Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station accident causes and consequences. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station and its consequences

The accident caused a great public outcry, becoming one of the most discussed events in the media in 2009.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station on the Yenisei River is the largest hydroelectric power station in Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world. It is located on the border of the Krasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia. Construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1968, the first hydraulic unit was launched in 1978, the last in 1985. The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000. Technically, the hydroelectric power station consists of a concrete arch-gravity dam with a height of 245 m and a hydroelectric power station building near the dam, which houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each. The installed capacity of the hydroelectric power station is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 22.8 billion kWh. The hydroelectric dam forms a large Sayano-Shushenskoye reservoir with seasonal regulation. Downstream of the Yenisei there is a counter-regulating Mainskaya hydroelectric power station, which forms a single production complex with the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The hydroelectric power station structures were designed by the Lenhydroproject Institute, hydraulic power equipment was supplied by the LMZ and Elektrosila plants (now part of the Power Machines concern). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP belongs to JSC RusHydro.

At the time of the accident, the station carried a load of 4100 MW, out of 10 hydraulic units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13 local time on August 17, 2009, a sudden destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2 occurred with significant volumes of water flowing through the hydraulic unit shaft under high pressure. The power plant personnel, who were in the turbine room, heard a loud bang in the area of hydraulic unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. An eyewitness to the accident, Oleg Myakishev, describes this moment as follows:

Streams of water quickly flooded the machine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, while short circuits occurred on the working hydroelectric generators (their flashes are clearly visible on the amateur video of the disaster), which put them out of action. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which also led to a blackout of the station itself. A light and sound alarm went off at the station's central control panel, after which the control panel was de-energized - operational communications, power supply to lighting, automation and alarm devices were lost. Automatic systems, stopping hydraulic units, worked only on hydraulic unit No. 5, the guide vane of which was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and water continued to flow through the water conduits to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (the stators and crosspieces of the generators were severely damaged). Streams of water and flying debris from hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine room in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4. Hydraulic units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with debris from the turbine room. Those station employees who had such an opportunity quickly left the scene of the accident.

At the time of the accident, the station management was in place with the chief engineer of the hydroelectric power station A. N. Mitrofanov, the acting chief of the civil defense and emergency situations staff M. I. Chiglintsev, the head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, the head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift manager M. G. Nefedov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the station territory after the accident.

Due to the loss of power supply, it was only possible to close the gates manually, for which personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 8:30, eight operational personnel reached the gate room, after which they contacted cell phone with the station shift supervisor M. G. Nefedov, who gave the order to lower the shutters. Having broken open the iron door, station workers A. V. Kataitsev, R. Gafiulin, E. V. Kondrattsev, I. M. Bagautdinov, P. A. Mayorshin, A. Ivashkin, A. A. Chesnokov and N. N. Tretyakov Within an hour, we manually reset the emergency repair gates of the water intakes, stopping the flow of water into the turbine room. The closure of water pipelines led to the need to open the gates of the spillway dam in order to ensure sanitary passage in the downstream of the SSHHPP. By 11:32, power was provided to the gantry crane of the dam crest from a mobile diesel generator, and at 11:50 the operation to lift the gates began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water flow began.

Search and rescue and repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees of the Siberian Regional Center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, flew to the area of the accident and headed the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident; the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to examine the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in air pockets and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, already on August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as insignificant. On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine room premises began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been discovered, 58 people were listed as missing. As the station's interior was cleared of water, the number of dead bodies found grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when the water pumping work entered its final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of the search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of structures and equipment. On August 28, the state of emergency imposed in connection with the accident was lifted in Khakassia. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the hydroelectric power station) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m³ of rubble was dismantled and removed, and more than 277,000 m³ of water was pumped out of the station premises. In order to eliminate oil pollution in the Yenisei waters, 9,683 meters of booms were installed and 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

The lack of obviousness of the causes of the accident (according to the Russian Minister of Energy S.I. Shmatko, “this is the largest and most incomprehensible hydropower accident that has ever happened in the world”) gave rise to a number of versions that were not subsequently confirmed. Immediately after the accident, a version of water hammer was voiced, and suggestions were also made about the explosion of the transformer. The version of a terrorist act was also considered - in particular, one of the Chechen separatist groups posted a statement claiming that the accident was a consequence of sabotage; however, no traces of explosives were found at the accident site.

The Rostechnadzor commission initially planned to announce the causes of the accident and the amount of damage caused by September 15, but the final meeting of the commission was first postponed to September 17 due to the “need to further clarify certain technological aspects in the draft final act of the commission,” and then postponed for another 10 days. “The technical investigation report into the causes of the accident...” was published on October 3, 2009. The report of the parliamentary commission investigating the circumstances of the accident was presented on December 21, 2009. The investigation, conducted by the Investigative Committee, was completed in June 2013.

On December 24, 2014, the Sayanogorsk City Court sentenced the accused. All seven were found guilty. Nikolai Nevolko and Andrei Mitrofanov were sentenced to imprisonment in a general regime colony for six years, Evgeniy Shervarli was sentenced to 5.5 years, Gennady Nikitenko - to five years and nine months. Alexander Matvienko and Alexander Klyukach were sentenced to 4.5 years of suspended imprisonment, Vladimir Beloborodov was amnestied. On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of Khakassia pardoned Matvienko and Klyukach in connection with the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The results of the accident investigation by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the agency’s website in the form of a document under official name“Act of technical investigation into the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 at a branch of the Open Joint Stock Company"RusHydro" - "Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhniy." The act provides general information about the hydroelectric power station, a list of events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, and lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The immediate cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows:

The parliamentary commission, the results of which were published on December 21, 2009 under the official title “Final report of the parliamentary commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the emergence of emergency of a man-made nature at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP on August 17, 2009,” formulated the causes of the accident as follows:

Changes in the readings of the radial vibration sensor of the turbine bearing of hydraulic unit No. 2

Hydraulic unit No. 2 was the last to pass major renovation in 2005, its last medium repair was carried out between January 14 and March 16, 2009. After the repairs, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibrations of the equipment were recorded, which nevertheless remained within the permissible values. During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration condition gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it became permissible level. The deterioration continued further; Thus, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 microns with a maximum allowable of 160 microns; at 8:13, just before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with regulatory documents was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the reasons for the increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and plant management when making decisions.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, like other large hydroelectric power plants, played an important role in the frequency and power flows (APF) of the United Energy System of Siberia and was equipped with a group control system for active and reactive power (GRARM), which made it possible to automatically change the load on hydraulic units in depending on the current needs of the power system. The GARM algorithm of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP provided for the inadmissibility of operating hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation, but did not in any way limit the number of transitions of hydraulic units through this zone in the process of changing their power according to GRARM commands. During 2009, hydraulic unit No. 2 passed through the non-recommended operation zone 232 times, spending a total of 46 minutes in it (for comparison, hydraulic unit No. 4 for the same period of time made 490 passes through the non-recommended operation zone, working in it for 1 hour and 38 minutes). It should be noted that the operation of hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation was not prohibited by the turbine manufacturer; there were also no restrictions on the passage of hydraulic units through this zone.

Hydraulic unit No. 2 was put into operation from reserve at 23:14 local time (19:14 Moscow time) on August 16, 2009 and was designated by plant personnel as a priority for changing the load when power control ranges are exhausted. The change in power of the hydraulic unit was carried out automatically under the influence of the GARM regulator in accordance with the commands of the ARFM. At this point, the station was operating according to the planned dispatch schedule. At 20:20 Moscow time, a fire was recorded in one of the premises of the Bratsk hydroelectric power station, as a result of which the communication lines between the Bratsk hydroelectric power station and the dispatch control of the Siberian power system were damaged (a number of media outlets hastened to declare these events the “trigger” of the disaster, which forced the launch of the ill-fated hydroelectric unit No. 2, overlooking the fact that by this time he was already in work). Since the Bratsk HPP, which operated under the control of the ARFM, “fell out” of the control of the system, its role was taken over by the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, and at 20:31 Moscow time the dispatcher gave a command to transfer the GRARM station to automatic control mode from the ARFM. In total, 6 hydraulic units (No. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) operated under the control of GRARM; three more hydraulic units (No. 3, 8 and 10) worked under the individual control of personnel; hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair.

From 08:12 there was a decrease in the power of hydraulic unit No. 2 as directed by GRARM. When the hydraulic unit entered an area not recommended for operation, the turbine cover studs broke. A significant portion of the 80 studs failed due to fatigue; At the time of the accident, six studs (out of 41 examined) were missing nuts - probably due to self-loosening as a result of vibration (their locking was not provided for by the design of the turbine). Under the influence of water pressure in the hydraulic unit, the rotor of the hydraulic unit with the turbine cover and the upper crosspiece began to move upward, and, due to depressurization, water began to fill the volume of the turbine shaft, affecting the elements of the generator. When the impeller rim reached 314.6 m, the impeller switched to pumping mode and, due to the stored energy of the generator rotor, created overpressure on the inlet edges of the impeller blades, which led to the breakage of the guide vane blades. Through the vacated hydraulic unit shaft, water began to flow into the station's turbine room. Automatic control systems for hydraulic units, stopping them in case of emergency situations, could function only if there was a power supply, but in conditions of flooding of the turbine room and a massive short circuit of electrical equipment, the power supply to the station itself was lost very quickly, and the automation managed to stop only one hydraulic unit - No. 5. The flow of water into the station's turbine room continued until station personnel manually closed the emergency gates from the dam crest, which was completed by 9:30.

