Barbarossa's plan in brief. Plan Barbarossa

Barbarossa Fall"), the code name for Germany's war plan against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).

In 1940, after the defeat of the French army, the moment came that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. On July 22, 1940, the day of the French surrender, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Franz Halder, received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch, to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December simultaneously developed several options, each independently. One of the options was developed by the German High Command (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy, General Walter Warlimont, and was codenamed “Lossberg Study.” It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main blow in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. When making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time work on the plan options was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was tasked with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the comments made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership took place, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: “The preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was carried out under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces command in Zossen.

The main goal was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was planned to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and deprive the Russian Baltic Fleet of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later the Caucasus with its oil sources. Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow in the OKW plans. However, the capture of Moscow had to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad pursued several military goals: the liquidation of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling military industry this city and the liquidation of Leningrad as a concentration point for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.

On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a rapid collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called “colossus with feet of clay...

"The entire territory in which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern halves. The latter has a poor road network. The best highways and railways located on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, in the northern half there are more favorable conditions for use large quantity troops than in the south. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line. It must be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. The Dnieper and Western Dvina represent the easternmost line on which the Russians will be forced to give battle.

If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to protect their industrial areas. As a result, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. A particularly large strike force should advance from the Warsaw area towards Moscow. Of the three army groups envisaged, the northern one will need to be sent to Leningrad, and the southern forces will need to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kyiv. The final goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon."

"We moved through frozen swamps, often the ice cracked, and ice water got into boots. My gloves were soaked through and I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands in a towel. I wanted to howl in pain." From a letter from a German soldier, a participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.

“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from retreating while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aircraft cannot carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aircraft can launch air strikes against the Russians military-industrial areas. To do this, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of the Russian armed forces and prevent their reconstruction. Already the first strikes must be delivered by such units that it is possible to destroy large enemy forces. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups. deliver the main blow.

In the north, it is necessary to achieve encirclement of enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will advance on Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat marshes must move out later and achieve encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north... The number of troops of 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient."

The final version of the plan is set out in the directive of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.

Directive 21) and the “Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops” of the OKH of January 31, 1941. The Barbarossa plan provided for “defeating Soviet Russia in a short-lived campaign even before the war against England is over.” The idea was “to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disunited groups of enemy troops.” At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the line Astrakhan, Volga, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan outlined in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states, etc.

It was planned to begin its implementation in May 1941, but due to operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this date was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given for the day of the attack - June 22.

A number of additional documents were developed to the OKW and OKH directives, incl.

part of the disinformation directive, which required that “the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa be presented as the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, aimed at diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England.”

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.

people, about 4,300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5,000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North" consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the zone from Memel (Klaipeda) to Gołdap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the zone from Goldap to the Pripyat marshes; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. The army groups had the task of advancing respectively in general directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The German Army Norway and 2 Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway - a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.

They were given the task of reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. There were 24 divisions left in the OKH reserve.

Despite the initial significant successes of the German troops, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be untenable, since it was based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.

Great definition

Incomplete definition ↓

The USSR began to be developed under the leadership of General Paulus on July 21, 1940, i.e. at a time when Germany managed to occupy France and achieve its surrender. The plan was finally approved on December 18. It was assumed that victory over the USSR would be won in the shortest possible time - even before defeat was suffered. To achieve this, Hitler ordered tanks to be sent to the main enemy forces in order to quickly destroy the ground forces and prevent the troops from retreating deeper.

It was assumed that this would be quite enough for victory, and in the shortest possible time the USSR would be forced to capitulate. According to calculations, the implementation of the plan should have taken no more than 5 months. Thus, the Wehrmacht assumed that even before the onset of winter the enemy would be defeated, and the Germans would not have to face the harsh Russian cold.

In the very first days of the invasion, the troops of the Third Reich had to advance so far that the USSR soldiers could not attack objects located in the previously captured territories. Next, it was planned to cut off the Asian part of the country from the European one, destroy industrial centers with the help of Luftwaffe forces and bomb the Baltic Fleet, launching several powerful raids on bases. To air force The USSR could not prevent the implementation of the plan; they were also supposed to be quickly destroyed.

The subtleties of the Barbarossa plan

According to the plan, not only the Germans were to participate in the operation. It was assumed that soldiers from Finland and Romania would also fight, with the former destroying the enemy on the Hanko Peninsula and covering the advance of German troops from Norway, while the latter would be in the rear. Of course, both the Finns and the Romanians had to act under the Germans and carry out all the orders given to them.

The task was to attack the territory of Belarus, destroy the enemy in the Leningrad direction and in the Baltic states. Then the soldiers had to capture Leningrad and Kronstadt and, in the shortest possible time, destroy all enemy defensive forces located on the way to Moscow. The Air Force at this time was supposed to capture or destroy stations, terminals, railway tracks and bridges, as well as carry out several powerful raids on enemy military bases.

Thus, in the very first weeks, the Germans were supposed to capture the largest and destroy communication centers, after which victory over the USSR, according to the plan, became only a matter of time and did not require large sacrifices.

Chapter 23

However, Hitler kept his decision to attack the USSR strictly secret, leading the military to believe that England remained his main target. On the day Molotov arrived in Berlin, the Fuhrer outlined a new strategy. Having canceled the crossing of the English Channel, he decided to capture Gibraltar, Canary Islands, Madeira and part of Morocco, which was supposed to cut off the British Isles from the rest of the empire and force it to capitulate.

It was a strategically precise plan, but unrealistic because it involved military cooperation with hesitant allies. No one understood the difficulties of this complex operation better than its author himself, but, despite recent setbacks, he was confident in his ability to cope with Petain, Mussolini and Franco. The Führer started with the caudillo and on November 18 informed his minister Serrano Suñer: “I have decided to attack Gibraltar. All we need is a signal to start the operation.”

Convinced that Franco would eventually enter the war, the Führer held a meeting in early December to seize Gibraltar. He informed the generals that he would receive Franco's consent in the near future, and then sent his personal representative to him. But the choice of the Fuhrer turned out to be disastrous: it was Admiral Canaris, who had been working against Hitler since 1938. He laid out Hitler's official arguments to Franco and then informally advised him not to get involved in a war that the Axis would inevitably lose.

Canaris reported that Franco would enter the war “when England is on the verge of collapse.” Hitler lost patience and on December 10 ordered the cancellation of Operation Felix, the code name given to the plan to capture Gibraltar. But a few weeks later, the Fuhrer sent a lengthy message to Franco, in which he promised to immediately deliver the promised grain to Spain if the caudillo agreed to participate in the attack on Gibraltar. In his response, Franco did not skimp on promises, but did practically nothing to implement them. This led to the failure of Operation Felix. If Gibraltar had fallen, it is possible that all of North Africa and the Middle East would have been taken over by Hitler. Arab world would enthusiastically support German expansion due to his hatred of the Jews. In addition to Spain's difficult economic situation and fears of being a loser, Franco also had a personal motive that prompted him to abandon the alliance with Hitler: the caudillo had an admixture of Jewish blood in his veins.

Stalin hesitated for almost two weeks before informing the Germans that he was ready to join Hitler's proposed quadripartite pact, but under certain conditions, one of which was the withdrawal of German troops from Finland. The demands did not seem excessive, but, to the surprise of the Foreign Ministry, Hitler did not even want to discuss them and, moreover, did not bother to answer Moscow.

