Sunken submarines. Sunken submarine

The sunken nuclear submarines of the USSR and Russia are a topic of ongoing debate. During the Soviet and post-Soviet years, four nuclear submarines (K-8, K-219, K-278, Kursk) were lost. The sunken K-27 was sunk independently in 1982 following a radiation accident. This was done because the nuclear submarine could not be restored, and dismantling was too expensive. All these submarines were assigned to the Northern Fleet.

Nuclear submarine K-8

This sunken submarine is considered the first officially recognized loss in the Union's nuclear fleet. The cause of the ship's death on April 12, 1970 was a fire that broke out during its stay in (Atlantic). Crew for a long time fought for the survivability of the submarine. The sailors were able to shut down the reactors. Part of the crew was evacuated on board a Bulgarian civilian ship that arrived in time, but 52 people died. This sunken submarine was one of the first nuclear-powered ships of the USSR.

Submarine K-219

Project 667A was at one time one of the most modern and survivable ships of the submarine fleet. It sank on October 6, 1986 due to a powerful explosion ballistic missile in the mine. As a result of the accident, 8 people died. In addition to two reactors, the sunken submarine had at least fifteen and 45 thermonuclear warheads on board. The ship was badly damaged, but demonstrated amazing survivability. It was able to emerge from a depth of 350 meters with terrible damage to the hull and a flooded compartment. The nuclear-powered ship sank only three days later.

"Komsomolets" (K-278)

This sunken Project 685 submarine died on April 7, 1989 as a result of a fire that broke out during a combat mission. The ship was located near the (Norwegian Sea) in neutral waters. The crew fought for the survivability of the submarine for six hours, but after several explosions in the compartments, the submarine sank. There were 69 crew members on board. Of these, 42 people died. Komsomolets was the most modern submarine of that time. His death caused great international resonance. Before this, the sunken submarines of the USSR did not attract so much attention (partly due to the secrecy regime).

"Kursk"

This tragedy is probably the most famous disaster associated with the loss of a submarine. The "Aircraft Carrier Killer", a formidable and modern nuclear-powered cruiser, sank at a depth of 107 meters, 90 km from the coast. 132 submariners were trapped at the bottom. Efforts to rescue the crew were unsuccessful. According to the official version, the nuclear submarine sank due to the explosion of an experimental torpedo that occurred in the mine. However, there is still a lot of uncertainty about the death of the Kursk. According to other versions (unofficial), the nuclear-powered submarine sank due to a collision with the American submarine Toledo, which was nearby, or due to being hit by a torpedo fired from it. The unsuccessful rescue operation to evacuate the crew from the sunken ship was a shock for all of Russia. 132 people died on board the nuclear-powered ship.

Disappeared underwater

On January 28, 1990, the newspaper “On Guard of the Arctic” published an article by A. V. Krivenko, senior researcher at the Museum of the Northern Fleet, “The Mystery of the Sunken Submarine” about the disappearance of the first Soviet submarine “D-1” (“Decembrist”) on November 13, 1940. .

The submarine disappeared (died) with its entire crew in Motovsky Bay in the visual visibility zone of naval coastal observation posts, presumably 15 cable cables from Bolshoi Arsky Island at a depth of 70-127 m.

In March 1990, several responses to this article were published, including from Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Vice Admiral G.I. Shchedrin, about the need to raise the “Decembrist” to create a monument to the submariners who laid the foundation of the Northern Fleet.

The officially accepted version of the ship's death was the submersion of the submarine below the maximum depth, then the destruction of the ship's durable hull (or the outboard clinkers of diesel engines, or the valves of the diving and ascent station). Possible reason diving below the maximum depth was assumed to be a jammed horizontal rudders of the boat or a mistake by the crew. These reasons could indeed exist.

Locking horizontal rudders.

In the spring of 1940, after another military campaign in the area of ​​​​the island of Vardø, “D-1” stood for repairs at the side of the “Red Horn” floating workshop.

The control system for the horizontal rudders was located in the central post of the ship (4th compartment) and was connected to the end compartments by roller drives. Manual steering wheels and electric motors were installed in the central post; their switching was carried out using cam clutches.

This is where the steering wheel malfunction could occur.

An addition to the assumption about the jamming of the horizontal rudders can be lines from a letter from the former assistant to the flagship mechanical engineer of the submarine brigade P. A. Miroshnichenko to the son of the D-1 commander F. M. Eltishchev, written in January 1967: “...I assume that while maneuvering the D-1 underwater, the horizontal rudders jammed and it went beyond the maximum diving depth...” (“On Guard of the Arctic,” 01/28/1990, p. 7).

However, the repositioning of the rudders for submersion, their wedging or fixing in this position, i.e., direct influence on the rudders, could be facilitated by external circumstances, which will be discussed below.

Submarine diving below the maximum depth due to an error by the crew.

There are good reasons for this assumption. Let’s use the list of D-1 crew members who died on November 13, 1940 (“On Guard of the Arctic,” March 4, 1990, p. 7).

At sea, to practice torpedo firing, complicated by diving under the target ship, with a regular crew of 10 officers, 15 petty officers and 28 privates, the submarine went without 3 officers, 3 petty officers and squad leaders and 6 privates. The main specialists were absent on board - the senior assistant to the ship's commander G.I. Galagan and the commander of the electromechanical combat unit K.V. Stepanov (both were on vacation), as well as the commander of the artillery and mine-torpedo warhead (not on the list).

At the same time, the assistant commander (probably from one of the cruising submarines of the division), senior lieutenant I. I. Grachev, arrived at the brigade and the ship 10 days before the last exit, the commander of the torpedo group, lieutenant P. L. Chernoknizhny, arrived at the ship 3 months before the last release.

In the fall of 1940, in the navy, at the end of active service military service A significant part of the rank and file and senior officers were transferred to the reserve. They were replaced by young recruits. Of the 13 students who went to sea on the D-1 on November 13, 7 served on the ship for a month and a half, and two served only 3 days.

At some combat posts of the compartments, instead of the regular personnel, already trained in long-distance combat campaigns, there could have been 9 students who did not have sufficient practical training and practice, each of whom could have made erroneous actions that led to the disaster of the submarine.

Having accepted these versions as true, we will “automatically” agree with the most accessible and simplest reasons for the death of the D-1, which were “convenient” specifically for 1940.

But why now, 60 years after the death, the mystery of the disaster has not been revealed?

In 1990, the commander of the KSF, Admiral F.N. Gromov, planned to carry out search operations in the area where the D-1 crashed. The search and rescue vessel of the Northern Fleet, Georgiy Titov, was specially allocated to carry out the work, having returned after inspecting the area where the nuclear submarine Komsomolets sank. Then the representatives of the Northern Fleet PSS started making references to the fact that “naval specialists have never searched for or examined submarines that perished in the 1930-1940s,” as well as to “the complex bottom topography, faults, and underwater rocks. Hydroacoustics may be ineffective” (V.V. Sorokazherdyev “The Sea Kept the Secret.” - Murmansk, 1996, p. 31). Then any information about the search work disappeared. 10 years have passed. Nobody remembered about “Decembrist”.

At present, there is simply no reason to keep the death of the submarine and its 55 crew members a secret, but the D-1 submariners remain “Missing in Action.”

Dead or disappeared?

The submarine "D-1" (until August 21, 1934 - "Decembrist") factory N 177, the lead in the 1st series of Soviet submarine shipbuilding, was laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad and became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces on November 12 1930.