According to the head of Rostechnadzor N. G. Kutin, a similar accident involving the destruction of the fastenings of the hydraulic unit cover (but without human casualties) already happened in 1983 at the Nurek hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan, but the USSR Ministry of Energy decided to classify information about that incident.

The act of the Rostechnadzor commission indicates six officials, involved, in her opinion, “in creating conditions conducive to the occurrence of an accident” (punctuation preserved), including former manager RAO "UES of Russia" A. B. Chubais, former technical director RAO UES of Russia B.F. Vainzikher, former head of JSC RusHydro V.Yu. Sinyugin and former Minister of Energy I.Kh. Yusufov. In addition, the act indicates the names of 19 officials “responsible for preventing incidents and accidents at the station” and lists the violations identified by the commission in their implementation job responsibilities. Among these persons are the management of JSC RusHydro, headed by the acting chairman of the board V. A. Zubakin, as well as the management of the hydroelectric station, headed by its director N. I. Nevolko. On August 28, 2009, N. I. Nevolko was removed from his position as director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP; on October 26, 2009, the board of directors of JSC RusHydro terminated the powers of board members S. A. Yushin (financial director of the company) and A. V. Toloshinov ( head of the Siberia division of the company, former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP). On November 23, 2009, the powers of the acting chairman of the company’s board, V. A. Zubakin, as well as 4 members of the company’s board were terminated. E.V. Dod, who previously headed OJSC Inter RAO UES, was elected as the new head of JSC RusHydro. The report of the parliamentary commission named 19 people as involved in the accident, including 10 people representing the management of the station, 5 people who were part of the management of JSC RusHydro, 2 officials of Rostechnadzor, as well as the heads of LLC Rakurs and LLC Promavtomatika. who carried out work on the creation and installation of control systems for hydraulic units. December 16, 2010 Main investigative department The Investigative Committee indicted the former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station; On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee announced the completion of the investigation. 162 people were recognized as victims in the case. The investigation brought charges under Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of safety rules and other labor protection rules committed by a person who was responsible for complying with these rules, resulting in the death of two or more persons through negligence):

Some conclusions set out in the act of the Rostechnadzor commission are criticized by a number of experts as unfounded. This criticism is most fully presented in the article by the former chief engineer of RAO UES of Russia, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Viktor Kudryavy “System causes of accidents”, published in the journal “Hydraulic Engineering”. In particular, it is noted that the conclusion about the unacceptable level of vibration of hydraulic unit No. 2 is based on the readings of only one sensor (TP R NB), which cannot be considered reliable, since this sensor showed prohibitive vibrations even with the hydraulic unit stopped, which indicates a malfunction of the sensor. Nine other vibration sensors installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 did not record increased vibration, but their readings were not given in the Rostekhnadzor report. The normal vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident is confirmed by data from an automatic seismometric station located at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP dam, the results of an analysis of readings from a seismic station located in the immediate vicinity of the dam in the village of Cheryomushki, as well as measurements of the turbine shaft runout made by personnel twice per shift . Specialists from CKTI named after. I. I. Polzunov, Russia’s leading scientific and technical institute in the field of hydropower equipment, concluded that the transitions of hydraulic unit No. 2 through the non-recommended zone could not serve as a direct cause of the destruction of the studs. It should be noted that the Rostechnadzor act was signed by two members of the commission (R. M. Khaziakhmetov and T. G. Meteleva) with dissenting opinions that were not published. As the most likely cause of the accident, V. Kudryavy names fatigue failures of the studs, which, in his opinion, arose during the operation of hydraulic unit No. 2 with a temporary impeller and an unacceptable level of vibration in 1981-83. Since the regulatory documentation that existed at the time of the accident did not provide for mandatory ultrasonic flaw detection of studs, fatigue failures could not be detected by plant personnel.

Chief engineer of the Lenhydroproekt Institute (general designer of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP), Ph.D. B. N. Yurkevich at the IV All-Russian meeting of hydropower engineers (Moscow, February 25-27, 2010) said the following:

The peculiarity of this accident, which weighed heavily psychologically on all of us, is that it occurred under normal conditions. It happened when everything was working properly, repair regulations were being followed, and operating requirements were being met. No one violated anything, the station fully complied with all standards and requirements, the operating personnel complied with all prescribed regulations.

At the end of June 2012, a few days after the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (ICR) announced the completion of investigative measures in the criminal case regarding the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the press service of the RusHydro company released the following statement:

We know the conclusions of the Investigative Committee, formed based on the results of the investigation. The company previously received for review the results of a comprehensive technical examination (CTE), carried out at the request of the Investigative Committee by the Center for Independent forensic examinations Russian environmental fund TEHECO.

During the study of the KHP, RusHydro technical experts concluded that the factors identified in this document as the causes of the accident are ambiguous... We believe that a professional look at the problem will allow us to clearly determine the causes of the incident...

At the same time, KHPP sets out an approach to the causes of the accident, which is considered official.

A large number of alternative hypotheses for the causes of the accident have been put forward - in particular, the possibility of the development of self-oscillating (resonant) processes in the pressure path of a hydroelectric power station, the impact on the hydroelectric power station geological processes, collapse of the dam onto the hydroelectric power station building, desynchronization of the guide vane blades. These hypotheses (as well as the version of water hammer that was initially considered as a priority) did not receive support in the specialized scientific community and are criticized by a number of authoritative experts in the field of hydropower and hydraulic engineering.

From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who might have been inside the flooded turbine room were disappointing. In particular, a member of the board of the RusHydro company, former general director of hydroelectric power stations, Alexander Toloshinov, stated:

The lack of official information about the accident and the condition of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication and, subsequently, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the downstream settlements of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk, Abakan, Minusinsk. Residents hurriedly left to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby hills, which led to numerous queues at gas stations, traffic jams and car accidents. According to Sergei Shoigu:

In this regard, the Khakass Department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service conducted an audit of gasoline prices, which did not reveal any increase.

Material assistance to the families of the victims was provided from various sources. The RusHydro company made payments in the amount of 1 million rubles to the family of each deceased, separately paid two months' salary to the deceased and allocated funds for organizing funerals. Those who survived but were injured in the accident received one-time payments in the amount of 50 to 150 thousand rubles, depending on the severity of the damage. The company works to provide housing to families in need, and also implements other social programs to help the families of the victims. In total, the company allocated 185 million rubles for social assistance programs.

The family of each deceased was given compensation in the amount of 1.1 million rubles additionally from the federal budget.

As part of its own charity program, Sberbank of Russia pledged to repay the mortgage loans of the families of the victims for a total amount of 6 million rubles.

The accident had negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of the bearings of hydraulic units, from destroyed control systems of guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting stain stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m³, of which approximately 45 m³ of mainly turbine oil ended up in the river. In order to prevent further spread of oil along the river, booms were installed; To facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent was used, but it was not possible to quickly stop the spread of oil products; the stain was completely eliminated only on August 24, and cleanup efforts coastal strip planned to be completed by December 31, 2009. Water pollution from oil products led to the death of about 400 tons of commercial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river; There were no facts of fish death in the Yenisei itself. The total amount of environmental damage was preliminary estimated at 63 million rubles.

As a result of the accident, hydraulic unit No. 2 was completely destroyed and thrown out of the shaft, and the hydraulic unit shaft was also destroyed. The generators at hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9 were destroyed. Other hydraulic units also suffered significant damage. The walls and roof of the turbine hall in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4 were destroyed. In the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 7, 9, the ceiling of the turbine hall was destroyed. Other station equipment located in the turbine hall and near it, such as transformers, cranes, elevators, and electrical equipment, also received varying degrees of damage. Total losses associated with equipment damage are estimated at 7 billion rubles. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said in the first days after the accident that the cost of restoring the SShHPP could exceed 40 billion rubles. “Just replacing the turbine hall to a large extent - by about 90% - will cost up to 40 billion rubles,” he said. The minister emphasized that the restoration of the hydroelectric power station is beneficial in any case, since the dam, which was not damaged in the accident, accounts for 80% of the total cost of the station. According to the management of JSC RusHydro, it may take more than four years. The need to allocate funds for the restoration of the station led to the need to change the investment program of JSC RusHydro.

The property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for $200 million, and the employees were also insured by ROSNO for 500 thousand rubles each. 18 dead and 1 injured were insured by Rosgosstrakh LLC, the total amount of payments exceeded 800 thousand rubles. Property risks under this insurance contract were reinsured for international market, mainly in Munich Re. There are legal proceedings with one of the reinsurers, the Swiss company Infrassure Ltd, regarding the payment of more than 800 million rubles. Reinsurance compensation took ROSNO more than 3 years. The civil liability of the owner of the hydroelectric power station, JSC RusHydro, was insured by the AlfaStrakhovanie company, the insured amount was 30 million rubles. in all cases (according to the data given in the act of investigating the causes of the accident, civil liability was insured for a total of 78.1 million rubles).

As a result of the accident, a number of industrial enterprises were completely or partially disconnected from the power supply for a short time: Sayanogorsk Aluminum Smelter, Khakass Aluminum Smelter, Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter, Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Plant, Novokuznetsk Aluminum Smelter, a number of coal mines and open-pit mines; power supply was disrupted, including to social facilities and the population, in

The causes of the largest man-made disaster in Russian history have seemingly been established, and those responsible have been brought to justice. However, there is still an opinion that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was planned.

