Submachine gun "Suomi" (Suomi). Finnish submachine guns

Until 1917, Finland was considered a province and was called Chukhonia. She received her sovereignty after October revolution. Until this time, the country's industry had not developed at all. Therefore, the state could not boast of its weapons. World fame Only the famous Finnish knives, which were widely used by Russian hunters and bandits, received. Nevertheless, Finland participated in two wars. The Finnish army was armed with Suomi submachine guns.

According to military experts, this weapon It wasn’t a masterpiece, but it also can’t be called completely bad. However, its mass production was never established. A description of the Suomi submachine gun, its design and tactical and technical characteristics is presented in the article.

Acquaintance

The Suomi submachine gun belongs to the small arms firearms Aimo Lahti systems. In the documentation this model is listed as KP/-31, Suomi KP. Development of the Suomi submachine gun has been carried out since 1921. The Finnish army received it only in 1931. Serial production of this rifle model continued until 1953. Over the entire period, no more than 80 thousand units were produced.

Start

Finnish weapons designer Aimo Johannes Lahti decided to use the KP/-26 7.65 mm submachine gun as the basis for the Suomi. This rifle model has been produced in Finland since 1926. It was originally planned that the Suomi submachine gun (a photo of the rifle model is presented in the article) would be used at close ranges. In those years, the Finnish army experienced a particularly acute shortage of lungs. light machine guns. "Suomi" was just supposed to become such a weapon. Since it was considered as a new light machine gun, the designers equipped it with a relatively long and quick-detachable barrel. In addition, Suomi is equipped with bipods and spacious magazines.

What difficulties did gunsmiths face?

Already the first test of Suomi showed that pistol bullets have a fairly low lethality. Shooting, as previously assumed, was effective only at short range. Due to its low lethality, the Suomi could not be considered as a full-fledged weapon for infantry squads. As a result, Finnish specialists had to make changes to the country's military doctrine. Eventually infantry squad got an extra manual Lahti-Saloranta machine gun L/S-26, using rifle-machine gun cartridges.

About production

The Suomi PP has a design similar to the first generation submachine guns, namely those created on the basis of the MP18. The shutter for Suomi was made according to the model German Rheinmetall MP19. At the same time, according to weapons experts, the Finnish PP has certain features that are characteristic only of it. The production of "Suomi" was carried out using various metalworking machines. The bolt box was made entirely using a steel forging. However, this entailed an increase in the weight of the weapon. The weight of a fully equipped Suomi PP exceeded 7 kg. In addition, the production of submachine guns required serious financial investments. This was the reason that mass release The Suomi border crossing point was never established.

Device

The submachine gun has a solid wooden stock, a solid-milled receiver with a round cross-section, a barrel, a removable casing and a trigger mechanism. The front part of the trigger guard has become a place for an L-shaped fuse, which is used as a fire mode switch. In an effort to make the receiver airtight, as well as to prevent dirt and dust from entering the mechanism, the Finnish designer in his PP placed the bolt handle motionless and separate from the bolt itself. In Suomi, the rear part of the receiver became the place for the handle. According to experts, as a result of the fixed fastening of the firing pin, the rigid connection with the cocking handle was lost, as a result of which the possibility of manually loading ammunition into the chamber was completely excluded, which would lead to injury or unplanned shooting. According to military experts, such delays in firing are considered normal. In automatic and repeating rifles equipped with complex percussion mechanisms, such problems are corrected manually. Another design feature of the Finnish PP is the ease of removing and installing the barrel casing. Having spare barrels on hand, the infantryman can replace it at any moment if the barrel overheats. Today, a similar solution is used by Israeli gunsmiths for “ultrasound”.

About shutter operation

The Finnish designer managed to slow down the rate of fire by introducing a vacuum braking system into the PP. It was a special membrane-spring pneumatic device containing five holes of different diameters. A very high-quality and tight fit is provided for the receiver, its cover and bolt. The valve works like a piston inside a cylinder. Thanks to this design feature It was possible to completely eliminate air leakage. The receiver, namely its butt plate, is equipped with a special valve, the task of which is to allow air to pass exclusively from the inside to the outside. Thus, when the bolt moves forward, the valve closes. Thanks to this design, the weight of the shutter is reduced. In addition, shooting, especially single shots, has become more accurate.

About the sighting device

The submachine gun is equipped with a sector sight, which can be adjusted at a distance of no more than 500 m. However, according to military experts, effective burst fire from the Suomi is possible only within 200 m.

About ammunition

At first glance, the Suomi submachine gun and the PPSh are very similar. Firstly, both shooting models are equipped with rifle stocks without handles. Secondly, the ammunition supply in submachine guns is carried out from disk clips, which can accommodate a large number of ammunition.