On May 18, 1933, “D-1”, as part of a special mission expedition (EON-1), left Kronstadt and began the transition along the White Sea-Baltic Canal to Murmansk. On August 5 of the same year, EON-1 ships became the basis of the Northern Military Flotilla being created. In 1934-1935, the “Decembrist”, as part of a separate division of the Northern Fleet, made long voyages to the White Sea, to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the North Cape.

In 1938-1939, the submarine's crew made two long-distance trips to the island of Novaya Zemlya, one to Bear Island, and carried out 3 military trips to the Vardø area (during the war with Finland, for a total of 45 days). Based on the results of the combat campaign, the commander of “D-1”, captain-lieutenant F. M. Eltishchev, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, and the commander of the motor group, military technician of the 2nd rank, S. P. Belov and the foreman of the motor team, V. S. Fedotov, were awarded the Order of the Red Star . It was these sailors who performed the duties of the commander of the warhead-5 and the commander of the motor group, respectively, in the last campaign of the “Decembrist”.

At 08.55 on November 13, 1940, the submarine of the 1st division of the Northern Fleet brigade “D-1” (commander-lieutenant F.M. Eltishchev) entered training ground No. 6 (Motovsky Bay) from the main fleet base of Polyarnoye. To carry out training torpedo firing, the brigade's floating base, "Umba", was allocated as a target and a support ship (the senior commander on board of the 1st division, captain 2nd rank M.I. Gadzhiev). An element that complicated the combat exercise was the task of firing from the stern apparatus while diving under the target ship.

After 4 hours the boat arrived at the training ground. At 13.26 Eltishchev reported to the management that he was ready for the dive and (probably) about the start of the exercise.

At 13.30, the submarine plunged under the periscope along the true bearing from Cape Vyev-Navolok 335 degrees and began moving on a course of 270 degrees.

At 13.45, at a bearing of 160 degrees from Cape Sharapov, at a distance of 17 cables from the tip of the cape, coastal posts observed the movement of the submarine’s periscope at a course of 225 degrees. No more coastal posts of the D-1 fleet surveillance and communications system were observed.

The submarine successfully attacked the Umba. After the end of the shooting, the floating base went to Polyarnoye, where the commander reported on the completion of the training mission and that everything was in order on the Dekabrist.

In the evening, after the submarine did not contact at the appointed time, the fleet began searching for the missing D-1.

The next day, November 14, an MBR-2 aircraft conducting a search in the dive area discovered large stains of diesel fuel. Later, ships of the Northern Fleet discovered a Red Navy cap and fragments of cork insulation (presumably from D-1) here. The search work continued until November 26, with the participation of minesweepers and the rescue tug “Pamyat Ruslana” of the Northern Special Purpose Underwater Expedition (EPRON).

November 18 at 02.00 in the southern part of training ground N 6, at point 69º 29"1"" northern latitude 32º 54"7"" east longitude (15-18 cable lengths from Bolshoy Arsky Island) during search work, the bottom cable of the minesweeper was broken, and the metal detector three times showed the presence of a large amount of metal here.

The second point where a large metal object was discovered was a point above Cape Vyev-Navolok, at a distance of 18-20 cables from the coastline.

After the end of the period of autumn-winter storms in April 1941, the commander of the Northern Fleet conducted an exercise for the fleet’s rescue squad to raise a “sunken” submarine. Probably, the exercise was carried out to test the fleet’s capabilities to lift the D-1. And here's why.

By 1940, the limit for divers’ work was a depth of 200 meters (this only and record-breaking descent at that time was made at the base of the Naval Diving College in Balaklava).

In the pre-war years, 2 submarines were lost in the Northern Fleet. "D-1" was at a relatively shallow depth (70-127 meters), while the other submarine "Shch-424" was at a depth of 250 meters.

Recovering a sunken submarine from a depth of 250 meters would be simply impossible.

The very fact of organizing such an exercise suggests that the fleet command knew that the depth of the place in the area where the submarine was lost was accessible for long-term work by rescue divers. And this, in turn, may indicate that the place of death of “D-1” was either the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island or the area near Cape Vyev-Navolok.

The boat “Shch-404” with the same maximum diving depth as the “Decembrist” was chosen as the “sunken” submarine, albeit with a smaller displacement.

This choice was forced. By April 1941, the 1st division of the brigade included one submarine of the “Dekabrist” type - “D-3” and two that arrived in July 1940 from the shipyard of cruising submarines of the “K” type. The brigade command could not risk these ships.

The exercise was carried out using the means and forces of the fleet's emergency rescue squad. During the recovery, 4 “soft” 10-ton pontoons were used, brought under the “sunken submarine” by naval divers.

The rescue operation ended unsuccessfully. One of the bow pontoons tore the braid and jumped to the surface on its own. The “Pike” hit the ground at a depth of 30 meters and only thanks to the decisive and timely actions of the crew it floated to the surface. Then the war began, and the lost submarine was forgotten.

The maneuvering of "D-1" and the ships that carried out the search were displayed on map No. 942 (let's call it map No. 1), which is currently preserved only in the Museum of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. A copy of this map was published in the newspaper “On Guard of the Arctic” on March 4, 1990.

There is a modern version of the map of Motovsky Bay, let’s call it map N 2. We will use this map to plot the “D-1” maneuvering on it according to data obtained from the Central State Archive of the USSR Navy Yu. P. Prokhorenko (the son of the deceased commissioner of “D-1” "Senior political instructor P. M. Prokhorenko), published in the newspaper "On Guard of the Arctic" on January 28, 1990.

The first time we compare these maps, we get a significant discrepancy between the calculated dive sites of “D-1” at 13.30 on November 13th. Several very important questions arise that require precise answers:

1. Why did “D-1” end up in the area of ​​the island? Big Arsky?

On the 1st map, diving point D-1 at 13.30 is located off the northern coast of Motovsky Bay, coordinates - 69º 33"7"" north latitude 32º 58"5"" east longitude (outside polygon N 6) along the true bearing from Cape Vyev -Navivolok 342 degrees.

But according to data from the Central State Archive of the USSR Navy (“On Guard of the Arctic” 01/28/1990), the coastal observation post on Vyev-Navolok observed the submarine diving at a bearing of 335 degrees (approximately 69 degrees 31.7 minutes north latitude, 32 degrees 58.5 minutes east longitude). This dive point is located almost in the middle of Motovsky Bay.

When comparing the archive data and map No. 1, the difference in the calculated location of “D-1” at 13.30 is 2.7 miles to the south. After completing the exercise according to plan, the submarine could end up significantly further south than the ship’s position calculated by the navigator. There may be an error here, like in determining the location of a submarine own funds the ship, and when determining its location by observation posts before the D-1 dive. This is so far the only explanation for the presence of a sunken submarine in the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island.

2. Could a submarine have been crushed in the depths in the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island?

The depths at the point of the supposed destruction of the boat range from 70 to 127 meters and are not so great as to crush the strong hull of the ship. The maximum immersion depth for submarines of the 1st series, to which the “Decembrist” belonged, is 90 m. When designing submarines, a certain margin of safety of the hull is necessarily specified, designed, for example, for the ship to be re-deepened due to a steering error, so the “D” -1" at a depth of 100-135 m, the durable hull should not have collapsed. This assumption was confirmed by an accident with the submarine “D-2” (“Narodovolets”) of the same type, which on June 25, 1938, while trimming, sank to a depth of 123 meters. At the same time, “... only drops of water were found in the seals and on the bolts of the removable sheets of the durable hull” (V.I. Dmitriev, “Soviet submarine shipbuilding.” - Moscow, Voenizdat, 1990, p. 44).

Consequently, the death of a submarine in this area could only have occurred due to external influences on the ship’s strong hull.

