Crimean campaigns 1687 1689 commander. The Holy League and the Crimean Campaigns of V.V.

The Bakhchisarai peace did not bring peace Ottoman Empire. Disillusioned with the Ukrainian lands, the Sultan turned his eyes to the west, where another seeker of Ottoman vassalage appeared - the Hungarian Calvinist nobleman Imre Tekeli. In 1678, he led an uprising in Hungary against the Austrian Habsburgs, and four years later he called on the Sultan for help, becoming his vassal. The support of part of the Hungarian nobility led by Tekeli gave the Turks the opportunity to conquer all of Hungary and defeat the Austrian Habsburgs.

However, the Turkish campaign against Vienna in 1683 ended in disaster for them. They were defeated at the walls of the Austrian capital by an army of Austrians, Germans and Poles led by the Polish king Jan Sobieski who came to its aid. This victory marked the beginning of the gradual ousting of the Turks from Central Europe. In 1684, a Catholic church was created to fight them. Holy League as part of Austria, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Venice.

Representatives of the League, primarily Poland, invited Russia to join as allies. For her, participation in a large European coalition gave her a chance to defeat the Crimean Khanate. Moscow agreed, subject to the settlement of relations with Warsaw. After two years of negotiations, the Poles, who were experiencing difficulties in the war with the Turks, agreed to sign the “Eternal Peace” (1686) with the government of the Russian princess Sophia. It meant Poland’s recognition of the borders outlined by the Andrusovo Truce, as well as the assignment of Kyiv and Zaporozhye to Russia.

For the first time since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the policy of the Russian State in relation to Crimean Khanate acquires an active offensive character. The government of Princess Sophia, whose foreign policy activities were in charge of Prince Vasily Golitsyn, sets the task of conquering Crimea and access to the Black Sea.

From this moment a new stage of the Russian-Crimean struggle begins. Now, to its main task - the protection of peasant labor - is added the goal of reaching south sea, which was associated with economic growth country and the expansion of its foreign trade needs. To achieve this new strategic goal, Russia already needed to crush the power of the Ottoman Empire. And in this historical period, the Crimean Khanate was destined for almost a whole century to play the role of the leading edge of Turkish defense or a buffer on the path of the economic and military-political aspirations of the Russian State.

But the Khanate became a barrier on Russia’s path not only to the sea. The attack on Crimea was also seen in Moscow as a step towards the spread of Russian influence on the Orthodox Christians of South-Eastern Europe, who were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. It is unlikely that the government of Sophia suspected that by joining the Holy League, Russia was embarking on a long and complicated path of dividing the Ottoman possessions. It will stretch for more than two centuries, becoming one of the most important areas foreign policy Russia. On this path she will be destined to win glorious victories, endure heavy losses, bitter disappointments and fierce rivalry between European powers.

And it was Crimea that was destined by historical fate to become the first center around which, at the end of the 17th century, the Eastern Question began to arise for Moscow, which meant the struggle for the division of the possessions of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of Orthodox peoples from its power. Subsequently, this led Russia to a series of sentimental alliances, often based not on practical goals, but on issues of ideology and assistance to Orthodox brothers. Built on spiritual connections and emotions, such alliances were characterized by high expectations, but instead sometimes brought grief and problems. During the period of the country's economic lag behind the leading world powers, the continuation of such a policy began to border on adventurism, which ended in defeat in Eastern war (1853-1856).

But all this was still far away. In the meantime, the beginning of the journey was laid by the royal decree of October 22, 1686 on the campaign to Crimea. The royal letter explained the reasons for the break in peace this way. It noted that the war begins to rid the Russian land of unbearable insults and humiliation; Nowhere do the Crimeans bring so many prisoners as from here, they sell Christians like cattle, they curse the Orthodox faith. But this is not enough: the Russian kingdom pays an annual tribute to the Crimea, for which it suffers shame and reproaches from neighboring sovereigns, but still does not protect its borders with this tribute: the khan takes the money and dishonors Russian messengers, ruins Russian cities; from Turkish Sultan there is no control over him.

However, not everyone in the Russian State was supporters the coming war. Thus, in a conversation with the Moscow clerk E. Ukraintsev, the Ukrainian hetman I. Samoilovich put forward reasons for the unprofitability of this conflict for Russia: “There will be no profit for the states of expansion, there is nothing to own before the Danube - everything is empty, and beyond the Danube it is far away. The Wallachians have all disappeared, and even if they existed, they are fickle people, they succumb to everything; The Polish king will take them for himself: why should they quarrel with him over them? Enough of the old quarrels! Crimea cannot be conquered or retained by any means. Fight for the Church of God? A holy and great intention, but not without difficulty. The Greek Church remains oppressed there, and until the holy will of God it remains so; and here, near the great sovereigns, the Polish king is persecuting the Church of God; he has ruined all Orthodoxy in Poland and Lithuania, despite treaties with the great sovereigns.” The Hetman believed that “The whole of Crimea cannot be conquered with one campaign; Let's take the towns - the Turks will come and begin to mine them, but it is difficult for us to defend them, because the army must be withdrawn from there for the winter, and if we leave them there, then from hunger and from the pestilence there, many will die and be exterminated. “And most importantly,” the hetman finished his speech, “I don’t trust the Poles: they are deceitful and fickle people and eternal enemies to the people of Moscow and our Cossacks.” In response, Ukrainians could put forward mainly only ideological motives: “if we are not in this union, then there will be shame and hatred from all Christians, everyone will think that we are closer to the Busurmans than to Christians.”

