Wehrmacht small arms. Wehrmacht small arms in WWII

The further back in time the years of fighting with the Nazi occupiers go, the more big amount Myths, idle speculation, often accidental, sometimes malicious, surround those events. One of them is that the German troops were completely armed with the notorious Schmeissers, which are an unsurpassed example of an assault rifle of all times and peoples before the advent of the Kalashnikov assault rifle. What the Wehrmacht small arms of the Second World War actually were like, whether they were as great as they are “painted”, it is worth looking into in more detail to understand the real situation.

The blitzkrieg strategy, which consisted of a lightning-fast defeat of enemy troops with an overwhelming advantage of tank formations covered, assigned motorized ground forces almost an auxiliary role - to complete the final defeat of a demoralized enemy, and not to conduct bloody battles with the massive use of rapid-fire small arms.

Perhaps this is why, at the beginning of the war with the USSR, the overwhelming majority of German soldiers were armed with rifles rather than machine guns, which is confirmed by archival documents. So, the Wehrmacht infantry division in 1940 should have had:

• Rifles and carbines – 12,609 pcs.
• Submachine guns, which would later be called machine guns - 312 pcs.
• Light machine guns – 425 pcs., heavy machine guns – 110 pcs.
• Pistols – 3,600 pcs.
• Anti-tank rifles – 90 pcs.

As can be seen from the above document, small arms, their ratio in terms of the number of types, had a significant advantage in favor of traditional weapons ground forces- rifles. Therefore, by the beginning of the war, the infantry formations of the Red Army, mostly armed with excellent Mosin rifles, were in no way inferior to the enemy in this matter, and the standard number of submachine guns of the Red Army rifle division was even significantly greater - 1,024 units.

Later, in connection with the experience of battles, when the presence of rapid-fire, quickly reloaded small arms made it possible to gain an advantage due to the density of fire, the Soviet and German high commands decided to massively equip the troops with automatic hand weapons, but this did not happen immediately.

The most popular small arms of the German army by 1939 was the Mauser rifle - Mauser 98K. It was a modernized version of a weapon developed by German designers at the end of the previous century, repeating the fate of the famous “Mosinka” model of 1891, after which it underwent numerous “upgrades”, being in service with the Red Army, and then the Soviet Army until the end of the 50s. The technical characteristics of the Mauser 98K rifle are also very similar:

An experienced soldier was able to aim and fire 15 shots from it in one minute. Equipping the German army with these simple, unpretentious weapons began in 1935. In total, more than 15 million units were manufactured, which undoubtedly indicates its reliability and demand among the troops.

The G41 self-loading rifle, on instructions from the Wehrmacht, was developed by German designers from the Mauser and Walther arms concerns. After state tests, the Walter system was recognized as the most successful.

The rifle had a number of serious shortcomings that were revealed during operation, which dispels another myth about the superiority of German weapons. As a result, the G41 underwent significant modernization in 1943, primarily related to the replacement of the gas exhaust system borrowed from the Soviet SVT-40 rifle, and became known as the G43. In 1944, it was renamed the K43 carbine, without adding any constructive changes. This rifle, in terms of technical data and reliability, was significantly inferior to self-loading rifles produced in the Soviet Union, which is recognized by gunsmiths.

Submachine guns (PP) - machine guns

By the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht had several types of automatic weapons, many of which had been developed back in the 1920s, often produced in limited series for police use, as well as for export sale:

Basic technical data of the MP 38, produced in 1941:

• Caliber – 9 mm.
• Cartridge – 9 x 19 mm.
• Length with folded stock – 630 mm.
• Magazine capacity of 32 rounds.
• Target firing range – 200 m.
• Weight with loaded magazine – 4.85 kg.
• Rate of fire – 400 rounds/min.

By the way, by September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had only 8.7 thousand MP 38 units in service. However, after taking into account and eliminating the shortcomings of the new weapon identified in the battles during the occupation of Poland, the designers made changes, mainly related to reliability, and the weapon became mass produced. In total, during the war years, the German army received more than 1.2 million units of the MP 38 and its subsequent modifications - MP 38/40, MP 40.

It was MP 38 that was called Schmeisser by the Red Army soldiers. The most likely reason for this was the stamp on the magazines chambered for them with the name of the German designer, co-owner of the arms manufacturer Hugo Schmeisser. His surname is also associated with a very widespread myth that the Stg-44 assault rifle or Schmeisser assault rifle, which he developed in 1944, which is similar in appearance to the famous Kalashnikov invention, is its prototype.

Pistols and machine guns

Rifles and machine guns were the main weapons of Wehrmacht soldiers, but we should not forget about officer or additional weapons - pistols, as well as machine guns - hand and easel, which were a significant force during the fighting. They will be discussed in more detail in the following articles.

Speaking about the confrontation with Nazi Germany, it should be remembered that in fact Soviet Union fought with the entire “united” Nazis, so the Romanian, Italian and many other countries’ troops had not only World War II Wehrmacht small arms produced directly in Germany, Czechoslovakia, which was a real arms forge, but also their own production. As a rule, it was of poorer quality and less reliable, even if it was produced according to the patents of German gunsmiths.

During World War II, the share of machine guns in infantry armament changed. The reduction in the production of self-loading rifles, as well as the small effective firing range of submachine guns, became the reason for the increase in the importance of machine guns in combat at medium (up to 1 thousand m) and long (up to 2 thousand m) ranges. The rifle company in July 1941 had six light machine guns on staff, in July 1942 - 12 light machine guns (while the German company had 12 single or light machine guns), in July 1943 - one heavy and 18 light machine guns, in December 1944 - 2 heavy and 12 light machine guns. That is, during the war the number of machine guns more than doubled. The decrease in the share of light machine guns towards the end of the war is associated with an increase in the number of mortars and submachine guns. By the end of the war, the rifle regiment had 108 light and 54 heavy machine guns for 2,398 people (for comparison, a German infantry regiment for 2,000 people had 107 light and 24 heavy machine guns).

