Who started the second Chechen war. Chechen war

Plan
Introduction
1 Background
2 Character
3 Chronology
3.1 1999
3.1.1 Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya
3.1.2 Attack on Dagestan
3.1.3 Aerial bombing Chechnya
3.1.4 Start of ground operation

3.2 2000
3.3 2001
3.4 2002
3.5 2003
3.6 2004
3.7 2005
3.8 2006
3.9 2007
3.10 2008
3.11 2009

4 Aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus in 2009
5 Command
6 Victims
7 Conflict in art, cinema, music
7.1 Films and TV series
7.2 Songs and music

References
Second Chechen War

Introduction

The second Chechen war (officially called the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) - fighting on the territory of Chechnya and border regions North Caucasus. Started on September 30, 1999 (date of entry Russian troops to Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000, then, as control was established Armed forces Russia over the territory of Chechnya has developed into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 0 o'clock on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was cancelled.

1. Background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1996, there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the surrounding regions.

Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives, working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, production and smuggling of drugs, release and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. Camps were created on the territory of Chechnya to train militants - young people from Muslim regions of Russia. Mine demolition instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab mercenaries began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasus republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

In early March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, was kidnapped by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that the President of the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, was unable to independently fight terrorism. Federal Center took measures to strengthen the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were strengthened along the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units for combating ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several rocket launchers"Tochka-U", designed for delivering targeted strikes. An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories has become impossible to export outside Chechnya. The fight against Chechens was also intensified criminal gangs, who actively financed militants in Chechnya. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the income of Chechen warlords fell sharply and they had problems purchasing weapons and paying mercenaries. In April 1999, the commander in chief internal troops Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War, was appointed. In May 1999 Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After this, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Rushailo, announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.

Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in force, they made more than 30 forays in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel and employees were killed and injured law enforcement agencies and civilians. Realizing that the strongest groups of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandits proceeded from the fact that there were no troops there, and in as soon as possible It will not be possible to transfer forces to this inaccessible area. In addition, the militants were counting on possible blow to the rear federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, controlled by local Wahhabis since August 1998.

As researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting to exploit the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea.

On August 7, 1999, a massive invasion of Dagestan by militants was carried out from the territory of Chechnya under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The core of the militant group consisted of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, associated with Al-Qaeda. The militants’ plan to have the population of Dagestan come over to their side failed; the Dagestanis offered desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities proposed that the Ichkerian leadership conduct a joint operation with federal forces against Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to “resolve the issue of liquidating bases, storage and rest areas of illegal armed groups, which the Chechen leadership in every possible way denies.” Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and instigators, but did not take real measures to counter them.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks - explosions of residential buildings - were carried out in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk).

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region Russian Federation" The decree provided for the creation of a Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.

On September 23, Russian troops began massive bombing Grozny and its environs, on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.

2. Character

Having broken the resistance of the militants by the force of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the command of the Russian troops successfully uses military tricks, such as, for example, luring militants to minefields, raids on the rear of gangs and many others), the Kremlin relied on the “Chechenization” of the conflict and winning over part of the elite and former militants to its side. Thus, in 2000, the former supporter of the separatists, the chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, became the head of the pro-Kremlin administration of Chechnya in 2000. The militants, on the contrary, relied on the internationalization of the conflict, involving armed groups of non-Chechen origin in their struggle. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. During 2005-2008, not a single major terrorist attack was committed in Russia, and the only large-scale militant operation (Raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in complete failure.

3. Chronology

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya

· June 18 - Chechnya attacked two outposts on the Dagestan-Chechen border, as well as an attack on a Cossack company in the Stavropol Territory. The Russian leadership is closing most of the checkpoints on the border with Chechnya.

· June 22 - for the first time in the history of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, an attempt was made to commit a terrorist attack in its main building. The bomb was defused in time. According to one version, the terrorist attack was a response of Chechen militants to threats from the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Rushailo, to carry out acts of retaliation in Chechnya.

· June 23 - shelling from the side of Chechnya at the outpost near the village of Pervomaiskoye, Khasavyurt district of Dagestan.

· June 30 - Rushailo said: “We must respond to the blow with a more crushing blow; “on the border with Chechnya, the order was given to use preventive strikes against armed gangs.”

· July 3 - Rushailo said that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation “is beginning to strictly regulate the situation in the North Caucasus, where Chechnya acts as a criminal “think tank” controlled by foreign intelligence services, extremist organizations And criminal community" Deputy Prime Minister of the ChRI government Kazbek Makhashev stated in response: “We cannot be intimidated by threats, and Rushailo knows this well.”

