Famous Chechen fighters. Destroyed Chechen militants

Currently full is underway development of new combat manuals for the Russian Armed Forces. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that came into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary fighter who fought in Chechnya. He addresses not just anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be questioned. But on the whole he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of combat operations and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations have not yet been approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published with virtually no editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former fighter. But first of all, I am a former SA senior sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three fractures of limbs, ribs, and a severe concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was “sheltered” by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He walked me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I learned that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but this did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. First, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from near Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned to my house with spare parts at night, the neighbor’s boy told me in confidence that they were asking and looking for me. Two days later the Taliban took me too. So I became a “voluntary” mercenary fighter.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab-Chechens, began to be trained for jihad in Chechnya. They were prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. Among us there were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians, and so on.
After preparation, the final instructions were given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for transfer, rest and treatment of “Chechens”. They said that highly qualified doctors were also former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by railway. They drove us non-stop across Georgia. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
They continued to prepare us. It started in the camp combat training- mountain. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead and guaranteed political support. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - studying the region, entering it, bases, warehouses (we did many of them ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan would be closed. The strike was expected along the Terek. Department of the plain part. Destruction enveloping the outer ring and the inner mesh - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, excuse the freethinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the terrain well, are well armed, and most importantly, knowledgeable. Observation and reconnaissance are carried out by absolutely everyone - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first abandoned near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many of the gang were locals. They received money for the fight and went home. You search, and he sits, waits for a signal, and bargains for food from the rear for money received in battle - dry rations, stewed meat, and sometimes ammunition “for self-defense from bandits.”
I was in battles, but I didn’t kill. Mostly he carried out the wounded and dead. After one battle they tried to pursue us, and then he slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through the Kharami to Shamilka. Then for 250 bucks he sailed to Kazakhstan, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. After working a little, I settled in and went to Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing is about the tactics of both sides:
1. The bandits know the tactics of the Soviet army well, starting with the Benderaites. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that “the Russians do not study or take these issues into account,” but it’s a pity, it’s very bad.
2. The bandits know that the Russian Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to operate at night, and there is no material support. In the first war through battle formations Whole gangs of 200-300 people passed through. They know that the Russian Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), no night vision devices, or silent firing devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all their attacks and prepare them at night - the Russians sleep. During the day, bandits carry out forays only if they are well prepared and for sure, but otherwise they are serving time, resting, collecting information is carried out, as I already said, by children and women, especially from among the “victims,” that is, those whose husband, brother, son, etc. have already been killed. etc.
These children are undergoing intense ideological indoctrination, after which they may even commit self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And the ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache the weapon and forward. They put up “beacons” - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything can be seen. How our troops appeared and left is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Data received from NATO bases in Turkey from satellites is immediately transmitted to field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. Indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio control and direction finding, and Yeltsin “helped” them with this by destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you transport living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Turn the fighters to face the enemy. Seat people facing the board, benches in the middle. The weapon is at the ready, and not like firewood, at random. The bandits' tactics are an ambush with a two-echelon arrangement: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
The 2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne ones, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they themselves cannot shoot. By the time we turn around, we’re ready.
Next: the first echelon shoots one at a time: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire is created and the effect of “many bandits”, etc. As a rule, this spreads fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is consumed, the 1st echelon retreats, carries out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd echelon finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and before they knew it, there were no bandits, and if there were, then they were 70-100 meters away, and there was not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not shoot so much as monitor the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and dead. They appoint strong men. And if they had pursued the gang after the battle, there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one left to pursue. Everyone is resting in the back under the awning. That's all the tactics.
4. Taking hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." This is what bazaar lovers are called. Since the rear doesn’t work, take a careless, careless scoundrel with a weapon “by the back” and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were like that. This was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Command error - and the bandits were afraid of it. It is necessary to immediately conduct a population census along with the “cleansing operations.” We came to the village and wrote down in each house how many were where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it was necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - the police or the same troops came to the village and checked - there were no men. Here is a list of a ready-made gang. New ones have arrived - who are you, “brothers”, and where will you be from? Inspecting them and searching the house - where did he hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival is through registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He joined the gang - fuck him! Wait - come - spanked. To do this, it was necessary to assign populated areas to each unit and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and the systematic shooting of bandits going out to gather. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
Half of the bandits feed themselves at home thanks to this, so there are fewer problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear people, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation through mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be taken away (look for Khattab, Basayev and others from their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. You plant them like seedlings in a garden. Example: in the gang I was in, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy a convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest were delayed, apparently). So the battalion hit the gang, “scattered” and “defeated”. Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to the general gathering area of the gang. And if they chased us, there was almost “0” ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead man. If they hadn’t gone far, of course they would have abandoned everyone and then, perhaps, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and back into service. This is the result of “dispersion” - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. This is why warlords remain alive and elusive for so long. There would be rapid response teams, with dogs, in a helicopter, and urgently to the area of the collision with the support of the “beaten” - that is, those who were fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.

