In what year did serfdom appear? Who abolished serfdom in Russia? When did it happen

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For several centuries, the serf system ruled in Russia. The history of the enslavement of the peasant people dates back to 1597. At that time, Orthodox obedience represented a mandatory defense of state borders and interests, a precaution against enemy attack, even through self-sacrifice. The sacrificial service concerned both the peasant, the nobleman, and the Tsar.

The advent of serfdom corresponds to a certain stage in the development of socio-political relations. But since the development of different regions of Europe proceeded at different speeds (depending on climate, population, convenience of trade routes, external threats), then if serfdom in some European countries is only an attribute of medieval history, in others it has survived almost to modern times.

In many large European countries, serfdom appeared in the 9th-10th centuries (England, France, western Germany), in some it appeared much later, in the 16th-17th centuries (north-eastern Germany, Denmark, eastern regions of Austria). Serfdom either disappeared completely and to a significant extent in the Middle Ages (western Germany, England, France), or remained to a greater or lesser extent until the 19th century (Germany, Poland, Austria-Hungary). In some countries, the process of liberating peasants from personal dependence goes in parallel with the process of either complete (England) or partial and slow dispossession of land (north-eastern Germany, Denmark); in others, liberation is not only not accompanied by landlessness, but, on the contrary, causes the growth and development of small peasant property (France, partly western Germany).

England

The process of feudalization, which began back in the Anglo-Saxon period, gradually turned a significant number of previously free communal peasants (curls), who owned both communal land and private plots (Falkland and Bockland), into serfs dependent on the arbitrariness of the owner (English hlaford) in regarding the size of their duties and payments.

The process was slow, but already in the 7th-8th centuries traces of a decrease in the number of free people became noticeable. This was facilitated by the increasing debt of small peasants and the increasing need to seek protection from strong people. During the 10th and 11th centuries, a significant part of the curls moved into the category of dependent people living on foreign lands. Patronage of the owner became mandatory; the owner turned into almost complete master of the subject population. His judicial rights over peasants expanded; he was also entrusted with police responsibility for protecting public peace in the area under his command.

The very word “curl” was increasingly replaced by the expression villan (serf). At the time of the compilation of the Book of the Last Judgment, there were a number of gradations among the peasantry. The lowest level was occupied by the villans of manors (English villein); almost complete dependence on the lord, uncertainty of payments and duties, absence, with few exceptions, of protection in the general courts of the kingdom - this is what characterizes the position of this class. The lord had the right to return the escaped serf before the expiration of a year and one day. Serfs were required to work for the lord all year round, 2-5 days a week, go out into the field during working hours with the whole family or with hired people.

Most of the peasants, who lived primarily on crown lands, also held land in villenage and served corvee and other duties. However, the development of commodity-money relations contributed to the gradual liberation of the villans from serfdom.

Wat Tyler's uprising dealt a serious blow to serfdom. In the 15th century, almost everywhere in England, peasants were liberated from personal serfdom and replaced by land dependence. Corvée was replaced by cash rent, the volume of duties was fixed, and the Villanian holding was supplanted by copyhold, which gave a much larger volume of guarantees to the peasant.

In parallel with the process of emancipation of serfs, the process of depriving English peasants of their allotments developed. Already in the first half of the 15th century, the transition from agriculture to pasture farming turned out to be so profitable that capital began to be directed to sheep breeding and to expanding pastures at the expense of arable land. Large landowners ousted small peasant holders. The rights of village residents to use communal lands that fall into the hands of large landowners are limited or simply abolished. In the 16th century, pasture enclosures became widespread and received support from the courts and government administration. Thus, from the legislative acts of 1488 it is clear that where 200 peasants previously lived, there remained 2-4 shepherds.

The process of changing peasant land relations was completed, in essential terms, in the 16th century: the connection between the peasants and the land was severed. Previously, peasants cultivated their own land, which they held under feudal rights; now they, for the most part, were expelled from their plots and were deprived of their rights to communal land. Most of them were forced to turn into rural workers and farm laborers. At the same time, there was a process of strengthening the free peasant economy, transferred to a capitalist framework, which led to the formation of a significant layer of wealthy peasant tenants (yeomen).

Spain

In Spain, the spread of serfdom was heterogeneous. In Asturias, Leon and Castile, servitage was never universal: already by the 10th century, the majority of the population in the lands of Leon and Castile belonged to the class of partially free farmers - conditional holders of plots who, unlike servos, had personal rights. However, the legal status of this stratum (hunores, or solaregos) was distinguished by a certain uncertainty, which required the Castilian kings to confirm their rights for protection from seigneurial oppression: for example, Alfonso X in the 13th century in his decree declared the right of the solariego to leave his allotment at any time , although without the right to alienate it in one’s own favor; Alfonso XI the Just in the next century prohibited landowners from any seizure of land from the holders and their descendants, subject to fixed payments in favor of the feudal lord. The final personal emancipation of peasants in the lands of the Castilian crown dates back to the first half of the 14th century, although in some areas this process could last a little longer, and episodic (but already illegal) seigneurial abuses could occur even later.

In Aragon and Catalonia, serfdom was much more severe, comparable to French, in which Frankish influence is seen. The result of a powerful popular uprising in Catalonia at the end of the 15th century was the signing by King Ferdinand of the Guadalupe Maxim in 1486, which finally abolished, under the terms of a cash ransom, all forms of personal dependence of the peasant on the feudal lord throughout Spain.

Serfdom in Central Europe

Having emerged in the early Middle Ages, serfdom in Central and Eastern Europe for a long time became the most important element of social relations in agriculture. The undivided political dominance of the nobility, interested in ensuring the unbridled exploitation of the peasants, led to the spread of the so-called. “the second edition of serfdom” in East Germany, the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

In East (Saelbe) Germany, serfdom developed especially fully after the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648 and took its most severe forms in Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia.

“Nothing belongs to you, the soul belongs to God, and your bodies, property and everything you have is mine.” - From the landowner's charter defining the duties of peasants, Schleswig-Holstein, 1740.

Since the middle of the 17th century, serfdom has spread in the Czech Republic. In Hungary it was enshrined in the Code (Tripartitum), issued after the suppression of the György Dozsa uprising of 1514. In Poland, the norms of serfdom, which began to take shape in the middle of the 14th century, were included in the Piotrkow Statute of 1496. Serfdom extended in these countries to the bulk of the peasants. It implied multi-day (up to 6 days a week) corvee labor, the deprivation of peasants of most of their ownership, civil and personal rights, and was accompanied by a reduction in peasant arable land or even the dispossession of some peasants and their transformation into powerless serfs or temporary owners of land.

In the Habsburg Empire, the peasant reform of 1848 declared “rustic lands” the private property of peasants by the laws of Ferdinand I of April 17, 1848 (law of the Kaiser government of Austria-Hungary), according to which, from May 15, 1848, peasant duties in the kingdom of Galicia were eliminated, and Law of September 7, 1848, which abolished serfdom in Austria-Hungary.

Serfdom in Northern Europe

In Sweden and Norway, serfdom as such did not develop.

The situation of peasants in medieval Denmark was closer to the German model.

At the end of the 15th century, about 20% of all land was in the hands of peasant owners. The strengthening of the nobility and clergy marked the beginning of a complete change in the position of the peasants. Their payments and duties began to multiply, although until the 16th century they were still certain; the forced conversion of peasant owners into temporary tenants began.

As the benefits from agriculture increase, due to the great demand for grain and livestock, the noble landowners strive more and more persistently to expand the landowners' arable land through the intensified demolition of peasant households. Corvée, which in the 14th-15th centuries did not exceed 8 days a year, is growing and becoming dependent on the discretion of the landowner; Peasants are allowed to move only with the consent of the landowner. In the 16th century, some peasants turned into real serfs.

Under Frederick I, serfs were often sold without land, like cattle - mainly in Zealand. After the revolution of 1660, carried out by the townspeople, the situation of the peasants worsened even more. What had previously been an abuse was now included in the code of laws issued by Christian V. The landowners became government agents in collecting taxes and supplying recruits. Their police-disciplinary power was correspondingly strengthened by mutual responsibility. If the peasants, burdened with taxes, fled, the taxes that fell on them were distributed among those who remained in place. The peasants were exhausted under the burden of unbearable work and payments; the whole country was ruined. Corvee was limited only by the laws of 1791, 1793, 1795 and 1799; then a procedure was established for the redemption of corvee labor and its transfer to money. In Zealand, corvee lasted until 1848. By the law of 1850, peasants were given the right to buy out corvée, which entailed its complete destruction.

Serfdom in Eastern Europe

In the Old Russian state and the Novgorod Republic, unfree peasants were divided into smerds, purchasers and serfs. According to Russian Truth, smerds were dependent peasants who were judged by the prince. They owned land plots, which they could pass on to their sons (if there were no sons, then the plot went to the prince). The fine for killing a smerd was equal to the fine for killing a slave. In the Novgorod Republic, most smerds were state peasants (cultivated state land), although princely, episcopal and monastic smerds are also mentioned. They had no right to leave the land. The purchases remained dependent on the feudal lord until they paid off their debt to him (“purchase”), after which they became personally free. Serfs were slaves.

In the Russian state at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, a local system took shape. Grand Duke transferred the estate to a serving man, who was obliged for this by military service. The local noble army was used in continuous wars waged by the state against Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, and in the defense of the border regions from the Crimean and Nogai raids: tens of thousands of nobles were called up every year for the “coastal” (along the Oka and Ugra) and border service.

The peasant was personally free and held a plot of land under an agreement with the owner of the estate. He had the right of withdrawal or refusal; that is, the right to leave the landowner. The landowner could not drive the peasant off the land before the harvest, and the peasant could not leave his plot without paying the owner at the end of the harvest. The Code of Law of Ivan III established a uniform deadline for the peasants to leave, when both parties could settle accounts with each other. This is the week before St. George's Day (November 26) and the week following this day.

A free man became a peasant from the minute he “instructed the plow” on a tax plot (that is, he began to fulfill public duty for cultivating the land) and ceased to be a peasant as soon as he gave up farming and took up another occupation.

Even the Decree on a five-year search for peasants dated November 24, 1597 did not cancel the peasant “exit” (that is, the opportunity to leave the landowner) and did not attach peasants to the land. This act only determined the need to return the escaped peasant to the previous landowner if the departure took place within a five-year period before September 1, 1597. The decree speaks only about those peasants who left their landowners “not on time and without refusal” (that is, not on St. George’s Day and without paying the “elderly fee”).

And only under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Council Code of 1649 established indefinite attachment to the land (that is, the impossibility of a peasant exit) and a fortress to the owner (that is, the power of the owner over the peasant located on his land).

However, according to the Council Code, the owner of the estate does not have the right to encroach on the life of a peasant and deprive him of land plot. The transfer of a peasant from one owner to another is allowed, however, in this case, the peasant must again be “planted” on the land and endowed with the necessary personal property (“lives”).

Since 1741, the landowner peasants were removed from the oath, the monopolization of serf property in the hands of the nobility took place, and serfdom extended to all categories of the landowning peasantry; The 2nd half of the 18th century is the final stage in the development of state legislation aimed at strengthening serfdom in Russia.

However, in a significant part of the country, in the Hetmanate (where the bulk of rural population was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), in the Russian North, in most of the Ural region, in Siberia (where the bulk of the rural population were black farmers, then state peasants), in the southern Cossack regions, serfdom did not spread.

Chronology of peasant enslavement in Russia

Briefly, the chronology of the enslavement of peasants in Russia can be presented as follows:

1497 - introduction of restrictions on the right to transfer from one landowner to another - St. George's Day.

1581 - abolition of peasant output in certain years - “reserved summers”.

1597 - the landowner's right to search for a runaway peasant within 5 years and to return him to the owner - "prescribed years."

1637 - the period for searching for fugitive peasants was increased to 9 years.

1641 - the period for searching for runaway peasants was increased to 10 years, and for those forcibly removed by other landowners - to 15 years.

1649 - the cathedral code of 1649 abolished fixed-term summers, thus securing an indefinite search for fugitive peasants. At the same time, the obligation of the harboring landowner to pay for the illegal use of the labor of someone else’s serf was also established.

1718-1724 - tax reform, which finally attached the peasants to the land.

1747 - the landowner was given the right to sell his serfs as recruits to any person.

1760 - the landowner received the right to exile peasants to Siberia.

1765 - the landowner received the right to exile peasants not only to Siberia, but also to hard labor.

1767 - peasants were strictly forbidden to submit petitions (complaints) against their landowners personally to the empress or emperor.

1783 - the spread of serfdom to Left Bank Ukraine.

Official dates for the abolition of serfdom by country

The official end of serfdom does not always mean its real abolition, much less an improvement in the living conditions of peasants.

• Wallachia: 1746
• Principality of Moldova: 1749
• Free State of Saxony: 12/19/1771
• Holy Roman Empire: 1.11.1781 (1st stage); 1848 (2nd stage)
• Czech Republic (historical region): 1.11.1781 (1st stage); 1848 (2nd stage)
• Baden: 23.7.1783
• Denmark: 20.6.1788
• France: 3.11.1789
• Switzerland: 4.5.1798
• Schleswig-Holstein: 12/19/1804
• Pomerania (as part of Flag of Sweden.svg Sweden): 4.7.1806
• Duchy of Warsaw (Poland): 22.7.1807
• Prussia: 10/9/1807 (in practice 1811-1823)
• Mecklenburg: September 1807 (in practice 1820)
• Bavaria: 31.8.1808
• Nassau (Duchy): 1.9.1812
• Württemberg: 11/18/1817
• Hanover: 1831
• Saxony: 17.3.1832
• Serbia: 1835
• Hungary: 11.4.1848 (first time), 2.3.1853 (second time)
• Croatia 8.5.1848
• Cisleithania: 7.9.1848
• Bulgaria: 1858 (de jure part Ottoman Empire; de facto: 1880)
• Russian Empire: 19.2.1861
• Courland (Russian Empire): 25.8.1817
• Estland (Russian Empire): 23.3.1816
• Livonia (Russian Empire): 26.3.1819
• Ukraine (Russian Empire): 17.3.1861
• Georgia (Russian Empire): 1864-1871
• Kalmykia (Russian Empire): 1892
• Tonga: 1862
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1918
• Afghanistan: 1923
• Bhutan: 1956

Abolition of serfdom in Russia

The moment when serfdom was abolished is rightfully considered a turning point in the history of Russia. Despite the gradualness of the reforms, they became a significant impetus in the development of the state. Serfdom existed in Russia for two and a half centuries, from 1597 to 1861, in two different types. How many denunciations on this matter are published in the West! Mainly with references to Russian literature, which has always preferred moral demands on power and its criticism with exaggeration, but not embellishment. However, it must be taken into account that the enslavement of Russian peasants occurred at the very end of the 16th century in the form of their attachment to the land (in 1597 their right to change employers was abolished) and this was then perceived as part of the Orthodox obedience necessary for everyone: Russia, defending itself from many enemies, came out to their vital geopolitical borders, and then everyone was obliged to sacrificially serve the state, each in his place - both peasants and nobles (they military service received estates without the right to transfer them by inheritance), and the Tsar himself.

