The problem of being in the history of culture. Being and existence

WITH with good reason It can be argued that in philosophy there is no problem more fundamental in importance and difficult to solve than clarifying the essence of being.

Currently, in world philosophy there is no single point of view on the question of what being is. We adhere to the fairly common point of view that:

For the first time, the concept of “being” as a specific category to designate existing reality used by the ancient Greek thinker Parmenides (c. 540 - 470 BC). According to Parmenides, existence exists, it is continuous, homogeneous and completely motionless. There is nothing else but existence. All these ideas are contained in his statement: “one should say and think that existing things exist, for being exists, while nothing else exists.” Plato paid considerable attention to the problem of being, and with his creativity made a significant contribution to its development. Being is identified by Plato with the world of ideas, which appear to be genuine, unchanging, eternally existing. “That being,” asks Plato, “the existence of which we find out in our questions and answers, - what is it, always unchanged and the same, or different at different times? Can something equal in itself, beautiful in itself, everything generally existing in itself, i.e. being, to undergo any change whatsoever? Or is any of these things, uniform and existing in themselves, always unchangeable and the same and never, under any circumstances, accept the slightest change? And he answers: “They must be unchangeable and identical...” True being is contrasted by Plato with inauthentic being, which means things and phenomena accessible to human feelings. Sensibly perceived things are nothing more than a likeness, a shadow, merely reflecting perfect images - ideas.

True Being- this is an idea, this is the thought of every soul, which, like the thought of God, “feeds on reason and pure knowledge” always when it befits it. “Therefore, when she sees things at least from time to time, she admires them, is nourished by the contemplation of truth and is blissful until the vault of heaven, having described a circle, takes her again to the same place. In its circular movement it contemplates justice itself, contemplates prudence, contemplates knowledge, not that knowledge which is characterized by emergence, and not that which changes depending on the changes of what we now call being, but that real knowledge that lies in the genuine being.” In the dialogue “Parmenides” Plato speaks in more detail about earthly, derivative existence, which for him is the real, sensory world. In it, in contrast to true, one might say, heavenly existence, there is one and many, emergence and death, development and peace. The essence of this world, its dynamics are characterized by a constant conflict between heavenly existence and earthly non-existence, ideas and matter. There is nothing eternal or unchangeable in this world, because... everything is subject to emergence, change and death. Aristotle makes a significant contribution to the development of the doctrine of being. The basis of all being, according to Aristotle, is primary matter, which, however, is difficult to define using any category, since it, in principle, cannot be identified. Here is one of the definitions and explanations of primary matter that Aristotle gives: “this is a being that exists necessarily; and since it exists necessarily, thereby (it exists) good, and in this sense is the beginning... there is a certain essence that is eternal, motionless and separated from sensible things: and at the same time it is shown that this essence cannot have no size, but it has no parts and is indivisible..., but on the other hand, (it is shown) also that it is a being that is not subject to (external) influence and is not subject to change.”

Although the first matter is an integral part of every being, nevertheless, it cannot be identified with being or considered one of the elements of real being. And yet, the first matter has some certainty, since it includes four elements - fire, air, water and earth, which, through various combinations, act as a kind of mediator between the first matter, incomprehensible through the senses, and the really existing world, which is perceived and is known by man. The most important merit of Aristotle in developing the doctrine of being is his idea that real being becomes accessible to knowledge thanks to the form, the image in which it appears to man. According to Aristotle, potential being, which includes first matter and the four basic natural elements, thanks to form, forms real being and makes it accessible to knowledge. For the first time, a truly existing being appears as a unity of matter and form. The French thinker Rene Descartes lays the foundations for a dualistic interpretation of existence. Descartes recognizes the primary reliability of everything that exists, first of all, in the thinking Self, in man’s awareness of his activities. Developing this idea, Descartes argues that if we reject and declare false everything that can be doubted in any way, then it is easy to assume that there is no God, heaven, body, but it cannot be said that we do not exist, that we do not think. It would be unnatural to believe that that which thinks does not exist.

And therefore the conclusion expressed in the words “ I think therefore I am” is the first of all and the most reliable of those that will appear before everyone who philosophizes correctly. It is not difficult to determine that here the spiritual principle, and in particular the thinking Self, acts as being. At the same time, Descartes recognizes another principle of all things, which for him is matter, independent of consciousness and spirit. Its main feature, attribute, is extension. Thus, motion and extension will be convincing characteristics of the materiality of the world. Consequently, being in Descartes is presented dualistically: in the form of a spiritual substance and in the form of a material one. From the standpoint of subjective idealism, the English philosopher George Berkeley (1685-1753) explains the essence of being. The essence of his views lies in the assertion that all things are just “complexes of our sensations,” which were initially given by our consciousness. According to Berkeley, real being, i.e. things, ideas do not exist objectively, in reality, in their earthly embodiment; their refuge is human thought. And although Berkeley shows tendencies towards an objective-idealistic interpretation of the essence of being, in general his interpretation of this problem is of a subjective-idealistic nature. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, the founders of the philosophy of Marxism, Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820 - 1895), interpret the problem of being. Based on materialist traditions in the interpretation of being, developed by English and French materialist philosophers, Marxism understands being as matter that exists infinitely, in space and time, and is independent of human consciousness. While stating the eternity of existence, Marxism at the same time recognizes the beginning, emergence and finitude of specific things and phenomena. Being does not exist without matter, they are eternal and exist simultaneously. Non-existence does not mean the disappearance of existence, but the transition from one form of existence to another. The founders of Marxism, unlike their predecessors, identified several levels of being and, in particular, natural being and social being. By social existence they understand the totality of material and spiritual activities of people, i.e. “the production of material life itself.” In subsequent years, including the 20th century, there were practically no fundamental “breakthroughs” in the interpretation of existence.

An example is the understanding of being by one of the most famous philosophers of the 20th century. MartinHeidegger (1883 - 1976). As an existentialist philosopher, Heidegger gives various characteristics and interpretations of being, sometimes contradictory and refuting those previously expressed. Although the German thinker dealt with this problem almost all his life, nevertheless, he does not have an academic definition of being, but only gives a characteristic, description, highlighting some important aspects, which, however, corresponds to the existentialist consideration of the problem. Thus, according to Heidegger: “Being is a thing with which we deal, but not something that exists. Time is a thing with which we deal, but not something temporary. We say about existence: it exists. Looking at this thing, “being,” looking at this thing, “time,” let us remain cautious. Let us say not: being is, time is, but: being takes place and time takes place.” And further: “Being is in no way a thing, accordingly it is not something temporary, nevertheless, as presence, it is still determined by time. Time is in no way a thing, accordingly it is not something existing, but remains constant in its flow, not itself being anything temporary like something existing in time.

Being and time mutually determine each other, however, in such a way that neither the first - being - can be considered as temporary, nor the second - time - as an existent.” Based on what has been said, apparently, we should not be surprised that at the final stage of his activity, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to rationally cognize being.

Heidegger says that being is always the being of beings. But when being begins to be understood as an existent, when ontological difference is lost, the so-called “oblivion of being” occurs, overcoming which is the main task of any ontological research.

At the same time, he believes that we do not have “direct” access to being; it cannot become accessible to us in itself, but only through existence. Therefore, the study of being always takes place as a study of being, and in order for this study to bring the expected effect, it is also necessary to make a difference in the being itself: it always has the meaning of “who,” the essential specificity of which is that it is existential, or “what.” ", which is characterized as "essence" in the traditional sense of this word.

To designate a being that has a specific characteristic of “who,” Heidegger uses the special term “Dasein” and defines it as an “exemplary” being. This being is capable in its being of having a special ontological relationship to this being, which, in fact, gives it an “exemplary” character": it is in it that the possibility of grasping the real connection that exists between being and being reveals itself. At the same time, for Heidegger "Dasein" means. not a way of being natural thing, as happens with Kant or Husserl when they use the same term, but definite being, “which we ourselves are,” which has a specific way of being, defined terminologically as existence (Existenz). But does being understood in this way allow for what can be called “being in general”?

The very title “being” allows for its real possibility, although being is always the being of a being and this is the only form of grasping it accessible to us. Heidegger believes that “being in general,” which is a priori conceived from the integrity of beings, - need to eat. Thus, in the lecture course “Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” he says that in an attempt to grasp being as such, we are “at first helpless and grasp the void,” since existence is something, and being at this starting point of consideration cannot even be conceived. But, on the other hand, we constantly think about being, because we understand what “was”, “is” or “will be” means.

