Crimean campaigns of Golitsyn 1687 1689 reasons. The Holy League and the Crimean Campaigns of V.V.

The end of the regency of Tsarina Sophia Alekseevna, who ruled Russia from 1682 to 1689, was marked by two attempts to secure the southern borders of the state. They went down in history as Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. The portrait of the prince opens the article. Despite the fact that the main task assigned to the command could not be completed, both military campaigns played an important role both during the Great Turkish War, and in the further development of the Russian state.

Creation of an anti-Turkish coalition

In 1684, on the initiative of Pope Innocent XI, a union of states was organized, called the “Holy League”, and consisted of the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - a federation of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His task was to confront the aggressive policy, which by that time had gained strength, of the Ottoman Empire, as well as its Crimean vassals.

Concluded in April 1686 alliance treaty with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia took upon itself the responsibilities of carrying out the military tasks assigned to it as part of the overall strategic plan of the union’s fight against Muslim aggressors. The beginning of these actions was the Crimean campaign of 1687, which was led by Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, who was the de facto head of the government during the regency of Princess Sophia. Her portrait is located below.

Burning steppe

In May, the Russian army, numbering 100 thousand people and reinforced by detachments of Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks, set out from the left bank of Ukraine and began advancing towards the Crimea. When the warriors reached the borders of the Crimean Khanate and crossed the border river Konka, the Tatars resorted to the old, and centuries-proven method of defense against the advancing enemy - they set fire to the steppe throughout the territory lying in front of them. As a result, the Russian army was forced to turn back due to lack of food for the horses.

First defeat

However, the First Crimean Campaign did not end there. In July of the same year, the army of the Crimean Khan Selim Girey overtook the Russians in the area called Kara-Yylga. Despite the fact that his army was inferior in number to the army of Prince Golitsyn, the khan was the first to launch an attack. Dividing the forces at his disposal into three parts, he launched simultaneously frontal and flank attacks.

According to surviving historical documents, the battle, which lasted 2 days, ended in victory Crimean Tatars, who captured more than a thousand prisoners and about 30 guns. Continuing their retreat, Golitsyn's army reached a place called Kuyash and built defensive fortifications there, digging a ditch in front of them.

The final defeat of the Russian-Cossack forces

Soon the Tatars approached them and camped on the opposite side of the ditch, preparing to give the Russian-Cossack army a new battle. However, the army of Prince Golitsyn, which had traveled a long way across the waterless steppe scorched by the enemy, was in no condition to fight, and its command invited Khan Selim-Girey to begin negotiations on concluding peace.

Having not received a positive response on time, and trying to avoid the complete destruction of his army, Golitsyn gave the order for a further retreat. As a result, having withdrawn at night, the Russians began to retreat, leaving the enemy an empty camp. Having discovered in the morning that there was no one behind the defensive structures, the khan began pursuit, and after some time overtook the Russians in the Donuzly-Oba area. In the ensuing battle, Prince Golitsyn's army suffered heavy losses. According to historians, the cause of this military failure was the extreme exhaustion of the warriors caused by the burning of the steppe.

The result of the first trip

Nevertheless, the events of 1687, which became part of the military campaign that went down in history as the Crimean Campaigns, played an important role in the struggle of the Holy League against Turkish expansion. Despite the failure that befell the Russian-Cossack army, he managed to divert the forces of the Crimean Khanate from the European theater of military operations, and thereby facilitate the task of the allied forces.

The second campaign of Prince Golitsyn

The failure of the military campaign of 1687 did not plunge either Princess Sophia or her closest boyar, Prince Golitsyn, into despair. As a result, it was decided not to stop the Crimean campaigns, and as soon as possible to again strike at the Horde, who had become more frequent in their predatory raids.

In January 1689, preparations began for a new military campaign, and in early March, the army of Prince Golitsyn, this time increased to 150 thousand people, set out in the direction of the Crimea, which was the nest of the hated Khanate. In addition to cavalry regiments and infantry, the warriors also had powerful artillery reinforcements, consisting of 400 guns.

Considering this period of the war of the European coalition with the Ottoman Empire and its vassals, it should be noted the very unworthy actions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which entered into negotiations with Istanbul and forced Russia to carry out the Crimean campaigns alone. Something happened that was repeated many times in subsequent years both in both World Wars and in many local conflicts- the main burdens fell on the shoulders of Russian soldiers, who irrigated the battlefields with their blood.

Tatar attack repelled by artillery fire

After two and a half months of travel, in mid-May the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars near the village of Green Valley, located in three days path from Perekop. This time the Horde did not set fire to the steppe, saving food for their own horses, and, waiting for the Russian army to approach, they tried to sweep it away with an unexpected blow from their cavalry.

However, thanks to reports from patrols sent forward, the enemy did not achieve the effect of surprise, and the artillerymen managed to deploy their guns in battle formation. With their dense fire, as well as rifle volleys from the infantry, the Tatars were stopped and then thrown back far into the steppe. A week later, Prince Golitsyn’s army reached Perekop, the isthmus connecting the Crimean peninsula with the mainland.

A close but unattainable goal

No matter how great was the desire of the prince’s warriors, having overcome the last kilometers, to break into the Crimea, from where from time immemorial the daring raids of the Horde had been carried out on Rus', and where countless lines of captured Christians were then driven, they failed to make this final throw. There were several reasons for this.

As it became known from the testimony of captured Tatars, throughout the entire territory of Perekop there were only three wells with fresh water, which were clearly not enough for the prince’s army of thousands, and beyond the isthmus the waterless steppe stretched for many miles. In addition, the losses inevitable during the capture of Perekop could greatly weaken the army and call into question success in the battle with the main enemy forces concentrated on the peninsula.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses, it was decided to postpone further advance and, having built several fortresses, accumulate in them the necessary supply of food, equipment and, most importantly, water. However, it was not possible to implement these plans, and soon the prince gave an order to retreat from their positions. This is how Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689 ended.