Clips for the Suomi software are presented in two versions. They can contain 40 and 70 rounds. But as shown combat use, the large capacity of the clip did not justify itself. This is due to the fact that such a device is quite difficult to make. Producing 70-round clips requires significant financial investment. In addition, this device is not considered more reliable than a box magazine. As a result, only simple and trouble-free clips began to be produced for PPSh and Suomi. This example followed in Denmark and Sweden. Despite the fact that the design of the submachine gun did not include a fore-end, in Finland soldiers were instructed not to hold onto the magazine while firing. This recommendation was due to the fact that the receivers and clip latches were not of a strong enough design and very often became loose. Red Army soldiers using PPSh received similar instructions from their command. Nevertheless, during military operations this prohibition was often ignored.

About the accessory

Finnish industry produced special submachine guns that were used to arm soldiers in bunkers and other fortified facilities. The buttstock in such weapons was replaced by a pistol grip. In addition, such Suomi were equipped with shortened barrel housings and special stops. They were bipods that were attached to the muzzle of a submachine gun. In total, the Finnish industry produced no more than 500 such shooting models.

About the advantages and disadvantages

The Suomi PP is a fairly effective small weapon for its class, widely used at one time by Finnish and Soviet soldiers. "Suomi" has established itself as a weapon that is reliable even at sub-zero temperatures. The ability to quickly replace barrels was also appreciated.

However, despite the undeniable advantages, this submachine gun also has disadvantages. TO weaknesses"Suomi" can be attributed to it heavy weight and low muzzle velocity. In addition, according to experts, the tactical and technical characteristics of Finnish-made SMGs are significantly inferior to Soviet and German models. But the main disadvantage of Suomi is not of a technical, but of a technological nature. To manufacture the receiver, it was necessary to use milling technology. A solid forging took a lot of time and money. In order to produce submachine guns with a total number of about one million, stamping had to be introduced into the process, which increased the cost of weapons.

Application

There are only a few countries in the world that operate the Suomi submachine gun. Bulgaria during 1940-1942. 5505 units were purchased. Weapons designers in Denmark created 1,400 copies based on the Suomi submachine gun, which are listed as M/41 (Lettet-Forcegs submachine gun). Finnish in Poland weapon used by police officers since 1933. A total of 20 pieces were purchased. In the Soviet Union, captured Suomi submachine guns were used by reconnaissance groups of the Red Army, which carried out missions behind enemy lines and in “neutral territory” during the Soviet-Finnish War. Also soviet soldiers used "Suomi" during the Great Patriotic War. Sweden purchased 420 weapons. Based on the Finnish Suomi submachine gun, Swedish gunsmiths created a similar licensed model, which is listed in the documentation as M/37. In total, Swedish industry produced 35 thousand units. Switzerland purchased 100 Finnish small arms. The MP 43/44 was mass-produced on the Suomi basis. Croatia purchased 500 Suomi units from 1942 to 1943. Estonia - 485 pieces. In 1940, 3042 Suomi entered service with the Third Reich.

Finnish weapons used by Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units. In addition, Suomi was listed in 5th tank division SS "Viking" and regiment "Nordland". 1931-1990 - years of operation of the Suomi submachine gun in Finland.

About tactical and technical characteristics

The Suomi submachine gun was put into service in 1931.
Country of origin - Finland.
Overall size weapons is 87 cm.
Weight - 4.6 kg.
Barrel length 314 mm.
The weapon is equipped with 9 x 19 mm and 7.65 x 17 mm Parabellum ammunition in 9 and 7.65 calibers.
The principle of operation of the Suomi submachine gun is a free bolt.
Within one minute, you can fire from 750 to 900 shots.
The fired bullet has a speed of 396 m/s.
The Finnish Suomi submachine gun is effective at a distance of up to 200 m.

Ammunition was supplied from box magazines designed to hold 20, 36 and 50 rounds of ammunition, as well as from drum magazines with a capacity of 40 and 70 rounds.

About combat use

In the pre-war period, as the thirties of the 20th century are commonly called, a redistribution of spheres of influence in Europe began. Finland, unlike Soviet Union, did not have strong aviation. Therefore, the country's military budget was aimed at developing exclusively defensive, rather than offensive, programs. Civilians and military personnel waited and prepared for an attack from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Red Army overcame the large-scale and impregnable fortifications erected by the Finns with huge losses. In the conditions of the harsh polar winter, all the combat qualities of the Suomi PP were revealed. In accordance with the field regulations of the Finnish army, there was one submachine gun per platoon. Due to the state of its industry, Finland in 1939 could not provide every commander with such weapons. The situation has changed in better side in 1940. Now there were four Suomis per platoon. However, this was not enough. It was possible to solve the problem with the shortage of weapons by forming separate consolidated companies of machine gunners to inflict surprise on the enemy heavy fire.