The Führer set his sights on war, and at the end of November his generals began a series of staff exercises related to an attack on Russia. On December 5, the chiefs of staff of the three army groups participating in these exercises met with Hitler, Brauchitsch and Halder. Having approved in principle the plan of operation proposed by Halder, the Fuhrer noted, however, that one should not imitate Napoleon and consider Moscow as the main goal. Taking the capital, he said, “is not that important for us.” Brauchitsch objected that Moscow has great value not only as the center of the Soviet communications network, but also as the center of military industry. To this Hitler replied irritably: “Only completely ossified brains, brought up on the ideas of past centuries, think of nothing other than the capture of the capital.” He was more interested in Leningrad and Stalingrad, these hotbeds of Bolshevism. After their destruction, Bolshevism will be dead, and this main goal upcoming campaign. “Dominion over Europe,” Hitler continued, “will be achieved in the battle with Russia.”

Five days later, Hitler began preparing his people for a crusade. He gave a passionate speech in Berlin about the injustice in the distribution of natural resources. “Is this fair,” he asked, addressing the audience, “when 150 Germans live on one square kilometer? We must solve these problems, and we will solve them."

At the same time, Goebbels was preparing Germany for new challenges. Speaking to his employees, he said that the upcoming Christmas holidays should be limited to two days and should be celebrated modestly, in accordance with the requirements of the current moment and the fighting spirit of the German people.

On December 17, Hitler was presented with a plan for an attack on Russia developed by the General Staff. The Fuhrer made some changes to it, which provided for a delay in the attack on Moscow until the Baltic states were cleared and Leningrad was taken. The Fuhrer also gave the upcoming operation, which was previously called "Otto", a new name - "Barbarossa" ("Red Beard"). This was the name given to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, who in 1190 began crusade to the East. The main forces of the Red Army, concentrated on the western border, the Fuhrer indicated, “will be destroyed as a result of crushing blows from deeply penetrating tank wedges.” The troops that have retained their combat capability will be surrounded so that they will not be able to retreat into the interior of the country. “The final goal of the operation is to erect a barrier against the Asian part of Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. The last stronghold of the USSR in the Urals can then, if necessary, be eliminated by aviation.”

Halder believed that Hitler was bluffing and asked Engel how serious this plan was. The Fuhrer's adjutant replied that Hitler himself was apparently not yet confident in the accuracy of his forecasts. But the die was cast. Hitler did not tolerate those who called for moderation. Most of Europe was under German rule, they argued, and if they waited a little, England would recognize German hegemony. But for Adolf Hitler such a passive policy was unacceptable. The goal of National Socialism was the destruction of Bolshevism. Could he, the chosen one of fate, change his great mission?

The original plan "Barbarossa"

Outwardly, nothing marred the relationship between the two rival allies. Shortly after the approval of the Barbarossa plan, on January 10, 1941, Hitler approved two agreements with Moscow: one economic - on mutual supplies of goods, the other - a secret protocol, according to which Germany renounced its claims to a strip of Lithuanian territory for $ 7.5 million gold.

However, behind the facade of friendship, discord between the allies intensified. Raw materials from the Soviet Union arrived in Germany strictly on schedule, and German deliveries were constantly disrupted. There were cases when machines for Russia were already ready, but some inspector from the military department appeared, praised the product and then, “for reasons of defense,” took the machines away. This practice also extended to ships. Hitler himself ordered the suspension of work on the heavy cruiser intended for the Soviets: Germany needed to speed up the production of submarines. The Germans offered to tow the ship's hull to Leningrad and arm it with 380 mm Krupp guns, but the parties disagreed on the price, and the ship remained in Wilhelmshaven.

While Stalin sought peace, at least until the Red Army was brought to a combat-ready level, Hitler continued to prepare his people for war. Ominous was his speech on January 30 at the Sports Palace: “I am convinced that 1941 will be the beginning of a great new order in Europe.” But he named only England as the enemy, the leader of the “plutodemocracies”, which, Hitler claimed, were under the control of the international Jewish clique. Anti-British attacks served as cover for plans to attack the Soviet Union.

Four days later, after listening to Halder’s message that the number of German troops would soon equal the Russians, and they would surpass any enemy in terms of equipment, Hitler exclaimed: “When Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath!” The Fuhrer's appetites extended beyond the continent, and on February 17 he gave orders to prepare a plan for an invasion of the heartland. British Empire- India. Then the conquest of the Middle East was to follow by an enveloping maneuver: on the left - from Russia through Iran and on the right - from North Africa to the Suez Canal. Although these grandiose plans were primarily aimed at forcing England to yield to Germany, they indicated that Hitler had lost his sense of reality. In his imagination, Russia had already been conquered, and he was looking for new worlds to conquer, new enemies who had to be brought to their knees.

The defeat of Italian troops in Albania and Greece, according to Hitler, "dealt a blow to the belief in our invincibility among both friends and enemies." And therefore, before launching Operation Barbarossa, it was necessary to crush Greece and restore order in the Balkans. Hitler believed that the defeat of the Italians in the Balkans cleared the way for him to conquer new territories and acquire economic benefits.

Hitler's task became more difficult geographical conditions. Between Germany and Greece lay four countries - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The first two, which became German satellites, had had German troops for several months. The third, under strong pressure, joined the tripartite pact on March 1. Although this opened a direct route to Greece for German troops, Hitler was not left alone by the strategically important Yugoslavia. Its leaders did not want either a German or Russian military presence in the Balkans, and after hidden threats and vague promises did not help to achieve the accession of the recalcitrant Yugoslavs to the “axis,” Hitler invited the head of state, Prince Paul, to the Berghof.

Although the Yugoslav regent was tempted by Hitler's promise to guarantee territorial integrity country, he said that the decision to join the Axis presented a personal difficulty for him: his wife is a Greek woman who sympathizes with England, and he is very disliked by Mussolini. The prince left without giving an answer, but three days later - an infinitely long period for Hitler - he announced Yugoslavia's readiness to join the tripartite pact, provided that he received the right to refrain from providing military assistance to anyone and would not be obliged to allow German troops through through the territory of your country. With difficulty containing his irritation, Hitler announced that he accepted the conditions. This conciliatory gesture unexpectedly met with a decisive rebuff: the Yugoslavs declared their reluctance to take any actions that could involve them in war. But on March 17, the situation in Yugoslavia suddenly changed. The Royal Council agreed to join the tripartite pact. This caused a storm of protests, and after the resignation of three ministers, senior officers air force started a rebellion. On March 27, the rebels overthrew the government, and the young heir to the throne, Peter, was proclaimed king.

In Berlin that morning, Hitler was congratulating himself on the successful conclusion of the Yugoslav episode: he had just received a message that the local population “generally approved” of Yugoslavia joining the pact and that the government was “completely in control of the situation.” At five minutes to twelve, when the Fuhrer was preparing to receive Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, a new telegram arrived from Belgrade: former members of the Yugoslav government had been arrested. At first the Fuhrer thought it was a joke. But then he was overcome with indignation. The thought of having his victory taken away from him at the last moment was unbearable. He believed that he had been personally insulted. Hitler demanded to immediately call Ribbentrop, who at that time was talking with Matsuoka, burst into the meeting room where Keitel and Jodl were waiting for a reception, and, waving a telegram, shouted that he would destroy Yugoslavia once and for all. The Fuhrer vowed that he would order troops to immediately invade Yugoslavia. Keitel objected that such an operation was now hardly possible: the start date of Barbarossa was close, the transfer of troops to the east was taking place in accordance with the maximum capacity of the railways. In addition, List's army in Bulgaria is too weak, and it is difficult to hope for help from the Hungarians.

