Tatar tactics of action in the forest. Combat tactics

Let's look at combat tactics in the forest using the example of the most familiar forest zone of a temperate climate. For effective combat in the forest, it is necessary to regroup the platoon. Depending on the combat mission and the region in which they take place fighting, the specifics, composition and weapons of the unit may change. But, since the main danger to the group is always ambushes, the platoon structure should ensure maximum resistance to them and minimize losses. The platoon is divided into 4 squads of 4 fighters each (“fours”) and 4 combat “twos”.

The three combat “fours” are: machine gunner (PKM), assistant machine gunner (AK with GP), sniper (VSS), shooter (AK with GP). In one of the “fours” the sniper must have an IED. These are the three main combat units. The squad leader is a sniper. All the four fighters act in his interests. In one of the “fours” there is a platoon commander (VSS) and a radio operator (AK).

The fourth combat “four” includes: machine gunner (PKM), assistant machine gunner (AKMN with PBS), grenade launcher (RPG-7), assistant grenade launcher (AKMN with PBS). This is the counter fire department.

It follows the lead patrol. Its task is to create a high density of fire, stop and delay the enemy while the main forces turn around and take up positions to repel the attack. The squad leader is a machine gunner, and all the “four” fighters use their fire to ensure his work.

Combat "twos"- these are the head and rear patrols and 2 side guards. Their armament is the same and consists of an AK with a GP; the AKS-74UN2 with a PBS is also appropriate. For machine guns, it is better to use RPK magazines with 45 rounds. Each fighter, except for the machine gunners, assistant grenade launcher and radio operator, carries 2-3 RPG-26, or better yet MRO-A or RGSh-2. After the start of the clash, the counter-fire “four”, following behind the lead patrol, also opens fire on the enemy, suppressing his activity with machine-gun fire and fire from RPG-7. The assistant machine gunner and the assistant grenade launcher of the fire countermeasures group are armed with AKMN with PBS. This allows them, without being exposed again, to destroy an enemy who poses an immediate danger to the machine gunner and grenade launcher.

If the enemy is detected from the front by the head patrol, but the patrol remains unnoticed, shooters with PBS destroy the enemy with fire from silent weapons. From the features of such a structure, it is clear that the fighters in the platoon are somehow grouped in pairs. This promotes combat coordination, the development of conditioned signals, and a better understanding of each other. At the same time, it should be noted that it is often appropriate to divide a platoon in half, 12 fighters each. Each group performs a specific combat mission. In this situation, the dozen will act differently.

As part of each reinforced squad- 2 PKM machine gunners (Pecheneg), 2 VSS snipers, 8 shooters (AK+GP). The second squad includes an RPG-7 grenade launcher and two shooters with AKMN + PBS. With such an organization, in a squad on the march there are 3 soldiers (machine gunner and 2 riflemen), a core (4 riflemen, 2 snipers) and a rear guard (machine gunner, 2 riflemen) in the head patrol. In the event of a sudden collision with the enemy, the head patrol opens heavy fire and holds the enemy while the others turn around.

In the event of a sudden collision with superior enemy forces, the rear patrol takes an advantageous position and covers the retreat of the entire group. In forest areas, open areas are not found very often - as a rule, these are the banks of rivers and lakes, burnt areas, hilltops, and clearings.

That is, the area is basically “closed”. The range of fire contact in such conditions is minimal, and there is no need for long-range weapons (such as Kord, ASVK, AGS and even SVD), but fighters must have a pistol or submachine gun as an additional weapon. A great tactical advantage in the forest comes from the use of mines. The most convenient, in my opinion, is MON-50. It is relatively light and practical. Each of the group's fighters, except for the machine gunners, assistant grenade launcher and radio operator, can carry at least one mine.

Sometimes it is convenient to use the MON-100, which, with a mass of 5 kg, provides a destruction corridor 120 meters long and 10 meters wide. It is convenient to install it on clearings and roads, directing along them or along the edge of the forest. POM-2R mines are also needed, truly irreplaceable. After being brought into firing position, the mine becomes armed after 120 seconds and throws four 10-meter target sensors in different directions. The radius of the circular lesion is 16 meters. Very convenient for mining when a group is retreating, or when you need to quickly create a minefield in the enemy’s path.

Summarizing the above, we note: the result is a platoon armed with 4 PKM or Pecheneg machine guns, 3 silent sniper rifles VSS, 1 SVU-AS, 1 RPG-7; 17 fighters each have 2-3 RPG-26 grenade launchers (34-51 pcs.), 2 AKMN with PBS, 14 fighters are armed with GP and carry at least 18 MON-50 mines and 18 POM-2R mines. ORDER OF OPERATION OF WATCHES On the march, it is more convenient to move in a battle formation of the “arrow” type. There are machine gunners in front and on the flanks. Side protection is required. The lead patrol does not move more than 100 meters from the first “four”; visual communication must be maintained. Such a battle formation allows for the greatest safety in the event of a surprise attack. In the event of an explosion on a directed mine, only one “four” is hit.

Depending on the situation, the battle formation may change to a “wedge”, “ledge” or “chain”. Patrols and side guards must have special thermal imaging and acoustic reconnaissance devices, through the use of which the surprise attack factor can be reduced to a minimum.

At the moment, we have models in service that are either outdated or very bulky. So we again came to the conclusion that we need to buy everything ourselves. However, there is no such money with which one could value one’s own life. The necessary devices can be bought in hunting stores - this is an individual hearing amplifier "Superear" and Life Finder - a device for searching for wounded animals. “Superears” are headphones that amplify sound many times over.