3. Where was the source of the solar stains coming to the surface?

The numbering of places where diesel fuel was observed escaping from the crushed fuel tanks of the boat on map No. 1 for the point of its supposed death near Bolshoi Arsky Island does not find a clear explanation.

If the submarine sank in the southern part of the bay, then the numbering of the detected spots should increase as it approaches the center of the bay.

When the D-1 was located at shallow depths in the Bolshoi Arsky area, the body of the fuel tanks (located outside the pressure hull) could only be destroyed by external influences: a ram, a mine explosion, or shoreline stones.

The numbers of detected solarium spots on the 1st map increase from north to south. Probably, in this case, the source of the spots may be located in the center of polygon No. 6 at great depths, where it is necessary to look for “D-1”.

4. Why was no one found on the surface of the bay?

If the submariners had the opportunity to go to the surface or release a rescue buoy, the search forces would be able to find the sailors on the surface of the bay or on the coast. Moreover, the total vector of currents in the bay is directed towards the southern coast of Motovsky Bay. But why didn’t the crew use individual means of rescuing submariners (ISA) from the sunken submarine or didn’t mark the place of the ship lying on the ground? The answer to this question will be given only by the rise of the “Decembrist” to the surface. This could most likely mean:

Either the submariners died from the rapid spread of sea water and therefore remained in a durable hull at combat posts;

Either it was impossible for the surviving crew members to reach the surface due to great depth occurrence on the ground;

Or the 4th compartment, also known as the central post of the “Decembrist” (at the same time a shelter compartment containing centralized systems for immersion, ship control, and locking for leaving a sunken submarine), became the site of a large influx of sea water, where the entire command staff of the ship and helmsmen died, controlling horizontal rudders. And the submariners who were in the end compartments were unable to reach the surface on their own.

The reality of these assumptions is supported by the deaths of North Sea submarines: "Shch-424" (October 20, 1939), "S-80" (January 27, 1961) and Pacific submarines: "S-117" (December 15, 1952) and "K-129" (March 8, 1968).

In any case, the disaster could have occurred both due to the re-deepening of the D-1, and from external influences on its hull.

Three out of four answers indicate the presence of a possible external influence on the D-1 hull when it is submerged or at periscope depth.

In favor of the version about external influence on “D-1” (in this case both the command staff and helmsmen died immediately), precisely in the 4th compartment, the following can be said. According to the project, “D-1” had a very “large reserve of buoyancy (45.5%)”, and in the event of a large influx of water into the strong hull of the ship, the ability to control horizontal rudders and decisive actions by the command staff of the central post, “it was able to float to the surface with flooding of any compartment,” including the largest ones - torpedo or diesel (V.I. Dmitriev, “Soviet submarine shipbuilding” - Moscow, Voenizdat, 1990, pp. 39, 51-52).

In addition, if the Decembrist was on the surface, then there would be a top watch on the bridge or in the wheelhouse fence, the commander of the submarine or his assistant. In this case, after the death of the ship, the search forces would be able to find either the surviving submariners of the top watch or the bodies of the sailors. The search for the missing "D-1" by fleet ships began 5 hours after the boat submerged and the start of the combat exercise, i.e., around 19:00 on November 13. But not until November 26, not later, no traces of the dead submariners were found either on the surface of the bay or on the coast, with the exception of the Red Navy cap and pieces of insulation (presumably from the submarine hull).

But a year before the death of the D-1, a disaster had already occurred in the Northern Fleet with the death of most of the crew and the submarine itself, which was on the surface. On October 20, 1939, the submarine of the 2nd division of the brigade "Shch-424" left for a shift on patrol near the Rybachy Peninsula "Shch-404". Actually, she did not reach the patrol line. At the exit from the Kola Bay, not far from Toros Island, it was rammed by the Soviet trawler RT-43 Rybets entering the bay. The submarine was on the surface; on the bridge there was Captain 3rd Rank K. M. Shuisky, acting commander of the Shch-424, and 6 submariners. The trawler hit the Pike on the left side in the area of ​​the 4th compartment. The submarine with a large trim to the stern sank in 2 minutes at a depth of 250 meters. Killed were 29 crew members, a division mechanic of the 1st division of the brigade, captain 3rd rank G. F. Noritsyn and two cadets of the VMU named after. Dzerzhinsky. Everyone who was on the bridge at the time of the disaster was thrown overboard upon impact. In addition, before the Pike disappeared under water, 3 sailors managed to get out of the central post and were also rescued. Rescue ships and fishermen arrived in time and brought on board 10 living crew members of the Shch-424.

But “D-1” disappeared, leaving virtually no traces. It is most likely that the submarine died while it was underwater or at periscope depth, or the true cause of the death of the crew and ship was in another...

In his book “Together with the Fleet,” the former commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral A. G. Golovko, wrote:

“...All sorts of assumptions were made about the causes of death. Some believed that there was an alien submarine in the bay; it allegedly waylaid the D-1 and sank it. Others believed that someone had planted mines in Motovsky Bay and that the boat was blown up by one of them.”

The question arises: “What alien submarine or mines placed by someone can we talk about in a peaceful interwar autumn?”

Why did D-1 die?

There may be several reasons for the death of the D-1.

As already mentioned, the official version of the death of the submarine - due to departure from the maximum diving depth due to the fault of the crew personnel or due to a malfunction of the GR - could indeed have taken place, but it would have been too obvious and superficial.

Keeping it secret true reasons The death of submarines at that time could have been contributed to by:

The beginning (precisely on November 13, 1940, on the day of the submarine’s death) in Berlin of German-Soviet negotiations on the prospects for further cooperation and interstate relations, where each side tested the reliability of its alliance of 1939. At the same time, Germany did not particularly strive to preserve this union, and even vice versa. Already during the negotiations (11/14/1940), Hitler, at a meeting with his generals, noted that in order to achieve victory over England it was necessary to strengthen the Air Force and Navy. At the same time, this would lead to a weakening of the ground forces, while this is not acceptable as long as the threat from Russia remains. According to Hitler, it was impossible to count on Russia remaining indifferent until British resistance was broken;

The desire of the Soviet leadership to at least outwardly demonstrate its neutrality in the outbreak of World War II, in general, and in undermining the economic blockade of the British Isles by Kriegsmarine ships, in particular. At the same time, it tried in every possible way not to aggravate interstate relations with either Germany or Great Britain, while the latter, in order to protect their own interests, did everything to drag their enemy into hostilities with the Soviet Union, thereby scattering its forces.

And here we must say about the presence of a secret German base “Nord” in the Arctic, about which little is reliably known:

1. According to German sources, the location of the base was indicated by coordinates 69º 25" north latitude, 32º 26" east. longitude

2. From December 1939 to April 1940, the senior naval commander of the base was Kapitan zur See Nischlag, and in July 1940, Korvettenkapiten Gaushofer.

3. German supply ships were permanently based here: Viking 5, Sachsenwald, Ködingen, Fenicia (Venice) and Jan Willem. In June-July 1940, the banana transport transport “Iller” was located here, originally intended for the transition to Pacific Ocean along the Northern Sea Route.

There are two secrets at the Nord base (possibly related to each other), the solution of which could provide significant assistance in explaining the need for such a late training exit of D-1 (while all training trips were carried out only in summer months), which became the last for the 55 crew members and the submarine itself.

One of them is the conduct of Operation Fall Grün. This operation probably “revealed” to the British Admiralty the existence of some connection between the secret Nord base and the unexpected appearance of German warships-raiders and submarines in the Pacific Ocean.