Most of all, the “great Europeanizers” Peter I and especially Catherine II contributed to the tightening of our serfdom. The estates became hereditary, and the meaning of serfdom was completely changed when in 1762, by decree of Peter III, and then by Catherine’s charter to the nobility (1785), the nobles were exempted from service, receiving the peasants as personal property - this violated the previous concept of justice. This happened precisely as a result of the Europeanization of Russia by our Westernizing monarchs, since in the same unjust form, serfdom, long before Russia, was introduced for reasons of exploitation in many European countries and generally lasted there much longer - especially in Germany, from where it was adopted to Russia in new form. (In the German lands, the abolition of serfdom took place in the 1810–1820s and was completed only by 1848. In “progressive” England and after the abolition of serfdom, inhumane treatment of peasants was observed everywhere, for example, in the 1820s, thousands of peasant families were expelled from the ground.)

It is significant that the Russian expression “serfdom” originally meant precisely attachment to the land; whereas, for example, the corresponding German term Leibeigenschaft has a completely different meaning: “property of the body.” (Unfortunately, in translation dictionaries these different concepts are given as equivalent.)

At the same time, in Russia, serfs had no more than 280 working days a year, could go to work for a long time, carried out trade, owned factories, taverns, river boats, and often had serfs themselves. Of course, their position largely depended on the owner. The atrocities of Saltychikha are also known, but this was a pathological exception; the landowner was sentenced to prison.

And although from the beginning of the 19th century serfdom in Russia was subject to weakening and partial abolition, extending to only a third of the peasants by 1861, the conscience of the Russian nobles was increasingly burdened by it; There have been talks about its abolition since the beginning of the 19th century. The peasants also considered their dependence to be temporary and endured it with Christian patience and dignity, testified an Englishman traveling around Russia. When asked what struck him most about the Russian peasant, the Englishman replied: “His neatness, intelligence and freedom... Look at him: what could be more free than his manner of speaking! Is there even a shadow of slavish humiliation in his behavior and speech? (Notes of a visit to the Russian Church by the late W. Palmer. London, 1882).

So, Napoleon in 1812 hoped that the Russian serfs would greet him as a liberator, but he received popular rebuff and suffered huge losses from partisan detachments spontaneously created by the peasants...

In the 19th century, the situation of serfs began to improve: in 1803, they were partially emancipated on the basis of the law on “free cultivators”, from 1808 it was prohibited to sell them at fairs, from 1841 only owners of inhabited estates were allowed to have serfs, and the possibility of self-redemption expanded. Sovereign Nicholas carried out great preparatory work for the abolition of serfdom

Use of the term “serfdom” by opponents of collective farm policy in the USSR

Sometimes the terms “attachment of peasants to the land” and “serfdom” (apparently, one of the leaders of the right communists, Bukharin, was the first to do this in 1928) are also used in relation to the collective farm system during the reign of Stalin in Russia, meaning the introduced in the 30s of the 20th century, restrictions on the freedom of movement of peasants, as well as compulsory food supplies (a kind of “rent”) from collective farms and work on state land (a kind of “corvee”) on state farms.

Serfdom is the basis of the feudal mode of production, while the owner of the land has legally formalized power in relation to the peasants living in his possessions. The latter were not only economically (land) dependent on the feudal lord, but also obeyed him in everything and could not leave their owner. The fugitives were pursued and returned to their owner.

Serfdom in Europe

In Western Europe, the emergence of serfdom began under Charlemagne. In the 10th-13th centuries, serfdom had already developed there for part of the rural inhabitants, while the other part remained personally free. Serfs served their feudal lord with rent: quitrent in kind and corvée. The quitrent represented part of the food products produced by the peasant farm, and corvée was labor in the master's field. From the 13th century in England and France there was a gradual destruction of serfdom, which completely disappeared by the 18th century. In Eastern and Central Europe, a similar process took place later, covering the period from the 15th to the early 19th century.

Registration of serfdom in Russia

In the country, serfdom was formed quite late, but we can see the formation of its elements back in Ancient Rus'. Starting from the 11th century, certain categories of rural residents moved into the category of personally dependent peasants, while the bulk of the population was the category of free communal peasants who could leave their owner, find another, and choose a better life for themselves. This right was first limited in a code of laws issued by Ivan III in 1497. The opportunity to leave the owner was now determined by two weeks a year, before and after November 26, when St. George's Day was celebrated. At the same time, it was necessary to pay the elderly, a fee for the use of the landowner's yard. In the Sudebnik of Ivan the Terrible of 1550, the size of the elderly increased, making the transition impossible for many peasants. In 1581, a temporary ban on crossing began to be introduced. As often happens, the temporary has acquired a surprisingly permanent character. A decree of 1597 introduced the duration of the search for fugitive peasants at 5 years. Subsequently, the summer hours constantly increased, until in 1649 an indefinite search for escapees was introduced. Thus, serfdom was finally formalized by the father of Peter the Great, Alexei Mikhailovich. Despite the modernization of the country that had begun, Peter did not change serfdom; on the contrary, he took advantage of its existence as one of the resources for carrying out reforms. With his reign, the combination of capitalist elements of development with serfdom dominant in Russia began.

Decline of the feudal-serf system

Already by the end of the 18th century, signs of a crisis in the existing economic system in Russia began to emerge. Its main manifestation was the issue of the unprofitability of an economy based on the exploitation of the labor of dependent peasants. In non-black earth provinces, the introduction of monetary rent and otkhodnichestvo (serfs leaving for the city to earn money) had long been practiced, which undermined the system of interaction between “landowner and serf.” At the same time, there comes an awareness of the immorality of serfdom, which is very similar to slavery. The Decembrist movement especially raised the question of the need to eliminate it. Nicholas I, who headed the state after the uprising, decided not to touch this problem, fearing to make it even worse. And only after the lost Crimean War, which revealed the lag of feudal Russia from Western countries, the new Tsar Alexander II decided to eliminate serfdom.

Long-awaited cancellation

After a long preparatory period, covering the years 1857-1860, the government developed a more or less acceptable scheme for the abolition of serfdom for the Russian nobility. The general rule was the unconditional release of peasants with the provision of land for which a ransom had to be paid. The size of land plots fluctuated and depended primarily on their quality, but was insufficient for the normal development of the economy. The manifesto on the abolition of serfdom, signed on February 19, 1961, became a breakthrough in the historical development of the Russian state. Despite the fact that the interests of the nobility were taken into account much more than the peasants, this event played an important role in the life of the country. Serfdom slowed down the process of capitalist development in Russia, while its abolition contributed to rapid progress along the path of European modernization.

Short story

In ancient Russia, most of the land was taken over by princes, boyars and monasteries. With the strengthening of the grand ducal power, service people were rewarded with extensive estates. The peasants who lived on these lands were personally free people and entered into lease agreements (“decent”) with the landowner. At certain times (for example, around St. George’s Day), peasants could freely leave their plot and move to another, fulfilling their obligations towards the landowner.

Gradually, the extent of peasants’ dependence on landowners expanded, and by the end of the 16th century. the free departure of peasants was prohibited; they were attached to their place of residence and landowners (decrees 1592 and 1597). From then on, the situation of the serfs began to rapidly deteriorate; Landowners began to sell and buy serfs, marry and give in marriage at will, and received the right to trial and punish serfs (before exile to Siberia).

The difficult situation of the serfs, who sought to escape from the yoke of the landowners, prompted the serfs to resort to murder and arson of the landowners, to riots and uprisings (Pugachevism, and the incessant unrest of peasants in different provinces throughout the first half of the 19th century). Under Alexander I, the idea of ​​the need to soften serfdom was expressed in the 1803 law on free cultivators. By voluntary agreement between landowners and peasants, about 47 thousand serfs were freed. The rest of the landowner peasants are approx. 10.5 million souls - liberated on February 19, 1861.

Chronology of peasant enslavement in Russia

Briefly, the chronology of the enslavement of peasants in Russia can be presented as follows:

1. 1497 - introduction of restrictions on the right to transfer from one landowner to another - St. George's Day.
2. 1581 - abolition of St. George's Day - “reserved summers”.
3. 1597 - the landowner’s right to search for a runaway peasant within 5 years and to return him to the owner - “prescribed summers”.
4. 1607 - cathedral code of 1607: the period for searching for fugitive peasants was increased to 15 years.
5. 1649 - the cathedral code of 1649 abolished fixed-term summers, thus securing an indefinite search for fugitive peasants.
6. - Messrs. - tax reform, which finally attached the peasants to the land.
7. 1747 - the landowner was given the right to sell his serfs as recruits to any person.
8. 1760 - the landowner received the right to exile peasants to Siberia.
9. 1765 - the landowner received the right to exile peasants not only to Siberia, but also to hard labor.
10. 1767 - peasants were strictly forbidden to submit petitions (complaints) against their landowners personally to the empress or emperor.
11. 1783 - extension of serfdom to Left Bank Ukraine.

see also

Notes

Links

• // Small Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron: In 4 volumes - St. Petersburg. , 1907-1909.

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See what “Serfdom in Russia” is in other dictionaries: Serfdom is a form of dependence of peasants: their attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lord. In Western Europe, where in the Middle Ages the English villans, Catalan remens,... ...

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This article should be Wikified. Please format it according to the rules for formatting articles... Wikipedia - (serfdom), a form of peasant dependence: their attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lord. In Western Europe (where in the Middle Ages the English villans, Catalan remens,... ...

encyclopedic Dictionary A set of legal norms of the feudal state that consolidated the most complete and severe form of peasant dependence under feudalism. K. p. included a prohibition on peasants leaving their land plots (the so-called attachment ... ...

Great Soviet Encyclopedia Serfdom - a state in which peasants are completely economically and personally dependent on their owners. In some countries of Western Europe (Sweden, Norway) serfdom did not exist, in others it arose in the era of feudalism.... ...

Popular Political Dictionary - (serfdom) a form of dependence of peasants: their attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lord. In the West Europe (where in the Middle Ages the English villans, Catalan remens,... ...

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Great Soviet Encyclopedia- (serfdom), a form of peasant dependence: their attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lord. In Russia it is enshrined in Code 1497; decree on reserved years (late 16th century), which prohibited the transition of peasants from ... Illustrated encyclopedic Dictionary

The form of dependence of the peasants: their attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lord. In Western Europe (where in the Middle Ages English villans, French and Italian serfs were in the position of serfs), elements of K... Legal Dictionary

Serfdom, serfdom, a form of dependence of peasants: their attachment to the land and subordination to the judicial power of the landowner. In Russia, it was formalized on a national scale by Code of Law 1497, decrees of the late 16th and early 17th centuries. about protected areas... ...Russian history

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• Historical sociology of Russia in 2 hours. Part 1 2nd ed., revised. and additional Textbook for academic bachelor's degree, Boris Nikolaevich Mironov. The textbook presents the history of Russia from a sociological point of view. The book examines topics such as colonization and ethno-religious diversity, family and demographic trends;...

WHO ABOLISHED SERFORMITY?*

Lev Anninsky, critic

Inheritors on earth

It would be interesting to know whether modern historical thought finds any grain of truth in the judgments of Alexander Melikhov?

Modern historical thought has already sorted through, shoveled and rinsed so many subjects and opinions that are little compatible with each other that there are enough grains of truth in Melikhov’s judgments on the abolition of serfdom. His article concentrates (and brilliantly illustrates) contemporary doubts that the liberation of the peasants in Russia was a solution to the problem. The problem is how to keep the population on this Eurasian saucer and how to encourage people to work on the ground, without running away from this earth wherever necessary. Our land is claimed by hundreds of owners who have inherited it at different times, but few people know how or want to manage it. Why? From fear of neighbors. From fear of the authorities, keeping neighbors from aggression. Out of fear, one cannot understand what is worse and what one should be more afraid of.

Although it is even more important to understand: what was the reason for the lack of preparation for “emancipation”, which ultimately led to the October catastrophe? To what extent did objective circumstances play a role here (the excessive complexity of the issue, the pressure of some social forces, the lack of sufficient resources), and to what extent were collective phantoms, collective illusions in which both the top and bottom lived?

It was not “emancipation” that led to the October catastrophe, but double German aggression and invasion, the causes of which were rooted in the geopolitical rhythms of history, and not in the concepts of Dubelt and Herzen.

Is there any similarity here with our perestroika?

There is a similarity here not with our perestroika, but with our current “transition” to an unknown destination, because it is unclear whether a new geopolitical existence will be established through the resettlement of peoples, and whether this resettlement will be bloody. And it is still unclear what will happen to humanity if it avoids the horrors and, having settled into consumer life,
emancipation, will go crazy from the incomprehensibility of why to live.

Or maybe acts of this magnitude cannot, in principle, be “well prepared and thought out in advance”?

Acts of this magnitude cannot be prepared due to the mystery of the meaning of human presence in the Universe, but can be implemented in a frantic attempt to escape when the next catastrophe looms, but has not yet collapsed.

Mikhail Kuraev, writer

HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SERFORMITY

The 150th anniversary of the proclamation of the Decree on the Abolition of Serfdom is a good reason to once again think about our history.

The question “Who abolished serfdom?” does not seem significant, although credit should be given to the young emperor.

Who freed Rus' from dependence on the Horde? Dmitry Donskoy? Ivan III? Ivan IV?

Who overthrew the autocracy? Miliukov? Shulgin? Kerensky? It overthrew itself, became obsolete, about which Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy directly and clearly wrote on January 16, 1902 to the last tsar: “Autocracy is an outdated form of government that can meet the requirements of the people somewhere in Central Africa, separated from the whole world, but not the requirements of the Russian a people who are more and more enlightened by the general enlightenment of this world. And therefore, this form of government can only be maintained, as is now being done, through all sorts of violence: increased security, administrative exile, executions, religious persecution, banning books, newspapers, perversion of education, and in general all kinds of bad and cruel deeds.

And such have been the affairs of your reign until now.”

Replace the word “autocracy” with the word “serfdom”, and the words of the great Leo will be just as true. It is said directly and clearly - they have become obsolete!

But let's return to the anniversary topic.

We must be aware that “serfdom” and “serfdom”
system” - phenomena are certainly related, but not identical.

“Serfdom” is a legal fact. You can name the documents and dates when slavery in Russia acquired a legal basis, and name the document and date when serfdom lost its legal force. This statement can give points in the game “What? Where? When?”, but will hardly help us understand the historical
the uniqueness of our path.

The “serf system,” which took shape long before the legalization of “serfdom,” existed even after its abolition. With a “condescendingly benevolent” view of serfdom, it only lasted 147 years, from Peter’s decree to the decree of Alexander II. But there is another account, from 1485, from the restriction of the transfer of peasants from one owner (!) to another until 1905, when peasants, during the First Russian Revolution, were equalized in rights with other classes and redemption payments for land were abolished. There are already 400 years and more here. This is the “age” of the “serf system”. Hardly in one hundred and fifty years the servile spirit, the slave consciousness and the slave psychology could, like coal into the lungs of a miner, enter our souls.

