On February 19, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree on the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Thanks to this document, Crimea was, in fact, donated by Khrushchev to Ukraine. The “royal gift” was made on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia...

“How many Russians experienced with indignation and horror this weak-willed, in no way contested, not the slightest protested, due to the flabbyness of our then diplomacy, surrender of Crimea in 24 hours - and its betrayal in every subsequent Crimean conflict.” Alexander SOLZHENITSYN.

Crimea, they say, was donated to Ukraine by the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev in a fit of “drunken generosity” - after two glasses of cognac. Of course, the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR within the framework of the “united and indestructible” Soviet Union was a mere formality. Then in nightmare no one could have imagined that the USSR would collapse and Ukraine would become “independent”. Independent Ukraine, of course, did not return the gift.

Historians explain Nikita Sergeevich’s generosity quite simply. Coming to power after Stalin's death, debunking the cult of personality and condemning repression, the leader of the state himself was involved in many repressive matters. As the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938 - 1947, he himself led an active struggle against the “enemies of the people” and, in order to to some extent atone for Ukraine and enlist the support of the Ukrainian “elite,” Khrushchev made a broad gesture. He gave the republic an entire resort peninsula!

The first secretary informed his party comrades about his decision, as if casually, during a break in one of the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, on the way to lunch. “Yes, comrades, there is an opinion here to transfer Crimea to Ukraine,” he said casually. No one had the courage to protest. First Person's Desire ruling party- law.

On the agenda of the next meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, held on January 25, 1954, the 11th item was the issue “On the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.” The question took 15 minutes. They listened and decided: “To approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.”

No one objected, no one doubted the expediency and political consequences. No one even asked the question: how would the population of Crimea, almost entirely Russian, react to this? It turned out that “such important issues as the territorial movement of individual regions into a particular republic are resolved without any difficulties.”

According to the law, the issue then had to be brought up for open discussion by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the opinion of the residents of both republics - and Crimea itself - be found out in referendums, and only then a union-wide referendum should be held.

But they did without this: on February 19, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR met, and of its 27 members, only 13 were present. There was no quorum, but they voted unanimously for “the greatest friendly act, testifying to the boundless trust and love of the Russian people for the Ukrainian people.” .

In 1992, the illegality of the transfer was officially recognized by the Supreme Council of Russia.

Now the region is called the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and it does not include the southwest of the peninsula, subordinate to the Sevastopol City Council, which is a unit of national subordination, and the northern half of the Arabat Spit, which is part of the Kherson region.

FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR (02/19/1954)

VOROSHILOV K. E., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:
- Today we must discuss one issue - about the joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Comrade gives the floor. Korotchenko.

KOROTCHENKO D.S., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR:
- Comrades! The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic expresses its heartfelt gratitude to the great Russian fraternal people for an exceptionally wonderful act of fraternal assistance...

SHVERNIK N. M., Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions:
-...Such a transfer of the largest region, rich in raw materials, with developed large-scale industry, valuable natural healing factors, can be carried out only in the conditions of our socialist country, forever freed from the oppression of capitalists and landowners, in a country where caring for people and his material and cultural needs.

RASHIDOV S. R., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR:
- The transfer of the Crimean region to Soviet Ukraine is responsible common interests our great Motherland. This is possible only in our country, where there is no national hatred and national contradictions, where the life of everyone Soviet people proceeds in an atmosphere of peaceful creative work in the name of peace and happiness of all mankind...

KUUSINEN O. V., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Karelo-Finnish SSR:
- Only in our country is it possible for such a great people as the Russians to generously transfer one of their regions to another fraternal people without any hesitation...

VOROSHILOV K. E.:
- There are no more people signed up. It is proposed to adopt the following resolution:

“Taking into account the commonality of the economy, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decides: to approve the joint proposal of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic".

Any other suggestions? Those who are in favor of this proposal, I ask you to raise your hand. Who is “against”? There are none. Who "abstained"? Not either. Adopted unanimously.