For Sartre, the fundamental point is the postulation of existence as a phenomenon denoting myself, A not your being. This leads him to the idea that the being of a being is not capable of “baring” itself before consciousness, since being in a being is “everywhere and nowhere,” that is, being always presupposes “the existence of a certain way of being.” Sartre’s thesis: “being is the always present basis of existence,” which gives rise to the illusory idea of similarity with Heidegger, should be understood not ontologically, but logically, in the sense that being is “simply the condition of all revelation: it is being-for-discovery.” That is, “real” in the full sense of the word for Sartre is only existence, which presupposes being as its immanent structure, in the sense of absolute indistinguishability from itself. Being itself “is not revealed”; it cannot be discovered in Heidegger’s sense as an ontological structure standing “behind” beings. The discovery of the existence of a being in this aspect can only take place as a “raising” of consciousness above a being, which refers “not exactly to its being, but to the meaning of this being.”

Sartre applies this approach to the consideration of existence, because he believes that the existence of existence (the existence of phenomena) cannot “act” on consciousness, since it is cut off from consciousness, in contrast to the way Heidegger understands it, for whom the existence of phenomena shows existence in its “meetings”. In this regard, he believes that one should distinguish the “being of a phenomenon” from the “phenomenon of being” and, of course, not reduce the first to the second in order to discover it. The phenomenon of being requires for its disclosure a “transphenomenal” basis - that is, the “being of a cognizing subject” as a semantic dimension - and does not feel the need for any other being. In other words, the existence of phenomena does not presuppose the presence of consciousness, it is not phenomenal: in this connection, the pre-reflective “cogito” and the existence of phenomena are absolutely cut off from each other; the phenomenon of being, on the contrary, presupposes consciousness. It is in this sense that the existence of beings (the existence of phenomena), according to Sartre, it turns out to be completely inaccessible to us. Thus, Heidegger’s movement of beings towards being, which is realized as recognition in the phenomenon of the being revealed in it, is accepted by Sartre. next view: consciousness transcends from ontic to ontological from being to the phenomenon of being as the “meaning of being of being”, since it reveals itself in consciousness. The sphere of being in this case acts as a dimension of meaning, given by consciousness, and not substantially, as is the case with ontological structures in Heidegger’s concept.

The presented ontological difference, the symptomatology of which is set by the theme of the difference between phenomenon and appearance, determines the specificity of those images of everyday life that Heidegger and Sartre offer in their concepts.

With good reason it can be argued that in philosophy there is no problem more fundamental in importance and difficult to solve than clarifying the essence of being.

Currently, there is no single point of view in the world on the question of what being is. We adhere to the fairly common point of view that:

For the first time, the concept of “being” as a specific category to designate existing reality was used by the ancient Greek thinker Parmenides (c. 540 - 470 BC). According to Parmenides, existence exists, it is continuous, homogeneous and completely motionless. There is nothing else but existence. All these ideas are contained in his statement: “one should say and think that existing things exist, for being exists, while nothing else exists.” He paid considerable attention to the problem of existence, and with his creativity made a significant contribution to its development. Being is identified by Plato with the world of ideas, which appear to be genuine, unchanging, eternally existing. “That being,” asks Plato, “the existence of which we find out in our questions and answers, - what is it, always unchanged and the same, or different at different times? Can something equal in itself, beautiful in itself, everything generally existing in itself, i.e. being, to undergo any change whatsoever? Or is any of these things, uniform and existing in themselves, always unchangeable and the same and never, under any circumstances, accept the slightest change? And he answers: “They must be unchangeable and identical...” True being is contrasted by Plato with inauthentic being, which means things and phenomena accessible to human feelings. Sensibly perceived things are nothing more than a likeness, a shadow, merely reflecting perfect images - ideas.

True Being- this is an idea, this is the thought of every soul, which, like the thought of God, “feeds on reason and pure knowledge” always when it befits it. “Therefore, when she sees things at least from time to time, she admires them, is nourished by the contemplation of truth and is blissful until the vault of heaven, having described a circle, takes her again to the same place. In its circular movement it contemplates justice itself, contemplates prudence, contemplates knowledge, not that knowledge which is characterized by emergence, and not that which changes depending on the changes of what we now call being, but that real knowledge that lies in the genuine being.” In the dialogue “Parmenides” Plato speaks in more detail about earthly, derivative existence, which for him is the real, sensory world. In it, in contrast to true, one might say, heavenly existence, there is one and many, emergence and death, development and peace. The essence of this world, its dynamics are characterized by a constant conflict between heavenly existence and earthly non-existence, ideas and matter. There is nothing eternal or unchanging in this world, because... everything is subject to emergence, change and death. Aristotle makes a significant contribution to the development of the doctrine of being. The basis of all being, according to Aristotle, is primary matter, which, however, is difficult to define using any category, since it, in principle, cannot be identified. Here is one of the definitions and explanations of primary matter that Aristotle gives: “this is a being that exists necessarily; and since it exists necessarily, thereby (it exists) good, and in this sense is the beginning... there is a certain essence that is eternal, motionless and separated from sensible things: and at the same time it is shown that this essence cannot have no size, but it has no parts and is indivisible..., but on the other hand, (it is shown) also that it is a being that is not subject to (external) influence and is not subject to change.”

Although the first matter is an integral part of every being, nevertheless, it cannot be identified with being or considered one of the elements of real being. And yet, the first matter has some certainty, since it includes four elements - fire, air, water and earth, which, through various combinations, act as a kind of mediator between the first matter, incomprehensible through the senses, and the real existing world, which is perceived and is known by man. The most important merit of Aristotle in developing the doctrine of being is his idea that real being becomes accessible to knowledge thanks to the form, the image in which it appears to man. According to Aristotle, potential being, which includes first matter and the four basic natural elements, thanks to form, forms real being and makes it accessible to knowledge. For the first time, a truly existing being appears as a unity of matter and form. The French thinker Rene Descartes lays the foundations for a dualistic interpretation of existence. Descartes recognizes the primary reliability of everything that exists, first of all, in the thinking Self, in man’s awareness of his activities. Developing this idea, Descartes argues that if we reject and declare false everything that can be doubted in any way, then it is easy to assume that there is no God, heaven, body, but it cannot be said that we do not exist, that we do not think. It would be unnatural to believe that that which thinks does not exist.

An example is the understanding of being by one of the most famous philosophers of the 20th century. Martin (1883 - 1976). As an existentialist philosopher, Heidegger gives various characteristics and interpretations of being, sometimes contradictory and refuting those previously expressed. Although the German thinker dealt with this problem almost all his life, nevertheless, he does not have an academic definition of being, but only gives a characteristic, description, highlighting some important aspects, which, however, corresponds to the existentialist consideration of the problem. Thus, according to Heidegger: “Being is a thing with which we deal, but not something that exists. Time is a thing with which we deal, but not something temporary. We say about existence: it exists. Looking at this thing, “being,” looking at this thing, “time,” let us remain cautious. Let us say not: being is, time is, but: being takes place and time takes place.” And further: “Being is in no way a thing, accordingly it is not something temporary, nevertheless, as presence, it is still determined by time. Time is in no way a thing, accordingly it is not something existing, but remains constant in its flow, not itself being anything temporary like something existing in time.

Existence as material reality and the unity of the world

It was previously shown that the problem of existence and its subsequent comprehension arises almost along with the formation of a cultured person.

Already the first ancient sages began to think about what their environment was, where it came from, whether it was finite or infinite, and finally, how to designate or name it. As paradoxical as it may seem, approximately these same questions interest modern people, primarily those who think about the problem of their existence and the world as a whole. In our time, being is interpreted as a philosophical category to designate reality. existing world underlying all things and phenomena. In other words, being embraces and includes all the diversity of cosmic, natural and man-made things and phenomena. Being appears to a specific person in at least two forms (in two ways). This is, first of all, space, nature, the world of things and spiritual values created by man. This is a being that exists eternally in relation to a person as a boundless and imperishable integrity.