However, on this issue Samoilovich had his own opinion. “Under the Turkish yoke,” the hetman noted in a letter to Moscow, “there are peoples of the Orthodox Greek faith, Wallachians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Serbs, followed by numerous Greeks, who are all hiding from their father’s authorities and are consoled by the name of the Russian tsars, hoping someday get joy from them. If, through the entry of the royal majesties into an alliance, the Caesar of Rome and the King of Poland were lucky enough to take possession of the Turkish regions and force the local peoples to a union, in Jerusalem itself to raise the Roman Church and lower Orthodoxy, then all Orthodox peoples would receive insatiable pity from this.”

In general, the hetman considered this war unnecessary, ruinous and capable of doing more harm than good. According to a number of researchers, the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, which maintained the balance of power in the region, was also disadvantageous to him. The disappearance of Crimea meant the strengthening of Moscow’s regional influence, and, accordingly, the possibility of limiting the autonomy of Ukraine. Many subsequent events showed the foresight of the Ukrainian hetman, who knew the problems of the region closely. But they didn’t listen to him then.

The first campaign against Crimea took place in May 1687. It was attended by Russian-Ukrainian troops under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. Up to 100 thousand people set out on the campaign. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. For the first time, the number of cavalry units was lower than the infantry units, which are gradually becoming the backbone of the Russian armed forces.

Meanwhile, the collected power, sufficient for a military victory over the Khanate, turned out to be powerless in the face of nature. The troops had to go through tens of kilometers of deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, issues of supply and studying the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Their insufficient elaboration by Golitsyn, who, being a good diplomat, turned out to be an inexperienced military leader, contributed to the failure of his undertaking. Striving for military glory and strengthening the position of Princess Sophia, the prince did not bother to calculate all the “ravines” of his enterprise.

As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, people literally fell off their feet. Hundreds of kilometers of open steppe turned into a nightmare for infantry and artillery. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before seeing the Crimeans, ordered to turn back.

The unsuccessful campaign caused the intensification of raids by Crimean troops on the territory of Ukraine and the removal of Hetman Samoilovich, who openly expressed disagreement with Moscow’s policies in his circle. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman initiated the burning of the steppe because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, which served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected I.S. as the new hetman. Mazepa.

The second campaign began in February 1689. Now Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring, so as not to have a shortage of water and grass, and also not to be afraid of steppe fires. An army of 112 thousand people was assembled for the campaign. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. The trek to Perekop lasted almost three months. The troops approached Crimea on the eve of the hot summer.

On May 16, Golitsyn had a skirmish with the Khan’s troops in the Black Valley. The Crimean cavalry overthrew the Russians and drove them into the convoy. However, after volleys of Russian artillery, the Crimean attack fizzled out and was never resumed. Having repulsed the onslaught, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. The governor did not dare to storm them. He was confused not so much by the fortifications as by the steppes lying beyond Perekop. The coveted Crimea turned out to be the same sun-scorched land where there was a lack of fresh water. On the right side of Perekop lies the expanse of the Black Sea. On the left is Lake Sivash. The water in them was salty and undrinkable. It turned out that in Crimea a huge army could find itself in a terrible waterless trap.

Hoping to intimidate Khan Selim-Girey, Golitsyn began negotiations with him. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to leave. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and drank supplies of fresh water, Golitsyn’s army hastily went home. What saved him from a larger failure was the lack of pursuit by the Khan's cavalry.

In the Crimean campaigns the main emphasis was placed on military power. Having decided to conquer Crimea “with one thunderclap,” the Russian command did not sufficiently develop the plan for the campaign itself, the features of the theater of military operations and the mechanism for implementing the planned tasks. And when nature and the defenders of Crimea presented unexpected obstacles to Golitsyn, he was not ready to overcome them. “The main question was not resolved in advance: what is Crimea and how to conquer it? They thought that as soon as they invaded Crimea with a large army, the Tatars would get scared and surrender to the will of the winner; They didn’t think about one thing: beyond Perekop’ there is the same waterless steppe as on the road to the peninsula,” noted S.M. Soloviev.

The results of both campaigns were insignificant in comparison with the costs of their implementation. Of course, they made a certain contribution to the common cause, since they diverted the Crimean cavalry from other theaters of military operations. But these campaigns did not decide the outcome of the Russian-Crimean struggle. However, they testified to a radical change in forces in the southern direction. If a hundred years ago Crimean troops reached Moscow, now Russian troops have already come close to the walls of Crimea. Since then, according to the Turkish historian Seyid-Muhammad-Riza, “the inhabitants of Crimea began to look through the doors of fear and expectations at the events of the time.”

The Crimean campaigns had a much greater impact on the situation inside Russia. Their unfortunate outcome was important reason the overthrow of Princess Sophia and the coming to power of Peter I. There was a six-year lull in the war, when the country was actually ruled by the mother of Peter I, Natalya Naryshkina (1688-1694).

In Zaporozhye during this period there was a mutiny of the military clerk Petrik. Accompanied by 60 Cossacks, he set out for Kyzy-Kermen, where he concluded Eternal Peace between Ukraine and Crimea. While on the territory of the Khanate, Petrik declared Ukraine a “separate” (independent) power and, with the help of the Crimean army, began the fight against Moscow and Mazepa. However, wide sections of the Cossacks did not support the new “Tatar hetman”. It relied on the forces of the Khanate and was used by it to give some legitimacy to the Crimean raids on Ukrainian lands. According to one version, Petrik was hacked to death during the Crimean raid of 1696.

After the death of Queen Natalie, Peter, who led the country, resumes hostilities. Golitsyn's disastrous experience predetermined the tsar's choice of a more modest object of attack. It became not the center of the Khanate, but its eastern flank with the Azov fortress. Its capture disrupted the land connection between the possessions of the Crimean Khanate in the Northern Azov region and the Caucasus. Owning this support base, the tsar strengthened control not only over the Khanate, but also over the Don Cossacks.