· July 5 - Rushailo stated that “early in the morning of July 5, a preemptive strike was launched against concentrations of 150-200 armed militants in Chechnya.”

· July 7 - a group of militants from Chechnya attacked an outpost near the Grebensky Bridge in the Babayurt region of Dagestan. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the FSB of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that “Russia will henceforth take not preventive, but only adequate actions in response to attacks in the areas bordering Chechnya.” He emphasized that “the Chechen authorities do not fully control the situation in the republic.”

On September 30, 2015, Russia launched a military campaign in Syria. After the end of World War II, the USSR and then Russia participated in dozens of military operations in which they suffered losses. From China and Cuba to Angola and Czechoslovakia - where and what the Russian armed forces achieved - in a special project by Kommersant

At the beginning of August 1999, armed clashes began on the border of Dagestan and Chechnya. On August 7, gangs of more than 400 people under the leadership of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of the Botlikh region of Dagestan from Chechnya. The fighting continued until the end of August, after which federal forces began an assault on the Wahhabi villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar in Dagestan.
On the night of September 5, about 2 thousand extremists again crossed the Chechen-Dagestan border. The fighting in Dagestan continued until September 15. By the end of September, up to 90 thousand soldiers and about 400 tanks were concentrated on the border with Chechnya. The combined group of federal forces was commanded by Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev. The separatist forces were estimated at 15–20 thousand militants, up to 30 tanks and 100 armored vehicles.

On October 2, 1999, Russian troops entered Chechnya. They managed to occupy the northern part of Chechnya with minimal losses and take control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Gudermes without a fight.

On December 22, Russian border guards and Airborne units landed in the south of the Argun Gorge, blocking the path to Georgia. The assault on Grozny took place in December 1999-January 2000.

On February 1–3, as part of Operation Wolf Hunt, militant groups were lured out of the Chechen capital with the help of disinformation and sent to minefields (the militants lost approximately 1,500 people).

The last major combined arms operation was the destruction of a detachment of militants in the village of Komsomolskoye on March 2–15, 2000 (about 1,200 people were destroyed and captured). On April 20, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Valery Manilov said that the military part of the operation in Chechnya had been completed and now its “special part was being carried out - conducting special operations to complete the defeat of the remaining undead gangs.” It was announced that about 28 thousand military personnel would be stationed in the republic on a permanent basis, including the advanced units of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 2.7 thousand border guards, nine battalions of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Moscow has relied on resolving the conflict by attracting some of the local elites to its side. On June 12, 2000, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Akhmat Kadyrov, a former close associate of Maskhadov and the Mufti of Ichkeria, was appointed head of the administration of the Chechen Republic.

Since the spring-summer of 2000, militants switched to guerrilla actions: shelling, mining of roads, terrorist attacks. Terrorist activity quickly spread beyond the republic. Militants took hostages at the Nord-Ost musical in Moscow, organized a bombing of a government building in Grozny (2002), an explosion at the Wings rock festival in Tushino (2003), suicide bombings in the Moscow metro and on board passenger planes (2004) .

On May 9, 2004, Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in an explosion at the Dynamo stadium in Grozny.
Interview of Vladimir Putin to Sergei Dorenko (1999)
On September 1, 2004, the most high-profile terrorist attack V Russian history- the taking of more than 1 thousand hostages at a school in Beslan. The attack killed 334 people.

On October 13, 2005, militants made their last major attack - up to 200 people attacked 13 objects in Nalchik, including the airport, FSB and police buildings. 95 militants were killed and 71 were detained over the next year.

On July 10, 2006, Shamil Basayev, who took responsibility for the attack on Nalchik and a number of other high-profile terrorist attacks, was killed during a special operation by the FSB in Ingushetia. By that time, many separatist leaders had already been destroyed, including the President of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov.

In 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of Akhmat Kadyrov, came to power in Chechnya.

From 00:00 on April 16, 2009, the counter-terrorism operation regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic was canceled. The message from the National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that from now on, measures to combat terrorism in Chechnya will be carried out by local law enforcement agencies, as in other regions of the country. This moment is considered the official end of the second Chechen war.

The total losses of security forces during the active phase of hostilities (from October 1999 to December 23, 2002) amounted to 4,572 dead and 15,549 wounded. According to Ministry of Defense statistics, from 1999 to September 2008, 3,684 military personnel were killed in the line of duty in Chechnya. According to the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the losses of internal troops in August 1999-August 2003 amounted to 1,055 people. The losses of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to data for 2006, were estimated at 835 people killed. It was also reported that in 1999–2002, 202 FSB officers were killed in Chechnya. The total losses of Russian law enforcement agencies can be estimated at at least 6 thousand people.