"Tachanka" 1943 - machine gun "Maxim" mod. 1941 in a Willys car

Total produced machine guns during the Second World War:
- II half of 1941 – 106,200 units. (during the evacuation of the Tula arms factory);
- I half of 1942 – 134,100 units. (at plant No. 526 (Stalinsk) DPs were produced, at plant No. 524 (Izhevsk) - “Maxim”, at plant No. 54 (Zlatoust) - “Maxim”, at the Tula Machine-Building Plant during this period the production of “Maximovs” was resumed, in . Kuibyshev produced DShK);
- II half of 1942 - 222,000 units;
- I half of 1943 – 236,000 units;
- II half of 1943 – 222,500 units. (at plant No. 2 (Kovrov) production of SG-43 was established);
- I half of 1944 – 230,500 units. (at plant No. 54 (Zlatoust) they also launched production of SG-43);
- II half of 1944 - 208,600 units;
- I half of 1945 – 117,500 units.

During the war, the following number of machine guns was supplied to the armed forces of the USSR (taking into account pre-war stocks, as well as supplies under Lend-Lease):
II half of 1941 - 45,300 manual, 8,400 easel, 1,400 large-caliber;
1942 - 172,800 manual, 58,000 easel, 7,400 large-caliber;
1943 - 250,200 manual, 90,500 easel, 14,400 large-caliber;
1944 - 179,700 manual, 89,900 easel, 14,800 large-caliber;
I half of 1945 - 14,500 manual, 10,800 easel, 7,300 large-caliber.

If we take the number of weapons in the Red Army on January 1, 1942 as 100%, then on January 1, 1943 the number of submachine guns and rifles will be 180%, and on January 1, 1944 - 280%, machine guns - 210% and 450%, respectively. In defense, the average density of rifle and machine-gun fire increased from 1.2-1.6 bullets per minute per linear meter in the first period of the war to 9-12 bullets per minute in the third period. At the same time, the depth of continuous small arms fire decreased to 200 meters, since the main contribution was made by submachine guns.

IN Active Army The Soviet Union during the Second World War consisted of:
06/22/1941 - 170,400 light machine guns, 76,300 heavy machine guns, 2,200 large-caliber;
01/01/1942 - 81,000 light machine guns, 30,000 heavy machine guns, 2,200 large-caliber;
01/01/1943 - 177,100 light machine guns, 63,500 easel, 4,700 large-caliber;
01/01/1944 - 344,500 light machine guns, 133,000 heavy machine guns, 18,200 large-caliber;

01/01/1945 - 418,100 light machine guns, 184,700 heavy machine guns, 31,100 large-caliber;
05/09/1945 - 405,400 light machine guns, 182,600 heavy machine guns, 37,500 heavy-caliber.

Throughout the war, the importance of machine gun fire remained in the country's military air defense and air defense. Of the 3,837 aircraft that were shot down by front-line troops in the period from June 22, 1941 to June 22, 1942, 295 were shot down by anti-aircraft machine guns, 268 by rifle and machine gun fire from troops. In the air defense of Moscow on June 22, 1941 there were 105 anti-aircraft machine guns, on January 1, 42 - 511, on October 1, 44 - 686. The number of machine guns in the country's air defense during the war increased 12.1 times, as a rule they were large-caliber machine guns. Their role in the country's air defense decreased by the end of the war, but increased significantly at the front. Despite the fact that the use of heavy machine guns when setting up barrage fire was beneficial, it could not completely replace special anti-aircraft installations. Large-caliber machine guns were much more effective than normal-caliber machine guns, however, even here, machines with free aiming were inferior to installations with a mechanical or electromechanical guidance drive and more advanced sights.

Soviet heavy machine gun DShK (Degtyareva - Shpagina heavy-caliber)

Changes in the personnel and saturation of the Red Army rifle division with automatic weapons (by state):
Personnel: as of April 1941 – 14,483 people; July 1941 – 10859 people; December 1941 – 11626 people; December 1942 – 9435 people; December 1944 – 11,706 people; June 1945 – 11,780 people;
The total number of submachine guns during the same periods was: 1204 pcs. (or 83 pieces per 1000 people); 171 (15.75 per 1000); 582 (50 per 1000); 727 (77 per 1000); 3594 (307 per 1000); 3557 (302 per 1000);
The total number of light machine guns in the same periods was: 392 pcs. (or 27 per 1000 people); 162 (15 per 1000); 251 (21.5 per 1000); 494 (52.4 per 1000); 337 (28.8 per 1000); 383 (32.5 per 1000);
The total number of heavy machine guns in the same periods was: 166 pcs. (or 11.5 per 1000 people); 108 (10 per 1000); 109 (9.4 per 1000); 111 (11.76 per 1000); 166 (14.2 per 1000); 178 (15.1 per 1000);
Number of shots from small arms and machine guns per minute; April 1941 – 297460; July 1941 – 140470; December 1941 – 190930; December 1942 – 204710; December 1944 – 491160; June 1945 – 492720.

During different periods of the war, there was a change in the weapons system not only of the USSR but also of Germany:

In December 1941, personnel infantry division Germany numbered 14,742 people. (USSR Rifle Division - 11,626 people), while in service there were 705 submachine guns (528 in the USSR), 454 light machine guns (251 in the USSR), 112 heavy machine guns (109 in the USSR). In addition, the German infantry division did not have anti-aircraft machine gun installations, while the USSR rifle division was armed with 33 anti-aircraft machine gun installations, including large-caliber ones.

At the beginning of 1943, the personnel of the German infantry division numbered 13,656 people. (USSR rifle division - 9435 people) were armed with 681 submachine guns (727 in the USSR). At this time, the German troops did not have light or heavy machine guns, and the rifle division was armed with 494 light and 111 heavy machine guns. With regard to anti-aircraft machine gun installations, the situation changed - the infantry division had 18 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun installations, but the rifle division did not have this type of weapon. It should be noted that at the beginning of 1943, the Guards Rifle Division (10,670 personnel) had 166 heavy and 499 light machine guns and 1,097 submachine guns; separate rifle brigade (4197 people) - 36 heavy and 109 light machine guns, motorized rifle brigade(4000 people) - 36 heavy and 98 light machine guns.