The relative convenience of the message also played an important role in the choice. Unlike the road to Perekop, the path to Azov ran along rivers (Don, Volga) and through relatively populated areas. This freed the troops from unnecessary convoys and long marches across the sultry steppe. To divert the Crimean forces from Azov, a group of governor B.P. acted in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. Sheremetev and Hetman I.S. Mazepa.

The Azov campaign began in March 1695. The Russian army (31 thousand people) was commanded by generals Avton Golovin, Franz Lefort and Patrick Gordon. The Tsar himself served as commander of the bombardment company in the army. In July, Azov was besieged. It was defended by a 7,000-strong garrison. The Russians did not have a fleet, and the besieged could receive support from the sea. The delivery of food to the Russian camp along the river was prevented by towers with chains. We managed to take them. But this was the only serious success of the campaign. Both assaults on the fortress (August 5 and September 25) ended in failure. In October, the siege was lifted and the troops returned to Moscow.

Actions in the lower reaches of the Dnieper were more successful. Sheremetev and Mazepa took Kyzy-Kermen, after which the rest of the lower Dnieper towns (Mustrit-Kermen, Islam-Kermen, etc.) were abandoned by their garrisons and occupied by the Russian-Ukrainian army without a fight. Having fortified these towns (especially the Tavansk fortress that arose on the site of Musritt-Kermen) and left garrisons there, the Russian-Ukrainian army left the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

Returning from the Azov campaign, the king began to prepare for a new campaign. It was supposed to use the fleet as well. The place of its creation was Voronezh. By the spring of 1696, 2 ships, 23 galleys, 4 fire ships, as well as a significant number of plows, on which Peter set out on a new campaign, had been built. To distract the Crimean troops, Sheremetev’s group was again sent to the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

In the second Azov campaign, the Russian forces, led by governor Alexei Shein, were brought to 75 thousand people. As a result of joint actions of the army and navy, Azov was completely blocked. The attacks of the Crimean troops, who tried to put the siege under control, were repulsed. The onslaught from the sea was also repelled. On June 14, 1696, Cossack plows attacked a Turkish squadron with a 4,000-strong landing force that had entered the mouth of the Don. Having lost two ships, she went to sea and left the combat area.

Then the Azov garrison tried to establish contact with the Kuban Tatars. This was prevented by the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks. Having repelled the attempts of the Kuban Tatars to break through to the fortress, the Cossack detachments of Yakov Lizogub and Frol Minaev (2 thousand people) on their own initiative went on July 17 to attack the Azov stronghold. They knocked the defenders off the rampart and rushed onto the stone walls. The Turks, due to a lack of lead, fired back with anything, even coins, and threw burning bags filled with gunpowder at the attackers. The Cossacks, not supported by the main forces, returned to the rampart, from where direct shelling of the fortress began. Peter ordered the troops to prepare for a general assault. But it didn't come. Deprived of support, the garrison surrendered on July 19.

Access to the Sea of ​​Azov did not solve the problem of communication between Russia and the Black Sea. Access to it required a larger-scale war with Turkey and the involvement of much large resources. In an effort to find strong allies to solve this problem, Peter organized the Great Embassy in 1697 European countries in order to use them to achieve access to the zone of ice-free seas. This mission did not live up to Peter's hopes. The collapse of the Black Sea plans leads to a reorientation of the tsar's foreign policy towards the Baltic shores.

When Peter replaced military activity with diplomatic activity, Crimean side tried to seize the initiative. In the summer of 1697, Azov was attacked by a large Crimean army. On August 1, after a stubborn 11-hour battle with Shein’s army, the Crimeans retreated. The Russians pursued them all the way to Kagalnik (a river south of the lower Don). After this battle, the Crimean Khanate made no more serious attempts to recapture Azov.

In the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the campaign of 1697 was marked by the heroic defense of the Russian-Ukrainian garrison of the Tavansk fortress, which withstood a three-month siege and a series of attacks by the Crimean-Turkish army under the command of Duma nobleman Vasily Bukhvostov. The Tavanans’ response to the demand to surrender has been preserved, showing a worthy example of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood in arms: “We do not believe your false prophets, we hope in Almighty God and His Most Pure Mother, we firmly hope that you will not take our city until our sabers rust and Our hands have not weakened, and we have a lot of grain and military supplies. Do not frighten us with threats and do not seduce us with deceptions. Do what you want, but we will not think of giving this city to your region, but every hour we expect troops to come to us and are ready to stand courageously until our strength lasts, for the Orthodox faith, for the honor and for the name of our sovereign. We hope, with God’s help, to inflict a great defeat on you and you will have eternal shame.”

The assault on Tavansk that followed on September 25 was repulsed. The explosion of a tunnel under the fortress on October 1 did not affect the determination of the garrison. Its defenders were preparing to fight on the ruins when, on October 10, the troops of Prince Y. Dolgoruky and Hetman I. Mazepa came to their aid. This forced the besiegers to retreat. The defense of Tavansk and the defeat at Kagalnik did not allow the Crimean-Turkish army to seize the initiative in the 1697 campaign. The following year, Dolgoruky and Mazepa went to Perekop. The campaign ended in failure.

In January 1699, the countries of the Holy League, with the exception of Russia, signed the Treaty of Karlowitz with the Ottoman Empire. According to it, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth regained the lands lost to it under the Buchach Peace. The Allies did not support Moscow’s demand to get Kerch, which opened the Russians to the Black Sea. On July 3, 1700, Russia also made peace with Turkey, which received Azov and stopped sending commemorations to the Crimean Khan. The lower reaches of the Dnieper returned to the rule of the Sultan with the obligation to destroy all towns and fortifications there.

