Lifetime of armored vehicles on the battlefield. The average life expectancy of a German or Soviet soldier in the Battle of Stalingrad was a day. How many minutes of battle is a tank designed for?

Tanks are obsolete as weapons for modern warfare. Why then spend billions on developing new models of these weapons?

On the Internet there is a widespread statement: “The average life of a tank in modern combat is 2 minutes.” Even if this is not true, all the same, tanks burn in a modern battle, against an equal enemy (God may not send an obviously weak enemy, so we will not consider him). Even the best ones. The crews in the tanks are burning. As of 2012, the cost of the tank under contract for the US Army is 5.5-6.1 million dollars. The crew of the tank must consist of contract soldiers who, within three to five years, acquire the necessary skills necessary for competent and efficient operation of such an expensive vehicle, which is also not cheap. And the lives of the crew are the lives of the crew. From the point of view of weapons created in the 70s and 80s of the last century, nothing can be changed. Everything is as it should be. Everything is logical. The technique of military operations using tanks was worked out during the Second World War, and assumes a certain percentage of losses. There are even formulas for calculating this percentage of retirement.

I propose to speculate on why tanks are needed in the modern theater of military operations. We all know very well that current tanks are designed to destroy other tanks. And here everything is more or less clear. But classic tank duels happen less and less often, because classic full-scale wars regular armies are a thing of the past. Global modern conflicts can only occur with the use of atomic weapons, but in this case tanks are not needed. The time of “tank Armadas” and “tank wedges” has passed (unless the goal of the Russian Army is the fastest advancement ground forces across the territory of Europe, and its exit to the border of the Rhine, and then the Channel"). Tanks have long been used for local battles, i.e. in the city and residential area, against an enemy armed with small arms, hand grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and anti-tank systems. Shelling from ambush of columns of equipment and convoys. Breakthroughs through checkpoints not covered by a tank or ATGM crew. Destruction of lightly armored vehicles. Short raids to destroy certain objects from a distance, such as launchers, transformer stations, water towers, warehouses. Destroying the firing positions of machine gunners, snipers and spotter positions. Those. The main task of the tank was to support the advancing infantry units.

Experience local conflicts showed that tanks without infantry cover are instantly set on fire by enemy ATGMs. Even the most best tanks. Israel's second Lebanese campaign turned out to be a real nightmare for armored vehicles. The IDF ground operations using Merkava tanks became one of the most terrible pages in the history of Israeli tank formations. Lebanese Hezbollah placed its main emphasis on anti-tank weapons and was right. About a thousand fighters were divided into groups of 5-6 people with the most different weapons. From the earliest ATGMs “Malyutka” to the already Russian “Fagot”, “Konkurs”, “Metis-M”, “Kornet-E” and the most unpleasant for the Israelis - RPG 29 “Vampire”. All your best big losses The IDF carried precisely from anti-tank weapons. Officially, the IDF recognized 46 tanks and 14 armored personnel carriers as destroyed. There were 22 cases of penetration of armor in tanks and about a dozen in armored personnel carriers. Official data is sparse, but unofficial data suggests that the number of destroyed tanks is underestimated by about 20-30%. Along with the Merkava-MK2 and Merkava-MK3, the latest Merkava-MK4 also took part in the operation, which, despite their ultra-high protective properties, were just as easily penetrated by Russian ATGMs as their previous modifications of this tank.

By May 9, 2015, information hysteria was being promoted in Russia regarding the performance characteristics of the newest Russian tank platform “Armata”, which was shown to us at the Victory Parade on Red Square. A wonderful car, if you look at it as further development tank doctrine of military operations. And if you look at the need to develop this doctrine in general. Isn't it outdated?

If, in the conditions of local wars in densely populated residential areas, tanks do not ensure the safety of the crew’s lives and are clumsy and expensive military mechanisms, wouldn’t it be better to build unmanned, silent, lightly armored, nimble, inexpensive combat drones?