Human consciousness states the existence of this being and thereby, as it were, receives an unshakable point of support for confirming the eternity and inviolability of the world. However, there is another, everyday understanding of existence, which is determined by the temporary transitory existence of a person and receives a corresponding reflection in his consciousness. This existence is temporary, finite, transitory. This is exactly how it is perceived by a person. In the strict sense of the word, the category “being” cannot be used to designate and characterize this image of human existence, but since it has come into use, when characterizing such existence it is advisable to support it with such concepts as relative, finite, transitory existence. The subject of our study becomes being in its transcendental, universal plane as eternally existing, imperishable and eternal. The study of being in this context requires understanding the categories of non-existence, existence, matter, space, time, formation, quality, quantity. After all, before talking about anything, much less making any generalizations, it is necessary that this something first of all be available, i.e. existed. And indeed, first, with the help of sensory perception, a person records, as if photographing the things and phenomena that have appeared, and only then does he have the need to reflect them in an image, word, concept. The qualitative difference between the category of “being” and a really existing being or the concrete existence of a thing or phenomenon is that the category “being” is not self-evident, it arises and is formed due to both a specifically existing thing or phenomenon, and the presence of specifically existing human thinking. Having arisen as a result of such interaction, the category “being” then begins to exist independently. In understanding the essence of the existence of the world as a whole, the category of matter plays an important role. Indeed, being needs not only existence, but also some kind of basis, foundation. In other words, all concrete things and phenomena, in order to be united into one whole, and in particular, into the category of being, must have points of contact, some kind of unified basis. Such a basis, forming the inextricable unity and universal integrity of specific things and phenomena, is matter. It is thanks to her that the world appears as a single whole, existing independently of the will and consciousness of man. Nevertheless, there are certain difficulties in understanding the unity of the world. They are due to the fact that in people, in the process of their practical activity, the transitory is intertwined, mixed with the imperishable, the eternal with the temporary, the infinite with the finite. In addition, the differences that exist between nature and society, the material and the spiritual, the individual and society, and finally, the differences between individuals are too obvious. And yet, man steadily moved towards an understanding of the unity of the world in all its diversity - natural-material and spiritual, natural and social, since reality itself increasingly persistently pushed him towards this.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that space, nature, society, man, ideas exist equally. Although they are presented in different forms, nevertheless, by their presence they create the universal unity of the infinite, imperishable world. Not only what was or is, but also what will be will necessarily confirm the unity of the world. Another important characteristic or component of the philosophical category “being” is the presence of reality as a total reality. In everyday life, a person is constantly convinced that various wholes, structures of the world, possessing only their inherent properties and forms, equally coexist, manifest themselves, and simultaneously interact with each other. Space, nature, society, man - these are all different forms of being that have their own specificity of existence and functioning. But at the same time they were, are and will be interdependent and interconnected.

There is no need to explain in detail how interconnected such “distant” entities as space and society are. Environmental problems, which are becoming more and more acute, are not least based on human activity. On the other hand, scientists have been convincing for decades that only through the exploration of outer space will humanity in the coming centuries, and perhaps decades, be able to solve vital problems for itself: for example, supplying earthlings with so urgently needed energy resources and creating high-yielding varieties of grain crops. Thus, there is reason to assert that in human consciousness the idea of the existence of a total reality is formed, which includes the cosmos and its impact on nature and man; nature, which means the environment, directly or indirectly affecting man and society, and, finally, society and man, whose activities, accordingly, not only depend on space and nature, but also, in turn, have a certain impact on them. All this total reality most directly influences the formation in a person of the idea of being, the consciousness of being. It is always necessary to keep in mind that not only the external natural world, but also the spiritual, ideal environment is mastered in the process of practice, interaction with something that really exists, and therefore, reflected in human consciousness, it acquires a certain independence and in this sense it can be considered as special reality. Therefore, not only in everyday life, but also when analyzing transcendental problems, this must be taken into account no less than the objective material world of phenomena.

Basic forms of being and the dialectics of their interaction

World how everyday reality appears in front of a person as a holistic phenomenon, a universal unity, which includes a huge variety of different things, processes, states of human individuals, natural phenomena.

This is what we call universal existence. The main component with the help of which universal connections are made between this infinite multitude of things is the individual. In other words, the world is filled with many isolated phenomena, things, processes that interact with each other. This is the world of individual entities, which include people, animals, plants, physical processes and much more. But if we proceed only from the universal and the individual, then it will be very difficult, or rather impossible, for human consciousness to navigate in this diverse world. Meanwhile, in this diversity there are many such individuals, which, although different from each other, at the same time have a lot in common, sometimes even essential, which allows them to be generalized, united into something more general and holistic. This is something that is best described as special. Of course, all these forms of being are closely interconnected with each other, and their classification as universal, individual and special, reflecting what actually exists, helps a person to better understand existence. If these states are presented in detail using examples, it will look like this:

universal- this is the world as a whole, space, nature, man and the results of his activities;
single- is an individual person, animal, plant; what is special is different species of animals, plants, social classes and groups of people.

Taking into account the above, the forms of human existence can be represented as follows:

the existence of material phenomena, things, processes, which, when detailed, in turn, can be divided into natural existence in all its diversity and material existence created by man;
the material existence of man, in which, for convenience of analysis, we can distinguish the bodily existence of man as a part of nature and the existence of man as a thinking and at the same time socio-historical being;
spiritual being, which includes individualized spirituality and universal spirituality.

In addition to these forms of being, which serve as the object of our current analysis, there is also social being, or the being of society, the nature of which will be considered within the framework of the doctrine of society. Before moving on to clarifying what natural being is, we note that human knowledge about this very first and most important form of being, thanks to which, in fact, it became possible to speak out about the problem under consideration, is based on the entire experience of practical and mental activity of man, on numerous facts and arguments of applied and theoretical sciences, collected and summarized over the entire period of its existence cultural humanity. These same conclusions are convincingly confirmed by modern science. Natural being is materialized, i.e. visible, perceptible, tangible, etc. states of nature that existed before the advent of man, exist now and will exist in the future. A characteristic feature of this form of being is its objectivity and its primacy in relation to other forms of being. The objective and primary nature of nature is confirmed by the fact that it arose and existed many billions of years before the appearance of man. Consequently, the recognition of its existence did not depend on whether human consciousness exists or not. Moreover, as is known, man himself is a product of nature and appeared at a certain stage of its development. Another argument to substantiate the inviolability of the most essential qualities of natural existence is that, despite the emergence of man, his conscious activity and impact on nature (often destructive), humanity now, just like thousands of years ago, in the most important thing, , as regards the foundations of its existence, continues to depend on natural phenomena.

Strong evidence in favor of the primacy and objectivity of nature can be found in the fact that the physical and mental state of a person depends on natural conditions. If we allow some even not very significant changes in nature, for example, an increase or decrease in the average temperature on earth by several degrees, a slight decrease in the oxygen content in the air, this will immediately create insurmountable obstacles for the survival of hundreds of millions of people. And what if something more drastic happens? natural disasters, for example, a collision of our planet with a large comet or other cosmic body, this threatens the physical existence of all humanity. Finally, one cannot help but say about one more quality of natural, or more precisely, cosmic existence. It is known that in the course of its existence, humanity, step by step - and it must be said with enormous difficulties - mastered the secrets of the natural world. And today, at the turn of the new millennium, despite the discovery of laws that explain cause-and-effect relationships in the world around man, perfect tools and devices created by the human mind in the world external to man, including outer space, there are many things that now, and perhaps in the distant future, will remain inaccessible to the human intellect.

Consequently, when analyzing the natural form of being, we must proceed from the fact that, due to its primacy and objectivity, due to its infinity and immensity, nature or the universe as a whole can never before, and, consequently, in the future, be captured not only by perception , but even by human imagination and thought. Material existence produced by man or, as it is also called “second nature,” is nothing more than the objective-material world created by people and surrounding us in everyday life. “Second nature” or “second being” is that material world, everyday and industrial, which is created and used to satisfy the individual and special needs of people. Strange as it may seem, this being, having once arisen by the will of man, then continues to exist relatively independent of man, and sometimes of humanity, for a very long time, spanning centuries and millennia. So, for example, tools and means of transportation change faster than material objects used by an individual for life (home), education (books), and everyday life (tables, chairs). In the relationship between the first and second natures, the determining role belongs to the first, if only because without its participation not only the existence, but also the creation of the “second nature” is impossible. At the same time, and this has become especially noticeable and noticeable in the last century, the second nature has the ability to locally destroy the “first” being. Currently, this manifests itself in the form of environmental problems caused by ill-conceived or socially uncontrolled human activities. Although the “second nature” cannot destroy the first being, considered in its cosmic dimensions, nevertheless, irreparable damage can be caused to earthly existence as a result of destructive actions, which under certain circumstances will make the physical existence of a person impossible.