Of course, the leaders of the RSFSR were well aware that it was necessary to provide a reliable ideological justification for the transfer of Crimea. It was a rather profitable and understandable anniversary for the Soviet masses - the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada, which the propaganda machine of both the Tsarist and Bolshevik empires presented as the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. They decided to celebrate this date loudly and widely at the state level.

The transfer of the Crimean region to Ukraine on the eve of the grandiose holiday of “eternal friendship of two fraternal peoples” fit perfectly into the well-prepared Kremlin scenario. Subsequent events showed that such a loud propaganda show staged in Crimea in the second half of May 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of reunification apparently did not take place in any of the Ukrainian regions, not even in Pereyaslav.

On May 16, 1954, in accordance with the resolution of the executive committee of the Crimean regional and Simferopol city Councils of Workers' Deputies, a joint anniversary session was held dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. The meeting took place in the regional theater named after. Gorky. On May 24, 1954, Crimean Truth wrote:

“As a great joyful holiday, the working people of Crimea celebrate a significant date - the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.”

There is no doubt that such a large scale and pomp staged on the peninsula was also a celebration of the official transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.

But no one gave Sevastopol! Back in 1948, Sevastopol was separated into an independent administrative and economic unit subordinate to the RSFSR. The decree was not canceled. Unlike Crimea, in relation to Sevastopol there was not even a legal act of transfer. And Russia’s rights to Sevastopol were not even formally violated in 1954.

Why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine and why there was almost no objection to him: excerpts from as yet unpublished archival records and printed memoirs of Dmitry Shepilov, one of the brightest and most mysterious politicians of that era for today’s Russians.

Ukraine in 1954, I would like, firstly, to recall the evidence published 13 years ago of a direct participant in those events - Dmitry Shepilov, who between 1954 and 1957 was rising star Soviet politics. Foreign correspondents in Moscow even called him, albeit with exaggeration, “the third man in the Kremlin.”

The author uses this episode (I quote it with abbreviations) as an example of Nikita Khrushchev’s “managerial style”: “Being to the extreme an ambitious man, he wanted the Ukrainian people to see him as their generous “boss” and “patron” after his transfer to work in Moscow. These feelings were dictated by a number of measures on the part of Khrushchev, which clearly bore the stamp of ingratiation with the Ukrainian cadres and which, in some cases, contradicted the constitutional foundations of the Soviet state. The subsequent course of events showed Khrushchev’s deep delusion that in Ukraine he was a beloved father. (...)

One of the measures to “win” Ukraine to one’s side was Khrushchev’s solution to the issue of Crimea.

Celebrations dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia were approaching. (...) In this regard, the anniversary sessions of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR were celebrated. The Ukrainian Republic and the city of Kyiv were awarded the Order of Lenin. Kyiv Theater named after. Shevchenko showed in Bolshoi Theater their best operas and ballets. The stone for the future monument in honor of the reunification was laid at the Kievsky railway station in Moscow. Grandiose military parades and demonstrations took place in Moscow and Kyiv. In a word, everything necessary was done in the name of a noble goal - further strengthening the friendship of the two largest peoples and all other peoples of the Soviet country.

But Khrushchev wanted to present Ukraine with a gift on a golden platter, so that the entire republic would know about his generosity and constant concern for the success of Ukraine.

One of the numerous meetings on agriculture at that time was taking place in the Grand Kremlin Palace. At the presidium table were all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. During the break, as usual, members of the Presidium and secretaries gathered in two rooms adjacent to the podium of the Presidium of the Great Hall (...) Urgent issues were discussed one after another. Suddenly Khrushchev made a proposal: in connection with the celebration of the 300th anniversary, transfer the Crimean region from Russian Federation into the Ukrainian Republic.
“It’s a long way from Crimea to Russia,” he said. — Ukraine is closer. It will be easier to conduct all sorts of business affairs. I've already talked to someone about this. Ukrainians, of course, are salivating; they will be very happy if we give them Crimea. I think we will also come to an agreement with the Russian Federation. We just need to arrange all this wisely: so that the Supreme Councils of both republics ask the Union Supreme Council to make such a transfer. And Voroshilov needs to carry out all this kindly through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I think there will be no objections?