At the end of such raids, these groups were disbanded, and the machine gunners returned back to their platoons. This combat tactics adopted by Soviet commanders. Already at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a company of machine gunners functioned in the Red Army as staffing structure. Thus, the Soviet soldiers directed the massive firepower borrowed from the Finns against the Nazis. The Soviet-Finnish war played the role of a kind of catalyst that contributed to an increase in quantities of weapons produced in the Soviet Union. At the end of the war, Finland lost some territories, but became the owner of other lands granted to it by the USSR. Taking advantage of the German attack, the Finns wanted to return what they had taken, which became the second phase of the Soviet-Finnish war. Despite the Finns’ assurances that they act independently and have not entered into an alliance with Hitler, it is known that over three thousand Suomi submachine guns were at one time in service with the Wehrmacht.

During the interwar period, searches were conducted in many countries effective means anti-tank defense. One of the most popular destinations began the development of anti-tank rifles (ATR) with a caliber from 7.92 to 20 mm, intended for arming infantry units. This trend did not bypass Finland, which watched the development with caution. armored vehicles its “big neighbor” – the Soviet Union.

Initially, Finnish experts settled on a caliber of 13.2 mm. However, while the development of PTR of this caliber was underway, the military began to doubt its effectiveness against the armor of new tanks. To be on the safe side, it was decided to create a 20-mm anti-tank gun as well, and then make the final choice by conducting comparative tests. At the beginning of 1939, the development of a 20-mm gun was entrusted to the most famous Finnish gunsmith designer, Aimo Johannes Lahti. By this time, Lahti already had a pistol L-35, and in 1938 he created a very successful 20-mm aircraft cannon. Lahti used the experience gained during its development to create an anti-tank rifle.

Design

The 20x138V Solothurn cartridge was chosen as ammunition for the PTR, which was used not only in anti-tank rifles of the Swiss company of the same name, but also in anti-aircraft guns - the German Flak 30 and Flak 38 and the Italian Breda M/35.

The heavy anti-tank rifle, known as the L-39, is a self-loading weapon whose automation operates on the principle of gas exhaust. The gas outlet is located approximately in the second third of the length of the barrel, immediately behind its perforated casing. The gas outlet tube is located under the barrel and is equipped with a four-position regulator, ensuring normal operation of the automation in various atmospheric conditions and at varying degrees barrel contamination. The barrel is equipped with a box-shaped muzzle brake with five holes on each side. In transport position muzzle brake a tin case is put on. To make it easier to carry the PTR, its barrel is equipped with a perforated wooden casing.

The bolt box has a rectangular shape. On its back side there is a shoulder rest with a rubber shock-absorbing pad, and on the left (at the level of the arrow's cheek) a wooden pad is screwed on. At the bottom there is a pistol grip with a trigger mechanism. The bolt handle is on the right side of the bolt box, the safety lever is on the left.

The PTR is equipped with a lightweight folding biped, attached to the front of the bolt box. It is complemented by a removable machine with two wide and short runners. Sights – open type(front sight and sector sight with graduation from 100 to 1400 m). They are shifted slightly to the left of the barrel axis, since a detachable box magazine (double-row, 10 rounds) is located on top of the center of the lock box.

One of the features of the Finnish PTR was the original machine
Source: en.wikipedia.org

The PTR crew consisted of two people. In winter conditions, the gun was transported either on a sled or on long runners that had fastenings for two cartridge boxes.

Tests

In the summer of 1939, comparative tests of two models of anti-tank rifles began - 13.2 mm and 20 mm. Their results were mixed - with a much larger mass, the 20-mm PTR was only slightly superior in armor penetration to its competitor. However, they took into account another advantage of the “twenty-millimeter” - a significantly better armor effect. Its shell produced more fragments after penetrating the armor, which means it was more likely to disable the “stuffing” of the tank and its crew. As a result, on August 11, 1939, it was decided to stop fine-tuning the 13.2 mm PTR and further develop the 20 mm model as the one that most fully meets the requirements.

On September 6, 1939, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, General Eirik Axel Heinrichs, who was responsible for the armament of the Finnish army, signed an order for the immediate adoption of the 20 panssarintorjuntakkivääri L-39 anti-tank rifle (abbreviated as 20 pst.kiv. L-39). The production of anti-tank guns was established at the state arms factory "Valtion Kivaeritedas" in the city of Jyväskylä. Hence another designation for PTR - VKT-L (an abbreviation of the manufacturer and the name of the designer).

PTR L-39 in combat position
Source: en.wikipedia.org

Service and combat use

Light anti-aircraft gun L-39/44 in combat position. Kouvola area, October 1944
Source: SA-kuva, photo No. 167128

In the mid-50s, Finland made an attempt to modernize the L-39/44 by redesigning the gas exhaust mechanism to increase the weapon's rate of fire. In 1956 prototypes 20 ltkiv/39–54L and 20 ltkiv/39–55/ST were tested, but were unsuccessful. On the one hand, the theoretical rate of fire actually increased to 500 rounds/min, on the other hand, the increased load on the automation led to its failure after 250 rounds. In addition, the modified ersatz anti-aircraft guns weighed about 10 kg more than the original sample. At this point, the development of 20-mm light anti-aircraft guns in Finland stopped.