“That’s why I called Brauchitsch and Halder,” Hitler replied irritably. “They must find some solution.” Now I intend to cleanse the Balkans."

Soon Brauchitsch, Halder, Goering, Ribbetrop and their adjutants arrived. Hitler sharply declared that he would destroy Yugoslavia as a state. To Ribbentrop's remark that it might be better to first send an ultimatum to the Yugoslavs, Hitler responded in an icy tone: “Is that how you assess the situation? Yes, the Yugoslavs will swear that black is white. Of course they say they have no aggressive intentions, and when we enter Greece they will stab us in the back.” The attack, he exclaimed, would begin immediately. The blow to Yugoslavia must be dealt ruthlessly, in the style of a blitzkrieg. This will scare the Turks and Greeks. The Fuhrer instructed Goering to destroy Yugoslav aviation at airfields, and then bomb their capital in “wave raids.” The Hungarian and Bulgarian envoys were urgently summoned. Hitler promised the first that if Hungary helps him resolve the Yugoslav issue, it will receive the disputed territories claimed by its Romanian neighbors. The Fuhrer promised Macedonia to the second.

Having ordered the attack and gained two allies, Hitler finally found time to receive the Japanese minister. The Fuhrer expressed the hope that America could be kept from entering the war, and this would best be done by Japan's capture of Singapore. Such a chance, Hitler concluded, may not present itself in the future. Japan, he added, had no need to fear that the Red Army would invade Manchuria: it was opposed by the might of the German army.

After a meeting with the Japanese minister, Hitler signed a directive on a simultaneous attack on Yugoslavia and Greece and at midnight began to prepare a message to Mussolini. The Fuhrer informed him that he had taken all necessary measures to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Hitler advised the Duce not to hold a meeting in Albania in the coming days. further operations, warning him against new adventures.

By this time, the nature of the relationship between the two dictators had changed. After the unsuccessful actions in Greece and Africa, Mussolini was no longer the "senior partner". In the eyes of the Fuhrer, he was simply a loser. The defeat of the Italians in Greece not only inspired the British to launch a successful offensive in Libya and discouraged Franco from supporting the operation to capture Gibraltar, but also forced Germany to deal with unruly Yugoslavia at the most inopportune moment for this. Operation Barbarossa had to be postponed for at least a month.

Although Hitler attributed the delay to Barbarossa to the campaign in Yugoslavia, the decisive factor was apparently the lack of weapons for the Wehrmacht. The Fuhrer was constantly haunted by the obsessive thought that the Russians might attack first. But when the commanders involved in Barbarossa were invited to the Reich Chancellery on March 30, he seemed calm. America, the Fuhrer reasoned, would reach its peak military power not earlier than in four years. During this time, Europe must be cleansed. War with Russia is inevitable, and inaction would be catastrophic. The fighting is due to begin on June 22.

It was impossible to delay, Hitler continued, since none of his successors had sufficient authority to take responsibility for this operation. He alone can stop the Bolshevik skating rink before it spreads across Europe. Hitler called for the destruction of the Bolshevik state and the Red Army, assuring listeners that victory would be quick and effective. The only problem, he added ominously, was the way prisoners of war and civilians were treated.

The military listened to the Fuhrer in suspense. They were offended by Hitler's brutal methods after the conquest of Poland against Polish Jews, intelligentsia, clergy and aristocracy. And the Fuhrer continued: “The war against Russia is a struggle of ideologies and racial differences, and it will have to be waged with unprecedented, ruthless and unyielding cruelty.” There were no protests.

Meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece were completed. Patriotic demonstrations took place daily in Belgrade, some of them inspired by pro-Soviet local communists. Russia did seek to support the Yugoslavs in the face of the threat of a German invasion and signed a treaty with the new government on April 5. However, this did not bother Hitler. The next morning, a significant force of German troops crossed the Yugoslav border. During the operation, which the Fuhrer gave the meaningful name “Punishment,” the bombers began to methodically destroy Belgrade. The Soviet leaders, having just signed a treaty with Yugoslavia, reacted with surprising indifference, placing the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on the back page of Pravda. Only passing mention was made of the devastating air raids on Belgrade, which continued around the clock.

Hitler warned Goebbels that the entire campaign would last a maximum of two months, and this information was published. However, a week later, German and Hungarian troops entered the destroyed Belgrade. 17 thousand civilians died. On April 17, the remnants of the Yugoslav army capitulated. Ten days later, when German tanks entered Athens, the campaign in Greece was effectively over. 29 German divisions were transferred to combat zones with enormous expenditures of energy, fuel and time. Of these divisions, only ten took part in hostilities for six days.

The costs of the operation in the Balkans were mitigated by unexpected developments in North Africa. With only three divisions, General Erwin Rommel marched across the desert almost to the Egyptian border. This victory was no less a surprise for Hitler than for the enemy. England was losing control of the eastern Mediterranean. This damaged British prestige and convinced Stalin of the need to maintain previous relations with the Germans, despite their constant provocations. The Soviet leader stubbornly ignored the growing rumors about Hitler's plans to attack his country. Warnings came from numerous sources, including the US State Department. Foreign diplomats in Moscow spoke openly about the upcoming battle.

In recent months, Soviet intelligence also repeatedly warned its leadership about an impending attack on the USSR. But Stalin did not trust anyone. Convinced that Hitler was not so stupid as to attack Russia before neutralizing England, he believed that these were rumors fabricated by the capitalist West, which was seeking to provoke a war between him and Hitler. On one such warning from a Czech agent, he wrote in red pencil: “This is an English provocation. Find where the message came from and punish the culprit.”

Stalin sought to pacify Japan. As an honored guest, he received Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who had just visited Berlin, and did not hide his joy when the neutrality treaty was signed. At a banquet in the Kremlin on the day Belgrade fell, Stalin brought plates of treats to the Japanese guests, hugged and kissed them, and even danced. The treaty was a victory for USSR diplomacy, convincing proof that rumors of a German attack on Russia should be ignored. Of course, I reasoned Soviet leader, Hitler would never have allowed Japan to conclude this treaty if he was going to attack Russia...

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka signs a Neutrality Pact with the USSR. Behind are Molotov and Stalin

The tipsy Stalin was in such high spirits that he even went to the station to see off the Japanese delegation. He kissed General Nagai, then squeezed little Matsuoka in a bear hug, kissed him and said: “Now that there is a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Europe has nothing to fear.”

When the train with the Japanese started moving, he grabbed the German ambassador von Schulenburg with his hand and said: “We must remain friends, and you must do everything for this.”

Meanwhile, German planes committed numerous border violations while flying over the western regions of the USSR. In the last two weeks alone, the number of such violations reached 50. Soon, on Soviet territory, almost 150 kilometers from the border, a German plane made an emergency landing, on board which was a camera, undeveloped rolls of film and a map of this region of the USSR. Moscow sent a formal protest to Berlin, complaining that there had been 80 other violations of Soviet airspace since the end of March. But the protest was drawn up in a rather mild form, and Stalin continued to stubbornly ignore a new stream of warnings, including from English Ambassador Cripps, who predicted that Hitler would attack the USSR on June 22.

Although everyone in the German Foreign Office suspected that the day of attack on Russia was near, it was not until mid-April that Hitler initiated Ribbentrop into Plan Barbarossa. The dejected minister wanted to make another diplomatic move in Moscow, but Hitler forbade him to do so. And the Fuhrer assured Schulenburg: “I am not planning a war with Russia.”