9 January 1996, militants attacked Russian city Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan).
The militants, numbering about 350 people, acted under the command of Salman Raduev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov. The initial goal is to eliminate the helicopter base federal forces and hostage-taking among federal security forces. However, it didn’t work out. As a result of a clash with federal forces and local police, the militants tried to capture the city, train station and airport. After local battles throughout the city, the militants took hostages among the civilian population (about 3,000 people) and established themselves in the local maternity hospital, because it is much more convenient to fight behind the backs of pregnant women - the militants managed to repeat the Budyonnovsky scenario...

The next day troops entered the city. Some of the militants remained to hold the bridge over the Terek on the approach to the city. By the end of the day, 32 people were killed and 64 were injured.
At that time, the militants never entered into negotiations with the command of the federal forces, who blocked the neighborhoods near the hospital.

Taking advantage of the situation, Salman Raduev demanded that the Russian leadership withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Of course, no one agreed to this, but the militants were released on buses with hostages from the maternity hospital. It would be madness to storm it. For every Chechen killed, the militants threatened to shoot 15 civilians.

The return route of Raduev’s group passed through the territory of Dagestan along the border with Chechnya. The militants wanted to switch to their side in the area of the village of Pervomaiskoye, located 300 meters from the border.

Near the border Aksai River, a convoy of buses with militants and hostages (165 people) was stopped by warning fire from helicopters (which hit an escort vehicle of the Dagestan traffic police). The federal authorities were not going to allow the militants with hostages into the territory of Chechnya: it was assumed that they would free the people at the border. The militants intended to travel further with the hostages, to Dudayev’s headquarters in the village of Novogroznensky.

After the shelling, the convoy returned to the village of Pervomaiskoye, where the militants, hiding behind hostages, disarmed the Russian police checkpoint. The riot police had orders not to shoot at the buses. As a result, the number of prisoners taken by the militants increased by 37 policemen from Novosibirsk; they grabbed their weapons, communications and armored personnel carriers.

On January 11-14, militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The village was blocked by federal troops. The militants began to prepare for the assault, forcing the prisoners to dig trenches. Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov and FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov arrived at the scene of the events. Negotiations have reached a dead end. Raduev constantly changed his demands. He insisted that Grigory Yavlinsky, Boris Gromov, Alexander Lebed and Yegor Gaidar become either mediators in the negotiations or voluntary hostages. He demanded that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin participate in the negotiations.

On January 16, 1996, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ferry Aurasia, threatening to shoot the Russian hostages and then blow up the ship. The terrorists demanded to stop the assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye, where the surrounded bandit group of Salman Raduev was located.

On the night of January 18, a group of militants approached from the direction of Pervomaisky and tried to unblock Raduev’s group. She pulled the forces onto herself, forcing the Dagestan riot police to move away from Pervomaisky.

In the same place, at 3 o’clock in the morning, the militants made a breakthrough. The bandits carried out a powerful three-minute fire raid, and then shouting “Allahu Akbar!” rushed to attack. On the rampart where our trenches were located, it came to hand-to-hand combat. They chopped with knives and spatulas. 150 militants in this area were opposed by no more than fifty special forces from the 22nd brigade of the North Caucasus Military District. (memoirs of Colonel General Gennady Troshev). When did it open in the morning? scary picture night battle, it turned out that they killed the entire first wave of militants. During the breakthrough, 39 militants were killed. 153 corpses of militants were found at the battle site and on the outskirts of the village, and 28 bandits were captured.