Moreover, the level of technological development of industry allows this, and has been used in aviation for a long time. American drones can fly thousands of kilometers, bomb from 10 thousand meters, return and land on an aircraft carrier. Unmanned aircraft The US, which was used to spy on al-Qaeda terrorist group leader Osama bin Laden, was controlled from a German-based military base NATO Ramstein. And in ground assault equipment, why do you need a crew? Tankers still control the tank from the capsule, using the monitors of the same external cameras as the operator. Why risk the lives of tank crews if you can do it while sitting in safety, kilometers away from the fighting?

You will immediately object to me that electronic warfare equipment will easily suppress the communication between the operator and the drone, and then the machine becomes a useless target. Not at all, I will answer you. Since the advent of drones that broadcast complex optical and radio signals, remaining in the line of sight of both the operator and the unit, this problem has become irrelevant. The optical alternative to Wi-Fi has speeds of up to 15 Gbit/s, and does not depend on electronic warfare.

I foresee the following argument from the opponent: “Optical alternative, you say...have you heard about the smoke screen? And not just ordinary smoke, but with a suspension of special dispersed particles that tightly cut off not only the optical, but also the electromagnetic component of any radiation.” So, for this case there is an autopilot. Back on November 15, 1988, the Buran space shuttle made its unmanned flight. Is it really the hardware and software Hasn't it developed since then? Not at all. “Russia has developed a system that allows you to drive a car without human intervention. According to the developers, new technology is several years ahead of the developments of Google and others foreign manufacturers and is being successfully implemented on KamAZ trucks.” Those. a drone, having such an autopilot, will be able to move out of the smoke zone into the zone of confident reception of the operator’s commands.

The advantages of a combat robot are:

Silence and possibility fast acceleration, due to the use of hybrid engines,

Lightness, due to the use of composite armor protecting only from small arms, due to the lack of a pilot capsule, due to the lack of need to have a powerful engine, gun large caliber, large supply of fuel and ammunition,

High maneuverability due to the six-wheel drive, with independent turning and independent drive of each wheel, or tracked chassis,

Small overall dimensions (the size of a kitchen table), reducing the affected area,

Possibility of fire use both against armored vehicles and infantry, as well as against low-flying air targets.

The possibility of collective coordinated actions of an unlimited number of drones in an operation,

Relatively low cost of the robot (compared to a tank),

100% safety of the crew located outside the range of enemy fire,

The ability to quickly and inexpensively train an operator to remotely control a drone (in video game mode).

Looking at the total confusion and hype raised around the future adoption Russian Army“SECRET combat platform “Armata””, I dare to suggest that in the depths of the military-industrial complex weapons of the sixth technological order are quietly maturing.

Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, June 23, 2013, in talk show broadcast « Iron ladies“On NTV he admitted: “We have few people in Russia now, we have a total population of 140 million, so we also have few soldiers, and it will be difficult to defend a huge territory. Therefore, we move on to the principles of combat, when one soldier, using robotics and automated systems combat control, will be able to fight for five, for ten. Everything that you have seen in various Hollywood fairy tales is now becoming reality.”

Now, let’s ask ourselves the question: “Why waste labor and material resources, time and money on something that is not modern weapons? Let it be even the most advanced model in the world.”

Of course, the trunk is long, life is short
But artillery is far from just armor-piercing guns.

Well, it’s clear that the artillerymen from the special power artillery of the RGK had a significantly higher survival rate than the IPTAP soldiers. It is possible that they lived longer than others.

As for VET, there are interesting memories of one artilleryman on iremember.ru:

To me and, as far as I can judge from conversations with my comrades at the time, to my fellow soldiers, the picture of the battles seemed like this. After short but powerful artillery raids, the Germans attacked with tanks. Heavy vehicles, "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" reached heights in the depths of German positions and stopped at a distance of one to one and a half kilometers from our positions. The lighter and more maneuverable T-IVs continued to move along with a small number of infantry. It was pointless for us to fire at the cars standing behind us. Even in the event of a direct hit, the projectile could not cause serious damage at such a distance. AND German tank crews We waited until our anti-tank defense was forced to open fire on the tanks moving forward. The gun that started firing and discovered itself immediately became a victim of an accurate shot from stationary heavy vehicles. It should be noted that the Tigers had very accurate sights and a very accurate firing 88-mm cannon. This explained the advice I received not to shoot until the last moment. Having opened fire at “pistol range”, you can count on being hit by the first or, in extreme cases, the second shell, and then, even if the gun is destroyed, you still end up with an unfavorable “exchange of pieces” for the Germans - a tank for a light gun. If you show your position prematurely, then, most likely, the weapon will be lost in vain.