With the help of this device, it is easy to hear a quiet rustle, a whisper, the knock of a buckle on a weapon - in a word, everything can give away the presence of the enemy. At the same time, in the event of a strong explosion or powerful shot, the device lowers the threshold of sound vibrations to a safe level of 92 dB. (This is especially true for a grenade launcher, who literally stalls after the first two shots.) Life Finder is also an extremely effective thing for a fighter, as it allows you to detect an enemy holed up in the thickets by body heat. Its effective range in a forest overgrown with bushes is 100 meters (branches and leaves greatly retain and screen the heat emitted by the object), in open areas - up to 900 meters. (However, in tropical forest Life Finder is ineffective because the temperature environment is close to the human body temperature, which reduces the contrast; in addition, the capabilities of the device are negatively affected by dense vegetation.) Each of the security and patrol soldiers should have a set of these two devices.

By the way, “Super Ear” will allow them not only to identify the enemy, but also to communicate quietly at a distance without using radios. After modification, Life Finder can be attached automatically to the Weaver bar.

AMBUSH TACTICS IN THE FOREST

While in an ambush, you need to follow some rules. Snipers and machine gunners must be evenly distributed along the front and must control the flanks. The latter, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s approach, are mined. It is also appropriate to mine the front, preferably with a chain of several MON-50s. Sectors of continuous mine damage must overlap.

When the enemy enters the affected sector, the entire mine chain is undermined. Infantry moving at full height at this moment will be destroyed. This should be followed by a blow with all forces and means aimed at finishing off the enemy. The snipers' positions are located separately, and their single shots are lost against the background of general shooting. This allows them to calmly and systematically shoot the enemy.

If there are no radio-controlled fuses, then you can build a homemade one and detonate it at the right moment using a sniper shot. A piece of glass is inserted between two pieces of tin, and the whole thing is (not very tightly) tied together at the edges. The contacts of a series-connected circuit of several minutes are suitable for the tin.

This “sniper fuse” must be placed on the tree trunk from the side convenient for the sniper. When the enemy enters the affected area, a sniper shoots at the “fuse”, the glass between the pieces of tin crumbles, and the circuit closes. This is how you can kill an entire platoon with one shot, and many such traps can be set. It is even more effective to place a POM-2R mine in the affected area of the MON-50 chain. One or two enemy soldiers will be blown up by a mine, and the bulk of the enemy unit’s personnel will come to the aid of the wounded.

The subsequent detonation of the MON-50 chain will cover them all at once. (In this regard, it is necessary to make it a rule that no more than two people provide assistance to the wounded in the place where the injury occurred.) During the mining process, when setting up an ambush, a calculation of 3-4 MON-50 mines per enemy platoon is taken. The problem is the need to hit the core without the patrol and side guards noticing the ambush ahead of time.

The head patrol must be passed forward (usually two soldiers). They are neutralized separately after the mines are detonated. With flank protection it is much more difficult. To do this you need to use a silent weapon. The enemy reconnaissance group will most likely not follow the path, but will move along it. The enemy may be much larger than expected, in which case the remaining forces will attack you in the flank. It’s convenient to place the POM-2R there.

The surviving enemy soldiers will launch a lightning-fast counterattack, and if you do not open dagger fire on them, they can take the initiative into their own hands. During the battle, you must not forget that shots from RPGs and VOGs explode when they hit branches. This must be feared, but it must also be used. If the enemy is lying under a bush and you cannot reach him, launch the VOG into the crown of the bush above him, and he will be covered with fragments. When occupying a line, the place for the gap is chosen to the right of the tree, which plays the role of a natural shield. Nothing should block the field of fire or interfere with visibility. It is especially important to make sure that there are no anthills nearby.

When digging a “scorpion hole,” as a shel is sometimes called, it is necessary to carry the soil into the depths of the forest, and ideally, if possible, pour it into a stream, swamp or lake. The gap should not have a parapet, since the mounds of dug sand will immediately give away your position. The front of the “scorpion hole” must be directed to the right edge of the firing sector. This is due to the fact that it is more convenient to turn the weapon to the left than to the right, where you need to turn with your whole body, which is inconvenient in a tight space. For a left-hander everything will be exactly the opposite. Lastly, think about the roots of the tree. If possible, you can squeeze between them, because a thick root can stop the splinter. The fighters are grouped in twos: this way they can cover each other in case of a delayed shot or when reloading a weapon, and also quickly provide first aid if wounded.

As for stretch marks. If you set the normal (low) one, then the enemy’s lead patrol soldiers will be the first to blow it up. At the same time, the enemy group commander is a more important target. To destroy it, a directed mine is installed at a height of 2 meters above the ground, and a tripwire is also carried out at this level. The patrolmen will pass under it unhindered, they focus on low tripwires and identifying enemy positions. High stretch marks can only be discovered by chance. Next comes the core. In it, next to the commander, there is a radio operator, who breaks the guy wire of the radio station’s antenna.

Fire system The fire system of a group in an ambush is built taking into account inflicting maximum losses on the enemy in the shortest possible time, primarily in the affected area. It is built taking into account the fire capabilities of the group's weapons, supporting assets, their close interaction in combination with mine-explosive weapons and natural obstacles. The fire system in an ambush includes: - a zone of continuous multi-layered fire from all types of weapons - the kill zone; - sectors and areas of concentrated fire of the group to cover the flanks and rear of the ambush; - prepared fire maneuver in order to concentrate it in a short time in any threatened direction or area; - areas of barrage, concentrated fire and fires on individual targets of supporting mortars and artillery.