Nothing is known about the other secret, except that in 1998 information appeared in open literature (requiring careful verification) about a certain secret mission of the 1st (cruising) division of M. Gadzhiev in 1940. At the same time, it is also indicated here that one of the division’s submarines was killed. Only D-1 could become a lost submarine. But what kind of secret operation it was remains a mystery to this day.

In addition, there is information about one more point of death of the D-1. This is a point with coordinates 70º 52"06"" north latitude 48º 45"05"" east. longitude But this point is located in the southern part of the Barents Sea, approximately 95 miles from the northern tip of Kolguev Island and from the Gusinaya Zemlya Peninsula (on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago). With an understaffed and poorly trained crew, especially during autumn-winter storms, F. M. Eltishchev would hardly have gone so far from the Main Fleet Base. And while “D-1” is not discovered in Motovsky Bay, this point of death “has the right to life.”

Below are offered possible versions death of "D-1".

Version N 1. English Navy.

Considering the great dependence of the English economy on the uninterrupted functioning of maritime shipping, the Admiralty considered one of the main elements of protecting sea communications to be organizing a naval blockade of Kriegsmarine ships within the North and Baltic Seas, as well as organizing a system for convoying its own merchant ships.

However, in reality, with the outbreak of hostilities, everything turned out to be much worse. And already from the first days of the war, the successes of German raiders and submarines showed that most of the Admiralty’s plans remained only “on paper.” By the beginning of 1940, the British felt a shortage of food and many types of industrial raw materials (especially iron ore and forests). In addition, after the capture of Norwegian naval bases, Kriegsmarine submarines were able to no longer go around the British Isles when traveling to combat areas and act much more effectively on allied communications. And already in the summer of 1940, the British Isles were forced to begin living largely off the reserves accumulated earlier. In addition, British intelligence received information that “in Poland the Germans kept only 7 divisions, 2 of which were transferred to the west during the spring campaign” (W. Shirer, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.” - M.: Military Publishing House, 1991. T. 2, p. 185)

The defeat of the Allied forces on the continent created real threat invasion of German troops into the British Isles. At the beginning of July, the British government recognized that Germany would attempt to invade within the next few weeks and began to accept the most emergency measures to strengthen the defense of the islands. Never before has the external threat of defeat for Great Britain been so serious. However, as it turned out later, the actual threat of a landing on the British Isles was not as great as it seemed. Hitler considered the Soviet Union a more formidable force that could not be left in its rear when attacking Great Britain. And already on June 30, 1940, the Chief of the German General Staff, F. Halder, had the first record of the idea of ​​the German leadership to decide first “ eastern problem”, i.e. about the invasion of the USSR (“Military Historical Journal”, N 2, 1959, p. 65). At the same time, the German leadership understood that only the secrecy of preparation and surprise of the attack could produce positive results in the “lightning war” against the Soviet Union. Germany's main potential adversary had to remain confident in the prosperity of German-Soviet friendship and cooperation, while Great Britain had to be in constant voltage and think only about your own protection. And this was facilitated by grandiose disinformation actions, the sole purpose of which was the need to convince both opponents of the complete uncertainty of Germany’s intentions.

Germany succeeded. The preparation of Operations Seelewe and Felix (capture of Gibraltar) attracted all the attention of the world community to the British Isles and, in turn, diverted the attention of the Soviet leadership from the concentration of German troops in the east according to the Otto plan. The Soviet Union continued to treat Germany with full confidence (at least outwardly), fulfilling its trade obligations and carefully delivering strategic raw materials in accordance with the closed commodity lists “B” and “C” of the loan agreement of August 19, 1939 and economic agreements of 1940 and 1941, without suspecting that preparations for the attack had already begun and German troops, mainly from Army Group B (France), began a covert transfer to the borders of the USSR. Initially, German military operations were scheduled for the fall of 1940.

Almost simultaneously, the British Intelligence Committee received “reliable information” that Army Group A had been created for the “invasion” of the British Isles and Operation Seelewe was scheduled for August. Then it was postponed to September 1940. Britain has further intensified its defense preparations.

The British leadership understood that from October-November the time of autumn-winter storms would come in the English Channel and then the use of landing ships and equipment collected by Germany on the coast (for “Zeelewe”) and capable of delivering troops to the British Isles, in the fall of 1940 years will become impossible. And Great Britain did its best to hold out until the onset of these autumn storms. The regrouping of German troops to the eastern direction was completely completed on October 7, 1940, the headquarters of the 4th, 12th, 18th armies and 12 corps, as well as 30 divisions with all weapons and equipment were transferred. On October 12, Hitler canceled the state of readiness of troops for Operation Seelewe, and a month later (December 8) Operation Felix was canceled. But all this became known later.

In July 1940, the British continued to prepare for a possible landing of German troops on the British Isles and continued to look for any means of defense. Probably, one of the methods of defense should have been the “neutralization” of the Nord base.

In November 1940, in the Pacific Ocean, far from the Atlantic Theater of Operations (ATVD), a new raider "Komet" (raider "B", "Ship N 45") appeared, which was in a group with another auxiliary cruiser "Penguin" (raider F , “Ship No. 33”), carried out the destruction of allied transports here with complete impunity. For short time this group sank 9 transports and captured a Dutch transport with natural rubber (due to a shortage of rubber in Germany, civil department vehicles with a carrying capacity of less than 3 tons were supposed to be converted to iron rims).

The passage along the Northern Sea Route to the Pacific Ocean of the German auxiliary cruiser "Komet" (depending on the area of ​​passage bore the names on board: "Semyon Dezhnev", "Danube", "Donau", "Doon", Japanese transport) under the command of frigate Captain Keptel was produced in support of Soviet icebreakers and under the control of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (GU NSR). He showed the Kriegsmarine command that it was possible to travel from Bergen to the Bering Strait in 3.5-4 weeks and did not need to spend several months (if the raider was going through the Suez or Panama Canal). Moreover, under conditions of a naval blockade, the raider might not even have reached the Far East.

07/09/1940 "Komet", disguised as the Soviet icebreaker steamer "Semyon Dezhnev", left Bergen and began moving to east direction. It was one of the fastest (speed up to 15 knots) and well-armed Kriegsmarine raiders, owned by the North German Lloyd company.

With its own displacement of about 7.5 thousand tons, it had a fuel reserve of more than 2 thousand tons, which made it possible to travel almost 50 thousand miles at an economical speed (up to 9 knots) and arrive at the Pacific Ocean without refueling. In terms of its armament, the Komet was superior to the specially built Allied cruisers. It had six 150-mm (according to other sources 180-mm) guns (covered with folding and camouflage shields), up to 10 torpedo tubes (located in the ports and also covered with camouflage shields) with a large supply of torpedoes, 7-9 anti-aircraft installations, 400 anchor mines of the EMC type and a high-speed boat LS, equipped for their secret placement, 2 Arado-196 seaplanes in the hangar. The seaplanes were equipped with special devices to cut off the radio antennas on detected ships, which would not allow these ships to report a raider attack.

Radio communications and radio reconnaissance for the cruiser were provided by 6 radio operators fluent in Russian and English.

An ideal and reliable legend was created to disguise the transition of the Komets. Externally, the Komet really resembled the new Soviet icebreaking steamship Semyon Dezhnev, whose arrival in Arkhangelsk was expected in the summer of 1940. Some differences in the contours of the German raider were eliminated with the help of canvas body kits and special devices made in the factory.

On July 12, while in the area of ​​Cape North Cape, "Komet" received a radiogram from the Main Directorate of the NSR about the start of the escort on August 4-6, in the same radiogram, the senior at the crossing of Kapiten zur Zee R. Eissen received an invitation to wait for the start of the escort in the port of Murmansk.