Results of two military campaigns

Over the next centuries, there were repeated discussions about what role the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689 played during the Great Turkish War, and what benefits they brought directly to Russia. Different opinions were expressed, but most historians agreed that thanks to the military campaigns discussed above, Russia was able to significantly facilitate the task of the allied forces fighting the army of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Having deprived the Turkish Pasha of the support of the Crimean vassals, the Russian army significantly limited his actions.

In addition, Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns contributed to the rise of Russia’s authority in the international arena. Their important result was the termination of the payment of tribute, which Moscow had previously been forced to pay to its long-time enemies. As for the internal political life of the Russian state, the failed Crimean campaigns played a very important role in it, becoming one of the reasons for the overthrow of Princess Sophia and the accession of Peter I to the throne.

Hetmanate 22px Ottoman Empire
22px Crimean Khanate Commanders Strengths of the parties

unknown

Losses

Great Turkish War and Russian-Turkish war 1686-1700
Vienna - Šturovo - Neugeisel - Mohács - Crimea- Patachin - Nissa - Slankamen - Azov - Podgaitsy - Zenta

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.

First Crimean campaign

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns made it possible to divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimeans for some time and benefited Russia’s European allies. Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved.

According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And hello again, God and Holy Mother of God by mercy and with your intelligence and happiness, defeating the Hagarians! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

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Notes

Literature

Bogdanov A.P.“The true and true story of the Crimean campaign of 1687.” - a monument to journalism of the Ambassadorial Prikaz // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages: Coll. articles / USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of History of the USSR; Rep. ed. V. T. Pashuto. - M., 1982. - P. 57–84. - 100 s.

An excerpt characterizing the Crimean campaigns

Young, untouched and pure
I brought you all my love...
The star sang songs to me about you,
Day and night she called me into the distance...
And on a spring evening, in April,
Brought to your window.
I quietly took you by the shoulders,
And he said, not hiding his smile:
“So it was not in vain that I waited for this meeting,
My beloved star...

Mom was completely captivated by dad's poems... And he wrote them to her a lot and brought them to her work every day along with huge posters drawn by his own hand (dad was a great drawer), which he unrolled right on her desktop, and on which , among all kinds of painted flowers, there was in capital letters it is written: “Annushka, my star, I love you!” Naturally, what woman could withstand this for a long time and not give up?.. They never parted again... Using every free minute to spend it together, as if someone could take it away from them. Together they went to the cinema, to dances (which they both loved very much), walked in the charming Alytus city park, until one fine day they decided that enough dates were enough and that it was time to look at life a little more seriously. Soon they got married. But only my father’s friend (my mother’s) knew about this younger brother) Jonas, since this union did not cause much delight on either my mother’s or my father’s side of the family... My mother’s parents predicted a wealthy neighbor-teacher as her groom, whom they really liked and, in their opinion, “suited” my mother perfectly , and in my father’s family at that time there was no time for marriage, since my grandfather was sent to prison at that time as a “noble accomplice” (which, probably, they tried to “break” the stubbornly resisting father), and my grandmother ended up in the hospital from nervous shock and was very sick. Dad was left with his little brother in his arms and now had to run the entire household alone, which was very difficult, since the Seryogins at that time lived in a large two-story house (in which I later lived), with a huge old garden around. And, naturally, such a farm required good care...
So three long months passed, and my dad and mom, already married, were still going on dates, until my mom accidentally went to my dad’s house one day and found a very touching picture there... Dad stood in the kitchen in front of the stove, looking unhappy “replenishing” the hopelessly growing number of pots of semolina porridge, which at that moment he was cooking for his little brother. But for some reason the “evil” porridge became more and more, and poor dad could not understand what was happening... Mom, trying with all her might to hide a smile so as not to offend the unlucky “cook,” rolled up her sleeves right away began to put this whole “stagnant household mess” in order, starting with the completely occupied, “porridge-filled” pots, the indignantly sizzling stove... Of course, after such an “emergency”, my mother could no longer calmly observe such a “heart-tugging” male helplessness, and decided to immediately move to this territory, which was still completely alien and unfamiliar to her... And although it was not very easy for her at that time either - she worked at the post office (to support herself), and in the evenings she went to preparatory classes for medical school exams.