When organizing a fire system in an ambush, indicate to each subgroup (troika, pair) and individual fire weapons: - the place in the group’s battle formation and the degree of equipment of firing positions; - main and additional firing sectors; - enemy engagement zone - the main area of concentrated fire; - additional areas of concentrated fire; - dangerous directions of fire; - signals for opening, stopping and transferring fire; - spare firing positions and the extent of their equipment.

Fig. 2 The group's order of battle during an ambush (option).

Each group must know well: - where other subgroups are located; - own sectors of fire; - dangerous directions of fire of friendly groups; - maintain reliable communication with neighboring groups. Most ambushes are preceded by a long wait, which can last from several hours to a day or more.

The firing position is equipped as comfortably as possible. How long you will be in an ambush depends on when and where the ambush occurs. Cold winter night you cannot be in an ambush for a long time without taking measures to warm the personnel. No matter how long you are in ambush, every scout must be ready for active action, regardless of whether he is watching or resting. If this is not done, then the concentration of attention will decrease.

Establish a duty order at the ambush site. This is necessary for rest (sleep), heating in winter and food intake for personnel located at the base.

Rice. 3 Organization of rest in ambush Under unfavorable factors external environment, if you are forced to wait for the enemy for a long time, set up a day camp (base) away from the ambush. A system should be organized at the position where part of the personnel rests while the other conducts observation. The number of scouts on vacation should not exceed a third of the number of members of the group. The day should not draw attention to the ambush. The group must be ready to leave the day at any time. During the day, things accumulate that will interfere with the ambush. Backpacks, sleeping bags and mats should not be ambushed, because You will have to very quickly retreat from the ambush site or maneuver in the ambush area. Equipment during the day should be packed so that in case of departure, it can be quickly retrieved. After an ambush, a quick retreat may be necessary. A day can be designated as an “intermediate” collection point after an ambush. Rice. 4 Organizing a day in ambush

Fire raid

A raid is a surprise attack by the RGSpN on a pre-selected enemy target with the aim of destroying (incapacitating) its elements, personnel and equipment, as well as capturing prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment.

Depending on the purpose of the raid, it can be carried out in different ways, for example, only by inflicting fire damage on enemy personnel and elements of the target. This form of attack is called a fire attack and is characterized by a very short period of time affecting the enemy.

Despite this, a raid is a fairly effective way to defeat an illegal armed formation when there are insufficient numbers of special reconnaissance forces and means. In the event of a surprise attack on an illegal armed formation's base and skillful organization of the raid, the enemy suffers the main losses in the first moments of the battle.

The duration of an RGSpN fire attack on a superior enemy should not exceed more than one minute. This time is due to the following calculation. The first return fire, as a rule, is not aimed, the enemy will open in 3-8 seconds, organized resistance will come in 15-25 seconds, after 30-60 seconds individual militants will try to bypass the reconnaissance group and open fire on its flank or rear.

If the battle is protracted, a numerically superior enemy, who has fortifications at the base, equipped firing positions, a sufficient amount of ammunition and knows the terrain well, can turn the tide and impose unfavorable battle conditions on the group. In this regard, a fire raid by the RGSpN extended over time can lead to losses among personnel and disruption of the unit’s combat mission. In the first moments of the battle, the first to be destroyed are the guards, if they were not silently destroyed first, the leaders of the illegal armed formations and militants with radio stations identified during observation, snipers, machine gunners and grenade launchers, as well as other militants who are outside the shelters. The latter must be destroyed in order to prevent them from hiding from the group’s fire.

During a raid, preemptive fire from small arms is carried out at the entrances to capital-type shelters, which prevents the enemy from leaving the shelter, as well as lethal fire from RPGs, RPOs and RShGs in order to destroy the shelters and destroy the manpower in them. As the openly located enemy is destroyed, the fire of the entire group is concentrated on shelters (dugouts) in order to prevent the militants from attempting a breakthrough. Fire at enemy shelters is also carried out in order to prevent the militants located in them from leaving and occupying prepared firing positions (trenches) and providing organized resistance, conducting targeted fire through the loopholes of the shelters.

After defeating the enemy, the group disengages from the battle and secretly retreats to the assembly point, continuing to adjust artillery, mortar fire, or directing aircraft. Subsequently, the RGSpN, after the approach of the reserves, with reconnaissance patrol forces can conduct additional reconnaissance of the area and verify the results of the enemy’s fire defeat. Based on the results of enemy reconnaissance, an illegal armed formation base abandoned by militants is inspected or it is captured if the enemy has not left the base, which happens very rarely.

Capturing the militant base

Capture consists of a sudden attack on the enemy with the aim of taking possession of an object to destroy (preserve) the enemy’s object, capture prisoners, weapons and documents, release persons forcibly held by the enemy, as well as to ensure the actions of other branches of troops and forces.

The seizure of bases and other objects of irregular armed formations is carried out after thorough reconnaissance and the availability of sufficient forces for its successful implementation. During the capture of an illegal armed formations base, after fire defeat of the main enemy forces, when individual militants continue to resist from a shelter (dugout, bunker, cave) or have taken refuge there, they are destroyed by the actions of the assault subgroup.

The assault subgroup secretly (by crawling, short dashes or throwing), under the cover of fire from other subgroups, advances to the object (shelter, dugout, cave) and takes its starting position for its assault.