On January 18, the village was stormed. The decision to launch the operation was made after the news of the execution of elders and several policemen. Federal troops lost 26 killed and 93 military personnel wounded during the operation. In those days, nothing was known about the fate of the militant leader Salman Raduev.

Scheme of the assault on the village of Pervomaisky.

It later turned out that Raduev and a small group of militants with hostages still managed to get through the ring and escape to Chechnya. The militants escaped the encirclement using a gas pipe laid over the Aksai River.

The GRU Alpha detachment lost five killed and six seriously wounded. And that’s from our own people. After the battle in Pervomaisky, they were handing over equipment to conscripts and one of the soldiers accidentally leaned in the wrong place and pressed the electric trigger of the Thunder gun. Several people were immediately “blown away” by the shot. By that time, Barsukov had already reported that there were no losses in Alpha...

February 9, 1996 State Duma decided to grant amnesty to participants in “illegal actions” in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky, subject to the release of the remaining hostages. During the terrorist attack, the militants executed about 200 hostages, mostly Avars and Lezgins.

For the attack on the maternity hospital, Dagestanis nicknamed Raduev “Gynecologist,” and the authorities sentenced the leader to death. There were hotheads in Dgestan who planned a similar robbery campaign settlements to Chechnya.

In March 2000, Salman Raduev was arrested by the FSB and transported to Moscow to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. A year and a half later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and in December 2002 he died in a maximum security colony in Perm from internal hemorrhage in the backside.

According to the Moscow News publication, the authorities allocated 250 million non-denominated rubles as compensation to residents of Pervomaisky, and each family received a VAZ-2106 car...

Happy memory to those who died at the hands of terrorists...

Info and photos (C) Internet

In December 1991, elected President of the Checheno-Ingush Republic former general To the Soviet army, D. Dudayev announced the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria and its secession from Russia. Since the summer of 1994 they returned to Chechnya once fighting between “pro-Dudaev” militants and opposition forces. December 9 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin signed the Decree “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

Photographer V. Podlegaev. Commander of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Lieutenant General A.A. Romanov (center) and Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic A. Maskhadov (left) during negotiations. Chechen Republic. June 16, 1995. RIA Novosti

Two days later, units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya, and on December 31, bloody battles for Grozny began. Using aviation and heavy weapons, the United Group of Forces (OGV) gradually expanded the territories it controlled, pushing the militants into the mountains. In June 1995, a detachment of militants took hundreds of people hostage in a hospital in Budennovsk ( Stavropol region). In order to save the lives of citizens, the Russian government agreed to begin peace negotiations with representatives of Ichkeria.

However, negotiations broke down in October 1995, and hostilities continued. The conflict has become ordeal for Russia and its security forces. In the eyes of the world community, Russia's authority has suffered serious damage. Anti-war sentiment increased within the country. In August 1996, taking advantage of the lack of clear political instructions to the OGV command from the Russian leadership, the militants captured Grozny. Under these conditions, President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin decided to hold peace negotiations. On August 30, an agreement was signed in Khasavyurt on the withdrawal of troops and the “freezing” of the status of Chechnya for five years.

Photographer V. Vyatkin. Paratroopers of a separate artillery battalion of the 247th Stavropol Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation at the forefront. Chechen Republic. November 1, 1999. RIA Novosti

Continuous terrorist acts, attacks, and kidnappings have turned the south of Russia into a front-line zone. In August 1999, Chechen militants invaded Dagestan and captured several villages in the border areas. As a result of the military operation of the North Caucasus Military District in August-September 1999, the bulk of the militants were eliminated.

Photographer I. Mikhalev. A Russian soldier before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti

In retaliation for the losses, in September the militants carried out a series of terrorist attacks with hundreds of casualties, blowing up residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk. In October 1999, a counter-terrorist operation began in Chechnya. During the winter-spring period of 1999/2000, troops created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation of the United Group of Forces (OGV(s)) pushed Chechen extremists to the south, cutting off the mountainous regions of Chechnya from the flat part of the republic.