Of course, Khrushchev’s proposal was wrong, because it grossly violated both historical traditions and Leninist national principles in party and state building. (...)

Since 1918, Crimea (Republic of Taurida, Autonomous Crimean Republic, Crimean Region) was part of the Russian Federation. Here, for decades, strong ties have been formed with planning, financial, cultural and other organizations of the Russian Federation.

But the main and decisive thing is ethnic composition areas. Of course, under the socialist system, in conditions of indestructible friendship of peoples, the decision territorial issues presents no difficulties and cannot cause social conflicts. The territorial demarcation of the Central Asian republics took place amicably, Kazakhstan amicably transferred part of its territory to Uzbekistan, etc.

But when implementing any such measure, the party and government always took into account the totality of all circumstances in order to prevent the rights of any nation, national group or nationality, especially small ones, from being infringed. It is known that, in accordance with the principles of the Soviet Constitution, even areas with a small population, but with a special ethnic composition, are allocated into autonomous national districts. (...)

When Khrushchev introduced his draft on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the population of the Crimean region numbered 1 million 200 thousand people, of which 71.4 percent were Russians, 22.2 percent were Ukrainians, and 6.4 percent were other nationalities. And yet, when Khrushchev asked his question: “I think there will be no objections?” - N. Bulganin, A. Mikoyan, A. Kirichenko, L. Kaganovich and others responded with exclamations: “That’s right! Accept! Pass on!” And only V. Molotov, standing at the door to the next room, waiting for some kind of telephone conversation, said, without addressing anyone:

- Of course, such a proposal is incorrect. But, apparently, we will have to accept it.

This is how the Decree of February 19, 1954 was born on the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The inconsistency of the motives for such a transfer set out in the Decree: common economics, territorial proximity, the presence of economic and cultural ties - was obvious to everyone. And yet the Decree appeared. And in Crimea they began to remake signs on Ukrainian, introduce radio broadcasting, newspapers in Ukrainian, etc.

(...) But the fact is that this was one of the first acts of Khrushchev’s subjectivist, arbitrary approach to resolving state issues.

Khrushchev wanted to give Ukraine a gift in connection with the anniversary and thereby put another weight on the scale of his, as it seemed to him, glory in Ukraine. This was a clear and flagrant violation of the principles national policy parties and states. And, of course, not only V. Molotov, who submitted his remark, but also others (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, etc. communists) understood the fundamental incorrectness and inexpediency of such an act from all points of view.

Dmitry Kosyrev, political commentator at MIA Rossiya Segodnya

The true history of the Russians. XX century Vdovin Alexander Ivanovich

Why did Khrushchev give Crimea to Ukraine?

One of the first initiatives of N.S. Khrushchev, who had a general impact negative influence on the development of national relations in the country, was associated with the celebration in early 1954 of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. On this occasion, on January 12, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, “Theses on the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia” were published. in them once again emphasized the enormous progressive significance of the decisions of the Pereyaslav Rada, expressed mainly in three historical facts. “Having united with Russia within a single Russian state, Ukraine was saved from enslavement by the gentry of Poland and absorption by the Sultan’s Turkey.” “The growth of strength and power of the USSR made it possible to realize centuries-old aspirations Ukrainian people about its national reunification" (incorporation into Soviet Ukraine Western Ukraine in 1939, Bukovina and Izmail region in 1940, Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945). “Only thanks to the fraternal help of the great Russian people and other peoples of the USSR, Ukraine was liberated from the fascist yoke.”

Successes of Ukraine (17-fold growth of industry in Soviet era, ahead of all European countries in terms of the number of students, etc.), according to the “Theses”, were another proof that “only socialism ensures free and happy life, development and prosperity of all peoples and nations, genuine friendship of peoples, their cooperation and mutual assistance,” that the USSR “is an inspiring example of a country in which the national question has been resolved for the first time in the history of mankind.”

