Commander of the Russian army during the Crimean campaigns. The Holy League and the Crimean Campaigns of V.V.

Military campaigns of the Russian army under the command of V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate as part of the Great Turkish War of 1683-1699.

Russia and the anti-Ottoman coalition

In the early 1680s, the system international relations important changes have occurred. A coalition of states emerged that opposed the Ottoman Empire. In 1683, near Vienna, the united troops inflicted a serious defeat on the Turks, but the latter put up strong resistance, not wanting to give up the positions they had conquered. The Polish-Lithuanian state, in which the processes of political decentralization intensified in the second half of the 17th century, became increasingly unable to conduct long-term military campaigns. Under these conditions, the Habsburgs - the main organizers of the coalition - began to seek the entry of the Russian state into it. Russian politicians used the current situation to achieve recognition by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the results of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. Under pressure from the allies, she agreed to replace the truce agreement with Russia in 1686 with an agreement on “Eternal Peace” and a military alliance against the Ottoman Empire and Crimea. The issue of Kyiv, acquired by Russia for 146 thousand gold rubles, was also resolved. As a result, in 1686 the Russian state joined the Holy League.

When deciding on war, the Russians developed a program to strengthen Russia’s position in Black Sea coast. The conditions prepared in 1689 for future peace negotiations provided for the inclusion of Crimea, Azov, Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dnieper, and Ochakov into the Russian state. But it took the entire next 18th century to complete this program.

Crimean campaign of 1687

In fulfillment of their obligations to their allies, Russian troops twice, in 1687 and 1689, undertook large campaigns against the Crimea. The army was led by Princess Sophia’s closest ally V.V. Golitsyn. Very large military forces were mobilized for the campaigns - over 100 thousand people. 50 thousand Little Russian Cossacks of Hetman I.S. were also supposed to join the army. Samoilovich.

By early March 1687, troops were supposed to gather on the southern borders. On May 26, Golitsyn conducted a general review of the army, and at the beginning of June he met with Samoilovich’s detachment, after which the advance to the south continued. The Crimean Khan Selim Giray, realizing that he was inferior in numbers and weapons to the Russian army, ordered to burn the steppe and poison or fill up the water sources. In conditions of lack of water, food, and fodder, Golitsyn was forced to decide to return to his borders. The retreat began at the end of June and ended in August. Throughout his time, the Tatars did not stop attacking Russian troops.

As a result, the Russian army did not reach Crimea, however, as a result of this campaign, the khan was unable to provide military assistance Turkey, busy at war with Austria and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Crimean campaign of 1689

In 1689, the army under the command of Golitsyn made a second campaign against the Crimea. On May 20, the army reached Perekop, but the military leader did not dare to enter the Crimea, as he feared a shortage fresh water. Moscow clearly underestimated all the obstacles that a huge army would face in the dry, waterless steppe, and the difficulties associated with the assault on Perekop, the only narrow isthmus through which it was possible to get to the Crimea. This is the second time the army has been forced to return.

Results

The Crimean campaigns showed that Russia did not yet have sufficient forces to defeat a strong enemy. At the same time, the Crimean campaigns were the first purposeful action of Russia against the Crimean Khanate, which indicated a change in the balance of forces in this region. The campaigns also temporarily distracted the forces of the Tatars and Turks and contributed to the successes of the Allies in Europe. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command and forced it to abandon the attack on Poland and Hungary.

OBLIGATIONS FOR PEACE WITH POLAND 1686

In 1686, Jan Sobieski agreed to an eternal peace, according to which he forever ceded to Moscow everything that it had won from Poland in the 17th century. (Kyiv is most important). This peace of 1686 was a very major diplomatic victory, which Moscow owed to V.V. Golitsyn. But according to this world, Moscow had to start a war with Turkey and Crimea, its subordinates. It was decided to march to the Crimea. Involuntarily, Golitsyn accepted command of the troops and made two campaigns to the Crimea (1687–1689). Both of them were unsuccessful (only the second time, in 1689, the Russians managed to reach Perekop across the steppe, but could not penetrate further). Lacking military abilities, Golitsyn could not cope with the difficulties of the steppe campaigns, lost many people, aroused the murmur of the army and brought charges of negligence from Peter. However, before the overthrow of Sophia, her government tried to hide the failure, celebrated the transition through the steppes to Perekop as a victory and showered Golitsyn and the troops with awards. But the failure was clear to everyone: below we will see that Peter took advantage of it and left Crimea alone in his attack to the south.

[…] The annexation of Little Russia moved Moscow even more towards Crimea, and at the very end of the 17th century. (1687–1689) Moscow troops for the first time undertake campaigns against the Crimea itself. However, there was no luck yet - the steppe got in the way. This is where Moscow policy stopped before Peter.

Platonov S.F. Full course lectures on Russian history. SPb., 2000 http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/platonov/plats005.htm#gl2

PREPARATION FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1687

After long meetings, the Muscovites decided at the military council to send a significant army against the Small Tatars. Prince Golitsyn was appointed governor of the Bolshoi [regiment], that is, commander-in-chief, boyar Alexei Semenovich Shein - governor of Novgorod, that is, general of the Novgorod army, boyar Prince Dmitry Dmitrievich Dolgorukov, governor of Kazan, that is, general of the Kazan army, Prince Mikhail Andreevich Golitsyn - governor of Belgorod (this cousin of the great Golitsyn. He had such a great inclination towards foreigners that, leaving for the voivodeship, he took all those who wanted to follow him, including the Frenchman, who taught him the language in 6 months), Duma nobleman Ivan Yuryevich Leontyev, as voivode. Ertaul, that is, the general of a small Cossack army and other civilian detachments, which always go ahead of the army of the commander-in-chief, and consist of those who can be called hunters and the okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev - the Sevsky governor, that is, the general of the Sevsky army.

All the troops of White Russia were also equipped with commanders, and the Cossacks had their usual hetman, they also thought about ways to have and receive military supplies and food. All residents of the great Empire of the Tsars were forced to pay a ruble from the court, and the ruble corresponds in value to almost five French livres; From this we can judge the enormous sums that were collected.

De la Neuville. Notes about Muscovy. M.. 1996 http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus6/Nevill/frametext4.htm

ADDRESS BY IGNATIUS RIMSKY-KORSAKOV\

However, the abbot of the royal monastery was not only a talented polemicist, but also a preacher. […] On February 21, 1687, the archimandrite of the Novospassky Monastery spoke to the troops setting off on the first Crimean campaign with an extensive sermon: “A word to the pious and Christ-loving Russian army,” and on March 14, a richly decorated copy of this word was presented to Princess Sofya Alekseevna.