She, without hesitation, gave all her remaining strength to her, exhausted to the limit, to my young husband and his family. The house immediately came to life. The kitchen smelled overwhelmingly of delicious Lithuanian zeppelins, which my dad’s little brother adored and, just like dad, who had been sitting on dry food for a long time, he literally gorged himself on them to the “unreasonable” limit. Everything became more or less normal, except for the absence of my grandparents, about whom my poor dad was very worried, and sincerely missed them all this time. But now he already had a young, beautiful wife, who, as best she could, tried in every possible way to brighten up his temporary loss, and looking at my father’s smiling face, it was clear that she succeeded quite well. Dad’s little brother very soon got used to his new aunt and followed her tail, hoping to get something tasty or at least a beautiful “evening fairy tale”, which his mother read to him in great abundance before bed.
Days and then weeks passed so calmly in everyday worries. Grandmother, by that time, had already returned from the hospital and, to her great surprise, found her newly-made daughter-in-law at home... And since it was too late to change anything, they simply tried to get to know each other better, avoiding unwanted conflicts (which inevitably appear with any new, too close acquaintance). More precisely, they were simply getting used to each other, trying to honestly avoid any possible “underwater reefs”... I was always sincerely sorry that my mother and grandmother never fell in love with each other... They were both (or rather, my mother still are) wonderful people, and I loved them both very much. But if the grandmother, throughout their entire life together, somehow tried to adapt to her mother, then the mother - on the contrary, in the end grandma's life, sometimes showed her my irritation too openly, which deeply hurt me, since I was very attached to both of them and really did not like to fall, as they say, “between two fires” or forcibly take sides. I could never understand what caused this constant “silent” war between these two wonderful women, but apparently there were some very good reasons for this, or perhaps my poor mother and grandmother were simply truly “incompatible” , as happens quite often with strangers living together. One way or another, it was a great pity, because, in general, it was a very friendly and loyal family, in which everyone stood up for each other like a mountain, and experienced every trouble or misfortune together.
But let’s go back to those days when all this was just beginning, and when each member of this new family honestly tried to “live together”, without creating any trouble for the others... Grandfather was already at home, but his health, much to the regret of everyone else , after the days spent in custody, it deteriorated sharply. Apparently, including the difficult days spent in Siberia, all the long ordeals of the Seryogins in unfamiliar cities did not spare the poor, life-torn grandfather’s heart - he began to have recurring micro-infarctions...
Mom became very friendly with him and tried as best she could to help him forget all the bad things as soon as possible, although she herself had a very, very difficult time. Over the past months, she managed to pass the preparatory and entrance exams V medical school. But, to her great regret, her old dream was not destined to come true for the simple reason that at that time in Lithuania you still had to pay for the institute, and in her mother’s family (which had nine children) there was not enough finances for this.. That same year, her still very young mother, my grandmother on my mother’s side, whom I also never met, died from a severe nervous shock that happened several years ago. She fell ill during the war, on the day when she learned that there was a heavy bombing in the pioneer camp, in the seaside town of Palanga, and all the surviving children were taken to an unknown location... And among these children was her son , the youngest and favorite of all nine children. A few years later he returned, but, unfortunately, this could no longer help my grandmother. And in the first year of my mother’s and father’s life together, it slowly faded away... My mother’s father – my grandfather – was left with a large family, of which only one of my mother’s sisters – Domitsela – was married at that time.

Eternal peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was concluded on April 26, 1686. It assumed the possibility of joint actions by Russia and the Holy League as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria, the Holy See and Venice against the Ottomans. Pope Innocent XI (pontificate 1676–1689) was considered the nominal head of the Holy League. The accession of Russia to the struggle of the Holy League became a turning point in the history of Russian-Polish relations: from centuries-old struggle Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century. moved to the union. He's in strategic plan turned out to be much more profitable for Russia than for Poland. The Polish historian Zbigniew Wojczek, who studied the development of Russian-Polish relations in the second half of the 17th century, stated that the war of 1654–1667. and the Eternal Peace of 1686 ended with “that the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden, Turkey and eo ipso the Crimean Khanate lost their positions in relation to Russia,” which through its actions won “hegemony among the Slavic peoples.” And University of London professor Lindsay Hughes summed up her analysis of foreign policy during Sophia's regency with the conclusion: “From now on, Russia took a strong position in Europe, which it never lost.” It is fair to recognize the Perpetual Peace of 1686 as the most important contribution of the Sophia regency to the long-term strategy of turning Russia into the main pole of geopolitical power in Eastern Europe and a Great European Power.

Patrick Gordon, who was in Russian service, made efforts to actually join Russia to the Holy League. From 1685 to 1699 he became one of the leading Moscow military leaders. It was Gordon who persuaded the head of the government of Sophia, Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, to pursue an alliance with the Holy League. This alliance of Christian states against the Ottomans and Crimea arose in 1683-1684. Gordon was a supporter of pan-Christian unity in repelling Turkish expansion. (In life, a zealous Catholic, Gordon always communicated tolerantly with Orthodox and Protestants, unless it concerned a religious issue in Britain. There Gordon wanted to stop “Protestant aggression.”) The idea of a union between Russia and the Holy League permeates Gordon’s memorandum submitted to V.V. Golitsyn in January 1684

N.G. Ustryalov, citing Gordon’s memorandum of 1684 in its entirety, noted that V.V. Golitsyn treated him “indifferently.” This is an obvious misunderstanding, dictated and inspired by apologetics for Peter I, which demanded that all recent predecessors or opponents of Peter I be perceived as narrow-minded and useless for Russia. Another explanation for Ustryalov’s conclusion may be his understanding of the fact of unsuccessful Russian-Austrian negotiations in 1684. Imperial ambassadors Johann Christoph Zhirovsky and Sebastian Blumberg failed to conclude an alliance between the Habsburgs and Russia in Moscow in May 1684. Golitsyn's actions in 1685–1689, especially the conclusion of the Eternal Peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on April 26 (May 6, Gregorian style) 1686 and the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. fully agree with the proposals of the Scottish general of 1684.

In a memorandum of 1684, the major general analyzed all the arguments for peace with the Ottoman Empire and in favor of war with it in alliance with the Holy League. Gordon, who served at one time in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, always paid tribute to Polish love of freedom, courage and cordiality, but he warned the Russian government that only the joint struggle of Christians with the Turks would make the Russian authorities’ fears about the anti-Russian plans of the Poles “unreasonable misunderstandings.” “Suspicion and distrust between neighboring states were, are and will continue to be,” noted Gordon. “Even the sacredness of so close a League cannot remove it, and I have no doubt that the Poles will retain such thoughts and grievances, for discord is weeds, nourished by the memory of past rivalries, unfriendliness and insults.” However, keep in mind that by doing a favor and helping them now, you will be able to erase, at least to a greater extent, soften the anger from past enmity, and if they turn out to be ungrateful, then you will have the advantage of a just cause, which is the main thing for waging war.

