarding the operating principles of Perimeter. According to the first of them, during a period of international aggravation, which theoretically could end in a nuclear war, the head of state - who is also its commander in chief - transfers the system to combat mode. If, before a certain moment, “Perimeter” is not “turned off” again, then it will initiate the launch of command missiles, which, in turn, will launch the scenario of the Third World War.

This scheme is reminiscent of the operation of a bomb with a timer, which can only be turned off by one person.

The second version assumes that Perimeter has some kind of powerful electronic analytical center capable of receiving information, processing it, and then making independent decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, the system has large number sensors that collect and transmit information to the analytical center.

By measuring the level of electromagnetic radiation, radioactive background, seismic activity, recording the level and intensity of negotiations on military frequencies, and also analyzing data from the SPNR, the system determines whether an enemy nuclear attack has occurred. It also constantly checks whether there is a connection with senior management countries and command centers Strategic Missile Forces. If data about a massive nuclear strike is confirmed, but there is no communication with the leadership, then the system itself gives the command to use nuclear weapons.

Such a hypothesis raises a lot of questions and has many opponents. One of the main functions of any nuclear weapon systems is protection against unauthorized activation. Therefore, rocket launches are still carried out manually. This is too serious a matter, and people here don't trust computers too much.

Vladimir Yarynich, already mentioned above, in an interview with Wired journalists said that the Perimeter system can really determine whether hit throughout the country. Then she tries to contact the General Staff and only if this is impossible, she transfers the right to launch nuclear weapons to anyone who is nearby in a secret and specially protected bunker at that moment. That is final decision the person still accepts...

By the way, Yarynich himself considered Perimeter the best insurance against the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a false alarm. Having received information about a massive launch of enemy missiles, the highest official of the state can simply switch the Perimeter into combat mode, knowing that even after destroying the entire leadership of the country, the aggressor will not avoid retaliation.

During the Cold War, Americans were not even aware of the Perimeter, which can be called very strange. The Soviet leadership needed to trumpet the existence of such a system, because the mere mention of it would serve as deterrence much better than any new missiles or nuclear-powered missile-carrying ships. Probably, the military was afraid that, having learned about the existence of the system, the Americans would be able to find a weak link in it. One way or another, the first information about “Perimeter” began to appear in the Western press only after the collapse of the USSR.

Perimeter system(Strategic Missile Forces air defense index - 15E601, nicknamed “Dead Hand” in the West, and “Hand from the Coffin” in the East) - the control system for strategic missile forces - Strategic Missile Forces. In the documents it received the name “Perimeter”. The system involved the creation of such technical means and software that would make it possible, in any conditions, even the most unfavorable, to convey the order to launch missiles directly to the launch teams. According to the creators of Perimeter, the system could prepare and launch missiles even if everyone died and there was no one to give the order. This component began to be unofficially called “Dead Hand or Hand from the Coffin.”

Operating principle of the system:

The logic of the Dead Hand’s actions involved the regular collection and processing of a gigantic amount of information. A variety of information was received from all kinds of sensors. For example, about the state of communication lines with a higher command post: there is a connection - there is no connection. About the radiation situation in the surrounding area: normal level of radiation - increased level of radiation. About the presence of people at the starting position: there are people - there are no people. About registered nuclear explosions and so on and so forth.
The “Dead Hand” had the ability to analyze changes in the military and political situation in the world - the system assessed commands received over a certain period of time, and on this basis could conclude that something was wrong in the world. When the system believed that its time had come, it became active and launched a command to prepare for the launch of the rockets.
Moreover, the “Dead Hand” could not begin active operations in peacetime. Even if there was no communication, even if the entire combat crew left the starting position, there were still a lot of other parameters that would block the operation of the system.

After an order received from the highest echelons of the Strategic Missile Forces control to a special command post, the 15P011 command missile with a special 15B99 warhead is launched, which in flight transmits launch commands to all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces that have the appropriate receivers.

System concept:

The system is designed to guarantee the launch of silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a crushing nuclear strike by the enemy on the territory of the USSR, all command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of ordering a retaliatory strike are destroyed. The system is the only doomsday machine (weapon of guaranteed retribution) in existence in the world, the existence of which has been officially confirmed. The system is still classified and may still be on combat duty to this day, so any information about it cannot be confirmed as unequivocally reliable, or refuted, and should be viewed with a due degree of skepticism.

At its core, the Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the military armed with nuclear warheads. It was created as a backup system in case the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communications lines of the Strategic Missile Forces were destroyed by the first strike, in accordance with the concept of Limited Nuclear War developed in the United States. To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was initially designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is capable of making a decision on a retaliatory strike independently, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is essentially the only deterrent that provides real guarantees that a potential enemy will renounce the concept of a preventive crushing strike.

History of creation:

The development of a special command missile system, called “Perimeter”, was assigned to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by USSR Government Decree N695-227 dated August 30, 1974. It was initially planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) missile as the base missile, later they settled on the MR missile -UR100 UTTH (15A16). The missile, modified in terms of its control system, received the index 15A11.

In December 1975, a preliminary design of the command rocket was completed. The rocket was equipped with a special warhead, indexed 15B99, which included an original radio engineering system developed by OKB LPI. To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead had to have a constant orientation in space during flight. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing the propulsion system for the Mayak SGCH), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and testing. The production of SGC 15B99 was organized at NPO Strela in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979, the flight tests of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile according to orders coming from the highest echelons of the Strategic Missile Forces control. At a special technical position in the assembly building, a shielded anechoic chamber was built, equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter.