Today, a respected writer, asking himself a rhetorical question why Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy “virtually did not touch upon the horrors of serfdom,” dreamily answers himself: “Perhaps it seemed to both that every world was harmonious in its own way.” (!!! - M.K.) that is easy to break, but extremely difficult to improve.” If we look at historical facts, it was extremely difficult to break, and slavery was “improved” by anyone who was not too lazy. And only Chekhov’s Firs, a slave in spirit, blood and conviction, sighed about the “harmony” of the serf system: “The men are with the masters, the gentlemen are with the men, and now everything is in disarray, you won’t understand anything...”

Today, for some reason, I really want to look at the history of Russian slavery somehow condescendingly, “in a kind way,” so, they say, both the mature Pushkin and the mature Tolstoy “practically did not touch the horrors of serfdom.”

One can, of course, consider Pushkin’s poem “Village”: “Here skinny slavery drags along the reins of an inexorable owner...” - “immature”, Alexander I did not think so, but one can, if desired, in “Eugene Onegin” one can hear a slave blessing the fate of everything - then for transferring from corvee to quitrent. Leo Tolstoy, of course, is not Radishchev, but in 1855 he also wrote about crowds of “oppressed slaves obeying thieves, oppressive mercenaries and robbers.” Only those who do not want to know do not know about Tolstoy’s attitude not only to “baptized property,” but also to landowner property in general.

The French emigrant and caustic memoirist Marquis de Custine, who came to Russia, rightly noted: the ability to endure may be the dignity of one person, but the endless patience of a nation is shameful! And this was said by the aristo-
Krat, who fled the horrors of the Great French Revolution. In our country, patience has been elevated almost to the highest Christian virtue. Why on earth? Why do we allow any nonentity to dominate us? We can defeat Napoleon, but we are afraid of the Belikovs. “We teachers were afraid of him. And even the director was afraid. Come on, our teachers are all-thinking people, deeply decent, brought up on Turgenev and Shchedrin... Yes. Thinking, decent people read Shchedrin, and Turgenev, various Bokleys and so on, but they obeyed, endured... That’s what it is.” This is already the end of the nineteenth century. And Chekhov’s conversation is not conducted by downtrodden men, but by two intellectuals.

They can tell when it was! There are closer examples. Let us remember Stalin, who recklessly trashed people, his first toast at a banquet in honor of the Victory, a toast to the Russian people... for their patience! Egyptian executions were endured with slavish obedience, and to endure Gorbachev’s “coupons”, Yeltsin’s “noodles” about the CIS with a common currency and borders, the monstrous theft with the appropriation of people’s property for Chubais’ “vouchers”, as they say, God himself ordered. And “shock therapy”, which turned out the pockets of millions and gave birth to a class of grabbers and freeloaders who created nothing, but bought yachts, mansions in the capitals of Europe, estates on the Mediterranean islands... and cheerfully spit on the worries of “this country” that made them happy, as they put it. . And the “new Russian”, the “lumpen-bourgeois”, the product of unrest, is a slave in freedom, a limited being, rushing to satisfy his insatiable needs, who has not heard of such concepts as duty, responsibility, and finally, the fate of the fatherland, culture...

It is much better to look at the tragic and shameful pages of our history in the context of discussions about the “struggle and decline of collective illusions and collective dreams.” Seeing the serfdom in the flesh is so boring. The picture is sad. Here is the testimony of a historian: “The growth of the serf population in the northern half of the state began to fall, and from 1835, instead of growth, there was already a decline, explained not only by the movement of the population to the south, but also by exhaustion from backbreaking work.” The people began to die out, and we are talking about illusions and dreams, and whether the peasants were given freedom too early, we had to sit on their backbone for another three hundred years in order to properly prepare for “emancipation.”

And another question, just to take up time: is there a connection between “unprepared emancipation”, the abolition of serfdom, and the preparation of the “October catastrophe”? Here it is reasonable to ask, who prepared the “catastrophe of 1905”? And who prepared the “February catastrophe”? Nicholas II? Rasputin? Queen? Lenin in Zurich?

Let's face it, “emancipation” was not prepared, but was delayed for a century, delayed until the last day! In the first projects of peasant reform in 1858, there was talk of liberation with land, but the serf owners stood up to death. Who knows, if Alexander II had been more persistent and firm, he could have suffered the same fate as his predecessors...

And the connection between “unprepared emancipation” and the “catastrophe of 1905” and the “October catastrophe” is the most direct. It is in the “liberation of the peasants” without land that the beginning lies. proletarian revolution in a peasant country."

It’s a strange thing, when we talk about “serfdom”, the conversation is more and more about peasants, but the slave owners generated by the “serf system” seem to be in the footnote. But it would be good to look at this audience calmly and carefully. Let us not forget about the contribution of the nobles to science and culture, to education. Let us not forget those who fought for their fatherland on the battlefield. But they did not have the power, they did not have the strength, but those who, in inescapable self-interest, were ready to preserve their “historical”, or God-given, well-being at any cost...

And it was not only the peasants who paid this price.

The ill-fated Emperor Peter III, who took the first decisive step towards the abolition of serfdom, was brutally killed by the slave owners, so that, for good measure, he would not take the second step. Moreover, they glorified him, turning the ruler of European training, who during his six-month reign prepared the most serious transformations, into almost a clown. And at the funeral they carefully hid not only the mutilated face of God’s anointed, but they also buried well the documents of his short reign. (Instead of lengthy evidence, I will refer the reader to the documentary chronicle of S. N. Iskyul “The Fatal Years of Russia. The Year 1762.”)

And so it went, almost all Russian autocrats were approaching the abolition of serfdom, which, after the decree of Peter III on the freedom of the nobility, lost its socio-economic and legal justification. The Great Catherine, who gave thousands of peasants to her lovers, was, of course, prevented by the impatient Pugachev. Paul I, who did not know that his people were being trafficked, was not even allowed to look around properly, his skull was broken and he was subjected to a “control strangulation” with an officer’s scarf. Alexander I, who managed to abolish serfdom in Poland, was so intimidated by the “greedy crowd standing at the throne” of the slave owners that he himself became frightened. Nicholas I created a “harmonious world in its own way,” which was cracked at all the seams from contact with the “harmonious world in its own way” of Europe.

Why, they ask, is there such a rush, why did Alexander II order that the Decree on the abolition of serfdom be placed on his table precisely on the sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne? Yes, because all orders for the preparation of a decree are more early dates successfully sabotaged. This could continue until the carrots. He saw that they were setting up a crayfish for a stone, and not preparing a decree. Now my patience has run out! The highest commanded, and that’s it! The end of the tricentennial banquet!

We remember how the autocrat, the monarch, not limited by anything other than knowledge and conscience, signed a document of the greatest significance in the history of Russia.

There is nothing to compare with this document, which put an end to the centuries-long conquest of the majority by the minority. It would seem that such a document should be signed, if not on Red Square, then in the Assumption Cathedral, in the Chamber of Facets, in St. George's Hall at a gathering of the first people of the fatherland, to the cries of the happy people in the streets and squares. But no! Alexander II clearly understood that he snatched this decree from the serf owners. Let us remember his trip to Moscow, this last stronghold of slave owners, how he shamed and admonished the Moscow nobility!.. That is why he signed an act of the greatest historical significance in his office - alone! He even kicked out the nobleman who brought him the text. Why alone? Knowing what kind of resistance the serf owners, living and powerful, he had to overcome, it seems that he was simply afraid that his loyal slave owners would push him under the elbow, knock over his inkwell, and not let him in. last minute to accomplish what they have been preventing all their lives. Or, worse, like Peter III or Paul I...

On the issue of serfdom and its legacy, in my opinion, the main thing after its abolition is not the fate of the peasantry; it was not they who determined the country’s course towards a new split, towards fratricide.

So, if the fate of the peasants is not important when considering the consequences of the serfdom, then what is?

And here the reasoning of the author of “Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends” about peasants orphaned without the care of the landowners is worth less to me than the remark of the perceptive Rudoy Panka, who noticed a social type that he called “the highest lackey.”

Bravo, beekeeper, you drew in two words the type of Russian serf owner and his relatives in a straight line.

Who knows whether the main consequence of three hundred years of serfdom is not the “highest lackey”, greedy and irresponsible, cultivated and introduced into the life of Russia for many years?

The peasant became free, for example, but the serf owner, and the slave owner, did he go to retraining courses and decide to master a related profession? By nature, not oriented toward creation or development, the slave owner, having lost the slave tribe that fed him, dreams of revenge.

No, it was not the harmless Gaevs, nor the frivolous Ranevskys who lived in their “cherry orchards” until the First Russian Revolution.

Why are there so many references to Chekhov? Not by chance. He raised his voice against the slave spirit that permeates our lives from top to bottom, he was not afraid to speak about the “little man” beloved by the liberals, who had lost his human appearance, the bitter truth, about the peasant, downtrodden to an unnecessary degree, about the intellectual and the official, about all of us, infected bacillus of slavery.

And now it would be good to remember who strangled the Great Reforms of Alexander-
RA II, zemstvo, financial, judicial? Zhelyabov? Perovskaya? Who stole half a million hectares of “Bashkir lands” from the treasury of Alexander III, buying up lands covered with timber at the price of the steppe? Zasulich? Who on the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov Railway poured slag into the roadbed instead of gravel, who did not change rotten sleepers for years, so that they could remove the “crutches” with their fingers? Kibalchich? Rysakov? So who derailed (what a symbol!) the train with the Emperor, the Empress, the Tsarevich and the Grand Duchesses, not to mention the two dozen killed servants and guards?

The testimony of Chief Prosecutor of the Senate A.F. Koni (chairman of the commission to investigate the causes of the disaster), who reported on the work of the commission personally to Emperor Alexander III, sitting on an uncomfortable ottoman in the sovereign’s office in Gatchina, is significant: “In these eyes, deep and almost touching, a soul shone, frightened in its trust in people and helpless against lies... From him - the autocrat and ruler of all Rus', who could turn our entire civil and political life upside down with one stroke of the pen... - there was an air of such helplessness in relation to the deception and deceit of those around him ... "

Those responsible for the disaster of 1888 should have gone to trial, but the State Council covered up both socially and, presumably, morally close thieves and irresponsible nobles. “Higher servility” is a terrible force! And the all-powerful sovereign, although he promised the chief prosecutor a strict and impartial trial, this time he endured deception and deceit, just as millions of his subjects endured. What harmony!

Where did these deceitful, insatiable, unscrupulous and irresponsible adjutant generals, barons, princes, ministers and “new Russians” come from, rallying around the throne - Lazar Polyakov and company, managers and board members of the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov railway, who staged an unprecedented theft of the railway farms? When did they gain such strength that the “autocrats and rulers of all Rus'” are afraid and collapse before them in helplessness?

Crafty slaves, relying on nothing but their own dexterity, cunning and luck, “masters of the Russian land”, looking at it as a prey acquired by chance - isn’t this a product of the slave-owning system!

Today, no, no, there is talk about historical responsibility, of course, when it comes to the seventy-year rule of the Bolshevik Party. But beyond conversations, and then almost idle ones, nothing moves anywhere. The thought does not move. Why? Yes, because there is no skill to think about historical responsibility, much less demand it while there is still someone to do it.

Is this not a direct consequence of the existence of a huge part of the nation in slavery for centuries?

Boris Mironov, historian

Social institution as a social need

Why did serfdom exist? I agree with K. Leontyev that “serfdom was at one time a saving institution for Russia.”

The institution of serfdom arose and developed largely spontaneously and was an organic and necessary component of Russian reality. Its emergence was determined by the weak development of individualism, the breadth of Russian nature, the people's understanding of freedom and was a reaction to economic backwardness, in its own way a rational response of Russia to the challenge of the environment and the difficult circumstances in which the life of the people took place. Serfdom was used by the state as a means to solve pressing problems - meaning defense, finance, keeping the population in places of permanent residence, maintaining public order. It was not serfdom that was the cause of the country's backwardness, but backwardness that was the cause of serfdom.

The ability of the institute to satisfy the basic needs of the population was an important condition for its long existence. There is no apology in this, but only confirmation of the fact that everything social institutions are based not so much on arbitrariness and violence, but on functional expediency. The peasants received modest but stable means of livelihood, protection and the opportunity to organize their lives on the basis of folk and community traditions. For the nobles, both those who owned serfs and those who did not own them, but lived in public service, serfdom was a source of material benefits for life by European standards, and in this unique way it contributed to the Westernization of the country.

The most important factor in the long existence of serfdom was the work ethic of the people. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of Russian peasants saw the purpose of life not in wealth, success and fame, but in saving the soul, in simply following tradition, in reproducing established forms of life. In order for the peasant to work more, the state authorities in the state-owned village and the landowners in the proprietary village were forced to resort to coercion, otherwise he simply stopped working after his basic biological needs were satisfied. Here is data on the balance of working time of peasants before and after emancipation.

1850s Early 1870s 1902

abs. % abs. % abs. %

Number of working days 135 37 125 34 107 29

Total number of non-workers

days, 230 63 240 66 258 71

including holidays 95 26 105 29 123 34

Contrary to expectations, after the abolition of serfdom, the number of working days began not to increase, but to decrease: on average, one holiday, and therefore a non-working day, was added every year. The increase in the number of holidays occurred everywhere and quite spontaneously, despite the efforts of the crown authorities to stop this process. And this happened because the tax burden weakened and peasant incomes increased. This is also evidenced by the increase in costs for vodka. From 1863 to 1906–1910, they increased nominally by 2.6 times, and taking into account the general increase in prices, by 1.6 times.

The position of the serfs. In pre-reform times, 1796 -1855, the well-being of landowner peasants, as well as the entire working population, tended to increase. Judging by the average height (body length) for 1801-1860, then in terms of living standards, peasants of different categories practically did not differ, but were inferior to other social groups:

Social group Height, cm

Nobles, officials and officers 167.5

Honorary citizens and merchants 166.6

Freedmen 165.8

Lower military ranks 165.2

Tradesmen and shop workers 165.2

Free cultivators 164.8

State, economic peasants and single-yard owners 164.4

Appanage peasants 164.3

Landowner peasants 164.3

Having ranked social groups according to average height, we obtained their hierarchy according to social status and financial situation: at the bottom - peasants of different categories, at the top - privileged groups.

Reasons for the abolition of serfdom. The supreme power, under the influence of the demands of the progressive public and the peasantry itself, as well as due to the state need for modernization and a deeper assimilation of European cultural, political and socio-cultural standards, abolished serfdom in the 1860s, although from a purely economic point of view its possibilities were not were completely exhausted. Serfdom was not unprofitable. That is why only a third of the landowners were ready to abolish serfdom, and two-thirds opposed it. The great reforms, in their meaning and content, summed up the past and present, learned lessons from the experience of Austria, Prussia and other European countries and created the opportunity for the gradual transformation of the country into a rule-of-law state with a market economy.