In propaganda literature, the degree of unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union acquired complete expression. It was said that the consequence of the transformations in the life of the Soviet peoples after 1917 “was the complete and final resolution of the national question.” In 1951, from the pages of the party magazine it was announced that the unity of the peoples of the USSR had acquired a fundamentally new quality condition. “During the course of socialist transformations, a community of people unprecedented in history has emerged in our country - Soviet people- a commonwealth of two classes, workers and peasants, and a truly popular intelligentsia, a commonwealth of all the peoples of the USSR. Soviet people of all nationalities are workers of a single socialist economic system, have unified system state life - the Soviet state, a single ideology - Marxism-Leninism, a single goal - the building of communism, a single party that expresses their vital interests and leads them from victory to victory - the party of Lenin - Stalin. All peoples have one Fatherland - Soviet Union"(Bolshevik of Ukraine. 1951. No. 9).

Controversies in national relations began to be associated only with the presence of prejudices in the minds of individual Soviet people and the machinations of the capitalist environment. “As long as the capitalist encirclement exists,” said the “Theses on the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” “the imperialist states will continue to send spies and saboteurs to us, try to use the remnants of defeated hostile groups for anti-Soviet purposes, and activate bourgeois-nationalist elements , revive nationalist prejudices in the minds of individual people and use them to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.”

To long-term negative consequences resulted in the transfer of the Crimean region from Russia to Ukraine by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 19, 1954. The operation, which was fundamentally contrary to the interests of the Russian people, was accepted under an absurd, from the point of view of the national-state interests of Russia, pretext. The transfer allegedly took into account “the commonality of the economy, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR.” Despite the supposedly “complete unanimity” in approving this, as deputy P. Tychin believed, “the generous gift of the great brother,” letters were sent to the Supreme Council for a long time (they were studied by the historian A.P. Myakshev), indicating something completely different. For example, in a letter handed over to the archive with the cowardly resolution “Get to the Point” dated August 9, 1964, parliamentarians were asked the question: “How can Russia, having the best, greatest value that constitutes its decoration - Crimea, whose territory exceeds Belgium or Switzerland , this whole state is to be given away... How could they give this Russian treasure, Russian heritage, without the knowledge of the Russian people?” The authors of the letter themselves answered the question unambiguously: “A Russian man could not give Crimea. This is an anti-state act aimed at a dangerous goal,” and they proposed to cancel the erroneous decision, otherwise, put the issue to a referendum. Such letters, of course, remained unheeded.

The real reason for Khrushchev's gift to Ukraine Crimean territory with a predominant Russian population (in total, in Crimea, according to 1954, there were 1.2 million inhabitants, of which 71.4% were Russians), there was a desire to make amends for personal guilt for the repressions sanctioned in 1938–1940. Their victims were 167,565 residents of Ukraine, including more than two thousand representatives of the republic’s leadership and several hundred people who were suspected of organizing a “terrorist act” against Khrushchev. With the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine (“conquest of Ukraine to its side,” as D.T. Shepilov said) N.S. Khrushchev not only counted on the support of representatives of the republic in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, but also received 36 guaranteed votes of Central Committee members from the Ukrainian party organization at plenums of the Central Committee, which had only 175 members. It was not without reason that during the flight from Pitsunda to Moscow on October 14, 1964, Khrushchev tried to persuade the guards accompanying him, promising to promote their commander, a major, to colonel and award each of them the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: “There is a conspiracy in the capital!.. We are flying to Kyiv. There is our salvation."

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On February 19, 1954, a decree was adopted on the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR. Nikita Khrushchev with a sweeping gesture handed over Crimea to Ukraine.