There is no doubt that Germany was facing the strongest military force in the world without reliable allies. Japan was on the other side of the continent. Italy was more of a burden than a helper, Spain avoided any specific obligations, and the Vichy government of France behaved the same way. Hitler's conquests frightened all his friends, including small countries such as Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. His only strength lay in the Wehrmacht, and relying only on force destroyed more than one conqueror.

Hitler's only chance to win the war in the East could be an alliance with millions of potential opponents of the Stalinist regime. This is exactly what Rosenberg called for, but the Fuhrer ignored his arguments. This had fatal consequences for the Nazi dictator.

Hess's flight to England

Although at first the Wehrmacht leaders rejected the very idea of ​​​​an attack on Russia, they now almost unanimously shared the Fuhrer's confidence in a quick victory. The general consensus was that the campaign would be successfully completed within three months, and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch predicted that major battles will end in four weeks and the war will turn into local battles with “little resistance.” The hard-nosed Yodel interrupted Warlimont, who questioned his categorical statement that “the Russian colossus will turn out to be a pig’s bladder: pierce it and it will squirt.”

According to General Guderian, the Fuhrer managed to infect his immediate military circle with unfounded optimism. The command was confident that the campaign would end before the onset of winter. Only every fifth soldier had warm uniforms. There were, of course, many skeptics in high circles. From the very beginning, Ribbentrop and Admiral Raeder spoke out against the Barbarossa plan. Keitel also had serious doubts, but he kept them to himself. There was opposition in " family circle» Hitler.

Rudolf Hess, the Fuhrer's second successor after Goering, fully approved of the theory of expanding the "living space", but he was against an attack on Russia while the war with England continued. He believed that only the Bolsheviks would benefit from this conflict. Having met with geopolitician Professor Karl Haushofer, Hess was inspired by the idea of ​​a secret meeting with some influential Englishman in a neutral city. This, according to Haushofer, could contribute to the conclusion of peace with England.

Excited by the prospect of a secret mission, Hess outlined the plan to Hitler in the hope that it would restore his shaky position in the Nazi hierarchy. Hitler reluctantly agreed to Hess's proposal to talk on this topic with Professor Haushofer's eldest son Albrecht, who worked in the Foreign Ministry.

Young Haushofer, who had been a member of the secret anti-Hitler group for a number of years, told Hess that perhaps it would be best to arrange a meeting with his good friend English friend Duke of Hamilton, who has close ties to Churchill and the King. Hess left inspired, but Albrecht wrote to his father that “this business is a stupid idea.”

At the same time, as a German patriot, he decided to do everything he could and wrote a letter to Hamilton with a proposal to organize a meeting with Hess in Lisbon. He signed “A” and sent the letter to a certain Mrs. Roberta in Lisbon, who forwarded it to England, but the letter was intercepted by the English censor and handed over to intelligence. Time passed, no answer was received, and Hess decided to act independently, without the knowledge of the Haushofers and Hitler. He decided that he would fly to the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, jump out by parachute and negotiate under an assumed name. He was an experienced pilot who flew on the fronts of the First World War, the winner of the dangerous 1934 competition to fly around Germany's highest peak, Zugspitze. A solo flight through enemy territory into a remote corner of Scotland, he thought, would certainly impress young Hamilton, the same adventurous sports aviator who was the first to climb the world's highest peak, Everest. “I was faced with a very difficult decision,” Hess later admitted during interrogation. “I don’t think I would have dared to do this if I hadn’t seen the picture of an endless row of children’s coffins and crying mothers.” Hess was convinced that only in such an original way could he realize the Fuhrer's dream of a coalition between Germany and England. If this fails, he will not drag Hitler into the dubious business, and if he succeeds, then all the credit will be attributed to the Fuhrer. He was aware that the chances of success were low, but the game was worth the candle.

Karl Haushofer (left) and Rudolf Hess

Hess was sure that Hitler would approve of such a unique attempt to resolve the conflict, but would never allow him to take such risks. Therefore, it was very important to maintain secrecy. So thought the naive, not very smart Nazi, who, according to Adjutant Wiedemann, was Hitler’s “most devoted follower.”

Hess carefully prepared for the implementation of his plan. He persuaded aircraft designer Willy Messerschmitt to give him one. time two-seat fighter "Me-110". But this plane had a short range. According to Hess’s wishes, one additional gas tank with a volume of 100 liters was installed on each wing. Then he asked the designer to install a special radio station. After making twenty test flights, Hess decided that he had mastered the converted aircraft. In violation of wartime regulations, he purchased a new leather jacket and persuaded the Fuhrer Baur's personal pilot to give him a secret map of restricted air zones.

It is quite possible, he later wrote to his wife from prison, “I am not entirely normal. The flight and its purpose gripped me like an obsession. Everything else faded into the background."

Early in the morning of May 10, after listening to the weather forecast, which turned out to be favorable, Hess began to prepare for the flight. Never before had he been so affectionate with his wife. After breakfast he kissed her hand and stood at the door of the nursery with a thoughtful expression on his face. The wife asked when to expect him, assuming that her husband was flying to meet someone like Petain. “Monday at the latest,” was the answer.

The wife expressed doubt: “I don’t believe it. You won’t be back so soon.” Hess thought that she obviously guessed everything, looked at his sleeping son for the last time and left.

At 18.00, having handed over a letter to the adjutant for the Fuhrer, he took off from the airfield in Augsburg and headed for the North Sea. England was covered in haze. Disguising himself, Hess went down sharply, not knowing that a Spitfire was hanging on his tail. But the advantage in speed helped - the English fighter fell behind. Hess flew very low above the ground at speeds of up to 700 kilometers per hour, almost hitting trees and houses. A mountain appeared ahead. This was his reference point. At about 11:00 p.m. the pilot turned east and saw the railroad tracks and a small lake, which, as he remembered, was supposed to be just south of the Duke's estate. Having risen to a height of 1800 meters, Hess turned off the engine and opened the cabin. He suddenly remembered that he had never jumped with a parachute, believing that it was easy. When the fighter began to lose altitude, Hess remembered the words of one friend that it is best to jump when the plane is upside down. He turned the car over. The pilot was pinned to the seat and began to lose consciousness. With his last effort he pushed himself out of the cabin, pulled the parachute ring and, to his surprise, slowly began to fall down.

Upon impact with the ground, Hess lost consciousness. He was discovered by a farmer and taken to the militia, who took the captured pilot to Glasgow. Calling himself First Lieutenant Alfred Horne, he asked to see the Duke of Hamilton.

His letter was delivered to Hitler at the Berghof on the morning of Sunday 11 May. During Engel's report, Martin Bormann's brother Albert came in and said that Hess's adjutant wanted to see the Fuhrer on a very urgent matter. “Don’t you see that I’m busy? I’m listening to a military report!” Hitler flared up. But a minute later Albert appeared again, saying that the matter was very serious, and gave Hitler a letter from Hess. He put on his glasses and began to read indifferently, but the very first line stunned him: “My Fuhrer, when you receive this letter, I will be in England.” Hitler fell into his chair shouting: “Oh God, oh God! He flew to England! Hess's goal, Hitler read, was to help the Fuhrer achieve an alliance with England, but he kept the flight secret because he knew that the Fuhrer would not agree to it. “And if, my Fuhrer, this project, which I admit has little chance of success, ends in failure and fate turns away from me, it will not have disastrous consequences for you or Germany; You can always disclaim any liability. Just tell me I'm crazy."