The starting position for the assault is at the minimum safe distance from the object (usually a little further than throwing a fragmentation grenade from cover). Having taken their starting position, the scouts of the assault subgroup prepare their weapons for the assault, attaching full magazines to the machine guns (preferably magazines light machine gun), hand fragmentation grenades are removed from the bags, the valves of the grenade bags and magazine bags are unfastened, and the RPO-A, RShG-1 and RPG-18 (-22, -26) are transferred to the firing position. The machine gun magazines and machine gun belts of the scouts of the assault subgroup must be equipped with alternating cartridges with tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and “ordinary” bullets. Tracer and armor-piercing incendiary bullets are used to set fire to shelters from the inside.

At the conditioned signal of the senior assault subgroup (orange or white smoke, green flare of a signal pistol, etc.), all RGSPN subgroups stop firing at the object, keeping sights on the exit and the loopholes of the shelter. The assault subgroup, having reduced the pause after small arms fire on the target to a minimum, opens fire on it, in this case using RPGs, RPO-A or RShG-1. After this, with a throw, conducting intense fire from machine guns, he immediately advances to the shelter and pelts it with hand fragmentation grenades and assault charges. Fire with grenades and detonation of explosive charges is combined with firing from small arms inside the shelter.

The scouts of the assault subgroup penetrate inside the shelter only after inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the enemy - one after which he is unable to resist (killed, seriously wounded, severely shell-shocked). If the militants continue to resist inside the shelter, it is recommended to choose the most effective method of destroying them.

Correct deployment of scouts from the assault subgroup to the long-term shelter of the illegal armed formations base.

Incorrect deployment of scouts from the assault subgroup to the long-term shelter of an illegal armed formation base.

If the shelter has a wood-earth floor, the enemy located in it can be destroyed by detonating shaped charges of the KZ-6 and KZU-1 types installed outside or by trench charges. You can also use a powerful concentrated charge of explosives to blow up a shelter.

In some cases, it is possible to hit a shelter again with RPO-A or RShG after the scouts of the assault subgroup have retreated from the shelter to a safe distance.

Sometimes the militants who survived in the shelter are forced to leave the burning shelter and make a breakthrough. To prevent this, the scouts of the assault subgroup must block the exit from the shelter with dense preemptive fire. Using cunning, you can retreat and, hiding, allow the militants to “unhindered” leave the shelter, and then destroy them with sudden dagger fire.

Base inspection

To inspect the base, an inspection subgroup is allocated, which includes scouts armed with silent weapons and sappers. The RGSpN begins inspecting the base and the results of the fire defeat of the enemy, finally making sure that all the militants are dead.

First, a quick inspection of the entire base is carried out. From this moment on, any group fire from low-noise weapons can only be opened on militants who are resisting or trying to escape. After a quick inspection of the base, making sure that the enemy has been destroyed, they inspect it for the presence of mine explosives. If necessary, demining is carried out. At the same time, we must remember about base cover mines and surprise mines.

After conducting engineering reconnaissance of the area, a military guard is set up along the perimeter of the base, and only then a detailed inspection of the battle site is carried out. During a detailed inspection of the base, the group commander remembers or sketches the location of its elements, the location of the bodies of the militants and gives instructions for photo or video recording of the results of the combat tasks.

The examination of the bodies of militants, the seizure of documents, the collection of weapons and other material assets is carried out under the personal control of the group commander or his deputy. When seizing documents, including identification of the killed, weapons and communications, notes are made indicating that they belonged to specific bandits killed during the battle.

make any notes on captured documents, hide them or destroy them
use ammunition and food products confiscated from the enemy, enter the radio network of illegal armed groups on captured radio stations and especially use for personal purposes seized mobile and satellite phones of militants, transfer documents, weapons, ammunition and other material assets seized from the enemy to someone before the reconnaissance group returns to the unit and is registered by their respective unit services. All documents, weapons and ammunition captured from the militants, as well as material assets, are indicated by the group commander in the report on the completion of the task and are handed over in the prescribed manner to the senior commander.

Inspection of the shelter

Inspection of the shelter is carried out after the destruction or detention of the militants in it. Before you begin inspecting the shelter, you must wait until the dust settles inside it and the smoke dissipates. If there is a fire inside the shelter, the search should be abandoned due to the danger of exploding the ammunition inside.

Penetrating into a shelter, scouts act, as a rule, in two pairs, covering each other. The first pair of scouts inspect the shelter for the presence of militants, moving inside the room without touching any objects. For every militant found inside the shelter, shots are fired from silent weapons. When inspecting a large shelter that has several rooms or closed corners, a hand-held fragmentation grenade is thrown into the room or around the corner or a burst from a silent weapon is fired. Conventional weapons in a closed volume deafen reconnaissance officers inspecting a shelter and drown out the sounds made by surviving militants, as well as other extraneous sounds.
In addition, the use of silent weapons by the scouts inspecting the shelter allows the commander and the rest of the group personnel to determine the presence of militants offering resistance when they fire from conventional small arms.
After the first pair of scouts neutralize the militants in the shelter, the second pair checks the shelter for mining.

Detention

Experience shows that repeated attempts by bandits blocked in a shelter or building to enter into negotiations with the scouts blocking them rarely lead to their cessation of resistance and their voluntary surrender. Most often, militants enter into negotiations only to gain time. As a rule, after assessing the situation and clarifying the strength of the attackers and their placement, and using the resulting time to regroup, the militants try to break through the blocking ring.