DP light machine gun. Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 Degtyarevsky DPs took third place in terms of mass production - after the Mosin rifle system and the PPSh-41 submachine gun designed by G.S. Shpagin

In December 1944, the personnel of the German infantry division numbered 12,801 people. (USSR rifle division - 11,706 people) were armed with 1,595 submachine guns and assault rifles(3594 in the USSR), 614 light machine guns (337 in the USSR), 102 heavy machine guns (166 in the USSR). Rifle Division during this period it was armed with 18 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun installations.

Before World War II, the idea that a mass-produced self-loading rifle could take on some of the tasks solved with light machine guns was partly revived. However, practice has shown that it is precisely the use of light machine guns that removes the relevance of “automatic” rifles high power. The experience of the war became the reason for revising the ranges of use of small arms downward due to the increased density of artillery and mortar fire and the widespread use of attack aircraft and tanks. The 1942 “Combat Manual of the Infantry” (BUP-42) established that the fire of heavy machine guns is valid at a range of up to 1000 meters, “however, it is better to conduct sudden fire at distances of 600 meters or less” (“close” ranges), light machine guns - up to 800 meters. Light machine guns fired at air targets at ranges of less than 500 meters, mounted machine guns with an anti-aircraft sight - less than 1000 meters, and with a conventional sight - less than 500 meters. For comparison: before the war, the firing range of light machine guns was set in the range from 800 to 1200 meters, heavy machine guns for ground targets - 3000-5000 meters, for air targets - up to 1500 m. However, the increase in the saturation of artillery did not reduce the importance of machine guns.

After the division was canceled order of battle On the pinning and shock groups, the light machine gun began to always operate in the squad chain. During an offensive, the machine gun was usually the first to move to a new position (fire could be carried out on the move), and when leaving the battle, it was the last. A light machine gunner as part of a tank landing suppressed anti-tank weapons and covered the actions of the riflemen. Tanks for heavy machine guns often played the role of “machine gun carriers”.

Service and operational requirements were also changed. At the beginning of 1942, competitions were announced for lightweight models of heavy and light machine guns, and a submachine gun. Work was carried out in two directions: the modernization of the Degtyarev infantry machine gun and the development of a new light machine gun, which could be serviced and carried along with ammunition by one soldier.

The heavy machine gun at that time was the main group fire weapon of rifle (infantry) units, capable of conducting intense fire with a combat rate of fire of 250-300 rounds per minute. Machine gun companies equipped heavy machine guns, as a rule, were assigned to rifle companies by platoon. According to BUP-42, heavy machine guns distributed in depth and along the front covered the advance of the unit, supported the attack, hit enemy heavy weapons crews, ensured advance into the depths and flanks, and repelled a counterattack. Indirect fire was practically not used, as was shooting over heads. As a rule, heavy machine guns fired from behind the flanks and into gaps.

Crew of sailors at an anti-aircraft machine gun

Shooting at long ranges was still carried out, for example, at crossings or in the mountains, but even in these cases the range did not exceed 3000 meters. Reducing the ranges made it possible, firstly, to reduce the range of cartridges used (cartridges with a heavy bullet were excluded), and secondly, to again raise the issue of creating a lightweight heavy machine gun. However, the dimensions of the heavy machine gun and the time spent changing positions and preparing to fire did not allow these machine guns to be moved into the front lines, since they could be late in reacting to the revived enemy firing points or his counterattack. IN populated areas In forests and mountains, the bulkiness of machine guns was especially sensitive.

Heavy machine guns showed their capabilities and power in defense. At the same time, the position was adapted for shooting at various ranges and to the requirements of all-round defense. Machine gun fire at strong points provided flanks and gaps, covered the positions of artillery and anti-tank crews, they were moved to forward positions and points, and separate duty and “dagger” machine guns were allocated. It was practiced to create areas of barrage and concentrated fire from heavy machine guns, which were superimposed on areas of artillery and mortar fire.

Fire structures for machine guns were further developed. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad, 200 bunkers were created in the city, and 37 armored and reinforced concrete caps for machine guns were installed. More attention was paid to firing in the dark, training crews to zero in on landmarks and lines, as well as techniques for recording aiming with artificial dispersion in depth and along the front. Quick maneuvers with heavy machine guns, the importance of which is especially important during defense on a wide front, were difficult even after the transition to a trench system with full-profile trenches.

Go to new system armaments began in the middle of the war. The appearance of a lightweight light machine gun became possible after the intermediate power cartridge was created, but the production of RPDs began only in recent months World War II. But among the new models, the SG-43 heavy machine guns were adopted by the Red Army. The rapid and successful implementation of the experimental design reserves and combat experience accumulated before the war in new weapons testified to the creation of an effective system of design, testing and production.

The predilection of the Red Army commanders for a wheeled machine gun machine is explained by the fact that such a machine made it possible to move a machine gun ready to fire (most machine guns on tripod machines had to be removed from the machines and reinstalled in a new position), but in general such a machine rather hampered the actions of the crew . Combat experience has shown the advantages of a tripod machine with the ability to conduct anti-aircraft fire over universal and wheeled machines.

Despite the fact that large-caliber machine guns, according to the Manual on Small Arms, were intended “for firing at air targets” and also “for combating enemy firing points and manpower covered by light armor“The main task for them was the role of anti-aircraft. As a rule, firing at air targets was carried out at ranges of less than 1.5 thousand meters. Anti-aircraft machine guns were usually located no further than 300-500 meters from the front edge of the defense. With the help of these machine guns, control points, front-line automobile and railways. For example, in May 1943, 558 heavy machine guns were used to protect the railway communications of the fronts. During the war years, anti-aircraft machine guns (quadruple Maxims and DShK) shot down 2,401 enemy aircraft. Firing at low-flying high-speed targets increased the requirements for combat rate of fire and the possibility of use on complex installations (this was embodied in the modernization of the DShK).

But the possibility of flat long-range shooting, the penetrating effect of bullets (for battles in the city or mountains), and the growing share of light armored vehicles were not ignored - for example, the DShK had to be used in anti-tank defense during the Battle of Kursk.

During the war, the need for more powerful machine guns became apparent. To solve this problem, the USSR returned to machine guns chambered for a 14.5 mm cartridge. Some countries preferred to use automatic small-caliber guns. At the final stage of the war, supplies of large-caliber DShK machine gun they were not reduced to the troops, unlike heavy and light machine guns.