The Fuhrer, white as chalk, ordered him to be connected with the Reichsmarshal. “Goering, come here immediately!” he shouted into the phone. Then he ordered Albert to find and call his brother and Ribbentrop. He immediately ordered the arrest of the unfortunate adjutant Hess and began excitedly pacing around the room. When Martin Bormann ran in out of breath, Hitler demanded to know whether Hess could fly to England on the Me-110. The answer to this question was given by the famous First World War ace, Luftwaffe General Udet. “Never!” he exclaimed. “I hope he fell into the sea,” muttered the Fuhrer.

Hitler's anger intensified. How to present this story to the world? What if the Japanese and Italians suspect that Germany is plotting a separate peace? Will this message affect the morale of the soldiers? Worst of all, did Hess give away the Barbarossa plan? After consideration different versions a press release was finally compiled saying that Hess had taken off without permission and disappeared. It is believed that he crashed. It was also stated that the letter he left “unfortunately shows signs of mental disorder and raises concerns that Hess was the victim of hallucinations.”

Frau Hess was watching a movie when she was called out of the audience. Upon learning that a message was broadcast on the radio about the death of her husband, she angrily replied: “Nonsense!” - and called the Berghof, hoping to talk to the Fuhrer. Borman answered her and said that he had absolutely no information on this issue. Knowing her husband's assistant well, she did not believe him. Then she called her husband’s brother Alfred Hess in Berlin - he also did not believe that Rudolf was dead.

There were no reports from England, although Hess, who confessed his true identity, told the Duke of Hamilton about his peacekeeping mission and how he and Albrecht Haushofer tried to arrange a meeting in Lisbon. Hamilton hurried to Churchill, but he said: “Well, Hess or not Hess, I’m going to watch a film with the Marx brothers.” (The Marx Brothers were popular comic actors in American cinema at the time).

A few hours after the German report of Hess's disappearance, the British finally reported his arrival in England. No details were provided. But this news forced the Germans to clarify the official version of the incredible act of Hitler’s closest associate.

On May 13, a communiqué was published acknowledging the fact of Hess’s flight to England. It continued: “As was well known in party circles, Hess had been suffering from serious physical illness for a number of years. Lately he has been seeking relief through various methods practiced by psychics, astrologers, etc. Measures are being taken to establish the extent to which these individuals are responsible for creating the conditions for the mental disorder that prompted him to take such a rash step.”

This version caused general bewilderment. Goebbels told his staff: “Currently our business is to keep our mouths shut, not to explain anything to anyone, not to enter into polemics with anyone. This matter will become clear during the day, and I will give appropriate instructions.” He tried to reassure his subordinates that Hess's flight would be considered a minor episode in the future.

At an emergency meeting of the Gauleiter and Reichsleiter, Hitler said that Hess’s flight was pure madness: “Hess is first of all a deserter, and if I get him, he will pay for it like an ordinary traitor. It seems to me that the astrologers whom Hess gathered around him pushed him to this step. So it’s time to put an end to these stargazers.” Listeners knew of Hess's interest in homeopathic medicine and astrology and were prepared to believe in his mental disorder. However, they wondered: why did Hitler keep him in such a high position for so long?

At the meeting, the Fuhrer did not say a word about the upcoming attack on Russia and his fear that Hess had revealed this secret to the British. He needn't have worried. During interrogation, Hess argued that there was “no basis for rumors that Hitler was going to attack Russia.” He wanted to talk about peace with England. He arrived without Hitler's consent to "convince the responsible people: the most reasonable course would be to conclude peace."

As soon as Albrecht Haushofer learned about Hess's flight to England, he hurried to his father. “And with such fools we make politics!” he exclaimed. The father sadly agreed that "this terrible sacrifice was made in vain." Young Haushofer was summoned to the Berghof, taken into custody and ordered to write a message for the Fuhrer, who refused to accept it. He wrote everything he knew, but did not mention his friends in the anti-Hitler group. Albrecht Haushofer spoke about his connections with the Duke of Hamilton, about the letter he wrote at the request of Hess, adding that he himself would be very useful for further contacts with the British. After reading the paper, Hitler decided not to rush. He ordered Haushofer to be handed over to the Gestapo for further interrogation. The Fuhrer spared the father of the criminal, angrily saying about him: “Hess is on the conscience of this professor associated with Jews.”

Other people from Hess' entourage were also arrested - his brother Alfred, adjutants, orderlies, secretaries and drivers. Ilsa Hess remained free, but Martin Bormann tried his best to humiliate her. Having become Hess' successor, he did everything to erase his memory: all photographs of Hess and literature with his photographs were destroyed. He even tried to confiscate Hess's house, but Hitler did not sign this order.

The British government decided not to publish the materials of Hess's interrogation in order to confuse the Germans. On the night of May 16, he was secretly transported to the Tower of London, where he remained a prisoner of war until the end of the war.

Hess's flight greatly alarmed Stalin, who, in light of rumors of an impending attack on the USSR by unreliable allies, suspected that the British had entered into a conspiracy with Hitler.

No matter how upset and angry Hitler was, he once admitted in a small circle that he respected Hess for such self-sacrifice. Hitler did not believe that Hess was crazy, he believed that he was simply not smart enough and did not realize the catastrophic consequences of his mistake.

From the Tower, Hess wrote to his wife that he did not regret his action: “It’s true, I achieved nothing. I couldn't stop this crazy war. I couldn't save people, but I'm happy I tried."

On May 12, Hitler issued two repressive orders. One declared that Russian civilians who used weapons against the Wehrmacht in the coming war should be shot without trial. Another authorized Himmler to carry out “special tasks arising from the struggle between two opposing political systems" The SS chief was to act independently of the Wehrmacht “on his own responsibility.” No one had the right to interfere with his activities in the occupied Russian territory, which must be “cleansed” of Jews and troublemakers by special SS units “Einsatzgruppen” (“special forces”).

Both directives worried Alfred Rosenberg, who had recently been appointed "Reich Commissioner for the Control of Eastern European Territories." Coming from the Baltic states, he believed that Soviet people should be treated with loyalty. He assured Hitler that the population would greet the Germans as liberators from Bolshevik-Stalinist tyranny, and in the occupied territories former USSR It will be possible to allow self-government within certain limits. Moreover, each region requires a selective approach. For example, Ukraine could be “an independent state in alliance with Germany,” but the Caucasus should be governed by a German “plenipotentiary.”

Convinced that hard-line policies in the East would interfere with the development of Lebensraum, Rosenberg submitted a memorandum to Hitler objecting to both directives. How can a civil administration be created in the occupied territories, he argued, without the use of Soviet commissars and officials currently managing them? Rosenberg recommended that only high-ranking figures be “liquidated.” Hitler did not give a definite answer. He was used to the fact that Rosenberg competed with Himmler in the struggle for influence over the Fuhrer.

Meanwhile, final preparations for the implementation of the Barbarossa plan continued. On May 22, Raeder informed Hitler that he was stopping supplies of strategic materials to Russia, although supplies from the East were coming regularly. In addition to 1,500,000 tons of grain, the Soviet Union supplied Germany with 100,000 tons of cotton, 2,000,000 tons of petroleum products, 1,500,000 tons of wood, 140,000 tons of manganese and 25,000 tons of chromium. Despite the suspicions caused by Hess's flight, Stalin tried so hard to appease Hitler that he ordered the green light for trains delivering important raw materials to Germany.