That is, it really turns out that the life of an anti-tank gun on the battlefield was very short

But the death of a gun did not always mean the death of the crew. In 1645 IPTAP found a way out:

This also explains the additional changes made to the standard design of a gun trench. To the right and left of the gun, near the wheels, two slits were made - one for the gunner, the second for the loader. The ZIS-3 gun practically does not require the simultaneous presence of the entire crew at the gun. Moreover, the presence of only one person at a time is quite enough. The gunner, having fired a shot, could hide in the gap while the loader drove the next cartridge into the barrel. Now the gunner takes his place, aims, shoots, and the loader is in cover at this time. Even with a direct hit on a gun, at least one of the two has a chance to survive. The rest of the crew numbers are scattered along the cracks and side “pockets” of the trench. The practical experience that this regiment has accumulated since the Kursk Bulge made it possible to reduce losses to a minimum. During the month and a half of fighting on the bridgehead, the regiment changed its equipment three times, receiving new or repaired guns to replace the ones that were knocked out and destroyed, and retained its combat effectiveness, receiving almost no additional personnel.

Everyone who had even a tangential relationship with the army service or the defense industry has heard about the “lifetime in battle” - of a fighter, a tank, a unit. But what really stands behind these numbers? Is it really possible to start counting down the minutes until the inevitable end when going into battle? The prevailing ideas about the time of life in battle among the broad masses of military personnel were successfully depicted by Oleg Divov in the novel “Retribution” - a book about the service of “Ustinov’s students” at sunset Soviet power: “They, proudly: our division is designed for thirty minutes of battle! We tell them openly: we found something to be proud of!” In these two sentences, everything came together - pride in one’s suicide, and the transfer of a misunderstood tactical assessment of the unit’s capability over time to the lives of its personnel, and the rejection of such false pride by more competent comrades...

The idea that there is a calculated life expectancy for individual units and formations came from the practice of staff work, from understanding the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The average period of time during which a regiment or division, according to war experience, remained combat-ready was called the “lifetime.” This does not mean at all that after this period all personnel will be killed by the enemy and the equipment will be burned.

Let's take a division - the main tactical formation. For its functioning, it is necessary that the rifle units have a sufficient number of fighters - and they leave not only killed, but also wounded (from three to six per killed), sick, legs worn down to the bone, or injured by the hatch of an armored personnel carrier... It is necessary that the engineer battalion had a supply of the equipment from which bridges would be built - after all, the supply battalion would carry everything that units and subunits needed in battle and on the march. It is required that the repair and restoration battalion have the necessary number of spare parts and tools to maintain the equipment in working / combat-ready condition. And all these reserves are not unlimited. The use of heavy mechanized bridges TMM-3 or links of the pontoon-bridge fleet will lead to a sharp decrease in the offensive capabilities of the formation and will limit its “life” in the operation.

Disastrous meters

These are factors that influence the viability of a formation, but are not related to enemy resistance. Now let's turn to assessing the time of “life in battle”. How long can an individual soldier survive in a battle fought with the use of one weapon or another, using one or another tactic. The first serious experience of such calculations was presented in the unique work “Future War in Technical, Economic and Political Relations.” The book was published in six volumes in 1898, and its author was Warsaw banker and railway worker Ivan Blioch.