The conditions for the abolition of serfdom took into account the interests of the peasants. Taxes and payments were reduced compared to pre-reform ones, and the redemption operation was ultimately beneficial to them. The plots were purchased at the price established by the “Regulations on peasants emerging from serfdom” - 26.87 rubles. per tithe, and in 1907-1910, immediately after the abolition of redemption payments, the average market price of a tithe of allotment land cost 64 rubles. - 2.4 times higher. However, the real gain or loss of the peasants from the redemption operation depended on inflation. From 1854-1858 to 1903-1905, nominal land prices increased 7.33 times, the general price index - 1.64 times. Consequently, adjusted for inflation (64%), real land prices increased 4.5 times, and the actual gain of peasants from the redemption operation by 1906 was real, not virtual. Even if we take into account that, in addition to the redemption payments (867 million rubles), they paid another 703 million rubles. percent, as a result of which a tithe (1.1 hectares) of allotment land cost them 48.5 rubles, they ultimately still won: 48.5 rubles. - this is 1.3 times lower than the price of peasant land in 1907-1910 (64 rubles). Let us not forget that for 45 years, in 1861-1906, allotment land fed, watered and clothed the peasants, and that at the beginning of the twentieth century it turned into huge capital.

The abolition of serfdom was carried out in an economic sense very competently: not in a shock mode, but gradually, as recommended by the modern theory of reform, which ensured the success of the reform. After the abolition of serfdom, a real economic miracle occurred. In 1861-1913, the pace of economic development was high: comparable to European ones, although lagging behind American ones. Over the past 52 years, national income has increased by 3.84 times, and per capita by 1.63 times. At the same time, there was an increase in well-being. In other words, industrialization was accompanied by an increase in the standard of living of the peasantry and, therefore, did not occur at their expense, as is commonly believed. The growth in well-being is evidenced by an increase in the human development index (from 0.188 to 0.326 - 1.7 times), since the index takes into account (1) life expectancy; (2) literacy; (3) gross domestic product per capita. The production of consumer goods per capita increased 2.1 times from 1885 to 1913. The increase in living standards in post-reform times was clearly reflected in the fact that the average height of adult men from 1851-1860 to 1911-1920 increased by
4 cm (from 164.9 to 168.9 cm), weight - 7.4 kg.

From what has been said, it follows that the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 did not occur due to poorly carried out or untimely abolition of serfdom. The reasons are the difficulties of modernization, the war and the strong desire of the intelligentsia, firmly convinced that they could cope with the management of the country better, to take away power from the monarch and the elite who stood behind him. As studies have shown, modernization, even successful, contains many pitfalls, problems and dangers for society. Russia was no exception. Modernization proceeded unevenly, to varying degrees covering economic, social, ethnic, territorial segments of society, the city more than the countryside, industry more than agriculture. Collateral destructive consequences were observed in the form of increased social tension, deviance, violence, crime, etc. On this basis, serious contradictions and conflicts arose between industries, social strata, territorial and national communities. Economic growth was to some extent destabilizing, as it brought about changes in expectations, consumption patterns, social relations and political culture that undermined traditional foundations. If poverty produces hungry people, then improvements create higher expectations. Military difficulties, after a long period of rising living standards, also served as an important factor in the revolution.

Are there any similarities with our perestroika? The development of Russia after perestroika in the 1980s really resembles what happened in the country after the abolition of serfdom and the Great Reforms of the 1860s, when a market economy, civil society, and democratic institutions began to develop. It’s a paradox, but in the 1990s Russia returned to where it left off in
1917 - to the trajectory of its development interrupted by the revolution. True, in my opinion, the Great Reforms were carried out more subtly and much more effectively than the economic reforms of the 1990s. All economic institutions (in the sense of norms and standardized models of behavior, rules of interaction when making decisions) necessary for successful economic development were created gradually, with an eye to the West, but taking into account Russian specifics. By the beginning of the 20th century, liberal legislation on business activity that was adequate to Russian economic realities had developed and a strong institution of property was created, without which successful economic development is impossible. The bourgeoisie built its wealth with its own labor, and therefore cherished and valued its business, did not think about how to wind it up at home, transfer money abroad, and then, in case of unfavorable circumstances, go there itself. On the contrary, the modern Russian big bourgeoisie for the most part possesses property that was not earned by its own labor. For many, it is rather a “gift of fate”, which has not yet been firmly secured by law. There is no contract between large owners, the state and society. For the state, this may even be convenient: at any moment an unwanted owner can be pulled back. The population, as it seems, is dreaming of the expropriation of the property of large owners. Hence the fragility of the latter’s position: they do not consider their property rights to be strong and inviolable, despite the assurances of the top officials of the state about the inadmissibility of nationalization. It seems to me that the insecurity of large property, the lack of roots of the current bourgeoisie, its uncertainty in the future prevent it from becoming a locomotive of modernization, and the lack of institutions adequate to Russian economic realities hinders the development of entrepreneurial activity.

WHAT IS THIS ILLUSION, WHAT IS THIS...

I agree: to see in any historical event only a struggle for “material resources” and interests is unforgivable naivety! But to put “collective illusions” and “the invisible influence of fiction” in place of the decisive factor is, in my opinion, even greater naivety. If it were all about literature, what would be simpler: “in order to stop evil, collect all the books and burn them!” And if any power were eternal, and the people would be eternally happy in blissful ignorance... Alas, it won’t work! This path has been tried many times in world history and has never led to anything other than unnecessary blood. For literature does not so much sow “collective illusions” as it grows from them.

To be convinced of this, it is enough, in my opinion, to look at the abolition of serfdom a little more broadly. Serfdom is by no means a Russian invention; all European peoples passed through it, everyone was somehow freed... J.M. Trevelyan testifies that already under Henry VII in England “few traces remained” of serfdom. And Henry VII is the end of the 15th - the very beginning of the 16th century; and now - I just can’t remember: which of the English authors before that time described the “horrors of serfdom”? Perhaps the poet and preacher John Ball is remembered, but he did not describe the horrors, but only asked: “When Adam plowed and Eve spun, who was the nobleman then?” And yet serfdom disappeared...

In France, it almost disappeared by the beginning of the same 16th century, only “remnants” remained, mainly in the form of noble banalities. True, to put an end to these remnants, it took bloody spasms French Revolution, but again I can’t remember: who described the “horrors of banalities”? Beaumarchais, the most popular author of the pre-revolutionary period, was no fool himself for profiting from the slave trade.

If we return to our native aspens, the problem of serfdom began to be discussed in our country in 1766, when Catherine II posed the question to the Free Economic Society: “Does a peasant farmer, for the benefit of the whole people, need to have landed immovable property or only movable property?” And whose descriptions of the “horrors of serfdom” made her do this? There was still a quarter of a century left before the publication of Radishchev’s “Travel”, and Sumarokov, the most popular author of that time, fiercely argued that his peasants
Captivity is as necessary as a dog needs a chain, or a canary needs a cage.

So there is no need to talk about the role of literature and the “collective illusions” it creates in the abolition of serfdom. Much more interesting, if we look at the liberation of the peasants as a pan-European process, the question seems to me: why do we say about some countries that serfdom disappeared in them around that time; about others - that the remnants of serfdom were eliminated at that time; Regarding the third, we can name several dates for its gradual liquidation (in Prussia, for example, peasants received personal freedom in 1807, the decree “On the regulation of relations between landowners and peasants” appeared only in 1850, and redemption payments continued for almost 30 years!) , and only in Russia did the abolition of serfdom require the Great Reform, which shook the entire system, the entire political system of the country?

But there is no big mystery here either! Among European peoples, serfdom both developed and began to decay on the basis of customary law. Parallel to this decomposition there was another process - the creation of centralized states. At some stage, he caught up with the former, the remnants of serf customs were recorded in written, state-protected law, and “a completely different song” began. For here neither the changing social views on personal freedom and property rights, nor even economic expediency played the first fiddle anymore. It is clear: what is not beneficial to society as a whole, because, say, it slows down the development of industry, is still very beneficial to someone. And the closer this someone is to centralized government power, the more difficult it is to advance his private interests in the name of the common good. First of all, it is more difficult for the authorities themselves.

In Rus', a centralized state was created at the stage of formation, and not the decomposition of the serf system. It was completed, starting with the abolition of St. George's Day in 1497, not by force of custom, but by the iron hand of the state. Therefore, only the state could abolish it, although it was infinitely difficult for him, because those who benefited from serfdom stood in a “greedy crowd” at the very throne, and the throne had no other support except them. Catherine II understood this perfectly well, which is why she never uttered a word about revising serf relations after the members of the Free economic society clearly demonstrated to her that wealthy landowners were against any progress in this area. To carry out the reform, the need for which the authorities had understood for almost a century, they needed very special circumstances. They were created by the shameful defeat in the Crimean War.

There is no point, I think, in praising the intellectual fearlessness of Konstantin Leontyev, who declared that “serfdom was in my time a great and saving institution for Russia.” If we remember the simple truth that all nations went through serfdom, then there is no doubt: at some time (for each nation - its own) it was necessary and salutary. One can seriously argue only about which one exactly time. But the second part of Leontief’s statement confuses me much more: “with the establishment of this special kind of feudalism, caused by the need to tighten, stratify and thereby discipline too broad and too monotonous Russia, our state began to grow.” The “inconsistencies” here, excuse me, are quite enough to cast doubt on the depth of our conservative’s historical knowledge. For, firstly, our state began to grow much earlier than the serf system was built, and secondly, what is the “specialness” of our feudalism, since all European peoples without exception went through serfdom? Little island England, I suppose, there was no need to pull together? Why didn’t she pass this stage? As we see, Konstantin Nikolaevich’s ends meet are not very well.

And with all my love for Gogol, the quotation from him cited by Melikhov does not really impress me, because, alas, I know and remember that less than 1% of Russian landowners managed to “educate at the university”, and the majority of the “self-interested officials” with whom he scares , were also part-time landowners, albeit small ones.

But these are all particulars. The main thing, as I understand it, is whether revolutionary Russian populism and Russian terrorism are by-products of the Great Reform? I will answer without hesitation: yes, they are! But precisely – “by-products”. That is, a product not of the reform itself, but of certain circumstances and features of its implementation. Which ones? To answer this question, you need to ask yourself a number of others, and first of all: what made the government agree to these reforms? In Soviet historiography, this issue was resolved “finally”: liberation became necessary due to the ineffectiveness of serfdom and the impoverishment of the peasants; the reform was carried out “predatory”, impoverishment accelerated, which gave rise to the revolutionary movement. Logical? Very much... But in recent years, more and more historians (for example, I will refer to the work of B.N. Mironov), studying statistical data, come to the conclusion that there was no impoverishment or increased exploitation. And in the second half of the 50s there were more peasant riots than usual, but not enough to frighten the government. What prompted Alexander II, immediately after the signing of the Paris Peace, to announce to the Moscow nobility: “We live in such a century that over time this (the abolition of serfdom. - VC.) must happen. I think you are of the same opinion with me, therefore, it is much better for this to happen from above than from below.” And most importantly, what a haste: the reform has not yet been prepared, not even really conceived, and he – bam! - posted. For what?

I dare, however, to think that this was not impulsiveness at all, but a subtly, successfully calculated political move: defeat knocked out of the hands of the opponents of emancipation their eternal argument: “Our fatherland has always remained and will remain calm!” – and the national consciousness, shocked by defeat, not only accepted the new shock more easily, but also found in it hope for renewal! One involuntarily agrees with the Moscow historian L. Zakharova: “Alexander II took the path of liberation reforms not because of his convictions, but as a military man who realized the lessons of the Eastern War.” These lessons consisted, first of all, in the fact that the cheapest professional army in the world was created by Peter on the basis of conscription, that is, the fact that a soldier forever broke with his class and became a “sovereign’s man.” And this army, once in which there was no escape, for a century and a half it became overgrown with disabled teams, soldiers’ wives, orphan units, etc., etc., becoming more and more cumbersome, clumsy, expensive and less and less combat-ready . Meanwhile, the main European armies had long been formed on the basis of conscription, their numbers were easily increased and just as easily reduced as soon as the war was over. A citizen, a subject, can be called up for temporary service and then demobilized, but not someone who is someone else’s property.

The liberation of the peasants, and urgently at that, was urgently required by the task of renewing the army! So we had to hastily loosen the tongues of those who had been taught to remain silent for centuries, because with the silence of society, you can suppress any rebellion, shoot and hang as many rebels as you like, but it is impossible to carry out reform! Any reform is a compromise between the interests of different groups of the population, but how to achieve a compromise if these interests are not voiced by anyone? An extremely complex compromise was required - after all, a significant part of the property had to be confiscated from the ruling and, moreover, the only educated class in the empire. It was necessary not only to give relative freedom to newspapers and magazines, but also to create special “talking shops” - provincial committees.

But here’s the problem: someone whose mouth has been clamped for a long time cannot speak calmly; when they release him, he screams! So there was a lot of screaming, and - naturally! - mostly stupid. Here, it seems to me, it’s time to remember Dubelt and his diary. You say he is “a practical person and is used to thinking more about consequences than principles”? Wonderful! But why didn’t he, like other government figures, think about the consequences in the spring of 1848, when the participants in Petrashevsky’s “Fridays” were captured and thrown into the fortress? This is an amazing thing: what did the supreme power care about at the end of 1847? Liberation of the peasants. Yes Yes! Nicholas I, receiving the elected Smolensk nobility, says a phrase surprisingly similar to the phrase of his son before the Moscow nobility: “It is better for us to give voluntarily than to allow it to be taken away from us.” And what do the “state criminals” who are gathering at Petrashevsky’s at the same time care about without five minutes? Liberation of the peasants! Moreover, from exactly the same point of view as Nikolai Pavlovich: how to carry out this liberation without causing any social upheaval! And when, following Liprandi’s denunciation, these intellectuals began to be seized (and the composition of “Fridays” was the envy of any academy!), why would Leonty Vasilyevich, “accustomed to thinking about the consequences,” not think about what consequences the final break in power with intellectual elite? Alas, I didn’t think... Because he was an official to the core, and an official, in essence, doesn’t give a damn about the future of the government as much as he does about the future of society.

So - more than a decade before the reform - the main circumstance arose that gave rise to its so undesirable “by-products”. When the future of the country is thought out either in secret committees created by the authorities, or in underground circles created by society, with the complete silence of everyone else, it cannot be prosperous. Any isolated groups are inevitably marginalized and radicalized. In this case, there is no fundamental difference between the authorities and the underground - both inevitably come to the idea of ​​violence.

Russia was lucky with the Great Reform. Due to various unique circumstances (for example, the fact that the most effective group for developing future reform was created completely privately in the salon of Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna...) it was possible to unite a narrow group of government officials with an equally narrow group of public figures and within this random community develop completely acceptable terms for the desired compromise. But this turned out to be not enough! The society was not ready - it did not discuss, did not think about it, did not try out different options, and therefore not a single group of it accepted the reform. Everyone was dissatisfied: nobles, peasants, industrialists, conservatives and liberals... - everything, everything! How can one not recall Petrashevite Kuzmin, who argued that first it is necessary to carry out a judicial reform that will not affect anyone’s material interests, let the society around it speak out, discuss the whole range of its problems, and only then take on more fundamental reforms...