A meeting between von Schulenburg and Molotov that same day convinced the German ambassador that the recent concentration of power in the hands of Stalin had strengthened his control over foreign policy Soviet Union. Hoping to prevent the implementation of Barbarossa, Schulenburg reported to Berlin that in recent weeks the USSR's attitude towards Germany had noticeably improved. And on May 30, three days after the capture of the strategically important island of Crete by German paratroopers, Admiral Raeder tried to divert Hitler's attention from the East, advising him to organize a major offensive on Egypt with the aim of capturing the Suez Canal. Now, he argued, was the right moment to strike. After receiving reinforcements, General Rommel can win a decisive victory. But nothing could stop Hitler: the Barbarossa plan was put into action. Meeting with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on June 2, Hitler talked about everything - about the submarine war against England, about Hesse and the situation in the Balkans. But he didn’t say a word about Barbarossa. And not only for reasons of secrecy: the Duce warned him in no uncertain terms against attacking Russia.

Roads and railways operated at full capacity. On June 6, Hitler summoned the Japanese Ambassador Oshima to the Berghof and informed him that, due to Soviet border violations, a significant number of troops were being transferred to the East. “Under such circumstances, war between us may be inevitable,” he said confidently. For Oshima, this meant a declaration of war, and he immediately warned Tokyo that an attack on Russia would soon occur.

June 14 Soviet agent Sorge sent a warning from Tokyo: “The war will begin on June 22.” But Stalin continued to stubbornly ignore the alarming messages. He convinced himself that the war could not begin before 1942, and on the same day he ordered the publication of a TASS message refuting numerous rumors about the war. This authoritative message calmed the army.

On June 17, the “Z” hour was approved - 3 a.m. on June 22. On this day, a German non-commissioned officer, who was threatened with execution for a fight with an officer, ran over to the Russians. He announced that the German offensive would begin at dawn on June 22. This alarmed the military, but they were reassured: “There is no need to panic.”

In London, Ambassador Cripps, who arrived from Moscow for consultations, issued another warning about the impending attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. “We have reliable information that it will take place tomorrow, June 22, or at the latest June 29,” he told Soviet Ambassador Maisky. He sent an urgent encrypted message to Moscow.

Finally, Stalin authorized putting the troops on combat readiness. He also instructed his ambassador in Berlin to deliver a note to Ribbentrop strongly protesting the 180 violations of Soviet airspace by German aircraft, which had "assumed a systematic and deliberate character."

In the Reich Chancellery, Hitler was preparing a letter to Mussolini, trying to explain the reason for the attack on Russia. The Soviets had concentrated enormous numbers of troops along the Reich's borders, he argued, and time was on the enemy's side. “So after much agonizing thought, I finally made the decision to break the loop before it tightened.”

In Moscow, Molotov urgently summoned the German ambassador Schulenburg to give weight to the note of protest, which his ambassador in Berlin had not yet been able to deliver to Ribbentrop. “There are a number of signs,” he told Schulenburg, “that the German government is dissatisfied with our actions. There are even rumors that Germany and the Soviet Union are close to war.”

All Schulenburg could do was promise to convey the Soviet government's statement to Berlin. He returned to the embassy, ​​not knowing, like Molotov, that war would begin in a few hours.

The commanders read out Hitler's address to the troops. “Burdened with many months of anxiety, forced to remain silent, I can finally speak openly to you, my soldiers.” The Fuhrer claimed that the Russians were preparing to attack Germany and were guilty of numerous violations of its border. “German soldiers!” Hitler addressed them. “You have to fight a battle, a difficult and important battle. The fate of Europe and the future of the German Reich, the existence of our country are now only in your hands.” Along the entire winding front line, 1,500 kilometers long, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, three million people listened to the Fuhrer and believed him.

It was the shortest night of the year, it's time summer solstice. But for those who waited for the pale dawn to rush into the offensive, it seemed endless. At midnight, the Moscow-Berlin express rumbled across the border bridge into German territory. He was followed by a long freight train loaded with grain - this was Stalin's last delivery to his ally Adolf Hitler.

There was an atmosphere of anticipation in Berlin that evening. Foreign journalists gathered in the foreign press lounge hoping to get information from a group of Foreign Office officials, but as no official word had been received by midnight, everyone began to go home. And in the Reich Chancellery there was such unusual activity that even Hitler’s press secretary Dietrich, who knew nothing about the Barbarossa plan, was sure that “some kind of grandiose action against Russia was being prepared.” Hitler had no doubt about success. “In three months at the latest,” he told the adjutant, “Russia will suffer such a collapse as the world has never seen before.” Nevertheless, that night he could not close his eyes.

At 3 a.m. on June 22, exactly one year after the French surrender at Compiègne, the German infantry moved forward. Fifteen minutes later, fires broke out along the entire front line. From the flashes of the guns, the pale night sky became as bright as day: Operation Barbarossa had begun.

Fifteen minutes before Z hour, the German ambassador to Italy, von Bismarck, handed Ciano a lengthy letter from Hitler. Ciano immediately called Mussolini. The Duce was angry both at being disturbed at such a late hour and at being informed so late. “I don’t even bother the servants at night,” he grumpily told his son-in-law, “but the Germans make me jump up at any time.”

In Moscow, Schulenburg went to the Kremlin to report that in response to the Soviet Union's intention to "stab Germany in the back," the Führer had ordered the Wehrmacht to "confront this threat with all means." Molotov listened silently to the German ambassador and said with bitterness in his voice: “This is war. Your planes just bombed about ten of our cities. Do you really think we deserve this?

In Berlin, Ribbentrop ordered the Soviet ambassador to be summoned at 4.00. Never before had translator Schmidt seen the Foreign Minister so excited. Walking around the room like a caged animal, Ribbentrop repeated: “The Fuhrer is absolutely right to attack Russia now.” He seemed to be convincing himself: “The Russians themselves would have attacked us if we had not gotten ahead of them.”

At exactly 4.00, the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov entered. Just as he began to outline Soviet grievances, Ribbentrop interrupted him, declaring that the hostile position of the USSR had forced the Reich to take military countermeasures. “I regret that I cannot say anything more,” Ribbentrop said. “Despite serious efforts, I have not been able to establish reasonable relations between our countries.”

Having mastered himself, Dekanozov expressed regret about what happened, placing responsibility for the consequences on the German side. He stood up, nodded casually and left without extending his hand to Ribbentrop.

Operation Barbarossa (Barbarossa plan 1941) - a plan for a military attack and rapid seizure of USSR territory by Hitler’s troops during.

The plan and essence of Operation Barbarossa was to quickly and unexpectedly attack Soviet troops on their own territory and, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, defeat the Red Army. Then, within two months, the German army was to advance deep into the country and conquer Moscow. Control over the USSR gave Germany the opportunity to fight with the United States for the right to dictate its terms in world politics.

Hitler, who had already managed to conquer almost all of Europe, was confident of his victory over the USSR. However, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be a failure; the protracted operation turned into a long war.

The Barbarossa plan received its name in honor of the medieval king of Germany, Frederick 1st, who bore the nickname Barbarossa and was famous for his military achievements.

Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans

Although Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack Russia, as this was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the Third Reich. Hitler instructed the German command to collect information about the composition of the Soviet army and, on this basis, draw up an attack plan. This is how Plan Barbarossa came into being.

After an inspection, German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German: it was less organized, less prepared, and the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. Focusing precisely on these principles, Hitler created a plan for a rapid attack that was supposed to ensure Germany's victory in record time.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR on the borders of the country and, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the army and then destroy it. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise.

The plan was to be carried out at the beginning of 1941. First, German troops were to attack the Russian army in Belarus, where the bulk of it was gathered. Having defeated Soviet soldiers in Belarus, Hitler planned to advance towards Ukraine, conquer Kyiv and the sea routes, cutting off Russia from the Dnieper. At the same time, a blow was to be delivered to Murmansk from Norway. Hitler planned to launch an attack on Moscow, surrounding the capital from all sides.