Accustomed to numbers, the financier Bliokh, with the help of a unique team he had assembled, consisting of General Staff officers, tried to mathematically evaluate the impact of new types of weapons - repeating rifles, machine guns, artillery guns with smokeless powder and with a high explosive charge - on the then types of tactics. The technique was very simple. The battalion's offensive plan was taken from the French military manual of 1890. We took the probabilities of hitting a tall target by an entrenched shooter using three-line rifles, obtained at the training ground. The speeds at which the chain of shooters moved to the beat of drums and the sounds of horns were well known - both for walking and for running, which the French were going to switch to when approaching the enemy. Next came the most ordinary arithmetic, which gave an astonishing result. If from the line of 500 m 637 infantrymen begin to approach a hundred dug-in riflemen with repeating rifles, then even with all the speed of the French rush to the line of 25 m, from which it was then considered appropriate to switch to the bayonet line, only a hundred will remain. There were no machine guns, which were then used by the artillery department - ordinary sapper shovels for digging in and repeating rifles for shooting. And now the position of the riflemen is no longer able to be taken by the six times greater mass of infantry - after all, a hundred who ran half a mile under fire and in bayonet combat have little chance against a hundred lying in a trench.

Pacifism in numbers

At the time of the release of “The Future War,” peace still reigned in Europe, but in Bliokh’s simple arithmetic calculations the whole picture of the coming First World War, its positional impasse, was already visible. No matter how trained and devoted the soldiers are to the banner, the advancing masses of infantry will be swept away by the fire of the defending infantry. This is what happened in reality - for specifics we will refer the reader to Barbara Tuckman’s book “The Guns of August”. The fact that in the later phases of the war the advancing infantry was stopped not by riflemen, but by machine gunners who had sat out the artillery barrage in dugouts, essentially did not change anything.

Based on Bliokh's methodology, it is very simple to calculate the expected life time of an infantryman in battle when advancing from the 500 m line to the 25 m line. As we can see, 537 out of 637 soldiers died or were seriously wounded during the time of overcoming 475 m. From the diagram given in the book it is clear how The lifespan was reduced when approaching the enemy, as was the likelihood of dying when reaching 300, 200 m... The results turned out to be so clear that Bliokh considered them sufficient to justify the impossibility of a European war and therefore took care of the maximum dissemination of his work. Reading Blioch's book prompted Nicholas II to convene the first peace conference on disarmament in 1899 in The Hague. The author himself was nominated for Nobel Prize peace.

However, Bliokh’s calculations were not destined to stop the coming massacre... But there were a lot of other calculations in the book. For example, it was shown that a hundred shooters with repeating rifles would disable an artillery battery in 2 minutes from a distance of 800 m and in 18 minutes from a distance of 1500 m - isn’t it, similar to the artillery paratroopers described by Divov with their 30 minutes of battalion life?

World War III? Better not!

The works of those military specialists who were preparing not for the prevention, but for the successful conduct of war, as the Cold War escalated into the hot Third World War, were not widely published. But - paradoxically - it was precisely these works that were destined to contribute to the preservation of peace. And so, in the narrow circles of staff officers not inclined to publicity, the calculated parameter “lifetime in battle” began to be used. For a tank, for an armored personnel carrier, for a unit. The values for these parameters were obtained in approximately the same way as Bliokh once did. They took anti-tank gun, and at the test site the probability of hitting the silhouette of the car was determined. One tank or another was used as a target (at the beginning cold war both opposing sides used captured German equipment for these purposes) and checked with what probability a shell hit would pierce the armor or an action behind the armor would disable the vehicle.

As a result of the chain of calculations, the very life time of a piece of equipment in a given tactical situation was derived. It was a purely calculated value. Probably, many have heard about such monetary units as the Attic talent or the South German thaler. The first contained 26,106 g of silver, the second - only 16.67 g of the same metal, but both never existed in the form of a coin, but were just a measure of account more small money- drachma or groschen. Likewise, a tank that has to survive exactly 17 minutes in an oncoming battle is nothing more than a mathematical abstraction. It's about only about the integral estimate convenient for the time of arithmometers and slide rules. Without resorting to complex calculations, the staff officer could determine how many tanks would be needed for a combat mission that required covering a particular distance under fire. We bring together the distance, combat speed and life time. We determine according to the standards how many tanks should remain in service for the width of the front after they go through the hell of battle. And it’s immediately clear what size unit combat mission should be instructed. The predicted failure of the tanks did not necessarily mean the death of the crews. As driver-mechanic Shcherbak cynically reasoned in the story of front-line officer Viktor Kurochkin “In War as in War,” “It would be happiness if the Fritz rolled a blank into the engine compartment: the car would be kaput, and everyone would be alive.” And for the artillery division, the exhaustion of the half-hour of battle for which it was designed meant, first of all, the use of ammunition, overheating of the barrels and recoilers, the need to withdraw from positions, and not death under fire.