Patrick Gordon insisted on instilling in the Russian people the idea of the need for victory over the Crimea, as well as on continuing to improve Russian military affairs. “...It is a very mistaken idea to think that you can always or for a long time live in peace among so many warlike and restless peoples who are your neighbors,” warns Gordon. He ends his message to V.V. Golitsyn in the words: “I will add that it is very dangerous to allow soldiers and people to get out of the habit of owning weapons when all your neighbors use them so diligently.” Gordon's memorandum also proposed a plan for the defeat of Crimea, which in 1687–1689. unsuccessfully tried to implement V.V. Golitsyn.

Gordon believed that the flat steppe surface would facilitate the movement of the Russian army to Perekop. “...With 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, you can easily accomplish this in one or at most two years. And the way there is not so difficult, only a two-day march without water, even so comfortable that you can walk the whole way in combat formation, except for very few places, and even there there are no forests, hills, crossings or swamps.” The international situation should also have made the campaign “easier”. Ottoman expansion into Central and Eastern Europe a limit was set. In the fall of 1683, the troops of the Holy Roman Empire and the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, led by King John Sobieski, defeated huge Turkish forces near Vienna. As subsequent history showed, the growth of Turkish possessions in European space ceased. Ottoman Empire moved to maintain its conquests, but its military-economic backwardness, progressing against the background of the rapid development of European powers, doomed Turkey to a gradual but continuous weakening of its position as an empire and a great power.

This opened up brilliant strategic prospects for Russia to recapture Ottoman possessions in the Black Sea region. The Scottish commander felt them. But with “ease” he was clearly mistaken. The Russians were able to implement his plan for the defeat of the Crimean army and the occupation of Crimea for the first time only during the next (5th) Russian-Turkish War of 1735–1739. during the reign of Peter I's niece, Anna Ivanovna (1730–1740). The campaign of 1735 under the leadership of General Leontyev almost completely repeated the campaign of V.V. Golitsyn 1687 Russian troops reached Perekop and returned. In 1736, Field Marshal Minikh, president of the Military Collegium, who himself led the troops, defeated the Tatars, entered Crimea, took and burned Bakhchisarai, but was forced to leave the Crimean peninsula. Having no fleet in either the Black or Azov Seas, Russian forces in Crimea could have been blocked from Perekop, hastily returning from Persian campaign Crimean cavalry.

The annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1783 was still a long way off. But this goal, proposed by Gordon as the immediate tactical task in 1684, has been around since the end of the 17th century. became strategic for the southern direction of Russian foreign policy.

Campaigns of V.V. Golitsyn to the Crimea in 1687 and 1689 became a real confirmation of Russia’s alliance with the anti-Turkish coalition. Golitsyn's offensive Crimean campaigns opened a new era in Russian foreign policy, which lasted until the First World War inclusive. The international meaning of the tactics of the Crimean campaigns as part of the international actions of the Holy League was to prevent the Tatar cavalry from helping the Turks in their actions in Central Europe. Internal tasks were reduced to the defeat of the Crimean cavalry and the occupation of Crimea. If the first international part of the Crimean campaigns was a success, then the second part was much worse.

Russian army after the military reforms of the 17th century. was stronger than the Crimean one. Crimea had neither infantry nor modern artillery. All its power consisted of maneuverable medieval cavalry, which, having no convoys, moved quickly. The surprise of the attack was its main trump card, and the capture of people, livestock and some other booty was the main goal of the military campaigns of the Crimea. Creation by Russia in the 17th century. four abatis defensive lines on the southern borders made it impossible for an unexpected deep breakthrough of the Crimean cavalry into Russia. Only border raids by small Crimean detachments were carried out, and the scale of their production was incomparable with the 16th century, when the Crimeans reached Moscow. The reliability of Russian defense to a large extent provoked Crimean and Turkish aggression against the more accessible Little Russia. The Crimean campaigns were the first attempt at large offensive operations involving more than 100 thousand people on foreign territory.

The backbone of Golitsyn's army in both 1687 and 1689 were regiments of the new system. The army moved all the way to Perekop under the cover of the Wagenburg, a mobile fortification of 20 thousand carts. It is significant that the Tatars did not dare to give battle. In the 17th century In general, without European allies (for example, the Zaporozhye Cossacks) or their Turkish patrons, they did not dare to engage in general battles. It is no coincidence that General Gordon noted about the Crimeans: “Their former courage has been lost and the sudden invasions to which they previously subjected the Great Russians have been forgotten...”. The real enemies of the Russian army in the campaigns of 1687 and 1689. the heat and scorched steppe became. Lack of food for horses turned out to be a big problem for the Russian army. Food and water spoiled by the heat, as well as the hardships of marching at high temperatures and under the scorching sun, were the second major problem. The Second Moscow Butyrsky Elected Soldiers' Regiment, distinguished by impeccable discipline and training, lost more than 100 out of 900 people on the march to the Russian border in April 1687. (By the way, losses on the march, even during the Napoleonic Wars, accounted for the majority of losses of all European armies, often exceeding combat losses.) The third group of problems was a consequence of the preservation of many medieval relics in the Russian army. “Noness” immediately surfaced, i.e. absenteeism or desertion of many service people. Conclusion by nobles, especially noble ones, large number The armed, but in fact absolutely useless servants accompanying them only delayed the movement of the already huge and slow army. But these were already minor costs. In essence, Golitsyn’s army fought not with the enemy, but with the climate and terrain. It turned out that in the conditions of the Wild Field these are much more powerful opponents than the Crimean Tatars.

It was the natural factor that Patrick Gordon did not appreciate in his project for the Crimean campaign in 1684, and in 1687 the main organizer of the Russian offensive, V.V., did not take it into account. Golitsyn. And no wonder. After all, this was the first large-scale rush of the Russians across the Wild Field to Perekop.