Multiple factor

As a rule, any man-made disaster consists of little things in which someone is involved human factor, and it doesn’t matter if it’s criminal connivance or simple negligence. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (SSHHPP), which occurred on the morning of August 17, 2009, was no exception. Due to the release of thousands of cubic meters of water and subsequent destruction, 75 people died and another 13 were injured.

The Rostekhnadzor Commission quickly identified the causes of the accident and published the names of the people whose mistakes and miscalculations led to the tragedy. Among them are important officials: Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, General Director of OJSC TGC-1 Boris Vainzikher, as well as the former head of RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was officially put into operation in 2000: the corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais. The investigation noted that the head of RAO UES of Russia approved the Act of the Central Commission on the acceptance into operation of the SSHHPP hydropower complex “without a comprehensive assessment of the information available at that time on its functioning.”

What followed was a chain of bureaucratic abuses and violations of operating standards, which ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. As the head of Rostechnadzor Nikolai Kutin noted, the accident occurred due to a combination of various reasons: design, operational and repair.

In particular, it was found that a few hours before the accident, the second hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station reached excessive capacity six times, and vibration during this time increased fourfold. However, no one sounded the alarm.

The main cause of the disaster was said to be tension fatigue of the fasteners (studs) of the structure of hydraulic unit No. 2, which, with increased vibration, led to their rupture and, as a consequence, to the destruction of the turbine cover and water breakthrough. Summing up the investigation, the Chairman of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician Alexander Aseev, said that the fastening studs were made of steel, “not capable of withstanding the necessary loads.”

Major disaster

To date, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is the largest disaster at a hydropower facility in Russian history. Sergei Shoigu compared this accident in terms of its impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia with the disaster in Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The accident at the SSHPP caused a great public outcry and became, perhaps, the most discussed event of 2009 in the media. In particular, many reviews from witnesses of this disaster were published.

For example, Oleg Myakishev, an employee of the SSHHPP, recalled how he heard a growing roar, and then saw how the covering of the hydraulic unit stood on end and rose. “Then I saw the rotor rising from under it. He was spinning. - continues Myakishev. “My eyes didn’t believe it.” He rose three meters. Stones and pieces of reinforcement flew, we began to dodge them. I figured: the water is rising, 380 cubic meters per second, and - I’m heading towards the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn’t make it in time.”

Raging streams of water in a matter of seconds flooded the turbine room and the rooms below it. All 10 hydraulic units were under water, after which a series of short circuits occurred that disabled the machines. Hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9 were completely destroyed; under the flow of water and flying debris of structures, the walls and ceilings of the turbine room in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 also collapsed. The area of destruction reached 1200 square meters.

Consequences

The accident at the SShHPP led to a large power shortage in the entire Siberian energy system. The supply of electricity to a number of enterprises in Kuzbass was limited; temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical enterprises, including the Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant and the West Siberian Metallurgical Plant, as well as a number of coal mines and open-pit mines.

Energy workers have seriously reduced the load on the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter and the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant and completely cut off power to the Sayan and Khakass aluminum smelters. Less than a day after the accident, a massive death of trout began in several fishing farms located downstream of the Yenisei.

All property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for the amount of $200 million. In addition, each employee of the complex was insured by ROSNO for 500 thousand rubles. 18 dead and 1 injured were insured by Rosgosstrakh LLC, the total amount of payments exceeded 800 thousand rubles.

Property risks were also reinsured internationally, mostly by the Munich Re Group. With the German company, all disputes were resolved without any problems, but with the Swiss insurer Infrassure Ltd, litigation over payment of more than 800 million rubles dragged on for as long as 3 years.

The disaster at the SSHPP forced the authorities to monitor the condition of other water energy complexes. Thus, in the analytical note of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, which dealt with the problems of JSC RusHydro, it was noted that at many of the company’s stations “there is the operation of obsolete and physically worn-out equipment that has reached its standard service life of 25-30 years, the wear of which is almost 50% ", and "the degree of wear of certain types of hydraulic equipment - hydraulic turbines and hydraulic generators, hydraulic structures - exceeded 60% or reached a critical level."

Cyber attack?

Not all of the conclusions of the commissions that investigated the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station satisfied Gennady Rassokhin, an energy engineer by profession. According to documents from Rostechnadzor and the parliamentary commission, the main cause of the accident was metal fatigue of the studs securing the turbine cover on hydraulic unit No. 2.

However, Rassokhin asks the question why on the surfaces of broken studs there are traces of the so-called “tarnished colors”, characteristic only of “fresh” surfaces of metal breaks, and not of surfaces with a long break? Such an inconsistency may suggest a planned disaster.

At one time, Edward Snowden released materials confirming that the United States National Security Agency in full swing is preparing for future digital wars, the goal of which is complete control over the world through the Internet. In particular, it was noted that the Politerain project, run by the NSA, is creating a team of so-called “digital snipers” whose task is to disable computers that control the operation of water supply systems, power plants, factories, airports, as well as intercepting cash flows.

A blogger, a programmer and physicist by training, who introduces himself under the nickname Mr. Andrey, put forward an alternative version of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. In his opinion, the root cause of the disaster was the Stuxnet virus, which, as an element of cyber weapons, had previously been used to undermine the Russian economy.

Indeed, military analysts recognize that Stuxnet is a new milestone in the development of cyber weapons. Today it has confidently crossed the threshold of virtual space and has begun to threaten not only information objects, but also real-life objects.

Mr. Andrey describes his scenario of what happened at the SSHPP. At the moment when an accident occurred at the second hydraulic unit due to resonance, the equipment was controlled automatically, the blogger claims. Manual control for constant power delivery was disabled and the unit operated in load ripple compensation mode for the power systems of Western Siberia.

The programmer also draws attention to the fact that in March 2009, Ukrainian specialists worked at the facility and, in the process of checking the equipment (during scheduled repairs), they took the parameters of the resonant frequencies from the second unit. It is unknown where and into what hands this data fell, but one can guess, comments Mr. Andrey.

Having this data, according to the expert, it was not difficult to pump up the unit’s system through the control microcontroller so that it would gradually, over the course of several hours, “drive the turbine unit with the electric generator on the same shaft into the resonance zone.” Of course not about any information security They didn’t think about it then, despite the fact that this system had direct access to the Internet, the blogger concludes.

Station diagram

Catastrophe

External video files
	Video recording of the moment of the accident.
	Outdoor surveillance camera footage.

...I stood at the top, heard some kind of growing noise, then saw the corrugated covering of the hydraulic unit rise and stand on end. Then I saw the rotor rising from under it. He was spinning. My eyes didn't believe it. He rose three meters. Stones and pieces of reinforcement flew, we began to dodge them... The corrugated sheet was already somewhere under the roof, and the roof itself was blown apart... I figured: the water was rising, 380 cubic meters per second, and - I was heading towards the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn’t make it in time, I rose higher, stopped, looked down - I saw how everything was collapsing, the water was rising, people were trying to swim... I thought that the gates needed to be closed urgently, manually, to stop the water... Manually, because there was no voltage, no protections worked...

Streams of water quickly flooded the machine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, while short circuits occurred on the working hydroelectric generators (their flashes are clearly visible on the amateur video of the disaster), which put them out of action. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which also led to a blackout of the station itself. A light and sound alarm went off at the station's central control panel, after which the control panel was de-energized - operational communications, power supply to lighting, automation and alarm devices were lost. Automatic systems that stop hydraulic units worked only on hydraulic unit No. 5, the guide vane of which was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and water continued to flow through the water conduits to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (the stators and crosspieces of the generators were severely damaged). Streams of water and flying debris from hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine room in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4. Hydraulic units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with debris from the turbine room. Those station employees who had such an opportunity quickly left the scene of the accident.

Due to the loss of power supply, it was only possible to close the gates manually, for which personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 8:30, eight operational personnel reached the gate room, after which they contacted the station shift manager by cell phone, who gave instructions to lower the gates. Having broken open the iron door, station workers A.V. Kataitsev, R. Gaifullin, E.V. Kondrattsev, I.M. Bagautdinov, P.A. Mayoroshin and N.N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates of the water intakes within an hour , stopping the flow of water into the turbine room. The closure of water pipelines led to the need to open the gates of the spillway dam in order to ensure sanitary release in the downstream of the SSHHPP. By 11:32, power was provided to the gantry crane of the dam crest from a mobile diesel generator, and at 11:50 the operation to lift the gates began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water began to flow through.

Emergency rescue work

Search and rescue and repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees of the Siberian Regional Center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, flew to the area of the accident and headed the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident; the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to examine the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in “air bags” and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, already on August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as insignificant. On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been discovered, 58 people were listed as missing. As the station's interior was cleared of water, the number of dead bodies found grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when the water pumping work entered its final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of the search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of structures and equipment. On August 28, the state of emergency introduced in connection with the accident was lifted in Khakassia. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the hydroelectric power station) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m³ of rubble was dismantled and removed, and more than 277,000 m³ of water was pumped out of the station premises. In order to eliminate oil pollution in the Yenisei waters, 9,683 meters of booms were installed and 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

Investigation into the causes of the accident

The investigation into the causes of the accident was carried out independently by various departments. Immediately after the accident, a Rostechnadzor commission was created, and the investigative committee at the prosecutor’s office began its investigation as part of a criminal case initiated under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of labor safety rules). On September 16, the State Duma created a parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of the accident under the leadership of V. A. Pekhtin. The lack of obviousness of the causes of the accident (according to the Russian Minister of Energy S.I. Shmatko, “this is the largest and most incomprehensible hydropower accident that has ever happened in the world”) gave rise to a number of versions that were not subsequently confirmed. Immediately after the accident, a version of water hammer was voiced, and suggestions were also made about the explosion of the transformer. The version of a terrorist act was also considered - in particular, one of the Chechen separatist groups posted a statement claiming that the accident was a consequence of sabotage; however, no traces of explosives were found at the accident site. The Rostechnadzor commission initially planned to announce the causes of the accident and the amount of damage caused by September 15, but the final meeting of the commission was first postponed to September 17 due to the “need to further clarify certain technological aspects in the draft final act of the commission,” and then postponed for another 10 days. “The technical investigation report into the causes of the accident...” was published on October 3, 2009. The report of the parliamentary commission investigating the circumstances of the accident was presented on December 21, 2009. The investigation, conducted by the Investigative Committee, was completed on March 23, 2011.