However, 20 pst.kiv. L-39/44 was not the first anti-aircraft weapons, created on the basis of the L-39 PTR. At the beginning of 1940, Aimo Lahti designed an automatic cannon based on it with a theoretical rate of fire of 700 rounds/min and a practical rate of 250 rounds/min. Such guns were used in a paired installation (on a carriage like German Flak 30/38), adopted for service under the designation 20 ltk/40 VKT (the name L-40 “Vekotin” was also used). In the Finnish army, these anti-aircraft guns were used for training purposes until the 70s, and were in the mobilization reserve in the 80s.

The only time the L-39 PTR was used to arm armored vehicles was in December 1940, when it was installed on the Landsverk L-182 armored car instead of the 13.2 mm L-35/36 machine gun.

A total of 2076 L-39 and L-39/44 anti-tank guns were produced. The first contract for 410 L-39 rifles was completed by June 1941, and in March of the same year another 496 units were ordered (delivery took place by December). In November 1941, a third order was issued - for 1000 guns at once, 946 of which were delivered in the basic version by May 1944, and the last 54 in the L-39/44 version. Finally, in July 1944, another 170 units were ordered - all of them were produced as “ersatz anti-aircraft guns”. However, the Finnish army did not receive 224 L-39/44 units, but about a hundred more. The fact is that in November 1944 it was ordered that 606 L-39 anti-tank missiles be converted into this version, and only a small part of it was completed before this order was cancelled. They were in service until the 60s. After this, approximately 1,000 anti-tank rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for them were sold to collectors, mainly in the United States.

The Lahti L-39 PTR, like other 20-mm caliber anti-tank guns (Swiss Solothurn of various modifications, Japanese Type 97), was the result of an attempt to create a kind of “hand cannon” with high ballistic characteristics. The result turned out to be disappointing - by 1940 the armor-piercing characteristics of 20-mm shells ceased to meet the requirements of combating modern tanks, and the PTR itself turned out to be too heavy. Suffice it to say that the Lahti weighed a good half centner - 2.5–3 times more than anti-tank rifles of 13.97–14.5 mm caliber (English Boys, Soviet PTRD and PTRS). However, due to chronic shortages in the Finnish army anti-tank artillery The L-39 anti-tank rifle remained in demand throughout the war. The good accuracy of the gun made it possible to hit such difficult targets as viewing slits of tanks and loopholes of field fortifications. We should not forget about the specific conditions in which the battles took place on the Soviet-Finnish front. The 20-mm anti-tank gun, which was relatively successfully used in wooded areas, would hardly be useful in open spaces, where armor-piercing positions were detected by the enemy at a distance significantly exceeding the effective firing range of the gun.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the 20 mm anti-tank rifle 20 pst.kiv. L-39

	20 pst.kiv. L-39
Caliber, mm
Weight of anti-tank rifle (with two legs, without magazine), kg
Weight of loaded magazine, kg
Combat weight (with magazine and machine with runners)
Projectile mass, g: armor-piercing armor-piercing tracer
Cartridge weight, g
PTR length, mm
Barrel length, mm
starting speed projectile, m/s
Rate of fire, rds/min: theoretical practical
Maximum firing range, m
Armor penetration at an encounter angle of 60°, rated (according to tests in 1943): at a distance of 300 m at a distance of 500 m at a distance of 1000 m

List of sources and literature:

Ochman M.H. Ciężki karabin przeciwpancerny Lahti L-39 (VKT-L) // Nowa technika wojskowa. – 2003. – No. 8
jaegerplatoon.net
winterwar.com
militaryfactory.com

The period of World War II was characterized for Finland by a time of continuous wars in the struggle for its own independence. This country could not carry out its own policy against the backdrop of European giants, and its main goal was to preserve the state system and independence gained in 1918.

However, Finland was the only country from the former Baltic provinces Russian Empire, which managed to maintain its statehood and become a full member of Europe after the events of the 40s of the last century. She had to pay for her own freedom with the lives of tens of thousands of her compatriots.

Finland during the Second World War experienced three local military conflicts - the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1939-1940 ( Winter War) and 1941-1944, as well as the Lapland War against German troops in 1944-1945. The Soviet-Finnish conflicts are still assessed differently by historians Western countries and Russia.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was the result of the USSR's desire to create a buffer zone near Leningrad and the Finns' unwillingness to make concessions. Soviet and Russian scientists view this conflict as a separate bilateral company not related to the events of World War II. The Finns, on the contrary, consider it an episode general war, the natural result of which was the conflict of 41-44.

Trying to secure its northern capital, the Soviet Union began negotiations with Finland in 1938. Initially, no territorial claims were put forward; the demands concerned only the lease of several islands. Later, the Soviet side proposed an exchange of territories of the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for double large areas Eastern Karelia. In addition, the USSR intended to lease part of the Hanko Peninsula, four Finnish islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and put forward a number of additional demands. They turned out to be unacceptable for the Finns, although a number of Finnish leaders were ready to agree to a peaceful settlement of the issue.