However, such a procedure for carrying out reforms was still possible in the late 40s, but by the beginning of the 60s there was simply no time for it - it was, in fact, impossible to leave the country without a combat-ready army for several decades! Carrying out very late and not seriously thought out reforms is generally an extremely dangerous matter, as we ourselves saw in the 90s of the 20th century.

Let me just remind you of one point in the preparation of the Great Reforms: almost everyone practically involved in this matter, one way or another, changed their positions in the process of work. General Rostovtsev, at first a supporter of the liberation of peasants without land, later contemptuously called such liberation “bird freedom”, N.A. Milyutin, a principled opponent of the community, agreed with its preservation, Yu. F. Samarin, who idolized the community, agreed that the decision of its fate was “left to time and to the people themselves,” etc., etc. This is very typical! For harmonious and strictly logical social theories are a product of the intellectual underground. The lot of practitioners is compromises. Why was he a theorist?
N. Ya. Danilevsky: gave lectures to the Petrashevites about Fourier, Geographical Society reported on the eternal values ​​of the Russian community, and defended them in “Russia and Europe,” but in 1868 he was sent to the Arkhangelsk province to find out the causes of the famine, and he recommended that the government give the newly cleared areas “for long-term and hereditary ownership,” that is, destroy a community in the name of economic expediency.

So if we can draw any lesson from the Great Reform and the emergence of its “by-products,” then only one, but, in my opinion, an extremely important one: only a society that strives to avoid the emergence of marginal groups within itself can develop normally. intellectual underground, involving all social groups and interest groups in the discussion of common problems of a desirable future. We must remember that the gap between the power and intellectual elites is extremely dangerous, as it leads to the marginalization and radicalization of both. And it is especially important to remember this now, when the modernization of the country is once again on the agenda.

Igor Yakovenko, culturologist

What happened; What will happen; what you don't expect...

Alexander Melikhov wrote a highly professional provocative text. That's why he is a brilliant writer and editor of a serious literary magazine. The problem is that in the introductory reflection offered to us, a dozen pro-
problems that deserve independent consideration. Let's touch on some of the
them. One of the ideas dear to the writer is that history “is also, to a huge extent, the history of the origin, formation, struggle and decline of collective illusions, collective dreams.” Here I will allow myself to speak as a philosopher. Alexander means phenomena of an ideological nature, beliefs and convictions, calling them collective illusions and dreams. Human ideas about existence can be framed in two systems - beliefs and knowledge. Knowledge by its nature is objective (describes some reality that does not depend on the subject of knowledge), verifiable, and is universal. The scientific picture of the world that sums up knowledge develops through a change of paradigms, but quite consistently. In the space of knowledge, it is legitimate to ask: whether this or that judgment is true or false. Beliefs and convictions are fundamentally plural and fundamentally subjective. There is not, and cannot be, a true philosophy or a true religious doctrine. If someone tells you that he knows what true faith is, shoot him down or run from him like the plague. For he believes and passes off his faith as knowledge. In this space, a person makes an existential choice of certain doctrines. Responsibility for this choice falls entirely on the person himself. The believer is convinced that the truth of his choice will be finally verified after death, and nothing more.

There is no objective criterion to distinguish between true and illusory beliefs. Therefore, talking about collective dreams loses its meaning. The author can be understood in two senses: either all beliefs and beliefs are illusions, or in all beliefs and beliefs there is a moment of illusion. The first interpretation is boring and philosophically sterile. In the history of philosophy, only solipsism is sadder and more hopeless than skepticism. You can agree with the second, but this, sorry, is trivial. Indeed, it is human nature to alternate reliable and objective knowledge with myths and illusions, to mix dreams and reality, to believe as true what one likes and what one wants. People do the same thing with religious systems and ideological complexes. But the ideas themselves are not responsible for the transformations that occur to them. Transformers are responsible for this. Moreover, they answer not in a moral sense, but, so to speak, with their own skin. There are rational cultures in which the logic of thinking is brought up, a healthy skeptical principle lives, and the tendency to mythological constructions is suppressed. There, doctrines with powerful mythological potential do not take root, and what is accepted by society is minimally transformed into collective illusions. This is how Western Europe, in particular, works. And there are cultures with gigantic mythological potential. The bearers of these cultures find it cramped and boring to live in the world of objective reality. So they indulge in everything that Alexander Melikhov writes about. Yes, in particular. Russia is organized.

Melikhov’s idea is that in critical eras, fiction participates in the unfolding of these illusions, seducing a gullible society, and therefore bears responsibility for this. In this logic, an extremely narrow-minded, romantically inclined provincial young lady, who has read a lot of French novels, for some time jumps into the arms of the next gentleman, being convinced that he is “the one” and a fire breaks out between them real love. And then, having survived an inevitable catastrophe in life, he begins to blame everything on the writers and performers of heartbreaking romances, who sang and seduced with unrealistic hopes. The world turns out to be completely different! And in general, all men
we are bastards. I guess I'm a callous person. You can certainly feel sorry for this girl. But the first remark that such a situation gives rise to in me is: it’s my own fault, I’m a fool.

You and I live in Russia. If we talk about the deep typology of consciousness, then the Russian intelligentsia (and all sorts of “rulers of thoughts”: writers, poets, publicists are entirely intelligentsia) are not far from the provincial young lady we have identified. Commitment to the sacred Ought, a painful craving for the creation of idols, worship of the people, the aspiration of “absolute good” (do you understand what this is? I have lived on earth for sixty-five years and I don’t understand. The construct of “absolute good” does not fit in my head), faith in the fact that give free rein to the Russian people, and he will build a wonderful, magical world in which everyone will be happy - all this and much more reveals in the classical Russian intellectual the brother of our heroine. So, the Russian intellectual created illusions not the way a modern political strategist and image-maker, who understands everything and works off his fee, does it, but completely sincerely. He sincerely mythologized reality, because the poor fellow is not capable of perceiving the world rationally. This is his family trait. He soberly perceives reality and automatically realizes what his interests are, a wingless Western bourgeois. In critical epochs, the Russian intellectual becomes deluded and gives birth to radical ideas.

Further, as Melikhov rightly notes, the leaders public opinion become “unselfish, but irresponsible figures, inclined to reason in terms of ethical principles.” So it's not their fault. This is the nature of Russian culture. She is in critical times will claim exactly this type of understanding peace. In all normal and prosperous countries, various radicals occupy marginal positions, are published in publications with tiny circulations, and go out to noisy demonstrations. Society listens to a solid and balanced mainstream. The same one, devoid of illusions and inclined to see the whole range of direct and remote consequences.

Now let's talk about the problem of the abolition of serfdom. The introductory text counters the intellectual belief that “this question is simple and does not require careful thought and long-term precautions.” I can remind Alexander Melikhov that the secret committees, created by the highest order, carefully considered the problem for decades, until the thunder of Russia’s military defeat finally struck. There was no sense in this. Melikhov blames the Russian intellectual for his lack of inclination to seriously think about what will follow the abolition. The intelligentsia listened to the liberal thinker Herzen, and not to General Dubelt, who predicted: the proletariat will appear and revolutions will begin. For some reason Alexander doesn’t wonder much more topical issue; What would have happened, what would have been the consequences, if the abolition of serfdom had not occurred?

The emergence of the proletariat and “revolution, as in France,” is immeasurably better than the cemetery peace of Nicholas Russia, for this is life and development. I am aware that today “healthy conservatism” is in use, and regarding Nikolaev’s Russia one should speak with emotion. However, this is my principled position. An alternative to reform existed, and it was collapse of Russia. The authorities in Russia are always, with rare exceptions, not conservative, but reactionary1. It seeks to reverse the course of world history, which is moving in a direction that is decidedly unsatisfactory to the Russian authorities, and to shift the situation back to some past idealized by the reactionary authorities. Therefore, Russia is embarking on major reforms literally on the verge of collapse. When all the deadlines for reasonable reform have long passed and, as they say, it’s locked up. This applies to 1861, 1905, and 1988-1991. Serfdom could be abolished either by the ruling regime, revolutionary conventions, or the colonial administration. The fortress should have been abolished sixty years earlier.

But what really touches Alexander Melikhov’s text is the citation of Alfred and Saint-Clair. Behind the question: “Who will take care of them, who will teach them to use the freedom given to them for their own benefit?” - there is a burning selfish interest. This is a strategy as old as time, filthy from being used a thousand times, for the pseudo-moral justification of immoral practices on the part of the subject of the immoral action. All tyrants and serf owners proclaim that the people are cattle and free life I'm definitely not ready. Give him free rein, he will instantly become drunk and die. I am absolutely not convinced by the paternalistic humanism of the serf owners, since I see here a pronounced conflict of interests.

Okay, let's forget about the conflict of interest. Neither I nor Alexander Melikhov have serfs. Which means we have moral right discuss the problem stated by St. Clair. The problem of “emancipation of the peasantry” has both a moral and pragmatic dimension. The need to abolish serfdom was set by a historical imperative. Behind it were purely pragmatic considerations. However, since we are dealing with an Orthodox post-medieval society, just emerging from the Middle Ages, the spiritual elite of this society was able to recognize and formulate this imperative exclusively in moral categories. There were simply no other ways to rationalize social reality in Russian culture. For the classic Russian intellectual, considerations of benefit/disadvantage, efficiency/ineffectiveness, increases/reduces competitiveness are actually incomprehensible, and, in addition, endlessly vulgar and wingless. These are landmarks from another, alien and ontologically hostile cultural universe. Thus, the actual culture, that is, its own nature, moved Russian society towards moral maximalism.

Contrary to the illusions and latent hopes of Russian ideologists, our country does not live on the continent of “Russia”, but on planet Earth. This means it must constantly compete with neighboring societies. In such competition, any state remains exactly as long as its level of competitiveness does not drop below a certain critical threshold. As soon as this happens, the “forest orderlies” come running and tear the poor fellow apart. This is how the fate of Byzantium, beloved by Russian traditionalists, unfolded in 1453, and this is how Russia itself tore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into pieces at the end of the 18th century.

Another aspect of the same problem is historical dynamics. A strict pattern is being realized in history. A society that has not had time to master the new technology that revolutionizes the world (a new technological structure) leaves the historical arena. At the beginning of the 16th century, about six hundred Cortes warriors armed with muskets
destroyed the huge Aztec empire, whose population is estimated at 10 -
15 million people. In the 19th century, the era of steam began. Countries capable of creating factory production based on the steam engine, building and operating railways (even with the involvement of foreign specialists) gained/maintained independence. Those who were not capable of this became colonies. In Russia, steam engines and railways appeared in the 40s of the 19th century. However, both the first and second were extremely rare and eked out a miserable existence. Technological lag behind the enemy became obvious to the political elite as the reason for the lost Eastern War (Crimean Campaign)
1854-1856. And this technological lag was determined by an insurmountable, truly iron law: the steam engine doesn't match with serfdom or slavery. Where the era of steam is established, both serfdom (as in Russia) and relict slavery (as in the USA) collapse.

There is a strict connection between the nature of the technology and the culture of the subject using this technology. A Paleolithic hunter cannot become a farmer. To do this, he must radically change his consciousness, die as a hunter and be born again as a farmer. Historians call this transition the “Neolithic revolution.” Likewise, industrial technologies based on the steam engine do not combine with the patriarchal privately owned peasant. The partially modernized state serf, who received a primary education and was forcibly integrated into the early industrial plantation economy within the framework of the ideocratic state, is combined not only with a steam locomotive, but also with a primitive electric drive and a DT-54 tractor, while the patriarchal peasant is not combined. The defeat in the war conveyed the truth to the political elite of the empire: the economic and technological backwardness was determined by serfdom. It had to be canceled urgently.

The public debate around the issue of “emancipation” is interesting and significant. It expresses the self-awareness of society in the era of a qualitative leap. But this polemic did not solve anything; decided by the logic of world history. If we are talking about fundamental decisions, Russian rulers begin to take “society” (that is, subjects, little people) seriously only when these subjects take to the streets in tens of thousands and power begins to slip away from under the feet of the designated rulers. Perestroika was also started by the authorities, and it began under the pressure of a general historical imperative. The liberal intelligentsia perked up and cheered, but the initiative came from the authorities. So in this aspect, Herzen and Belinsky are not at fault either.

Melikhov finds courage in the position of Konstantin Leontyev, who called serfdom “a great and saving institution for Russia.” In a country where at all times there has been an abundance of whip connoisseurs, poets of the Russian ulus and defenders of Bukhara justice, to see intellectual courage in the glorification of slavery, in my opinion, is tricky. We have before us the normal position of a classical reactionary, who does not conform to the liberal discourse that was dominant at that time, but takes advantage of the aggravation of his position. This is what Prokhanov or Dugin write. All these guys are driven by a secret idea: to cancel the course of world history, starting at least from 1453, and to replay the fate of Orthodoxy, Russia and all humanity. That's all. You give a cross to Hagia Sophia. As for the content of K. Leontyev’s statement, I will say the following: once upon a time both cannibalism and human sacrifice were natural and historically inevitable. Fortunately, the cultures and societies that shared these practices have disappeared and become history. If Leontyev is right and the Russian Empire was truly constituted by serfdom, then thank God that this country has disappeared.

The humanism of the serf owners, who grieved over the dim prospects of yesterday's serfs, deserves extensive commentary. Freedom in its ontology presupposes that those endowed with freedom can drink themselves to death, become a drug addict, etc. This distinguishes him from a slave or a young child, who is looked after by parents, masters and captains, police officers. Man freely chooses between good and evil. This is the burden of freedom and the greatness of a free person. Alexander Melikhov knows all this as well as I do. What makes him sympathize with the ideologists of slavery? For me freedom is a religious value. From these positions, Gogol’s reasoning that “the rule of one landowner can be more profitable” than the rule of many officials is absolutely unacceptable. The benefits Gogol talks about are fictitious. But even if he were right, choosing the yoke is a rejection of the God-given nature of man. Of course, centuries of slavery deformed the human material and created a dead-end inertia, which is all the more difficult to overcome the later it is taken up. Here we come to the sad plot of paying for moving society to the next stage of historical development.

The history of mankind is structured in such a way that at turning points the layer of “yesterday’s people,” who are acutely inadequate to the changed conditions, are marginalized and die out. The peasant, unable to effectively manage his freedom, should have died out. This is absolutely normal and represents one of the mechanisms of historical dynamics. Marginalizing fathers breaks a dead-end tradition. Children choose a different scenario – one that is adequate to the new conditions, an adaptive one. This is the price to pay for the transition to the next stage of historical development. In history, such a drama has been observed dozens of times. What a story. One day, dinosaurs became extinct, but mammals remained. At the next revolution, the Neanderthals died out, but the Cro-Magnons (that is, you and me) remained. Let us note that if all this had not happened, there would have been neither the Neva magazine nor this controversy. Moreover, there are serious reasons to believe that both mammals and Cro-Magnons, as best they could, helped their historical alternative become extinct. It is foolish to evaluate the above in ethical categories. This is the nature of things.