Causes of the accident

Due to the repeated occurrence of additional variable loads on the hydraulic unit associated with transitions through the non-recommended zone, fatigue damage to the hydraulic unit attachment points, including the turbine cover, formed and developed. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the tearing off of the turbine cover and depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit.

Original text(Russian)

[...]

Accident at hydraulic unit No. 2 (destruction of a specific technical device) occurred at the moment the turbine cover was torn off due to a break in the cover mounting studs. As a result visual inspection 49 studs fastening the turbine cover of hydraulic unit No. 2 in the breaks of the studs, two zones are distinguished: a fatigue fracture zone and a break zone (letter of September 23, 2009 No. 04/23/- 2561 VS OJSC NPO "TsNIITMASH"):

41 studs failed along the thread with fatigue fracture areas:

from 5 to 10% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 5 studs;
from 20 to 30% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 35 to 40% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 8 studs;
from 50 to 55% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 6 studs;
from 60 to 65% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 4 studs;
70% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 80 to 85% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 3 studs;
from 90 to 95% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 6 studs;
97 to 98% of the total cross-sectional area of the stud on 2 studs.

Two studs failed without signs of fatigue failure via a static separation mechanism.

The remaining 6 studs are full length, the threads are not broken, which may indicate that there were no nuts on them at the moment the turbine failed. The length of the undamaged pin is 245 mm and corresponds to that specified in the drawing.

The parliamentary commission, the results of which were published on December 21, 2009 under the official title “Final report of the parliamentary commission to investigate the circumstances associated with the occurrence of a man-made emergency at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP on August 17, 2009,” formulated the causes of the accident as follows:

The accident at the SSHHPP with numerous casualties was the result of a number of reasons of a technical, organizational and regulatory legal nature. Most of these reasons are systemic and multifactorial in nature, including unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the plant management, as well as abuse of official position by the plant management.

Constant monitoring of the technical condition of the equipment by operational and repair personnel was not properly organized (which should be provided for in the operating instructions for hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, approved by the chief engineer of the SSHHPP dated May 18, 2009). The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly stop the second hydraulic unit and determine the causes of vibration.

Prerequisites

Operating areas of hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Changes in the readings of the radial vibration sensor of the turbine bearing of hydraulic unit No. 2

Hydraulic unit No. 2 underwent its last major overhaul in 2005, its last medium overhaul was carried out from January 14 to March 16, 2009. After the repairs, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibrations of the equipment were recorded, which, however, remained within acceptable values. During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration condition gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it exceeded the permissible level. The deterioration continued further; Thus, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 microns with a maximum allowable of 160 microns; at 8:13, immediately before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with regulatory documents, was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the reasons for the increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and plant management when making decisions.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, like other large hydroelectric power plants, played an important role in the system of automatic regulation of the regime of power systems by frequency and power flows (APFM) of the United Energy System of Siberia and was equipped with a group regulation system of active and reactive power (GRARM), which allowed automatic change the load on hydraulic units depending on the current needs of the power system. The GARM algorithm of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP provided for the inadmissibility of operating hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation, but did not in any way limit the number of transitions of hydraulic units through this zone in the process of changing their power according to GRARM commands. During 2009, hydraulic unit No. 2 passed through the non-recommended operation zone 232 times, spending a total of 46 minutes in it (for comparison, hydraulic unit No. 4 for the same period of time made 490 passes through the non-recommended operation zone, working in it for 1 hour and 38 minutes ). It should be noted that the operation of hydraulic units in an area not recommended for operation was not prohibited by the turbine manufacturer, and there were also no restrictions on the passage of hydraulic units through this zone.

Development of the accident

Hydraulic unit No. 2 was put into operation from reserve at 23:14 local time (19:14 Moscow time) on August 16, 2009 and was assigned by plant personnel as a priority for changing the load when the power control ranges were exhausted. The change in power of the hydraulic unit was carried out automatically under the influence of the GARM regulator in accordance with the commands of the ARFM. At this point, the station was operating according to the planned dispatch schedule. At 20:20 Moscow time, a fire was recorded in one of the premises of the Bratsk hydroelectric power station, as a result of which the communication lines between the Bratsk hydroelectric power station and the dispatch control of the Siberian power system were damaged (a number of media outlets hastened to declare these events the “trigger” of the disaster, which forced the launch of the ill-fated hydroelectric unit No. 2, overlooking the fact that by this time he was already in work). Since the Bratsk HPP, which operated under the control of the ARFM, “fell out” of the control of the system, its role was taken over by the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, and at 20:31 Moscow time the dispatcher gave a command to transfer the GRARM station to automatic control mode from the ARFM. In total, 6 hydraulic units (No. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) operated under the control of GRARM; three more hydraulic units (No. 3, 8 and 10) worked under the individual control of personnel; hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair.

From 08:12 there was a decrease in the power of hydraulic unit No. 2 as directed by GRARM. When the hydraulic unit entered an area not recommended for operation, the turbine cover studs broke. A significant portion of the 80 studs failed due to fatigue; At the time of the accident, six studs (out of 41 examined) were missing nuts - probably due to self-loosening as a result of vibration (their locking was not provided for by the design of the turbine). Under the influence of water pressure in the hydraulic unit, the rotor of the hydraulic unit with the turbine cover and the upper crosspiece began to move upward, and, due to depressurization, water began to fill the volume of the turbine shaft, affecting the elements of the generator. When the impeller rim reached 314.6 m, the impeller switched to pumping mode and, due to the stored energy of the generator rotor, created excess pressure at the inlet edges of the impeller blades, which led to the breakage of the guide vane blades. Through the vacated hydraulic unit shaft, water began to flow into the station's turbine room. The automatic control systems of hydraulic units, stopping them in case of emergency situations, could function only if there was a power supply, but in conditions of flooding of the turbine room and a massive short circuit of electrical equipment, the power supply to the station itself was lost very quickly, and the automation managed to stop only one hydraulic unit - No. 5. Water supply into the station's turbine room continued until station personnel manually closed the emergency gates from the dam crest, which was completed by 9.30.

Alleged culprits

The act of the Rostekhnadzor commission identifies six officials involved, in its opinion, “in creating conditions conducive to the occurrence of an accident,” including the former head of RAO UES of Russia A. B. Chubais, the former technical director of RAO UES of Russia B. F. Vainzikher, former head of JSC RusHydro V. Yu. Sinyugin and former Minister of Energy I. Kh. Yusufov. In addition, the act contains the names of 19 officials “responsible for preventing incidents and accidents at the station” and lists the violations identified by the commission in the performance of their official duties. Among these persons are the management of JSC RusHydro, headed by the acting chairman of the board V.A. Zubakin, as well as the management of the hydroelectric power station, headed by its director N.I. Nevolko. On August 28, 2009, N. I. Nevolko was removed from the position of director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP; on October 26, 2009, the board of directors of JSC RusHydro terminated the powers of board members S. A. Yushin (financial director of the company) and A. V. Toloshinov ( head of the Siberia division of the company, former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP). On November 23, 2009, the powers of the acting chairman of the company’s board, V. A. Zubakin, as well as 4 members of the company’s board were terminated. E.V. Dod, who previously headed OJSC Inter RAO UES, was elected as the new head of JSC RusHydro. The report of the parliamentary commission named 19 people as involved in the accident, including 10 people representing the management of the station, 5 people who were part of the management of JSC RusHydro, 2 officials of Rostechnadzor, as well as the heads of LLC Rakurs and LLC Promavtomatika. who carried out work on the creation and installation of control systems for hydraulic units. On December 16, 2010, the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee brought charges against the former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP; On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee announced the completion of the investigation. 162 people were recognized as victims in the case. The investigation brought charges under Article 143 Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of safety rules and other labor protection rules committed by a person who was responsible for complying with these rules, resulting in the death of two or more persons through negligence):

former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP Nikolai Nevolko;
First Deputy Director - Chief Engineer of the station Andrey Mitrofanov;
Deputy Chief Engineer for the technical part of the station Gennady Nikitenko;
former deputy chief engineer for station operation Evgeniy Shervarli;
Head of the station equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko;
Leading engineer for commissioning and testing of the monitoring service ( former boss laboratory of technical diagnostics) station to Vladimir Beloborodov;
to the leading engineer of the equipment monitoring section of the equipment monitoring service (former leading engineer of the technical diagnostics laboratory - group of vibration and strength measurements) of the station, Alexander Klyukach.