During the war, search work did not stop. For example, in 1942-1943, the need to lighten light machine guns led to the creation of B.C. Deykin, N.M. Afanasyev and V.F. Lyutym at the Scientific Testing Site small arms belt-fed LAD machine gun chambered for the 7.62 mm TT pistol cartridge. The deterioration in shooting accuracy was one of the main reasons for the general desire to increase the density of fire. It is not surprising that “heavy fire” installations appeared, such as the experienced 8-barreled machine gun I.I. Slostina.

Based on materials from the article by Semyon Fedoseev “Machine guns of the Second World War”

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, fascist troops defeated the Red Army on all fronts. The reason for this was the human factor - the confidence of Stalin and the high command that Hitler would not violate the treaty.

After the outbreak of World War II, the USSR accelerated the reorganization and increase in the composition of the armed forces. By the beginning of the Second World War, there were 5.3 million people in the Red Army. In terms of armament, the Soviet border districts were distinguished by impressive defensive capabilities, but they were not brought to full combat readiness in time.

The main tactical mistake of our troops was the uncoordinated interaction of different types of troops: infantry, tanks, aviation and artillery. The infantry did not follow the artillery fire direction and broke away from the tanks. These mistakes were the main reason for the huge losses in the initial period of the war.

In the first hours of the war, German aircraft destroyed most of the Soviet tanks and aircraft, leaving behind dominance in the air and on the ground. The bulk of the work to protect the Motherland fell on the shoulders of ordinary infantrymen.

The armament of the USSR before the start of the Great Patriotic War met the needs of that time. Mosin repeating rifle mod. 1891 caliber 7.62 mm was the only non-automatic weapon. This rifle performed well in the Second World War and was in service with the SA until the early 60s.

In parallel with the Mosin rifle, the Soviet infantry was equipped with Tokarev self-loading rifles: SVT-38 and the SVT-40, improved in 1940. Also present in the troops were Simonov automatic rifles () - at the beginning of the war there were almost 1.5 million units.

The presence of such huge number automatic and self-loading rifles covered the shortage of submachine guns (only at the beginning of 1941 did production of the Shpagin PP begin, which for a long time became the standard of reliability and simplicity).

The best example of submachine guns during the Second World War was recognized as the Sudaev submachine gun.

One of the main features of the infantry weapons of the Soviet army at the beginning of the Second World War was complete absence anti-tank rifles. And this was reflected already in the first days of hostilities. In July 1941, Simonov and Degtyarev, by order of the high command, designed a five-shot PTRS shotgun (Simonov) and a single-shot PTRD (Degtyarev).

Throughout the Great Patriotic War military industry The USSR produced 12139.3 thousand carbines and rifles, 1515.9 thousand all types of machine guns, 6173.9 thousand submachine guns. Since 1942, almost 450 thousand heavy and light machine guns, 2 million submachine guns and more than 3 million self-loading and repeating rifles have been produced every year.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War confirmed the importance of good infantry supplies the latest designs small arms. During the war, many different types of automatic weapons were developed and supplied to the army, which ultimately played a decisive role in the victory of the USSR over the fascist invaders.

Petrov Nikita

This essay describes the achievements of designers, innovators, and inventors during the Great Patriotic War, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany.

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MUNICIPAL STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

SECONDARY SCHOOL No. 15 Kh. SADOVY

Abstract competition

“Achievements of designers, innovators, inventors

during the Great Patriotic War",

dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany.

Nomination: “Innovations and technical inventions of artillery and small arms and their use”

Research

Topic: “Artillery and small arms

during the Great Patriotic War"

Petrov Nikita

Radislavovich

9th grade,

MKOU secondary school No. 15

x. Sadovy

Supervisor:

Gresova Elena Pavlovna

history and social studies teacher

Mineral water

2014

Introduction

The events and facts of the past Great Patriotic War are becoming a thing of the past. Soviet people against the most aggressive, most terrible enemy of humanity - German fascism. In each of the 1418 days of the Great Patriotic War, the entire victorious path Soviet soldiers, their feat of arms was accompanied by the most massive, most common weapon - small arms. Without a doubt, the first shot fired at the aggressor was made from domestic small arms.

War in the history of the development of any type of military equipment and weapons, including small arms, is the main test of its combat qualities, service and operational indicators and technical excellence. The Red Army small arms system and weapon samples created in the pre-war years fully met the tactical requirements placed on them and the various conditions of use, as demonstrated by the experience of combat operations. At the same time, the dynamic nature of combat operations, the saturation of troops with different military equipment, the further development of combat tactics necessitated the development of a number of new types of small arms, as well as the improvement of existing small arms equipment.

Purpose this study: determine the role of technical achievements in the field of rearmament of artillery and small arms during the Great Patriotic War. To achieve this, the following tasks were set:

1. Study weapons from the Great Patriotic War.
2. Consider the developments of domestic designers of small arms and artillery weapons during the Great Patriotic War.

Victory over Nazi Germany depended not only on the dedication of the soldiers, but also on the armament of the army. By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had a bloodless army. The command staff was practically destroyed, the army was armed with outdated equipment. On the contrary, all of Europe worked for Germany. Therefore, the start of the war was unsuccessful for the USSR; it took some time to mobilize forces and create new equipment.

1. On the eve of the war

The alarming international situation of the late thirties and early forties required the implementation of urgent measures to strengthen the Soviet armed forces. The primary task was to rearm the troops with the latest models of military equipment, turning Special attention to improve artillery, armored and aviation equipment, as well as automatic small arms. Specialized research institutes, design bureaus and laboratories were organized for these areas.

At the same time, many wrong decisions were made. Unjustified repressions of a number of highly qualified specialists in science, industry and the central apparatus had a serious impact on the pace of rearmament of the Soviet Army. It should also be noted that the provisions of the then military doctrine also had a negative impact on the course of events. Serious study of fundamental issues of strategy and tactics was often opposed by superficial propaganda and agitation. There were, equally, both sarcastic moods and an excessive overestimation of the real capabilities of the potential enemy.