Thus, the abolition of the “fortress,” like any revolutionary transformation, included a mechanism for stratifying the traditionalist masses into people of yesterday and today. Yesterday's people become drunkards, at best they live quietly, today's
nie - fit into the “new and furious world”, rise up, build their future. We have been observing these processes for the last twenty years.

Next, we need to understand how the reform was implemented and what policies were pursued until August 1914. Melikhov’s thought boils down to the following: “collective phantoms, collective illusions in which both the top and the bottom resided” (these are the very illusions for which liberal-minded Russian publicists are responsible) determined the insufficient preparedness for emancipation, which “ultimately led to the October catastrophe." Everything is decidedly wrong.

Let's start with the question: what goals did the reformers set for themselves? The thesis was stated above: the political wisdom of the Russian elite, its philosophy is opposed to the logic of the world-historical process. Therefore, the so-called “conservative modernization” is being implemented here. The point of this strategy is to master the necessary Western technologies, but categorically cut off from them everything that gives rise to these technologies: norms, values, social dynamics, the spirit of freedom, etc. And then, relying on Western tools, resist this very West and, if possible, rake it up for yourself. The strategic goal of modernization: not to let history into Russia. We have a special path and sovereign democracy.

Therefore, reforms in Russia are carried out according to one algorithm: reform in such a way that, if possible, nothing is changed. It is necessary to preserve all the system-forming parameters of the whole. Paint the facades, change the signs, let in the most energetic and ambitious people from below into the select circle, and after that firmly cement the situation. You see, everything will work out and go as before.

This task determined the parameters of the reforms. The authorities did everything to preserve class society, save the nobility from erosion, leave the peasants in the ghetto redistribution rural community and not allow all these millionaires, journalists, lawyers, bankers (they are also Jews!) to rise to the top. The Russian government abandoned serfdom, but did everything in its power to ensure that capitalism did not come to Russia. What was previously called “class interest” was at work here: the desire for self-preservation class society from the privileged class. But there was something beyond this. Bourgeois society caused a metaphysical protest among the Russian nobles. It was something infinitely vulgar, encroaching on the sacred foundations of existence and absolutely unthinkable here in Holy Rus'. As a cultural historian, I testify: the historically subsequent is always perceived by the ideologists of the historically preceding as a challenge to sacred values, a marketplace of immorality and the death of the Universe.

But if only the ruling elite had stood on the side of historical inertia, nothing would have worked out for them. History was opposed by an alliance between the upper and lower classes. The top - tsarism, Orthodox Church, nobility. The lower classes are the traditional patriarchal peasantry and partly God-fearing urban inhabitants. The patriarchal peasant is vital to Asian despotism. In it – its ontological
skoe foundation. The kulak is an agent of the market and capitalist relations. He needs guarantees of private property, trade in land, abolition of estates, etc. A kulak and a farm laborer will get along well with the president, the junta, and the parliamentary republic, as long as they don’t interfere with making money. But the patriarchal peasant fears and hates the city, and with it everything that embodies the forces of historical dynamics. He needs a “tsar-father” as a guarantee that fists with merchants will not destroy the motionless world of age-old tradition. And therefore, the peasantry, standing on the positions of primitive communism, rejecting the city, mature market relations, commodity production, a real state and history as a force that draws the archaic world dear to them away from the ideal of the Opon kingdom, had to be mothballed. The forces that destroy this element should be crushed and spread rot.

All the forces that blocked the movement of history in our country got their due. They were destroyed after 1917. The forms of destruction and the sequence of events varied. The last to disappear, in the 70s of the last century, was the traditional Russian village. Country writers sang a majestic departure for her. The half-century delay is due to the gigantic size of the Russian peasantry. And then, for half a century, Soviet power fed on historical energy extracted from the destroyed world of the traditional peasantry. When this world ended, the food cycle of the Soviet ghoul broke down, and he literally disappeared from the historical arena within a decade.

The agents of the historical process in Russia were: the bourgeois strata of the city, the liberal intelligentsia, the kulaks in the countryside, the Old Believer industrialist, and the trade and entrepreneurial element growing out of the peasant environment. The weight proportions of these forces were obviously unequal. The forces of historical reaction dominated. Through the combined efforts of the upper and lower classes, the formation of a bourgeois society in Russia was blocked. That is why, and only why, the Bolsheviks won in 1917.

In order to guarantee a decent future for the country, it was necessary to: destroy the class society, carry out land reform in such a way that a wide layer of private owners would appear in the countryside with an allotment sufficient for successful farming, and consistently develop the economic infrastructure. A frontal attack on illiteracy was vitally necessary - universal primary education, a broad program of economic and agronomic education. Such a policy guaranteed an economic and general social effect, but it meant the death of the “old regime” and the transformation of the country into a normal capitalist society. One of the largest Slavic scholars of the second half of the 19th century, Slavophile and pan-Slavist V.I. Lamansky, in a speech delivered in 1894, stated that the wars against revolutionary France of the late 18th - early 19th centuries and the Hungarian campaign of 1848 were unnecessary interventions in the affairs of European states . “It would be a hundred times better if we... spent at least part of this enormous money in the first years of our century on the liberation of the peasants, public education and on improving our means of communication”2. There is little to add to this.

From 1861 to 1917, a consistent policy of conservation of the patriarchal peasantry as an integral socio-cultural phenomenon was implemented. The reform itself was designed in such a way that the peasant would remain dependent on the landowner. The landowners retained ownership of all the lands that belonged to them, but were obliged to provide the peasants with a house plot and field allotment for use. Field allotment lands were provided not personally to the peasants, A for collective use by rural communities, who could distribute them among peasant farms at your own discretion. The community was responsible for taxes with “mutual responsibility,” which means it led the peasant. The “redemption operation” with an installment plan of 49 years tied the peasant to the landowner, delayed the departure of the poor to the city and slowed down the development of capitalism. Redemption payments hung like a dead weight on the farm and made it difficult to rise. Moreover, not only serfs, but also appanage and state peasants had to buy back land.

To summarize, two legal systems have emerged in post-reform Russia. People from “decent society” were in a legal framework that guaranteed private property and normal market relations, but the smerds never became subjects of market relations and remained in the community, from which they could leave after fifty years3. Does this remind you of anything? Try opening and registering your small business first. This venture will add to your life experience, and maybe even lead to some thoughts.

And then state policy consistently stifled the sprouts of capitalism in the countryside. The Regulations on Employment for Rural Work of 1886 took a step back to non-economic coercion of the worker. The Family Division Law of 1886 blocked the natural processes of disintegration of the patriarchal family, which was faced with the need to conduct commercial farming. The division could occur with the consent of the head of the family and was sanctioned by a decision of 2/3 of the village assembly. Adult family people who had children had to wait for the death of the “bolshak” in order to have your own farm. The authorities prescribed for the peasant a school of obedience to his father and the village gathering. Further, the authorities consistently supported the community and resisted the processes of its erosion. She banned intra-community land redistribution in 1893. The law of December 14, 1893 prohibited leaving the land community without its consent, even with early redemption of the plot. The sane K. H. Bunge, who categorically objected to the ban on the sale and pledge by peasants of their land, who saw a huge danger for the state in such a policy, warned that this ban “would destroy the peasants’ concept of property rights, thereby a threat is being created to Oryan land ownership”4. The senile dignitaries from the State Council thought differently.

A special topic is the deliberate preservation of ignorance. On a report from the Tobolsk province about the low literacy of the population, Alexander III imposed a resolution
tion: “And glory to God!” This attitude gave rise to the famous “decree on cooks’ children” of 1887, which prohibited the children of commoners from entering gymnasiums. Social dynamics are inseparable from education. By blocking these channels, the authorities drove the common people into the ghetto. Schooling was not compulsory. Universal primary education was introduced only by P. A. Stolypin. While a third of the budget went to the army and navy, public education suffers from chronic underfunding. The parish and zemstvo schools covered at first an insignificant, then obviously insufficient part of the rural population. According to the 1897 census, two out of five men and one out of five women could read.

A completely separate plot of the Russian drama is the destruction by the system of large officials who propose reforms that can lead the country out of the deadlock. In 1881, God gave Russia a talented Minister of Finance, Nikolai Khristoforovich Bunge. Bunge developed the resettlement movement, which was necessary in connection with the construction of the Great Siberian Railway and solved the problem of land shortage. However, communal orders, mutual responsibility and the passport system hindered the growth of the resettlement movement. In the conditions of the agrarian crisis, the Minister of Finance called on the government to build agrarian policy not on the conservation of the communal system, but on private peasant land ownership. Bunge established the Peasant Land Bank, which issued long-term loans to peasants to purchase land. The minister believed that with reasonable policies the community would quietly die out. He planned to abolish mutual responsibility, revise the passport charter, reduce redemption payments... In the fall of 1885, “conservative” forces launched a campaign in the press and government circles and achieved the resignation of the Minister of Finance.

In 1905, the chief manager of land management and agriculture, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kutler, developed a project for a liberal agrarian reform, which involved the alienation of part of the landowners' lands and the distribution of them to the peasants. It was proposed to alienate leased lands for compensation (up to 40% of landowners' land). The land was transferred to a state-controlled land fund. These lands are then purchased through the Peasant Bank on the basis of private property rights by landless peasants.

Some clarification is required here. TO end of the 19th century century in Russia the rural population has been growing. The socio-cultural consequences of the abolition of religious
Lenten law. Developments in obstetrics, vaccinations and other measures have reduced infant mortality. The patriarchal village suffered acutely from land shortage. The traditional peasant saw one solution to the problem - “black redistribution”. The entire land fund is distributed to peasant societies, which, as before, manage this fund, allocating and redistributing land at their discretion.

Conservation of the community and preservation of the archaic way of life hindered the growth of marketability of peasant farming. Productive grain farming developed on large estates with agronomists, modern technology and hired labor. Commodity production was created by the fist, which was hated by the peasant and denounced by the Russian intellectual. The way out of land shortage lay through the intensification of production. Simply put, the subsistence-oriented traditional peasant was to be replaced by the capitalist farmer. But this required a different infrastructure, capital, a different socio-political climate and, finally, acutely lacking land. The liberal project of agrarian reform gave a chance exchange loyalty to the communal attitudes of peasants for private property. This would be a genuine revolution in the consciousness of a huge part of Russian society. The movement of people from prehistoric times into the space of the state and civilization. Kutler's project was proposed at the height of the First Russian Revolution, when the situation favored realism and required one to look into the future. It was only necessary to sacrifice a part in the name of preserving the whole. The empire's political class had a chance to set the country's history on a path in which the granddaughters of the tsar's dignitaries would avoid the fate of an Istanbul prostitute, and the grandchildren of a Parisian taxi driver. The court clique achieved Kutler's resignation.

The more you delve into the history of our country, the clearer it becomes: Russian-
The Russian elite was driven by absolute, unmistakable instinct. Without being distracted by unnecessary body movements and discarding saving ideas, she steadily walked towards her own death.

It is hardly worth describing in detail the agrarian reform of Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin. It included: permission to leave the community for farms, strengthening the Peasant Bank, forced land management and strengthening the resettlement policy aimed at eliminating the peasant land shortage. The reform ensured the establishment of private ownership of land, stimulated the intensification of economic activity and increased marketability of agriculture.

The reform was based on the indivisibility of landowners' land, and therefore did not solve the agrarian question. The peasants were forced to make up for the lack of land by renting from landowners and village societies. This was the main flaw of the Stolypin reform. The reform met with opposition in the countryside. In 1911, exit from the community decreased sharply. Nevertheless, Stolypin's reforms provided some chance to avoid catastrophe and evolutionarily lead the country out of the impasse, resolving the conflict between the imperative of modernization and the class character of Russian society. This policy met with a fierce wave of opposition. The Prime Minister's house is blown up by the Socialist-Revolutionaries-maximalists (August 1906). At court, a fuss begins to remove the prime minister. The court environment, which opposed the prime minister, convinced the tsar: since the revolution had been defeated, no reforms were required. This was the level of state thinking of the ruling elite. In September 1911, the prime minister was assassinated by terrorist Dmitry Bogrov, an agent of the Kyiv security department, under extremely dubious circumstances.

The final chord of suicide of the class monarchy in Russia was the outbreak of the First World War. The reforms were extremely difficult and painful. The patriarchal mass refused to be cut off. The twenty years of peace that Stolypin dreamed of were needed for the majority of the peasants to leave the community and for the bourgeois model of sociality to establish itself among the peasantry. In 1914, Russia was less than a decade removed from a lost war with a modernizing Asian state, followed by revolution. Entry, and almost full-fledged participation in starting a war in the name of the incomprehensible interests of the “brothers of the Slavs,” the existence of which either 90% of the subjects either did not suspect or had the vaguest idea of, was pure madness. Russia was opposed by three empires: Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and German. If the Ottomans were breathing their last, then Austria was no weaker than Russia, and Germany obviously surpassed Russia in its potential.

The war required a monstrous effort and resulted in casualties and hardships on an unprecedented scale. Society could not stand it and the state collapsed. From February 1917, the “agrarian, or peasant, revolution” unfolded, which lasted until 1922. It was the agrarian revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power and marked the “October catastrophe” that Melikhov writes about.

If a normal bourgeois society had established itself in Russia, the Bolsheviks would have nothing to catch in this country. Let us repeat: at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was possible to exchange the peasant ideal of a communal world order for private property. But this required widespread land reform. Confiscation of estates, distribution of specific lands. The elite of the “old world” were honored with this in 1920, under Wrangel, when the lands had long been dismantled and it was too late. The practical implementation of the reform began in September 1920, a couple of months before the evacuation of the White Army from Crimea.

After Khrushchev’s removal, there was an anecdote in which the disgraced leader was credited with taking the initiative to award the title of Hero Soviet Union Nicholas II “for creating a revolutionary situation in Russia.” The paradox is that, in terms of content, this premise is pure truth. Alexander III and Nicholas II did everything in their power to ensure that a peasant revolution broke out in Russia and the Jacobins came to power.

Now let's talk about the phenomenon of revolution. Today's good form involves spitting at the word “revolution” and making the sign of the cross. But since I am beyond the bounds of good manners and have nothing to lose, I report that my understanding of this essence is decisively at odds with the dominant one. One social thinker who is categorically unfashionable today called revolutions the locomotive of history. The history of European civilization has experienced three great revolutionary eras: the emergence of Christianity, spiritual liberation from the shackles of the Middle Ages (this revolution was embodied in the Renaissance and Reformation) and the Great bourgeois revolutions. My understanding of history is that these revolutions were milestones on the path to freedom. February 1917 and August 1991 lie in this cluster. Another thing is that very often good wins in the fourth act of the drama, and after the procession singing “La Marseillaise” the gentlemen Jacobins appear on stage. The rhythm of history does not coincide with the short life of man.