After fruitless attempts to achieve concessions through diplomacy, the USSR escalated the situation, which led to the outbreak of the Winter War. On November 30, 1939, the troops of the Soviet Union crossed the state border. The Soviet government, thanks to its vastly superior forces, planned to defeat the enemy without any problems. However, a network of well-fortified Finnish positions (the so-called Mannerheim Line), poor reconnaissance and poor training of troops led to significant losses in the first phase of the offensive operation. The worst situation developed in the area of the Karelian Isthmus, where the troops failed to break through even the first line of fortifications. More north Lake Ladoga the situation was little better - in some places the Soviet forces managed to penetrate 80 km into the defense, but the Finnish forces successfully counterattacked the Red Army units that were surrounded.

After initial failures Soviet army carried out large-scale preparations taking into account previous miscalculations, brought up reinforcements and in February 1940 resumed the offensive against Finland. Within a month, the troops managed to break through the Finnish defensive positions and they were forced to sit down at the negotiating table.

An interesting fact is that the Soviet-Finnish War almost led to the outbreak of military operations by England and France against the USSR. Actually high level plans for intervention were considered in these states, but due to the end of the war they were not destined to come true. Soviet aggression against Finland led to its expulsion from the League of Nations.

The conflict became one of the reasons for Finland's close cooperation with Germany. The population experienced revanchist sentiments, which led to the Soviet-Finnish War of 1941-1944. During that war, Finland officially announced the goals of returning its former territories, but it soon became clear that the country’s government intended to seize land from the USSR up to the “border of the three isthmuses” (Karelian, Olonetsky and White Sea). Such actions caused a sharp negative reaction from England and the United States, which by that time had already supported the USSR in its battle with Germany.

After reaching their previous borders by the end of 1941, Finnish troops encountered fortified positions Soviet troops. Difficulties on the political front (Allied pressure), in the army and within the country led to the stabilization of the Finnish front until the summer of 1944. At this time, the Allies were actively working to get Finland out of the war. In the summer of 1944, the USSR launched a large-scale offensive against Finnish positions in order to protect itself before the main battles with the Germans. Having suffered serious losses, the Finns managed to repel the advance of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus. However, later the resistance was broken and the new Finnish government led by Mannerheim asked for peace.

One of the conditions of the peace treaty included demands for the withdrawal or internment of German troops on Finnish territory. This led to the Lapland War, fighting against German forces, concentrated in the north of the country. Although this episode of the war did not cause great loss of life, Germany used scorched earth tactics in Finland. Buildings and infrastructure in the north of the country were largely destroyed. The last German units left Finnish lands in April 1945.

The experience of World War II forced a balanced policy between the West and the USSR in the post-war years. Ultimately, the country managed to maintain sovereignty and the existing political system.

Very little has been written about the Soviet-Finnish War (11/30/1939 - 03/12/1940), and what is written is mostly myths. Unfortunately, few works have historical truth, this is especially true for the beginning of the war, about which it is still said, 73 years later, that little Finland attacked the big USSR.

Much is kept silent about the losses of the Red Army during the breakthrough in February - March 1940 of the “Mannerheim Line” and access to Viipuri (Vyborg).

According to the head of the Center for Military Forecasting, corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences Anatoly Tsyganok, taking into account new documents that have become known in Lately, it is necessary to debunk some myths that are firmly entrenched in old textbooks on the history of Russia and have been voiced again recently.

Carl Gustav Mannerheim

According to the latest data, which both Russian and Finnish scientists agreed with, this war was started by the “peace-loving” Soviet state. Although, indeed, Finland mobilized earlier. However, the immediate cause of war was “the shelling of the village of Maynily by Finnish artillery.”

According to the stories of the former state security major (later general) Okunevich, he, together with two Moscow “ballistics specialists” and fifteen other military personnel, fired five artillery shots from the new secret weapon in the Maynila area. 1

The head of the NKVD was also located near Maynila. Leningrad region- Commissar 3rd rank S. Goglidze. 2 But, according to TASS, on November 26 at 15.45 min. Finnish artillery shelled the border area near the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result of which four Red Army soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. 3

President of Finland Risto Heikki Ryti (center) and Marshal K. Mannerheim

Signal flares over the Soviet-Finnish border, the first month of the war.

At work “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Book of Loss" Shy they say “It’s hard to say now by whom and with whose sanction this shelling was carried out. Since the incident was not investigated through joint efforts". 4 Colonel P.G. went to the scene of the shooting. Tikhomirov, head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. 5

The materials of his investigation have not yet been found. However, a number of documents have been discovered in the archives that allow us to look at this event in a new way. The issue of “killed and wounded Red Army soldiers” became clearer. In 1940, Maynila had the 68th Regiment 70 rifle division 19th Rifle Corps.