The Treaty of Karlowitz put an end to Ottoman expansion in Europe. The era of great conquests of the empire is over. Türkiye no longer posed a serious threat to its European neighbors and assumed a defensive position. Due to its growing weakness, it becomes an object of expansion by stronger powers.

All these changes affected the Crimean Khanate, which repeated the fate of its overlord. Now Istanbul needed Crimea less and less and restrained its military activity. This was reflected in the decrease in the regional weight of the Crimean Khanate. If in 1681 it was a full participant in the Peace of Bakhchisarai, now it was excluded from the number of subjects international law. As the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey II lamented: “We were not included in the world. No matter how much we asked, our request was not heeded and they showed us complete contempt.” Russian-Crimean problems were now resolved directly by Russia and Türkiye.

Historian V.D. Smirnov summed up the previous period of the Khanate’s life this way: “Serving the interests of the sovereign Porte without visible benefit for its own own country, the vassal Crimean khans killed all the forces of their people in continuous wars in the political forms of Turkey, themselves being content only with plunder during military raids. Either rushing towards separatism, or, on the contrary, relying on the firmness of support in unity with the Otoman Empire, the Crimean Tatars did not develop strong foundations for the identity of their state, having done nothing fundamental either in its internal organization or in terms of merging its various constituent national elements, nor in creating a reasonable and expedient modus vivendi with neighboring states. The short-sightedness of the Crimean politicians broke the friendly relationship with Russia, established by the clever organizer of the Crimean Khanate Mengli-Gerai I, and after hesitations, always harmful in international politics, inclined them to rapprochement with Poland, whose days were also numbered in history. When, at the end of the 17th century, Russia, gradually gathering its strength, at once deployed it in all its formidability in front of the Turks and together in front of the Tatars, the former were stunned by this formidability, but did nothing; the latter, having come to their senses, wanted to do something, but the time had already been lost. The Tatars had neither fortresses nor weapons, and they did not have the means to establish either, for even if there were some internal sources, such as industry and trade, they were not in the hands of the Tatar population of the country, which was very indifferent to the strengthening or decline of the sovereign power of the Tatar aliens. The source of enrichment of the Tatars themselves through raids has now closed due to international obligations, which the Ottoman Porte was forced to take upon itself.”

First Crimean campaign (1687). It took place in May 1687. Russian-Ukrainian troops took part in it under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. The Don Cossacks of Ataman F. Minaev also took part in the campaign. The meeting took place in the area of ​​the Konskie Vody River. The total number of troops that set out on the campaign reached 100 thousand people. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. However military power allies, sufficient to defeat the Khanate, turned out to be powerless before nature. The troops had to walk tens of kilometers through deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, the issues of supplying the army and a detailed study of the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Golitsyn's insufficient study of these problems ultimately predetermined the failure of his campaigns.
As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the Allied troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, the weakened troops literally fell off their feet. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before meeting the enemy, ordered to go back. The result of the first campaign was a series of raids by Crimean troops on Ukraine, as well as the removal of Hetman Samoilovich. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman himself initiated the burning of the steppe, because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khan, who served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected Mazepa as the new hetman. Second Crimean Campaign (1689). The campaign began in February 1689. This time Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not to be afraid of steppe fires. For a hike

an army of 112 thousand people was assembled. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. As a result, the campaign to Perekop lasted almost three months, and the troops approached the Crimea on the eve of the hot summer. In mid-May, Golitsyn met with Crimean troops. After volleys of Russian artillery, the rapid attack of the Crimean cavalry choked and was never resumed. Having repelled the onslaught of the khan, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. But the governor did not dare to storm them. He was frightened not so much by the power of the fortifications as by the same sun-scorched steppe lying beyond Perekop. It turned out that, having passed along the narrow isthmus to the Crimea, a huge army could find itself in an even more terrible waterless trap.
Hoping to intimidate the khan, Golitsyn began negotiations. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to go home. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and being left without fresh water, Golitsyn was forced to hastily turn back. Further standstill could have ended in disaster for his army. From a bigger failure Russian army What saved us was that the Crimean cavalry did not particularly pursue the retreating ones.

QUESTION No. 13 AZOV CAMPAIGNS OF PETER I Azov campaigns 1695 and 1696 - Russian military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire; were a continuation of the war started by the government of Princess Sophia with the Ottoman Empire and Crimea; undertaken by Peter I at the beginning of his reign and ended with the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov. They can be considered the first significant accomplishment of the young king. In 1694, it was decided to resume active fighting and strike not at the Crimean Tatars, as in Golitsyn’s campaigns, but at the Turkish fortress of Azov. The route was also changed: not through the desert steppes, but along the Volga and Don regions. In the winter and spring of 1695, transport ships were built on the Don: plows, sea boats and rafts for the delivery of troops, ammunition, artillery and food for redeployment to Azov. In the spring In 1695, the army in 3 groups under the command of Gordon (9,500 people with 43 guns and 10 mortars), Golovin (7,000 people) and Lefort (13,000 people - with the last two: 44 pikes, 104 mortars) moved south. During the campaign, Peter combined the duties of the first bombardier and the de facto leader of the entire campaign. From the Ukrainian side, Sheremetyev’s group and Mazepa’s Cossacks acted. On the Dnieper, the Russian army recaptured three fortresses from the Turks (July 30 - Kyzy-Kermen, August 1 - Eski-Tavan, August 3 - Aslan-Kermen), and at the end of June the main forces besieged Azov (fortress at the mouth of the Don). Gordon stood opposite the southern side, Lefort to his left, Golovin, with whose detachment the Tsar was also located, to the right. On July 2, troops under the command of Gordon began siege operations. On July 5, they were joined by the corps of Golovin and Lefort. On July 14 and 16, the Russians managed to occupy the towers - two stone towers on both banks of the Don, above Azov, with iron chains stretched between them, which blocked river boats from entering the sea. This was actually the highest success of the campaign. The fortress housed a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison under the command of Bey Hassan-Araslan. On August 5, Lefort's infantry regiments, supported by 2,500 Cossacks, made the first attempt to storm the fortress, which was unsuccessful. On the Russian side, losses in killed and wounded amounted to 1,500 people. On September 25, the second assault on the fortress took place. Apraksin with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments and 1000 Don Cossacks managed to capture part of the fortifications and break into the city, but this was affected by inconsistency in the Russian army. The Turks managed to regroup, and Apraksin, not supported by other units, was forced to retreat. On October 2, the siege was lifted. 3,000 archers were left in the captured defensive towers, called the “Novosergievsky city”.