Photographer H. Bradner. The movement of militants towards the presidential palace under artillery fire. Grozny. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)

On February 7, 2000, Grozny was liberated. Russian troops were faced with the task of eliminating numerous groups of militants in mountainous areas. The enemy introduced tactics guerrilla warfare, operating in the territories of both Chechnya and neighboring republics. As a result of the operation, the illegal armed formations of Ichkeria were defeated. However, battles with gangs continued for another eight long years.

Photographer Yu. Pirogov. Russian military personnel killed in battle. Area of the Severny airport, Chechen Republic. January 10, 1995. RIA Novosti

The counter-terrorist operation regime in Chechnya was canceled only on April 16, 2009. According to General Staff The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in total, during the period of military operations in 1992-2009, without return, the losses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other law enforcement agencies in Chechnya amounted to over 8,500 people killed and dead, 510 people captured and missing, and over 70,000 people wounded.

Dzhokhar Dudayev congratulates his guards on Independence Day. Chechen Republic, Grozny. 1994

A column of armored vehicles enters Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 12, 1994.

Chechen women during an anti-Russian rally in front of the parliament building. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 15, 1994.

Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers say goodbye to their fallen comrade. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995

The separatist rests during the fighting. Grozny, Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.

Photographer Yu. Tutov. Russian soldiers during a break between battles. Chechen Republic. January 12, 1995. RIA Novosti

Photographer N. Ignatiev. Engineering reconnaissance of the railway track on the bridge over the river. Terek. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)

Photographer Christopher Morris. Chechen militants in the basement of a residential building. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January 1995.

Federal soldiers during breaks between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.

Russian soldiers during the assault on Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January-February 1995.

Crossing of Russian army units across the Sunzha River. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 7, 1995.

Photographer Yu. Tutov. Presidential Palace. Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 17, 1995. RIA Novosti

A combined detachment of fighters from the Tyumen OMON, SOBR, and Ural RUBOP is conducting a counter-terrorist operation in the combat zone. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. April 1995.

Sergeant Misunov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Neighborhood of Shatoy. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995

Tank driver Alexey Stepanov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Near Shatoi. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995

Photographer Oleg Klimov. Federal checkpoint. Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 1995.

Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.

Life on the city streets. Grozny, Chechen Republic, Russian Federation. May 1995.

Photographer I. Mikhalev. Soldiers of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation at a rest stop. Chechen Republic. May 25, 1996. RIA Novosti

Photographer V. Podlegaev. Handing over weapons to illegal armed groups. S. Zandag. Chechen Republic. August 16, 1995. RIA Novosti

Photographer I. Mikhalev. Russian soldiers before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti

Photographer S. Gutsiev. View of Minutka Square in Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 15, 1996. RIA Novosti

The commander of a detachment of Chechen militants, terrorist Shamil Basayev during the seizure of a hospital in Budennovsk. Budennovsky district. Stavropol region, Russian Federation. June 19, 1995.

Photographer Alexander Nemenov. Russian soldier. Chechen Republic. RF. 1996

Photographer D. Donskoy. Meeting of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin with soldiers and officers of the 205th motorized rifle brigade Federal forces of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. May 28, 1996. RIA Novosti

Child on Mira Street. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. August 1996.

Photographer - Thomas Dworzak. Punishment for drunkenness according to Sharia law. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. August 1996.

Photographer I. Mikhalev. Member of illegal armed groups during a battle. Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, Chechen Republic, August 14, 1996, RIA Novosti

Chairman of the ChRI government Shamil Basayev presents a personalized pistol to Joseph Kobzon “For support of the ChRI.” Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. Summer 1997.

Pupils of the Military College of the Armed Forces of ChRI. The unrecognized republic of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. 1999

Photographer: Vladimir Vyatkin. During the entry of federal forces into the city. Gudermes. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1999.