Catastrophic lesions initial period The wars forced the country's military-political leadership to rethink the situation. It turned out that the Nazi troops were advancing with a wide variety of and not always first-class equipment, including captured weapons from previously defeated European armies.Most likely, the enemy’s rapid blitzkrieg is ensured mainly by two years of successful experience in conducting military operations, vocational training well-trained East Prussian generals, “correctly” organized ideological work with personnel, and also, last but not least, traditional German punctuality, organization and discipline. We came to the conclusion that, subject to the full mobilization of the remaining scientific, technical and production reserves, it would be possible to give a convincing response to the enemy. However, there is an urgent need to review the quantitative and qualitative structure, practice combat use various types weapons.

1. Weapon

Shpagin submachine gun (PPSh-41) - a submachine gun developed by a Soviet designerGeorgy Semyonovich Shpagin.The PPSh became a kind of symbol of the Soviet soldier during the Great Patriotic War, just as the MP-40 is strongly associated with the Wehrmacht soldier, and the Kalashnikov assault rifle with the Soviet soldier of post-war times. PPSh appears in almost all Soviet and foreign films about the Great Patriotic War. The image of the Soviet soldier-liberator, captured in a huge number of monuments erected both on the territory of the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe, has become a textbook image: a soldier in a field uniform, a helmet, a cape, with a PPSh machine gun.

PPS-43 (Sudaev submachine gun) - a submachine gun developed by a Soviet designerAlexey Ivanovich Sudaevin 1942. It was decided to establish production of the new PPS assault rifles put into service in besieged Leningrad. The supply of weapons there was difficult, and the front required replenishment. Not inferior in combat qualities to the Degtyarev submachine gun and the Shpagin submachine gun, it was 2.5 kilograms lighter than them, and required 2 times less metal and 3 times less labor during production.

The machine gun ("Maxim") is an easel machine gun developed by the American gunsmith Hiram Stevens Maxim in 1883. The Maxim machine gun became the ancestor of all automatic weapons. The Maxim 1910 machine gun is a Russian version of the American Maxim machine gun, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during World War I and World War II. By the end of the 1930s, the Maxim design was obsolete. Ideal for defense against massive cavalry attacks, in the era of tank battles the machine gun was practically useless, primarily due to heavy weight and size. The machine gun without the machine, water and ammunition weighed about 20 kg. The weight of the machine is 40 kg, plus 5 kg of water. Since it was impossible to use a machine gun without a machine and water, the operating weight of the entire system (without cartridges) was about 65 kg. Moving such weight across the battlefield under fire was not easy. The high profile made camouflage difficult, which led to the rapid destruction of the crew by enemy fire. For the advancing Maxim tank and its crew, they were an easy target. In addition, significant difficulties in summer time caused the machine gun to be supplied with water to cool the barrel. For comparison: a single Wehrmacht MG-34 machine gun weighed 10.5 kg (without cartridges) and did not require water for cooling. Firing from the MG-34 could be carried out without a machine gun, which contributed to the secrecy of the machine gunner’s position.

In 1943, unexpectedly for everyone, an easel machine gun from a then little-known designer was adopted.Pyotr Mikhailovich GoryunovSG-43 with an air barrel cooling system. J.V. Stalin demanded the convening of a special meeting at the beginning of May 1943 to finalize the issue of adopting a model of a heavy machine gun for service with the troops. Honored V.A. Degtyarev was also invited to this meeting along with the heads of the People's Commissariats. To the question of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which machine gun should be adopted - Degtyarev or Goryunov, Vasily Alekseevich, without hesitation, answered that if we proceed from the interests of the army’s combat capability, then we should adopt the heavy machine gun of the Goryunov system, which is superior in reliability of operation, trouble-free operation and survivability of parts DS-39 machine gun.Vasily Alekseevich honestly answered: “The Goryunov machine gun is better, Comrade Stalin, and industry will master it faster.” The fate of the new machine gun was decided. In October 1943, 7.62-mm heavy machine guns of the Goryunov system mod. 1943 (SG-43) began to enter the active army.

The troops finally received the long-awaited simple, reliable and relatively light heavy machine gun, which played a positive role in ensuring the offensive combat operations of the Soviet troops in the second half of the Great Patriotic War. The production of the SG-43 machine gun was launched simultaneously at enterprises in Kovrov and Zlatoust, which contributed to the final solution to the problem of supplying troops with machine guns and the creation of reserves, which by the end of 1944 amounted to 74,000 units.

Back in 1924 V.A. Degtyarev offered his GAU prototype light machine gun. The 7.62-mm Degtyarev light machine gun was much lighter, more convenient to handle, and most importantly, simpler in design than the recently adopted Maxim-Tokarev light machine gun, which made it possible to quickly establish its production. In December 1927, its improved version was tested by a special commission of the Revolutionary Military Council. The weapon showed good results. In the same month, it was adopted by the Red Army under the designation “7.62-mm light machine gun of the Degtyarev system, infantry (DP).” The automatic machine gun operated on the principle of recoil of powder gases from the barrel, locking was carried out by spreading the combat larvae to the sides.

This design feature later became a signature business card, embodied in almost all Degtyarev machine guns. Thanks to its simple design, reliable operation, shooting accuracy and high maneuverability, the DP served with honor Soviet soldier for more than twenty years, being the main automatic fire support weapon for infantry in the platoon level. In just 4 years of war, gunsmiths handed over to the front a little more than 660 thousand DP, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the enemy.

In 1943-1944, the Degtyarev Design Bureau created a number of improved DP models, in which, to increase the survivability of the weapon, the recoil spring was moved to the rear of the receiver and the bolt parts were strengthened. The trigger mechanism is being improved to improve the stability of the weapon during shooting. After the tests, improved versions of Degtyarev’s machine guns, by decision of the State Defense Committee on October 14, 1944, were adopted by the Red Army under the designation “7.62-mm Degtyarev light machine gun, modernized (DMP).”

1. Artillery

Artillery weapons of the Soviet Army in the years after the end civil war and before the start of the Great Patriotic War, it underwent a radical modification and was improved on the basis the latest achievements science and technology. By the beginning of the war, the army was armed with the best artillery, superior in combat and operational qualities to Western European artillery, including German artillery.