It is impossible not to touch upon such a feature of human existence as the dependence of his bodily actions on social motivations. While other natural things and bodies function automatically and their behavior in the short and long term can be predicted with reasonable certainty, this cannot be done with respect to the human body. His activities and actions are often regulated not by biological instincts, but by spiritual, moral and social motives. It is necessary to mention such forms of human existence as individualized spiritual existence and universal human spiritual existence. By spirituality, without pretending to cover its entire essence, we mean the unity of the conscious and unconscious in human activity, morality, artistic creativity, knowledge materialized in specific symbols and objects. Individualized spiritual being is, first of all, the consciousness of the individual, his conscious activity, which includes elements of the unconscious or unconscious. The individualized spiritual is to a certain extent, although not very significant, connected with the evolution of universal existence, but in general it is a relatively independent form of existence. In general, it exists and makes itself felt due to the fact that there is another form of spiritual existence - universal human spiritual existence, which, in turn, is also relatively independent and could not exist without individual human consciousness. Therefore, these forms of being can and should be considered only in indissoluble unity. The objective and material manifestation of universal human spiritual existence is literature, works of art, industrial and technical objects, moral principles, ideas about state and political system public life. This form of spiritual existence is practically eternal, however, purely in the human time dimension, because her life is determined by the existence of the human race. Individualized spiritual existence and universal human spiritual existence, although created artificially, without them the existence of humanity would be impossible.

A holistic world is a universal unity that includes an immense variety of things, processes, states, organisms, structures, systems, and human individuals existing in their concreteness and integrity. Following the philosophical tradition, all of them can be called existing, and the world as a whole can be called existing as such. The universal connections of being are manifested only through connections between individual beings. Every being is unique. Unique external and internal conditions, in other words, the situation of the existence of everything that exists in the world (or, to express this using philosophical terminology, the unique “present being” of every existing thing). The certainty of a being characterizes the individuality of its being and its place in the whole being. The conditions, moments of a given existence, its “instants” are never reproduced again and do not remain unchanged. Some philosophers rightly argue that every being is the bearer of a unique essence inherent only to it.

Recognition of the uniqueness (singularity) of each being is especially important for the doctrine of man. From the conscious uniqueness of each person’s existence it directly follows most important rule humanism: recognizing and respecting the unique being in every person.

But no matter how unique the individual manifestations of being are and no matter how important this uniqueness is for people, their practice and knowledge urgently require that the individual be generalized, united into groups, as well as into very extensive wholes. When uniting individual beings in integrity, human thought necessarily takes into account how exactly the individual exists. Catching a certain similarity of conditions and modes of existence of individual beings, philosophy unites them into various groups, which are characterized by a common form of being. There are many such groups (we will talk here only about the basic forms of being). The differentiation and unification of what exists, from the point of view of belonging to a specific form of being, is the starting point of the most ordinary, everyday life of people. They necessarily take into account the differences in forms of existence in all areas of activity, although they do not always think about it. After all, processing the material of nature, which has not been touched by human hands, is in most cases not the same as transforming things and processes that have already come out of the crucible human activity; It is necessary to influence the living human body, and even more so on the thoughts and feelings of people, differently than on things of nature.

And first of all, you need to know how those objects, those givens with which a person deals, are “present” in the world, that is, have an idea of the specifics of their existence. However, at the same time, a person - no matter how specific practical problems he solves and no matter how far he is from philosophy - cannot do without at least some basic knowledge and skills that allow him to “take into account” existence as such. And this, in particular, means: it is necessary to distinguish between existing and being (contrary to those teachings where they are identified). However, not only to distinguish, but also to connect them. M. Heidegger emphasized: traditional philosophy (even that which called itself ontology, that is, the doctrine of being) focused mainly on the problem of existence. This manifested the “oblivion of being,” which Heidegger saw as a feature of the metaphysics and worldview of European humanity, which determined the tragedy of its fate. A turn from “only existing” to “being itself” is what Heidegger demanded from the new ontology. And this is not an idle or abstract thought. Indeed, humanity tends to show interest in momentary problems and tasks (in concrete existence); in such, for example, “concerns” the most modern weapons mass destruction. Of people for a long time cared little about how it would affect the fate of the world - nature, humanity, civilization, culture. Heidegger is right: the time has come to “become concerned” with being itself. This task is inextricably linked with the philosophical understanding of existence and its forms.

The problem of forms of being is, therefore, important for the everyday practice and cognitive activity of people (even if in life it is most often comprehended and discussed not in philosophical terms).

It is also fundamentally important for philosophy. Let us remember: when defining being, we first settled on the fact that the (different) wholes of the world exist equally and that this gives them all the character of reality, creates the precondition for the unity of the world. Now let us focus on the dialectical differences between the main forms of being - dialectical in the sense that the universal connections of being, the interrelations between these forms, will not be lost sight of.

It is advisable to highlight the following differing, but also interconnected basic forms of being:

1) the existence of things (bodies), processes, which in turn is divided into the existence of things, processes, states of nature, the existence of nature as a whole and the existence of things and processes produced by man;

2) human existence, which is (conditionally) divided into human existence in the world of things and specifically human existence;

3) the existence of the spiritual (ideal), which is divided into individualized spiritual and objectified (non-individual) spiritual;

4) social existence, which is divided into individual existence (the existence of an individual in society and in the process of history) and the existence of society.

The first three forms will be discussed in this chapter, and the fourth form will be analyzed in the chapter on society.

Philosophy presents a fairly wide range of opinions about the role and meaning of categories: from Hegel, who built his entire philosophical concept on the basis of the logical self-development of categorical structures, to Russell, who expressed his firm conviction that the term “category” itself is completely useless “because of its complete ambiguity."

However, in the overwhelming majority of existing and existing philosophical systems, this term is used quite widely. Its most common use is associated with the grouping of objects, phenomena, persons that have any common characteristics into categories and groups or, conversely, with the isolation of the same kind of categories and groups from some previously undifferentiated unity. Even in everyday speech, the word “category” is often used as a synonym for the words “group”, “category” or “genus”. It would seem that what is unclear here?

And yet, in philosophy, there have been lively debates and discussions around categories for more than two millennia, which continue to this day. Let's try to outline at least the main approaches to defining this concept and highlight the main groups of ideas about its philosophical interpretations.

The term “category” itself is borrowed from the vocabulary trial. In ancient Greek legal proceedings, this word literally meant “accusation, condemnation” and acted as an antonym of the word “apology” - “defense, justification” (perhaps it is to this literal meaning that the use of the adjective “categorically” in everyday language goes back to in the sense of “directly, decisively, sharp"). How and when does the meaning of the term of interest to us “drift” from “accusation” to “separation and union” and further to “group, category and genus”?

In the history of philosophy, teachings on categories have concentrated mainly around ontological, epistemological and logical issues, although recently there has been a tendency to understand categories as predominantly linguistic constructs. The key points in the development of these teachings are the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel.

Ontological interpretation of categories. The first developed system of philosophical categories is presented in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle talks about categories, considering them primarily in ontological terms. And although in Aristotelian philosophy categories also play a significant epistemological role, nevertheless, the categorical structure of thinking is considered by him as secondary, derived from the categorical structure of being. It is in the categories that Aristotle sees the basis of the internal distinctions of being, which determine the properties on the basis of which individual entities are distinguished, recorded and cognized. Categories play an important role in his system, but to understand it, one will have to general outline touch on the more general problem that Aristotle seeks to solve when starting to develop his doctrine of categories.

The earliest philosophical concepts of being expressed two diametrically opposed approaches to its definition. On the one hand, Heraclitus believed that being is a multitude of individual sensory objects, each of which differs not only from any other, but also from itself, since, changing over time, at each moment it will no longer be the same as before . On the other hand, Parmenides believed that being is a kind of unity, an undifferentiated integrity, absorbing and containing in itself in a “fused”, indistinguishably fused form everything individual.