That same spring […] the Novospassky preacher, presenting an icon to a huge gathering of troops in the suburbs of Moscow Mother of God Hodegetria, delivered a “Word to the Orthodox army about the help of the Most Holy Theotokos...”. […] In “Words” the author convinces his listeners of the inalienability of God’s help in the coming war, proving this with examples from Old Testament and Russian history.

Nikulin I.A. Review of the life and work of Metropolitan Ignatius (Rimsky-Korsakov) before his appointment to the Tobolsk See http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/774364.html

The 112,000-strong army, which Prince V.V. Golitsyn led on the second Crimean campaign in 1689, included the same 63 regiments of the foreign system, as according to the list of 1681, only numbering up to 80 thousand, with a decreased composition of the regiments , although the noble mounted militia of the Russian system numbered no more than 8 thousand, 10 times less than the foreign system, and according to the list of 1681 it was only 5-6 times less.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1687 and 1689.

Having concluded the “Eternal Peace” of 1686 with Poland, Russia joined the coalition of powers (the “Holy League” - Austria, Venice and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) that fought against the aggression of Sultan Turkey and its vassal - the Crimean Khanate. Prince V.V. was placed at the head of the Russian troops. Golitsyn. At the same time, the Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks. In May 1687, the Russian army (about 100 thousand people) set out from Ukraine. After it crossed the river in mid-June. Konskie Vody (modern name - Konskaya, a tributary of the Dnieper), the Crimean Tatars set fire to the steppe. The Russian army lost food for its horses. On June 17, the decision was made to return. Soon the government, at the request of the Cossack foreman, supported by V.V. Golitsyn, removed Hetman I. Samoilovich, who had a negative attitude towards the war with Turkey and Crimea. In his place was put I.S. Mazepa. The instability of the position of the government of Sofia Alekseevna-Golitsyn forced it to continue military operations. In 1688, preparations were underway for a new campaign to the south. During this period, international the situation worsened as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began negotiations with Turkey for peace. Russia bore the brunt of the war. The hike has begun early spring 1689, a Russian army of approx. moved south. 150 thousand people On May 15, in the Green Valley tract (north of the Perekop Isthmus), a stubborn battle took place with the detachments of the Crimean Khan attacking the Russian army, which were repulsed. After fighting with the Crimean detachments, the Russian army approached the Perekop fortress on May 20, but due to the unfavorable balance of forces, it did not besiege it and began to retreat on May 21.

The Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 provided serious assistance to Russia's allies, as they diverted the forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars. But the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 did not lead to the elimination of a dangerous source of aggression in the south and generally ended in failure, which was one of the reasons for the fall of the government of Sofia Alekseevna-Golitsyn.

Soviet Historical Encyclopedia http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/sie/8966#sel=3:198,3:214

GOLITSYN'S SECOND CAMPAIGN

Taught by experience, Golitsyn wanted to undertake a campaign early spring so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not be afraid of steppe fires. The military men were ordered to gather no later than February 1689. On November 8, a tenth collection of money for the army was announced from the townspeople and all merchants. Golitsyn needed to defeat the Tatars in order to defeat internal enemies who never ceased to remind him of themselves. They say that the killer rushed towards him in the sleigh and was barely restrained by the prince’s servants; the murderer was executed in prison after torture, without publicity; shortly before setting off on a campaign, a coffin was found at the Golitsyn gate with a note that if this campaign was as unsuccessful as the first, then a coffin would await the chief governor. […]

Under such unfavorable conditions for the main leaders, the second Crimean campaign began. In February 1689, 112,000 troops moved to the steppe under the main command of the Guardian. On March 20, Golitsyn wrote to the tsars from Akhtyrka that “the campaign is being slowed down due to the great cold and snow, and the treasury has not yet been sent to the regiment and there is nothing to give to the military men, reiters and soldiers.” The cold and snow did not stop Hetman Mazepa, and his first thing when meeting with Golitsyn was to petition the great sovereigns to grant him, the hetman, and the entire Little Russian army, to order the state coat of arms to be placed on the towers and town halls of the Little Russian cities. Golitsyn, of course, hastened to reassure Mazepa that his request would be fulfilled by the great sovereigns. In mid-April, news was received that there were no fires in the steppes, but that the khan was going to burn the grass as Golitsyn approached Perekop. When Moscow found out about this, they sent a letter to the Guardian, so that he, after consulting with the hetman, would send knowledgeable people For Samara, burn the steppe all the way to Perekop and to the Turkish towns on the Dnieper: by the time the Russian army arrives in those places, new grass will ripen. Golitsyn went to Perekop and in mid-May he met the khan with the hordes. The barbarians, as usual, quickly attacked the Russian army, but, fired from cannons, they left and did not resume their attacks; only at the edge of the horizon, in front and behind, like clouds, crowds of them could be seen: predators circled over their prey, the Scythians lured the enemy into their hopeless steppes.

Having repulsed the khan, Golitsyn hastened to send news of his triumph to Moscow, and wrote to the ruler to pray for his safe return. Sophia answered: “My light, brother Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello to God and the Most Holy Theotokos, by the mercy and with your reason and happiness, having defeated the Hagarians! May you, Lord, continue to defeat your enemies! And to me, light my, I can’t believe that you will return to us; then I will believe when I see you, my light, in my arms. sinner, I dare to hope for his goodness. I always ask you to see my light in joy. Therefore, hello, my light, forever.”

[…] On May 20, the troops approached the famous Perekop, to a fortified castle that protected a ditch that cut through the isthmus: beyond Perekop is the treasured Crimea, the goal of the campaign. But what is Crimea? The best, most experienced people, like Gordon, for example, had long explained to Golitsyn that it was easy to conquer Crimea, only the steppe road to it was somewhat difficult. Golitsyn experienced this difficulty in the first campaign, avoided it in the second, reached the Crimea and only then saw that the main question had not been resolved in advance: what is Crimea and how to conquer it? They thought that as soon as they invaded Crimea with a large army, the Tatars would get scared and surrender to the will of the winner; They didn’t think about one thing, that beyond Perekop there was the same waterless steppe as on the road to the peninsula, that the Tatars could destroy everything and starve the enemy to death with hunger and thirst. Golitsyn stood at Perekop: it was necessary to take the fortress, but the army had already been without water for two days; They hurried to Perekop, thinking that there would be an end to their hardships, and what did they see? On one side is the Black Sea, on the other is the Rotten Sea, there is salty water everywhere, there are no wells, horses are falling, a few more days - and how will they retreat, what will the outfit be carried on? In order to return with something, Golitsyn started peace negotiations with the khan in the hope that he, frightened by the invasion, would agree to conditions favorable to Russia: but the negotiations dragged on, and Golitsyn could not wait any longer. and he turned back without peace; We were glad for one thing that in the steppe, in terrible heat, with the painful languor of thirst, the Tatars pursued easily, not with all their strength.