Shortly before the attack fascist Germany it was decided to stop the production of 45-mm (“forty-five”) guns. This decision had dire consequences. The gun was intended to fight enemy tanks, self-propelled guns and armored vehicles. For its time, its armor penetration was quite adequate. The gun also had anti-personnel capabilities - it was supplied fragmentation grenade and buckshot.

Particular attention should be paid to the simplest type of artillery weapons - 82 mm and 120 mm mortarsBoris Ivanovich Shavyrin.These extremely simple to manufacture and operate, cheap mortars, unfortunately, in the pre-war years were not appreciated either by the military command or by the leaders of the artillery industry. Meanwhile, under the modest shell - a pipe and a slab, as mortars were ironically called, huge combat capabilities. The hard lessons of the first months of the war taught us to appreciate mortar weapons and their creators. Having escaped arrest in connection with the outbreak of the war, B.I. Shavyrin continued to work fruitfully on the development of new samples.

The first months of the Great Patriotic War showed that 70-80% of German tanks were old-style tanks T-2 and T-3, as well as captured French and Czech tanks. It is worth noting that the heavy T-4s at that time also had armor that was vulnerable to anti-tank rifles even when fired at the frontal armor. In the conditions of a massive offensive by German armored and mechanized units, an urgent need arose to resume the production of anti-tank rifles. Stalin urgently involved V. Degtyarev and his student S. Simonov in the development of the new PTR. The deadline was extremely strict - a month. It took Degtyarev and Simonov only 22 days to develop new models of PTR. After test firing and discussion of new weapons, Stalin decided to adopt both models - PTRD and PTRS.

There is no single confident version of why the BM-13 rocket launchers began to be called “Katyushas”; there are several assumptions:

• after the name of Blanter’s song, which became popular before the war, based on the words of Isakovsky “Katyusha”. The version is not very convincing, since a direct relationship is not immediately visible (why then not call a forty-five or one and a half “Katyusha”?), but, nevertheless, the song probably became the catalyst for the name under the influence of other reasons.
• abbreviated as “KAT” - there is a version that this is what the rangers called the BM-13 - “Kostikovsky automatic thermal”, after the name of the project manager, Andrei Kostikov.

Another option is that the name is associated with the “K” index on the mortar body - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant. And front-line soldiers loved to give nicknames to their weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed “Mother”, the ML-20 howitzer gun was nicknamed “Emelka”. Yes, and the BM-13 was at first sometimes called “Raisa Sergeevna,” thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (missile).

It should also be noted that the installations were so secret that it was even forbidden to use the commands “fire”, “fire”, “volley”, instead they were sounded “sing” or “play”, which may also have been associated with the song “Katyusha”. And for the infantry, a salvo of Katyusha rockets was the most pleasant music.

In the German troops, these vehicles were called “Stalin’s organs” due to their external similarity rocket launcher with the pipe system of this musical instrument and the powerful, stunning roar that was produced when the missiles were launched.

The first vehicles were manufactured on the basis of domestic chassis; after the start of Lend-Lease deliveries, the American Studebaker truck became the main chassis for the BM-13 (BM-13N). The new weapon was first used in battle on July 14, 1941: the battery of Captain I.A. Flyorova fired a salvo of seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The frightened Nazis called the weapon a “hellish meat grinder.”

1. The contribution of scientists to the cause of Victory

The Academy of Sciences received the task of immediately revising the topics of scientific and scientific-technical works and speeding up research. All her activities were now subordinated to three goals:

• designing new means of defense and offense;
• scientific assistance to the arms and ammunition manufacturing industry;
• finding new raw materials and energy resources, replacing scarce materials with simpler and more accessible ones.

Preparing for war with the USSR, the Nazis hoped to destroy the bulk of our fleet with the help of secret magnetic mines. On June 27, 1941, an order was issued to organize teams for the urgent installation of demagnetizing devices on all ships of the fleet. Anatoly Petrovich Alexandrov was appointed scientific director. Professor Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov voluntarily joined one of the teams.

The work was carried out almost around the clock, in the most difficult conditions, with a shortage of specialists, cables, equipment, often under bombing and shelling. A winding-free demagnetization method was also created, which was used to protect against magnetic mines submarines. It was a heroic victory of scientific knowledge and practical skill! Mikhail Vladimirovich Keldysh found out the reason and created a theory of a very complex and dangerous phenomenon- self-excitation of oscillations with large amplitude near the wings and tail of an aircraft (flutter), which led to the destruction of the machine - this helped to develop measures to combat flutter.

As a result of the research of Doctor of Technical Sciences Nikolai Mikhailovich Sklyarov, high-strength armor steel AV-2 was obtained, containing significantly less scarce components: nickel - 2 times, molybdenum - 3 times! Research by scientists from the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences Yakov Borisovich Zeldovich and Yuli Borisovich Khariton helped to switch to the use of cheaper gunpowder. To increase flight range rocket scientists suggested lengthening the charge, using more high-calorie fuel or two simultaneously operating combustion chambers.

In the history of the activities of Leningrad scientists, there is a heroic episode associated with the “Road of Life”: a circumstance, at first glance, completely inexplicable, was revealed: when the trucks went to Leningrad, loaded to the maximum, the ice withstood it, and on the way back with sick and hungry people, i.e. e. with significantly less cargo, the vehicles often fell through the ice. Pavel Pavlovich Kobeko, a researcher at the Institute of Physics and Technology, developed a technique for recording ice vibrations under the influence of static and dynamic loads. Based on the results obtained, rules for safe driving along the Ladoga highway were developed. Ice accidents have stopped. Scientists were actively involved in work that was new to them. It was the unity of science, creative impulse and a powerful wave of labor enthusiasm.

Conclusion

The Great Patriotic War subjected the small arms of the warring countries to the most serious tests. Small arms systems have received further development and complexity, both in terms of the variety of weapons themselves and the number of types of ammunition. During the war years, in almost all the armies of the warring countries, the evolution of small arms followed the same paths: by reducing the mass of the main automatic weapon of the infantry - the submachine gun; replacing rifles with carbines, and subsequently with machine guns (assault rifles); creating special weapons adapted for landing operations; lightening heavy machine guns and moving them onto the battlefield into rifle chains. Also characteristic of the small arms system in all armies was the pace and principles of development of infantry anti-tank weapons (rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers with cumulative grenades).Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, development and research work was carried out in the field of further improvement of small arms, laying the foundations of the post-war small arms system of the Soviet Army.