The world of Heraclitus is “a river that cannot be entered twice,” a stormy stream in which every thing appears for a brief moment and, having flashed, disappears to give way to a new one. In this world, everything arises and dies, but never exists steadily and firmly; this is a world of eternal becoming, “being,” but not true being. For cognitive thinking, the Heraclitean world is “nothing”; it constantly flows escapes from a thought that simply has nothing to “catch onto” in him.

The world of Parmenides, “like the solid mass of a well-rounded ball,” on the contrary, is not a world of becoming, but of genuine being - extremely stable, unshakable and completely monolithic. Such existence is inaccessible to sensory perception; it can only be thought. But how? If the world of Heraclitus is a collection of individuals, then the Parmenidean world is a pure and indivisible abstract universality. Thought slips off from this “well rounded ball”, without finding in it any distinctions, no support for more specific definitions.

We find ourselves in a seemingly completely hopeless situation: the individual is unknowable, since it is fluid, transient, but the general is also unknowable, since it is whole, undivided. In search of a way out of this impasse, Aristotle develops his ontological concept, the most important place in which is occupied by the doctrine of categories. He proposes to find something in which both the unchanging self-identity of the truly existing (true being) and the separation, isolation of the particular, would be simultaneously present. "this one""the existence of transitory things.

It is obvious that only that which is equally capable of existence and non-existence can be transitory, arise and disappear. Origination and destruction, therefore, concern things that may or may not exist, and therefore everything that changes is neither perfect being nor absolute nothing, but is in the middle, between non-existence and being. What appears as a real existence cannot appear on its own, without any reason. Everything that arises, before it is actually realized, must already exist as potentially possible. The possible cannot be considered to exist in the full sense, however, and it is also impossible to completely deny its existence. It does not really exist, but at the same time, as Aristotle believes, it “in some way” exists, in contrast to, say, the impossible, from that which cannot exist at all. The possible, thus, appears before us as something internally contradictory, as the unity of two opposing alternatives of development: towards being or towards non-existence.

The development “towards being” constitutes a transition from the general, but only possible “being in general”, to the individualized, special “this” concrete actual being of a separate thing. In the process of development, the first dividing lines are “drawn” on the monolithic “mass” of universal existence, dividing it into more and more clearly distinguishable divisions and fragments. Each such fragment is gradually individualized and acquires character traits, increasingly distinguishing him from all others. This division continues until the difference reaches such a level that the object becomes distinct from others, a recognizable, truly individualized object. Aristotle calls this object an essence.

Essence is the limit of division of existence, it is, so to speak, an “atom of being,” a separate thing that exists independently, but still retains a genetic connection with the being of the general from which it grew, and in which it remains rooted as its basis. At the very origins of this individualized, “atomic being” we find categories - those first dividing lines from which the separation of individual essences from the undivided unity of existence begins. Thus, the main ontological significance of categories is to provide certainty to entities. Being as such is pure possibility everyone of things. Real reality consists of many individual(singled out from the original universality) of things. These are many separate things form, in which being appears before us, hiding its internal unity under external diversity.

For each individual thing, being as such does not in itself constitute its essence. It represents only a common substrate from which individual things grow and develop. Categories can be likened to certain lines of internal tension along which the primary “crystallization” of the structures of a specific being from the initial amorphous “melt” begins.

As the most fundamental differences within being as such, Aristotle calls the categories “the first genera of beings.” There are ten such initial genera - categories - in his system: 1) essence; 2) quality; 3) quantity; 4) attitude; 5) place; b) time; 7) position; 8) possession; 9) action; 10) suffering.

The formation of a thing is associated with the separation of pure possibility from undivided existence and its isolation as a separate object, distinct from all other objects. In the process of implementation (reification, or, more precisely, implementation) from the many potential options for possible existence carried out one single thing - a specific thing arises. This thing is different from all others in its quality and size ( quantity), place And time of its existence, position in space, character relationship to all other things; it differs in that has certain features, is actively current or affected by (suffering).

As a result, some part of existence gains certainty and turns into an independent existing object, different from all others and, thanks to this, receiving the right to its own name. Here, now, being appears before us as Socrates, over there as a house, there as a horse, and further away as a tree. However, each of these objects arose for a reason, did not appear suddenly, straight out of nowhere. He is “what being has become” in its individual manifestation - “this, concrete being,” or, as Aristotle says, essence.

Essence is the latest in the “diairesis” (dismemberment) of being and at the same time the most complex category; with it, as a further indivisible unit, the division of existence (being) into genera and species ends. However, although the essence appears as an individualized being, its singularity is not the absolute singularity of an isolated object “suspended” in the void. It is included in groups of entities homogeneous with it, which arose as a result of similar “divisions” of existence and formed “kinds” of objects coexisting in one time or in the same position, having the same qualities or equal in size ( quantity). It is precisely thanks to participation in these categorical “kinds” that each entity, being separate and independent, is not completely torn away from existence as such, but remains rooted in this universal substratum as specific generation universal being.

The etymology of the ancient Greek word “ousia” (essence) goes back to its everyday meaning - “acquired property, acquired fortune, property.” But what does a thing acquire in the process of its formation? Certainty! Being pure potency, existence itself is devoid of certainty, since it acts as the fundamental beginning of all principles - the universal substrate of all kinds of things. The essence, being a single thing, at the same time combines many abstract definitions. It exists simultaneously with other entities and in this respect turns out to be identical to them, although it may differ in all other respects. It may be identical to other entities in size or position, but differs from them in some other respects. It is united, but at the same time all its features are, as it were, “distributed” across a number of categorical structures, in each of which it is “represented” by one of its sides. But as a single concrete thing, it always acts as a unique and unique combination of the diversity of its inherent general characteristics. It is this diversity of definitions that constitutes the wealth of the essence, its “property” - the totality of the “inalienable” inherent in it. properties”, acquired in the course of the categorical “diairesis” of being.

Now, perhaps, it will become clear to us why, when discussing the metaphysical problems of being and knowledge, Aristotle uses the terminology of the trial. Just as the judicial accusation is associated with exposure, the disclosure of the true essence of events, categorical analysis is associated with the disclosure, the discovery of the truth of existence, with its separation from everything imaginary and illusory. Thus, the ontological doctrine of categories, developed by the great Stagirite, becomes the basis of his epistemology.

Being as such reveals itself to us as “divided” into ten main “headings” - categories, therefore the categories, constituting the main types of being, simultaneously act as the main types of concepts about being. Consequently, knowledge about being must be structured by the same categories as the cognizable itself, i.e. being. Three important epistemological principles follow from this.

First, cognition various things can and should be guided universal principles and a unified methodology, since, no matter how individual entities differ from each other, they are all involved in a single being, and each of them, in its own way, has passed the same path of “diairesis” from universal being to a single, independently existing thing.

Secondly, the path of knowledge is the path of ascent from the individual properties of a thing to its generalized “generic” characteristics and further to being as such. Walking along this path, we seem to be tracing in reverse order the successive stages of the genesis of “this” specific thing, “returning” to its origins, which originate in the undifferentiated universality of pure being.

Thirdly, in order to obtain comprehensive knowledge about a thing or event, it is necessary to study it from the point of view of all categories. By using categories, we are able to group conceivable objects into groups and classes; we can subsume any object under one of the categories or present it in the form of some fusion of several of them.

It is easy to see that, taken together, the listed guidelines express in general terms the fundamental principles of classical European science. Ordinary knowledge deals exclusively with the individual, limiting itself to sensory images of individual things. The categorical structures on which science relies allow it to organize research in such a way as to consider many objects that are similar in one way or another as a single genus, that is, to talk about it as one object. Thus, ascending the steps of categorical generalizations, we rise from the sensory perception of individual objects to an understanding of the laws of the possibility and impossibility of their existence. The task of the special sciences is to reveal the universal certainties of individual essences and their closest genera. Questions about existence, about the origins and primary causes of things go beyond the boundaries of any science and constitute the sphere of philosophical knowledge, the subject of which is that very universal existence possible, from which, as from a universal substrate, the truly realized, valid worlds and destinies.

Epistemological interpretation of categories. In ontological discourse, the main purpose of categories is separation original integrity being, in epistemological terms - they are understood as providing unity human knowledge. The ontological understanding of categories is presented in the philosophical tradition dating back to Aristotle; the development of their epistemological interpretation is associated mainly with the name of Kant.