During the 16th-17th centuries Russian state increased greatly in size. But this territorial growth had a significant drawback: Russia remained practically landlocked. The northern route was inconvenient and was almost entirely controlled by the British. Sea routes were the only convenient ones for conducting large-scale trade, because on land there were too many problems with roads.
Moscow was also concerned about the Crimean issue. Tribute to the Crimean Khan continued to exist, and Tatar raids threatened the southwestern lands. Victory over Crimea could raise the prestige of any ruler. Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns were an attempt to resolve this issue.
The regime of Princess Sophia, who ruled the kingdom on behalf of her young brothers, was not strong from the very beginning. In addition, the younger prince, the energetic and intelligent Peter, was growing up, and the time was approaching when full power should be transferred to him. Sophia could not allow this, it would mean forcible tonsure as a nun. A major military victory could strengthen the princess's position and allow her to compete for power.
The eternal peace concluded between Russia and Poland in 1686 implied Russia's entry into the anti-Turkish alliance created by King John Sobieski. In accordance with the agreement, in the summer of 1687, Russian troops set out on the first Crimean campaign. The decision was not made very easily; many representatives of the Boyar Duma considered the war unnecessary, considering even a tribute to the khan “not offensive.”
The command was entrusted to Prince Vasily Golitsyn, the actual husband of the princess. The choice was unfortunate. Prince Golitsyn was smart, educated person, but had little understanding of military affairs. In addition, many did not treat him very well precisely because of his closeness to the princess. The hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I. Samoilovich and his Cossacks acted in alliance with the prince. But Samoilovich was cool about the idea of ​​the campaign, and many representatives of the elders and ordinary Cossacks did not approve of the alliance with Poland.
The army did not even reach Perekop. The summer turned out to be hot, the steppe was dry, the wells dried up. The Crimean Tatars deliberately covered them and burned the grass, creating fields of ash that horses refused to walk through. Superstitious inhabitants of the forest zone were afraid of mirages that sometimes appeared on open spaces. Moscow commanders and Golitsyn himself did not know how to navigate the steppe. The Moscow army did not know how to quickly fight off raids by Tatar detachments, as the Ukrainians were able to do. There was no vinegar stored to cool the guns during possible firing. Discontent was brewing among the Cossacks. The army lacked the basic necessities, and epidemics began. The grain taken to feed the soldiers was discovered to be damaged (some bags contained garbage or moldy bread), and “theft” began to be suspected.
Golitsyn understood that the campaign would have to be interrupted, but he needed a “scapegoat” who could be blamed for the failure. A suitable candidate was proposed to him by a group of representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack elders, led by General Captain I. Mazepa and General Clerk V. Kochubey. The prince was informed that the steppe was allegedly set on fire not by Tatar troops at all, but by people specially sent for this by Hetman Samoilovich. The hetman was accused of treason, arrested and exiled to Siberia, his eldest son's head was cut off. I. Mazepa was elected the new hetman. It is significant that Mazepa was in great favor with Samoilovich, and was even at one time the teacher of his executed son.
There is a very enduring legend in history that Mazepa paid Golitsyn 20,000 gold chervonets for his election as hetman. Evidence of this is unlikely to ever be found; such cases were carried out without witnesses in the 17th century. But it is known that the prince was constantly in need of money, and that Mazepa considered a bribe a very reasonable way to achieve his goal.
But the obligations to Poland regarding the Eternal Peace remained, and in the spring of 1689 the second Crimean campaign began. This time the troops reached Perekop, but no further. All the mistakes of the previous campaign were repeated. There was not enough food and fodder, the Streltsy army did not want to fight. The Crimean Tatars attacked in small but very mobile detachments, exterminating the Russian army “at retail.” Mazepa, like Samoilovich, did not express open dissatisfaction, but gave very cautious advice and referred to the discontent of his Cossacks. Golitsyn was again forced to turn back. The failure of the second Crimean campaign became a direct impetus for the fall of Princess Sophia and the transfer of real power to the grown-up Peter I. Frustrated Streltsy commanders and boyars declared that “no great deeds were to be seen” from the princess and left for the court of the young Tsar. Prince Vasily Golitsyn ended his days in exile, and the princess in a monastery.
Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns are interesting not for their results (there were none), but because they clearly showed the shortcomings of the Russian army of the late 17th century. The Streltsy army was becoming unreliable; the Streltsy were more interested in their profitable trades in Moscow. The noble militia gathered slowly and reluctantly; many nobles were in no hurry to spend time on military training. The warriors that the nobles brought with them did not know how to do anything. There was nothing resembling a quartermaster service. There were not enough cannons, and those that were available were often of very poor quality. The archers' weapons were also technically outdated. Commanders were selected according to their nobility, and not according to their knowledge and abilities. Military discipline was very weak.
Neither Sophia nor Golitsyn were able or had time to draw conclusions from their failures. But Peter I was able to do them. Recognizing the correct idea of ​​consolidating Russia in the Black Sea and getting rid of the Turkish and Tatar danger, he understood the need for a different organization of the Black Sea campaign. Peter's Azov campaigns were similar in purpose to Golitsyn's Crimean campaigns, but gave completely different results. All shortcomings in the organization of the army were taken into account by the new king and corrected during military reforms.

Hetmanate 22px Ottoman Empire
22px Crimean Khanate Commanders Strengths of the parties

unknown

unknown

Losses

Great Turkish War and Russian-Turkish war 1686-1700
Vienna - Šturovo - Neugeisel - Mohács - Crimea- Patachin - Nissa - Slankamen - Azov - Podgaitsy - Zenta

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.

First Crimean campaign

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns made it possible to divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimeans for some time and benefited Russia’s European allies. Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved.

According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello, having defeated the Hagarians by the grace of God and the Most Holy Theotokos and with your reason and happiness! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of his entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he only received access to the inland Sea of ​​Azov.