Revolutions (not coups at the top, but revolutions) are determined by the logic of the world-historical process. In this sense, they are inevitable and healing. Even the most terrible ones, inspired by the archaic and objectively aimed at turning history back, like the Bolsheviks in Russia or the Khomeinists in Iran, solve certain historical problems that the previous regime could not cope with, and after implementing these tasks, they lead their societies to further progressive development. It is important to understand the nature of revolutionary consciousness. A revolution is a holiday in the strictest sense of the word. The time of ideal life. The era of universal belief that the old regime will collapse and after this a new happy life will come. A revolution is a phase transition during which most of society is plunged into illusion. But without this illusion, revolutions do not win.

In some ways, October 1917 was certainly a disaster. It is important to realize the iron conditionality of this event. It was determined by the qualitative characteristics of Russian society, which turned out to be unable to find the evolutionary path of development in the specific historical situation of the 19th-20th centuries. At the same time, the utmost responsibility falls on the modernized layers of society, immersed in high culture, who have gone through the school of rational thinking, but have not demonstrated the ability to respond to the challenges of history. The Russian elite showed itself not to be the “only European”, but to be Asian nobles, critically inconsistent with the realities of the era.

Perestroika indeed has many similarities with the era of the Great Reforms of Alexander II. The Soviet government began reforms when all the deadlines for saving the system and ensuring its smooth evolution to a new quality had passed. (For example, the pragmatic Chinese communists have been rolling out Deng Xiaoping’s reforms since 1979. The Soviets stood until the last.) Here, too, an inexorable historical imperative pressed: the Union lost the Cold War, the Afghan operation reached a dead end. The alternative to transformation also promised to plunge the country into uncontrollable turbulent events, which in a nuclear superpower was fraught with a global catastrophe.

The reformers at the top were more or less clearly aware of “what inheritance they were refusing.” There was no extensive positive program. It is important to emphasize that this was not anyone's fault. The history of mankind has no experience of emerging from the communist experiment. In the USSR there is a layer of people who understand the realities of the world economy, the political system of the West, having experience of life in a qualitatively different reality(and this is critically important) was negligible. There was no unanimity in the ruling stratum. The reforms took place against the backdrop of growing pressure from conservative forces.

Everyone who was sick of the stagnant reality took up the slogans and became supporters of perestroika. At the same time, convinced bearers of liberal values there was negligible. Spontaneous democracy, protest against partyocracy, and the need to destroy ideological dictatorship dominated. The desire to escape from a miserable existence, to find shops with full counters, to see the world, etc. In parallel, historically inevitable processes of national revival of the imperial outskirts unfolded.

The picture of positive expectations has been mythologized. The market will put everything in its place. Once the CPSU is removed, our people will finally live no worse than the Europeans. The collective historical subject was acutely inadequate to historical reality. The blame for this lies entirely with the communist system. Society lived behind a high fence, and a perverted picture of the world was formed by a powerful ideological machine. Soviet people did not feel the need to understand the nature of the historical alternative to the Soviet project. There were two mythologies in the mass consciousness: the Soviet ideological caricature of the West and the positive mythology about a well-fed and free society, full of coveted goods, a society where even the unemployed had a better life than an ordinary Soviet worker. Under these initial conditions, one could not expect another, more rosy development of events. It could have been worse, like in Yugoslavia.

After 1991, the post-reform situation in Russia is slowly but consistently being reproduced. Over the course of two decades, the relatively loose Soviet class society was reformatted and formed into a post-reform bureaucratic pyramid. The emerging bourgeois strata are driven into the reservation. Their property is not guaranteed in any way. There is no independent court. Monstrous corruption is corroding society. The traditional masses do not like the rich, who are successfully robbed by “our” bosses. But the mole of history digs and digs. We'll wait until we see how this round ends. One thing is more or less clear: the forces that have relied on the restoration of class society and the formation of a reserve are in for big surprises.

Vyacheslav Rybakov, writer

The strength of our victories

For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

I am not a professional historian of Russia.

Having been studying China for many years and, moreover, from time to time stumbling upon
passionate discussions of amateurs about the intricacies of Chinese history and culture, I can best imagine how much nonsense quite intelligent and decent people can produce, arguing about something that they do not understand, but are guided by the most general considerations and the best intentions.

It is the reasoning about special issues from the transcendental positions of “in general”, from the positions of “good is better than bad”, “it would be good and fair to light up with something good and fair, but at least the grass wouldn’t grow there”, that have so filled our information space that it’s time to call its disinformation. Oddly enough, it is precisely with the current freedom of speech that it is becoming more and more difficult to discuss anything on the case, specifically, with the aim of finding a real way out of real difficulties.

I would really not like to turn out to be another Herzen; There are already so many of them in England.

Having decided to think aloud about Russian serfdom, I will quite deliberately not go into specifics. Any specialist with one phrase: “But in the village of Pustye Scrotums in March one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two it was not like this, but like this...” - will not leave any stone unturned from my amateur research.

Therefore, I will try to tackle the matter in an orientalist way. The orientalist has a habit: there are much fewer reliable facts, but the time frame of history is much longer, and the pace is much lower; and willy-nilly you have to almost touch it, closing your eyes and carefully touching with your fingertips the fifth eyelid, then the fifteenth, to look for similar roughnesses. The habit of measuring history over at least centuries helps us sometimes to see the forest for the trees.

So, did serfdom play any positive role in Russia, and do you have to be a hero like Konstantin Leontiev to even try to look at the problem from this angle?

The second question can be answered immediately with complete certainty. You don’t have to be a hero, you just need to honestly say what you think. If you think so, of course.

But regarding the first...

And what? And it very well may be so.

We have an example that is much closer to us in time, much more visual, much more terrible - and which left in Russian history no less harmful deformations than serfdom.

Yes, yes, everyone probably already understood what we were talking about. Exactly. Stalin's Gulag.

I recently re-read an article by my respected senior colleague Vladimir Aronovich Yakobson, a brilliant expert on all kinds of Akkadian-Sumerian affairs, any Ur and Uruk, and, in particular, the laws of Hammurabi, published in the eighth issue of “Zvezda” for the tenth year.

“And the future, built at such a cost, cannot be bright, because, I am sure, there is some still undiscovered historical law of the preservation of good and evil, if you like, something like historical karma for each people and for humanity as a whole. There is no mysticism here, I am a strict materialist, and that is why I am sure that we are paying and will continue to pay for a long time for the massacres of Ivan the Terrible, for the “successful management” of Joseph the Bloody and for all the evil that happened before them, as well as in between and after. And, finally, a completely prosaic remark: as the historical experience of many countries shows, well-fed, healthy, well-educated and satisfied people work much better and more efficiently than the Pavka Korchagins, and even more so than the prisoners at the logging site or at the White Sea Canal.”

What can I say? Everything is exactly like that. There's nothing to cover it with. The pepper is clear: it is better to be rich and healthy than poor and sick.

Now let's do a thought experiment. We take Herzen with his impeccable karma and put him in the pre-war Kremlin as general secretary. A rare chance, your honor! Show the fools how it really is!

Brotherly, but not for us, Poland sleeps and dreams of returning the Lithuanian and Ukrainian lands right up to the Black Sea. And in the twenties. And the thirties are already in the yard, Hitler has already eaten Czechoslovakia and loomed over the entire surrounding Europe, and in Warsaw, having taken several Czech crumbs from under his table, they are still dreaming of, with a weak wave of the hand, annul three centuries of European history and return to sweet mess “odd mozha do mozha”.

The most powerful European powers, England and France, are now planning the bombing of Baku and the seizure of Transcaucasia. And in the twenties. And the thirties are already here, Hitler has already attacked Poland, and they are still striving from the airfields of the mandated Middle East to destroy the large cities of the Caucasus and annex the south of the USSR to...

No, not to a free Europe, as some probably thought hopefully. Just to the same mandated territories.

There is nothing to say about Japan and the Russian Far East.

And there is absolutely no point in saying platitudes about Hitler himself, who back in the twenties, with an open heart, assured the world community that he would squeeze out the blinkers of anyone for kind lebensraum, and even with a feeling of deep satisfaction on Slavic subhumans.

Meanwhile, the factories that were able to be built under the tsar in defiance of the grabbers in epaulettes have collapsed. There is nothing to make weapons on. And not from anything. There aren't even any raw materials. That is, it is there, but the jester knows where. Where where? In Karaganda! In the permafrost! Where there is no Norilsk yet, where, in fact, there is not even Magadan yet. There is nothing, there is snow for hundreds of kilometers, that’s all the property of the republic.

How can you be lured to work there, in the white desert, in the icy silence, with a good salary, your own cottage in the garden, swimming pools with heated water, a developed network of roads? So that nickel, molybdenum and chromium are finally mined for the Motherland by “well-fed, healthy, well-educated and happy people” who, who can argue, “work much better and more efficiently than Pavka Korchagins and especially prisoners”?

And besides, every year is worth its weight in gold. It's not those who are about to attack, it's these. The bomb carriers of the rich and well-fed, who work better, are about to fly through with fire and sword, about to fly towards long-calculated targets. The blond, black-haired, and even red-haired heads of innocent Soviet children who have only just managed to be shoveled (which now for some reason is not possible) from the grimy are about to be knocked down by shrapnel, high-explosive, incendiary and chemical criminal street children in clean, very mischievous pioneers.

What does the smart, noble, kind Secretary General Herzen do, having seen enough of this disgrace from the Kremlin?

For some reason, it seems that in horror he pulls off the jacket known to the whole world for general secretaries over his head and with all his soul, as well as his whole body, runs, as usual, to England.

Clean hands, unsullied conscience. Let anyone who wants to deal with such nightmares. And then I will finish him off with all the temperament of an intellectual with an excellent style and considerable wealth. From London, I can definitely see that the Kremlin has no outside world and all the tricks of the cannibals there have no reasonable explanations. Just the crazy whims of fanatics who have seized power...

When the problem is to reduce the sea of ​​tears that will be shed one way or another, it is not inspiring. Somehow small. It’s better not to have anything to do with it one way or another. To talk about the fact that not a single tear should be shed even for the sake of complete world harmony - yes, this is our way. Hangover-like. There is no greater happiness than to wake up after a week-long binge and, with trembling hands, with eyes like frozen fish, swear: no more! Not a single one!

Tears.

And really - no, no. Not a single one. Until the next binge.

This terrible, hopeless squaring of the circle confronted Russia every time the situation in the surrounding world required it to make another breakthrough in its endless catch-up development. And any objectively necessary overstrain led to another increase in oppression and at the same time - to another sublimation of the hangover humanism of the fleet-footed intelligentsia.

Where does this curse come from - endless convulsions of catching up development, historical epilepsy? They say that epilepsy is a disease of geniuses, but something is too painful, really... Maybe, well, that kind of genius?

And here it is appropriate to move on to the next questions posed by Alexander Melikhov. What was the reason for the lack of preparedness for the “emancipation” of the peasants, which ultimately led to the October catastrophe? And at the same time, is there any similarity here with our perestroika? Could it have been accomplished with fewer losses and greater achievements?

What now to complain about the fact that when in Europe Charlemagne was already at the head of a perfectly organized armored army, I’m not afraid to even call a spade a spade - chivalry, burned the Polabian Slavs alive and drove them from their native Slavic Elbe far to the east, in the very east of this Krivichi and Vyatichi could only reason with each other with roughly shaved wood. It's a long time ago. And irrevocable. Let's not pay attention to this at all; two or three centuries of gap in technical and military development - just think, is there happiness in war? You just need to be kinder and more tolerant, no matter what happens. It’s only the generals who have gone crazy from their uselessness in life and have only war on their minds. And what will a humanist tell us when an enemy comes, whose military skill and equipment has surpassed his people by three centuries? There is only one thing: there is no need to resist at all, you need to lie down, spread yourself wider and join the advanced culture. Kinder and more tolerant, understand? And whoever didn’t lie down - ugh, savage!

But they didn’t go to bed. They beat them with their own weapons. And they fought back. And again they caught up in all combat aspects, when someone again was haunted by the Eastern Lebensraum. And there was no end to it. “It’s great that you, Your Majesty, thanked your teachers!” - Field Marshal Renschild said to Peter after the Poltava battle. If people had retained more of at least formal nobility, Keitel could have said the same thing to Zhukov on May 9, 1945. And many more to many others, perhaps starting with Ivan the Third.

And with almost every victory over external invasion, we lived worse and worse, uglier and uglier. And they rebelled more and more often.

No mystery.

Here, along the way, it’s time to answer a very simple question for complete clarity: is a country worthy of existence, in which from time to time it is necessary to do this? Maybe her? It's about time she... did that?

But if you stick your nose to the very bottom, to the very root, it becomes obvious: simple questions have very simple answers.

For whom this country is theirs, for that it is worthy.

And for those who are not their own, it is, of course, easier.

For those who are not their own, their kindness is like this: how can it finally fall apart - and then, in patches, everything will improve and become humanized.

And for those who have their own, those have a completely different one: how can they finally improve and humanize it - and, moreover, not ruin it.

A compromise between these two elementary positions is apparently impossible. So let us remember the optimism of the unforgettable comrade Sukhov and repeat in more or less harmonious chorus: it is better, of course, to suffer. The rest are on their way out with their things.

To freedom! WITH clear conscience! From Russian hell, from the prison of nations!

Is something wrong again?

Oh, there are too many things to fit on a personal yacht, or even on a specially chartered cruise ship?

Well, then I don’t know... What about confiscation? Will it suit you?

My generation remembers by heart both Lenin’s definition of a revolutionary situation and all the parodies of it. But I’ll refresh you for the young: this is when those on top can no longer do it, but those below no longer want to. That is, the upper classes cannot govern in the old way, and the lower classes cannot live in the old way.

There is an opinion that this is not entirely true.

There is an opinion that, theoretically, it is possible to get out of any situation without revolutions, exclusively peacefully through gradual reforms. From any. No matter how far the crisis has gone, no matter how many mistakes have accumulated. Slowly, thoughtfully and carefully unravel knot by knot, tear by tear, scooping out the ocean of centuries-old sobs...

But for some reason, in some countries it works at least sometimes, but in others it doesn’t work at all.

Where do all the reforms fail, or at least turn out to be almost their opposite, depriving those they were meant to make happy? Where, no matter what you do, everything only leads to harm and only brings the terrible all-encompassing bloody spasm closer?

I would venture to say that I know at least a large part of the answer.

This is where the ruling class is so stupid, selfish and irresponsible that no reform can be pushed through it.

For more than a century, a crisis had been brewing in the richest, most educated, most noble France. Everyone who lived with even a little open eyes understood already seventy years before the guillotine that the country was sliding into the abyss. That there will be a nightmare if everything goes on as it is going. Already from the beginning of the century - which at the end was destined to see the august heads on the scaffold, the infants of the Vendee pierced by republican bayonets (fraternite, vu compren?), the flight of Napoleons drunk with blood -
sky eagles and other romantic miracles - the royal power hesitantly and timidly, as if testing cold water with bare feet, from time to time tried to change something, improve it, save itself. And then she pulled back. Wet!