Stagirite believed that categories perform, first of all, an analytical function: they dismember, crush the “monolithic body” of being, as a result of which it, in the form of separate individual entities (things), becomes accessible to our knowledge. And only insofar as the categories have already served as the basis and form of analysis (division) of being, they can be considered as the basis and form for subsequent synthesis - the unification in cognitive thinking of already existing “units of being” into generalized genera and species.

Kant's line of reasoning is diametrically opposed to Aristotle's. He considers the main function of categories to be not analytical, but synthetic. In the process of cognition, thanks to categories, the human mind carries out synthesis - unification - of disparate sensory impressions into stable integral complexes, which become the objects of our judgments. And only secondarily, from these “constructed” by our consciousness according to the laws of categorical synthesis of objects, an object world is formed, which, in contrast to the undivided (and therefore unknowable) world of “things-in-themselves,” becomes the actual object of our cognition.

Kant focuses his closest attention on the study of human cognitive experience. Unlike his predecessors, the Koenigsberg philosopher is not limited to the traditional understanding of experience as a simple act of direct interaction of an object with a person’s cognitive abilities, but strives to reveal its internal structure, highlight its component parts and demonstrate the nature of their interaction. We will not analyze in detail the entire course of Kant’s reasoning; it is enough to consider in general terms that part of it that is directly related to our subject, that is, to the categories.

Kant proceeds from the fact that human knowledge begins with experience. It is experience that stimulates all the cognitive abilities inherent in a person to activity, therefore it is impossible for there to be any meaningful knowledge that precedes experience. However, although knowledge begins with experience and in no way can precede it in time, it does not at all follow that it comes entirely from experience!

Arising from experience, from sensory perception of the phenomena of reality, human knowledge is formalized in the form of judgments about objects that exist in this reality. Taking a close look at the judgments that “shape” our empirical experience, we, following Kant, can notice that they contain something that was completely absent from the original sensory impressions. Let's take the most elementary, most common empirical proposition: “The sun shining on a stone heats it up.” What happens when we formulate this judgment?

From the kaleidoscopic flow of impressions, two “nodes” stand out, which, “contracting” to the centers, form ideas about two objects: “sun” and “stone”. A relationship is established between these objects in which the object “sun” actively influences the object “stone”, changing one of its sensory characteristics. At the “input” - at the level of direct sensory perception - we have a disordered chaos of disparate impressions; at the “output” - at the level of judgments - a certain idea of the relationship between two localized objects, in each of which its inherent properties are organized into a stable unity. The situation is even more complicated with propositions in which we extend our empirical knowledge of an object to all objects of that kind, such as, for example, “All stones illuminated by the sun become hot.”

What All stones illuminated by the sun become hot cannot in any way be deduced from our experience, since it can never comprehend precisely All stones. Experience is always limited and incomplete, therefore experimental knowledge by its very nature cannot have either stable unity or strict universality. However, if we carefully examine the formulation of any scientific law, we will see that it is expressed in a judgment that has unity, universality, and necessity, for example: “Every body immersed in a liquid... etc.”

Kant calls judgments of this kind a priori synthetic judgments. The main task of scientific knowledge is to develop and justify precisely such universal formulations that expand our knowledge, extending it to entire classes of homogeneous objects. Science rests on a priori synthetic judgments as its fundamental principles; such are, for example, the principles of conservation of matter, energy, etc. But the essence of the problem that Kant poses is that the universality and necessity of such formulations cannot be based on empirical experience, since they always go far beyond its limits.

Necessary and universal synthetic judgments have no right to exist - and yet they exist. Centuries-old history science testifies that theoretical knowledge, which consists of a priori synthetic judgments that have necessary and universal significance, exists and, moreover, functions effectively. Therefore, Kant sees his main task not as an apology for such judgments, but in revealing the mechanism of their formation.

The process of cognition involves two “partners”: sensory experience and reasoning thinking. If the unity, necessity and universality of judgments are not directly derived from sensory experience, but are nevertheless clearly present in them, then they are introduced by reason, because they simply have nowhere else to come from. Kant believes that the very activity of reasoning thinking consists in synthesis, in grouping the motley chaos of sensory impressions, according to predetermined universal structures, which he calls categories. It is the categories that represent a priori, internally inherent forms of cognition in our mind, which in no way can be derived from experience, but, on the contrary, act as its necessary initial condition.

Taking as a basis the main types of judgments known in logic, Kant identifies the categories underlying each of them. The result is a table of four groups, three categories in each (twelve categories in total), exhaustively representing all variants of the synthetic activity of the mind.

Speaking in the language of analogies, the action of these schemes can be represented as follows. Take a book that contains valuable information. If necessary, this information can be easily retrieved by reading the book. Let's take a thousand books and dump them in a disorderly heap in the corner. The amount of information has increased a thousand times, but its value becomes zero, because it is almost impossible to extract any information from the disordered mass of books. useful information. To prevent this from happening, there is one system library classification, available in every library even before the start of its work. Each book arriving in any library is immediately sent to a place previously provided for by a universal classification for all books of this kind.

The epistemological functions of Kant's categories are somewhat similar to the functions of such a universal library classification. Even before the beginning of any empirical experience, the consciousness of any person contains a universal categorical scheme of its (still only future) organization. Therefore, the ordering of experience begins not after its completion, but immediately, directly at the moment of its implementation. At the same time, despite the fact that experience different people may be different, they still do not cease to understand each other, since the forms of organization of this experience remain universal.

Kant's categories - unlike Aristotle's - are not categories of being, but of thinking. They operate in the “gap” between the spontaneous flow of sensory impressions and the universal-universal constructions of a priori synthetic judgments, the unity and universality of which are ensured solely through categories as universal principles of the systematizing activity of the mind. Consequently, both the unity of the objects that are the subjects of such judgments and the universality of the laws expressed in them exist not in nature, but only in the imagination of the thinking subject.

The categorical synthesis carried out by the human mind literally creates a system of experience, or, what is the same thing, a system of nature. “The thing-in-itself” is an external reality that exists before cognition and is independent of it, does not manifest itself in any specific forms. It only stimulates our cognitive abilities and gives them an impulse to action. But the result of this action - the image of the external world, consisting of many independent objects, separated from each other, interconnected by stable, law-based relationships - is determined, first of all, by organizational forms our cognitive abilities. An illustration here can be the well-known psychological Rorschach test: a person is presented with a series of shapeless blots in which he can “see” a cloud, a butterfly, a tree and other objects. It is nothing other than his own consciousness that “shapes” initially vague figures and synthesizes completely certain images specific things.

So, according to Kant, certainty is brought into the world solely through the activity of our consciousness. The very concept of certainty presupposes the establishment limits- boundaries separating some objects from others. Categories act as the first dividing lines, thanks to which a certain order is introduced into the world.

Initially inherent in the individual consciousness of each individual person, the categorical structure acts as an immutable rule for the synthesis of sensory impressions. It is according to these rules that the objects of our experience, which we perceive as natural objects, are formed. Thus, all possible perceptions and, in general, everything that can constitute objects of empirical knowledge depend on the categories and must be subordinate to them. We, the way our minds are structured, look at the world through “categorical glasses” and never, no matter how hard we try, will be able to get rid of them. Therefore, even the most elementary image of “this stone” is the result of a categorical synthesis carried out by the mind. We cannot think of a single object except through categories; we cannot know a single object except through intuitions corresponding to the categories.

In Kant's epistemological interpretation, categories are not derived from nature, but exist in consciousness as universal principles for the synthesis of human knowledge. Their main function is that they predetermine the forms of systematization of experience, introducing a certain order into the chaos of sensory impressions. Categories ensure the unity and consistency of phenomena observed and described in experience, and therefore, they prescribe laws to nature as the totality of all possible phenomena. If in the Aristotelian ontological interpretation categories are considered as “patterns” rooted in being, with which the activity of the cognitive mind is conformed, then from the epistemological concept it follows that nature itself must be conformed to the categories. This tendency to subordinate the natural world to categories is expressed even more sharply in the logical interpretation of Hegel.

Categories in the system of dialectical logic. Hegel considers the main subject of his Logic to be necessary determinations of thought or pure concepts, which he, following Aristotle and Kant, calls categories. However, unlike his predecessors, he strives not to simply list categories or systematize them in the form of a table, but presents them in the form of a dynamically developing logically connected system. If Aristotle and Kant were talking about categories of science, then Hegelian logic itself becomes special science of categories, in which each category must be derived from a single basis and presented as a logical stage of a single process of dialectical development.