Second Azov campaign of 1696. Throughout the winter of 1696, the Russian army prepared for the second campaign. In January, large-scale construction of ships began at the shipyards of Voronezh and Preobrazhenskoye. The galleys built in Preobrazhenskoye were dismantled and transported to Voronezh, where they were reassembled and launched on the Don. On May 16, Russian troops again besieged Azov. On May 20, Cossacks in galleys at the mouth of the Don attacked a caravan of Turkish cargo ships. As a result, 2 galleys and 9 small ships were destroyed, and one small ship was captured. On May 27, the fleet entered the Sea of ​​Azov and cut off the fortress from sources of supply by sea. The approaching Turkish military flotilla did not dare to engage in battle. On July 16, preparatory siege work was completed. On July 17, 1,500 Don and part of the Ukrainian Cossacks arbitrarily broke into the fortress and settled in two bastions. On July 19, after prolonged artillery shelling, the Azov garrison surrendered. On July 20, the Lyutikh fortress, located at the mouth of the northernmost branch of the Don, also surrendered. By July 23, Peter approved a plan for new fortifications in the fortress, which by that time had been badly damaged as a result of artillery shelling. Azov did not have a convenient harbor for basing navy. For this purpose, on July 27, 1696, a more favorable location was chosen on Cape Tagany, where Taganrog was founded two years later. Voivode Shein became the first Russian generalissimo for his services in the second Azov campaign. the importance of artillery and navy for warfare. It is a notable example of successful interaction between the fleet and ground forces during the siege of a seaside fortress, which stands out especially clearly against the background of the nearby failures of the British during the assault on Quebec (1691) and Saint-Pierre (1693). The preparation of the campaigns clearly demonstrated Peter’s organizational and strategic abilities. For the first time, such important qualities as his ability to draw conclusions from failures and gather forces for a second strike appeared. Despite the success, at the end of the campaign, the incompleteness of the results achieved became obvious: without capturing the Crimea, or at least Kerch, access to the Black Sea was still impossible. To hold Azov it was necessary to strengthen the fleet. It was necessary to continue building the fleet and provide the country with specialists capable of building modern sea vessels. On October 20, 1696, the Boyar Duma proclaimed “Sea vessels will be...” This date can be considered the birthday of the Russian regular navy. An extensive shipbuilding program is approved - 52 (later 77) ships; To finance it, new duties are introduced. On November 22, a decree was announced sending nobles to study abroad. The war with Turkey is not yet over and therefore, in order to better understand the balance of power, find allies in the war against Turkey and not confirm the already existing alliance - the Holy League, and finally strengthen the position of Russia, the “Great Embassy” was organized. The war with Turkey ended with the Peace of Constantinople agreement (1700)

QUESTION No. 14 Campaigns to Crimea by Minikha (1736) and Lassi (1737,1738) On April 20, 1736, Minikh set out from Tsaritsynka with an army of about 54 thousand people. The troops were divided into five columns. Major General Spiegel commanded the first column, which formed the vanguard. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg led the second column, Lieutenant General Izmailov - the third, Lieutenant General Leontyev - the fourth and Major General Tarakanov - the fifth. In Minich's army there were both Zaporozhye and Ukrainian (Hetman) Cossacks. Minikh wrote to the empress about them: “In former times, the hetman’s Cossacks could field up to 100,000 people; in 1733 the number of employees was reduced to 30,000 and in this year up to 20,000, of which 16,000 are now equipped for the Crimean campaign; they were ordered to be at Tsaritsynka in full force at the beginning of April, but we have already walked 300 versts from Tsaritsynka, and the hetman’s Cossacks in the army are only 12,730 people, and half of them ride on carts, and are partly poorly populated, partly thin, most of them we are forced carry with you like mice who in vain only eat bread. On the contrary, the Cossacks from the same people, fugitives from the same Ukraine, have 2 or 3 good horses for each person, the people themselves are kind and cheerful, well armed; with 3 or 4 thousand such people it would be possible to defeat the entire hetman’s corps.” Minich's army marched to Crimea along Leontyev's path, along the right bank of the Dnieper, at a distance of 5-50 km from the river. The first battle greatly raised the morale of the Russian army and, accordingly, aroused fear among the Tatars of the regular troops. A thousand soldiers were ordered to carry out a demonstrative attack on the Perekop positions on the right flank. The Turks succumbed to Minich's trick and concentrated significant forces in this area. There were up to 60 cannons in the fortress and towers, including several with the Russian coat of arms, captured by the Turks during the unsuccessful campaign of Prince Golitsyn.