The scorched Wild Field met the Russian soldiers with completely unbearable conditions for a campaign. This is clearly reflected in the letters to the homeland of Franz Lefort, a lieutenant colonel and participant in the events. Lefort points out that the border river Samara met the Russian army with “not quite... healthy water. Having passed several more rivers, we reached the Konskaya Voda River, which concealed a strong poison in itself, which was discovered immediately when they began to drink from it... Nothing could be more terrible than what I saw here. Entire crowds of unfortunate warriors, exhausted by marching in the scorching heat, could not resist swallowing this poison, for death was only a consolation for them. Some drank from stinking puddles or swamps; others took off their hats filled with breadcrumbs and said goodbye to their comrades; they remained where they lay, not having the strength to walk due to the excessive excitement of the blood... We reached the Olba River, but its water also turned out to be poisonous, and everything around was destroyed: we saw only black earth and dust and could barely see each other. In addition, the whirlwinds raged constantly. All the horses were exhausted and fell in large numbers. We lost our heads. They looked everywhere for the enemy or the khan himself to give battle. Several Tatars were captured and one hundred and twenty of them were exterminated. The prisoners showed that the khan was coming at us with 80,000 thousand Tatars. However, his horde also suffered severely, because everything up to Perekop was burned out.”

Lefort reports huge losses of the Russian army, but not from battles that did not occur on the way to Perekop, and even greater losses when returning from there. Many German officers also fell. Death “kidnapped our best officers,” states Lefort, “among other things, three colonels: Vaugh, Flivers, Balzer and up to twenty German lieutenant colonels, majors and captains.”

The question of who set the steppe on fire is still controversial. A number of researchers believe that the Tatars did this, seeing no other opportunity to stop the Russians. But the fire doomed the Crimeans themselves to inaction. They also had nothing to feed their horses, and they found themselves locked on the Crimean peninsula. The second version comes from the assessment of what happened by the Russian authorities and now has more and more supporters. The fire was organized by the Cossacks, who were not interested in this war, since it led to the strengthening of Moscow’s position, its dictatorship over the Cossack elders, and the distraction of the Cossacks from the defense of Ukrainian territories proper.

In addition, many Ukrainians still saw the Poles as their main enemy, and the Crimean Campaign of 1687 also involved actions to protect Poland and Hungary, where the troops of the Holy League fought the Ottomans. Gordon constantly reports on Russia's allied obligations. For example, describing the retreat of the Russian army in 1687, he stated: “So, we slowly went back to the Samara River, from where we sent 20 thousand Cossacks beyond Borysthenes to monitor the actions of the Tatars and guard so that they did not invade Poland or Hungary , and in order to firmly block all crossings.” The anti-Polish sentiments of the “Russian Cossacks” were generated not only by old grievances and religious enmity. The “Russian Cossacks” saw in the robbery of Polish possessions their “legitimate booty,” which the alliance of Russia and the Holy League clearly deprived them of.

Patrick Gordon in one of his letters to the Earl of Middleton, a high-ranking nobleman at court English king Jacob II, July 26, 1687 wrote: “The Ukrainian hetman Ivan Samoilovich (a man with great power and influence) was very opposed to peace with the Poles and this campaign, and by all means hindered and slowed down our advance.” This message from Gordon, a direct participant in the events, whose “Diary” is usually confirmed by information from other sources, is a serious indirect confirmation of Samoilovich’s guilt. True, it was in relation to Hetman Samoilovich that Patrick Gordon could have a biased opinion. At one time, the hetman offended his son-in-law, the Kyiv governor F.P. Sheremetev, with whom Gordon was friends. After the death of Sheremetev’s wife, the hetman’s daughter, Samoilovich demanded that his daughter’s dowry be returned to him and his grandson be raised.

However, rumors that it was the Ukrainian Cossacks, with the connivance, if not the direct command of Hetman Samoilovich, who burned the steppe, besides Gordon, are also reported by the “neutral” Lefort: “They could not understand how the Tatars managed to burn out all the grass. The Cossack hetman was suspected of complicity with the Tatar Khan.” For example, after the Cossacks crossed the bridges over the Samara River, for some reason the bridges burned down, and the Russians had to build a new crossing in order to move on.

One way or another, Hetman I.S. had to answer for the return of Russian troops without victories over the Tatars. Samoilovich. He was unpopular among Ukrainians. The hetman's son Semyon (died in 1685) carried out in February-March 1679 the population of the “Turkish” Right Bank Ukraine behind the left bank of the Dnieper. Moscow did not leave the settlers under the rule of the hetman. They wandered around the “Russian” Sloboda Ukraine until 1682, until, finally, in 1682, a decree came about the places of settlement allocated to them there. The foreman was strained by Samoilovich’s despotic temper. Having lost the support of Moscow, Ivan Samoilovich could not stay in power. V.V. Golitsyn gave rise to the denunciation of the Zaporozhye general foremen and a number of colonels about the alleged betrayal of the hetman of Russia. As a result, Ivan Samoilovich lost his mace, his son Gregory was executed in Sevsk for “thieves’, fanciful” speeches about Russian sovereigns. Considerable wealth of the Samoilovichs was confiscated - half went to the tsarist treasury, half to the treasury of the Zaporozhye army. The hetman himself (without investigation into his case) and his son Yakov were sent into Siberian exile, where he died in 1690.