Naturally, a simple enumeration of Hegel’s categories cannot give a complete idea of his entire system, and a complete presentation of it within the confines of a small essay is completely impossible. Apparently, for the first acquaintance it will be enough to outline its starting and ending points and show general principles construction.

Hegel is by no means convinced of the reality of independently existing individual objects. He believes that only something unified, integral can be recognized as unconditionally existing. However, unlike Parmenides, he believes that such integrity is not absolutely simple and monolithic, but is a complex formation, all parts of which constitute, as it were, a single organism and have real existence only to the extent that they are parts of a single whole. The whole, in all its complexity, combines being and thinking and is called the “Absolute Idea” or “Absolute Spirit.” Thus, thinking in Hegelian philosophy is completely identified with being, and its logic simultaneously becomes ontology, that is, it appears in two faces at once: and as the science of necessary definitions thoughts, and as a science of universal definitions being(which, however, as a result turns out to be only two different hypostases of the same Absolute idea).

The absolute idea, being both a subject and an object of development, first appears in its logic pure form, unencumbered by anything natural, no sensuality. The development of this idea is carried out in the form of a consistent deployment of a system of categories, which are not just forms of thinking opposed to the natural world (as was the case with Kant), but universal forms of both being and thinking at the same time. Thus, in the doctrine of dialectical self-development of categories, fundamental principle Hegelian philosophy - the identity of being and thinking.

Thinking exists from the beginning. It exists insofar as being exists, or rather, it itself is being. But this is still completely undeveloped, and therefore devoid of any positive content, “thinking about nothing” - completely pure, empty thinking. This pure thinking-being is in reality complete uncertainty and emptiness. Nothing can be contemplated in him, just as he himself has nothing to think about. It is in fact pure nothingness.

So, the thesis is accepted as the starting point: “The Absolute is pure being" But were we wrong? After all, pure being without any further definitions is nothing. Perhaps the antithesis would be more correct: “The Absolute is nothing"? Not the same again. The antithesis turns out to be just as one-sided as the thesis. Let's try to combine both of these positions and imagine the Absolute as the unity of being and non-being. But the unity of being and non-being is becoming. As a result, we obtain a synthesis of thesis and antithesis: “The Absolute is becoming." Thus, thanks to the exclusively dialectical play of categories, we come to the understanding that the truth of being and non-being lies in the unity of both, and this unity is becoming. The essence of Hegelian dialectics lies precisely in the fact that the development of the original idea is carried out precisely through the collision of opposing definitions and the logical deployment of its internal potential through the gradual elimination of previous errors.

But let's follow a few more rounds of this dialectical game. As a result of becoming, being receives its first definitions and appears before us no longer as pure, but as existence(Dasein), as some well-defined “what” or quality. The antithesis of quality, or qualitative certainty, is quantity- certainty, the change of which does not affect the fundamental characteristics of existing existence (so a forest remains a forest, and a field remains a field, despite the fact that they can become larger or smaller). But every existing being is a unity of quality and quantity. Therefore, the truth of these two opposing definitions of being will be their unity, synthesis, expressed in the category measures. This completes the circle of categories of existence, and the game moves to the next level, where it unfolds according to the same three-fold scheme: thesis - essence, antithesis - phenomenon, synthesis - reality. In this dialectical “game,” development occurs exclusively in the sphere of thinking as a result of the synthesis of opposing, boundary definitions of extremely broad universal logical concepts- categories.

A generalized description of any development requires an answer to at least three questions: What is it developing? Of what? and to what? These are the three main definitions that make up the topic of development. What is this being; what is this base made of? essence; what is the goal or Absolute idea.

In accordance with the dialectical principle of the movement of knowledge round, in the last, highest, category, all previous ones are contained in the form of canceled, “sublated” moments, just as in the first, lowest, category, all subsequent ones are contained, but in the form of undeveloped rudiments. From being the entire system of Hegelian categories unfolds, blossoms in magnificent color and again collapses into An absolute idea. The entire system of categories is contained in it, as it were, in a collapsed form. And if we analyze it in detail and decompose it into separate elements, then we will not find in it any fundamentally new content in comparison with what was already potentially inherent at the very beginning of the dialectical series. The absolute idea differs from pure being only “by the amount of experience.” Thus, a child who read a theological treatise yesterday can talk thoughtfully about God, but you must agree that from the lips of an old man wise in life, the same words are perceived completely differently.

In Hegel's philosophy, categories act not only as stages of historically developing knowledge, but also as the absolute hierarchical order of the universe, with which everything that exists is conformed. They represent ideal entities that express the substantive moments of the absolute idea, and at the same time - the stages of its dialectical development. Being forms creative activity spirit, they determine the essence of material things, which is then isolated from them and reproduced in the content scientific knowledge. Both the absolute idea itself and its particular definitions - categories - have unconditional logical priority in relation to all things and processes of nature and man. They permeate all things and processes of the sensory world, acting as their universal, their law.

Since the Hegelian dialectic of categories unfolds exclusively in the sphere of the universal - from pure being to the Absolute Idea, its definitions are free from any sensibility. Hegel himself calls his logical system a “kingdom of shadows,” in which being “an absolute education and discipline of consciousness.” This discipline consists in the fact that a person, practicing purely logical thinking, I have weaned myself from mixing into my thoughts my personal opinions, passions and desires, which “blur” the clear contours of impeccably logical categorical distinctions of being. Hegel finally clears thinking of all “corporality,” which is fully present in Aristotle and still looms somewhere on the horizon as an infinitely distant but still existing “thing-in-itself” in Kant. “When I think,” says Hegel, “I renounce my subjective peculiarity, delve deeper into the subject, allow thinking to act independently, and I think poorly if I add something of my own.”

Indeed, devoid of any subjectivity, completely impersonal definitions of Hegelian dialectics become like flat shadows, but these are impeccably precise shadows, with sharp boundaries strictly separating one object from another. Divided into clear categories by a “diamond network” of categorical definitions, the world turns into a pattern of geometric shapes, the outline of which is a system of dialectical categories. However, acquiring logical harmony, such a world becomes non-human-sized. This is, strictly speaking, the world necessary And universal world global processes and mass movements, the world of “main lines of development”, among which the sufferings and concerns of an individual are lost, seem so small and insignificant.

Marx, accepting mainly Hegelian dialectics, will try to turn it to man by “changing signs.” He strives to consider the dialectics of categories as the “dialectics of nature,” as a logical expression of the universal laws of the objective material world reflected in human consciousness. However, the tendency inherent in the Hegelian system to think and act “en grand” turned out to be stronger, and the person somehow gradually fell out of the theory and practice of orthodox Marxism. Philosophers have gone much further along the path of “humanization” of categorical schemes, considering categories primarily in a linguistic context.

Categories and language. In “Prolegomena to any future metaphysics...” Kant outlines two ways to study categories. The first is focused on finding and systematizing really concepts (words) existing in everyday knowledge (or, which is practically the same thing, in language), which, not being based on any special experience, nevertheless constantly occur in any experimental knowledge (or in its verbal expression ). The second way consists in constructing, on the basis of previously developed rules, a complete speculative scheme of rational concepts, which would represent a universal logical model of the functioning of pure reason as such, considered without regard to the historical conditions of life of its bearer - man, and to the content of the material being processed.

Kant himself chooses the second path, which ultimately leads to the cold heights of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. But his main idea that the structures of being depend, even on universal, but still human definitions, turned out to be more fruitful precisely on the first path, leading to the development of a linguistic interpretation of categories, stimulated primarily by Humboldt’s research.

As has already been shown, the main function of categories is to introduce (by isolating structure-forming elements) a certain order into a certain undifferentiated or unorganized integrity. This order, one way or another, is expressed (or displayed) in language. The lexical composition of a language and the set of categories basically coincide, and every word, insofar as it generalizes, acts as a category for a certain set of things. Thanks to this coincidence, even a person who is completely unaware of the existence of theoretical reconstructions of categorical analysis and synthesis is able to see a certain order in the world, expressed in the structure of his native language.