According to the OGV headquarters, 15.5 thousand militants were killed in 1999–2002. From 2002 to 2009, security forces reported the elimination of about 2,100 more members of illegal armed groups: the bulk in 2002 (600) and 2003 (700). Separatist leader Shamil Basayev in 2005 estimated militant losses at 3,600 people. The human rights organization Memorial in 2004 estimated civilian casualties at 10–20 thousand people, Amnesty International in 2007 - up to 25 thousand dead.

As a result, the second Chechen campaign Russia managed to completely take control of the territory of the republic and provide a government loyal to the center. At the same time, the region developed terrorist organization“Caucasus Emirate”, which aims to create an Islamist state on the territory of all the Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation. After 2009, the bandit underground organized a number of major terrorist attacks(explosions in the Moscow metro in 2010, at Domodedovo airport in 2011, at a train station and in a trolleybus in Volgograd in 2013). A counter-terrorist operation regime is periodically introduced in the territories of the republics of the region.

Territory: Chechen Republic
Period: August 1999-April 2009
Duration: 9.5 years
Participants: Russia / Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Caucasus Emirate
USSR/Russian forces involved: joint group of troops numbering up to 100 thousand people
Losses: more than 6 thousand people, of which 3.68 thousand were military personnel of the Ministry of Defense (as of September 2008)
Supreme Commander-in-Chief: Boris Yeltsin
Conclusion: two Chechen wars helped to “pacify” Chechnya, but turned the entire North Caucasus into a powder keg

The period 1996-1999 in Chechnya is characterized by a gradual and deep criminalization of society, which led to a certain destabilization of the southern borders of Russia. Kidnappings, bombings and drug trafficking flourished, and it was not always possible to fight them, especially if Chechen bandits operated “on the road.” At the same time, the Russian leadership repeatedly turned to A. Maskhadov with an offer to provide assistance in the fight against organized crime, but received an invariable refusal. A new extremist movement in Chechnya - Wahhabism - was rapidly spreading in conditions of unemployment and social tension, although it was recognized as outlaw by the authorities of the self-proclaimed republic. The situation in the region was heating up.

The culmination of this process was the invasion of Chechen militants under the command of Sh. Basayev and Khattab into Russian territory, into Dagestan in August 1999. At the same time, the bandits were counting on the support of local Wahhabis, thanks to whom it was planned to then tear Dagestan away from Russia and thereby create the North Caucasus Emirate.

Beginning of the second Chechen war

However field commanders badly miscalculated, and Russian army was no longer the same as 3 years ago. The militants almost immediately found themselves drawn into protracted fighting along the Chechen-Dagestan border - in a mountainous and wooded area. And if earlier the separatists were often “saved” by the mountains, now they had no advantage. The militants' hopes for widespread support from the people of Dagestan were also not realized - on the contrary, the most severe resistance was offered to the invaders. As a result of the fighting in Dagestan during August, the Chechen gangs were completely driven back to the territory of Ichkeria, and relative calm established for several weeks.

However, already in the first half of September 1999, explosions occurred in residential buildings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk - and the traces of terrorist attacks led to Chechnya. These events put an end to the possibility of peaceful dialogue between Russia and Ichkeria.

Maskhadov's government officially condemned the actions of the militants, but in reality did absolutely nothing to prevent such actions. Taking this into account, on September 23, President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” according to which it was necessary to create a Joint Group of Forces and begin to destroy gangs and terrorist bases in the republic. On the same day Russian aviation bombed Grozny, and a week later troops entered the territory of the republic.

During the battles in the rebellious republic in the fall of 1999, the increased skill of the Russian army became noticeable. The troops, combining various tactics (for example, luring militants into minefields) and maneuvers, managed to partially destroy and push back the Chechen gangs to Grozny in November-December. However, the Russian leadership did not intend to storm the city, which was announced by the commander of the eastern group of Russian troops, G. Troshev.

The Chechen side, meanwhile, relied on the internationalization of the conflict, attracting mujahideen, instructors and capital from near and far abroad, and primarily from Arab countries. Main, but not the only reason their interest was, of course, oil. Peace in the North Caucasus would allow the Russian side to receive good profits from the exploitation of Caspian fields, which would be unprofitable for Arab countries. Another reason can be called the fashion for the radicalization of Islam, which then began to overwhelm the countries of the Middle East.