Minikh ordered 800 soldiers of the Belozersky regiment to occupy the fortress, and appointed their colonel Devitsa as commandant of the fortress. In addition, 600 Cossacks were assigned to Devitsa. The Cossacks took from the enemy 30 thousand sheep and 4 to 5 hundred cattle, which they had hidden in the forest. On May 25, Minich convened a military council - what to do next. Minich thought in terms of a European war, where long-term supply of the army at the expense of the conquered country was normal. The capture of Kozlov further strengthened Minich in his opinion. Turkish troops concentrated in Kafa, and the main Tatar forces went into the mountains. Small cavalry detachments of the Tatars still surrounded the Russian army. On July 7, 1736, the Russian army reached Perekop. But the army had nothing to do at Perekop. Supplies of food and fodder were dwindling every day. The Tatar cavalry darted around, constantly attacking the foragers, stealing horses and cattle. Aporozhye and Ukrainian Cossacks were sent home immediately. On August 23, Lieutenant General Leontiev, who left the destroyed Kinburn, joined Minich.

Upon the arrival of the troops in Ukraine, Minich reviewed the troops. It turned out that half of the regular troops were lost during the campaign. Moreover, the majority of people died due to illness and physical fatigue. In total, the campaign of 1736 cost Russia about 30 thousand people. At this point the campaign of 1736 was over; at the end of the year Minich went to St. Petersburg to make excuses before the empress.

Campaign of 1737. On July 2, the Ochakov fortress was taken, and a Russian garrison was left in it under the command of Shtofeln. Another Russian army (about 40 thousand), led by Field Marshal Lassi, moved from the Don to Sea of ​​Azov; then, advancing along the Arabat Spit, crossed the Sivash against the mouth of the Salgir River and invaded the Crimea. At the same time, she received very important assistance from the head of the Azov flotilla, Vice Admiral Bredal, who delivered various supplies and food to the Arabat Spit. At the end of July, Lassi reached Karasubazar and took possession of it; but due to increased sickness in the troops and depletion of provisions, he had to leave the peninsula. Having ravaged Perekop on the way back, he returned at the beginning of October. Like the previous ones, the campaign of 1737, thanks to climatic conditions and the accumulation of all kinds of disorder (embezzlement, bribery and sloppiness) in the administration of the troops, cost the Russian army huge losses in people; and due to the death of the horses, on the way back it was necessary to leave part of the artillery in Ochakov and in the Andreevsky fortification built on the Bug River. The war resumed; but the 1738 campaign was unsuccessful for the allies. Minikh with his weakened army, the replenishment of which he was denied, reached the Dniester with great difficulty in early August; but having learned that there was a strong Turkish army on the other side of the river and that plague had appeared in Bessarabia, Minikh decided to retreat. The retreat through waterless and deserted terrain, with the constant threat of danger from the Tatars pursuing the army, again entailed very significant losses. Lassi’s campaign in The Crimea, in places devastated last year, was also in disaster, since this time the Turkish fleet prevented Vice Admiral Bredal from delivering ground army necessary supplies. Russian troops were forced to leave Crimea at the end of August. For the Austrians, this year was especially unhappy: one defeat followed another. A number of all these failures did not lead, however, to the conclusion of peace. Only the plan of action for the future campaign was changed; Lassi had to limit himself to defense.

In 1684, under the patronage of Pope Innocent XI, the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth united into a single Holy League against the Ottoman Empire. The pretext for the anti-Ottoman coalition was the Balkan peoples who were under the protectorate of the Ottomans.

The idea of ​​liberating Christian peoples was only a pretext for an armed conflict, as a result of which the European powers hoped to divide the lands of the Danube principalities among themselves. But first it was necessary to divert the main forces of the Crimean state, which was on the side of the Porte. To do this, it was necessary to look for an ally in the north. And very soon he discovered himself in the person of the Moscow principality.

First Crimean campaign

By that time, Muscovy was inflamed with its own passions. The Sagittarius brought to power Sofya Alekseevna, an intelligent, powerful and ambitious princess, and with her her favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, one of the most educated people of his time. In contrast to the boyar opposition, his views were too progressive for the Moscow principality. The prince strove for Europe. Therefore, as soon as the Kremlin heard about the creation of the Holy League, a Moscow embassy was immediately sent to the Pope, the fact of its creation testified to the desire of the ruler Sophia to join a new coalition against the Ottomans. However, European states initially doubted the decision to accept Orthodox Muscovy into their Catholic union, and only two years later, when the need had matured to distract the main forces of the Crimean Khanate, did they deign to give it such a right.

On May 6, 1686, Muscovy signed the “Treatise on Eternal Peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This document obligated Moscow to involve the Cossacks of Left Bank Ukraine under the command of Hetman Ivan Samoilovich in military operations.

The hetman himself was against these actions, believing that a new war was actually breaking out “for no reason”, that peace with the Crimean Tatars was beneficial, and that the Khanate “cannot be won or retained by any measures” and that an attack on Crimea would bring more harm than benefits. But the supporters of the war were determined, and no one listened to Samoilovich. He was ordered to prepare 50,000 Cossacks for war.

As historian Lev Gumilyov writes, “The West sought to attract the Russians to the war not so much with the Ottoman Empire, but with its ally the Crimean state, since the Austrians and Poles were more afraid not of the regular Ottoman army, but of the swift Crimean Tatar cavalry.”

Consequently, the Russians were assigned the role of distracting the Crimeans from the main theater of military operations. Of course, this was not what Prince Golitsyn wanted, but in order to maintain prestige, one had to agree to such conditions.

They began to prepare thoroughly for war. After all, this was the first campaign against the Crimean Khanate. For this occasion, an army of one hundred thousand was assembled, headed by the prince himself. He was not distinguished by his talents as a commander, and he did not have any special desires to fight, but ruler Sophia demanded this from him.

They set out on the campaign in May 1687. In the Poltava region, Hetman Samoilovich joined the prince.

By this time, Selim Giray Khan was on the Crimean throne. It was one of the outstanding Crimean rulers. Historians evaluate him as an intelligent, reasonable, democratic and humane person. Selim Giray was not power-hungry and more than once voluntarily tried to resign as khan. However, the Ottoman sultans, the Crimean nobility and the people called him to the Crimean throne four times.