Neutron factor

The conditional “lifetime in battle” successfully served staff officers even when it was necessary to determine the combat effectiveness of advancing tank units in the conditions of the enemy’s use of neutron warheads; when you needed to figure out what power nuclear strike will burn out enemy anti-tank missiles and extend the life of your tanks. The problems of using gigantic power were solved by the simplest equations: they gave an unambiguous conclusion - nuclear war must be avoided in the European theater of operations.

Well modern systems command and control of combat operations, from the highest level, such as the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation, to tactical ones, such as Unified system tactical level control "Constellation" use more differentiated and more accurate modeling parameters, which are now carried out in real time. However, the goal function remains the same - to make sure that both people and machines survive in combat for the maximum amount of time.

Everyone who had at least a tangential relationship with the army service or the defense industry has heard about the “lifetime in battle” - of a fighter, a tank, a unit. But what really stands behind these numbers? Is it really possible to start counting down the minutes until the inevitable end when going into battle? The prevailing ideas among the broad masses of military personnel about the time of life in battle were successfully depicted by Oleg Divov in the novel “Weapons of Retribution” - a book about the service of “Ustinov’s students” at the end of Soviet power: “They proudly: our division is designed for thirty minutes of battle! We tell them openly: we found something to be proud of!” In these two sentences, everything came together - pride in one’s suicide, and the transfer of a misunderstood tactical assessment of the unit’s capability over time to the lives of its personnel, and the rejection of such false pride by more competent comrades...

Mikhail Vannakh

Disastrous meters

Pacifism in numbers

World War III? Better not...

The works of those military specialists who were preparing not for the prevention, but for the successful conduct of war, as the Cold War escalated into the hot Third World War, were not widely published. But - paradoxically - it was precisely these works that were destined to contribute to the preservation of peace. And so, in the narrow circles of staff officers not inclined to publicity, the calculated parameter “lifetime in battle” began to be used. For a tank, for an armored personnel carrier, for a unit. The values for these parameters were obtained in approximately the same way as Bliokh once did. They took an anti-tank gun, and at the training ground they determined the probability of hitting the silhouette of the vehicle. They used one or another tank as a target (at the beginning of the Cold War, both warring sides used captured German equipment for these purposes) and checked the likelihood of a shell hit piercing the armor or an action behind the armor that would disable the vehicle.

As a result of the chain of calculations, the very life time of a piece of equipment in a given tactical situation was derived. It was a purely calculated value. Probably, many have heard about such monetary units as the Attic talent or the South German thaler. The first contained 26,106 g of silver, the second - only 16.67 g of the same metal, but both never existed in the form of a coin, but were just a measure of account for smaller money - drachmas or pennies. Likewise, a tank that has to survive exactly 17 minutes in an oncoming battle is nothing more than a mathematical abstraction. We are talking only about an integral estimate convenient for the time of arithmometers and slide rules. Without resorting to complex calculations, the staff officer could determine how many tanks would be needed for a combat mission that required covering a particular distance under fire. We bring together distance, combat speed and life time. We determine according to the standards how many tanks should remain in service for the width of the front after they go through the hell of battle. And it is immediately clear which unit of what size should be entrusted with the combat mission. The predicted failure of the tanks did not necessarily mean the death of the crews. As driver-mechanic Shcherbak cynically reasoned in the story of front-line officer Viktor Kurochkin “In War as in War,” “It would be happiness if the Fritz rolled a blank into the engine compartment: the car would be kaput, and everyone would be alive.” And for the artillery division, the exhaustion of the half-hour of battle for which it was designed meant, first of all, the use of ammunition, overheating of the barrels and recoilers, the need to withdraw from positions, and not death under fire.

Neutron factor

The conditional “lifetime in battle” successfully served staff officers even when it was necessary to determine the combat effectiveness of advancing tank units in the conditions of the enemy’s use of neutron warheads; when it was necessary to estimate how powerful a nuclear strike would burn out enemy anti-tank missiles and extend the life of their tanks. The problems of using gigantic power were solved by the simplest equations: they gave an unambiguous conclusion - a nuclear war in the European theater of operations must be avoided.