In general, the Great Patriotic War showed that with the creation of the most modern means of armed struggle, the role of small arms did not decrease, and the attention that was paid to them in our country during these years increased significantly. The experience gained during the war in the use of weapons, which is not outdated today, laid the foundation for the development and improvement of small arms of the Armed Forces for many post-war decades.

And this is the heroic merit of our scientists, designers, engineers, as well as millions of ordinary Soviet people who worked in the rear and forged weapons of Victory.

List of sources used

1. Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. - M.: Eksmo, Yauza, 2004

1. Pastukhov I.P., Plotnikov S.E.Stories about small arms. M.: DOSAAF USSR, 1983. 158 p.
2. Soviet Armed Forces. History of construction. M.: Voenizdat, 1978. p. 237-238; Military-technical progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR. M: Voenizdat, 1982. pp. 134-136.

Let's talk about many myths that have long been boring, about true and fictitious facts and about the real state of affairs during the Great Patriotic War.

On the topic of the Great Patriotic War, there are many myths directed against Russia, from “they were filled with corpses” to “two million raped German women.” One of them is the superiority of German weapons over Soviet ones. It is important that this myth spreads even without anti-Soviet (anti-Russian) motivation, “accidentally” - a typical example is the depiction of Germans in films. This is often highly artistically depicted as a procession of “blond beasts” with rolled-up sleeves, who from the hips pour long bursts of “Schmeissers” (see below) on the Red Army fighters from the hip, and they only occasionally snarl with rare rifle shots. Cinematic! This happens even in Soviet films, and in modern ones it can even reach one shovel handle for three against sailing “tigers”.
Let's compare the weapons that were available at that time. However, this is a very broad topic, so let’s take small arms as an example, and “in a narrow range”, mass for the rank and file. That is, we don’t take pistols, nor do we take machine guns (we would like them, but the article has a limited scope). We also do not consider specific items, such as Vorsatz J/Pz curved-barrel attachments, and we will examine the specified “narrow” range specifically for mass products, without specifically highlighting early models(SVT-38 from SVT-40, MP-38 from MP-40, for example). I apologize for such superficiality, but you can always read the details on the Internet, and now we only need a comparative review of mass-produced models.
Let's start with the fact that the impression from many in the film that “almost all Germans, unlike the Red Army soldiers, had automatic weapons” is false.
In 1940, a German infantry division should have had 12,609 rifles and carbines, and only 312 submachine guns, i.e. less than the actual machine guns (425 light and 110 easel), and in the Soviet Union in 1941 there were 10,386 rifles and carbines (including snipers), while submachine guns were 1,623 (and, by the way, 392 light machine guns and 166 easel, and also 9 large-caliber). In 1944, the Germans had 9,420 carbines and rifles (including sniper rifles) per division, which accounted for 1,595 submachine guns and assault rifles, while the Red Army had 5,357 rifles with carbines, and 5,557 submachine guns. (Sergei Metnikov, Confrontation between the small arms systems of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army, “Weapons” No. 4, 2000).

It is clearly seen that by state the share of automatic weapons in the Red Army was greater even at the beginning of the war, and over time the relative number of submachine guns only increased. However, it is worth considering that “statutorily required” and “actually existed” did not always coincide. Just at this time, the rearmament of the army was underway, and a new range of weapons was just being formed: “As of June 1941, in the Kiev Special Military District, rifle formations had light machine guns from 100 to 128% of the staff, submachine guns - up to 35%, anti-aircraft machine guns - 5-6% of the state.” It should also be taken into account that the most big losses armaments occurred at the beginning of the war, 1941.

It was in the Second World War that the role of small arms changed compared to the First: long-term positional “trench” confrontations were replaced by operational maneuvering, which placed new demands on small arms. By the end of the war, the specializations of weapons were already quite clearly divided: long-range (rifles, machine guns) and for short distances using automatic fire. Moreover, in the second case, a battle at a distance of up to 200 m was initially considered, but then an understanding came of the need to increase the sighting range of automatic weapons to 400-600 m.
But let's get down to specifics. Let's start with German weapons.

First of all, of course, the Mauser 98K carbine comes to mind.

Caliber 7.92x57 mm, manual reloading, 5-round magazine, sighting range - up to 2000 m, therefore widely used with optical sights. The design turned out to be very successful, and after the war, Mausers became a popular base for hunting and sporting weapons. Although the carbine is a remake of a rifle from the end of the previous century, the Wehrmacht began to arm itself with these carbines en masse only in 1935.

The first automatic self-loading rifles began to arrive in the Wehrmacht infantry only at the end of 1941, these were Walther G.41.

Caliber 7.92x57 mm, gas-operated automatic, magazine for 10 rounds, sighting range - up to 1200 m. The appearance of this weapon was caused by the high assessment of the Soviet SVT-38/40 and ABC-36, to which the G-41 was still inferior. The main disadvantages: poor balance (the center of gravity is very forward) and demanding maintenance, which is difficult in front-line conditions. In 1943 it was upgraded to the G-43, and before that the Wehrmacht often preferred to use captured Soviet-made SVT-40s. However, in the Gewehr 43 version, the improvement was precisely in the use of a new gas exhaust system, borrowed precisely from the Tokarev rifle.

The most famous weapon in appearance is the “Schmeisser” with its characteristic shape.

Which has nothing to do with the designer Schmeisser, the Maschinenpistole MP-40 was developed by Heinrich Vollmer.
We will not consider the early modifications of MP-36 and -38 separately, as stated.