See also

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Notes

Literature

• Bogdanov A.P.“The true and true story of the Crimean campaign of 1687.” - a monument to journalism of the Ambassadorial Prikaz // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages: Coll. articles / USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of History of the USSR; Rep. ed. V. T. Pashuto. - M., 1982. - P. 57–84. - 100 s.

An excerpt characterizing the Crimean campaigns

Young, untouched and pure
I brought you all my love...
The star sang songs to me about you,
Day and night she called me into the distance...
And on a spring evening, in April,
Brought to your window.
I quietly took you by the shoulders,
And he said, not hiding his smile:
“So it was not in vain that I waited for this meeting,
My beloved star...

Mom was completely captivated by dad’s poems... And he wrote them to her a lot and brought them to her work every day along with huge posters drawn by his own hand (dad was a great drawer), which he unfolded right on her desktop, and on which , among all kinds of painted flowers, there was in capital letters it is written: “Annushka, my star, I love you!” Naturally, what woman could withstand this for a long time and not give up?.. They never parted again... Using every free minute to spend it together, as if someone could take it away from them. Together they went to the cinema, to dances (which they both loved very much), walked in the charming Alytus city park, until one fine day they decided that enough dates were enough and that it was time to look at life a little more seriously. Soon they got married. But only my father’s friend (my mother’s) knew about this younger brother) Jonas, since neither my mother’s nor my father’s relatives aroused great delight in this union... Mom's parents They intended her to marry a rich neighbor-teacher, whom they really liked and, in their opinion, was a perfect “suit” for mom, but in my dad’s family at that time there was no time for marriage, since grandfather was sent to prison at that time as an “accomplice.” noble” (by which they probably tried to “break” the stubbornly resisting dad), and my grandmother ended up in the hospital from nervous shock and was very sick. Dad was left with his little brother in his arms and now had to run the entire household alone, which was very difficult, since the Seryogins at that time lived in a large two-story house (in which I later lived), with a huge old garden around. And, naturally, such a farm required good care...
So three long months passed, and my dad and mom, already married, were still going on dates, until my mom accidentally went to my dad’s house one day and found a very touching picture there... Dad stood in the kitchen in front of the stove, looking unhappy “replenishing” the hopelessly growing number of pots of semolina porridge, which at that moment he was cooking for his little brother. But for some reason the “evil” porridge became more and more, and poor dad could not understand what was happening... Mom, trying with all her might to hide a smile so as not to offend the unlucky “cook,” immediately rolled up her sleeves began to put this whole “stagnant household mess” in order, starting with the completely occupied, “porridge-filled” pots, the indignantly sizzling stove... Of course, after such an “emergency”, my mother could no longer calmly observe such a “heart-tugging” male helplessness, and decided to immediately move to this territory, which was still completely alien and unfamiliar to her... And although it was not very easy for her at that time either - she worked at the post office (to support herself), and in the evenings she went to preparatory classes for medical school exams.

She, without hesitation, gave all her remaining strength to her exhausted young husband and his family. The house immediately came to life. The kitchen smelled overwhelmingly of delicious Lithuanian zeppelins, which my dad’s little brother adored and, just like dad, who had been sitting on dry food for a long time, he literally gorged himself on them to the “unreasonable” limit. Everything became more or less normal, except for the absence of my grandparents, about whom my poor dad was very worried, and sincerely missed them all this time. But now he already had a young, beautiful wife, who, as best she could, tried in every possible way to brighten up his temporary loss, and looking at my father’s smiling face, it was clear that she succeeded quite well. Dad’s little brother very soon got used to his new aunt and followed her tail, hoping to get something tasty or at least a beautiful “evening fairy tale”, which his mother read to him in great abundance before bed.
Days and then weeks passed so calmly in everyday worries. Grandmother, by that time, had already returned from the hospital and, to her great surprise, found her newly-made daughter-in-law at home... And since it was too late to change anything, they simply tried to get to know each other better, avoiding unwanted conflicts (which inevitably appear with any new, too close acquaintance). More precisely, they were simply getting used to each other, trying to honestly avoid any possible “underwater reefs”... I was always sincerely sorry that my mother and grandmother never fell in love with each other... They were both (or rather, my mother still there) wonderful people, and I loved them both very much. But if the grandmother, throughout their entire life together, somehow tried to adapt to her mother, then the mother - on the contrary, in the end grandma's life, sometimes showed her my irritation too openly, which deeply hurt me, since I was very attached to both of them and really did not like to fall, as they say, “between two fires” or forcibly take sides. I could never understand what caused this constant “silent” war between these two wonderful women, but apparently there were some very good reasons for this, or perhaps my poor mother and grandmother were simply truly “incompatible” , as happens quite often with strangers living together. One way or another, it was a great pity, because, in general, it was a very friendly and loyal family, in which everyone stood up for each other like a mountain, and experienced every trouble or misfortune together.
But let's go back to those days when all this was just beginning, and when every member of this new family I honestly tried to “live in harmony”, without creating any trouble for the others... Grandfather was also already at home, but his health, to the great regret of everyone else, had sharply deteriorated after the days spent in prison. Apparently, including the difficult days spent in Siberia, all the long ordeals of the Seryogins in unfamiliar cities did not spare the poor, life-torn grandfather’s heart - he began to have recurring micro-infarctions...
Mom became very friendly with him and tried as best she could to help him forget all the bad things as soon as possible, although she herself had a very, very difficult time. Over the past months, she managed to pass the preparatory and entrance exams to medical school. But, to her great regret, her old dream was not destined to come true for the simple reason that at that time in Lithuania you still had to pay for the institute, and in her mother’s family (which had nine children) there was not enough finances for this.. That same year, her still very young mother, my grandmother on my mother’s side, whom I also never met, died from a severe nervous shock that happened several years ago. She fell ill during the war, on the day when she learned that there was a heavy bombing in the pioneer camp, in the seaside town of Palanga, and all the surviving children were taken to an unknown location... And among these children was her son , the youngest and favorite of all nine children. A few years later he returned, but, unfortunately, this could no longer help my grandmother. And in the first year of mom and dad's life together, she slowly faded away... My mom's dad - my grandfather - remained in his arms big family, of which only one mother’s sister, Domitsela, was married at that time.