If an enemy blocked in a shelter wishes to surrender to federal forces, the procedure for surrender is strictly determined. Negotiations are conducted by only one soldier; everyone else is silent or communicates with each other in a whisper. The militants are asked to leave the shelter in a harsh ultimatum. More than one minute is not given to think, after which the militants who have not fulfilled the conditions of surrender are destroyed by the decisive actions of the assault subgroup. There is no point in entering into negotiations again!

When surrendering, militants are required to emerge from cover one at a time, without weapons or equipment, with their arms raised high and their sleeves rolled up. They go to the inspection place indicated to them, located 4-6 m away from the shelter, under the guns of scouts and lie face down on the ground with their arms and legs spread out to the sides, after which they are thoroughly searched.

After the search, the wounded bandits can be given first aid. The detainees are isolated from each other and immediately interrogated. Preliminary interrogation of detainees is carried out immediately after their capture. The purpose of the preliminary interrogation is to obtain information about the base and the enemy in the area of operation of the RGSpN in the interests of the mission it performs.
During the preliminary interrogation of the detained bandit, the following is established:

his surname, first name and nickname, call sign in the illegal armed formations' radio network, date and place of birth, place of residence and last place of registration number and affiliation of the illegal armed groups based bandit group name, surname, nickname of the "amir" (leader) of the gang and his personal call sign in the gangs' radio network presence and location of mine explosives on and around the base location of caches with weapons, ammunition and other material means
If there are unidentified bodies of bandits and the identities of the detainees are identified, the interrogated person is asked to clarify their names and other information.

Subsequently, a more complete interrogation is carried out and the value of the detainee as a source of intelligence is determined. During the interrogation, it should be taken into account that, by agreement between members of the gang groups, the captured federal forces The bandit is obliged to give only false and “non-specific” testimony within three days. Information received from detainees is cross-checked and compared with information received from other sources.

The Russian campaign showed that it was difficult for German soldiers to get used to the peculiarities of Russian forests. Even the most thorough training of the personnel of any unit that was previously located in a Western country with cultivated forests could only be considered here as preliminary training. Practice was crucial. Attempts by the German command to bypass vast forested and swampy areas were unsuccessful, since large Russian forces skillfully operated not only within these areas, but also outside them, often achieving operational successes. Bypasses of forested and swampy areas often led to severe crises. In order to encircle the enemy in a wooded and swampy area, like encircling a fortress, there was not enough strength. Combat in large forested areas required well-trained troops with high morale. Combat in the forest is close combat, where the most important combat weapons are assault rifles, hand grenades, melee weapons and flamethrowers. The outcome of a battle in the forest is not decided by an avalanche of fire or tanks. It is decided by a man, an infantryman, armed with a handgun, performing his tasks with movement, deliberate actions and fire.

Based on combat experience, obtained on the Eastern Front, some lessons can be drawn regarding combat operations in wooded and swampy areas. We present them below.

Reconnaissance, march and deployment

If troops approach a vast forested and swampy area, then in addition to operational ground and air reconnaissance, they must continuously conduct tactical reconnaissance with their own forces and means. If this requirement is ignored, troops may suddenly encounter an enemy in ambush or unexpectedly come under their destructive fire.

The results of reconnaissance, including aerial reconnaissance data, are plotted on route maps, with which the troops are supplied, if possible, before the start of the battle. For ease of use of maps, separate roads and local items It is recommended to encode with conventional names or numbers.

In contrast to actions in open areas in the forest, it is recommended to highlight more strength and means for reconnaissance and close security. Reconnaissance and security units must be sent in advance. Moving from line to line, they must maintain continuous communication with their troops.

When making a march, it should be taken into account that on narrow forest roads it is difficult to transfer units from the tail to the head of the column. Since on forest roads you can find a large number of obstacles, mines, etc., in front of the units heavy weapons Sappers must follow. It is recommended to use some of the sapper and construction units for the construction of roads, gates, sidings, as well as for marking roads in accordance with the route map.

When marching in the forest, commanders of all levels must move ahead of their units, which, if necessary, ensures timely decision-making. To quickly overcome large forest areas without sending out vanguards and careful preparation in most cases it is not possible.

If a collision with a strong enemy is expected in the forest, it is necessary to advance from line to line. Advance units follow in pre-battle formations on both sides of the road. The direction of movement is indicated by teams of traffic controllers sent forward and indicated by marks on trees with paint, tracing cord or other means. German troops, not accustomed to operating in forest conditions, did not know how to silently and quickly overcome forested areas.

In anticipation of deployment into battle formation, units follow in dismembered formations. At the same time, strong reconnaissance is sent forward, and the flanks are provided with patrols, as well as due to deep echeloning. Maintaining close communication with neighbors is a must. Scattering of forces in the forest leads to defeat. The unit commander must be in front. But this does not mean that it should be the very first, since then it can be quickly detected by the enemy and destroyed.

Advance units, equipped with close combat weapons and axes for making clearings, follow directly behind the intelligence agencies. Not far from them, part of the heavy weapons units and tank destroyer squads should advance.

When making a march in large forested areas, when the terrain is not visible, an axis of movement and control lines are assigned. The axis of movement can be a road, a clearing, as well as a ridge of heights, a clearing, the edge of a forest, a river and other “natural landmarks”. Troops must move on both sides of the axis of movement. At the same time, the azimuths of movement must be indicated. Regulation boundaries are determined from a map or aerial photograph, taking into account the terrain features and should, if possible, be at right angles to the axis of movement. At the control lines, troops, depending on the situation, can linger, establish contact with neighbors and silently put themselves in order. If the terrain does not have characteristic landmarks or it is impossible to determine them from a map and aerial photograph, then the troops advance, making short stops approximately every kilometer of the route. It is not advisable to assign timed stops, since terrain conditions usually do not allow maintaining the same speed.