However, just like categories (all the same - in their ontological, epistemological or logical sense), language is not derived by each individual person directly from his individual experience. Humboldt considers language not innate to each individual, but an external product of the people and history. Each individual receives it as the legacy of a long series of past generations. Like any inheritance, language, on the one hand, enriches, and on the other hand, binds a person before and independently of him with established norms and rules. Thus, being subjective in relation to the cognizable, the norms and rules of language are objective in relation to the cognizer.

Human speech is unthinkable as absolutely “pure speech”, devoid of any specific content. Any conversation is a conversation about something. This “something” is the subject of speech, isolated and recorded in the word. Therefore, in words as lexical units of language, both the primary division of being and the primary synthesis of sensory impressions already occur.

The history of language does not have a clearly defined beginning. No matter how far our research goes into the depths of centuries, wherever we find people, we find them already speaking. Any, even the most primitive, rites and rituals are associated with the linguistic expression of certain symbols and ideas. It is impossible for them to be committed by non-speaking, and therefore non-thinking, beings. But it is also impossible that in the thinking of people who have words, those initial divisions of being and thought that already exist in language are completely absent. The idea of pure thinking, devoid of any content, working “idling”, is an abstraction that was formed quite late on the basis of the Cartesian cogito. Real thinking is never pure “thinking about anything”; it always has an intentional character, is always directed at an object, there is always thinking about something specific.

Only at first glance it may seem that language is like sign system completely neutral in relation to thought, which can be expressed in any arbitrarily chosen system of signs: sound, graphic, color, etc. In this case, it turns out that thought arises before language and is only expressed in it. Thinking finds language as a form (more precisely, as one of the possible forms) of the external expression of an already existing own content. In reality, the connection between thinking and language is much more dense. This becomes noticeable when posing the question of the genesis of language.

Phylogeny (historical development), as a rule, is reproduced in individual development- ontogeny. As J. Piaget's research has shown, the formation of categories in the child's mind occurs as he masters the corresponding language structures. First, the child masters complex syntactic phrases such as “because”, “where”, “after”, “despite”, “if”, etc., which serve to express causal, spatial, temporal, conditional, etc. i.e. categorical relations. Categories are not derived from subject experience, but are mastered along with language acquisition and are consolidated, first of all, in the practice of verbal communication. They are realized much later than they begin to be used in practice. Apparently, the order of the historical development of categories was basically the same.

There is an organic connection between categories and certain types of very real practical issues, each of which can be formulated with direct use of the corresponding category: Where? -In which space! When? -In which time? etc. But vice versa, each category can be expressed in the form of a question: What is this? - category of entity; Where when? - categories of space and time; Which one?, How much? - quality and quantity; Why? -causes; For what? - goal category.

We ask being about those aspects, properties and characteristics that constitute the sphere of our vital interests. Categories are the lines along which the fragments and relationships that interest us are separated from the general mass and appear before us as objects of our attention. Each category represents a specific angle, under which being is considered from its own special point of view, and all together they form a kind of functional unity, enshrined in the language system. Every speaker of a language is involved in this system, but this does not mean that its use is intentional and fully conscious. A person speaks a language no less, and perhaps more than a person speaks a language. A language does not fully belong to any one speaker; it exists fully only in a cultural community.

The culture of each community, like its language, is different from the culture and language of every other community. This gives us every reason to assume that the dividing lines that language draws across the monolith of being can form worlds with different configurations. This idea was first expressed in the well-known hypothesis about linguistic relativity, often called after its authors, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. “We dismember nature,” says Whorf, “in the direction suggested by our native language. We distinguish certain categories and types in the world of phenomena not at all because they (these categories and types) are self-evident... We dismember the world, organize it into concepts and distribute meanings one way and not another, mainly because we are participants in an agreement that prescribes such systematization... It is impossible to determine a phenomenon, thing, object, relationship, etc., based on nature; their definition always involves referring to the categories of one or another specific language» .

The essence of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity is that the organization of the world of our experience depends on the categorical structure of a particular language, therefore even the same event can look completely different, depending on the linguistic means used. Indeed, a world in which “the rooster calls the hens with his cry” is different from a world where “the rooster’s cry sets the hens in motion.”

By accepting this hypothesis, we transfer categories from the spheres of Aristotle's being, Kant's pure reason or Hegel's Absolute Spirit into the sphere of human language and thereby say goodbye to the hope that inspired these thinkers to discover (or create) an absolutely complete and complete system of categories that would be one and only "for all times and peoples." By placing categories in linguistic structures, we recognize that they express not being as such or consciousness in general, but the specific life world of a person belonging to a certain culture and historical era.

The idea of connecting categories with the immediate life world human being is developed in modern versions of phenomenological-existential philosophy. In the traditional sense, categories serve, first of all, to highlight and designate what is most important and significant for a person. But what seems important and significant from the point of view of the whole - a cultural community, for example - can be completely indifferent to an individual, “this” person. For an individual, the most important thing may be that which directly affects him, concerns specifically and only his individual existence: his fears and hopes, aspirations and complexes, doubts and fears. Thus, in the context of philosophical research, completely non-traditional, so-called “existential categories” appear, such as, for example, “death”, “fear”, “abandonment”, “care”, etc.

To summarize our analysis, we can say the following. Regardless of the context of their interpretation, philosophical categories represent extremely broad generic definitions of being. As extremely general genera, they themselves do not have a higher genus standing above them and, therefore, cannot, like concepts, be defined through assignment to a higher genus, with an indication of the specific difference. They are determined not through higher genera, but by establishing relationships with other categories. Concepts that are included in the semantic field of each category are subordinate to it and express certain aspects, shades and specific forms of manifestation. The relationship between categories and concepts can be illustrated as follows.

Every concept has a specific subject area or scope, which includes many subjects covered by this concept. So, for example, the scope of the concept “table” is the set of all possible tables, and the concept “house” is the set of all possible houses. It is clear that, since we mean not only actually existing ones, but also all possible tables or houses, the volume of each of these concepts is an infinite set, so we cannot say which of these concepts has a larger volume and which has a smaller one. However, there are concepts whose relationships are such that they make it possible to unambiguously determine which of the two infinities being compared is greater. So, for example, the infinite number of birches is clearly less than the infinite number of trees, and the infinity of trees is less than the infinity of plants. We get a hierarchical series of concepts in which each subsequent one includes the previous one as its own. component: birch - tree - plant - wildlife - nature - being. This series is completed by a concept that exhausts the possibility of further expansion of the volume. This is a philosophical category, which acts as an extremely broad generalization, the absolute limit of further expansion of the subject area.

Concepts of lower levels of generality delineate the boundaries of subject areas of specific sciences and act as categories of a particular science, since they perform (within the area they limit) the same role of ultimate generalizations. So, for example, if the subject of philosophy is being, That nature - This is a subject of natural science in general, nature lived- subject of biology, plant- botanists, and surely there is some science whose subject is only trees. Scientific categories not only highlight the corresponding subject area, but also impart internal unity to it. After all, all individual objects assigned to a given area can be spoken of as one object, since they all belong to a single genus, the internal diversity of which is ordered in the structure of its categorical definitions.

So, we have found out that the role of philosophical and scientific categories in knowledge and life is extremely important. However, there is no single universal system of categories. At different stages of historical development, different types of categories or, what is the same, different principles of structuring being and thinking become dominant in practical and spiritual activity. In general, each categorical-conceptual system can be likened to a network that we throw into the ocean of existence, but this network each time brings to the surface only what we ourselves have captured in the woven cells. What “slipped” through them remains unknown and, as it were, non-existent for us until a more successful network design brings it to the surface.

Literature

1. Aristotle. Categories // Works: In 4 volumes. T. 2. M., 1978.
2. Kant I. Criticism of pure reason // Works: V b vol. T. 3. M., 1964.
3. Hegel G. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: In 3 volumes. T. 1. Science of Logic. M., 1974.
4. Wharf B. L. Science and linguistics // New in linguistics / Ed. V. A. Zvegintseva. M., 1960.
5. Sergeev K. A., Slinin Ya. A. Dialectics of categorical forms of knowledge (Aristotle's Cosmos and modern science). L., 1987.
6. Lukanin R.K."Organon" of Aristotle. M., 1984.

Hegel G.V.F. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: In 3 volumes. T. 1. Science of Logic. M., 1974. P. 124.
ъWhorf B. L. Science and linguistics // New in linguistics / Edited by V. A. Zvegintseva. M., I960. pp. 175-177.

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