However, Eyssen, due to reasons of secrecy of the Fall Grün operation, officially rejected this proposal, and the Komet, as the Soviet transport Danube, according to the official version, independently headed to the Pechora Bay area, where it remained for more than a month.

Since July 15, the werewolf raider in the bay was awaiting the passage of the ships of the EON-10 expedition and, probably, the arrival of the real Dezhnev in the area. Before the start of Arctic navigation in 1940, the Soviet trust "Arktikugol" planned to charter the real "Dezhnev" to provide cargo transportation in the area of ​​​​the island of Spitsbergen, between the villages of Barentsburg, Grumant City and Pyramid. But the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route made changes to the Arktikugol plans and in August-September the ship was sent to deliver cargo to polar stations in the little-explored areas of the islands of the Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea.

In early August, the real "Semyon Dezhnev" began his Arctic navigation of 1940. During the voyage, the ship's crew accepted the challenge of the crew of the steamer "Stalingrad" to a competition, and in turn called the crew of the icebreaking steamer "Sibiryakov" to the competition, notifying them of this by radiograms.

On August 5, 1940, the submarine Shch-423 (commander captain 3rd rank I. M. Zaidulin, backup commander senior lieutenant A. M. Bystrov) left Polyarny for the Far East as part of a special-purpose expedition (EON-10).

In the history of preparations for the passage of the submarine “Shch-423” along the Northern Sea Route, there is one feature that may have fatally influenced the fate of the “D-1” crew. Unlike the combat training of the other submarines of the brigade, the Pike practiced all its naval tasks in Motovsky Bay. This was probably determined by the installation of an anti-ice “coat” on the submarine’s hull, but after information appeared in the English press about the joint transition of a German ship and a submarine to the Far East, in the ORC this training feature could easily be associated with the Nord base and the presence in the base special group of submarines.

On August 14, the real “Dezhnev”, having passed the Matochkin Shar Strait in Novaya Zemlya, encountered the first ice in the Kara Sea. "Komet", finishing its long stay in the Pechora Bay, began preparations for the transition to the Novaya Zemlya area.

By August 16, a representative of the German embassy, ​​Krepsch, who had been with the assistant of the German naval attache on the ship Venice (at the Nord base) since July 19, appeared on board the Comet, checking the state of affairs of the base.

After completing the passage along the NSR, which the raider completed in record short term- 23 days, of which only 15 were running (during a normal transition, convoys of ships and vessels spent at least 26 days), Krepsh (according to other sources - Krepsht) at the Ailinglop point transferred to the special supply vessel Regensburg and through Tokyo and Vladivostok immediately returned to Moscow to the German naval attaché von Baumbach.

If "Komet" did not enter ports Kola Peninsula, then how and for what purpose did this “representative” of the German embassy end up on board the raider? After all, he could have gotten to Moscow more conveniently and comfortably via the Kirov Railway? Maybe the cruiser did visit the Nord base or Murmansk?

The secrecy and secrecy of the raider's transition from west to east was maintained, but, apparently, in October some information still reached the British Isles and the English Admiralty.

On November 2, 1940 (10 days before the disappearance of “D-1”), the State Technical University of the NKVD of the USSR informed its leadership that one of the English newspapers published an article about the piloting of a submarine and a German steamship into the Arctic navigation in 1940 from west to east. And without a doubt, these ships were considered as one unit. (In addition, “Komet” began its movement to the Far East from Gotenhafen, where in July 1940 the 27th flotilla of German submarines was created specifically for tactical training of Kriegsmarine submarine commanders. “Komet” could probably have officers as part of its crew or passengers from this flotilla).

In this case, the Shch-423 was clearly considered by the English ORC to be a German submarine, which, paired with a surface raider, went to conduct combat operations in the Pacific Ocean. After all, it was October 1940 that became the most successful for the submariners of Rear Admiral Doenitz. German submarines sank 63 allied transports in a month.

During this time, the real “Dezhnev” actually visited 15 points in the Arctic and returned to Murmansk in November 1940, and then in early December went to Spitsbergen to work in Ice Fiord.

On November 5, 1940, the Kriegsmarine launched a new attack on the Royal Navy. The German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer attacked and destroyed the allied convoy HX-84 coming from Halifax. At the same time, 5 transports and the English auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay, which was guarding them, were destroyed. Two other convoys from Halifax and a convoy from Bermuda were returned to base. Economic, financial and combat losses were great. But as mentioned above, once every nineteen days the cruiser met with support ships, which, before arriving in the waiting area, had to break through the line of the English naval blockade or, thanks to the Nord base, safely bypass it.

Consequently, a secret base on the Kola Peninsula could still exist.

The secretive and rapid passage of the "Komet" along the Northern Sea Route, its successful actions against allied transports in the Pacific Ocean and the successful actions of the "Admiral Scheer" in the Atlantic, the unusual preparation of the "Shch-423" in Motovsky Bay, combined with each other, easily turned into English Admiralty as a “strong irritant” and a kind of “mine detonator”, which possibly sank the D-1.

The British knew the location of the Nord base with great certainty from captured crew members of supply ships. The Motovsky Bay area was also well known to the Admiralty since 1930, when Royal Navy warships (guarding fishing trawlers in the fishing area off the coast of the Kola Peninsula) replenished their fresh water supplies here and settled in bad weather. According to reports from the Main Directorate of the Border Guard and the OGPU troops, in March-April 1930 alone, British ships (including the cruiser) came here more than 5 times and were in the bay for up to 12 hours.

Later, in August 1937, a foreign submarine (most likely an English one) was discovered by Soviet ships in the area of ​​the Polyarnoye Main Naval Base under construction. After discovery, the submarine sank and left the Kola Bay. Later it turned out that the same boat landed a reconnaissance group on the Kola coast, and then also quietly removed it.

All the events taken together allow us to conclude that the appearance of an English hunter submarine in the area of ​​the Kola or Motovsky bays on November 13, 1940, which would search for German submarines, is quite possible. Moreover, in November 1940, the British Admiralty hardly knew that on September 5 the Germans had decided to liquidate the base and that in November the success of using German submarines would decrease by more than 2 times and would remain on average within these limits until the end 1941.

Version N 2. Secret minefield.

It is just as realistic to consider the installation of an English minefield at the entrance to Motovsky Bay or Zapadnaya Litsa Bay (i.e., in Soviet territorial waters), including one disguised as a defensive barrier of the Nord base.

Blowing up a Soviet ship at this barrier would not have caused an armed conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, but would have deprived Soviet-German relations of trust, and therefore would have “neutralized” the Nord base itself.

The use of British submarines for laying minelayers in the Second World War was generally limited, but it was in 1940 that the Admiralty was forced to actively use its minelayer submarines to impede the exit of German raiders, including from Norwegian bases. At the same time, out of 7 specially built underwater minelayers, 3 were lost, including the Narual, which died under unknown circumstances, according to official data, on 08/01/1940 in the Norwegian Sea.

The secret placement of an English minefield in the territorial waters of a neutral state that provided assistance to Germany had already been carried out previously. On April 8, 1940, off the coast of Norway, in order to prevent a possible German landing, British ships laid minefields on the approaches to Narvik, Trondheim and Bode within a three-mile zone.

For the sake of protecting its own sea communications in the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as to prevent the use of the Nord base as a potential stronghold for a German landing on the British Isles from the rear, the Royal Navy could actually lay mines on the approach to the Nord base, perhaps even excluding the appearance of Soviet ships in the Gulf.

The British knew about the seasonality of firing training by ships of the Northern Fleet (summer months of the year) and the firing area (shallow waters) White Sea). This was probably confirmed by the report of the commander of the submarine that arrived in the Polyarny area in August 1937.