In the reports of the regiment commander to the division commander in the period from November 21 to 30, 1940, no mention of artillery shelling by the Finns was found. Moreover, the strength of the regiment did not change these days. There were 3,041 Red Army soldiers and commanders on allowance without changes. 6

From the Finnish side, this event was interpreted as shelling that was conducted from the Soviet side. According to Marshal Mannerheim, the light artillery battery was located 20 km from the specified village. The observation log of Finnish border guards records that artillery shots were carried out on the Soviet side from 15.30 to 16.05.

According to the agreement on the border regime between the USSR and Finland, this incident should have been investigated. True, there was one strange thing: it was not “the operational duty officer of the Leningrad Military District who reported what had happened to Moscow, but, on the contrary, the General Staff of the Red Army made a request about this. 7

Now that close contacts between Hitler’s Gestapo and the NKVD are known, it seems surprising that the scenario and reason for the start of the German-Polish war in the area of the Gleiwitz radio station and the Soviet-Finnish war near the town of Mainila seem surprising, especially since there was a time interval of just over a year between them.

In both cases, citizens of Germany and the USSR were killed. In both cases, troops were already concentrated, plans were prepared in a month and a half offensive operations and goals are defined. Baltic Fleet as early as August 2, 1939, it had a directive that provided:
destruction of the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian fleets
mastery of Suursaari, Big and Small Tyutyarsaari, Lovansaari, Seiskari
preventing the penetration of Germans (by forces submarines) to Turk, Åland Archipelago, Helsinki and Tallinn, 8

At 18.30 on October 8, the troops of the Leningrad Military District received order No. 1 - to complete the concentration on the Karelian Isthmus near the border by the morning of October 10, 1939. 9

Consequently, both the USSR and Germany needed a reason, and special services he was prepared.

Red Army soldier with an SVT-40 rifle

Myth two. On the superiority of Finnish weapons

In the plans adopted by the Finnish government for the use of armed forces in the event of war VK-1 and 2 (Venayan kesitus - Russian concentration), the VK-2 plan was taken as a basis, which provided for defensive actions on its territory, since there were not enough weapons.

In total, the Finnish army had in service at the beginning of the war:

4150 - Suomi submachine guns
4060 - light machine guns
2405 - heavy machine guns. 10

Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi”

At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 13-14 thousand troops in its troops. self-loading carbines Simonov with a clip of 15 and 25 rounds. By the end of the war, the Finnish infantry had:

4704 submachine guns
11647 - light machine guns (of which 1574 “Degyatrev”, captured as trophies from the Red Army)
3475 - heavy machine guns (out of 954 captured as a trophy from the Red Army). eleven

By the end of March 1940, the Red Army had about 60,000 machine guns. By the beginning of the offensive on the Mannerheim Line, the Red Army had 1558 tanks, while the Finnish army had only 10 serviceable tanks. 12

By the end of the war against Finland, the Soviet side concentrated:

960 thousand people
11,266 guns and mortars
2998 tanks
3,253 combat aircraft

In total, the group consisted of about 700 battalions and 56 regiments of the Red Army Air Force.

The total strength of the Finnish army was:

340 thousand people (180 infantry battalions)
944 guns
241 anti-aircraft guns.

Action of Russian tanks

The offensive of the 7th Army in Karelia. December 1939

Finnish soldiers

Myth three. About the power of the Red Army and the possibility of taking Helsinki in two or three weeks

According to Colonel General Nikolai Chervov 13

, « The Red Army passed the maturity test". Fear God! The Finns captured countless trophies:

rifles - 25248
light machine guns - 1574
heavy machine guns - 954
anti-tank guns -123
field guns - 160
mortars - 94

And there was no talk of the possible capture of Helsinki. By March, out of 53 aviation regiments, 30 were based at ice airfields. Due to the melting of the ice, they were forced to relocate to stationary airfields near Leningrad, Murmansk and Petrozavodsk, from where they were not able to provide support to greater depths.

Bunker scheme

Myth Four: About the support of the world proletariat for the Soviet Union

It would be dishonest to talk about support for the Soviet government from the proletariat. In fact, 11,663 foreign volunteers fought on the Finnish side.

However, only a Swedish detachment of 8,680 people took part in the hostilities. Besides him there were detachments:

Danish (944)
Norwegian (693)
Hungarian (346)
Legion of American Finns (364)

The Legion arrived in Finland when fighting stopped. There were few volunteers from Western European states:

from Belgium - 51 people
from England - 13
from France - 2
from Germany Germans - 18 14

Assault on Finnish fortifications

Myth five: About the approximate equality of losses

In the pro-Soviet and pro-Stalinist literature of the last three or four years, data on the approximate equality of losses are beginning to be repeated, with reference to Molotov’s statement in March 1940: “The Finns have a death toll of 60,000, not counting 250,000 wounded. In the Red Army, losses amounted to 48,745 people, and the number of wounded was 150,863 people.”