Caliber: 9x19 mm Parabellum, rate of fire: 400-500 rounds/min, magazine: 32 rounds, effective firing range: 150 m for group targets, generally 70 m for single targets, since the MP-40 vibrates strongly when firing. This is exactly the question of “cinematography versus realism”: if the Wehrmacht had attacked “like in the movies,” then it would have been a shooting range for Red Army soldiers armed with “mosinki” and “svetki”: the enemy would have been shot another 300-400 meters away. Another significant drawback was the absence of a barrel casing when it quickly heated up, which often led to burns when firing in bursts. It should also be noted that the stores are unreliable. However, for close combat, especially urban combat, the MP-40 is a very good weapon.
Initially, the MP-40 was only available to command personnel, then they began to issue it to drivers, tank crews and paratroopers. There was never a cinematic mass appeal: 1.2 million MP-40s were produced throughout the war, in total more than 21 million people were drafted into the Wehrmacht, and in 1941 there were only about 250 thousand MP-40s in the army.

Schmeisser, in 1943, developed the Sturmgewehr StG-44 (originally MP-43) for the Wehrmacht.

By the way, it is worth noting that there is a myth that the Kalashnikov assault rifle was allegedly copied from the StG-44, which arose due to some external similarity and ignorance of the structure of both products.

Caliber: 7.92x33 mm, rate of fire: 400-500 rounds/min, magazine: 30 rounds, effective firing range: up to 800 m. It was possible to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher and even use an infrared sight (which, however, required backpack batteries and he was by no means compact). Quite decent weapon for its time, but mass production was mastered only in the fall of 1944; in total, approximately 450 thousand of these assault rifles were produced, which were used by SS units and other elite units. Let's start, of course, with the glorious Mosin rifle of the 1891-30 model, and, of course, the carbine of the 1938 and 1944 model.


Caliber 7.62x54 mm, manual reloading, magazine for 5 rounds, sighting range - up to 2000 m. The main small arms of the Red Army infantry units of the first period of the war. Durability, reliability and unpretentiousness have entered legends and folklore. The disadvantages include: a bayonet, which, due to an outdated design, had to be carried permanently attached to the rifle, a horizontal bolt handle (that’s realistic - why not bend it down?), inconvenient reloading and a safety lock.

Soviet weapons designer F.V. Tokarev developed a 10-round self-loading rifle SVT-38 in the late 30s

Then a modernized version of the SVT-40 appeared, weighing 600 g less, and then a sniper rifle was created on this basis.


Caliber 7.62x54 mm, gas-operated automatic, magazine for 10 rounds, sighting range - up to 1000 m. One can often come across an opinion about the capriciousness of the rifle, but this is due to the general conscription into the army: for fighters "from the plow" the Mosin rifle, of course, is easier to use operation. In addition, in front-line conditions there was often a shortage lubricants, and unsuitable ones may have been used. Additionally, one should point out the low quality of the cartridges supplied under Lend-Lease, which produced a lot of soot. However, it all comes down to the need to comply with maintenance regulations.
At the same time, SVT had a greater firepower due to automation and twice as many cartridges in the magazine as the Mosin rifle, so the preferences were different.
As mentioned above, the Germans valued captured SVTs and even adopted them as a “limited standard.”

As for automatic weapons, at the beginning of the war the troops had a number of V.A. submachine guns. Degtyareva PPD-34/38

It was developed back in the 30s. Caliber 7.62x25 mm, rate of fire: 800 rounds/min, magazine for 71 rounds (drum) or 25 (horn), effective firing range: 200 meters. It was used mainly by border units of the NKVD, since, unfortunately, the combined arms command still thought in terms of the First World War and did not understand the importance of submachine guns. In 1940, the PPD was structurally modernized, but still remained unsuitable for mass production in war time, and by the end of 1941 it was replaced in service by the cheaper and more effective Shpagin PPSh-41 submachine gun

PPSh-41, which became widely known thanks to cinema.

Caliber 7.62x25 mm, rate of fire: 900 rounds/min, effective range: 200 meters (sighting range – 300, which is important for single-shot shooting). The PPSh inherited a 71-round drum magazine, and later received a more reliable open-arm magazine with 35 rounds. The design was based on stamping-welded technology, which made it possible to mass produce the product even in harsh military conditions, and in total about 5.5 million PPSh were produced during the war years. Main advantages: high effective firing range in its class, simplicity and low cost of manufacturing. Disadvantages include significant weight, as well as too high rate of fire, which leads to excessive consumption of ammunition.
We should also recall the PPS-42 (then PPS-43), invented in 1942 by Alexey Sudaev.


Caliber: 7.62x25 mm, rate of fire: 700 rounds/min, magazine: 35 rounds, effective range: 200 meters. The bullet retains destructive power up to 800 m. Although the PPS was very technologically advanced in production (stamped parts are assembled by welding and rivets; material costs are half and labor costs are three times less than that of the PPSh), it never became mass weapons, although about half a million were produced during the remaining years of the war. After the war, the PPS was massively exported and also copied abroad (the Finns made a replica of the M44 chambered for the 9 mm cartridge already in 1944), then it was gradually replaced by the Kalashnikov assault rifle among the troops. The PPS-43 is often called the best submachine gun of World War II.
Some will ask: why, since everything was so good, did the blitzkrieg almost succeed?
Firstly, do not forget that in 1941 rearmament was just underway, and the provision of automatic weapons according to the new standards had not yet been carried out.
Secondly, handguns in the Great Patriotic War are not the main damaging factor, his losses are usually estimated between a quarter and a third of the total.
Thirdly, there are areas where the Wehrmacht had a clear advantage at the beginning of the war: mechanization, transport and communications.

But the main thing is the number and concentration of forces accumulated for a treacherous attack without declaring war. In June 1941, the Reich concentrated 2.8 million Wehrmacht troops to attack the USSR, and the total number of troops with the allies was more than 4.3 million people. At the same time, in western districts The Red Army numbered only about 3 million people, and specifically in the districts, and less than 40% of the personnel were located near the border. Combat readiness, alas, was also far from 100%, especially in terms of technology - let’s not idealize the past.



We also must not forget about the economy: while the USSR was forced to hastily evacuate factories to the Urals, the Reich made full use of the resources of Europe, which gladly fell under the Germans. Czechoslovakia, for example, before the war was the leader in arms production in Europe, and at the beginning of the war, every third German tank was produced by the Skoda concern.

And the glorious traditions of gunsmith designers continue in our time, including in the field of small arms.