Mazepa became the new hetman of “Russian Ukraine”. Gordon characterizes him as a great supporter of the union of Russia and the Holy League. “Yesterday, someone named Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa,” Gordon informed Middleton, “a former adjutant general, was elected to his (Samoilovich’s) place. This person is more committed to the Christian cause and, we hope, will be more active and diligent in stopping the Tatar raids on Poland and Hungary...” This refers to the participation of the Cossacks in operations directed against the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the actions of the Ottomans in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in Hungary. The government of Sophia had some doubts about Ivan Mazepa’s loyalty to Russia. The princess's trusted associate, Duma nobleman Fyodor Leontyevich Shaklovity, went to Ukraine to investigate this matter. “When he returned,” Gordon reports, “he gave a favorable report about the hetman, but with an admixture of some guesses and suspicions about him because of his origin (he is a Pole), and therefore about his possible goodwill, if not secret relations with this people "

The campaign of 1687 made a due impression on the Tatars. They did not risk organizing a large-scale counter-offensive in 1688, limiting themselves to the traditional raids of individual detachments on the Russian border. The serif lines did not allow the Tatars to break through into Russian territory. In view of a possible new Russian offensive, the khan did not dare to go far from his own borders.

This certainly contributed to the victories of other members of the Holy League in 1687–1688. Gordon defined the Ottoman army without the Crimean cavalry as “a bird without wings.” After the capture of Buda (1686), Prince Ludwig of Baden with 3-4 thousand of his people defeated 15 thousand Turks in Bosnia near the village of Trivenic in 1688. In the same year, General von Scherfen captured Belgrade from the Ottomans after a 27-day siege. The losses of the imperial troops were several times less than the Turkish ones. Things were worse for the Poles. They were defeated at Kamenets, where the Ottomans acted with the Crimean Tatars. It is noteworthy that the Poles explained their defeat precisely by the fact that the Muscovites did not distract the Tatars this time. Gordon shared the same opinion. However, the Ottoman victory at Kamenets did not radically change the picture of the failures of the Turkish Empire in 1687–1688. Back in November 1687, the Janissaries overthrew Sultan Mehmed IV and elevated his brother Suleiman II to the throne. Turkish ambassadors arrived in Bratislava in 1688. Formally, they wanted to notify the emperor about their new ruler. The main goal was to probe the question of peace.

Rumors about a possible truce between the Holy League and Turkey alarmed Russia. She was preparing for the second Crimean campaign. The government of Sophia hoped that Holy League will also continue fighting. In 1688, the Holy Roman Emperor assured the Russian Tsars that this would be the case. The imperial message was transmitted to the Russian resident in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prokofy Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (future one of the three “great ambassadors” of 1697–1698). Austrian victories over the Turks were halted not because of their collusion with the Ottomans, but because the French, longtime European allies of the Turks and opponents of the Empire, invaded its possessions. The French king Louis XIV began the War of the Palatinate Succession (1688–1698). He soon captured Philipsburg, a city in Baden.

The ambassadorial order obliged P.B. Voznitsyn, as well as the Greek Orthodox scholar monk I. Likhud, sent by the tsarist government to Venice in 1688, to convince the imperial government to take into account Russian interests in the event of peace. Looking ahead, we note that Peter’s diplomacy will do exactly the same, having discovered in 1697–1698. the impossibility for their Western allies to continue the war with Turkey due to the expectation in Europe of the war “for the Spanish succession”. The Truce of Karlowitz of 1699 will be represented by a number of separate treaties between the League participants and Turkey. Russia will be able to secure Azov, captured in 1696, and the Peace of Constantinople in 1700, in addition to Azov, will bring Russia the official cessation of payments for “commemorations” to Crimea and the liquidation of Turkish fortresses near the Dnieper. Peter's policy on the southern borders was not some new turn, but a logical continuation of the course begun by the government of Sophia and Golitsyn.

Another indicator of this continuity can be Russian diplomatic activity on the eve of the First Crimean Campaign. Russian Ambassador V.T. Postnikov negotiated the expansion of the anti-Turkish alliance in England, Holland, Bradenburg (Prussia) and Florence. B. Mikhailov went to Sweden and Denmark for the same purpose; to Venice - I. Volkov, to France and Spain - Ya.F. Dolgorukov and Y. Myshetsky, to Austria - B.P. Sheremetev and I.I. Chaadaev. All these embassies had the same official tasks as the Grand Embassy of Peter I - they tried to expand the circle of their Western allies in the war with Turkey.

In the spring of 1688, Hetman Ivan Mazepa and okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev insisted on attacking the Belgorod regiments of Kazy-Kermen. They proposed appointing Patrick Gordon as one of the main military leaders. His authority increased after the campaign of 1687 V.V. Golitsyn rejected this proposal, focusing on the construction of the large Novobogoroditsk fortress on the Samara River, which strengthened Russia's border defense system. Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, an undeniably talented diplomat and administrator, did not have the abilities of a major military leader, although he spent most of his life on military service. The Old Moscow unification of military and civil service demanded that such a large-scale expedition of Russian troops into foreign lands be led by the head of government. As an experienced politician, Golitsyn could not ignore this. A number of historians, in particular Ustryalov, suggested that exorbitant ambition forced Golitsyn to aspire to the post of commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, the Frenchman Neville, ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was admitted to the house of V.V. Golitsyn, completely refutes this version. “Golitsyn did everything,” recalls Neville, “to reject this position, because... he rightly assumed that he would have a lot of difficulties, and that all responsibility for failure would fall on him, no matter what measures of foresight and precautions he took, and that it would be difficult for him to maintain his glory if the campaign was unsuccessful... Having been a greater statesman rather than a commander, he foresaw that his absence from Moscow would cause him more harm than the conquest of Crimea itself would have brought glory, since it would not have placed him higher, and the title of commander of the troops did not add anything to his power.”