Consequently, for the English ORC, the “D-1” and PBS “Umba” that appeared in Motovsky Bay could become the 2nd group preparing to move to the Far East (let’s assume, the southern route). At the same time, they probably became the first warships to enter the Motovsky Bay after the storm that raged in the Barents Sea since November 7.

The English commander could have information that only German submarines from the Nord base can practice their naval missions in Motovsky Bay, as did the submarine (“Shch-423” - which had just moved to the Pacific Ocean together with the raider). auto.).

Therefore, “D-1” as a “German submarine” could have been torpedoed by mistake by an English hunter submarine.

True, it is difficult to talk about versions of an explosion at a minefield or as a result of a hit by torpedoes of an English submarine, since observers or gunners of the 4th battery of the 104th PAP at Cape Vyev-Navolok should have heard the explosion. But they didn't hear anything.

But we cannot deny this version until the D-1 itself is lifted or inspected.

Version N 3. Kriegsmarine.

In April-May 1940, Germany occupied Norway, gaining free access to the North Atlantic and the North Sea, practically ensuring the safety of its maritime transport of iron ore and strategic raw materials (including in transit through the Soviet Union or the Northern Sea Route) and allowing its Navy sufficient hunt freely on the trade routes of allied coastal shipping. The need for the existence and use of the secret “Base” Nord, always closely connected with the individual opinion of the Soviet leadership, has practically disappeared.

On September 5, 1940, the Kriegsmarine decided to liquidate the secret base in Western Litsa.

One of the reasons for Germany’s refusal to further use the Nord base could be the establishment of control of the Northern Fleet over Motovsky Bay. In November 1939, the 6th battery of the 104th gun artillery regiment was deployed in the western part of the bay, and on Cape Vyev-Navolok - the 4th battery of the 104th PAP, armed with 152-mm guns that were capable of only protect the base from uninvited guests, but also cover any target in Motovsky Bay.

Perhaps the submarine died as a result of the liquidation activities of the Nord base.

To maintain the secrecy of liquidation measures, the evacuation of property was probably carried out in the dark. Departure at this time of day was necessary for the German ships in order to leave Soviet territorial waters before dawn and break away from the sea areas off the coast of the Kola Peninsula. In addition, the exit of the transports was probably carried out without notifying the Soviet observation posts, since the ships of the Northern Fleet were based in Polyarny and the Zapadnaya Litsa Bay was quite far away from them.

Thus, "D-1", which surfaced after self-execution training tasks, on the possible route of the ship leaving the Nord base on November 13, 1940, in the dark it could easily be mistaken for an English submarine carrying out reconnaissance here, or sunk in an accidental collision.

The fact that the ramming strike, if it took place, was accidental (and probably not noticeable to the crew of the ship or transport) is indicated by the fact that on April 30, 1941, the German naval attaché (probably von Baumbach) made a report to General Staff about the presence of three D-type submarines in the Northern Fleet. The reliability of the information in the report was quite high (only 2 K-type submarines, which arrived at Polyarnoye in August 1940, the D-2, which went to Leningrad for modernization, and the lost D-1, were not taken into account).

This report contained the latest reliable information about the composition of the Northern Fleet as of September 1939 (in September 1939, "D-2" left for Leningrad) and was received by the German naval attache no earlier than November 1939 (it took into account the death of "Shch-424" October 20, 1939).

Therefore, it did not contain information about the new cruising submarines of the fleet and the death of the D-1.

In turn, this allows us to conclude that the Kriegsmarine command had no information about the incident in Motovsky Bay on November 13, 1940.

This can be explained by the fact that either the collision was invisible to the crew of the foreign ship, or the ship that collided with the D-1 did not reach its base.

On November 18, minesweepers with a metal detector in the area of ​​Cape Vyev-Navolok, at a distance of 18-20 cable lengths from the shore, discovered a second point - a large metal object (approximately 69º 29" north latitude 33º 03" 8"" east longitude). The lack of survey data suggests that at this point there may be an English submarine (or another vessel or ship, including a German one), which accidentally collided with the D-1.

In 1940, the Royal Navy lost six submarines (including the underwater minelayer Narwhal). At the same time, for unknown reasons, closest to November 13, the following disappeared:

However, the possible laying of mines in the territorial waters of a neutral state is an operation of particular importance and secrecy. It would be naive to believe that information about the areas where minefields were laid in 1940 would “surface” in the archives: the Barents Sea, the Kola Bay or the Motovsky Bay.

We must not forget that there is still no complete information and about the disappearance of the Polish submarine "Ozel" (passed to the allies in June 1940), as well as the fate of the Norwegian submarine "V-1" and 4 Dutch submarines - "K-14", "K-15", "O- 21" and "Zvardis".

There is no complete information yet about the disappearance of British boats and submarines that went over to the Allies (acting according to the plans of the English Admiralty), as well as about the second large metal object at the bottom of Motovsky Bay. This version will exist, and it would be premature to rule out the participation of the British Royal Navy in the death of D-1.

In addition, as mentioned above, the 1st division of the SF submarine brigade, which at that time consisted of two new cruising submarines of the "K" type and two large submarines of the "D" type, completed a secret mission in the late autumn of 1940 (the submarines were at sea for more than two months). Perhaps it was connected with the autumn general naval maneuvers to practice landing and anti-landing operations. Indeed, according to the operational plan, the Northern Fleet was supposed to solve, among other tasks, “conducting cruising operations of submarines on sea communications off the western coast of Norway and in the Skagerrak Strait” (Northern Fleet of Russia. - Murmansk, 1996, p. 83).

However, it should be noted that apart from the mention of this task in the “Encyclopedia of Military Art” (dedicated to famous sailors and submariners of the 20th century), no other references to the operation have yet been found.

Version N 5. The will of chance.

According to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, of the 404 mines laid by Soviet ships in January 1940 to block the approaches to Petsamo and the western part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas, by the end of 1940, 88 were found torn from their anchors and drifting under the influence of wind and waves. From November 6-7, 1940, a hurricane raged over Rybachy for almost a week, and there was strong storm. The mines placed in the Petsamo area could have been brought into any bay or Rybachy Bay, especially since the resulting vector of currents in Motovsky Bay is directed precisely towards the southern coast.

Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the D-1 could be detonated by a random floating mine.

The eastern regions of the Kola Peninsula have been well known to the Royal Navy since the First World War. At the beginning of the war, Russian minesweepers in the North were weak. Therefore, in the second half of 1915, 8 English technical units of special construction came to Arkhangelsk to ensure the delivery of goods by allied transport. The English ships were allocated an area northwest of Iokanga. In the second half of 1916, the British set up an anti-submarine barrier in the Iokang roadstead, since in the summer the British began to base themselves here warships, including the cruiser Iphigenia.

It was in the anti-submarine network in the fall of 1937 that the submarine “D-3” (commander - M.N. Popov) fell into the anti-submarine network off the Murmansk coast. She was returning to the base and found on the route of movement large group fishing trawlers. Judging by the further actions of the boat commander, the trawlers belonged to Great Britain or Norway. The submarine commander decided to bypass these trawlers in a submerged position. Having submerged, the D-3 fell into an anti-submarine network, not indicated on the map, and lost the ability to move and be controlled. For about an hour, the boat, changing its course, tried to escape from the underwater trap.

When this was possible, the density of the electrolyte in the battery allowed the submarine in the submerged position “D-3” to move in the direction of Polyarny.