Offensive

Small forests and groves attract the attention of enemy artillery and aircraft. In large and dense forests, an attack on the move and combat at short distances are advisable only in case of an unexpected collision with a weak enemy or to capture individual strong points. In all other cases, it is recommended to take the starting position for the attack in advance and systematically. In the forest, it is advisable to carry out an enveloping maneuver. Forests should in all cases be used to conduct combat operations that surprise the enemy.

In forest conditions, the possibility of interaction between heavy weapons units and infantry and fire support its offensive capabilities are very limited. Despite this, it is necessary to adhere to the principle of combining fire and maneuver. The infantry can implement this principle in the forest only within its own units. Rapid transmission of target designation and accurate determination of initial data for shooting in forest conditions are associated with especially great difficulties.

To ensure an accurate measurement of the distance of forward observers from firing positions, the telephone cable connecting them should be laid with a meter designation. This (along with reliable communication) will ensure the ability to quickly open fire.

Advance on the move

When attacking on the move, it is necessary to strive to direct the main blow to the flank or rear of the enemy, pinning him down from the front. Poor development of the road network in forested areas may lead to the wrong decision to achieve decisive success along these roads. In most cases, it is here that the enemy can prepare more quickly and create a stronger defense than anywhere else. Therefore, troops advancing on the move will in this case bear big losses. In this regard, in any case, it is necessary to make maximum use of forested areas, which allow secretly regrouping troops and encircling maneuvers.

Advance after taking the starting position

In the forest, you cannot choose your starting position using only a map. To do this, it is necessary to use data from all types of intelligence and recent aerial photographs. Moving troops to occupy a starting position due to the difficulty of orientation in dense forests is a very difficult and time-consuming task. Therefore, the occupation of the starting position should be carried out, as a rule, when an offensive plan has been developed.

If the enemy does not have continuous defensive positions or has continuous defensive positions only in certain areas, then breaking through the defenses away from the roads will in most cases be successful.

The organization and conduct of an offensive by large forces in the forest should be as simple as possible. The most important condition for achieving success in these conditions is a clearly defined “reference line” that the troops must adhere to. It should run as parallel to the direction of attack as possible. If, in the absence of landmarks, it is impossible to determine the offensive zone on the ground, you can limit yourself to indicating the direction by compass. Problems should be set to a much shallower depth. Excessive haste in an attack in the forest is a particularly big mistake. When setting tasks, it is necessary to indicate clearly visible boundaries: height ridges, river beds, paths and clearings.

To advance in the forest, it is necessary to have narrow but deep battle formations. For this purpose, appropriately organized and equipped assault groups up to a platoon-company strength are most suitable. Forward units must be armed assault rifles, have a large number hand grenades and flamethrowers. Tank destroyer groups and mortar units should advance closely behind the leading units. When advancing in a forest, artillery in most cases can only fire at targets located deep in the enemy’s defenses. Forward artillery observers should be sent in advance to the first echelon companies. This is necessary mainly for timely opening of fire when entering an open area or the edge of a forest. In a dense forest, artillery preparation is carried out before the start of an attack in the form of a strong fire attack from all guns.

If the enemy occupies a continuous defense in the forest, it is necessary to sequentially capture individual strong points, if possible bypassing them from the flanks or rear. For this purpose, assault groups suddenly attack the enemy in the weakest areas and wedge themselves into his defensive positions. If conditions allow you to silently penetrate into the depths of the enemy’s defense in blind areas, then the attack leading edge may not be carried out. It should be noted that in the forest it is not always possible to fully use the shelters found or captured.

Often a surprise attack without preliminary fire preparation is more successful than an attack after artillery preparation, which allows the enemy to prepare for defense.

Acting without undue haste, advanced units must penetrate as far as possible into the depths of the enemy’s defenses. The units following them expand and clear the breakthrough area of the enemy. A deep penetration of the advancing troops with secured flanks should lead to a complete breakthrough of the defense.

During the offensive, concentrations of troops should not be allowed on roads, paths and open areas. Pulling up reserves and repelling counterattacks are organized according to the same principles as in normal conditions.

If the enemy’s defenses are broken through on a wide front and to great depth, it is necessary to develop an offensive until reaching the edge of the forest or capturing any important section of the forest, preventing the enemy from consolidating on subsequent lines. After leaving the forest, the offensive can be continued only with sufficient artillery support and the presence of anti-tank weapons.

If a large swampy area is encountered during the attack, a road, embankment, or non-swampy area must be found to overcome it. Under these conditions, the battle is conducted according to the principle of fighting for gorges and defile. In order to be able to conduct an offensive over a wider area, it is necessary to lay column tracks using previously prepared boards and fascines.

Defense

Defense in the forest requires more strength than in open areas. This applies primarily to infantry. Along with a greater density of troops on the front line, it is necessary to have stronger reserves. In the forest, artillery and heavy infantry weapons, as a rule, can only conduct unobserved fire and lay barrage fire. Therefore, in wooded areas, cases of enemy penetration into the defense will be much more frequent than in open areas, and the defender must be prepared to carry out numerous counterattacks.

When advancing in a forest, enemy losses due to limited visibility and poor observation conditions are significantly reduced compared to an attack in open areas. Under these conditions, precise fire from artillery and heavy weapons is replaced by close infantry combat. Therefore, when defending in a forest, troops must have at least a third of their forces in reserve.