V.V. Golitsyn decided to take the same route a second time. Gordon in 1688 no longer found the previous path, which he himself had proposed in 1684, successful. The Scotsman describes the reasons for choosing the old route: “Antony, an experienced Cossack, sent on reconnaissance towards the Crimea, returned and reported that all the way to Perekop he discovered places where you can get water either from springs or by digging the ground an elbow deep. This became a strong incentive for our gullible and crazy people to undertake another campaign along the same path that we went through before.” It was decided to increase the number of participants in the campaign to 117.5 thousand people. Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Mazepa sent up to 50 thousand more. Troops began gathering in Sumy in February 1689. A decree was sent out, “... that those who do not appear... lands will be taken away in the name of Their Majesties.” Gordon commanded three regiments of soldiers on the left flank. He has already said goodbye, as can be seen from his “Diary,” with the version about the ease of conquering Crimea. In March 1689, Gordon advised “Generalissimo” Golitsyn to go not through the steppe, as last time, but along the Dnieper, having previously organized outposts there with reliable garrisons, “every four days of marching.” Gordon advised to reinforce the regiments of the new formation with grenadier companies. But V.V. Golitsyn did not follow these ideas from Gordon.

When the Russian army, having made a difficult march in the heat across the steppe, successfully reached Perekop (May 20, 1689), Golitsyn did not dare to storm its outdated fortifications, although the skirmishes with the Tatars that took place this time testified to the superiority of Russian weapons. On May 15, the Tatar cavalry tried to attack the Russian right flank, but was repulsed with heavy losses by Russian marching artillery fire. The regiments of the new system performed well, which indicated the correctness of the course towards the gradual professionalization of the Russian army. The Russians had a chance for a successful breakthrough to the Crimean Peninsula, but V.V. Golitsyn preferred negotiations. He demanded surrender from the khan, and having received a refusal, he gave the order to retreat in view of big losses people from the heat, illness and hardships of the campaign.

This was a fatal mistake by the commander-in-chief. There were even rumors about his khan bribing him. During the retreat, the regiments of the new formation again distinguished themselves. “...There was great danger and even greater fear, lest the khan pursue us with all his might,” Patrick Gordon wrote later (January 28, 1690) in his message to Earl Erroll, “so I was detached from the left wing with 7 registrants infantry and several cavalry (although all were dismounted) in order to guard the rearguard. They pursued us very zealously for 8 days in a row, but achieved little..."

Princess Sophia, as in 1687, ordered that the troops be met as victors, which, in essence, they were. For the second time in Russian history, it was not the Crimeans who attacked Russian soil, but the Russians who fought within the Crimean borders, making their contribution to the common cause of the Holy League. This is exactly how A.S. assessed the Crimean campaign of 1689. Pushkin, collecting material for his “History of Peter the Great.” “This campaign brought great benefit to Austria, for it destroyed the alliance concluded in Adrianople between the Crimean Khan, the French ambassador and the glorious Transylvanian prince Tekeli. According to this alliance, the khan was supposed to give 30,000 troops to help the high vizier enter Hungary; The khan himself, with the same number, was to attack Transylvania together with Tekeli. France pledged to help Tekeli with money and give him skilled officers.”

But all these international multi-step combinations were little understood by the population of Russia in the 17th century, especially against the background of the entry into the final stage of the conflict of two court “parties” - the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins. Without the occupation of Crimea by the “Naryshchkin party,” it was easy to imagine V.V.’s campaign. Golitsyn failure. It is no coincidence that young Peter, as Gordon’s Diary reports, did not even allow V.V. Golitsyn upon his return from Crimea to his hand. True, such a recognized expert on the history of Peter I as N.I. Pavlenko, based on other sources, claims that Peter only “intended to refuse Golitsyn and his retinue an audience, but he was hardly dissuaded from this step, which meant a break with Sophia. Reluctantly, Peter accepted Golitsyn and those accompanying him. Among the latter was Colonel Franz Lefort.” A participant in the Crimean campaign, Lefort, along with Patrick Gordon, in a few months would turn into the closest friend and mentor of Peter I. The colossal losses of Golitsyn’s army from heat, bad water, food and disease made a grave impression on ordinary Muscovites. The “Naryshkin party,” whose leadership included cousin V.V. Golitsyna B.A. Golitsyn, a good chance arose for the overthrow of Sophia, which was realized during the August coup of 1689.

In the interests of the victors, it was in every possible way to “blacken” the history of the Crimean campaigns, which did not prevent Peter I, 6 years later, from continuing the offensive launched by his sister’s government on the southern borders of Russia, as well as on other borders, for during the entire second half of the 17th century. Russia has not known a single strategic defeat. She won the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking away half of Ukraine and Kyiv from it. It reduced the war with Sweden to a draw, without winning or losing any of the territories it had after the Time of Troubles. Forced Turkey to recognize Russian citizenship of Left Bank Ukraine, Zaporozhye and Kyiv and, finally, attacked Crimea twice, forcing it to permanently switch from attack to defense. Peter would take into account the difficulties of a foot march across the Wild Field discovered during the Crimean campaigns and shift the direction of the main attack in the south directly to the Turkish outpost of Azov, where troops could be transported along the Don. Among the main leaders of the Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696. we will see V.V.’s closest associates. Golitsyn on the Crimean campaigns - “service Germans” Pyotr Ivanovich Gordon and Franz Yakovlevich Lefort.

First Crimean campaign

The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower than the listed number of troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Giray was at that time on Molochnye Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.

To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.

When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky Prikaz, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The royal letters stated that Crimean Khanate enormous military strength was sufficiently demonstrated, which should have warned him against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.

While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.

In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.

On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River; on August 24, it received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.

In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by historian Halim Geray, a representative ruling dynasty Gerayev, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was on the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. The exact number of his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one was led by himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications near the ditch facing the Russians, in preparation for decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason The defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”

Contrary to this version, as noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.

In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military men of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.