Eternal peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was concluded on April 26, 1686. It assumed the possibility of joint actions by Russia and the Holy League as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria, the Holy See and Venice against the Ottomans. Pope Innocent XI (pontificate 1676–1689) was considered the nominal head of the Holy League. The accession of Russia to the struggle of the Holy League became a turning point in the history of Russian-Polish relations: from centuries-old struggle Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century. moved to the union. Strategically, it turned out to be much more beneficial for Russia than for Poland. The Polish historian Zbigniew Wojczek, who studied the development of Russian-Polish relations in the second half of the 17th century, stated that the war of 1654–1667. and the Perpetual Peace of 1686 ended with “that the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden, Turkey and eo ipso Crimean Khanate lost their position in relation to Russia,” which through its actions won “hegemony among the Slavic peoples.” And University of London professor Lindsay Hughes summed up her analysis of foreign policy during Sophia's regency with the conclusion: “From now on, Russia took a strong position in Europe, which it never lost.” It is fair to recognize the Perpetual Peace of 1686 as the most important contribution of the Sophia regency to the long-term strategy of turning Russia into the main pole of geopolitical power in Eastern Europe and a Great European Power.

Patrick Gordon, who was in Russian service, made efforts to actually join Russia to the Holy League. From 1685 to 1699 he became one of the leading Moscow military leaders. It was Gordon who persuaded the head of the government of Sophia, Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, to pursue an alliance with the Holy League. This alliance of Christian states against the Ottomans and Crimea arose in 1683-1684. Gordon was a supporter of pan-Christian unity in repelling Turkish expansion. (In life, a zealous Catholic, Gordon always communicated tolerantly with Orthodox and Protestants, unless it concerned a religious issue in Britain. There Gordon wanted to stop “Protestant aggression.”) The idea of ​​a union between Russia and the Holy League permeates Gordon’s memorandum submitted to V.V. Golitsyn in January 1684

N.G. Ustryalov, citing Gordon’s memorandum of 1684 in its entirety, noted that V.V. Golitsyn treated him “indifferently.” This is an obvious misunderstanding, dictated and inspired by apologetics for Peter I, which demanded that all recent predecessors or opponents of Peter I be perceived as narrow-minded and useless for Russia. Another explanation for Ustryalov’s conclusion may be his understanding of the fact of unsuccessful Russian-Austrian negotiations in 1684. Imperial ambassadors Johann Christoph Zhirovsky and Sebastian Blumberg failed to conclude an alliance between the Habsburgs and Russia in Moscow in May 1684. Golitsyn's actions in 1685–1689, especially the conclusion of the Eternal Peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on April 26 (May 6, Gregorian style) 1686 and the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. fully agree with the proposals of the Scottish general of 1684.

In a memorandum of 1684, the major general analyzed all the arguments for peace with the Ottoman Empire and in favor of war with it in alliance with the Holy League. Gordon, who served at one time in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, always paid tribute to Polish love of freedom, courage and cordiality, but he warned the Russian government that only the joint struggle of Christians with the Turks would make the Russian authorities’ fears about the anti-Russian plans of the Poles “unreasonable misunderstandings.” “Suspicion and distrust between neighboring states were, are and will continue to be,” noted Gordon. “Even the sacredness of so close a League cannot remove it, and I have no doubt that the Poles will retain such thoughts and grievances, for discord is weeds, nourished by the memory of past rivalries, unfriendliness and insults.” However, keep in mind that by doing a favor and helping them now, you will be able to erase, at least to a greater extent, soften the anger from past enmity, and if they turn out to be ungrateful, then you will have the advantage of a just cause, which is the main thing for waging war.

Patrick Gordon insisted on instilling in the Russian people the idea of ​​the need for victory over the Crimea, as well as on continuing to improve Russian military affairs. “...It is a very mistaken idea to think that you can always or for a long time live in peace among so many warlike and restless peoples who are your neighbors,” warns Gordon. He ends his message to V.V. Golitsyn in the words: “I will add that it is very dangerous to allow soldiers and people to get out of the habit of owning weapons when all your neighbors use them so diligently.” Gordon's memorandum also proposed a plan for the defeat of Crimea, which in 1687–1689. unsuccessfully tried to implement V.V. Golitsyn.

Gordon believed that the flat steppe surface would facilitate the movement of the Russian army to Perekop. “...With 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, you can easily accomplish this in one or at most two years. And the way there is not so difficult, only a two-day march without water, even so comfortable that you can walk the whole way in combat formation, except for very few places, and even there there are no forests, hills, crossings or swamps.” The international situation should also have made the campaign “easier.” Ottoman expansion into Central and Eastern Europe a limit was set. In the fall of 1683, the troops of the Holy Roman Empire and the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, led by King John Sobieski, defeated huge Turkish forces near Vienna. As subsequent history showed, the growth of Turkish possessions in European space ceased. The Ottoman Empire moved to maintain its conquests, but its military and economic backwardness, progressing against the backdrop of the rapid development of European powers, doomed Turkey to a gradual but continuous weakening of its position as an empire and a great power.

This opened up brilliant strategic prospects for Russia to recapture Ottoman possessions in the Black Sea region. The Scottish commander felt them. But with “ease” he was clearly mistaken. For the first time, the Russians were able to implement his plan to defeat the Crimean army and occupy Crimea only during the next (5th) Russian-Turkish War 1735–1739 during the reign of Peter I's niece, Anna Ivanovna (1730–1740). The campaign of 1735 under the leadership of General Leontyev almost completely repeated the campaign of V.V. Golitsyn 1687 Russian troops reached Perekop and returned. In 1736, Field Marshal Minikh, president of the Military Collegium, who himself led the troops, defeated the Tatars, entered Crimea, took and burned Bakhchisarai, but was forced to leave the Crimean peninsula. Having no fleet either in Black or in Seas of Azov, the Russian forces in Crimea could have been blocked from Perekop by the Crimean cavalry hastily returning from the Persian campaign.

The annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1783 was still a long way off. But this goal, proposed by Gordon as the immediate tactical task in 1684, has been around since the end of the 17th century. became strategic for the southern direction of Russian foreign policy.

Campaigns of V.V. Golitsyn to the Crimea in 1687 and 1689 became a real confirmation of Russia’s alliance with the anti-Turkish coalition. Golitsyn's offensive Crimean campaigns opened a new era in Russian foreign policy, which lasted until the First World War inclusive. The international meaning of the tactics of the Crimean campaigns as part of the international actions of the Holy League was to prevent the Tatar cavalry from helping the Turks in their actions in Central Europe. Internal tasks were reduced to the defeat of the Crimean cavalry and the occupation of Crimea. If the first international part of the Crimean campaigns was a success, then the second part was much worse.