Photographer: Oleg Lastochkin. Residents of the village of Znamenskoye in the Nadterechny district, located in the combat zone, are leaving their homes. Chechen Republic. RF. October 1999.

Photographer O. Lastochkin. Mi-24 combat helicopter patrols over the location Russian troops. Chechen Republic, October 16, 1999. RIA Novosti

The crew of the BMP-2 near the road to Grozny. Samashki village. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. December 1999.

Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Russian paratroopers repulse an attack by Chechen militants after being ambushed near Tsentoroi. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev

Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Carrying the wounded out of the battle. Tsentoroi area. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev

Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Carrying the wounded out of the battle. Tsentoroy district, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev

Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Paratroopers after the battle. Tsentoroy district, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev

Photographer A. Kondratyev. I. o. President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin among the fighters of the Russian federal forces in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. December 31, 1999, RIA Novosti

Photographer Yuri Kozyrev. Russian soldiers during a break between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 2000.

Photographer Natalya Medvedeva. Combined detachment 2 separate brigade special purpose GRU. Shatoi district. Chechen Republic. RF. February 2000.

Soldiers of the 101st Special Brigade operational purpose Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. The inscription on the BMP - “Even if she is wrong - she is my Motherland!” Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 9, 2000.

Scouts of the Guard platoon of Lieutenant Kozhemyakin D.S. shortly before the battle at Hill 776. Shatoi district. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 29, 2000.

Photographer Sergey Maximishin. A child plays with a cat at one of the checkpoints. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. 2000

45th separate guards regiment special purpose patrols the mountain gorge of the Bass River. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. March-April 2000.

Photographer V. Vyatkin. The death of Sergei Timoshin, a serviceman of the 6th company of the 10th regiment of the Russian Airborne Forces. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti

Photographer V. Vyatkin. Rest after a combat operation. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti

After the assault on the village of Komsomolskoye. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 2000

Photographer V. Vyatkin. Special operation Airborne units Russian Federation to identify and destroy base camps of Chechen gangs in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti

Photographer V. Vyatkin. An operation of a special reconnaissance detachment of the 45th Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation to identify and destroy gangs in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000, RIA Novosti

Militia from among local residents at a parade in memory of the fallen Dagestani soldiers and local residents during the invasion of Chechen militants. Agvali village. Tsumadinsky district. Republic of Dagestan. RF. October 2000.

Reconnaissance Special Forces Group Raid airborne troops in the vicinity of the Baath River. The vicinity of the villages of Khatuni, Kirov-Yurt and Makhkety. Vedensky district. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. October 5, 2000.

Some of the photographs are taken from the book: Military Chronicle of Russia in Photographs. 1850s - 2000s: Album. - M.: Golden-Bi, 2009.

“Jihad” was the code name for the operation to storm Grozny, undertaken by Chechen militants in August 1996. From a military point of view, the assault on Grozny did not end in victory for either side.
But if you look at the political consequences, Operation Jihad was extremely effective: government forces left the city, and the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements marked the end of the First Chechen War. How did the events develop in Grozny and around Grozny in August 1996?

Balance of power

The garrison of Grozny at that time consisted of 6,000 people. This number included fighters internal troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. About 10,000 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense were concentrated in Khankala and in the area of the Severny airport. In Grozny there were 22 checkpoints, 5 commandant's offices and 2 commandant's stations. All checkpoints were supplied with ammunition, water and food. Many objects that could be of interest to the attackers were turned into strongholds. However, Grozny is large city, which attracts more than 100 roads. Only 33 of them were under the control of federal forces. The total number of militant units that entered the Chechen capital, according to Maskhadov, was only 850 militants. Other sources talk about 1.5-2 thousand fighters. Speaking about the numerical superiority of federal troops over the militants, we should not forget that during the week of fighting, the number of Maskhadovites increased to 6 thousand due to the transfer of reinforcements.

Militant tactics

It would be incorrect to call the militants’ tactics an assault in the strict sense of the word. They did not storm the city, but simply entered it. The accumulation of forces in the suburbs of the city began long before August; some militants entered the city under the guise of civilians. August 6 at 5.00 am Chechen troops began to enter Grozny, wisely using shortcomings in the location of checkpoints, and moving along routes uncontrolled by federal troops. At the same time, the militants did not set as their goal the capture of all objects occupied by federal units. The tactic was to block checkpoints and commandant's offices. The main blow was dealt to the Government House, the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and other administrative buildings in the city center.