Defense in the forest should be carried out using maneuverable methods whenever possible. During protracted combat operations, maneuver must be supported by special command measures. During local combat operations in limited areas, it is advisable to periodically push the front line of defense slightly forward or pull it back. As a result, the enemy will be forced to act in a constantly changing environment. These activities should be carried out under cover of darkness and forest.

It is advisable to locate advanced defensive structures so that the enemy cannot see the depth of the battle formations of the defending troops. Such structures must be pulled deep into the forest, and not located at the edge. In exceptional cases, defensive structures may be moved forward. However, even in this case, they should be located at a considerable distance from the edge of the forest.

When choosing the front line of defense deep in the forest, it is necessary to strive to force the enemy to operate in difficult terrain with bad roads. At the same time, the area where friendly troops operate must have good roads and hard, dry soil.

The front of the battalion defense area in the forest should not exceed 800 and, in extreme cases, 1000 m.

In the forest it is impossible to create the usual zones of continuous fire, so it is very important to organize a dense fire at least immediately in front of the front edge. In this case, machine guns are called upon to play a particularly important role. They should be used primarily at the front line, since they still cannot fire at medium ranges under these conditions. The greatest effectiveness of using machine guns is achieved when firing flanking fire along a pre-prepared “firing corridor” at an advancing enemy. In case of repelling an enemy attack at night, in fog or during a blizzard, machine guns should be installed so that they can also conduct unobserved fire. At all strong points it is necessary to have a sufficient number of hand grenades.

The most effective heavy weapons in forest defense are mortars. In most cases, they are assigned to companies operating on the front line.

Defensive positions are equipped in the same way as in open areas. In this case it is necessary to pay special attention to create “fire corridors”, while avoiding large deforestation, since the enemy can detect these “corridors” from the air. Defense engineering equipment must provide for the construction large quantity dugouts, the creation of false structures of all types, as well as the installation of anti-fragmentation ceilings over the trenches of heavy weapons.

With skillful placement of barriers, it is possible to force the enemy to advance in the direction desired by the defender and thus bring him under flanking fire.

Forest areas that can be called tank-inaccessible are very rare. The Russians, as a rule, use tanks when conducting an offensive in the forest. If there are no tanks designed to strengthen anti-tank defense, then the troops must be provided with a sufficient number of close-in anti-tank weapons.

When defending in the forest, tanks are used to accompany infantry during counterattacks and as an anti-tank weapon. Tanks that are knocked out and unable to move independently, as well as captured tanks, can be buried in the ground and used as armored firing points.

One of the difficulties of conducting an offensive in the forest is to coordinate the actions of artillery with the actions of the advancing infantry and provide fire support for it. In defense this difficulty disappears. Given enough time, it is possible to carry out accurate shooting, well-equipped firing positions, build decoys and improve roads. However, due to the danger of shells or mines exploding in trees, it is not recommended to fire at targets located close to friendly troops.

Troops defending in the forest especially need sappers. However, they should not be used to equip infantry positions or as reserves for counterattacks, as their main task is to create rubble, lay minefields and other obstacles, and build bridges and roads. It is very important not to spray deminers. This means that they must first complete the installation of barriers in one area, then install barriers in another, rather than starting work on many areas at the same time.

Between 2012 and 2015, Finland reformed its land warfare doctrine. A significant difference between the innovations and the previously adopted concept was the abandonment of linear defense with firm holding of lines. The new Finnish approach is reminiscent of the doctrine of zone defense (Raumverteidigung), developed by the Austrian general Emil Spannocchi, which provided that the defending side would avoid large defensive battles and that the regular army will take over small war with constant raids on the supply lines of the advancing enemy.

Tactical innovations of our time

The new Finnish doctrine is similar to the American concept of dispersed operations (DistributedOperations). This approach means a transition to conducting combat operations with relatively small but well-trained units. One of its main elements is the coordinated actions of spatially dispersed parts towards one object (target).

The Finnish military proceeds from the assumption that traditions, level of training and support Russian army as the main probable enemy will not allow it to operate off roads in wooded and swampy areas, which will create convenient conditions for constant attacks on columns of advancing troops stretched along forest roads. Television of the Finnish Ministry of Defense released a visual film entitled Reform of the Finnish Army Land Doctrine (Maavoimienuudistettutaistelutapa - Taistelu), which is available on the Internet.

In fact, in 2012, the Finnish army officially began to switch to a style of warfare similar to guerrilla warfare.

Stop. Stop. Stop. This statement may seem very strange. Popular mythology around the Soviet-Finnish (Finnish/Winter) War of 1939-1940. calls the conduct of guerrilla actions one of the main features Finnish tactics. For example, Pasi Tuunanen, associate professor of the Department of Military History and lecturer at the Faculty of History at the University of Eastern Finland, in his book “Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War, 1939-1940” indicates that attacks by small Finnish forces units against the encircled Soviet troops (the so-called “motti”) and the conduct of partisan actions by the Finns were one of the significant factors that determined the overall high efficiency of the Finnish army during this war.

However, in fact, it turns out that “guerrilla” tactics began to be introduced into the Finnish doctrine of land warfare only after more than seventy years after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, its implementation by Finnish military specialists themselves is directly related, among other things, to the advent of modern communication and positioning systems, without which coordinated strikes by dispersed units are extremely difficult.