This time, a war was being prepared with the Holy League and Selim Giray was to march at the head of his army against Austria. But as soon as the khan approached the Austrian lands, news came that an army of 100 thousand Russians and 50 thousand Cossacks under the command of boyar Vasily Golitsyn had approached the borders of the Crimean state with the goal of invading its borders.

Having hastily left Europe, Selim Giray arrived in Crimea and already on July 17, 1687, in the town of Kara-Yylga, he met with the Russian army.

Compared to the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry was small in number. But this circumstance did not bother the khan. He divided his army into three parts, led one himself, and entrusted the other two to his sons - Kalga Devlet Giray and nur-ed-din Azamat Giray.

The first and only battle lasted with intervals of several days. Thanks to the courage of Nur-ed-din, who threw his main forces into the center of the Russian army, the enemy’s ranks were upset. Crimean askers captured 30 cannons and captured about a thousand people. At the same time, the askers under the leadership of the khan blocked the Russians’ path to retreat. Two days later, Golitsyn decided to make peace with the Crimean Khan. Russian envoys were sent to the headquarters of the Crimean Khan. But the peace agreement was never concluded due to the fact that the prince ordered his troops to hastily leave the camp the night before the conclusion of a possible peace. WITH big losses The Russians broke out of the encirclement. They retreated, pursued by the Crimean Tatar cavalry right up to the borders of the Hetmanate.

Prince Vasily Golitsyn placed all the blame for the failure of the unsuccessful campaign on Ivan Samoilovich. The prince openly accused the hetman of disrupting the campaign and that the steppe along which the Russian army was advancing was allegedly burned out by the Cossacks themselves on the orders of the hetman, who did not want war with the Crimean Tatars. Without any special proceedings, Samoilovich was deprived of the hetman's mace. For the “betrayal” of the Cossacks, Golitsyn was favored by Princess Sophia, who encouraged him that on his next campaign he would be accompanied by a “devotee” royal crown the new hetman is Ivan Mazepa.

Prince Golitsyn tried to do everything to entrust the command of the second campaign to the Crimean Khanate to someone else. But he fails. Sophia wanted her favorite to take revenge in a new campaign, which should bring him victory. There was only one thing left - to take all possible measures to prevent a repeat defeat.

Second Crimean Campaign

On April 6, 1689, the prince, having waited out the thaw, with new army headed to Ukraine. Here, on the Samara River, he was joined by the Cossacks, led by the new hetman Ivan Mazepa. A few days later, the Russian army invaded the Crimean state.

The first clash with the Crimean cavalry took place on May 14 on the approaches to Or-Kapy. Golitsyn gave the order to prepare for battle. The Crimeans attacked Sheremetev's regiment, which almost immediately fled. But after a short battle the Crimeans retreated. The Russians also retreated. They moved away from Or-Kapa and set up camp in the town of Black Valley.

And already on May 16, Selim Giray and his army went out to meet the enemy. The maneuverable Crimean cavalry surrounded the Russian army. Golitsyn was in no hurry to give the order to go on the offensive, despite the fact that the governors demanded this of him. He ordered not to budge and set up defense. Armed firearms the infantry and all the artillery formed a reliable defense in the field. However, when the order was given to fire muskets and cannons, it turned out that the Russian people, not trained in such weapons, put more of their own on the battlefield than the Crimean askers who were watching this fuss from the sidelines. Nur-ed-din Azamat Giray was the first to enter the battle. He attacked the Cossacks, led by Emelyan Ukraintsev, Moscow Secretary of State. The Muscovite, inexperienced in military affairs, was so shy that he could not withstand the onslaught of the Crimeans. As a result, the camp’s defenses were broken through and the Crimean Tatars took 30 cannons with them as a trophy. Voivode Sheremetev was also unlucky; he was attacked by another Crimean detachment, which managed to break through and capture a convoy with firearms. Having sowed panic in the ranks of the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry ended the battle and retreated along with the captured trophies.

The next day, Prince Golitsyn ordered to remove the camp, unite the regiments into one army and then go to the Or fortress. Before they had time to move, the Crimeans unexpectedly appeared again and walked around the entire army in a circle, struck fear into the Muscovites and disappeared again. The entire next day, the Russians did not meet a single Crimean Tatar on their way. This gave them a little courage. And on May 19, with varying degrees of success, they approached Or-Kapy and set up camp within a cannon shot of the city.

Hetman Ivan Mazepa wrote to Moscow about these same events a little later: “...On the 15th day of May, in those wild fields close to the Green Valley tract, the enemies of the Basurmans Khan of Crimea and Kalga and Nur-ed-Din Sultans also Shirin Bey with his Crimean and Belogortsky hordes , with the Circassian and Yaman-Sagaidak hordes with them, they crossed our path, from the second hour of the day the battle began and strongly attacked the troops of their royal majesty [Russian troops] and pressed until the evening, and the troops of their royal majesty ... bravely and courageously With them, in a strong fight and beating many of them and wounding them, they came to the Black Valley and spent the night here.” According to Mazepa's letter the next day, May 16, the Crimeans forced the Russian army into battle. Moreover, the Crimeans, according to the eyewitness hetman, made continuous attacks on the Muscovite camp and broke through carts in different places. By evening, the Crimean askers stopped the attack. On May 17, the Russians approached Kalanchak: “... and there the enemies, the Khan, the sultans, and all the hordes, stepped in front and surrounded the carts, harrowed the distant troops of the great sovereigns on the campaign and carried out raids and attacks all day long...”