Despite careful preparation in an atmosphere of secrecy, from the first weeks it became clear that the Barbarossa plan was a failure.

Implementation of the Barbarossa plan and results

From the very first days, the operation began to not be as successful as planned. First of all, this happened due to the fact that Hitler and the German command underestimated the Soviet troops. According to historians, the Russian army was not only equal in strength to the German one, but in many ways superior to it.

The Soviet troops turned out to be well prepared, in addition, military operations took place on Russian territory, so the soldiers could use the natural conditions, which they knew better than the Germans, to their advantage. The Soviet army was also able to hold its own and not fall apart into separate units thanks to good command and the ability to mobilize and make lightning-fast decisions.

At the beginning of the attack, Hitler planned to quickly advance deep into the Soviet army and begin to split it into pieces, separating units from each other in order to avoid mass operations from the Russians. He managed to advance, but failed to break the front: Russian detachments quickly gathered together and brought up new forces. This led to the fact that Hitler’s army, although winning, moved deeper into the country catastrophically slowly, not by kilometers, as planned, but by meters.

Only a few months later, Hitler managed to approach Moscow, but the German army did not dare to launch an attack - the soldiers were exhausted from prolonged military operations, and the city was never bombed, although something else was planned. Hitler also failed to bomb Leningrad, which was besieged and blockaded, but did not surrender and was not destroyed from the air.

It began, which lasted from 1941 to 1945 and ended with the defeat of Hitler.

Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa

Hitler's plan failed for several reasons:

• the Russian army turned out to be stronger and more prepared than the German command expected: the Russians compensated for the lack of modern military equipment with the ability to fight in difficult natural conditions, as well as competent command;
• the Soviet army had excellent counterintelligence: thanks to intelligence officers, the command almost always knew about the enemy’s next move, which made it possible to quickly and adequately respond to the actions of the attackers;
• inaccessibility of territories: the Germans did not know the territory of the USSR well, since it was extremely difficult to get maps. In addition, they did not know how to fight in impenetrable forests;
• loss of control over the course of the war: the Barbarossa plan quickly showed its inconsistency, and after a few months Hitler completely lost control over the course of hostilities.

	USSR: Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR; regions: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol, Leningrad, Belgorod.
	Aggression of Nazi Germany
	Tactical - defeat of Soviet troops in border battles and retreat into the interior of the country with relatively small losses of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies. The strategic result is the failure of the blitzkrieg of the Third Reich.
Opponents
Commanders
Joseph Stalin	Adolf Hitler
Semyon Timoshenko	Walter von Brauchitsch
Georgy Zhukov	Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb
Fedor Kuznetsov	Fedor von Bock
Dmitry Pavlov	Gerd von Rundstedt
Mikhail Kirponos †	Ion Antonescu
Ivan Tyulenev	Carl Gustav Mannerheim
	Giovanni Messe
	Italo Gariboldi
	Miklos Horthy
	Josef Tiso
Strengths of the parties
2.74 million people + 619 thousand Reserve of the Civil Code (VSE) 13,981 tanks 9397 aircraft (7758 serviceable) 52,666 guns and mortars	4.05 million people + 0.85 million German allies 4215 tanks + 402 allied tanks 3909 aircraft + 964 allied aircraft 43,812 guns and mortars + 6673 Allied guns and mortars
Military losses
2,630,067 killed and captured 1,145,000 wounded and sick	About 431,000 dead and dead 1,699,000 missing

(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for Germany's invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and the military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by directive of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht No. 21. The lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army was envisaged west of the rivers The Dnieper and Western Dvina, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with subsequent access to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

The expected duration of the main hostilities, designed for 2-3 months, is the so-called “Blitzkrieg” strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).

Prerequisites

After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments sharply increased in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry into the war of Great Britain and France, the German government decided to protect itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed the former possessions of the Russian Empire from Poland: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French Campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States.

However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to make peace or defeat it. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany made attempts to attract Spain and Vichy France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.

Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions it set out were unacceptable to Germany, since they required it to renounce intervention in Finland and closed its possibility of advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans.

However, despite these events of the autumn, based on the demands Hitler put forward in early June 1940, the OKH drew up rough outlines of a campaign plan against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan began, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa.” The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler soon after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.

England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […] If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941. The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia. […] Beginning [of the military campaign] - May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start this year, but this is not suitable, since the operation must be carried out in one blow. The goal is to destroy the life force of Russia. The operation breaks down into: 1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd hit: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a two-pronged attack - from the north and south; later - a private operation to capture the Baku region.

The Axis powers are informed of Barbarossa's plan.

Plans of the parties

Germany

The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is “ defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the war against England was over" The concept was based on the idea “ split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep strikes from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groups of enemy troops" The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing them from withdrawing inland.

In development of the Barbarossa plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops on January 31, 1941.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikie Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare new base supplies. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means both politically and economic relations a decisive success, not to mention the fact that the Russians would lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces into defense of the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.

The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a disinformation directive, calculation of time for preparing an operation, special instructions, etc.

In Directive No. 21 signed by Hitler, as the most early date The date for the attack on the USSR was May 15, 1941. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, the next date for the attack on the USSR was named June 22, 1941. The final order was given on June 17.

USSR

Soviet intelligence managed to obtain information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word “Barbarossa”. And the information received about the possible outbreak of war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were absolutely disinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated the approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941 and emphasized that the USSR must be defeated " more before that how the war against England will end».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic staff game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.

The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Bialystok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th Army occupied the most unfavorable location. This operational configuration of troops created the threat of deep envelopment and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by attacking the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suwalki and Brest directions was not deep and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough and envelopment of the Bialystok group. This erroneous deployment of troops, committed in 1940, was not corrected until the war itself...»

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, the meaning and purpose of which continue to be discussed. At the end of May and beginning of June 1941, a partial mobilization of troops was carried out under the guise of reserve training, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people who were used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began moving from the internal military districts to the border of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a hidden regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of entering the camps, more than half of the divisions constituting the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line commands to field command posts. From mid-June, vacations for personnel were cancelled.

At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the forefield. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive to switch to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters only after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were given to the commanders of the western districts from June 14 to 18.

In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were incorporated into the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population belonged to Soviet power quite hostile, and after the German invasion many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.

Balance of power

Germany and allies

Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.

• Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Klaipeda to Gołdap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Tank Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st air fleet, which had 1070 combat aircraft. The task of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.

• Army Group Center (Field Marshal Feodor von Bock) occupied the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa. It included the 4th Army, 9th Army, 2nd Tank Group and 3rd Tank Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with dissecting the strategic front of the Soviet defense, encircling and destroying the Red Army troops in Belarus and developing an offensive in the Moscow direction.

• Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It included the 6th Army, 11th Army, 17th Army, 3rd Romanian Army, 4th Romanian Army, 1st Tank Group and the Hungarian Mobile Corps - a total of 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 800 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which had 500 aircraft. Army Group South had the task of destroying Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.

USSR

In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.

• The North-Western Front (commander F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic states. It included the 8th Army, the 11th Army and the 27th Army - a total of 34 divisions (of which 6 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Northwestern Front.
• The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It included the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and 13th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 20 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Western Front Air Force.
• The Southwestern Front (commander M.P. Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It included the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th Army and 26th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front.
• The Southern Front (commander I.V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and Southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
• The Baltic Fleet (commander V.F. Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 ​​torpedo boats and other ships, 656 aircraft.
• The Black Sea Fleet (commander F.S. Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It consisted of 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, and over 600 aircraft.

Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came to third place after the United States and Germany in terms of the level of development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.

First phase. Invasion. Border battles (22 June - 10 July 1941)

Beginning of the invasion

In the early morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy (Italian troops began fighting on July 20, 1941) and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia declared war on June 23, and Hungary declared war on June 27. The German invasion took the Soviet troops by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of the ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; The Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1,200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libau, Vindava, Sevastopol. On the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas they deployed submarines, were placed minefields. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts, demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched against the enemy groups that had broken through in the morning of June 23. As a result of failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even further. Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for events to develop, but giving German aviation the opportunity to refuel.

The Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory on June 25. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and threatening Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The fighting soon turned into trench warfare and had no impact on general position affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography they are usually separated into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.

Northern direction

At first, not one, but two tank groups operated against the Soviet North-Western Front:

• Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main striking force, the 4th Tank Group, was advancing on Daugavpils.
• The 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center was advancing in the Vilnius direction.

An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the city of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the Western Dvina line.

But already on June 26, the German 4th Tank Group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (56th motorized corps of E. von Manstein), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (41st motorized corps of G. Reinhard). Following the motorized corps, infantry divisions advanced. On June 27, Red Army units left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned to the southeast and went behind the rear of the Soviet Western Front.

Central direction

A difficult situation developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno area and 4th Army in the Brest area) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23–25 ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, which contained the main forces of the Western Front.

On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; Later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the Western Front headquarters, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were led first by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.

At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the Soviet defense line on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly encountered troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the heated tank battle On July 6-9, between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1,600 tanks took part on the Soviet side, and up to 700 units on the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units retreated to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up their starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of ​​Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.

South direction

The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful group of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. On June 23-25, Black Sea Fleet aircraft bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, Constanta was attacked by ships of the Black Sea Fleet together with aviation. In an effort to stop the advance of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with six mechanized corps (about 2,500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area, Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lviv group (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front retreated to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. At the beginning of July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to counterattacks by Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.

At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, on July 2, German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10 they reached the Dniester.

Results of border battles

As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.

Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:

« In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and Dnieper has been completed... Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The enormous extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many more weeks. ...When we cross the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will not be so much about defeat armed forces the enemy, so much about taking away his industrial areas from the enemy and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of his industry and inexhaustible human resources, to create new armed forces. As soon as the war in the east moves from the phase of defeating the enemy’s armed forces to the phase of economic suppression of the enemy, further tasks of the war against England will again come to the fore...»

Second phase. The offensive of German troops along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)

Northern direction

On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advancing in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Ostrov, and on July 9, Pskov.

On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Tank Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th Motorized Corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, the German command on July 19 suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies arrived. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the border of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.

On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was split into two parts: the 11th Rifle Corps went to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.

On August 8, Army Group North resumed its offensive against Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeysk, and on August 10 - in the Luga area and in the Novgorod-Chudov direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19 the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.

On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, and on August 20, Chudovo. On August 23, fighting began for Oranienbaum; The Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).

Offensive on Leningrad

To strengthen Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th Motorized Corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.

At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Lyuban, on August 30 it reached the Neva and cut off the railway connection with the city, on September 8 it took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.

However, having decided to conduct Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release no later than September 15, 1941 of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps, which were called upon to participate in the final offensive on Moscow.

On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, to break the resistance of Soviet troops in specified deadlines the Germans failed. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further military operations in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)

On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northern direction. The railways carrying the Lake Ladoga food is supplied to Leningrad. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of German troops breaking through to the rear and encircling the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops who occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malovishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were thrown back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.

Central direction

On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group attacked from Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, and three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk “cauldron” ended, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were captured.

On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for a whole month for Velikiye Luki. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central section of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.

Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, the main forces went over to the defensive and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat Soviet troops in the Velikiye Luki area and capture Toropets on August 29.

On August 8-12, the 2nd Tank Group and the 2nd Field Army began advancing southward. As a result of the operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, and Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts of the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on September 6.

South direction

In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack of two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Coastal Army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa pinned down the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.

Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Belaya Tserkov direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both army commanders. But although German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.

Thus, Army Group South was unable to independently solve the tasks set for it by the Barbarossa plan. From early August to early October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.

Battle of Kyiv

In pursuance of Hitler's orders, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.

After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center advanced to join the 6th Army of Army Group South; September 9 both German armies united in eastern Polesie. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was completely broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.

At the same time, the German 2nd Tank Group, repelling the attack of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered operational space. September 9 3rd tank division V. Model broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.

Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Group launched an offensive on September 12 from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northerly direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd tank groups linked up at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front found themselves in the gigantic Kiev “cauldron”; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. The administration of the Southwestern Front turned out to be destroyed; Front commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos died.

As a result, Left Bank Ukraine fell into the hands of the enemy, the path to Donbass was open, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbass direction, see Donbass operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, Crimea was important as an aviation base. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the ability to raid Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and focused its efforts on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.

On October 17, Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of Army Group South gained a foothold on the Mius Front line.

Turn from Moscow

At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; Volga line - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November.

On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front, the implementation of Operation Barbarossa was discussed in time:

• Army Group North: Operations developed almost completely according to plans.
• Army Group Center: Until the start of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed in accordance with plans, then development slowed down.
• Army Group South: Operations progressed more slowly than expected.

However, Hitler became increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: “ First, Leningrad must be captured, for this purpose the troops of the Gotha group are used. Secondly, the eastern part of Ukraine will be captured... And only as a last resort will an offensive be launched to capture Moscow».

The next day, F. Halder clarified the Fuhrer’s opinion with A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (the seizure of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Fuehrer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine, you should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.

On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: " The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and blocking the Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is to encircle Leningrad and connect with Finnish troops».

Evaluation of Hitler's decision

Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and to turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help Army Group South caused mixed opinions among the German command.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, G. Goth, wrote in his memoirs: “ There was one compelling argument of operational significance against continuing the offensive on Moscow at that time. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops located in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back the enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper to the south. An attempt to throw the Baltic group into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being attacked; in the south, this danger was already making itself felt...»

The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group, G. Guderian, wrote: “ The battle for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, whether this tactical success also had major strategic significance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw.».

Only on September 30, German troops, having brought up reserves, went on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, stubborn resistance by Soviet troops, difficult weather conditions late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see Battle of Moscow)

Results of Operation Barbarossa

The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unachieved. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.

The main reasons can be associated with a general underestimation of the Red Army. Even though before the war total quantity and the composition of the Soviet troops was determined quite correctly by the German command, the major miscalculations of the Abwehr included an incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces.

Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, it was expected to meet no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army. In fact, the Soviet leadership sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer alone (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games conducted by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the “Eastern Campaign” had to be won with one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of operations, “which is expanding to the east like a funnel,” German forces “will prove insufficient unless it is possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians up to the Kyiv-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line.”

Meanwhile, on the line of the Dnieper-Western Dvina rivers, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrating behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the enemy’s advance to the east.

In addition, due to the fact that the army groups launched attacks on divergent directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain cooperation between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central attacking group. These operations, although successful, resulted in wasted time and resources for the motorized troops.

In addition, already in August the question of the priority of targets arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict, a crisis of command arose.

Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.

Army Group "South" was unable to carry out deep envelopment with its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) and destroy the main enemy troops in right-bank Ukraine on time and, as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .

Subsequently, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.

In the fall of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow).

The 1941 campaign ended with the defeat of German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under