Russian army after military reforms of the 17th century. was stronger than the Crimean one. Crimea had neither infantry nor modern artillery. All its power consisted of maneuverable medieval cavalry, which, having no convoys, moved quickly. The surprise of the attack was its main trump card, and the capture of people, livestock and some other booty was the main goal of the military campaigns of the Crimea. Creation by Russia in the 17th century. Four serrated defensive lines on the southern borders made it impossible for the Crimean cavalry to make an unexpected deep breakthrough into Russia. Only border raids by small Crimean detachments were carried out, and the scale of their production was incomparable with the 16th century, when the Crimeans reached Moscow. The reliability of Russian defense to a large extent provoked Crimean and Turkish aggression against the more accessible Little Russia. The Crimean campaigns were the first attempt at large offensive operations involving more than 100 thousand people on foreign territory.

The backbone of Golitsyn's army in both 1687 and 1689 were regiments of the new system. The army moved all the way to Perekop under the cover of the Wagenburg, a mobile fortification of 20 thousand carts. It is significant that the Tatars did not dare to give battle. In the 17th century In general, without European allies (for example, the Zaporozhye Cossacks) or their Turkish patrons, they did not dare to engage in general battles. It is no coincidence that General Gordon noted about the Crimeans: “Their former courage has been lost and the sudden invasions to which they previously subjected the Great Russians have been forgotten...”. The real enemies of the Russian army in the campaigns of 1687 and 1689. the heat and scorched steppe became. Lack of food for horses turned out to be a big problem for the Russian army. Food and water spoiled by the heat, as well as the hardships of marching at high temperatures and under the scorching sun, were the second major problem. The Second Moscow Butyrsky Elected Soldiers' Regiment, distinguished by impeccable discipline and training, lost more than 100 out of 900 people on the march to the Russian border in April 1687. (By the way, losses on the march, even during the Napoleonic Wars, accounted for the majority of losses of all European armies, often exceeding combat losses.) The third group of problems was a consequence of the preservation of many medieval relics in the Russian army. “Noness” immediately surfaced, i.e. absenteeism or desertion of many service people. The withdrawal by nobles, especially noble ones, of a large number of armed, but in fact absolutely useless, servants accompanying them only delayed the movement of an already huge and slow army. But these were already minor costs. In essence, Golitsyn’s army fought not with the enemy, but with the climate and terrain. It turned out that in the conditions of the Wild Field these are much more powerful opponents than the Crimean Tatars.

It was the natural factor that Patrick Gordon did not appreciate in his project for the Crimean campaign in 1684, and in 1687 the main organizer of the Russian offensive, V.V., did not take it into account. Golitsyn. And no wonder. After all, this was the first large-scale rush of the Russians across the Wild Field to Perekop.

The scorched Wild Field met the Russian soldiers with completely unbearable conditions for a campaign. This is clearly reflected in the letters to the homeland of Franz Lefort, a lieutenant colonel and participant in the events. Lefort points out that the border river Samara met the Russian army with “not quite... healthy water. Having passed several more rivers, we reached the Konskaya Voda River, which concealed a strong poison in itself, which was discovered immediately when they began to drink from it... Nothing could be more terrible than what I saw here. Entire crowds of unfortunate warriors, exhausted by marching in the scorching heat, could not resist swallowing this poison, for death was only a consolation for them. Some drank from stinking puddles or swamps; others took off their hats filled with breadcrumbs and said goodbye to their comrades; they remained where they lay, not having the strength to walk due to the excessive excitement of the blood... We reached the Olba River, but its water also turned out to be poisonous, and everything around was destroyed: we saw only black earth and dust and could barely see each other. In addition, the whirlwinds raged constantly. All the horses were exhausted and fell in large numbers. We lost our heads. They looked everywhere for the enemy or the khan himself to give battle. Several Tatars were captured and one hundred and twenty of them were exterminated. The prisoners showed that the khan was coming at us with 80,000 thousand Tatars. However, his horde also suffered severely, because everything up to Perekop was burned out.”

Lefort reports huge losses of the Russian army, but not from battles that did not occur on the way to Perekop, and even greater losses when returning from there. Many German officers also fell. Death “kidnapped our best officers,” states Lefort, “among other things, three colonels: Vaugh, Flivers, Balzer and up to twenty German lieutenant colonels, majors and captains.”

The question of who set the steppe on fire is still controversial. A number of researchers believe that the Tatars did this, seeing no other opportunity to stop the Russians. But the fire doomed the Crimeans themselves to inaction. They also had nothing to feed their horses, and they found themselves locked on the Crimean peninsula. The second version comes from the assessment of what happened by the Russian authorities and now has more and more supporters. The fire was organized by the Cossacks, who were not interested in this war, since it led to the strengthening of Moscow’s position, its dictatorship over the Cossack elders, and the distraction of the Cossacks from the defense of Ukrainian territories proper.

In addition, many Ukrainians still saw the Poles as their main enemy, and the Crimean Campaign of 1687 also involved actions to protect Poland and Hungary, where the troops of the Holy League fought the Ottomans. Gordon constantly reports on Russia's allied obligations. For example, describing the retreat of the Russian army in 1687, he stated: “So, we slowly went back to the Samara River, from where we sent 20 thousand Cossacks beyond Borysthenes to monitor the actions of the Tatars and guard so that they did not invade Poland or Hungary , and in order to firmly block all crossings.” The anti-Polish sentiments of the “Russian Cossacks” were generated not only by old grievances and religious enmity. The “Russian Cossacks” saw in the robbery of Polish possessions their “legitimate booty,” which the alliance of Russia and the Holy League clearly deprived them of.

Patrick Gordon in one of his letters to the Earl of Middleton, a high-ranking nobleman at court English king Jacob II, July 26, 1687 wrote: “The Ukrainian hetman Ivan Samoilovich (a man with great power and influence) was very opposed to peace with the Poles and this campaign, and by all means hindered and slowed down our advance.” This message from Gordon, a direct participant in the events, whose “Diary” is usually confirmed by information from other sources, is a serious indirect confirmation of Samoilovich’s guilt. True, it was in relation to Hetman Samoilovich that Patrick Gordon could have a biased opinion. At one time, the hetman offended his son-in-law, the Kyiv governor F.P. Sheremetev, with whom Gordon was friends. After the death of Sheremetev’s wife, the hetman’s daughter, Samoilovich demanded that his daughter’s dowry be returned to him and his grandson be raised.