Criticism of the official version of the causes of the accident

Some conclusions set out in the act of the Rostechnadzor commission are criticized by a number of experts as unfounded. In particular, it is noted that the conclusion about the unacceptable level of vibration of hydraulic unit No. 2 is based on the readings of only one sensor (TP R NB), which cannot be considered reliable, since this sensor showed prohibitive vibrations even with the hydraulic unit stopped, which indicates a malfunction of the sensor. Nine other vibration sensors installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 did not record increased vibration, but their readings were not given in the Rostekhnadzor report. The normal vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident is confirmed by data from an automatic seismometric station located at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP dam. Specialists from CKTI named after. I. I. Polzunov, Russia's leading scientific and technical institute in the field of hydropower equipment, concluded that the transitions of hydraulic unit No. 2 through the non-recommended zone could not serve as a direct cause of the destruction of the studs.

It should be noted that the Rostechnadzor act was signed by two members of the commission (R. M. Khaziakhmetov and T. G. Meteleva) with dissenting opinions that were not published.

Chief engineer of the Lenhydroproekt Institute (general designer of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) Ph.D. n. B. N. Yurkevich at the IV All-Russian meeting of hydropower engineers (Moscow, February 25-27, 2010) said the following:

The peculiarity of this accident, which weighed heavily psychologically on all of us, is that it occurred under normal conditions. It happened when everything was working properly, repair regulations were being followed, and operating requirements were being met. No one violated anything, the station fully complied with all standards and requirements, the operating personnel complied with all prescribed regulations.

At the end of June 2012, a few days after the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation announced the completion of investigative measures in the criminal case regarding the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the press service of the RusHydro company released the following statement:

We know the conclusions of the Investigative Committee, formed based on the results of the investigation. The company previously received for review the results of a comprehensive technical examination (CTE), carried out at the request of the Investigative Committee by the Center for Independent Forensic Expertise of the Russian Environmental Foundation TEKHECO.

During the study of the KHP, RusHydro technical experts concluded that the factors identified in this document as the causes of the accident are ambiguous. ... We believe that a professional look at the problem will allow us to clearly determine the reasons for what happened...

At the same time, KHPP sets out an approach to the causes of the accident, which is considered official.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that during the first year that passed from the moment of the Sayan disaster, Ph.D. n. Yuri Lobanovsky to explain it as the development of the ideas of D.F.M. n. Valery Okulov, a theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations of pressure systems of hydroelectric power stations was created. Its main provisions and results of application not only to the events that occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, but also to similar incidents at other hydroelectric power plants are briefly described below.

According to the theory of Yu. I. Lobanovsky, the separation of the turbine cover of the second hydraulic unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and the ejection of its central block to a height of about 14 meters occurred as a result of a catastrophic increase in pressure pulsations in the water conduit of the hydraulic unit. The pulsations arose as a result of the excitation of self-oscillations in the conduit by a precessing behind-the-turbine vortex (that is, a vortex whose axis of rotation itself rotates). Then this first self-oscillatory process excited a second, more powerful one, the development of which ultimately led to the disaster. This scenario describes everything that happened at the time of the disaster and is completely consistent with the phenomena observed there.

According to the author of the theory, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is the most famous incident of this kind, but it was not the first. There are 5 more known hydro- and pumped-storage stations, in the water conduits of which either self-oscillations were excited, or balancing occurred at the very border of this dangerous phenomenon. In particular, similar processes were observed three times at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The application of the theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations and the targeted collection of information about various strange and obscure incidents with the separation of turbine covers of hydraulic units, as well as the occurrence of very strong vibrations that did not allow the normal operation of these units, made it possible to fully understand the details of what happened to the second hydraulic unit SSH GES August 17, 2009.

Lobanovsky presented his arguments in a number of works. The result is summarized in the article “Threat to the Chosen,” and a more detailed justification of the proposed approach is described in the work “Hydroacoustic excitation of the pressure system of the second hydraulic unit of the SSh HPP - the cause of the Sayan disaster.” Two articles were published in the specialized journal “Hydraulic Engineering”: “Self-oscillations of pressure systems and destruction of hydraulic units” and “On calculations of the hydroacoustic stability of Yali, Teri and Irganai hydroelectric power plants.” The research results were reported in the report “Hydroacoustics of the water conduit/turbine system and the safety of operation of hydroelectric power plants and pumped storage power plants” at scientific-practical conference within the framework of the International Congress “Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia: the priority vector of development is safety”.

At the same time, the conclusions of Lobanovsky, who had not previously been involved in research in the field of hydropower, are criticized by some relevant experts as unfounded, primarily by B. N. Yurkevich, the chief engineer of Lenhydroproekt OJSC, where the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was designed. He wrote a review of an article by Yu. I. Lobanovsky in the journal “Hydraulic Engineering” about self-oscillations in pressure systems. Lobanovsky, in turn, wrote a response to Yurkevich’s review, in which he criticized his conclusions.

Consequences

Social consequences

The lack of official information about the accident and the condition of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, subsequently, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the downstream settlements of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk, Abakan, Minusinsk . Residents rushed to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby higher ground, leading to large lines at gas stations, traffic jams, and car accidents. According to Sergei Shoigu,

Gasoline prices doubled, people began to take children from kindergartens and pioneer camps, fill all the canisters they had in the house with gasoline, and buy food and essentials in stores.<…>Well, as for gas stations, we will, of course, deal with this separately, who warmed their hands on this. This means that, as far as food and basic necessities are concerned, I also think it will be necessary to sort it out, and they are already sorting it out.

In this regard, the Khakass Department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service conducted an audit of gasoline prices, which did not reveal any increase.

Compensation and social assistance

The family of each deceased was given compensation in the amount of 1.1 million rubles additionally from the federal budget.

As part of its own charity program, Sberbank of Russia pledged to repay the mortgage loans of the families of the victims in the total amount of 6 million rubles.

Environmental consequences

The accident had a negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of the bearings of hydraulic units, from the destroyed control systems of guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting stain stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m³, of which approximately 45 m³ of mainly turbine oil ended up in the river. In order to prevent further spread of oil along the river, booms were installed; To facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent was used, but it was not possible to quickly stop the spread of petroleum products; the stain was completely eliminated only on August 24, and the cleanup of the coastal strip was planned to be completed by December 31, 2009. Water pollution with oil products led to the death of about 400 tons of commercial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river; There were no facts of fish death in the Yenisei itself. The total amount of environmental damage is tentatively estimated at 63 million rubles.

Economic consequences

Damage to power plant structures and equipment

As a result of the accident, hydraulic unit No. 2 was completely destroyed and thrown out of the shaft, and the hydraulic unit shaft was also destroyed. The generators at hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9 were destroyed. Other hydraulic units also suffered significant damage. The walls and roof of the turbine hall in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4 were destroyed. In the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 7, 9, the ceiling of the turbine hall was destroyed. Other station equipment located in the turbine hall and near it, such as transformers, cranes, elevators, and electrical equipment, also received varying degrees of damage. Total losses associated with equipment damage are estimated at 7 billion rubles. According to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, the costs of restoring the SShHPP may exceed 40 billion rubles. “Just replacing the turbine hall to a large extent - about 90% - will cost up to 40 billion rubles,” he said. The minister emphasized that the restoration of the hydroelectric power station is beneficial in any case, since the dam, which was not damaged in the accident, accounts for 80% of the total cost of the station. According to the management of JSC RusHydro, the complete restoration of the station may take more than four years. The need to allocate funds for the restoration of the station led to the need to change the investment program of JSC RusHydro.

The property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for $200 million, and the employees were also insured by ROSNO for 500 thousand rubles each. Property risks under this agreement are reinsured on the international market, mainly by Munich Re. The civil liability of the owner of the hydroelectric power station, JSC RusHydro, was insured by the AlfaStrakhovanie company, the insured amount was 30 million rubles. in all cases (according to the data given in the act of investigating the causes of the accident, civil liability was insured for a total of 78.1 million rubles).

Impact of the accident on the power system

As a result of the accident, a number of industrial enterprises were completely or partially disconnected from power supply for a short time: Sayan Aluminum Smelter, Khakass Aluminum Smelter, Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter, Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Plant, Novokuznetsk Aluminum Smelter, a number of coal mines and open-pit mines; power supply was disrupted, including social facilities and the population, in the Altai Territory, Kemerovo Region, the Republic of Khakassia, Novosibirsk Region, Tomsk Region Despite the sudden one-time loss of 4.5 gigawatts of the generating capacity of the unified energy system of Siberia, the actions of emergency automation and personnel of the joint dispatch control Siberia and the Central Dispatch Directorate, which promptly distributed the load between other power plants and involved transit from the combined power systems of the Urals and Middle Volga through the territory of Kazakhstan, managed to avoid a cascade shutdown and “extinguishing” of the IPS of Siberia, similar to, say, the accident in the power system of the USA and Canada in 2003. In this regard, on September 14, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev awarded a presidential certificate of honor to the workers of the United Dispatch Management of Siberian Energy Systems “for conscientious, highly professional work during the accident and the post-accident period at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP.” 8 hours after the accident, all restrictions were lifted due to the introduction of reserve capacity at thermal power plants and an increase in the flow of electricity from the European part of the country. Until the completion of the restoration of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, its underproduction of electricity will be compensated by the increased load of thermal power plants operating mainly on coal (due to which the volume of its transportation has increased significantly), the import of electricity from Kazakhstan, as well as due to the commissioning of the first stage of the Boguchanskaya hydroelectric power station in 2011. Hydroelectric power station.