Fighting in Grozny

On August 6, the day the assault began, units of the Ministry of Defense, which were located at the Severny airport and at the base in Khankala, almost did not react to the situation in the City. The army generals believed that the “allied forces” from the Ministry of Internal Affairs would cope with the situation on their own, and were in no hurry to help. Only in the evening of August 7, armored columns were sent to help the besieged. However, time was lost, and the Chechen detachments were able to organize ambushes along the route of movement of the columns of federal forces. Only on August 11, one of the columns from the 205th motorized rifle brigade made its way into the center of Grozny to the complex of government buildings. It became possible to evacuate the wounded, journalists and bodies of the dead. The commander of the combined group of federal forces, General Pulikovsky, ordered assault troops to be sent into the city. The militants put up active resistance. The situation of the government forces surrounded in Grozny remained very difficult, and our losses were growing. But by August 13 the situation began to improve, federal troops Unblocked most of the surrounded objects. Aslan Maskhadov's adventure was close to failure. The militants suffered serious losses and found themselves surrounded. A group of units of the 58th Army deployed around Grozny. However, federal troops did not receive an order to completely liquidate the militants.

Pulikovsky's ultimatum

General K. B. Pulikovsky, commander of the combined group of federal forces, was extremely determined, intending to destroy all the separatist forces in the cauldron. He presented an ultimatum to the surrounded militants: to surrender within 48 hours, otherwise a powerful blow would be dealt to the city using all the heavy artillery and aircraft. To the civilian population an exit corridor was provided. According to eyewitnesses, the militants did not doubt Pulikovsky’s determination, and his words truly frightened the field commanders. The militants found themselves in a hopeless situation, they were running out of ammunition, and there was no hope for reinforcements. Pulikovsky’s decision was assessed extremely negatively by a number of publicists, who said that if his ultimatum were implemented, Grozny would have died large number civilians who simply would not have had time to use the corridor provided by the federals, and would also have suffered losses from the federal units still in the city.

Signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements

Even before the expiration of the ultimatum, Secretary of the Russian Security Council A.I. Lebed, vested with the powers of the representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, arrived in Chechnya. Oligarch Boris Berezovsky came with him. Lebed immediately canceled Pulikovsky’s order and stated that Russian army demoralized and unable to fight, and insisted on continuing negotiations with the militants. The militants who escaped final defeat considered this a manifestation of the will of Allah and a real miracle. The negotiations ended on August 31 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. The first Chechen war is over.

Losses

From August 6 to August 22, federal forces in Grozny lost 2,083 people (494 killed, 1,407 wounded, 182 missing). 18 tanks, 61 infantry fighting vehicles, 8 armored personnel carriers, 23 vehicles were burned, and 3 helicopters were shot down. It is difficult to name the exact losses of the militants. However, there is evidence that militant losses exceeded Russian losses by 2-3 times.

Results

Commander of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, General G. N. Troshev, author of the book of memoirs “My War. Chechen diary of a trench general,” he wrote about the results of the storming of Grozny: “Perhaps never before in Russia have generals been so powerless and helpless in a war due to the pressure of civilians who are complete amateurs in military matters. ... And if you evaluate the moral side of the matter, then you won’t be able to find the right words. Because in Chechnya, a fighter... recognized himself as a defender of the unity and dignity of the Motherland, his enemies were afraid... And after fleeing Chechnya (under the stick of Lebed and Berezovsky) he felt spat upon and disgraced. The whole world laughed at him. “Tiny Chechnya defeated great Russia!” - that’s the rumor that spread around the world.” According to General Troshev, if it had been possible to destroy the militants then, there would have been no Second Chechen War, terrorist attacks in Moscow, Volgodonsk, etc., as well as aggression in Dagestan. Much of Pulikovsky's plan was implemented during the storming of Grozny in 1999-2000, which put an end to the active stage of the Second Chechen campaign.