"Credit history"

One of the versions of the transfer of Crimea is a “credit history” connecting the RSFSR and the American Jewish organization “Joint”. The idea of ​​relocating Jews to Crimea began to be discussed immediately after the end of Civil War. Foreign foundations actively lobbied for the issue. The Politburo repeatedly discussed this project. Its active supporters were Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov. A branch of Agro-Joint Bank was created in Simferopol. In January 1924, there was already talk about “autonomous Jewish government, federated with Russia,” a draft decree was prepared on the creation of the Jewish Autonomous SSR in the northern part of Crimea. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency (ETA) distributed a corresponding message abroad on February 20, 1924. In 1929, an agreement was concluded between the RSFSR and the Joint organization. The document that carried beautiful name“On Crimean California” contained the obligations of the parties. The Joint allocated 1.5 million dollars a year to the USSR (until 1936, 20 million dollars were received), and for this amount the Central Executive Committee pledged 375 thousand hectares of Crimean land. They were issued in shares, which were bought by more than 200 Americans, including politicians Roosevelt and Hoover, financiers Rockefeller and Marshall, General MacArthur.
The decision to create “Crimean California” was delayed. During the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt reminded Stalin of his obligations, the Secretary General was in no hurry, but some historians explain the deportation of the Tatars in 1944 precisely by the liberation of Crimea for Jewish settlers.
1954 was the deadline for paying off debts and Khrushchev made a “knight’s move”, giving Crimea to Ukraine.

National question

One of the main “Crimean” issues is the national issue. In 1944, the deportation of peoples began from Crimea. Usually they only talk about the deportation of Tatars, but not only Tatars were evicted. Greeks (almost 15 thousand) and Bulgarians (12.5 thousand) were deported. The Tatars left most of all for Uzbekistan. Greeks and Bulgarians were settled in Central Asia, to Kazakhstan and to certain regions of the RSFSR. According to the 1939 census, about 50% of Russians, 25% of Tatars and only 10.2% of Ukrainians lived in Crimea. After the deportation of the Tatars in 1944, Crimea “howled.” Especially heavy damage suffered agriculture. In 1950, compared to 1940, grain production fell almost five times, tobacco production fell threefold, and vegetable production fell twice as much. In 1953, there were 29 grocery stores and 11 department stores throughout the region. In the 60s, the process of returning the Tatars and settling Crimea with Ukrainians and Russians began. Voluntary-forced Ukrainization was underway. Everywhere except Sevastopol, they introduced school curriculum Ukrainian. Today there are more than 2 million people in Crimea. 1 million are Russians, more than 400 thousand are Ukrainians, and 240 thousand are Tatars. It is not surprising that the words of the Ukrainian president “One country, one people, one religion” are perceived in Crimea at least ambiguously.

Historical background

The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine is an idea that was in the air ten years before 1954. Even at the height of the Great Patriotic War, when the Germans were driven out of the peninsula, Khrushchev, who was then the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, ordered a certificate to be drawn up on Crimea. Khrushchev searched the archives for historical connections between Russia and Ukraine. One of the staff members recalled that Nikita Sergeevich told him about 1944: “I was in Moscow and said: “Ukraine is in ruins, and everyone is pulling out of it. What if we give her Crimea?” After that, they didn’t call me that and they didn’t shake my soul. They were ready to be crushed into dust.”

The question of legitimacy

The issue of the legitimacy of the transfer of Crimea is still controversial. The main noise arises when the question of a referendum arises. Allegedly, a nationwide referendum was to be held in the country, but the rights and legal framework for the referendum were not described in the Soviet Constitution, except for the mention in Article 33 that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR could hold it. Important: I could, but I don’t have to. Thus, the question of a referendum is removed. The answer to the question about the body that has the authority to give or not give consent to change borders is given to us by Article 22 of the Constitution: “The highest body state power The RSFSR is the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR." According to Article 24, “The Supreme Council of the RSFSR is the only legislative body of the RSFSR.” Article 151 states that the Constitution can only be amended by a decision of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, adopted by a majority of “at least two-thirds of the votes.” Thus, the amendment to Article 14 of the Constitution of the RSFSR and the removal of the Crimean region from it can be regarded as consent received for the transfer of this region to another union republic. Thus, the legal procedure for transferring Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was absolutely correct. The issue was discussed by the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian SSR, and they jointly appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And only on the basis of this appeal was a resolution adopted and a decree signed on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine

Who made the decision?