Golitsyn had long ago decided that at the slightest opportunity he would retreat. He absolutely did not want to engage in battle with the Crimeans. And he saw some kind of catch in the fact that they were so easily allowed to approach the fortress. However, in order not to lose face in front of his compatriots, he hastened to send envoys to the fortress with an ultimatum, knowing in advance that the khan would never agree to his conditions.

The ultimatum amused the Khan. In response, he said that he did not want other terms of peace besides those on which he had previously made peace with the Russian tsars. Prince Golitsyn did not like this answer, and, not considering it more possible to camp in the steppe, he thought about retreating, since the army would not have lasted long without food and water.

Meanwhile, the Russian commanders hoped to attack Or-Kapy at night. But in the evening, when everyone came to the prince’s camp tent for orders, they were very surprised to learn that they would have to return tomorrow. Golitsyn did not want to explain the reasons for such a strange decision. He again sent an ultimatum to the Khan, but this time only to stall for time. And the next morning, when the khan prepared an answer, he discovered that the Russian army, without waiting for the khan’s people, began to retreat.

Meanwhile, Golitsyn sent messengers to Moscow and to the Polish king with the message that he had defeated the Crimeans and pursued them to their borders. But in Moscow, thanks to Hetman Mazepa, they learned about the true state of affairs, and Vasily Golitsyn very soon went to Siberia. And the princess is in the Novodevichy Convent.

Gulnara Abdulaeva

(map from the article ""
"Sytin's Military Encyclopedia")

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.

First Crimean campaign[ | ]

The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower than the listed number of troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Giray was at that time on Molochnye Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.

To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.

When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky Prikaz, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The Tsar's letters stated that the Crimean Khanate had been sufficiently demonstrated to have enormous military strength, which should have warned it against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.

While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.

In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.

On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River; on August 24, it received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.

In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by historian Halim Geray, a representative ruling dynasty Gerayev, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was on the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. Exact number his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one was led by himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications along the ditch facing the Russians, preparing for the decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason The defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”

Contrary to this version, as noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.

In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military men of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.

The unsuccessful campaign of V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate. The artist depicts the return of the army along the bank of the Samara River. Miniature from the 1st half manuscript. 18th century "History of Peter I", op. P. Krekshina. Collection of A. Baryatinsky. State Historical Museum.

On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov's successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.

Second Crimean Campaign[ | ]

Results [ | ]

The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance; they were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia’s European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance concluded in 1683 in Adrianople between the Crimean Khanate, France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. Thus, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that the huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I. Ukraintsev.

Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, historian A. G. Brickner, noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.

Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of bread” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses under the outfit fell, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them were set on fire and never appeared for decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”

As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the princess’s government

Moscow agreed subject to the settlement of relations with Poland. After two years of negotiations with the Poles, their king Jan Sobieski, who was experiencing difficulties in the fight against the Turks, agreed to sign the “Eternal Peace” with Russia (1686). It meant Poland’s recognition of the borders outlined by the Truce of Andrusovo, as well as the assignment of Kyiv and Zaporozhye to Russia.

Despite its duration, this Russian-Turkish conflict was not particularly intense. It actually came down to only two large independent military operations - the Crimean (1687; 1689) and Azov (1695-1696) campaigns.

First Crimean campaign (1687). It took place in May 1687. Russian-Ukrainian troops took part in it under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. The Don Cossacks of Ataman F. Minaev also took part in the campaign. The meeting took place in the area of ​​the Konskie Vody River. The total number of troops that set out on the campaign reached 100 thousand people. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. However, the military power of the allies, sufficient to defeat the Khanate, turned out to be powerless in the face of nature. The troops had to walk tens of kilometers through deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, the issues of supplying the army and a detailed study of the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Golitsyn's insufficient study of these problems ultimately predetermined the failure of his campaigns.
As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the Allied troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, the weakened troops literally fell off their feet. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before meeting the enemy, ordered to go back. The result of the first campaign was a series of raids by Crimean troops on Ukraine, as well as the removal of Hetman Samoilovich. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman himself initiated the burning of the steppe, because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khan, who served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected Mazepa as the new hetman.

Second Crimean Campaign (1689). The campaign began in February 1689. This time Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not to be afraid of steppe fires. An army of 112 thousand people was assembled for the campaign. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. As a result, the campaign to Perekop lasted almost three months, and the troops approached the Crimea on the eve of the hot summer. In mid-May, Golitsyn met with Crimean troops. After volleys of Russian artillery, the rapid attack of the Crimean cavalry choked and was never resumed. Having repelled the onslaught of the khan, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. But the governor did not dare to storm them. He was frightened not so much by the power of the fortifications as by the same sun-scorched steppe lying beyond Perekop. It turned out that, having passed along the narrow isthmus to the Crimea, a huge army could find itself in an even more terrible waterless trap.
Hoping to intimidate the khan, Golitsyn began negotiations. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to go home. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and being left without fresh water, Golitsyn was forced to hastily turn back. Further standstill could have ended in disaster for his army. The Russian army was saved from a larger failure by the fact that the Crimean cavalry did not particularly pursue the retreating ones.

The results of both campaigns were insignificant in comparison with the costs of their implementation. Of course, they made a certain contribution to the common cause, since they diverted the Crimean cavalry from other theaters of military operations. But these campaigns could not decide the outcome of the Russian-Crimean struggle. At the same time, they testified to a radical change in forces in the southern direction. If a hundred years ago Crimean troops reached Moscow, now Russian troops have already come close to the walls of Crimea. The Crimean campaigns had a much greater impact on the situation within the country. In Moscow, Princess Sophia tried to portray both campaigns as great victories, which they were not. Their unsuccessful outcome contributed to the fall of the government of Princess Sophia.

The struggle continued with the later Azov campaigns (1695) of Peter I.