However, rumors that it was the Ukrainian Cossacks, with the connivance, if not the direct command of Hetman Samoilovich, who burned the steppe, besides Gordon, are also reported by the “neutral” Lefort: “They could not understand how the Tatars managed to burn out all the grass. The Cossack hetman was suspected of complicity with the Tatar Khan.” For example, after the Cossacks crossed the bridges over the Samara River, for some reason the bridges burned down, and the Russians had to build a new crossing in order to move on.

One way or another, Hetman I.S. had to answer for the return of Russian troops without victories over the Tatars. Samoilovich. He was unpopular among Ukrainians. The hetman's son Semyon (died 1685) carried out in February-March 1679 the population of the “Turkish” Right Bank Ukraine behind the left bank of the Dnieper. Moscow did not leave the settlers under the rule of the hetman. They wandered around the “Russian” Sloboda Ukraine until 1682, until, finally, in 1682, a decree came about the places of settlement allocated to them there. The foreman was strained by Samoilovich’s despotic temper. Having lost the support of Moscow, Ivan Samoilovich could not stay in power. V.V. Golitsyn gave rise to the denunciation of the Zaporozhye general foremen and a number of colonels about the alleged betrayal of the hetman of Russia. As a result, Ivan Samoilovich lost his mace, his son Gregory was executed in Sevsk for “thieves’, fanciful” speeches about Russian sovereigns. Considerable wealth of the Samoilovichs was confiscated - half went to the tsarist treasury, half to the treasury of the Zaporozhye army. The hetman himself (without investigation into his case) and his son Yakov were sent into Siberian exile, where he died in 1690.

Mazepa became the new hetman of “Russian Ukraine”. Gordon characterizes him as a great supporter of the union of Russia and the Holy League. “Yesterday, someone named Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa,” Gordon informed Middleton, “a former adjutant general, was elected to his (Samoilovich’s) place. This person is more committed to the Christian cause and, we hope, will be more active and diligent in stopping the Tatar raids on Poland and Hungary...” This refers to the participation of the Cossacks in operations directed against the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the actions of the Ottomans in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in Hungary. The government of Sophia had some doubts about Ivan Mazepa’s loyalty to Russia. The princess's trusted associate, Duma nobleman Fyodor Leontievich Shaklovity, went to Ukraine to investigate this matter. “When he returned,” Gordon reports, “he gave a favorable report about the hetman, but with an admixture of some guesses and suspicions about him because of his origin (he is a Pole), and therefore about his possible goodwill, if not secret relations with this people "

The campaign of 1687 made a due impression on the Tatars. They did not risk organizing a large-scale counter-offensive in 1688, limiting themselves to the traditional raids of individual detachments on the Russian border. The serif lines did not allow the Tatars to break through into the depths Russian territory. In view of a possible new Russian offensive, the khan did not dare to go far from his own borders.

This certainly contributed to the victories of other members of the Holy League in 1687–1688. Gordon defined the Ottoman army without the Crimean cavalry as “a bird without wings.” After the capture of Buda (1686), Prince Ludwig of Baden with 3-4 thousand of his people defeated 15 thousand Turks in Bosnia near the village of Trivenic in 1688. In the same year, General von Scherfen captured Belgrade from the Ottomans after a 27-day siege. The losses of the imperial troops were several times less than the Turkish ones. Things were worse for the Poles. They were defeated at Kamenets, where the Ottomans acted with Crimean Tatars. It is noteworthy that the Poles explained their defeat precisely by the fact that the Muscovites did not distract the Tatars this time. Gordon shared the same opinion. However, the Ottoman victory at Kamenets did not radically change the picture of the failures of the Turkish Empire in 1687–1688. Back in November 1687, the Janissaries overthrew Sultan Mehmed IV and elevated his brother Suleiman II to the throne. Turkish ambassadors arrived in Bratislava in 1688. Formally, they wanted to notify the emperor about their new ruler. The main goal was to probe the question of peace.

Rumors about a possible truce between the Holy League and Turkey alarmed Russia. She was preparing for the second Crimean campaign. The Sophia government hoped that the Holy League would also continue fighting. In 1688, the Holy Roman Emperor assured the Russian Tsars that this would be the case. The imperial message was conveyed to the Russian resident in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prokofy Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (future one of the three “great ambassadors” of 1697–1698). Austrian victories over the Turks were halted not because of their collusion with the Ottomans, but because the French, longtime European allies of the Turks and opponents of the Empire, invaded its possessions. The French king Louis XIV began the War of the Palatinate Succession (1688–1698). He soon captured Philipsburg, a city in Baden.

The ambassadorial order obliged P.B. Voznitsyn, as well as the Greek Orthodox scholar monk I. Likhud, sent by the tsarist government to Venice in 1688, to convince the imperial government to take into account Russian interests in the event of peace. Looking ahead, we note that Peter’s diplomacy will do exactly the same, having discovered in 1697–1698. the impossibility for their Western allies to continue the war with Turkey due to the expectation in Europe of the war “for the Spanish succession”. The Truce of Karlowitz of 1699 will be represented by a number of separate treaties between the League participants and Turkey. Russia will be able to secure Azov, captured in 1696, and the Peace of Constantinople in 1700, in addition to Azov, will bring to Russia the official cessation of payments for “funerals” to Crimea and the liquidation of Turkish fortresses near the Dnieper. Peter's policy on the southern borders was not some new turn, but a logical continuation of the course begun by the government of Sophia and Golitsyn.

Another indicator of this continuity can be Russian diplomatic activity on the eve of the First Crimean Campaign. Russian Ambassador V.T. Postnikov negotiated the expansion of the anti-Turkish alliance in England, Holland, Bradenburg (Prussia) and Florence. B. Mikhailov went to Sweden and Denmark for the same purpose; to Venice - I. Volkov, to France and Spain - Ya.F. Dolgorukov and Y. Myshetsky, to Austria - B.P. Sheremetev and I.I. Chaadaev. All these embassies had the same official tasks as the Grand Embassy of Peter I - they tried to expand the circle of their Western allies in the war with Turkey.