According to Molotov, it turned out that the Finns lost 1.5 times more. The actual losses of the Red Army during the 105 days of the war amounted to 333,084, including:

irrecoverable losses - 126875
sanitary losses - 264908

In sanitary losses:

188671 - wounded
58,370 - sick
17867 - frostbitten ¹⁵

According to other sources, the alphabetical card index of the Russian State Military Archive, which contains a list of casualties by name, lists 131,476 dead.

During the same time, the USSR lost about 2,000 tanks and 600 aircraft. Finnish aircraft losses amounted to 62 destroyed and 35 damaged. The Finns lost 66,400 people in the war, of which:

21,396 - killed
1,434 - missing
43,557 - wounded
847 soldiers and officers returned from the Russian plan ¹⁶

In four months, the USSR lost more soldiers than England (388 thousand), France (250 thousand), Austria (230 thousand) or the USA (250 thousand) would lose during all the years of World War II.

In general, the total losses of the Red Army are 5 times, and in terms of killed - 6 times, in terms of aircraft - 8 times higher than the losses of the Finnish army, and this is called " passing the maturity exam».

For Finland it was also a “Pyrrhic victory” ¹⁷

17it lost 1.8% of the country's total population, while the USSR lost only 0.15%. What a “trifle” for the mighty giant of the USSR!

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

War Prelude

In 1996, transcripts of a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were discovered in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee. Based on transcripts, I.V. Stalin, speaking at the final seventh meeting of the commanding staff to collect experience in combat operations against Finland under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 17, 1940, especially emphasized that so far “in the West, the three largest powers are at each other’s throats, ... when our hands are full and we are given a favorable environment in order to strike at this moment. It would be great stupidity, political myopia, to miss the moment and not try as quickly as possible, while there there is a war going on in the west, to resolve the issue of the security of Leningrad. That is why our government did the right thing by not rejecting this case and opening military action immediately after the break in negotiations with Finland.". 18

Therefore, the Red Army began military operations in “five columns” - understaffed, poorly trained, unarmed men in civilian black jackets and coats going on the attack, and not soldiers dressed in army uniforms.

They tried to shock Finland for the fifth time in history. And they lost 3,918 people every day for three months and 12 days. But this was a prelude to a larger war, in which the losses of the USSR would exceed the losses of all the main countries that took part in it.

Finnish citizens leave for Finland after the transfer of part of the territory to the USSR

The main conclusions about this war explain why some Russian military historians do not like to remember it.

Firstly, the USSR was recognized as an aggressor and was expelled from the League of Nations (predecessor of the UN), but annexed part of Finnish territory.
Secondly, The Red Army suffered a crushing defeat, despite the PR campaign in the Soviet press “about complete victory over Finland,” which is why this war was shyly called a small conflict.
Third Apparently, some kind of agreement was concluded between the USSR and Finland, according to which, even in the difficult days of the autumn of 1941, Finnish troops did not take any active action to blockade Leningrad.

Monument to those who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy)

Therefore, the Karelian Front was the calmest front of the Second World War and that is why it was mainly armed with captured German weapons.

In the Soviet-Finnish war, more than 126,875 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army died (at least this is documented), and it is necessary to talk about it and remember it.

Used Books:

1. Manninen O. There were shots: Rodina, 1995. No. 12, p. 57

2. Winter War 1939-1940. Book one. Political history. M.: Nauka, 1999, p. 137

3. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. M., t.3.p.361

4. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Book of losses./Krivosheev G.F., Andronikov V.M. .Burikov P.D.-M.: Veche, 2010. P.169

5. Winter War. Right there. P. 137

6. Myths and reality of the winter war. Newspaper, November 30, 2004. No. 223.S.6

7. RGVA. F. 37977. opI. D 261. p. 270271. Negotiations by telegraph between the General Staff of the Red Army and the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District 11/26/1939

8 . Winter War 1939-1940. Book one. Political history. M.: Nauka, 1999. P. 145

9. Ibid.S. 147

10. Winter War. Quoted op. P.196

11.

12. The secrecy has been removed. Losses of armed forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. Statistical collection. M: Voenizdat, 1993. Table. 46. P.123.

13. Chervov Nikolay. Provocations against Russia, Olma - Press, 2003. P.23

14. Jarvela T, Vourenmaa A. Op.cit.S.40-55. Brooke J.The Volunters: The Full Story of the Britsh Volunters in Finnland, 1939-1941. Worcester, 1990; Svenska frivilliga i Finland, 1939 - 1944 // Militarhistoriska Forlaget.1989.

15. Winter War 1939-1940. Book one. Political history. M.: Nauka 1999. P.325.

16. Talvisodan historia.Osa S.186.

17. Winter War 1939-1940. Book one. Political history. M.: Nauka 1999..P 325.

18. Winter War 1939-1940. Book 2. Stalin and the Finnish company. Transcript of the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. - M: Nauka, 1999. P. 273.