Only in the evening she surfaced. The crew discovered that the submarine's hull and the wheelhouse fence were entangled in anti-submarine nets left over from the First World War. In this case, damage to the submarine's rudders was detected. For their courage and self-control, part of the crew was rewarded by the commander of the Northern Fleet.

Similar anti-submarine barriers were also installed in the Kola Bay (area of ​​Sedlovaty Island - Cape Belokamenka), and a chainmail boom was placed in front of the entrance to Catherine Harbor, where 3 British submarines were based since 1916.

Since Motovsky Bay was an area that British ships used until 1930 (and possibly longer) to replenish fresh water supplies and make minor repairs, it can theoretically be assumed that anti-submarine nets could have been deployed here too. Considering that "D-1" could have a position error of up to 2.7 miles towards the southern shore, then, if there were nets here, it could fall into this trap and not break away from it.

The submarine trap could also be of natural origin: a narrow crevice between stone blocks on the ground or a rocky “peak” not indicated on the map on the southern coast of Motovsky Bay. But, I repeat, this version is the most unrealistic.

Conclusions.

The disappearance of the submarine "D-1" may mean that the following happened.

1). "D-1" was sunk by an English submarine that was carrying out topographical reconnaissance of the coast of Motovsky Bay or that had specially come to destroy another German submarine from the Nord base, which was preparing to move from Zapadnaya Litsa to the Pacific Ocean;

2). "D-1" was mistaken for one of the British submarines conducting reconnaissance off the Soviet coast. In this case, like an English submarine, she could be destroyed by a German transport or warship;

3). “D-1” came under an accidental ramming attack by a German ship or transport leaving the “Nord” base during its liquidation activities;

4). “D-1” was blown up on an English (unlikely, German) minefield placed on the approaches to the Nord base or on a drifting mine;

5). A navigation accident occurred due to the loss of the ability to surface;

6). The submarine went beyond the maximum diving depth due to a malfunction of the GR or due to a personnel error in the middle part of Motovsky Bay.

The brevity of the content of a particular version depends on the availability of materials and documents or real events that occurred in the Northern Fleet before November 1940. Later, perhaps, new versions of the death of “D-1” will appear, since it is already known that the ship’s military commissar, senior political instructor P. M. Prokhorenko led personal diary. After the sinking of the boat, the military commissar’s wife was visited twice by a “submariner mechanic”, at the same time a neighbor communal apartment, and in the rudest form demanded to give up this diary (V.V. Sorokazherdyev. The sea kept the secret. - Murmansk, 1996, p. 30). The submariner of the SF submarine brigade was unlikely to demand a diary in such a tone. Perhaps it can be found in some special storage facility.

Soon it will be 65 years since the 1st submarine of the Northern Fleet with its entire crew disappeared not far from the Main Base. In any case, the submariners of the “Decembrist” deserved to be remembered and to unveil a monument to the founder of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet.

The primary elements in solving the mystery of the death of “D-1” remain the detection and inspection of the ship on the ground, and, if possible, its recovery.

Reliable sources of information about the disaster at present can be the German naval archives, the above-mentioned Collection of Captured Documents, and possibly documents from the English Admiralty.

Presumably "D-1" may be located:

In the former training ground No. 6: 69º 33"2"" north latitude 32º 47"2"" east. longitude;

69º 33"2"" north latitude 33º east longitude;

69º 30" north latitude 33º east longitude;

69º 30" north latitude 32º 51" 2"" east longitude;

69º 30"7"" north latitude 32º 47"2"" east latitude longitude;

In the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island 69º 29"1"" north latitude 32º 54"7"" east. longitude;

In the area of ​​cape Vyev-Navolok 69º 29" north latitude 33º 03" 8"" east. longitude

Funds for conducting a search operation and installing a monument can be obtained from:

From all-Russian voluntary donations for the Monument to the first submariners of the Northern Fleet;

From the funds of the Administrations of the regions whose natives were the deceased submariners;

In agreement with the governments of Germany and Great Britain.

If it is not possible to raise the submarine, then it will be necessary to raise the fence of the conning tower or the submarine’s artillery gun to install them on a Memorial declaring the place of the sinking of the submarine “D-1” a Memorial Site of the Northern Fleet.

Sergey Kovalev,

On October 6, 1986, a Soviet nuclear submarine sank strategic purpose K-219. It was one of the most dangerous submarines of that time. K-219 combined a submarine and a missile depot capable of bringing about the end of the world. Soon after the dive and departure towards the United States, a leak was discovered in one of the shafts, which ultimately led to the complete depressurization of the compartment. As a result, the rocket inside exploded, causing the release of a huge amount of harmful substances into the ocean. Today we will talk about five equally dangerous submarines left at the bottom of the oceans.

This American nuclear submarine died on April 10, 1963 in Atlantic Ocean near Boston with the entire crew. It was impossible to immediately determine the cause of the sinking, because at some point the connection with the boat was simply lost. Subsequently, based on numerous photographs, it became clear that, most likely, the boat was depressurized and, due to water that got inside, a short circuit occurred, which led to the shutdown of the reactor.

Video

USS Thresher

K-8. Killed during a training exercise

The submarine, which was on combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea, was sent to the North Atlantic region to participate in the largest exercise in the history of the Soviet Navy, Ocean-70. Its task was to designate the “enemy’s” submarine forces breaking through to the shores of the Soviet Union. On April 8, 1970, as a result of a fire in one of the compartments, the boat sank off the coast of Spain, where it is still located. The boat had four nuclear torpedoes.

Video

Submarine K-8

K-27 - legendary boat

Before its crash, the Soviet boat was a ship that won various awards; its crew included admirals and Heroes of the Soviet Union. But due to an accident that occurred on it in 1968, it was decided to exclude the submarine from the Navy and sink it in the Barents Sea. Nuclear reactor mothballed, the boat was sunk in the Kara Sea and is still at a depth of 75 m. In 2013, a project was adopted to raise the boat from the bottom for further disposal.

Video

The last trip of the “Goldfish” K-27

K-278 "Komsomolets" - third generation submarine

This Soviet submarine holds the absolute record for diving depth - 1027 m. It sank in the Norwegian Sea on April 7, 1989. A fire broke out in one of the compartments, as a result of which she sank with her entire supply of torpedo shells.

Video

Nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets"

K-141 "Kursk"

This boat sank in the Barents Sea at a depth of 108 m as a result of a disaster that occurred on August 12, 2000. All 118 crew members on board were killed. The submarine sank during an exercise. On board the boat there were 24 P-700 Granit cruise missiles and 24 torpedoes. Several versions of the death of this boat have been put forward, including a torpedo explosion, a mine explosion, torpedoing, and a collision with another object.

Video

Until the sad date - the anniversary of the nuclear submarine tragedy, former pride Russian fleet has only a month left. And the closer it is, the stronger the pain is felt.

“Why didn’t they save the people?” – the question of what happened on August 12, 2000 in the Barents Sea remains open many years after the tragedy. Then the third day of Russian Navy exercises took place. K-141 "Kursk" - the pride of the Russian fleet, a nuclear-powered ship the size of two huge aircraft - looked like an unshakable pillar.

The explosion that reached Alaska

There were 118 people on board the submarine. On August 11, the work done by the Kursk was observed from the ship Pyotr Velikiy, which was also undergoing exercises. He successfully completed firing missiles and went to another sector of the exercise. Afterwards it was planned to launch torpedoes at surface ships. But on August 12, three submarines completed the task, but the Kursk remained silent.

The explosion occurred at 11.28 am - so powerful that it was recorded even in Alaska. Experts say its strength was equivalent to an earthquake measuring 4.2 on the Richter scale. A couple of minutes later there was a second explosion. Communication with the submarine ceased, and by the end of the day the Kursk was declared “emergency.”