It is believed that the decision to transfer Crimea was made by Khrushchev. In November 1953 he made a trip to Crimea. According to his son-in-law, journalist Alexei Adzhubey, who accompanied him, he was shocked that in the southern region there were no vegetables and fruits in state trade. A common misconception is that Khrushchev was Ukrainian and this influenced the decision to transfer Crimea. This is, of course, not true. Khrushchev was not Ukrainian; he never spoke Ukrainian. Another thing is that he had a certain Ukrainian sentiment, as well as a feeling of guilt for participating in the repressions. This could indirectly influence, but government decisions are not made at the level of sentiment, and Khrushchev was not the only one who made the decision on the transfer. It is the retinue that makes the king. Khrushchev's retinue included Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuusinen. Main role was behind Georgy Malenkov, who headed the Council of Ministers.

Black Sea Fleet

The issue with the Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, still remains problematic. According to Ukrainian laws, the presence of foreign military facilities on its territory is prohibited, but Ukraine is making an exception for the Russian fleet. In April 2010, Viktor Yanukovych agreed to extend Russia's lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, which expired in 2017, for another 25 years with the possibility of extension. During the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the issue of the fleet was not raised; Ukraine was a union republic; legal problems arose already in 1991.

Question about returning

The first of the major Russian politicians Vice President Alexander Rutskoy spoke about the return of Crimea. Since that time, the issue of the return of Crimea to Russia has been raised many times. Several referendums held in Crimea have shown the population's loyalty to reunification with Russia. According to the results of the last official census, conducted in 2001, 10.1% of residents of Crimea named Ukrainian as their native language. 97% of the population are Russian-speaking. This issue has gained new relevance today, when Ukraine is going through hard times.

Why did Khrushchev give Crimea to Ukraine? This question still belongs to one of the most mysterious pages of post-war history and has not yet found a clear answer. In the light latest events in Ukraine, it suddenly gained relevance, confirming the undeniable truth that time will put everything in its place (many Russians did not have time to blink an eye when Crimea was annexed to Russia).

Issues relating to the self-determination of nations or the division of territories cannot be resolved with the stroke of a pen, without taking into account the opinions of the peoples inhabiting these territories: sooner or later this will lead to serious conflicts and ethnic hatred.

What is happening now in Ukraine is a consequence of the short-sighted actions of the former leadership of the country of the Soviets. Crimea played the role of a time bomb that exploded when the unrest in Ukraine reached last stage incandescence

Historical background

Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Union Republic by decree of the highest legislative body of the USSR on February 19, 1954.

According to the official version, the procedure was due to the following reasons:

• The deplorable state of the economy of the Crimean region due to post-war devastation.
• The shortage of human resources and labor resulting from the deportation of the Crimean Tatar population.
• The lack of agrotechnical knowledge and experience in farm management among immigrants from Russia climatic conditions Crimean peninsula.

Thus, the need to transfer the peninsula was linked to the commonality of economic, economic, cultural ties and territorial proximity.

According to this document, Ukraine was given the responsibility to restore the war-ravaged economy of the Crimean region. But this is only at first glance. Was the Supreme Council guided only by concern for the disastrous state of the peninsula?

Doubts arise already in connection with a gross violation of the legislation defining the procedure for conducting such procedures.

What was the violation of legislation during the transfer of Crimea?

What it should have been correct order actions when changing the administrative-territorial subordination of Crimea?

• The question of the advisability of its annexation to the Ukrainian Republic should first have been openly discussed.
• Next, referendums were to be held among the population of Ukraine, the RSFSR and the Crimean region itself.
• The final stage of discussion of the issue was to be a referendum among the population of the entire Union.

None of the points of the mandatory protocol were fulfilled.

How did things really go?

The final decision to transfer the territory was made by Khrushchev after an unofficial trip to the region. The motivating reason for this was information about the disastrous state of the region’s economy and the situation of Russian migrants.

The procedure for the official transfer of the region took less than a month: the issue was included in the agenda of the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on January 25, 1954, and took only eleventh place in it, as if it was something unimportant, and took no more than a quarter of an hour.

On February 5, at the next meeting, a draft resolution was developed confirming the transfer.

On February 19, after speeches by Kuusinen, Rashidov and Korotchenko, the resolution on the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian Republic was approved. However, less than half of the presidium members (13 out of 27 people) were present.