Stock markets reaction

The announcement of the accident predictably affected the company's stock quotes on Russian and foreign stock markets. On the day of the accident, August 17, trading in RusHydro shares on the Russian trading platforms RTS and MICEX Stock Exchange were suspended at the request of the company itself. This happened just a few minutes after the opening of trading, but during this time they managed to lose more than 7% of their value. On the London Stock Exchange, depositary receipts for RusHydro shares lost 14.8%. On August 18, trading in RusHydro shares was not carried out on Russian stock exchanges, and on August 19, after trading resumed, the company’s shares fell by more than 10%.

Simultaneously with the fall in RusHydro's quotes, shares of electric power companies with generating capacities in Siberia began to rise, which, according to market participants, could benefit from increased capacity utilization. Since the energy from the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP will presumably be replaced by electricity from more expensive thermal power plants, investors expect both an increase in electricity prices in the region and an increase in revenues for energy companies.

Ensuring the safety of hydroelectric power plants

Dam appearance

As a result of the failure of all units of the station and the blocking of water pipelines, the water throughput capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station dam was reduced by 3600 m³/s (10 units of 358.5 m³/s each), which raises concerns about the safety of passage of strong floods (subsequently, the launch of three hydraulic units somewhat eased, but did not eliminate these concerns). To solve the problem, work on the construction of the coastal spillway of the hydroelectric power station was accelerated, for which 4.3 billion rubles were allocated from the federal budget. According to Yuri Gorbenko, a member of the board of JSC RusHydro, the construction of the spillway was carried out around the clock; 36,000 m³ of concrete was laid per month. The first stage of the spillway was commissioned on June 1, 2010. In 2010, it was planned to spend 3.5 billion rubles on the construction of the spillway.

When a standard spillway operates, a cloud of water dust is formed; Since the spillway had never been operated in winter before the accident, there were concerns that this could lead to significant icing of the station structures. To prevent this phenomenon, a number of measures were taken.

According to the Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko, the government commission to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station instructed JSC RusHydro to replace the fastenings of the covers of turbines of high-pressure hydroelectric power stations during scheduled maintenance. The Ministry of Energy, Rostekhnadzor, RusHydro and other organizations operating hydroelectric power plants have also been instructed to conduct a complete flaw detection of the fastenings of the turbine covers of hydroelectric power stations and replace those unsuitable for use. HPPs must be provided with protective systems, sources of autonomous emergency power supply, as well as automatic recorders of the parameters of the equipment being operated (“black boxes”). The commission also ordered an analysis of the compatibility of the System Operator's control devices with local control systems of hydroelectric power plants, and the Ministry of Energy and Rostekhnadzor, together with the Russian Academy of Sciences, were instructed to prepare a comprehensive program for improving the safety of hydroelectric power plants by December 2009. The Ministry of Energy should also submit proposals on the development of the regulatory framework of the Russian Federation to establish technical requirements to the subjects of the electric power industry necessary to regulate the flow of electricity and power.

Station restoration

Work to restore the hydroelectric power station began almost immediately after the accident. On August 19, 2009, a directorate for eliminating the consequences of the accident was created, headed by the chief engineer of the station A. Mitrofanov. At the first stage of work, the main task was to restore the power supply to the station and clear away the rubble in the turbine room. The rubble was completely cleared by October 7. On September 21, 2009, the restoration of the walls and roof of the turbine room began; this work was scheduled to be completed by November 11, but was completed ahead of schedule, on November 6. At the same time, work is underway to dismantle the most damaged hydraulic units; Of particular difficulty was the dismantling of the remains of hydraulic unit No. 2, the completion of which was initially planned for the end of January 2010, but was actually completed only in April 2010.

Work on the restoration of the hydroelectric power station is planned to be completed by December 2014. The plant restoration plan includes the gradual replacement of all 10 hydraulic units with new ones of the same power, but with improved performance characteristics. The new hydraulic units will be manufactured by the Power Machines company - 6 units will be delivered in 2011, the remaining 4 in 2012, the total cost of the contract for the supply of equipment was 11.7 billion rubles.

In 2010, the least affected hydraulic units No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were launched. The fifth hydraulic unit was put into idle mode on December 30, 2009; It is planned to completely dismantle hydraulic unit No. 2 by March 1, complete work on the seventh unit by March 15, and on hydraulic unit No. 9 by April 30, 2010. By the end of 2009, it was planned to start hydraulic unit No. 6 at idle speed to dry the generator insulation; the launch took place on December 30, and on February 24, 2010, the unit was put into operation with the participation of V.V. Putin. On December 22, 2010, hydraulic unit No. 3 was launched, the station’s capacity reached 2560 MW.

Ratings

What happened is a harbinger of what has long been feared Russian leaders: the inexorable degradation of Soviet - era infrastructure . Everything - from power plants to ports and airports, from pipelines and railways to city thermal power plants and the Moscow metro - almost everything is in urgent need of repair.

Original text(English)

But the accident - apparently caused by a pressure surge in pipes - is also a harbinger of something Russia's leaders have long feared: the inexorable degradation of the Soviet-era infrastructure. From power stations to ports and airports, to pipelines and railways, through city heating plants and the Moscow metro - almost everything is in urgent need of renovation.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, at a meeting on the socio-economic development of the Siberian Federal District on August 24, 2009, called all statements about the onset of the so-called “technological collapse” “nonsense” in Russia, but confirmed the conclusions of news agencies. Referring to the accident, he said:

...These tragic events should once again remind us of fairly simple things that we, unfortunately, often forget - that security control systems and the infrastructure of Russian enterprises as a whole currently require the utmost attention. In some cases, this infrastructure is ineffective and needs urgent modernization, otherwise we will pay the heaviest price.

Notes

Report of technical investigation into the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Rostechnadzor (October 3, 2009). (inaccessible link - story) Retrieved October 5, 2009.(unavailable link)(the file was originally posted at , then renamed “due to technical problems caused by a large number of requests to the site upon publication of the Act”). MD5 hash of the authentic file is 2E7E94FEBDA2D3E9F683B1AE7A79B426. .
Causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Conclusions of Rostechnadzor. Main points. vesti.ru (October 03, 2009). Archived from the original on October 17, 2012. Retrieved September 10, 2012.
Accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station: parliamentarians will establish the causes. Interfax.ru (September 17, 2009). Retrieved October 24, 2009.

Abstract

Completed by a student
9th grade
Babich Lyudmila.

2010

Accident on Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP- industrialman-made disaster which occurred on August 17, 2009 . As a result of the accident, 75 people died and serious damage was caused to the equipment and premises of the station. Production station operation electricity suspended. The consequences of the accident affected ecological situation of the water area adjacent to the hydroelectric power station , on the social and economic spheres of the region. As a result of the investigation, the immediate cause of the accident was namedfatigue failure studs turbine cover fastenings hydraulic unit , which led to its breakdown and flooding station machine room.
This accident is the largest disaster in history at a hydropower facility. Russia and one of the most significant in world historyhydropower. However, the assessment of the consequences of the disaster in the expert and political community is ambiguous. Some experts and organizations compare the Sayano-Shushenskaya disaster in terms of its significance and impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia withaccident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Other experts believe that these disasters are incomparable in scale.President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev believes that one should not overdramatize the situation and do “apocalyptic» comments. The accident caused a great public outcry, becoming one of the most discussed inmeans mass media events of 2009.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

General plan of the station
Main article:Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station at Yenisei River is the largest hydroelectric power station Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world. It is located on the borderKrasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia . Construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1968. The first hydraulic unit was launched in 1978, the last in 1985 . The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000 . Technically, a hydroelectric power station consists of concrete arch gravity dam245 m high and the dam hydroelectric power station building, which houses 10radial-axialhydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW. The installed capacity of the hydroelectric power station is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 24.5 billion kWh. Dam The hydroelectric power station forms a largeSayano-Shushenskoye Reservoirseasonal regulation. Downstream the Yenisei is locatedcounter-regulatory Mainskaya HPP , which forms a single production complex with the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The hydroelectric power station structures were designed by the Institute Lenhydroproekt", hydraulic power equipmentsupplied by factories " LMZ and Elektrosila "(now part of the concern " Power machines "). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP belongs to JSC RusHydro".

Catastrophe

At the time of the accident, the load on the station was 4100 MW, out of 10 hydraulic units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13local time August 17, 2009 there was a sudden destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2 with the entry of a hydraulic unit through the shaft under a large pressure significant volumes of water. The power plant personnel, who were in the turbine room, heard a loud bang in the area of hydraulic unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. Streams of water quickly flooded the machine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, and accidents occurred at operating hydroelectric generators.short circuits(their flashes are clearly visible on the amateur video of the disaster), which disabled them. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a blackout of the station itself. A light and sound alarm was activated at the station's central control panel. signaling , after which the remote control was de-energized - operational communication and power supply were lost lighting , automation and alarm devices. Automatic systems that stop hydraulic units worked only on hydraulic unit No. 5,guide vanewhich was automatically closed. The valves on the water inlets of other hydraulic units remained open, and the water water pipelines continued to flow to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (severely damaged stators and crosspieces of generators ). Streams of water and flying debris from hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine room in the area of hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4. Hydraulic units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with debris from the turbine room.The station employees who had such an opportunity promptly left the scene of the accident.
At the time of the accident, the station management was in place chief engineer HPP A. N. Mitrofanov, acting chief of staff Civil Defense and Emergency M. I. Chiglintsev, head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift manager M. G. Nefedov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the station territory after the accident.
Due to the loss of power supply, it was only possible to close the gates manually, for which personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 8:30, eight operational personnel reached the gate room, after which they contacted the station shift manager by cell phone, who gave instructions to lower the gates. Having broken open the iron door, station workers A.V. Kataitsev, E.V. Kondrattsev, I.M. Bagautdinov, P.A. Mayoroshin and N.N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates within an hour water intakes , stopping the flow of water into the turbine room. The closure of water pipelines led to the need to open the gatesspillway damto avoid reservoir overflow. By 11:32 food was provided gantry crane dam crest from mobilediesel generator, at 11:50 the operation to lift the shutters began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water began to flow through.