On August 13, hydroacoustics found the nuclear-powered ship. He was lying on the seabed. The rescuers who were on the Peter the Great, which led the operation, were sure that they heard knocks similar to SOS signals.

Two ships, the Altai and the Rudnitsky, were sent to the site to provide electricity and oxygen to the sunken sailors. Three attempts to get the submariners out of the boat using rescue capsules ended in nothing. The two emergency hatches available on the Kursk were inaccessible. It was possible to exit only through the third and last one, which was located above the ninth compartment, where a special coaming platform was equipped. Almost zero visibility and strong underwater currents did not allow the sailors to be rescued from captivity.

Distress signals were received five days later. The government was convinced that the submariners would live for at least 5-6 days: there was still time. But all new attempts failed due to bad weather.

On August 20, Norwegian specialists began work. They managed to turn the Kursk valve, but were unable to lift the lid. On August 21, the hatch was opened. No survivors were found here.

Mysterious SOS sounds

Vladimir Ustinov, who served as Prosecutor General from 2000 to 2006, wrote in the book “The Truth about Kursk” that the sailors on the submarine died long before help arrived. According to the Prosecutor General, after the second explosion, the crews of the sixth, seventh and eighth compartments moved into the potentially life-saving ninth compartment, where they died of suffocation in a room where there was a lot of carbon monoxide.

Advocate Boris Kuznetsov Following this book, he published his own - as if an addition to the official’s publication: “She drowned... The truth about the Kursk, which was hidden by Prosecutor General Ustinov.”

Kuznetsov argued: no matter how many times the Prosecutor General repeated his lie that the submariners died very quickly, the statement would not become more truthful. In his opinion, the people who were imprisoned in water frantically hammered with a sledgehammer or other heavy object on the walls for at least two days. Their SOS signals were caught and recorded by Peter the Great.

As the midshipman of Peter the Great said Fedor N. about the events of that day, he also heard the signals being given. They were very deaf, they resembled an alarm bell, he even had doubts that they were knocking on iron. Later it turned out that the signals did not come from the nuclear submarine - the only surviving people could only be in the ninth compartment, but a day later they were dead, which is a proven fact. And the investigation was never able to identify the unnamed sailor who was sending signals from the underwater part of a certain ship.

Emergency torpedo version

In "The Empty Pier" Vladimir Shigin it is said that on August 12, the nuclear-powered ship was supposed to fire blanks at surface ships. The author explained that this type of shell has been used by the Russian Navy for more than two decades. But the Kursk torpedo was different from previous models: it contained a different battery. Therefore, representatives of the plant and military acceptance were present at the scene of the accident on the day when news of the crash arrived. There were reports that the submarine commander Gennady Lyachin Even before the tragedy, he asked for permission to shoot the emergency torpedo. But this version was not confirmed by the author of the book. Shigin writes that if Lyachin had actually informed management about the emergency on the submarine, the torpedo attack would have been canceled or postponed to another time.

Now everyone knows for sure that the nuclear submarine crashed due to a shell explosion in the first torpedo compartment. But the root cause is still unclear, the author writes. It could not explode on its own, since the engineers structurally incorporated a multi-stage protection system. The only thing that could serve as a catalyst was a strong external influence. Perhaps it was an underwater ram. Theoretically, this could happen when Russian boat floated up, and the foreign one sank - if there really was one.

Three versions, three riddles

According to the first, most obvious and officially recognized by the government version, the K-141 Kursk sank to the bottom due to the explosions of the torpedoes on it. 65-76A "Kit" exploded in torpedo tube No. 4 after a fuel leak, causing other shells to detonate.

The second version put forward by the Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet Mikhail Motsak and fleet commander Vyacheslav Popov, said that the Kursk had collided with another submarine - most likely American or British. Vice Admiral Motsak said that near the nuclear-powered ship there were “a lot of indirect signs of the presence of a second underwater object, also possibly an emergency one.” According to him, the foreign object was detected by the sonar equipment of Peter the Great. It was also noticed by sailors who were engaged in removing emergency buoys from the water.

In the third version, which the former Deputy Prime Minister leaned towards Ilya Klebanov, it was said that the Kursk ran into an anti-ship mine from the Great Patriotic War, and then the shell detonated. But experts said that even a small atomic explosion would not be enough to destroy this submarine, so the version seemed untenable.

When will the “secret” classification be lifted?

About 15 years after the tragedy, information appeared that the government was preparing to organize a commission that would determine the possibility of disclosing the true causes of the death of the Kursk.

The secrecy stamp was imposed for 30 years, but, according to the head of the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense Igor Permyakov, documents about the tragedy may be disclosed before this date - if the government decides so.

Post-war losses of the USSR submarine fleet
After the end of the Second World War, a new confrontation began - the Cold War. The guns did not fire, the planes did not bomb the enemy, and the ships did not exchange artillery and missile salvoes, but this did not protect against dozens of losses human lives. And some of the biggest losses on the fronts " cold war" suffered the submarine sailors.

In the post-war period, the Soviet fleet lost nine boats, including three nuclear-powered ones. In addition, many boats were seriously damaged, and the nuclear-powered K-429 sank, but was subsequently raised and put back into operation. At first, the destruction of submarines in the USSR concerned only diesel submarines. Between 1952 and 1968, people died from various reasons six boats, including one at the base, while several more boats were damaged in the explosion. A total of 357 people died. Accidents also occurred on nuclear boats during this period, but all of them were accomplished without “irretrievable losses” in technology.

The sunken submarines of the USSR belonged to different fleets: two boats each from the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets. On April 12, 1970, the Soviet nuclear submarine K-8 was lost, on board of which there was a fire during a military campaign. It was fires that became the main problem of Soviet submariners, regularly breaking out on boats of various projects. The crew fought the fire for four days, but were unable to save the boat, and the flames “took” the lives of 52 crew members.

The next year, it was a miracle that she didn’t die. nuclear boat K-56, which received a hole as a result of a collision with the scientific vessel Akademik Berg. The accident cost the lives of 27 sailors who battened down the compartment and saved the lives of others. This was followed by a long period of calm. Largest quantity The number of sunken submarines in the USSR dates back to the 1980s, marked by glasnost and perestroika. And if the death of the diesel boat S-178 on October 21, 1981 did not cause a resonance (collision with a cargo ship), then the death of the nuclear-powered K-219 in October 1986 had great publicity. For three days in the Sargasso Sea, the crew fought the fire, but the boat could not be saved. Fortunately, only four people died.

In the interval between the two accidents, on June 24, 1983, the K-429, which went out for testing after repairs, sank. As a result, the boat took on water during the dive, and incorrect actions by the crew led to the boat sinking to the bottom. 104 people made it to the surface, and another 16 died. The boat was later raised and returned to service.

But the most famous sinking of a submarine in the USSR occurred on April 7, 1989, when, as a result of a fire and subsequent flooding, it sank newest boat"Komsomolets" returning from combat duty. 42 sailors were killed in the accident. It is worth noting that the death of submarines in the USSR occurred much more often than in the United States, which lost only two of its nuclear submarines.

There were also losses in Russian time. And if the K-159 towed for scrapping cannot be considered a full-fledged combat boat, then the death on August 12, 2000 of the Project 945A nuclear submarine cruiser Kursk was a real tragedy, which led to the death of 118 submariners.

Finally, we note that sunken submarines of the USSR are located in all parts of the world, from their native shores to the Sargasso Sea, Hawaiian Islands and the Bay of Biscay, indicating the location of the Cold War front line.