The Russian leadership, on the contrary, relied on mass attraction civilians and former Chechen fighters on their side. Thus, the most prominent figure who went over to the side of the federals was the Mufti of Ichkeria Akhmad Kadyrov, who declared jihad on Russia during the First Chechen War. Now, having condemned Wahhabism, he became an enemy of A. Maskhadov and headed the pro-Russian administration of Chechnya after the end of the Second Chechen War.

Storm of Grozny

By the winter of 1999-2000. Russian troops managed to block Grozny from the south. The initial decision to abandon the assault on the republican capital changed, and on December 26, an operation began to eliminate gangs in the city.

In the first days, the situation developed favorably for the federal troops. On the second day of the operation, the federals, with the assistance of pro-Russian Chechen police units, took control of the Staropromyslovsky district of the capital. However, on December 29, fierce fighting broke out on the streets of Grozny; federal units were surrounded, but were able to escape at the cost of serious losses. These battles forced the tempo of the offensive to slow down somewhat, but did not have any impact on the general situation.

In the following days, the Russian army continued to advance stubbornly, clearing more and more urban areas of militants. In the second half of January, fierce fighting broke out around a strategically important area - Minutka Square. Russian troops managed to oust the militants and take possession of this line. On February 6, 2000, the acting President of the Russian Federation V. Putin announced that the operation to liberate Grozny had been victoriously completed.

The course of the second Chechen war in 2000-2009.

To many Chechen militants managed to escape from Grozny, and as a result the war entered the partisan stage. However, its intensity steadily decreased, and by 2002 the media began to talk about the “fading” of the Chechen conflict. However, in 2002-2005, militants committed a number of brutal and daring terrorist attacks (hostage-taking in a recreation center on Dubrovka (Moscow), at a school in Beslan, an unsuccessful raid in Kabardino-Balkaria), thereby demonstrating that the conflict is far from over .

It is worth noting that the period 2001-2005. was remembered for the frequent liquidations of the leaders of Chechen separatists and foreign fighters, as a result of which tension in the region significantly decreased. As a result, on April 15, 2009, the CTO (counter-terrorism operation) regime was abolished on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

Results of the war

Since then, the situation in Chechnya has practically stabilized, and the intensity of hostilities has decreased to almost zero. The new administration of the republic managed to restore order in the region and make Chechnya a completely safe place. Nevertheless, it should be noted that special operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army in the northern Caucasus continue - not only in Chechnya, but also in other areas. Therefore, the Second Chechen War can be called a completed chapter of history.

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Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war in modern Russian history is officially over. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime in Chechnya was introduced by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with repelling the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the gangs driven back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not help but begin. The events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements that ended the previous war in 1996 left no doubt that hostilities would break out again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars was very different. In 1994, the bet on the “Chechenization” of the conflict was lost - the opposition units were unable (and were unlikely to be able) to resist Dudayev’s formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not very well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops encountered fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

The assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994, was especially costly for the Russian army. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts place the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

As a result, the Russian army got involved in multi-week battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs, which lost about 7,000 people and large number equipment and weapons. It should be noted that the Chechen separatists received the equipment in the early 90s, seizing the warehouses of military units located on the territory of Chechnya with the connivance of first the authorities of the USSR and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the gangs. On June 14, 1995, Basayev’s gang raided the city of Budennovsk Stavropol Territory, where she captured the city hospital, taking patients and staff hostage. The militants managed to get to Budennovsk by road. The guilt of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost universal.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and begin negotiations with the Dudayev regime. Russian special forces began an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by the order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to give the terrorists the opportunity to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was placed on the director of the Federal Grid Company, Sergei Stepashin, and the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Viktor Erin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. Federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the attacks of militants hiding in mountainous and wooded areas and enjoying the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar and took a group of hostages in a local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them hundreds of hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the Ministry of Internal Affairs checkpoint.

Soon, Raduev’s group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was stormed by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev's gang on Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye, 78 military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Some of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in the poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, bandits recaptured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, a ceasefire agreement was signed, after which negotiations between representatives of Russia and Chechnya began on the development of “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side by Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent “agreement on peace and the principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Chechnya,” signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to the independence of Chechnya. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties based on the principles international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the country’s leadership and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aviation due to political reasons. Sorely missed modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, remained forgotten.