The list includes the most notable and significant operations of the FSB in its entire history. There are no cases about catching spies and others little-known operations, due to the fact that from the mid-90s to the present time, the main direction of the FSB is North Caucasus. It is the elimination and capture of key opponents in this region that has a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the entire direction. Places are distributed according to the importance of the object of the operation or the situation as a whole.

10. Detention of Magas Ali Musaevich Taziev (formerly known as Akhmed Evloev; call sign and nickname - “Magas”) - terrorist, active participant in the separatist movement in the North Caucasus in the 1990s - 2000s, Ingush field commander, since 2007 - commander (supreme amir) of the armed forces of the self-proclaimed “Caucasian Emirate”. He was second in the leadership hierarchy of the Caucasus Emirate after Doku Umarov. It turned out that since 2007, Ali Taziev, under the name Gorbakov, lived in one of the private houses in the suburbs of the Ingush city of Malgobek. He introduced himself to his neighbors as a migrant from Chechnya. He behaved quietly and inconspicuously and did not arouse any suspicion. The operation to capture “Magas” began six months before his arrest. Three times he was targeted by snipers, but the order was to take him alive. On the night of June 9, 2010, the house was surrounded by FSB special forces. At the time of his arrest, Taziev did not have time to resist (according to the Kavkaz Center - due to the fact that he was poisoned), the FSB officers did not suffer any losses

9. Elimination of Abu Hafs al-Urdani Abu Hafs al-Urdani - Jordanian terrorist, commander of a detachment of foreign volunteers in Chechnya, took part in battles on the side of the separatists during the First and Second Russian-Chechen Wars. After the death of Abu al-Walid, Abu Hafs replaced him as amir of foreign fighters and coordinator of financial flows from abroad. He led the attack of militants on the village. The attacks of the Shali region in the summer of 2004, as well as many smaller militant attacks. Abu Hafs was valued as a military strategist by Aslan Maskhadov, who planned operations with him. On November 26, 2006, Abu Hafs and four other militants were blocked in one of the private houses in Khasavyurt (Dagestan). As a result of the storming of the house by FSB special forces, all the militants were killed.

8. Elimination of Abu Dzeit Abu Dzeit (known as Little Omar, Abu Omar of Kuwait, Hussein, Moor) is an international terrorist, an emissary of the Al-Qaeda organization in the North Caucasus, the organizer of terrorist attacks in Bosnia and the Caucasus, including Beslan. According to some reports, he personally met with Osama bin Laden. In 2002, he was invited to Chechnya by one of the al-Qaeda emissaries, Abu Haws. He was a demolition instructor in one of the terrorist camps. Then he was sent by Abu Haws' representative in Georgia, to Ingushetia. In 2004, Moor became the leader of an al-Qaeda cell in Ingushetia. He died during an operation to eliminate militants on February 16, 2005 in the Nazran region of Ingushetia.

7. Elimination of Abu-Kuteib Abu-Kuteib is a terrorist, one of Khattab’s associates. He was a member of the Majlisul Shura of Ichkeria and was responsible for propaganda support for the activities of gangs, and was also given the exclusive right to post on the Internet information transmitted by groups of Arab mercenaries from Chechnya. It was he who, in March 2000, organized an attack on a convoy in Zhani-Vedeno, as a result of which 42 riot policemen from Perm were killed. He was one of the organizers of the militant invasion of Ingushetia. On July 1, 2004, he was blocked in the city of Malgobek and, after many hours of fighting, he blew up a “martyr’s belt” on himself.

6. Liquidation of Aslan Maskhadov Aslan Maskhadov - military and statesman unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI). In the early 1990s he participated in the creation armed forces ChRI and led the separatists' military operations against federal forces. On March 8, 2005, Maskhadov was killed during a special operation by the FSB in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt (Grozny rural district), where he was hiding in underground bunker under the house of one of the distant relatives. During the assault, Maskhadov resisted, and the special forces blew up the device, causing shock wave whose house was dilapidated.