In the spring of 1688, Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev insisted on attacking the Belgorod regiments of Kazy-Kermen with regiments. They proposed appointing Patrick Gordon as one of the main military leaders. His authority increased after the campaign of 1687 V.V. Golitsyn rejected this proposal, focusing on the construction of the large Novobogoroditsk fortress on the Samara River, which strengthened Russia's border defense system. Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, an undeniably talented diplomat and administrator, did not have the abilities of a major military leader, although he spent most of his life on military service. The Old Moscow association of military and civil service demanded that such a large-scale expedition Russian troops foreign borders were headed by the head of government. As an experienced politician, Golitsyn could not ignore this. A number of historians, in particular Ustryalov, suggested that exorbitant ambition forced Golitsyn to aspire to the post of commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, the Frenchman Neville, ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was admitted to the house of V.V. Golitsyn, completely refutes this version. “Golitsyn did everything,” recalls Neville, “to reject this position, because... he rightly assumed that he would have a lot of difficulties, and that all responsibility for failure would fall on him, no matter what measures of foresight and precautions he took, and that it would be difficult for him to maintain his glory if the campaign was unsuccessful... Having been a greater statesman rather than a commander, he foresaw that his absence from Moscow would cause him more harm than the conquest of the Crimea itself would have brought glory, since it would not have placed him higher, and the title of commander of the troops did not add anything to his power.”

V.V. Golitsyn decided to take the same route a second time. Gordon in 1688 no longer found the previous path, which he himself had proposed in 1684, successful. The Scotsman describes the reasons for choosing the old route: “Antony, an experienced Cossack, sent on reconnaissance towards the Crimea, returned and reported that all the way to Perekop he discovered places where you can get water either from springs or by digging the ground an elbow deep. This became a strong incentive for our gullible and crazy people to undertake another campaign along the same path that we went through before.” It was decided to increase the number of participants in the campaign to 117.5 thousand people. Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Mazepa fielded up to 50 thousand more. Troops began gathering in Sumy in February 1689. A decree was sent out, “... that from those who do not appear... lands will be taken away in the name of Their Majesties.” Gordon commanded three regiments of soldiers on the left flank. He has already said goodbye, as can be seen from his “Diary,” with the version about the ease of conquering Crimea. In March 1689, Gordon advised “Generalissimo” Golitsyn to go not through the steppe, as last time, but along the Dnieper, having previously organized outposts there with reliable garrisons, “every four days of marching.” Gordon advised to reinforce the regiments of the new formation with grenadier companies. But V.V. Golitsyn did not follow these ideas from Gordon.

When the Russian army, having made a difficult march in the heat across the steppe, successfully reached Perekop (May 20, 1689), Golitsyn did not dare to storm its outdated fortifications, although the skirmishes with the Tatars that took place this time testified to the superiority of Russian weapons. On May 15, the Tatar cavalry tried to attack the Russian right flank, but was repulsed with heavy losses by Russian marching artillery fire. The regiments of the new system performed well, which indicated the correctness of the course towards the gradual professionalization of the Russian army. The Russians had a chance for a successful breakthrough to the Crimean Peninsula, but V.V. Golitsyn preferred negotiations. He demanded surrender from the khan, and having received a refusal, he gave the order to retreat due to the large losses of people from the heat, disease and hardships of the campaign.

This was a fatal mistake by the commander-in-chief. There were even rumors about his khan bribing him. During the retreat, the regiments of the new formation again distinguished themselves. “...There was great danger and even greater fear, lest the khan pursue us with all his might,” Patrick Gordon wrote later (January 28, 1690) in his message to Earl Erroll, “so I was detached from the left wing with 7 registrants infantry and several cavalry (although all were dismounted) in order to guard the rearguard. They pursued us very zealously for 8 days in a row, but achieved little..."

Princess Sophia, as in 1687, ordered that the troops be met as victors, which, in essence, they were. For the second time in Russian history, it was not the Crimeans who attacked Russian soil, but the Russians who fought within the Crimean borders, making their contribution to the common cause of the Holy League. This is exactly how A.S. assessed the Crimean campaign of 1689. Pushkin, collecting material for his “History of Peter the Great.” “This campaign brought great benefit to Austria, for it destroyed the alliance concluded in Adrianople between the Crimean Khan, French Ambassador and the glorious Transylvanian prince Tekeli. According to this alliance, the khan was supposed to give 30,000 troops to help the high vizier enter Hungary; The khan himself, with the same number, was to attack Transylvania together with Tekeli. France pledged to help Tekeli with money and give him skilled officers.”

But all these international multi-step combinations were little understood by the population of Russia in the 17th century, especially against the background of the entry into the final stage of the conflict of two court “parties” - the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins. Without the occupation of Crimea by the “Naryshchkin party,” it was easy to imagine V.V.’s campaign. Golitsyn failure. It is no coincidence that young Peter, as Gordon’s Diary reports, did not even allow V.V. Golitsyn upon his return from Crimea to his hand. True, such a recognized expert on the history of Peter I as N.I. Pavlenko, based on other sources, claims that Peter only “intended to refuse Golitsyn and his retinue an audience, but he was hardly dissuaded from this step, which meant a break with Sophia. Reluctantly, Peter accepted Golitsyn and those accompanying him. Among the latter was Colonel Franz Lefort.” A participant in the Crimean campaign, Lefort, along with Patrick Gordon, in a few months would turn into the closest friend and mentor of Peter I. The colossal losses of Golitsyn’s army from heat, bad water, food and disease made a grave impression on ordinary Muscovites. The “Naryshkin party,” whose leadership included cousin V.V. Golitsyna B.A. Golitsyn, a good chance arose for the overthrow of Sophia, which was realized during the August coup of 1689.

In the interests of the victors, it was in every possible way to “blacken” the history of the Crimean campaigns, which did not prevent Peter I, 6 years later, from continuing the offensive launched by his sister’s government on the southern borders of Russia, as well as on other borders, for during the entire second half of the 17th century. Russia has not known a single strategic defeat. She won the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking away half of Ukraine and Kyiv from it. It reduced the war with Sweden to a draw, without winning or losing any of the territories it had after the Time of Troubles. Forced Turkey to recognize Russian citizenship of Left Bank Ukraine, Zaporozhye and Kyiv and, finally, attacked Crimea twice, forcing it to permanently switch from attack to defense. Peter would take into account the difficulties of a foot march across the Wild Field discovered during the Crimean campaigns and shift the direction of the main attack in the south directly to the Turkish outpost of Azov, where troops could be transported along the Don. Among the main leaders Azov campaigns 1695 and 1696 we will see V.V.’s closest associates. Golitsyn on the Crimean campaigns - “service Germans” Pyotr Ivanovich Gordon and Franz Yakovlevich Lefort.