Flight tests of the 15A11 missile (see layout diagram) were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission headed by Lieutenant General V.V. Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The first launch of the 15A11 command rocket with an equivalent transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. The developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the ability of the rocket to provide the given flight path of the GC 15B99 (trajectory apex at an altitude of about 4000 km, range 4500 km), operation of all service systems of the main unit in normal mode, the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

10 missiles were allocated for flight testing. In connection with the successful launches and the completion of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches.

During the tests of the Perimeter system, real launches of 15A14, 15A16, 15A35 missiles were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the SGCh 15B99 in flight. Previously, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed. All launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces subsequently underwent these modifications.

Along with flight tests, a ground test of the functionality of the entire complex was carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the testing laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas), and at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the control system and SGCh equipment at levels of exposure to a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified in the TTT MO.

Even during the flight tests, a government decree set the task of expanding the functions solved by the command missile complex, with the delivery of combat orders not only to Strategic Missile Forces facilities, but also to strategic missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, points control of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.

The flight tests of the command missile were completed in March 1982. In January 1985, the complex was put on combat duty. For more than 10 years, the command missile complex has successfully fulfilled its important role in the defense capability of the state.

System components:

System command posts:

Apparently, they are structures similar to standard missile bunkers of the Strategic Missile Forces. They contain the control equipment and communication systems necessary to ensure the operation of the system. Presumably integrated with command missile launchers, however, most likely they are spaced at a fairly large distance to ensure better system survivability.

Command missiles:

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system. The only widely known component of the complex. They are part of the 15P011 command missile complex and have the index 15A11, developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau on the basis of the 15A16 missiles (MR UR-100U). Equipped with a special warhead 15B99, containing a radio-technical command system developed by OKB LPI, designed to ensure the delivery of combat orders from the central command post to all command posts and launchers under conditions of exposure to nuclear explosions and active electronic countermeasures, when the warhead is flying on a passive part of the trajectory. The technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base 15A16 missile. Launcher 15P716 - silo, automated, highly protected, OS type, most likely a modernized OS-84 launcher. The possibility of basing missiles in other types of launch silos cannot be ruled out.

The development of a command missile began under the TTT of the Ministry of Defense in 1974. Flight design tests were carried out at NIIP-5 (Baikonur) from 1979 to 1986. A total of 7 launches were carried out (6 successful, 1 partially successful). The mass of the warhead 15B99 is 1412 kg.

Receiving devices:

They ensure that the components of the nuclear triad receive orders and codes from command missiles in flight. They are equipped with all launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, all SSBNs and strategic bombers. Presumably, the receiving devices are hardware connected to the control and launch equipment, ensuring autonomous execution of the launch order.

Autonomous control and command system:

The mythical component of the system is a key element of the Doomsday Machine, the existence of which there is no reliable information. Some proponents of the existence of such a system believe that it is a complex expert system equipped with a variety of communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. This system supposedly monitors the presence and intensity of conversations on air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the surrounding area, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and, possibly, the presence of living people at the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike.

Another proposed option for the system’s operation is that upon receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief switches the system to combat mode. After this, if within a certain time the system command post does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then command missiles are launched.

System location:

The automated system "Perimeter" is installed in the area of ​​Mount Kosvinsky Kamen (Ural). According to Blair, “American strategists consider it to be the crown jewel of the Russian nuclear combat command system, since it can communicate through the granite mass with Russian long-range strategic aircraft using a VLF radio signal (3.0 - 30.0 kHz) capable of propagation even in a nuclear war. This bunker is a critical link in the doomsday machine's communications network, designed to provide semi-automatic retaliation in response to a decapitation strike."

Operation and system status:

After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command post exercises. The 15P011 command missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the UR-100 MP) was on combat duty until June 1995, when, as part of the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. According to other sources, this happened on September 1, 1995, when the 510th missile regiment, armed with command missiles, was taken off duty in the 7th missile division (Vypolzovo village) and disbanded. This event coincided with the completion of the withdrawal of MR UR-100 missiles from the Strategic Missile Forces and the process of rearmament of the 7th RD with the Topol mobile ground missile system, which began in December 1994.

In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (Yurya town), a regiment (commander - Colonel S.I. Arzamastsev) with a modernized command missile system, called “Perimeter-RTs”, which included a command missile, took up combat duty , created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

There is also evidence that previously the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer MRBM. Such a mobile complex with “pioneer” command missiles was called “Gorn”. The index of the complex is 15P656, the missiles are 15Zh56. It is known about at least one unit of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Horn complex - the 249th Missile Regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk Region, 32nd Missile Division (Postavy), from March-April From 1986 to 1988 it was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

Organizations involved in the production of components and technical maintenance of the complex are experiencing difficulties with financing. Staff turnover is high, resulting in a decline in staff qualifications. Despite this, the Russian leadership has repeatedly assured foreign states that there is no risk of accidental or unauthorized missile launches.

In the Western press the name “Dead hand” was assigned to the system.

In Japan, military experts dubbed this system the “Hand from the Coffin.”

According to Wired magazine in 2009, the Perimeter system is operational and ready to strike back.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, stated that the Perimeter system exists and is on combat duty.

Operators:

Russia (The system is currently active).