Well, modern combat control systems, from the highest level, such as the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation to tactical ones, such as the Constellation Unified Tactical Control System, use more differentiated and more accurate modeling parameters, which are now carried out in real time. However, the goal function remains the same - to make sure that both people and machines survive in combat for the maximum amount of time.

The lifespan of a tank in modern combat...

... according to “completely reliable information” ranges from 0.1 seconds to 12 minutes. And for this very reason, the tank does not need durable [here you can insert any part of the tank and its crew, if we are talking about this].

It's just a stupid saying. Tale. They invented it for table bragging. They say that we are such brave kamikazes, on the verge of death, but we are not at all bashful, and even proud. And this is exactly what needs to be raised... There is nothing wrong with such bragging - men have always done and do this, it just strengthens their fighting spirit.

But for some reason many people take this seriously and try to draw conclusions about the device military equipment. Don't do that :) I'll explain in a simple way why you shouldn't.

Here you have an ordinary tank battalion of 30 combat tanks. And he enters into that very “ modern war" Let’s immediately discard the option where a nuclear strike is carried out on a battalion with a megaton warhead. There aren’t that many warheads; they won’t waste them on every little thing. We will also not consider the brave (and suicidal) attack of BT-7 tanks on the dug-in Acht-acht division.

Let this be a normal war. Like in 1944 or how it seems today. Normal full modern army versus comparable.

Our battalion will first march, concentrate somewhere, march again, go to lines, go to other lines... But sooner or later it will enter the battle. Let's assume that full staff. It doesn’t matter whether as a whole or in separate platoons assigned to someone. AND?

And a comparable enemy will inflict heavy losses on him - a third irrevocable or for factory repairs. These are very heavy losses. It will still remain a battalion, but with greatly weakened capabilities. If the losses were 50%, then we would be talking about a defeated battalion, the remainder would be about a company. And if it’s even more, then this is a destroyed battalion.

Why are such gradations needed? – And then that you would like to achieve your goals and maintain the combat effectiveness of your strike unit. It is unlikely that you will want to lose it for these purposes - the war will not end in the evening. And will your goals be achieved if the battalion is defeated or destroyed in the process? Therefore, you won’t send your battalion to such a fornication. Or take him away while you still have him, in case of unpleasant surprises. Therefore, a third of losses is the upper limit of losses in a “normal” “modern” battle.

OK. And our rear service does an excellent job and replenishes the lost materiel with just a fly. A week later you have ten new tanks - the composition has been restored. And you go into a new harsh battle.

Just don’t think that battles are so intense that you lose a third of your equipment and l/s can be daily. This is not Kursk Bulge with us? And this way, any division will have enough for three days. No, if, after all, the Kursk Bulge, then it is possible. But it wasn’t like that there either. Some division disappeared as a factor in one day, others went the next day, and for them everything was not so sad. You cannot attack enemy positions again and again every day with huge losses with the same troops. So after three attacks your army will run out and you will have to stop this business. Or do you break in with your adversary, and then catch up, finish off, trophies...

Briefly speaking. It's a tough fight every week is a very big exaggeration, but let's say, let's say.

So, we will lose 10 tanks again. Of these, 6.7 will be from the initial number, and 3.3 from the replenishment. We bring in new ones again and again lose a third in another week. Well, one more iteration. This is what comes out.

After a month of fierce fierce battles, the battalion includes tanks with a service life of:

– 4 weeks – 6 pieces,

– 3 weeks – 3 pieces,

– 2 weeks – 4 pieces,

– 1 week – 7 pieces,

- new - 10 pieces.

Purely mathematically, the oldest tanks will never run out. And all the equipment will be on average and mostly old. And it will be necessary to fight on it until the service life of the engine and transmission is exhausted, and after they are replaced in the field, until the service life of the gun barrel is exhausted. That is, everything there must be strong, durable, repairable, and the crews must be trained.

Although everyone knows for sure that the life of a tank in modern combat...