In addition, the army was unleashed information war- a number of media outlets and politicians conducted a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and background of the war were kept silent, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 90s. Many were killed, others were driven from their homes and were forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and imagined sins of the federal forces, but kept silent on the topic of the misfortunes of the Russian residents of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in states Eastern Europe and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting the Chechen separatists. The intelligence services of Western countries also provided assistance to the gangs. A number of countries provided asylum, medical and financial assistance militants, helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures was the gross mistakes made by both senior management, so operational command, as well as a wave of army corruption, as a consequence of the targeted and general disintegration of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number successful operations militants against Russian columns would be impossible provided that Russian troops comply with basic statutory requirements for organizing combat security, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not become a pledge peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. The authorities of Ichkeria even stole the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across Russian territory.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The bandits counted on weakness Russian authorities, and the surrender of Dagestan. The attack was carried out on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

The fighting with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted more than a month. At this time, major terrorist attacks were carried out in several Russian cities - residential buildings were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and army did not come true. The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has taken overall leadership of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large forces of militants with few losses. The militants’ individual “successes” cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Height 776, when the bandits managed to escape from encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, without due to bad weather aviation and artillery support, held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants for 24 hours. The bandits broke through the company's positions only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people remained alive). The militants' losses amounted to about 500 people. After this, the main type of action by militants becomes terrorist attacks - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively exploited the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Inside Russia itself new war also enjoyed significantly greater support than previously. IN upper echelons This time the authorities did not show the same indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. The federal center has sent and is sending large amounts of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya cash. Units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are permanently deployed in Chechnya to maintain order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather restless region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion of another, very important stage struggle for their territorial integrity.

The “Second Chechen War” (officially called the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) - the common name for military operations on the territory of Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. Began on September 30, 1999 (the date of the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya). The active phase of military operations lasted from 1999 to 2000 year, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it developed into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 0 o'clock on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was abolished.

North Caucasian Federal District - North Caucasus Federal District

The second Chechen war began

August 1999, Chechen militants attacked the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation, this is how the second Chechen war began, terrorist attacks, attacks and incidents also entered new stage from that moment on, many innocent Russians died in August of this year, becoming victims of terrorists.
link: http://russian.people.com.cn/ 31519/6735684.html

Living history: the beginning of the second Chechen war

It is difficult to name the starting point of the beginning of the war in Chechnya. What will it be? The first militant attacks on Dagestan? Maskhadov's introduction of martial law in CRI? The beginning of our aviation's bombing of militant bases? Explosions of residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk? Or the start of a ground operation by the Russian army?
link: http://www.livejournal.ru/ themes/id/21516

Dagestan. Beginning of the second Chechen war

On August 7, 1999, a 1,500-strong group under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded the territory of Dagestan. The militants immediately captured a number of villages in the Botlikh and Tsumadinsky regions. There were no Russian garrisons there, and the small local police offered no resistance. The militants immediately began to fortify themselves in the captured territory, intending to use it as a springboard for a further offensive. Their next goal was to unite with their allies - armed Wahhabi detachments concentrated in the area of ​​​​the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi.
link: http://www.warchechnya.ru/ load

Second Chechen war. Beginning of the Chechen crisis

The Chechen crisis is a complex, multifactorial phenomenon. Many of its components are still difficult to assess objectively today. In general, such events cannot have an unambiguous interpretation; each participant has their own truth. At the same time, the current degree of study of the problem allows us to draw a number of conclusions. The August 1991 events in Moscow, followed by the collapse of the USSR, provided multinational people CHIR has a unique chance to change the regime of communist bureaucracy to a democratic system of power through a constitutional means, determine the status of the republic through a referendum, find an acceptable form of relations with the Russian Federation, thereby gradually gaining real economic and political independence within the framework of a renewed federation.
link: http://www.seaofhistory.ru/shists-940-1.html

The causes of the second Chechen war from Maskhadov’s point of view

Ten years ago the second Chechen war began. A war that, contrary to official statements, has not yet ended.

Below I publish excerpts from the transcript of an audio letter sent in 2000 by Aslan Maskhadov to his friend and colleague in the Soviet army, who asked not to use his name.
link: http://01vyacheslav. livejournal.com/7700.html

The Second Chechen War: Russia in the Face of Terror

After the tragedy at Dubrovka, the Kremlin hastened to announce “the success of a unique operation to free the hostages.” Instead of serious organizational conclusions regarding the leadership of law enforcement agencies and intelligence services who allowed militants into Moscow, awards followed. Thus, the title of Hero of Russia was given to FSB generals V. Pronichev and A. Tikhonov. The first is deputy. the director of the FSB and the head of the headquarters for the release of hostages on Dubrovka, the second is the head of the FSB special forces center (which includes the Alpha and Vympel divisions). In less than 2 years, these same people will “check in” in Beslan - they will not become Heroes twice, but they will also not bear responsibility for the failed assault and numerous casualties among the hostages. More on this below.
link: http://www.voinenet.ru/voina/istoriya-voiny/784.html

The second is Chechen. For Putin?