All it took was for some sensible minister to come and at least start doing something - that was it, the end. Well, if only resignation. And then it fell. Link. All the nobles stand in orderly rows, their tongues bristling, - and the person of the sovereign, an upstart and hard worker, an apologist for bloodless corrections, is overshadowed and undermined by the royal authority, and does not respect princes, and is preparing a revolution, and a villain, a molester, of course, an enemy of the time-honored order , encroaches on holy stupor, probably bribed by an enemy, external or internal...

It's wet!

The usual life is under threat! The right to arbitrariness, already ingrained in basic reflexes, is under threat! Carelessness and carelessness, the only life that is truly worthy of a nobleman, will have to be replaced by at least some meaningful work and responsibility for the country and the crown; work and responsibility, which, as insolent plebeians are trying to teach blue blood, do not at all come down to gambling adrenaline and heroic swinging of swords, mostly in boudoirs.

One step forward - two steps back. For almost a century!

We jumped. Alonz enfant.

The same thing happened with us under Alexander and Nicholas the First. And under Alexander the Second Liberator. And before the seventeenth year. And right before our eyes - from Kosygin’s shy innovations to Gorbachev’s daring pandemonium.

Where the inertia, laziness and short-sightedness of the ruling class exceed a certain critical, extremely permissible level, reforms are always late and always go awry, one step forward, two steps back.

Revolutions occur when even the most urgent and most careful transformations are blocked or distorted by the mass stubbornness of the ruling class.

When there is no other way to carry out these transformations except by first exterminating and expelling at least the minimum necessary portion of this accursed class-ruler, and depriving the rest of it in such a way as to deprive even the slightest blocking capabilities.

It’s a joke with her, with France, it’s not for us to figure out why her nobility in a century that was crazy and wise turned out to be not so much wise as crazy. Arrogance ingrained in flesh and blood? Gallantry, which has become a universal sport and straightened everyone’s brain convolutions to a state of constant erection?

It's none of our business.

But the Russian blue princes? Our St. Petersburg salons and rublev-
Chinese dens?

The jerky growing inertia of the Russian elites, almost always forcibly replacing one another, is inextricably linked with the same catching-up development.

Few people think of a simple thought: each victory over the enemy, which required extreme mobilization and extreme self-sacrifice from the people, made the victorious elite less and less concerned about what was happening to these people, and made it more and more dependent on what is happening and what is being produced in the once again triumphantly defeated West.

The Poles were repulsed - and soon their own nobility desired to be gentry. They put the people in danger, so that there would be enough fire gear, ships and cloth, and they repulsed the Swedes. Napoleon was repulsed - and they themselves were forced into the Freemasons, getting rid of their own country with non-binding affection: and let our faithful people receive what they deserve in God. They repulsed the interventionists and at the same time gutted the country so much that later they had to simply use rifle butts to drive some into collective farms and some into camps. Hitler was repulsed - and it started to roll again: got spoiled at the front? They played a victorious draw with the richest and most powerful America in Korea - and taxes on personal farming completely strangled the village, otherwise, you know, vestiges of private property began to stir; it is necessary that the peasants themselves cut down every apple tree and slaughter every cow... Or take current science. The main thing is that the reporting is in order. To the right, smerdy, to the right! Who needs your discoveries? In America, anyway, everything has already been opened a long time ago, and your destiny, since we tolerate you for now, is approximate attendance and heaps of useless papers that are correctly filled out and submitted to the authorities on time!

The more the power took from the people for each successive victory, the less the people could give to the ruling class in their everyday life. Each successive victorious push for a technologically and economically more powerful enemy, over and over again, more thoroughly and more sophisticatedly, devastated the peaceful economy of the country and discouraged the masters from any desire to engage in any worthy business.

And from a life like that of furunculosis, in Russian history every now and then riots and revolutions swelled like bloody ulcers.

But during each revolution and each post-revolutionary devastation - exactly the same as during each post-victory devastation - the comfort of life behind the cordon went even further.

And therefore, every failed reform and every successful revolution caused by its failure (let us remember Gorbachev’s perestroika and Yeltsin’s coup as the closest example of such a combination) again and again widened the gap between the quality of life that the infrastructure of one’s country could provide - and that could be taken from those whom reforms tried to catch up with, whom revolutions rejected and whom armies defeated.

And therefore, each failed reform and each successful revolution made the next victorious elite more and more indifferent to the life of the subject country and more and more interested in the prosperity and favor of those who were overthrown, then expelled, or simply defeated.

By the way, each old elite could still, for some reason, put up with relative discomfort. It may not be as comfortable, but it’s cozy, like home. Like on my grandfather's estate. I walked under this table, and the nanny pretended to have lost me and called loudly: “Grishenka! Grishanya, it’s time to eat the dragon!” Even then this table was already drying out and creaking, oh, how I love it, my grandfather said that Pankrat the Craftsman himself got along...

Each new elite is completely devoid of these prejudices. There is nothing sweet and dear to her. She just needs the most modern, the most luxurious, the most prestigious.

Have fun, brave Ross... Yeah, just this second. But what vineyards did Radishchev warm his darling with? Chaadaev?

Where were the fabrics from which the Decembrists sewed their pants?

In Ivanovo, perhaps? In Vyshny Volochyok? Or is it still in Paris?

Where did the Speranskys and Loris-Melikovs order their outfits and furniture from?

Perhaps the leaders of the world proletariat were scurrying from People’s Commissariat to People’s Commissariat on their incredibly important matters in “Russo-Balts” or “ZISs”? Alas, to the bourgeois-
Russian Packards.

What technologies and what materials did the hasty benefactor Gorbachev use to build the new dachas vital for perestroika in Crimea and Abkhazia?

But he was not yet from the new elite, just a newcomer to the old one - and even then the Stavropol machine operator no longer liked either the Livadia or Pitsunda dachas of the departed leaders. New mansions were needed last word Euro-Atlantic technology and capitalist comfort. And let’s admit, without fear of flattering the elderly reformer too rudely: in six years of power over the emptying shops year after year, he really really and well built this. I managed to do both. Got ready for the putsch. Despite all the efforts of the CIA to collapse the Soviet economy.

Or maybe the humanist Raisa was wearing boots from the “Red Triangle”?

And then the fiery oppositionist Nemtsov, having failed to transplant State Duma to domestic cars, at least move into them?

Somehow not. Unless the terrible totalitarian Putin tried it. And even then, for this he was mercilessly ridiculed by the progressive democratic public and accused by the free media of cheap populism and flirting with the darkest instincts of the crowd.

Okay, these are all officials. Bureaucrats. Bureaucracy. In Rus', bribes have always been smooth from them. But these are the personification of the progressive system, the hope of the economy, the new strong people of a free Russia?

Oh, they - wow!

Only it’s not capitalism that happened. This, as often with our reforms, was not a step forward; on the contrary, we were brought back into feudalism. It’s just that modern people disdain to get involved with agriculture, who needs it, all this manure. And therefore, the newly-minted emperor, having gathered those who had seated him on the throne, did not at all distribute land holdings into fiefs. No. You, Count, will be fed from communications, you, Duke, from energy, you, Marquis, from strategic metallurgy...

But it was brilliantly noted by the Strugatskys in “It’s Hard to Be a God”: “You will begin to distribute lands to your associates, but what will your associates need land without serfs?”

Here are the reasons for fatal inertia. It never mattered to them what was happening to the gray-paws! What we say will happen will happen!

The nobles are not in the least dependent on our condition. There are no feedback connections - sleep well, Grandfather Wiener, even in your mortal nightmare you will not dream of this cybernetics in one gate. Even the thought that our life or death could somehow affect their well-being and comfort is wild and absurd for them. Is it possible that an unsuccessful war, threatening to shake them off the helm of power, could for a moment make them turn around and glance over their shoulder: how are they doing, defenders of the Motherland? Are they still moving? Shouldn't we throw them a couple of boxes of American stew and a bag of Lend-Lease egg powder, so that they won't stretch their legs at all? This reform, they say, is quite enough for the stinkers. Moreover, after the victory, anyway, those from whom we find empty tin cans with non-Russian letters will be jailed for espionage...

One step forward - two steps back.

This is both simpler and more reliable than giving up something, being limited in something, calculating something and thoughtfully, consistently changing it. Selifan, drive my Bentley, before going to street racing, I’ll decorate it with the tricolor! Let the rednecks, if they manage to dodge, know: we are patriots too!

And, let's be fair, you can't blame them for this. The ruling class needs some kind of comfort in order to calmly think about Serious Things. About geopolitics, about the fate of the country, about Russia’s image abroad, about joining the WTO, about controlling stakes, about the NASDAQ index... Once in a while you’ll think about it - and then, as luck would have it, the hot water will be turned off in the cold. This is like death, don’t you understand, slaves? The Duke will be distracted by hot water, miss NASDAQ - and the country will be finished!

And so it turned out that nothing was and was not done for a peaceful life. Even the habit of such work disappeared, even the skills melted away. For what? We will find three imported junk cars at the landfill, one of them is working...

What can we demand from them if we ourselves...

Children, raise your hands: who has domestically produced bathtubs and faucets at home? So... One, two... What, Ivanov? Are you not talking about the bath? Do you need to go to the toilet? It’s okay, just be patient, there are five minutes left until the bell rings. What about you, Rabinovich? Oh, should you go to the toilet too? Well, what should we do with you, go... And look, by the way, and tell us later: do the boys have domestic taps installed there or... What? In general, there have been no taps for a long time? And the pipes were handed over as scrap to a collection point?

Hmmm. Well, children, long live the abolition of serfdom and the triumph of demo-
kratii!

Mary Ivanna, has serfdom really already been abolished?

* Continuation of the discussion started by Alexander Melikhov in the magazine “Neva”, 2011, No. 2.

“Here’s St. George’s Day for you, grandma,” we say when our expectations do not come true. The proverb is directly related to the emergence of serfdom: until the 16th century, a peasant could leave the landowner's estate during the week before St. George's Day - November 26 - and the week after it. However, everything was changed by Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich, who, at the insistence of his brother-in-law Boris Godunov, prohibited the transfer of peasants from one landowner to another, even on November 26, during the compilation of scribe books.

However, the document on the restriction of peasant freedoms, signed by the tsar, has not yet been found - and therefore some historians (in particular, Vasily Klyuchevsky) consider this story to be fictitious.

By the way, the same Fyodor Ioannovich (who is also known by the name Theodore the Blessed) in 1597 issued a decree according to which the period for searching for fugitive peasants was five years. If during this period the landowner did not find the fugitive, then the latter was assigned to the new owner.

Peasants as a gift

In 1649, the Council Code was published, according to which an unlimited period was announced for the search for fugitive peasants. In addition, even debt-free peasants could not change their place of residence. The Code was adopted under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Tishaish, under whom, at about the same time, the famous church reform was carried out, which subsequently led to a schism in the Russian Orthodox Church.

According to Vasily Klyuchevsky, the main drawback of the code was that the duties of the peasant to the landowner were not spelled out. As a result, in the future, the owners actively abused their power and made too many claims against the serfs.

It is interesting that, according to the document, “baptized people are not ordered to be sold to anyone.” However, this ban was successfully violated in the era of Peter the Great.

The ruler encouraged trade in serfs in every possible way, not attaching importance to the fact that landowners were separating entire families. Peter the Great himself loved to give gifts to his entourage in the form of “serf souls.” For example, the emperor gave about 100 thousand peasants “of both sexes” to his favorite Prince Alexander Menshikov. Subsequently, by the way, the prince will shelter fugitive peasants and Old Believers on his lands, charging them a fee for accommodation. Peter the Great endured Menshikov’s abuses for a long time, but in 1724 the ruler’s patience ran out and the prince lost a number of privileges.

And after the death of the emperor, Menshikov elevated his wife Catherine I to the throne and himself began to actually rule the country.

Serfdom strengthened significantly in the second half of the 18th century: it was then that decrees were adopted on the ability of landowners to imprison courtyard people and peasants, exile them to Siberia for settlement and hard labor. The landowners themselves could only be punished if they “beat the peasants to death.”

Cute bride on the first night

One of the heroes of the popular television series “Poor Nastya” is the selfish and lustful Karl Modestovich Schuller, the manager of the baron’s estate.

In fact, the managers who received unlimited power over the serfs often turned out to be more cruel than the landowners themselves.

In one of his books, candidate of historical sciences Boris Kerzhentsev cites the following letter from a noblewoman to his brother: “My most precious and revered brother with all my soul and heart! rowdy, often flog their peasants, but they are not angry with them to such an extent, they do not corrupt their wives and children to such filth... All your peasants are completely ruined, exhausted, completely tortured and crippled by none other than your manager, the German Karl , nicknamed by us “Karla”, who is a fierce beast, a tormentor...

This unclean animal has corrupted all the girls of your villages and demands every pretty bride for the first night.

If the girl herself or her mother or groom do not like this, and they dare to beg him not to touch her, then all of them, according to routine, are punished with a whip, and the girl-bride is put on the neck for a week, or even two, as a hindrance. I'll sleep the slingshot. The slingshot locks, and Karl hides the key in his pocket. The peasant, the young husband, who showed resistance to Karla molesting the girl who had just married him, has a dog chain wrapped around his neck and secured at the gate of the house, the same house in which we, my half-brother and half-brother, were born with you. ..”

Farmers become free

Paul I was the first to move towards the abolition of serfdom. The Emperor signed the Manifesto on the Three-Day Corvee - a document that legally limited the use of peasant labor in favor of the court, the state and landowners to three days each week.

Moreover, the manifesto prohibited forcing peasants to work on Sundays.

The work of Paul I was continued by Alexander I, who issued a decree on free cultivators. According to the document, landowners received the right to free serfs individually and in villages with the issuance of a plot of land. But for their freedom, the peasants paid a ransom or performed duties. The freed serfs were called “free cultivators.”

During the reign of the emperor, 47,153 peasants became “free cultivators”—0.5% of the total peasant population.

In 1825, Nicholas I, “lovingly” known to the people as Nikolai Palkin, ascended the throne. The emperor tried in every possible way to abolish serfdom, but every time he was faced with the discontent of the landowners. The chief of gendarmes, Alexander Benkendorf, wrote to the ruler about the need to emancipate the peasants: “In all of Russia, only the victorious people, the Russian peasants, are in a state of slavery; all the rest: Finns, Tatars, Estonians, Latvians, Mordovians, Chuvashs, etc. - free."

The desire of Nicholas I will be fulfilled by his son, who, in gratitude, will be called the Liberator.

However, the epithet “Liberator” will appear both in connection with the abolition of serfdom, and in connection with the victory in the Russian-Turkish War and the liberation of Bulgaria that resulted from it.

“And now we expect with hope that the serfs, with the new future opening up for them, will understand and gratefully accept the important donation made by the noble nobility to improve their life,” the manifesto said.

“They will understand that, having received for themselves a more solid basis of property and greater freedom to dispose of their household, they become obligated to society and to themselves to supplement the benefits of the new law with the faithful, well-intentioned and diligent use of the rights granted to them. The most beneficial law cannot make people prosperous if they do not take the trouble to arrange their own well-being under the protection of the law.”