5. Elimination of Arbi Barayev Arbi Barayev, a participant in the separatist movement in Chechnya in the 1990s, supported the creation of a “Sharia” state in Chechnya. After the end of the first Chechen war, in 1997-1999, he became known as a terrorist and bandit, a murderer and the leader of a gang of slave traders and kidnappers, at whose hands more than a hundred people suffered in Chechnya and neighboring regions. The liquidation of the Chechen field commander Arbi Barayev was a consequence special operation of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, which took place from June 19 to 24 in the village of Alkhan-Kala. During the operation, Arbi Barayev and 17 militants from his inner circle were killed, many were captured, and federal forces lost one person killed during the operation.

4. Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev Dzhokhar Dudayev - Chechen military and politician, leader of the Chechen national liberation movement of the 1990s, first president of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In the past - major general of aviation, the only Chechen general in Soviet Army. According to data from Russian sources, by the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, Dudayev commanded about 15 thousand soldiers, 42 tanks, 66 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 123 guns, 40 anti-aircraft systems, 260 training aircraft, so the advance of the federal forces was accompanied by serious resistance from the Chechen militias and Dudayev’s guards. On the evening of April 21, 1996, Russian special services located the signal from Dudayev’s satellite phone in the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu, 30 km from Grozny. 2 Su-25 attack aircraft with homing missiles were lifted into the air. Dzhokhar Dudayev died from a rocket explosion while talking on the phone with Russian deputy Konstantin Borov.

3. Elimination of Khattab Amir ibn al-Khattab - field commander, terrorist originally from Saudi Arabia, one of the leaders armed forces self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on the territory Russian Federation in 1995-2002. He was an experienced and well-trained terrorist, mastered all types of small arms. He understood the mine demolition business. He personally trained the suicide bombers subordinate to him. Organized foreign financing for the purchase of ammunition and the construction of militant training camps on the territory of Chechnya. Khattab was killed in an unconventional way: a messenger delivered a message to the Arab, which contained a horse dose potent poison. Khattab opened the envelope and died very quickly after that. His bodyguards could not understand what was really happening.

2. Elimination of Shamilya Basayev Shamil Basayev is an active participant in military operations in Chechnya, one of the leaders of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) in 1995-2006. Organized a number of terrorist acts on the territory of the Russian Federation. He was included in the lists of terrorists of the UN, the US State Department and the European Union. According to official data from the FSB, Basayev and his accomplices were killed during the explosion of a KamAZ truck loaded with explosives in the Nazran region of Ingushetia. This explosion was the result of a carefully planned special operation, which became possible thanks to the operational work of the Russian special services carried out abroad. “Operational positions were created abroad, primarily in those countries in which weapons were collected and subsequently delivered to Russia to carry out terrorist attacks,” Mr. Patrushev said, clarifying that Basayev and his accomplices were going to carry out major terrorist attack to put political pressure on the Russian leadership during the G8 summit.

1. Capture of "Nord-Ost" Terrorist attack on Dubrovka, also referred to as "Nord-Ost" - a terrorist attack on Dubrovka in Moscow, which lasted from October 23 to 26, 2002, during which a group of armed militants led by Movsar Barayev captured and held hostages from among the spectators of the musical “Nord-Ost”. The assault began at 05.17, when special forces began to launch a special nerve agent through the ventilation shafts. At that moment, several hostages called their friends and said that some kind of gas was arriving at the cultural center, but their speech quickly became incoherent, and then they were unable to say anything at all. The gas suppressed the will of all those present in the hall, and most importantly, the terrorists. If at least one of them had time to press several toggle switches on her belt or connect wires, the bombs would begin to explode one after another, and the building could simply collapse. Within just a few seconds after the gas began to take effect, the snipers destroyed all the female suicide bombers with precise shots to the head, and then the fighters in gas masks moved on to destroy the other bandits who were in the auditorium. One of them was armed with a Kalashnikov machine gun, but did not have time to use it, firing only one unaimed burst. At the same time, part of the special forces, who entered the building through the roof, dealt with the terrorists in the utility rooms of the second floor, using noise and flash grenades. Most of the bandits were already unconscious, since the gas affected those first of all.