On September 23, 1999, the presidential decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was signed. According to the decree, a Joint Group of Forces was created in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.
link: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/1829292.html

The Second Chechen War as part of Putin's PR campaign

On September 14, 1999, shortly after the explosion of a second residential building in Moscow, Putin spoke at a meeting State Duma dedicated to the issue of combating terrorism.
link: http://www.razlib.ru/politika/korporacija_

The war against terrorists has ended in Chechnya

As of April 16, the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) regime, which had been in force in Chechnya since 1999, was lifted, RIA Novosti reports, citing the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.
link: http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/16/regime/

The “Second Chechen War” officially ended today

Today, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee issued the following statement: “The Chairman of the Committee, Director of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov, from 00:00 Moscow time on April 16, canceled the order declaring the territory of the republic a zone for conducting a counter-terrorism operation.” As a source from the presidential administration told The Morning News correspondent, NAC made changes to the organization of anti-terrorism activities in the Chechen Republic on the personal instructions of Dmitry Medvedev. The source additionally told The Morning News that this decision was previously agreed upon with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
link: http://www.utronews.ru/news/ politics/001239868105700/

3 years ago the second Chechen war ended

Three years ago it was announced the abolition of the counter-terrorism operation of federal forces in Chechnya
link: http://www.rusichi-center.ru/ e/2965905-3

10 years ago the second Chechen war began

Everyone has their own date for the start of this war. Dagestanis believe: since August 7, when Basayev’s gangs invaded the republic. Muscovites - since September 9, when a house in Pechatniki was blown up. Military - from September 30: official entry of troops into Chechnya. Everyone has their own date for the end of this war. For those who died, it ended long ago. No survivors have returned from it yet...
link: http://bosonogoe.ru/blog/1556. html

Second Chechen War and its consequences

In December 1994, the Russian authorities made their first attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by military means, but after two years of bloody fighting the army was forced to leave the Chechen Republic. The stubbornness of the Russian authorities, who set a course for military victory in Chechnya, led to the death of at least 30 thousand Chechens and 4.3 thousand Russian soldiers. This war, the economic damage from which is estimated at $5.5 billion, largely determined the all-Russian economic crisis of August 1998, when the state was unable to pay for its exorbitant debts.
link: http://old.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_38/article.php? art=53

The battle with the dragon is over. The chase for the snakes began.

I don't understand why. The second Chechen war was not necessary. The solution to this problem could be based on the agreements that General Lebed signed in Khasavyurt - they could become the basis for achieving long-term peace in Chechnya. I think that there are serious doubts that it was the Chechens who blew up the houses in Moscow. As you remember, this was the reason for the start of the second war. However, there are suspicions that this was a provocation by the Russian special services. It is strange that hexogen was used in the explosions, which was produced in a factory controlled by the KGB, and then strange exercises took place in Ryazan. The Chechen war had a negative impact on trust in the Russian government and on the attitude towards Russia on the part of democratic states.
link: http://flb.ru/info/34480.html

The Chechen path of the “coastal partisans”

The story of the “coastal partisans”, who have been unsuccessfully caught by hundreds of law enforcement officers with helicopters for the third week, and from today by army units with armored vehicles, could have begun 10 years ago. But the second Chechen war and the petrodollar rain that fell on Russia gave the country a reprieve. Now it is over, and the time has come to pay old and new bills. If the preliminary information about Roman Muromtsev’s group is correct, for the first time the Kremlin has on Russian soil an organized group of militants who consider the ruling regime an enemy and are ready to kill its minions without hesitation.
link: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article22866.htm

The second Chechen war began exactly 10 years ago. When did it end? And is it over?

By the time the second war began in October 1999, I was already 26, I had a wife and a two-year-old child who were completely dependent on me. We lived very difficult and poor, and I had no time for politics. Then I thought of staying in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the news about the progress of the war was rather reassuring: first they expanded the “cordon sanitaire”, then they began to take control over settlements Chechnya, mostly without a fight. My city, Shali, peacefully let federal troops in.
link: