Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station accident causes and consequences. Analysis of social protection of persons affected by man-made and radiation disasters

Hi all! The author of this modest blog, Vladimir Raichev, is with you. Friends, please tell me, have you ever been scared? But for those who saw the accident take place Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, it was very scary and now I will tell you how it was.

I remember that I was very scared when my car spun on a winter road and was thrown off the road onto high speed. It wasn’t scary right away, not when I was trying to catch an out-of-control car, frantically turning the steering wheel from side to side, but when it was all over. By the way, just yesterday I gave several recommendations on how to prepare for the winter period for motorists.

I often write about disasters and accidents, for example, the sinking of the Titanic or the Messinian earthquake, read it if you are interested. So, I write often, but I only thought about how scary it was once, when and how it happened, I will tell you at the end of the article.

And today let me continue the story about the disaster at the hydroelectric power station. When I was looking for information, I imagined how scared people were. This is truly terrible. I won’t bore you with expectations and get down to the main topic.

On August 17, 2009, several dozen people watched in amazement as the cover was torn off from hydraulic unit No. 2 of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Eyewitnesses recall:

“My eyes didn’t believe it. The rotor flew out of the corrugated covering of the unit and flew up about three meters. It was spinning! Pieces of concrete and metal flew, we tried to dodge them."

To understand what exactly the station personnel saw, let us recall that the total weight of the rotor assembly is 1300 tons. It was he who took off into the air. Imagine the size of such a colossus.

So, having flown out of its mount, the rotor lands back. The turbine room was flooded within minutes. 75 people were killed, 13 were injured. The hydroelectric power station is actually not functioning; all the main components of the station are damaged in one way or another. The Yenisei gains a temporary victory over man. Scary?

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station took a very long time to build, from 1968 to 2000. However, in fact, this only meant a phased start-up of the station’s capacities; it produced its first current already in 1978, and by 1985 all ten hydraulic units were launched. The last fifteen years have been just general improvements. This is the most powerful hydroelectric power station in Russia and 13th in the world (ironically).

The largest hydroelectric station is located in China (Three Gorges) and its parameters are approximately 4 times larger than ours (22,500 MW versus 6,400).

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is a unique object. Owned by RusHydro. Located in Khakassia on the Yenisei River.

Background of the disaster

At the time of the accident, nine out of ten units were in operation, the sixth was under repair. The staff has long noticed that something is wrong with the second machine; apparently one of the bearings is worn out. Vibrations are higher than normal. They are trying to stop the turbine, but the management is against it; it is enough that another one is already being repaired.

On the night of August 16-17, the vibrations become simply terrifying. A reinforced team of repairmen arrives, the go-ahead is given to stop and they try to do it twice.

The unit is bursting at the seams, there are strong beatings and they cannot decide to make a complete stop. In the morning, August 17 arrives chief engineer and gives the command to still brake the unit to the end. We all know the result: the pins that hold the turbine cover are torn off, and the rotor-cover assembly flies out into the turbine room. The diameter of one pin is about 15 centimeters; in fact, it is a metal blank with a thread. But it doesn't save.

Tragedy

After the rotor takes off and falls, the main disaster occurs. Water gushed out from the damaged hydraulic unit. It drowns the turbine hall, all the rooms below it and all other units. There are short circuits on them, quite spectacular.

In such a situation, emergency protection should be activated, which stops the turbine and provides an emergency drain of water. It only worked on the fifth. The rest were still spinning, short-circuited and without proper support systems. This led to the failure of almost all ten turbines, which were damaged in one way or another. In a matter of minutes, the entire energy system of Siberia simply sank.

Another problem was the complete loss of power to the station, including the attendant's console. The hydroelectric power station fed itself, centrally. There was no emergency independent power supply path; not a single designer could imagine a situation where it might be needed in his worst dreams.

Of course, there was a diesel generator, but in a situation where all the wiring was completely short-circuited, it was of little use.

So, water flows into seven hydraulic units and from one more (the fifth stopped normally, the sixth was initially standing). The Yenisei waters have two ways - through the station or through the dam for sanitary passage of water.

The station is stalled and flooded. The dam is closed. In order to somehow release water, you need to open the dam and close the valves of the hydraulic units. But there is nothing to do this with - everything is de-energized, the standard systems are destroyed.

But on the crest of the dam there is a special room with the ability to close the gates manually. Eight brave employees climb there. They break down the iron door and, having once again contacted the chief engineer by mobile phone, block it off.

At the same time, the same diesel generator was used to power the gantry crane for lifting the dam gates. Somehow the dam is opened, and it begins to let water through. All. The station is de-energized, covered in water, which is gradually leaving, 75 people remain in its depths. But the Yenisei flows further. The time is 13:07. Three and a half hours of water hell are over.

Liquidation

The Ministry of Emergency Situations arrives at the site promptly, together with the personnel participates in the water release operation and organizes diving operations in the flooded premises, pumping out the water. Mostly dead, but two hours after the accident, the first person saved took refuge in an air pocket. 15 hours later - the second one. There will be no more miracles; only the bodies of 75 people will be raised.

The Siberian regional center is organizing the transfer of additional forces to Khakassia, the station is being dismantled by the whole world. A day later, Shoigu arrives at the scene of the accident.

In general, there are no complaints about the work of rescuers in this situation. Everything happened too quickly and yet those who could be saved were saved.

Reasons

The saddest thing in this story is that no one could name the causes of the accident. It has been established exactly how the destruction of unit No. 2 occurred, each detail is described minute by minute. But here's the answer to specific question No one can tell you about the root cause.

There were certain specific problems in the operation of the unit, but none of them could be called critical; nothing like this has ever led to the rotor flying out of its socket. In the end, they decided so. Here is the official wording of Rostechnadzor’s conclusions:

“Due to the repeated occurrence of additional variable loads on the hydraulic unit associated with transitions through the non-recommended zone, fatigue damage to the hydraulic unit mounting points, including the turbine cover, formed and developed. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the tearing off of the turbine cover and depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit.”

To put it simply, water does not flow evenly; it has surges and falls. As a result, fatigue accumulated in the hydraulic unit, which turned out to be not designed for such a dynamic operating mode, and it ruptured. Yenisei turned out to be stronger than that safety margin that was originally built into the station. Although there are several other theories, including a terrorist attack, these are more likely in the realm of conspiracy theories.

Seven station employees, management and members of the monitoring service were charged with negligence. The investigation lasted five years; in December 2014, all received sentences ranging from four to six years, but the first was amnestied in the courtroom, and the other two were given amnesty in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Victory. There is information that all those convicted are already free.

As of 2016, the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station has been completely restored and is again providing electricity to Siberia. But power engineers are looking at the Yenisei with redoubled caution. And they do it right.

It’s just some kind of mysticism: the reason could not be established, in our 21st century. Can you imagine?

And now I’m telling you what catastrophe made me scared. Of course, this is the crash of our plane in Egypt. After all, Yulia and I were then supposed to fly to Egypt on vacation; the trips had already been ordered and paid for.

Friends, subscribe to my blog updates and receive newsletters about all the news that happens on my blog. Share this article with your friends on your walls social networks, I am sure that this story will touch them too. Until we meet again, bye-bye.

This August will mark 5 years since the accident at the Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The region is still dealing with the consequences of that disaster. The hydroelectric power station never reached full capacity. The families of the victims (75 people) continue to mourn their loved ones. Man-made disasters are the price that humanity pays for the development of scientific and technological progress. Consider some of the world's devastating hydroelectric dam accidents.

China, Henan Province, Banqiao Dam

This earth dam (height 24.54 m, length 118 m) was built on the Zhuhe River in 1952. Original purpose: protecting the province's farmland from flooding. Later, electricity generation was added to this. In terms of the number of deaths and those affected by the consequences, this disaster has no equal on the hydropower “black list.” On the night of August 8, 1975, a severe flood broke through the Shimantan dam, which was located upstream of the Zhuhe River. The water rushed down with a roar. Having reached the Banqiao Dam, the stream overflowed its crest and destroyed the structure to the ground within a few minutes. The resulting wave, 7 meters high, traveled a distance of 55 km in an hour. Sweeping away everything in its path, the water flooded a plain up to 15 km wide. From the pressure of water, the impact of falling walls and stones, 26 thousand people died within an hour after the accident. Later, another 145 thousand drowned. 60 dams, dozens of road bridges were destroyed, railway tracks. Communication lines have been destroyed. This made it very difficult to rescue the victims. The flood carried away 300 thousand heads of livestock. Water flooded vast areas of fertile farmland. Due to famine and cholera epidemics, the number of victims increased significantly. According to various estimates, it reached a terrifying number - from 170 to 230 thousand people. In terms of the number of deaths and damage caused, this accident is considered the largest in the history of hydroelectric power plants.

Reasons

All man-made disasters are caused by many factors, one of the main ones being “human”.

The destruction of the Bank Qiao Dam is no exception. The ongoing investigation into the circumstances of the accident revealed serious problems the technical condition of the dams and what has been known about them for a long time senior management energy industry in China. Due to gross miscalculations during construction, soon after its completion the entire structure was covered with cracks. Dam strengthening steel structures carried out by Soviet specialists. There were other technical problems as well.

Due to cost-saving considerations, the dam was commissioned with five outlets, although it was planned to build 12. The reduction in outlets also affected other dams on the Zhuhe River. For this reason, on August 8, 1975, they were unable to withstand the load of the wave and were destroyed. Designers designed the Bank Qiao Dam for floods that occur once every 1000 years (up to 306 mm of rainfall per day). But at the moment of his accident destructive force The flood exceeded all estimates. None of the top leaders of the PRC could have imagined this, and reducing the cost of building dams previously seemed to everyone a completely reasonable solution. Only one specialist, the hydrologist Chen Xing, spoke out against the general enthusiasm for the practice of saving. He has repeatedly stated publicly that reducing flows puts the Ban Qiao Dam in a technically dangerous position. But the engineer's opinion was not taken into account. For his adherence to principles, he was removed from his job and accused of trying to waste the money of the Chinese people. Unfortunately for everyone, Sin was right.

Weather

From the end of July 1975, super typhoon Nina raged over China for a week. Even after it weakened, heavy rains continued to fall. For the entire day of August 6, a record amount of precipitation fell - 1631 mm, which is 2 times higher than normal! Several provinces of the country were affected by flooding.

The Banqiao Reservoir was overflowing. There was an urgent need to drain the excess water. But power engineers were prohibited from doing this, because... The areas downstream of the Zhuhe were already flooded. When party comrades finally decided to open the spillways, communication with the dam was interrupted. The dam management decided to act at its own risk and release the water. But it was already too late. By the time the station director gave the order to open the spillways, they were thoroughly covered with silt. The last link in the chain of events was the destruction of the upper Shimantan dam, which was located upstream from Banqiao. The mass of water, having destroyed one dam, rushed to the second and swept it away in a few seconds. It was one o'clock in the morning on August 8, 1975. People sleeping in their homes were helpless before the madness of the elements. This explains the terrifying number of victims in the first hour after the accident. The destruction of roads and communications disrupted the work to rescue the victims. The water destroyed food supplies, medicines, and livestock. Aid was dropped into flooded areas by helicopter. Famine and epidemics began. 11 million people were drawn into the disaster.
In 1993, the dam was rebuilt and put into operation. Rehabilitated hydrologist Chen Xing took part in the restoration work.

Italy, Vajont Dam

The hydroelectric power station has been abandoned since the accident - more than 50 years. The concrete 5-arch structure (261.6 m, thickness at the base 23 m) is located on the Vainot River near Monte Toc in the province of Belluno. In October 1963, late in the evening, a huge part of the Monte Toc mountain slid into the reservoir, a section 2 km long and almost 1 km wide. The reservoir was filled to 175 m rock. Water rushed over the crest of the dam. The water column shot up half a kilometer above the dam and collapsed. A giant wave (seiche) 90 m high swept through the surrounding area at a tsunami speed of 8-12 m/s. Within 7 minutes from the moment of the landslide, it washed away 5 villages in the Piave River valley. Seriously destroyed other settlements. According to various estimates, the accident killed between 1,900 and 3,000 people. By morning the gorge was a huge lake of mud.

Reasons

The investigation into the disaster found that the site for construction was chosen incorrectly by the designers. Earth's crust The area is mobile, with small earthquakes and landslides occurring frequently. The executing company SADE was aware of this, but it continued to carry out work. Even before the construction of the dam began, geologists repeatedly expressed their concerns. Construction of the dam began in 1957, and the first landslides occurred 2 years later. Despite this, construction was not stopped. By the time the reservoir was filled with water (in 1960), the position of the station seemed extremely dangerous to some experts. A year before the disaster, engineers from SADE (the construction contractor), based on many years of observations of problem areas of the dam, warned their management about the impending threat of an accident. But the company’s management ignored the experts’ statement. No one reported the possible danger to residents of nearby villages.
The accident occurred on October 9, 1963 at 22.35 after prolonged and heavy rains.

Punishment

The lawsuit between the company's top managers and the Italian government lasted for many years. Several SADE specialists were convicted and received short sentences. One of the engineers committed suicide. Economic benefits were given to areas affected by the accident. This had a positive impact on the region's economy. The dam suffered little damage as a result of the disaster and is still standing. In 2001, a feature film was shot, restoring the chronicle of those events. Since 2002, the Vayont Dam has become a popular tourist attraction.

Russia, Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

The largest power plant in the country (total capacity together with the Main hydroelectric complex is 6721 MW) with a concrete dam 245 m high and 1066 m long is located 35 km from Sayanogorsk (Khakassia). Before the accident on August 17, 2009, hydroelectric power stations accounted for 15% of the country's electricity. Share in global volume – 2%. The station is currently operating at half its capacity. Restoration work has not yet been completed. Late in the evening of August 17, 2009, when vibration increased at hydraulic unit No. 2, the turbine cover was torn off and thrown into the air. The impact was so strong that the lid broke through the concrete ceiling. Water poured into the turbine room from the Sayano-Shushenskoye reservoir. In just a few minutes, destroying the turbine hall, a meter-high stream spilled onto the street and flooded the nearby area, causing severe destruction along the way. All dam units were destroyed or significantly damaged. The protection systems did not work, the hydroelectric power station was de-energized. At this time, specialists were carrying out repairs at hydraulic unit No. 6. They worked in the interior of the unit, under the floor of the machine room. Water from the destroyed unit No. 2 flooded those premises in a matter of minutes. All workers died. Later, other victims were added to them. The total number of deaths from the accident at the hydroelectric power station is 75 people. 13 people were seriously injured and injured. Water stopped flowing into the turbine room only the next morning. By this time, it was possible to manually dig through the technological gates on the dam crest.
Due to the accident, 45 cubic meters of turbine oil spilled into the Yenisei. A spot 130 km long was formed. In fish farms on the Sayano-Shushenskoye Reservoir, 400 tons of commercial trout died. The oil stain was localized within a week. In terms of the amount of material damage, the Minister of Emergency Situations (at that time) Sergei Shoigu compared the accident at the SShHPP with the destruction of the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Due to the accident, several large industrial enterprises were de-energized, including the Sayanogorsk Iron and Steel Works. Many cities and towns in Khakassia and the Altai Territory found themselves without electricity. And also in neighboring regions: Novosibirsk, Kemerovo and Tomsk. Soon the power supply was restored, redistributing the load between other power plants in Siberia. The restoration of the turbine hall, reconstruction of old units and installation of new units cost RUSHYDRO (energy holding, owner of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) 20 billion rubles.

Reasons

Rostekhnadzor conducted an investigation into the causes of the accident on August 17. In addition to technical reasons, the “human factor” was again present. Technical problems: the fastenings (studs) of the turbine cover could not withstand the increased vibration due to metal fatigue and collapsed. The pressure of the water tore off the lid. The accident could have been prevented by timely repairs. The station's chief engineer ignored critical sensor readings. HPP management for many years allowed unit No. 2 to operate in an unsatisfactory vibration mode. The special commission of Rostekhnadzor, which conducted the investigation, considered many top managers of the Russian energy sector responsible for the accident: the former head of RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Minister of Energy Vyacheslav Sinyugin and others, as well as Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Anatoly Dyakov and Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs RF Igor Yusufov. He headed the Department of Energy from 2001 to 2004. They all knew about the emergency situation at the Sayano-Shushenskaya station and about the accidents that occurred there before August 17. However, no drastic measures were taken to eliminate technical problems.

Punishment

The investigation into the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station lasted 3 years. The first criminal case was closed by the Prosecutor General's Office due to the statute of limitations in 2011. The guilt of the accused was reclassified to more serious articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. However, there is still no court verdict. The hearings were postponed many times for various reasons, including due to the failure of the defendants' lawyers to appear in court. The charges were brought against the former director of the station, the chief engineer, his two deputies, and specialists from the equipment monitoring service of the SSHHPP. There are a total of 7 people on the list of defendants. The investigation concluded in August 2012. For more than a year, the accused studied the case materials (1,213 volumes).

Resonance

Residents of Khakassia and the Krasnoyarsk Territory (1,823 people) in November 2009 appealed to the top leadership of Russia with a proposal to close the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station.
Another powerful power plant is located 25 km from Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisei. If the Sayano-Shushenskaya dam is destroyed, the wave will reach Abakan (the capital of Khakassia) in 60 minutes, and Sayanogorsk in 7 minutes. But even more terrible consequences will occur when the wave reaches the Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric station. If she fails to resist, the city of millions will be flooded. For this reason, after the accident on August 17, a tense emotional situation persisted for a long time in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, people were scared.

Station diagram

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station on the Yenisei River is the largest hydroelectric power station in Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world. It is located on the border of the Krasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia. Construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1968, the first hydraulic unit was launched in 1978, the last in 1985. The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000. Technically, the hydroelectric power station consists of a concrete arch-gravity dam with a height of 245 m and a hydroelectric power station building near the dam, which houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each. The installed capacity of the hydroelectric power station is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 22.8 billion kWh. The hydroelectric dam forms a large Sayano-Shushenskoye reservoir with seasonal regulation. Downstream of the Yenisei there is a counter-regulating Mainskaya hydroelectric power station, which forms a single production complex with the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The hydroelectric power station structures were designed by the Lenhydroproekt Institute, hydraulic power equipment was supplied by the LMZ and Elektrosila plants (now part of the Power Machines concern). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP belongs to JSC RusHydro.

Catastrophe

External video files
	Video recording of the moment of the accident.
	Outdoor surveillance camera footage.

At the time of the accident, the station carried a load of 4100 MW, out of 10 hydraulic units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13 local time on August 17, 2009, a sudden destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2 occurred with significant volumes of water flowing through the hydraulic unit shaft under high pressure. The power plant personnel, who were in the turbine room, heard a loud bang in the area of hydraulic unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. An eyewitness to the accident, Oleg Myakishev, describes this moment as follows:

...I stood at the top, heard some kind of growing noise, then saw the corrugated covering of the hydraulic unit rise and stand on end. Then I saw the rotor rising from under it. He was spinning. My eyes didn't believe it. He rose three meters. Stones and pieces of reinforcement flew, we began to dodge them... The corrugated sheet was already somewhere under the roof, and the roof itself was blown apart... I figured: the water was rising, 380 cubic meters per second, and - I was heading towards the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn’t make it in time, I rose higher, stopped, looked down - I saw how everything was collapsing, the water was rising, people were trying to swim... I thought that the gates needed to be closed urgently, manually, to stop the water... Manually, because there was no voltage, no protections worked...

Streams of water quickly flooded the machine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, while short circuits occurred on the working hydroelectric generators (their flashes are clearly visible on the amateur video of the disaster), which put them out of action. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which also led to a blackout of the station itself. A light and sound alarm went off at the station's central control panel, after which the control panel was de-energized - operational communications, power supply to lighting, automation and alarm devices were lost. Automatic systems, stopping hydraulic units, worked only on hydraulic unit No. 5, the guide vane of which was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and water continued to flow through the water conduits to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (the stators and crosspieces of the generators were severely damaged). Streams of water and flying debris from hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and floors of the turbine room in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4. Hydraulic units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with debris from the turbine room. Those station employees who had such an opportunity quickly left the scene of the accident.

At the time of the accident, the station management was in place with the chief engineer of the hydroelectric power station A. N. Mitrofanov, the acting chief of the civil defense and emergency situations staff M. I. Chiglintsev, the head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, the head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift manager M. G. Nefedov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the station territory after the accident.

Due to the loss of power supply, it was only possible to close the gates manually, for which personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 8:30, eight operational personnel reached the gate room, after which they contacted the station shift manager by cell phone, who gave instructions to lower the gates. Having broken open the iron door, station workers A.V. Kataitsev, R. Gaifullin, E.V. Kondrattsev, I.M. Bagautdinov, P.A. Mayoroshin and N.N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates of the water intakes within an hour , stopping the flow of water into the turbine room. The closure of water pipelines led to the need to open the gates of the spillway dam in order to ensure sanitary release in the downstream of the SSHHPP. By 11:32, power was provided to the gantry crane of the dam crest from a mobile diesel generator, and at 11:50 the operation to lift the gates began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water began to flow through.

Emergency rescue work

Search and rescue and repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees of the Siberian Regional Center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, flew to the area of the accident and headed the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident; the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to examine the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in “air bags” and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, already on August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as insignificant. On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been discovered, 58 people were listed as missing. As the station's interior was cleared of water, the number of dead bodies found grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when the water pumping work entered its final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of the search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of structures and equipment. On August 28, the state of emergency introduced in connection with the accident was lifted in Khakassia. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the hydroelectric power station) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m³ of rubble was dismantled and removed, and more than 277,000 m³ of water was pumped out of the station premises. In order to eliminate oil pollution in the Yenisei waters, 9,683 meters of booms were installed and 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

Investigation into the causes of the accident

The investigation into the causes of the accident was carried out independently by various departments. Immediately after the accident, a Rostechnadzor commission was created, and the investigative committee at the prosecutor’s office began its investigation as part of a criminal case initiated under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of labor safety rules). On September 16, the State Duma created a parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of the accident under the leadership of V. A. Pekhtin. The lack of obviousness of the causes of the accident (according to the Russian Minister of Energy S.I. Shmatko, “this is the largest and most incomprehensible hydropower accident that has ever happened in the world”) gave rise to a number of versions that were not subsequently confirmed. Immediately after the accident, a version of water hammer was voiced, and suggestions were also made about the explosion of the transformer. The version of a terrorist act was also considered - in particular, one of the Chechen separatist groups posted a statement claiming that the accident was a consequence of sabotage; however, no traces of explosives were found at the accident site. The Rostechnadzor commission initially planned to announce the causes of the accident and the amount of damage caused by September 15, but the final meeting of the commission was first postponed to September 17 due to the “need to further clarify certain technological aspects in the draft final act of the commission,” and then postponed for another 10 days. “The technical investigation report into the causes of the accident...” was published on October 3, 2009. The report of the parliamentary commission investigating the circumstances of the accident was presented on December 21, 2009. The investigation, conducted by the Investigative Committee, was completed on March 23, 2011.

Causes of the accident

The results of the accident investigation by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the agency’s website in the form of a document under official name“Act of technical investigation into the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 at a branch of the Open Joint Stock Company"RusHydro" - "Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhniy." The act provides general information about the hydroelectric power station, listing the events that preceded the accident, describing the course of the accident, listing the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The immediate cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows:

Due to the repeated occurrence of additional variable loads on the hydraulic unit associated with transitions through the non-recommended zone, fatigue damage to the hydraulic unit attachment points, including the turbine cover, formed and developed. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the tearing off of the turbine cover and depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit.

Original text(Russian)

[...]

Accident at hydraulic unit No. 2 (destruction of a specific technical device) occurred at the moment the turbine cover was torn off due to a break in the cover mounting studs. As a result visual inspection 49 studs fastening the turbine cover of hydraulic unit No. 2 in the breaks of the studs, two zones are distinguished: a fatigue fracture zone and a break zone (letter of September 23, 2009 No. 04/23/- 2561 VS OJSC NPO "TsNIITMASH"):

41 studs failed along the thread with fatigue fracture areas:

from 5 to 10% of total area stud sections on 5 studs;
from 20 to 30% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 35 to 40% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 8 studs;
from 50 to 55% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 6 studs;
from 60 to 65% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 4 studs;
70% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 80 to 85% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 90 to 95% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 6 studs;
97 to 98% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 2 studs.

Two studs failed without signs of fatigue failure via a static separation mechanism.

The remaining 6 studs are full length, the threads are not torn off, which may indicate that there were no nuts on them at the time of the turbine failure. The length of the undamaged pin is 245 mm and corresponds to that specified in the drawing.

The parliamentary commission, the results of which were published on December 21, 2009 under the official title “Final report of the parliamentary commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the emergence of emergency of a man-made nature at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP on August 17, 2009,” formulated the causes of the accident as follows:

The accident at the SSHHPP with numerous casualties was the result of a number of reasons of a technical, organizational and regulatory legal nature. Most of these reasons are systemic and multifactorial in nature, including unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the plant management, as well as abuse of official position by the plant management.

Constant monitoring was not properly organized technical condition equipment by operational and repair personnel (which should be provided for in the operating instructions for hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, approved by the chief engineer of the SSHHPP dated May 18, 2009). The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly stop the second hydraulic unit and determine the causes of vibration.

Prerequisites

Operating areas of hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Changes in the readings of the radial vibration sensor of the turbine bearing of hydraulic unit No. 2

Hydraulic unit No. 2 was the last to pass major renovation in 2005, its last medium repair was carried out between January 14 and March 16, 2009. After the repairs, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibrations of the equipment were recorded, which, however, remained within acceptable values. During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration condition gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it exceeded the permissible level. The deterioration continued further; Thus, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 microns with a maximum allowable of 160 microns; at 8:13, immediately before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with regulatory documents, was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the reasons for the increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and plant management when making decisions.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, like other large hydroelectric power plants, played an important role in the system of automatic control of the regime of power systems by frequency and power flows (APFM) of the United Energy System of Siberia and was equipped with a group control system for active and reactive power (GRAPM), which allowed automatic mode change the load on hydraulic units depending on the current needs of the power system. The GARM algorithm of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP provided for the inadmissibility of operating hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation, but did not in any way limit the number of transitions of hydraulic units through this zone in the process of changing their power according to GRARM commands. During 2009, hydraulic unit No. 2 passed through the non-recommended operation zone 232 times, spending a total of 46 minutes in it (for comparison, hydraulic unit No. 4 for the same period of time made 490 passes through the non-recommended operation zone, working in it for 1 hour and 38 minutes ). It should be noted that the operation of hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation was not prohibited by the turbine manufacturer, and there were also no restrictions on the passage of hydraulic units through this zone.

Development of the accident

Hydraulic unit No. 2 was put into operation from reserve at 23:14 local time (19:14 Moscow time) on August 16, 2009 and was assigned by plant personnel as a priority for changing the load when the power control ranges were exhausted. The change in power of the hydraulic unit was carried out automatically under the influence of the GARM regulator in accordance with the commands of the ARFM. At this point, the station was operating according to the planned dispatch schedule. At 20:20 Moscow time, a fire was recorded in one of the premises of the Bratsk hydroelectric power station, as a result of which the communication lines between the Bratsk hydroelectric power station and the dispatch control of the Siberian power system were damaged (a number of media outlets hastened to declare these events the “trigger” of the disaster, which forced the launch of the ill-fated hydroelectric unit No. 2, overlooking the fact that by this time he was already in work). Since the Bratsk HPP, which operated under the control of the ARFM, “fell out” of the control of the system, its role was taken over by the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, and at 20:31 Moscow time the dispatcher gave a command to transfer the GRARM station to automatic control mode from the ARFM. In total, 6 hydraulic units (No. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) operated under the control of GRARM; three more hydraulic units (No. 3, 8 and 10) worked under the individual control of personnel; hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair.

From 08:12 there was a decrease in the power of hydraulic unit No. 2 as directed by GRARM. When the hydraulic unit entered an area not recommended for operation, the turbine cover studs broke. A significant portion of the 80 studs failed due to fatigue; At the time of the accident, six studs (out of 41 examined) were missing nuts - probably due to self-loosening as a result of vibration (their locking was not provided for by the design of the turbine). Under the influence of water pressure in the hydraulic unit, the rotor of the hydraulic unit with the turbine cover and the upper crosspiece began to move upward, and, due to depressurization, water began to fill the volume of the turbine shaft, affecting the elements of the generator. When the impeller rim reached 314.6 m, the impeller switched to pumping mode and, due to the stored energy of the generator rotor, created excess pressure at the inlet edges of the impeller blades, which led to the breakage of the guide vane blades. Through the vacated hydraulic unit shaft, water began to flow into the station's turbine room. Automatic control systems for hydraulic units that stop them if emergency situations, could only function if there was a power supply, but in conditions of flooding of the turbine room and a massive short circuit of electrical equipment, the power supply to the station itself was lost very quickly, and the automation managed to stop only one hydraulic unit - No. 5. The flow of water into the turbine room of the station continued until it was manually closed by the station personnel emergency gates from the dam crest, which was completed by 9.30.

According to the head of Rostechnadzor N. G. Kutin, a similar accident involving the destruction of the fastenings of the hydraulic unit cover (but without human casualties) already happened in 1983 at the Nurek hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan, but the USSR Ministry of Energy decided to classify information about that incident.

Alleged culprits

The act of the Rostechnadzor commission indicates six officials, involved, in her opinion, “in creating conditions conducive to the occurrence of an accident,” including former manager RAO UES of Russia A. B. Chubais, former technical director of RAO UES of Russia B. F. Vainzikher, former head of OJSC RusHydro V. Yu. Sinyugin and former Minister of Energy I. Kh. Yusufov. In addition, the act contains the names of 19 officials “responsible for preventing incidents and accidents at the station” and lists the violations identified by the commission in their implementation job responsibilities. Among these persons are the management of JSC RusHydro, headed by the acting chairman of the board V.A. Zubakin, as well as the management of the hydroelectric power station, headed by its director N.I. Nevolko. On August 28, 2009, N. I. Nevolko was removed from the position of director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP; on October 26, 2009, the board of directors of JSC RusHydro terminated the powers of board members S. A. Yushin (financial director of the company) and A. V. Toloshinov ( head of the Siberia division of the company, former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP). On November 23, 2009, the powers of the acting chairman of the board of the company, V. A. Zubakin, as well as 4 members of the board of the company were terminated. E.V. Dod, who previously headed OJSC Inter RAO UES, was elected as the new head of JSC RusHydro. The report of the parliamentary commission named 19 people as involved in the accident, including 10 people representing the management of the station, 5 people who were part of the management of JSC RusHydro, 2 officials of Rostechnadzor, as well as the heads of LLC Rakurs and LLC Promavtomatika. who carried out work on the creation and installation of control systems for hydraulic units. December 16, 2010 Main investigative department Investigative Committee the former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was charged; On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee announced the completion of the investigation. 162 people were recognized as victims in the case. The investigation brought charges under Article 143, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of safety rules and other labor protection rules committed by a person who was responsible for complying with these rules, resulting in the death of two or more persons through negligence):

former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP Nikolai Nevolko;
First Deputy Director - Chief Engineer of the station Andrey Mitrofanov;
Deputy Chief Engineer for the technical part of the station Gennady Nikitenko;
former deputy chief engineer for station operation Evgeniy Shervarli;
Head of the station equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko;
the leading engineer for commissioning and testing of the monitoring service (former head of the technical diagnostics laboratory) of the station, Vladimir Beloborodov;
to the leading engineer of the equipment monitoring section of the equipment monitoring service (former leading engineer of the technical diagnostics laboratory - group of vibration and strength measurements) of the station, Alexander Klyukach.

Criticism of the official version of the causes of the accident

Some conclusions set out in the act of the Rostechnadzor commission are criticized by a number of experts as unfounded. In particular, it is noted that the conclusion about the unacceptable level of vibration of hydraulic unit No. 2 is based on the readings of only one sensor (TP R NB), which cannot be considered reliable, since this sensor showed prohibitive vibrations even with the hydraulic unit stopped, which indicates a malfunction of the sensor. Nine other vibration sensors installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 did not record increased vibration, but their readings were not given in the Rostekhnadzor report. The normal vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident is confirmed by data from an automatic seismometric station located at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP dam. Specialists from CKTI named after. I. I. Polzunov, Russia's leading scientific and technical institute in the field of hydropower equipment, concluded that the transitions of hydraulic unit No. 2 through the non-recommended zone could not serve as a direct cause of the destruction of the studs.

It should be noted that the Rostechnadzor act was signed by two members of the commission (R. M. Khaziakhmetov and T. G. Meteleva) with dissenting opinions that were not published.

Chief engineer of the Lenhydroproekt Institute (general designer of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) Ph.D. n. B. N. Yurkevich at the IV All-Russian meeting of hydropower engineers (Moscow, February 25-27, 2010) said the following:

The peculiarity of this accident, which weighed heavily psychologically on all of us, is that it occurred under normal conditions. It happened when everything was working properly, repair regulations were being followed, and operating requirements were being met. No one violated anything, the station fully complied with all norms and requirements, the operating personnel complied with all prescribed regulations.

At the end of June 2012, a few days after the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation announced the completion of investigative measures in the criminal case regarding the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the press service of the RusHydro company released the following statement:

We know the conclusions of the Investigative Committee, formed based on the results of the investigation. The company previously received for review the results of a comprehensive technical examination (CTE), carried out at the request of the Investigative Committee by the Center for Independent forensic examinations Russian Environmental Foundation TEKHEKO.

During the study of the KHP, RusHydro technical experts concluded that the factors identified in this document as the causes of the accident are ambiguous. ... We believe that a professional look at the problem will allow us to clearly determine the reasons for what happened...

At the same time, KHPP sets out an approach to the causes of the accident, which is considered official.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that during the first year that passed from the moment of the Sayan disaster, Ph.D. n. Yuri Lobanovsky to explain it as the development of the ideas of D.F.M. n. Valery Okulov, a theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations of pressure systems of hydroelectric power stations was created. Its main provisions and results of application not only to the events that occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, but also to similar incidents at other hydroelectric power plants are briefly described below.

According to the theory of Yu. I. Lobanovsky, the separation of the turbine cover of the second hydraulic unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and the ejection of its central block to a height of about 14 meters occurred as a result of a catastrophic increase in pressure pulsations in the water conduit of the hydraulic unit. The pulsations arose as a result of the excitation of self-oscillations in the conduit by a precessing off-turbine vortex (that is, a vortex whose axis of rotation itself rotates). Then this first self-oscillatory process excited a second, more powerful one, the development of which ultimately led to the disaster. This scenario describes everything that happened at the time of the disaster and is completely consistent with the phenomena observed there.

According to the author of the theory, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is the most famous incident of this kind, but it was not the first. There are 5 more known hydro- and pumped-storage stations, in the water pipelines of which self-oscillations were either excited or balancing occurred at the very border of this dangerous phenomenon. In particular, similar processes were observed three times at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The application of the theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations and the targeted collection of information about various strange and obscure incidents with the separation of turbine covers of hydraulic units, as well as the occurrence of very strong vibrations that did not allow the normal operation of these units, made it possible to fully understand the details of what happened to the second hydraulic unit SSH GES August 17, 2009.

Lobanovsky presented his arguments in a number of works. The result is summarized in the article “Threat to the Chosen,” and a more detailed justification of the proposed approach is described in the work “Hydroacoustic excitation of the pressure system of the second hydraulic unit of the SSh HPP - the cause of the Sayan disaster.” Two articles were published in the specialized journal “Hydraulic Engineering”: “Self-oscillations of pressure systems and destruction of hydraulic units” and “On calculations of the hydroacoustic stability of Yali, Teri and Irganai hydroelectric power stations.” The research results were reported in the report “Hydroacoustics of the water conduit/turbine system and the safety of operation of hydroelectric power plants and pumped storage power plants” at scientific-practical conference within the framework of the International Congress “Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia: the priority vector of development is safety”.

At the same time, the conclusions of Lobanovsky, who had not previously been involved in research in the field of hydropower, are criticized by some relevant experts as unfounded, primarily by B. N. Yurkevich, the chief engineer of Lenhydroproekt OJSC, where the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was designed. He wrote a review of an article by Yu. I. Lobanovsky in the journal “Hydraulic Engineering” about self-oscillations in pressure systems. Lobanovsky, in turn, wrote a response to Yurkevich’s review, in which he criticized his conclusions.

Consequences

Social consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the station’s turbine room, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the floor of the hall (at 327 m) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor (at 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were station employees, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work (most of them were employees of Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont OJSC). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the area affected by the accident). The accident killed 75 people and injured 13 people. The body of the last victim was found on September 23. indicating the locations where the bodies were found was published in the technical investigation report of the Rostechnadzor commission. Large quantity deaths is explained by the presence of most people in the internal premises of the station below the floor level of the turbine room and the rapid flooding of these premises.

From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who might have been inside the flooded turbine room were disappointing. In particular, a member of the board of the RusHydro company, former general manager HPP Alexander Toloshinov stated:

The lack of official information about the accident and the condition of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, subsequently, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the downstream settlements of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk, Abakan, Minusinsk . Residents hurriedly left to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby hills, which led to numerous queues at gas stations, traffic jams and car accidents. According to Sergei Shoigu,

Gasoline prices doubled, people began to take children out of kindergartens, pioneer camps, fill all the canisters that were in the house with gasoline, buy food and essentials in stores.<…>Well, as for gas stations, we will, of course, deal with this separately, who warmed their hands on this. This means that, as far as food and basic necessities are concerned, I also think it will be necessary to sort it out, and they are already sorting it out.

In this regard, the Khakass Department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service conducted an audit of gasoline prices, which did not reveal any increase.

Compensation and social assistance

Material assistance to the families of the victims was provided from various sources. The RusHydro company made payments in the amount of 1 million rubles to the family of each deceased, separately paid two months' salary to the deceased and allocated funds for organizing funerals. Those who survived but were injured in the accident received one-time payments in the amount of 50 to 150 thousand rubles, depending on the severity of the damage. The company works to provide housing to families in need, and also implements other social programs to help the families of the victims. In total, the company allocated 185 million rubles for social assistance programs.

The family of each deceased was given compensation in the amount of 1.1 million rubles additionally from the federal budget.

As part of its own charity program, Sberbank of Russia pledged to repay the mortgage loans of the families of the victims in the total amount of 6 million rubles.

Environmental consequences

The accident had a negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of the bearings of hydraulic units, from the destroyed control systems of guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting stain stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m³, of which approximately 45 m³ of mainly turbine oil ended up in the river. In order to prevent further spread of oil along the river, booms were installed; To facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent was used, but it was not possible to quickly stop the spread of petroleum products; the stain was completely eliminated only on August 24, and cleanup efforts coastal strip was planned to be completed by December 31, 2009. Water pollution with oil products led to the death of about 400 tons of commercial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river; There were no facts of fish death in the Yenisei itself. The total amount of environmental damage is tentatively estimated at 63 million rubles.

Economic consequences

Damage to power plant structures and equipment

As a result of the accident, hydraulic unit No. 2 was completely destroyed and thrown out of the shaft, and the hydraulic unit shaft was also destroyed. The generators at hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9 were destroyed. Other hydraulic units also suffered significant damage. The walls and roof of the turbine hall in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4 were destroyed. In the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 7, 9, the ceiling of the turbine hall was destroyed. Varying degrees Other equipment of the station, located in the turbine room and near it, was also damaged - transformers, cranes, elevators, electrical equipment. Total losses associated with equipment damage are estimated at 7 billion rubles. According to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, the costs of restoring the SShHPP may exceed 40 billion rubles. “Just replacing the turbine hall to a large extent - about 90% - will cost up to 40 billion rubles,” he said. The minister emphasized that the restoration of the hydroelectric power station is beneficial in any case, since the dam, which was not damaged in the accident, accounts for 80% of the total cost of the station. According to the management of JSC RusHydro, the complete restoration of the station may take more than four years. The need to allocate funds for the restoration of the station led to the need to change the investment program of JSC RusHydro.

The property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for $200 million, employees were also insured by ROSNO for 500 thousand rubles each. Property risks under this agreement are reinsured for international market, mainly in Munich Re. The civil liability of the owner of the hydroelectric power station, JSC RusHydro, was insured by the AlfaStrakhovanie company, the insured amount was 30 million rubles. in all cases (according to the data given in the act of investigating the causes of the accident, civil liability was insured for a total of 78.1 million rubles).

Impact of the accident on the power system

As a result of the accident, a number of industrial enterprises were completely or partially disconnected from power supply for a short time: Sayan Aluminum Smelter, Khakass Aluminum Smelter, Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter, Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Plant, Novokuznetsk Aluminum Smelter, a number of coal mines and open-pit mines; power supply was disrupted, including social facilities and the population, in the Altai Territory, Kemerovo Region, the Republic of Khakassia, Novosibirsk Region, Tomsk Region Despite the sudden one-time loss of 4.5 gigawatts of the generating capacity of the unified energy system of Siberia, the actions of emergency automation and personnel of the joint dispatch control Siberia and the Central Dispatch Directorate, which promptly distributed the load between other power plants and involved transit from the combined power systems of the Urals and Middle Volga through the territory of Kazakhstan, managed to avoid a cascade shutdown and “extinguishing” of the IPS of Siberia, similar to, say, the accident in the power system of the USA and Canada in 2003. In this regard, on September 14, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev awarded a presidential certificate of honor to the workers of the United Dispatch Management of Siberian Energy Systems “for conscientious, highly professional work during the accident and the post-accident period at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP.” 8 hours after the accident, all restrictions were lifted due to the introduction of reserve capacity at thermal power plants and an increase in the flow of electricity from the European part of the country. Until the completion of the restoration of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, its underproduction of electricity will be compensated by the increased load of thermal power plants operating mainly on coal (due to which the volume of its transportation has increased significantly), the import of electricity from Kazakhstan, as well as due to the commissioning of the first stage of the Boguchanskaya hydroelectric power station in 2011. Hydroelectric power station.

Stock markets reaction

The announcement of the accident predictably affected the company's stock quotes on Russian and foreign stock markets. On the day of the accident, August 17, trading in RusHydro shares on Russian trading platforms The RTS and the MICEX Stock Exchange were suspended at the request of the company itself. This happened just a few minutes after the opening of trading, but during this time they managed to lose more than 7% of their value. On the London Stock Exchange, depositary receipts for RusHydro shares lost 14.8%. On August 18, trading in RusHydro shares was not carried out on Russian stock exchanges, and on August 19, after trading resumed, the company’s shares fell by more than 10%.

Simultaneously with the fall in RusHydro's quotes, shares of electric power companies with generating capacities in Siberia began to rise, which, according to market participants, could benefit from increased capacity utilization. Since the energy from the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP will presumably be replaced by electricity from more expensive thermal power plants, investors expect both an increase in electricity prices in the region and an increase in revenues for energy companies.

Ensuring the safety of hydroelectric power plants

Dam appearance

As a result of the failure of all units of the station and the blocking of water pipelines, the water throughput capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station dam was reduced by 3600 m³/s (10 units of 358.5 m³/s each), which raises concerns about the safety of passage of strong floods (subsequently, the launch of three hydraulic units somewhat eased, but did not eliminate these concerns). To solve the problem, work on the construction of the coastal spillway of the hydroelectric power station was accelerated, for which 4.3 billion rubles were allocated from the federal budget. According to Yuri Gorbenko, a member of the board of JSC RusHydro, the construction of the spillway was carried out around the clock; 36,000 m³ of concrete was laid per month. The first stage of the spillway was commissioned on June 1, 2010. In 2010, it was planned to spend 3.5 billion rubles on the construction of the spillway.

When a standard spillway operates, a cloud of water dust is formed; Since the spillway had never been operated in winter before the accident, there were concerns that this could lead to significant icing of the station structures. To prevent this phenomenon, a number of measures were taken.

According to the Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko, the government commission to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station instructed JSC RusHydro to replace the fastenings of the turbine covers of high-pressure hydroelectric power stations during scheduled maintenance. The Ministry of Energy, Rostechnadzor, RusHydro and other organizations operating hydroelectric power plants have also been instructed to conduct a complete flaw detection of the fastenings of the turbine covers of hydroelectric power stations and replace those unsuitable for use. HPPs must be provided with protective systems, sources of autonomous emergency power supply, as well as automatic recorders of the parameters of the equipment being operated (“black boxes”). The commission also ordered an analysis of the compatibility of the System Operator's control devices with local control systems of hydroelectric power plants, and the Ministry of Energy and Rostekhnadzor, together with the Russian Academy of Sciences, were instructed to prepare a comprehensive program for improving the safety of hydroelectric power plants by December 2009. The Ministry of Energy should also submit proposals for the development of the regulatory framework of the Russian Federation to establish technical requirements for electric power industry entities necessary to regulate the flow of electricity and power.

Station restoration

Work to restore the hydroelectric power station began almost immediately after the accident. On August 19, 2009, a directorate for eliminating the consequences of the accident was created, headed by the chief engineer of the station A. Mitrofanov. At the first stage of work, the main task was to restore the power supply to the station and clear away the rubble in the turbine room. The rubble was completely cleared by October 7. On September 21, 2009, the restoration of the walls and roof of the turbine room began; this work was scheduled to be completed by November 11, but was completed ahead of schedule, on November 6. At the same time, work is underway to dismantle the most damaged hydraulic units; Of particular difficulty was the dismantling of the remains of hydraulic unit No. 2, the completion of which was initially planned for the end of January 2010, but was actually completed only in April 2010.

Work on the restoration of the hydroelectric power station is planned to be completed by December 2014. The plant restoration plan includes the gradual replacement of all 10 hydraulic units with new ones of the same power, but with improved performance characteristics. The new hydraulic units will be manufactured by the Power Machines company - 6 units will be delivered in 2011, the remaining 4 in 2012, the total cost of the contract for the supply of equipment was 11.7 billion rubles.

In 2010, the least affected hydraulic units No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were launched. The fifth hydraulic unit was put into idle mode on December 30, 2009; It is planned to completely dismantle hydraulic unit No. 2 by March 1, complete work on the seventh unit by March 15, and on hydraulic unit No. 9 by April 30, 2010. By the end of 2009, it was planned to start hydraulic unit No. 6 at idle speed to dry the generator insulation; the launch took place on December 30, and on February 24, 2010, the unit was put into operation with the participation of V.V. Putin. On December 22, 2010, hydraulic unit No. 3 was launched, the station’s capacity reached 2560 MW.

Ratings

The incident is a harbinger of what Russian leaders have long feared: the inexorable degradation of Soviet-era infrastructure. Everything - from power plants to ports and airports, from pipelines and railways to city thermal power plants and the Moscow metro - almost everything is in urgent need of repair.