At the very end of last February, information about a new contract for the supply of weapons became public. As it turned out, back in December 2012, Finland and Russia signed an agreement involving the sale of a certain number of machine guns Russian production. Our country will receive about 3.1 million euros for spare parts for it. The production of machine guns will be carried out by the Kovrov Degtyarev Plant.

In 2010, the Finnish military expressed a desire to purchase a thousand machine guns chambered for 7.62x54 mm, as well as a number heavy machine guns. Later, the Russian PKM and Kord machine guns were chosen, which ultimately resulted in the signing of a supply contract. this agreement immediately became the subject of discussion, and a considerable part of the opinions clearly smacked of bewilderment. The fact that Finland began to order Russian weapons, for an ignorant person it looks quite strange and unexpected. However, Russia and Finland have been cooperating in the field of small arms for several years now. Moreover, the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle was at one time even produced in Finland under license, and also became the basis for a line of automatic weapons still used by the Finnish army. As for Kalashnikov machine guns, there is much less experience in using them.

The first samples of PCM reached Finland only in the early nineties of the last century, when Moscow and Helsinki agreed on partial repayment Soviet debts through arms supplies. In the Finnish armed forces, the PKM machine gun was designated Konekivääri 7.62, which can be translated as “7.62 mm machine gun.” Along with the PKM, large-caliber machine guns NSV-12.7 “Utes” also came to Finland. In the Finnish army they received a new designation ITKK 96 and are still used in the mounted version and for weapons various equipment. Apparently, twenty years of experience in operating the PKM and NSV-12.7 machine guns left an extremely positive impression, and the Finnish Ministry of Defense decided to purchase new weapons of these types.

For a normal understanding of the existing contract, it is necessary to consider several issues related to ammunition, moral and material obsolescence of weapons, etc. As for ammunition, the Finnish military will not have problems with them. The fact is that 7.62x54R and 12.7x108 mm cartridges are available in sufficient quantities in warehouses, and the production of the former is still ongoing. There is no exact information about the production of large-caliber cartridges, but from the very fact of ordering “Cordov” the appropriate conclusions can be drawn. Thus, new machine guns are guaranteed not to be left without cartridges, and their manufacture will not take much effort. It is noteworthy that the famous cartridge factory in the city of Lapua was at one time built specifically for the production Russian cartridges 7.62x54R.

An interesting feature of 7.62mm rifle cartridges is also their characteristics. Several decades ago, gunsmiths different countries, including Finland, created a large number of light machine guns chambered for intermediate cartridges. During recent military conflicts, it became clear that infantry units also need automatic weapons chambered for a rifle cartridge. It has certain advantages over machine guns or machine guns that use intermediate ammunition, and therefore in a number of situations it can not only help a unit, but even decide the outcome of a firefight. Therefore, in last years All leading small arms developers are working on their own versions of new light machine guns for “old” cartridges. If the command of the Finnish army agrees with the current increase in the priority of machine guns chambered for a rifle cartridge, then another argument appears in favor of the PKT.

The second issue to consider concerns current state machine guns in the Finnish army. Delivered in the nineties PKM machine guns was relatively armed a small amount of divisions. In them, Soviet/Russian weapons replaced Finnish-made KvKK 62 machine guns, chambered for the Soviet intermediate cartridge 7.62x39 mm. However, the KvKK 62 remained the main Finnish machine gun for arming infantry. Half a century has passed since the adoption of this weapon and it cannot be called modern. Thus, urgent rearmament is required with the replacement of old machine guns with new ones.

In the case of heavy machine guns, the situation looks a little different. Over the past decades, the Finnish army has managed to use the Soviet DShK and NSV-12.7, as well as the American M2HB. The first ones have long been withdrawn from service and disposed of, but the other two types still remain in service. The thrifty Finns produced cartridges for both types of heavy machine guns in their factories. Therefore, we can say that the purchase of Russian Cordas is dictated not so much by the need to replace old weapons, but by the quality of new ones.

Finally, regarding PKM machine guns it is worth noting that interesting composition tender participants. In fact, only two arms factories were the favorites of the competition: the Russian Degtyarev Plant (Kovrov) and the Bulgarian Arsenal Ltd. Back in the days Warsaw Pact A Bulgarian company received a license to produce PKM machine guns for its armed forces. Licensed Kalashnikov Upgraded Machine Guns are called MG-1M. They differ from the original PCM only in the name and some minor design details. As you can see, the Finnish army was not interested in Bulgarian licensed machine guns.

In general, the current supply situation Russian machine guns to Finland, upon careful examination, ceases to be incomprehensible and strange. The decision of the Finnish command is completely justified and is based on several objective facts. The prerequisites for the recent tender were problems with the current state of machine gun “equipment”, and the final decision was influenced by issues of production quality and ammunition supply. The deal itself ultimately turns out to be beneficial for both parties: Russia will receive money, and Finland will receive modern small arms. According to available data, the order for the supply of machine guns will be completed by the end of this year 2013.

Based on materials from sites:
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/
http://lenta.ru/
http://rus.ruvr.ru/
http://world.guns.ru/