On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov’s successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance, were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia's European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance between the Crimean Khanate concluded in 1683 in Adrianople , France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. Thus, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that the huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I. Ukraintsev.

Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, historian A. G. Brickner, noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.

Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of bread” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses under the outfit fell, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops They set Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them on fire and never showed up for the decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”

As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689, believing the reports of his successes to be true:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello, having defeated the Hagarians by the grace of God and the Most Holy Theotokos and with your reason and happiness! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of his entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he only received access to the inland Sea of Azov. As N.I. Pavlenko noted, the Crimean campaigns were not useless, since their main goals - fulfilling obligations to the League and pinning down enemy forces - were achieved, which was of great diplomatic importance in Russia's relations with the anti-Ottoman coalition.

In the 17th century, the Crimean peninsula turned out to be one of the fragments of the old Mongol empire - the Golden Horde. Local khans staged bloody invasions of Moscow several times during the time of Ivan the Terrible. However, every year it became more and more difficult for them to resist Russia alone.

Therefore it became a vassal of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire at this time reached the peak of its development. It extended over the territory of three continents at once. War with this state was inevitable. The first rulers of the Romanov dynasty looked closely at Crimea.

Prerequisites for the hikes

In the middle of the 17th century, a struggle broke out between Russia and Poland for Left Bank Ukraine. The dispute over this important region escalated into a long war. Eventually a peace treaty was signed in 1686. According to it, Russia received vast territories together with Kiev. At the same time, the Romanovs agreed to join the so-called Holy League of European Powers against the Ottoman Empire.

It was created through the efforts of Pope Innocent XI. Most of it was made up of Catholic states. The Republic of Venice and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth joined the league. It was this alliance that Russia joined. Christian countries agreed to act together against the Muslim threat.

Russia in the Holy League

Thus, in 1683, the Great War began. The main fighting took place in Hungary and Austria without the participation of Russia. The Romanovs, for their part, began to develop a plan to attack the Crimean Khan, a vassal of the Sultan. The initiator of the campaign was Queen Sophia, who at that time was the de facto ruler huge country. The young princes Peter and Ivan were only formal figures who did not decide anything.

The Crimean campaigns began in 1687, when a hundred thousandth army under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn went south. He was the head and therefore was responsible for foreign policy kingdoms. Under his banners came not only Moscow regular regiments, but also free Cossacks from Zaporozhye and the Don. They were led by Ataman Ivan Samoilovich, with whom Russian troops united in June 1687 on the banks of the Samara River.

Great importance was attached to the campaign. Sophia wanted to consolidate her own sole power in the state with the help of military successes. The Crimean campaigns were to become one of the great achievements of her reign.

First trip

Russian troops first encountered the Tatars after crossing the Konka River (a tributary of the Dnieper). However, the opponents prepared for an attack from the north. The Tatars burned out the entire steppe in this region, which is why the horses of the Russian army simply had nothing to eat. Terrible conditions meant that in the first two days only 12 miles were left behind. So, the Crimean campaigns began with failure. The heat and dust led to Golitsyn convening a council, at which it was decided to return to his homeland.

To somehow explain his failure, the prince began to look for those responsible. At that moment, an anonymous denunciation against Samoilovich was delivered to him. The ataman was accused of being the one who set fire to the steppe and his Cossacks. Sophia became aware of the denunciation. Samoilovich found himself in disgrace and lost his mace, a symbol of his own power. A Cossack Council was convened, where they elected ataman. This figure was also supported by Vasily Golitsyn, under whose leadership the Crimean campaigns took place.

At the same time, military operations began on the right flank of the struggle between Turkey and Russia. The army under the leadership of General Grigory Kosagov successfully captured Ochakov, an important fortress on the Black Sea coast. The Turks began to worry. The reasons for the Crimean campaigns forced the queen to give an order to organize a new campaign.

Second trip

The second campaign began in February 1689. The date was not chosen by chance. Prince Golitsyn wanted to get to the peninsula by spring in order to avoid summer heat and the Russian army included about 110 thousand people. Despite the plans, it moved rather slowly. The Tatar attacks were sporadic - there was no general battle.

On May 20, the Russians approached strategically important fortress- Perekop, which stood on a narrow isthmus leading to the Crimea. A shaft was dug around it. Golitsyn did not dare to risk people and take Perekop by storm. But he explained his action by the fact that there were practically no drinking wells with fresh water in the fortress. After a bloody battle, the army could be left without a livelihood. Envoys were sent to the Crimean Khan. Negotiations dragged on. Meanwhile, the loss of horses began in the Russian army. It became clear that the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. will lead to nothing. Golitsyn decided to turn the army back a second time.

Thus ended the Crimean campaigns. Years of effort have not given Russia any tangible dividends. Her actions distracted Turkey, making it easier for the European allies to fight her on the Western Front.

Overthrow of Sophia

At this time in Moscow, Sophia found herself in a difficult situation. Her failures turned many boyars against her. She tried to pretend that everything was fine: she congratulated Golitsyn on his success. However, already in the summer there was a coup d'état. Supporters of young Peter overthrew the queen.

Sophia was tonsured a nun. Golitsyn ended up in exile thanks to the intercession of his cousin. Many supporters of the old government were executed. Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 led to Sophia being isolated.

Further Russian policy in the south

Later he also tried to fight with Turkey. His Azov campaigns led to tactical success. Russia has its first navy. True, it was limited to the internal waters of the Azov Sea.

This forced Peter to pay attention to the Baltic, where Sweden ruled. Thus began the Great Northern War, which led to the construction of St. Petersburg and the transformation of Russia into an empire. At the same time, the Turks recaptured Azov. Russia returned to the southern shores only in the second half of the 18th century.