Original text(English)

But the accident - apparently caused by a pressure surge in pipes - is also a harbinger of something Russia's leaders have long feared: the inexorable degradation of the Soviet-era infrastructure. From power stations to ports and airports, to pipelines and railways, through city heating plants and the Moscow metro - almost everything is in urgent need of renovation.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, at a meeting on the socio-economic development of the Siberian Federal District on August 24, 2009, called all statements about the onset of the so-called “technological collapse” “nonsense” in Russia, but confirmed the conclusions of news agencies. Referring to the accident, he said:

…These tragic events we must once again be reminded of enough simple things, which we, unfortunately, often forget - that security control systems and the infrastructure of Russian enterprises as a whole currently require the utmost attention. In some cases, this infrastructure is ineffective and needs urgent modernization, otherwise we will pay the heaviest price.

Notes

Report of technical investigation into the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Rostechnadzor (October 3, 2009). (inaccessible link - story) Retrieved October 5, 2009.(unavailable link)(the file was originally located at , then renamed “due to technical problems caused by a large number requests to the site upon publication of the Act"). MD5 hash of the authentic file is 2E7E94FEBDA2D3E9F683B1AE7A79B426. .
Causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Conclusions of Rostechnadzor. Main points. vesti.ru (October 03, 2009). Archived from the original on October 17, 2012. Retrieved September 10, 2012.
Accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station: parliamentarians will establish the causes. Interfax.ru (September 17, 2009). Retrieved October 24, 2009.

On the morning of August 17, 2009, a hydraulic unit in the turbine room collapsed. Everyone who was there died. Thanks to the competent actions of the station workers, an even more serious tragedy was prevented. The dam could have broken. As a result, the areas and cities located below were at risk of flooding. The victims would number in the thousands.

All consequences of the accident have been eliminated, and the hydroelectric power station itself has actually become a new station, and one of the most productive in the country.

8:30 am, Monday morning, August 17, 2009. Hydraulic unit number two, there are ten in total, breaks off the fastening studs - powerful bolts.

“I heard the sound of tearing metal, turned around and saw the generator cross rising in the area of the second unit, it was so dark,” recalls Sergei Ignatov, an employee of the SShGES.

Sergei Ignatov was only about 50 meters from the epicenter of the accident; he barely had time to shout to the female cleaners: “Let’s run!” before the first wave began.

A structure weighing almost two thousand tons is literally thrown out of its nest. Water floods the turbine room, one after another the generators burn, and the turbines go into overdrive, scattering iron around and forming funnels that suck in everything. Automation doesn't work. The station is completely de-energized. There is almost no connection.

“Of course, firstly, we had to figure it out pretty quickly. Secondly, do everything that is necessary to immediately, in the first hours, I would like, of course, minutes, to stop the flow of water,” says Sergei Shoigu.

In order to do this, the surviving employees of the hydroelectric power station climb up the stairs in pitch darkness to the top of the dam and there, on the ridge, manually lower the emergency gates, one by one blocking ten water pipelines, through each of which a train could pass.

“After we dropped the shutters, the fog began to clear, and we began to see the mangled turbine room, torn ITKs. I asked myself the question, am I dreaming or is this reality, am I dreaming or is it reality,” recalls Nikolai Tretyakov, an employee of the SSHHPP.

In the very first hours, help begins to arrive from several regions of Russia at once. More than 2.5 thousand rescuers have been sent to clear the rubble and search for people. Dozens of people are believed to be in the flooded premises of the station. Relatives of those who did not leave the station are on duty around the clock in the cultural center of the hydropower workers' village, waiting for at least some news.

“For two days it was the most terrible stress, coming to relatives to say that we had not found it yet,” recalls the acting governor of Khakassia, Viktor Zimin.

Only on the fourth day is it possible to pump out the caustic mixture of water and machine oil. The number of missing people is decreasing and the death toll is increasing. There are also survivors.

Here at the hydroelectric power station, Vladimir Putin gives instructions - not to leave anyone in trouble.

“We will restore the iron, we cannot bring people back, this is the biggest problem... Now the main thing is to help people... Payments to children under eighteen years of age,” the president ordered.

Help for the relatives of the victims - almost from the first days after the accident. First, support from psychologists, then payment of monetary compensation. In addition to a million rubles from the owner of the hydroelectric power station, the RusHydro company, each family received the same amount from the budget of Khakassia.

“Then we compiled, the first experience was, a social passport for each family. Children, illnesses, relatives, everything, everything about family. And what types of assistance can we provide them? We gave all the children apartments at that time. We guaranteed education,” says Viktor Zimin.

Some needed help repaying loans, some needed housing, some needed employment. Yulia Zholob, who lost her husband in an accident nine years ago, returned to the station, where she now runs the local museum.

“We are paid scholarships to children who study. We were employed, we are all working, that is, everything that was promised was done. Now everything has been done to ensure that this never happens again, I’m not afraid,” says Yulia Zholob.

As soon as the rescue operation was over, the restoration of the station began, because the failure of such an energy giant almost stopped Siberian metallurgy.

“Of course, here we were lucky or helped in many ways, or rather, it was not lucky that back in Soviet times a unified energy system was created, which overlapped each other in many ways, and due to such switchings and connections, Nazarovskaya GRES, Berezovskaya GRES, others, Krasnoyarsk Hydroelectric power stations, naturally, managed to equalize the supply of electricity to such large complexes, like the Sayan Aluminum Smelter, the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter,” explained Sergei Shoigu.

A Russian manufacturer of power machines received an order for the production of new hydraulic units. While the engineers got to work, it was decided to repair on site what was least damaged. Excess water had to be released through idle spillways that were not designed for operation in the cold season. And throughout the first winter, employees of the hydroelectric power station manually cut off blocks of ice freezing on the dam. In order for the station to be able to regulate the spring flood, the coastal spillway was completed in a short time.

“Once again I want to return to the words of gratitude to all those who participated in this great work, and pay tribute to the professionalism of those who worked at the hydroelectric power station, their courage,” thanked Sergei Shoigu.

Even the delivery of new turbines resembled a special operation. The giant wheels were transported from St. Petersburg along the Northern Sea Route, overcoming two more dams. The restoration of the hydroelectric power station was completed only in the fall of 2014, when all ten hydraulic units were replaced.

Now the station's turbine room looks almost the same as before the accident. But there are still changes. During the restoration, for example, closed staircases appeared that employees could use to climb to non-flooding levels. Nine years ago, when the accident occurred, everyone who was here had to run to the very end of the turbine hall.

However, there are many more invisible changes. The entire security system has been completely revised. The automation of the hydroelectric power station has been brought to a level where there cannot be water. Emergency shutdown of turbines and reset of valves can now be accomplished with one movement of the hand.

After the tragedy, as local residents say, the village of hydroelectric power workers was not left without attention. Schools were reconstructed, a sports and recreation complex was opened, and roads were repaired. Tourists from all over the country again come to admire the famous Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, which has received a rebirth.