A legislative document approving the decree of the Presidium and amending the Constitution of the USSR appeared on April 26, 1954.

Motives of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

The fact that the initiative to transfer the peninsula came personally from Khrushchev is beyond doubt.

Why did he give up Crimea?

1. Yourself main reason This initiative was a fierce struggle for the leadership of the country. After the death of I.V. Stalin, three people laid claim to it: Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev.

Beria controlled the security forces. Supported by the army and Marshal Zhukov, Khrushchev occupied a strong position in Moscow. Malenkov was the initiator and leader of the “Leningrad affair”, as a result of which the elite was destroyed Leningrad Regional Committee All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which represented serious competition to Malenkov.

By transferring Crimea to Ukraine, Khrushchev could not help but know that as a result of this transfer there would be a change in the party leadership in the region: the Russian communists who were wary of him would be replaced by loyal Ukrainian comrades.

2. The version that such a generous gift from Khrushchev was made by him in order to at least partially atone for his own guilt for personal participation in repressive actions in Ukraine is not without sound grain. In the period from 1938 to 1947, Khrushchev served as first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and was responsible for many ruined lives.

By planning an unprecedented process to debunk Stalin's personality cult, which led to brutal repressions and crimes against his own people, Khrushchev, to some extent, tried to downplay his own role in these atrocities.

3. According to the official version, the annexation of Crimea was timed to coincide with the tercentenary of the annexation of Ukraine to Russia. The reunification of the lands of the Zaporozhye army and the Russian kingdom, which occurred as a result of a popular decision during the Pereyaslav Rada, occurred in 1654.

4. Summarizing the economic basis for his decision to transfer the Crimean lands to Ukraine, Khrushchev spoke about the need to build a North Crimean irrigation canal, which would help solve the problem of irrigation of the arid steppe regions of the peninsula. It was advisable to manage construction work from Kyiv rather than from distant Moscow.

Preceding Events

Whatever the motives of the government of the Union, within the framework of an indestructible monolithic state (as the Union was then), the administrative-territorial resubordination of Crimea in those years had neither economic nor political consequences.

Then even the most heated imagination could not imagine that after just four decades the collapse of the most powerful world power would begin, ending with the formation of a number of sovereign states.

Why was Crimea given to the Ukrainian SSR? There is another version of the prerequisites for such a decision. A number of events led to its execution:

1) In 1923, negotiations took place between the Soviet government and the head of the Jewish financial organization Frank Rosenblatt. He discussed the possibility of creating a Jewish autonomous region, which included the north of the Crimean lands, the territory of Sochi, Odessa, Kherson and Abkhazia. The autonomy was to be populated by Western Ukrainian and Belarusian Jews.

If the Soviet government agreed, Rosenblatt promised his assistance in negotiations with the government of the United States of America regarding the allocation of a significant financial loan.

2) When discussing the project, Rosenblatt agreed to limit the territory of the future autonomy to the peninsula alone, however, due to fear of acute ethnic hatred in the territory inhabited by dozens of peoples, the Soviet leadership refused to implement the plan.

However, the urgent need for material support forced the government to resort to a trick. Diplomat Georgy Chicherin, during negotiations in Berlin, deliberately committed deception, assuring Jewish bankers that the Soviet Union agreed to the implementation of the Crimean project, and the government had developed a decree for its implementation.

3) The Jewish Congress, having secured the consent of the Soviet diplomat, decided to provide the Union with a loan of fifteen million dollars. The money was received, but no one even thought about starting the Crimean project.

4) In 1944, the deadline for the first payments approached. The US government again began to demand either the creation of the promised autonomy, or the return of the entire amount of the debt, taking into account the interest accrued during this time (amounting to over twenty million dollars).

5) Since the country, which had just ended a bloody war, had no money at that time, the decision arose to transfer the peninsula to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, which had no obligations to the American government, since formally the Russian Central Election Commission was the debtor.

By transferring Crimea, Khrushchev closed the issue of paying off a debt that was unsustainable for the country.