Emergency rescue work

Search and rescue and repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by station personnel and employees Siberian regional center Ministry of Emergency Situations . On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations flew to the accident area Sergei Shoigu , who led the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident, [the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to examine the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in “air bags” and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, already on August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as insignificant. On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been discovered, 58 people were listed as missing. As the station's interior was cleared of water, the number of dead bodies found grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when the water pumping work entered its final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of the search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of structures and equipment. On August 28, the regime was abolished in Khakassiaemergency, introduced in connection with the accident. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the hydroelectric power station) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m? were dismantled and removed? of rubble, more than 277,000 m3 were pumped out of the station premises? water. To eliminate oil contamination water areas Yenisei 9683 meters were installedbooms and collected 324.2 tons oil-containing emulsions.

Causes of the accident

The results of the accident investigation by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the agency’s website in the form of a document under the official title “Act of a technical investigation into the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 at the branch of the Open Joint Stock Company RusHydro - Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhniy.” .The act provides general information about the hydroelectric power station, a list of events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, and lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The direct cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows: Most of these reasons are of a systemic multifactorial nature, including unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the station management, as well as abuse of official position by the station management.
Constant monitoring of the technical condition of the equipment by operational and repair personnel was not properly organized (which should be provided for in the operating instructions for hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, approved by the chief engineer of the SSHHPP dated May 18, 2009). The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly stop the second hydraulic unit and determine the causes of vibration. The SSHPP with numerous human casualties was the result of a number of reasons of a technical, organizational and regulatory legal nature.

Prerequisites

Operating areas of hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Hydraulic unit No. 2 was started November 5, 1979 , initially at reduced pressure and with temporary impeller. November 7, 1986 The hydraulic unit was put into operation with a standard impeller. The standard service life of the hydraulic turbine was set by the manufacturer at 30 years. The design of the RO230/833-B-677 hydraulic turbines is characterized by a number of disadvantages, one of which is the presence of a large area of not recommended operation; When the hydraulic unit is in this zone, the operation of the turbine is accompanied by strong hydraulic shocks in the flow path and significant noise. In this case, the zone of not recommended operation separates two zones in which the operation of the hydraulic unit is permitted; Thus, with a significant change in power, the hydraulic unit is forced to pass through the zone of non-recommended operation each time. In the act of accepting the hydroelectric complex into operation, dated 2000 , the need to replace hydraulic turbine impellers was noted. According to the program of technical re-equipment and reconstruction of the station, the replacement of the impellers of hydraulic units was planned since 2011; in particular in August 2009 a tender was announced for the supply of a new impeller for one of the hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station
Hydraulic unit No. 2 underwent its last major overhaul in 2005 , its last medium repair was carried out in the period from January 14 to March 16 2009. After the repairs, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibrations equipment, which nevertheless remained within acceptable limits.During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration condition gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it exceeded the permissible level. The deterioration continued further; Thus, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600µm at the maximum permissible 160 microns; at 8:13, immediately before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with regulatory documents, was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the reasons for the increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and plant management when making decisions. Consequences

Social consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the station’s turbine room, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the floor of the hall (at 327 m) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor (at 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were station employees, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work (most of them were employees of Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont OJSC). In total, there were about 300 people on the station territory (including outside the area affected by the accident). The accident killed 75 people and injured 13 people]. The body of the last victim was found September 23. Full list of deadindicating the locations where the bodies were found was published in the technical investigation report of the Rostechnadzor commission. The large number of deaths is explained by the fact that most people were in the interior of the station below the floor level of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these rooms.
From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who might have been inside the flooded turbine room were disappointing. In particular, board memberRusHydro company, former general director of the hydroelectric power station Alexander Toloshinov said:
“The lack of official information about the accident and the condition of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, subsequently, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the downstream settlements - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk
etc.............

The tragedy at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station occurred on August 17 at 08:13 local time (04:13 Moscow time).

Due to the destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2, water began to flow into the station's turbine room under high pressure. The load on the hydroelectric power station almost immediately dropped to zero, and the constantly rising water in a short time flooded the entire hall and the technical rooms below it. All ten hydraulic units of the station were damaged, three of them were completely destroyed. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the hydroelectric power station.

As a result of the disaster, 75 people were killed and 13 were injured. Up to 50 tons of turbine oil ended up in the Yenisei.

The accident at the hydroelectric power station has no analogues in the domestic and global hydropower industry.

About Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after. P.S. Neporozhniy (SSHPP) is the most powerful hydroelectric power station in Russia. Its installed capacity is 6,400 MW, and its annual output is about 24 billion kW/h. The hydroelectric power station is located on the Yenisei River in Khakassia near the city of Sayanogorsk. Included in JSC RusHydro as a branch of the company.

Construction of the station began in 1968. The first of ten hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station was launched in December 1978, the last - in December 1985. The station was put into commercial operation in 2000.

SSHHPP is a high-pressure hydroelectric power station of the dam type. Its pressure front is formed by a concrete arch-gravity dam deeply cut into the rocky shores. The height of the hydraulic structure is 245 m, the length along the crest is 1074.4 m, the width at the base is 105.7 m and at the crest - 25 m. The area of the reservoir is 621 sq. m. km. The station's turbine room houses 10 hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each.

Continuation

Rescue operation

The head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu and the Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko flew to the scene of a large-scale emergency. During the night from August 17 to 18, the number of people involved in eliminating the consequences of the accident increased tenfold.

Divers examined the flooded premises. The search and rescue operation was carried out mainly in the turbine room of the hydroelectric station. “Divers work in difficult conditions: the water is cloudy, mixed with engine oil, but all corners of the engine room are thoroughly examined,” noted the head of the Siberian search and rescue team, Alexander Kresan.

On the day of the accident, two people were saved, but already on August 18, the likelihood of finding living people in the flood zone was assessed as insignificant.

If a person is caught in an air bubble, then there is hope for his salvation. If he finds himself in water, given that its temperature does not exceed four degrees, then the chances of saving him are minimal

Alexander Tolokonnikov

former general director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station

On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine hall began, by which time the number of victims had reached 17 people.

RusHydro announced that it plans to pay more than 300 million rubles in support of family members of the dead and injured.

"YouTube.com/tdudin80"

"The largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world"

The investigation into the causes of the disaster was carried out by several departments. Immediately after the accident, the Investigative Committee became involved in it as part of the criminal case initiated, and a Rostechnadzor commission was also created.

First versions

Initially as possible reason During the accident, a water hammer version was put forward, but it did not find support, as well as the version about the explosion of a transformer, which caused the collapse of the wall of the turbine hall. The Investigative Committee ruled out the possibility of a terrorist attack.

RusHydro specialists suggested that the accident occurred due to the destruction of the turbine due to a manufacturing defect. However, the heads of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Energy warned against hasty conclusions.

Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko called what happened at Russia's largest hydroelectric power station "the largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world."

Rostechnadzor report

On October 3, 2009, Rostechnadzor presented a report on the investigation into the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The document took up more than 100 pages. It was prepared by a commission of 26 specialists under the leadership of the head of the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision Nikolai Kutin. The Technical Investigation Report of the causes of the accident noted that the accident occurred due to a combination of reasons, including negligence, technical and organizational failures.

Rostekhnadzor, which came every three years and checked the condition of the station, should act as an “axe” that constantly hangs over the management of the station

Vladimir Pekhtin

co-chairman of the commission from the State Duma

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the last unit of which began operating in 1985, was officially put into operation only 15 years later, in 2000, without a state examination. The corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais, who at that time headed RAO UES of Russia. The report also stated that during the initial period of operation of the hydroelectric power station, several dozen cases of turbine equipment failures occurred.

The Rostechnadzor commission named six people involved in the accident at the hydroelectric power station. Among them are the former head of RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, General Director of TGK-1 Boris Vainzikher, Ambassador at Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation in 2001-2004 Igor Yusufov. The list of persons involved in the accident also includes Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Central Commission for Commissioning of the Sayano-Shushenskoye Hydroelectric Complex in 2000, Anatoly Dyakov, and Managing Director, Head of the “South” Division of the RusHydro Company, Chief Engineer of the SShHPP in 1983- 2006 Valentin Stafievsky.

Rostechnadzor report: six involved

As noted in the document, Vyacheslav Sinyugin carried out decisions to remove repair personnel from the staffing table of the hydroelectric power station, without ensuring that the requirements for regular monitoring of the technical condition of the main equipment were included in the repair and maintenance contracts. He “did not create the conditions for a proper assessment of the real state of safety of the SSHHPP. He did not take effective measures to develop, finance and implement compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP, including not ensuring the implementation of the decision on the speedy construction of an additional spillway at the SSHHPP, and did not take effective measures to replace impellers on hydraulic units that reduce the influence of “non-recommended zones” of their operation, did not ensure the adoption of a program for the safe operation of hydraulic units involved in power regulation and, therefore, having increased wear.”

Boris Vainzikher, according to the conclusions of the commission, was responsible for the introduction of RAO UES standards aimed at strengthening the safe operation of equipment and which did not ensure the safe operation of SSHHPP at the proper level.

Anatoly Chubais, the document notes, “approved the Act of the Central Commission on the acceptance into operation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex. At the same time, a proper assessment was not given of the actual safety state of the SSHHPP.” In addition, timely compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP were not developed and implemented, including the decision “to begin work on the construction of an additional spillway at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP as soon as possible”, the impellers on the hydraulic units were not replaced, and a program was not developed compensating measures for the safe operation of hydraulic units involved in power regulation and, therefore, having increased wear."

Valentin Stafievsky, according to the conclusions of Rostechnadzor, “knowing about the real state of the equipment operated at the SSHHPP, he did not create the conditions for RusHydro to take effective measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP. Participated in the removal of repair personnel from the staffing table, without ensuring compliance with the requirements for regular monitoring of the technical condition of the main equipment SShGES".

Anatoly Dyakov was the chairman of the Central Commission for the commissioning of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex and signed the acceptance certificate with a “good” rating. “The commission’s act did not fully reflect the actual state of the operating buildings, structures and equipment of the SShHPP, which created the preconditions for underestimation real consequences further operation,” notes the Rostechnadzor document.

Igor Yusufov, “while serving as Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, he did not create mechanisms for real state control and supervision over the safe operation of energy facilities, including those included in RAO UES of Russia,” notes the Rostekhnadzor act. Yusufov, the document says, “did not ensure development and adoption of the framework public policy in the field of safe operation of energy facilities, contributed to the transfer of control functions from the state to operating organizations without making decisions on increasing their responsibility for the energy security of the Russian Federation"

Continuation

Rostekhnadzor also reported that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was related to the fire at the Bratsk HPP on August 16. It is because of this that the load on the SSHPP had to be increased and a second hydraulic unit had to be put into operation. “It cannot be said that the Bratsk hydroelectric power station is to blame for the accident at Sayano-Shushenskaya, but the conditions were created just at the time of the fire at Bratskaya,” noted the head of Rostechnadzor Nikolai Kutin.

Parliamentary conclusions

In parallel with the Rostekhnadzor commission, a parliamentary commission created in September 2009 conducted its own investigation. Members of the commission - deputies and senators - visited the site of the accident and the enterprises where equipment for the hydroelectric power station was produced.

The commission determined that more than 20 persons were involved in creating the conditions for the accident. Among them are the management of the station, including the general director and chief engineer, technical services that were responsible for repair work and the technical condition of the equipment, as well as organizations that supplied various equipment to the hydroelectric power station, including automation.

The Commission addressed Investigative Committee at the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation with a request to identify the persons involved in the accident and establish the degree of their guilt.

Immediate cause of the accident

During the investigation into the causes of the accident by the Rostechnadzor commission and the parliamentary commission, the immediate cause of the destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2 was named fatigue failure of the turbine cover mounting studs as a result of vibration.

Continuation

Sentence for seven defendants

More than 300 witnesses were questioned in the case, 234 examinations were carried out, including forensic, genetic, technical, metallurgical, as well as explosive and seismological.

“Due to the large volume of materials, and more than 850 material evidence was attached to the criminal case, the examinations lasted for a year, based on the results of which a mathematical model development of the accident," said Vladimir Markin, a representative of the Investigative Committee.

Accusation

Seven station employees were in the dock: director of the SSHHPP Nikolai Nevolko, chief engineer Andrei Mitrofanov and his deputies Evgeniy Shervarli, Gennady Nikitenko, as well as employees of the hydroelectric power station equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach.

Family members of the victims still cannot come to terms with the loss of their loved ones. However, a month ago information appeared that those responsible for the accident would allegedly go unpunished. The fact that a criminal case could be terminated due to the statute of limitations angered people

Nikolay Popov

They were charged with violating labor safety rules, which negligently resulted in the death of a person. The article provided for imprisonment for up to three years. But by the time the case was received by the prosecutor’s office on December 8, 2011, amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation came into force, and this article was classified as of minor gravity. The statute of limitations for it is 2 years and by that time had actually expired, and therefore the prosecutor’s office returned the criminal case for additional investigation.

Investigative actions in the case of the accident at the SSHHPP were completed in June 2012. Seven defendants were charged with new article- part 3 art. 216 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - “Violation of safety rules during work, resulting in the death of more than two persons and causing major damage.” They face seven years in prison.

According to investigators, the accused for a long time allowed hydraulic unit No. 2 to operate in an unsatisfactory vibration state. HPP employees were inactive and did not take measures to eliminate the malfunction, including during scheduled repairs carried out in January-March 2009.

162 people were recognized as victims. On June 4, 2013, the criminal case was sent for consideration to the Sayanogorsk City Court of the Republic of Khakassia. On July 15, 2013, preliminary hearings were held in court and the trial began on July 19.

Sentence and amnesty

The verdict for the defendants in the criminal case regarding the accident at the hydroelectric power station was handed down on December 24, 2014. The former director of the hydroelectric power station, Nikolai Nevolko, was sentenced to 6 years in a general regime colony; the same sentence was given to chief engineer Andrei Mitrofanov. His deputies Evgeny Shervarli and Gennady Nikitenko were sentenced to 5.5 years and 5 years 9 months in a general regime colony. Employees of the equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach were sentenced to 4.5 years in prison without the right to occupy leadership positions. Moreover, Vladimir Beloborodov was released under an amnesty.

19 complaints were filed against the decision of the Sayanogorsk City Court from victims, defense and convicts. Three injured individuals, as well as a representative of the RusHydro company, which was also recognized as the injured party, asked to acquit the convicted persons. In turn, the state prosecution asked to leave the sentence unchanged.

May 26 Supreme Court Khakassia changed the sentence of two defendants in the case. Workers of the hydroelectric power station equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko and Alexander Klyukach, previously sentenced to 4.5 years in prison, were granted an amnesty on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The remaining defendants were left with the same sentences.

The statute of limitations in the criminal case regarding the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station expired on August 17, 2015. If the decision of the Sayanogorsk court had not entered into legal force before this date, all those convicted would have been released and the case closed.

Restoration work and modernization of the station

It took more than five years and 41 billion rubles to restore the hydroelectric power station. The first work at the station began in August 2009. By October, the rubble in the turbine hall was cleared, and by November, the walls and roof of the hall were restored, which made it possible to create a thermal circuit and ensure that work could be carried out during the cold season.

At the first stage (2010-2011), the least damaged hydraulic units No. 3, 4, 5, 6 were restored and a new hydraulic unit No. 1 was put into operation (in December 2011). In October 2011, a new coastal bypass spillway of the hydroelectric power station was put into permanent operation, allowing for additional water passage of up to 4 thousand cubic meters. m (construction cost - about 7 billion rubles) and meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters.

At the second stage (2012-2013), new hydraulic units No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 began to be used, and previously restored units No. 5 and 6 were replaced with new ones.

At the final stage in 2014, the updated unit No. 4 was connected to the network - on May 22, President Vladimir Putin, during a video conference, gave the command to launch it - and the equipment on unit No. 3 was updated.

The manufacture and installation of new hydraulic units for the station was carried out by OJSC Power Machines (a contract worth 11.7 billion rubles was signed with OJSC RusHydro on November 30, 2009).

Work on the reconstruction of the station was completed in November 2014, the station reached its design capacity (6400 megawatts).

The completion of the complete modernization of the hydroelectric power station is scheduled for 2015.

What changed after the emergency

After a large-scale accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, it was decided to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of the station and equip it with new and modern equipment that has improved performance characteristics and meets all reliability and safety requirements.

The service life of the new hydraulic units has been increased to 40 years. Open distribution installations will be replaced with devices closed type to reduce wear. The hydroelectric power station will have a comprehensive automated system monitoring the condition of the dam. The new coastal bypass spillway of the station, put into permanent operation in October 2011, meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters; it allows additional water passage of up to 4000 cubic meters. m per second. Also in 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation ordered, during planned repairs, to replace all fastenings of turbine covers and install recording devices ("black boxes") at all Russian hydroelectric power plants.

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station accident causes and consequences. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station and its consequences

Multiple factor

Major disaster

Consequences

Cyber attack?

Catastrophe

Emergency rescue work

Investigation into the causes of the accident

Causes of the accident

Prerequisites

Development of the accident

Alleged culprits

Criticism of the official version of the causes of the accident

Consequences

Social consequences

Compensation and social assistance

Environmental consequences

Economic consequences

Damage to power plant structures and equipment

Impact of the accident on the power system

Stock markets reaction

Ensuring the safety of hydroelectric power plants

Station restoration

Ratings

Notes

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Catastrophe

Emergency rescue work

Causes of the accident

Social consequences

Rescue operation

"The largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world"

Sentence for seven defendants

Restoration work and modernization of the station

What changed after the emergency

Related articles

Read also

Multiple factor

Major disaster

Consequences

Cyber ​​attack?

Catastrophe

Emergency rescue work

Investigation into the causes of the accident

Causes of the accident

Prerequisites

Development of the accident

Alleged culprits

Criticism of the official version of the causes of the accident

Consequences

Social consequences

Compensation and social assistance

Environmental consequences

Economic consequences

Damage to power plant structures and equipment

Impact of the accident on the power system

Stock markets reaction

Ensuring the safety of hydroelectric power plants

Station restoration

Ratings

Notes

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Catastrophe

Emergency rescue work

Causes of the accident

Social consequences

Rescue operation

"The largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world"

Sentence for seven defendants

Restoration work and modernization of the station

What changed after the emergency

Related articles

Read also

Cyber attack?