Experience of the Finnish War

Attaching excessive and unjustified significance to partisan actions during the Soviet-Finnish War is directly related to attempts to find the reason for the success of the actions of Finnish units against formations of the Soviet army when fighting in the forests. It should be noted here that the mere conduct of combat operations on terrain with a large number of forests does not automatically mean that in each battle the tactics of action will differ from the typical tactics used for combat operations in open spaces. For example, the tactical situation that arose when it was necessary to knock down a Finnish barrier on the road, which was preventing the advance of a column of advancing Soviet troops, fits well into the standard tactical task of organizing a frontal attack with pressing against the fire shaft and/or using other methods of interaction characteristic of combat tactics in open areas. However, the unsuccessful outcome of clashes directly in the forests also played a significant role in the failure of Soviet offensives in forested areas. Attempts to bypass Finnish blocking positions off-road by Soviet troops, as a rule, did not lead to success.

The history of battles provides many such examples:

In the period from December 12 to 17, 1939, the 184th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 37th rifle regiment 56 division, several attempts were made to bypass Finnish defensive positions on the Kollaa River through the forest in the direction of Loimola station, with up to two battalions. However, these attempts were stopped by Finnish troops.

Thus, attempts to conduct maneuverable combat operations in forests by our troops took place, but they often ended in failure.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to compare the contribution of general tactical failures of the Soviet troops and failures in specifically forest battles to the failures of Soviet offensives. Nevertheless, it is obvious that errors in forest combat tactics had an impact on the overall result of the fighting.

Hypothesis

Let's try to look at the general scheme of actions of units in forest combat in relation to the conditions of the Soviet-Finnish war. Obvious features of forest combat include relatively short distances for detecting the enemy and firing. A wall of trees and bushes hides the enemy. It is difficult to achieve suppression of enemy fire weapons as a prerequisite for performing one’s own maneuvers in forest shooting combat. The location of enemy fire weapons is poorly visible, and if they are discovered, the enemy only needs to pull back a couple of tens of meters and they again turn out to be hidden. In addition, it is difficult to see not only the enemy, but also soldiers from their own units. Do not forget that the forest is actually a non-landmark or poorly designed area. Everything looks about the same everywhere. Maneuvering your own units faces certain difficulties. In order not to lose each other in the forest, most of the time it is necessary to maintain relatively dense formations with reduced distances between individual units and soldiers within these units. Guiding artillery is difficult, and operating tanks and other armored vehicles off roads is almost impossible. Units with heavy weapons are virtually blind and are forced to move along few roads, often getting into traffic jams, and, as a result, have limited effectiveness.

Forest conditions make tactics more primitive. Combat in the forest is predominantly infantry versus infantry combat with fire at relatively short distances. Note that a shooting battle can very often turn into a chaotic firefight not controlled by officers, since the instinct of self-preservation pushes soldiers to shoot at the enemy as often as possible, even in cases where this is not advisable.

Such a battle is won by the side that can organize simultaneous fire of more small arms at the enemy than the enemy can use for return fire, especially at the beginning of the clash. All forest combat tactics are aimed at achieving the highest possible density of infantry fire and thus achieving fire superiority over the enemy. To simplify, a forest battle is, as a rule, “who will shoot whom,” if not physically (inflicting losses), then at least psychologically (depression from the enemy’s superiority). Maneuvering in the forest is complicated by the fact that the part allocated for maneuver, as a rule, is instantly lost from sight, which makes its interaction with the main group a difficult task.

To most effectively use the fire capabilities of an infantry unit, soldiers must be positioned in a deployed line (chain). This way, the shooting soldiers do not interfere with each other’s firing, they are relatively dispersed, and do not form a group target for the enemy. When moving towards the enemy, the chain approximately simultaneously leaves the field of invisibility, which does not allow the enemy to concentrate fire on the appearing targets one by one. He is forced to immediately disperse his fire.

However, building in a chain has known disadvantages. It is extremely difficult to maintain chain alignment when moving. Soldiers are constantly huddled together, especially in poorly trained units. The reason for this is that people look forward when moving, and to keep yourself in line with other soldiers you need to constantly look to the side in both directions, which, without the appropriate habit, is not done or is not done often enough. As a rule, there are not enough clearly visible landmarks, the direction of which coincides with the desired direction of movement for each individual soldier in the chain. Different level physical training the soldier contributes to the fact that some of the soldiers in the chain run ahead, and some lag behind. Only if you constantly monitor your position in the common line, is it possible to keep your position in the chain relative to others unchanged.

In addition, for a soldier, the need to maintain chain formation for the purposes of effectively controlling the movement and fire of a unit may not be at all obvious, or at least clearly secondary to the task of preserving his own life.

Therefore, for rapid movements, they use formation in a column - in it, the soldier can look around much less; to maintain his place in the formation, it is enough for him to see where the soldiers walking in front of him are moving. Since each side will strive to place soldiers in a deployed line, those who can maneuver faster win, namely, turn into a chain from a marching formation (column), quickly bring their units to the deployment site and make other changes (turning the chain to the right and left) . Thus, the ability to quickly maneuver and change formations by combat units from a column to a chain and back again becomes one of the main means (in addition to quantitative superiority over the enemy) of achieving fire superiority in forest combat. Superiority over the enemy in the speed of formation allows you to create a temporary local advantage in firepower and rain down on the enemy with fire from more guns than the enemy has at a given time and place to fire back. Consideration of the features of forest combat actually leads us to... principles of linear tactics of the 18th century. Of course, we are not talking about complete identity (the density of formations and their depth are significantly different, there is no requirement for a continuous line of shooters, etc.), but the basic tactical ideas are very similar. Fighting in the forest can be called a kind of “reserve of linear tactics.” Maintaining linear formations serves as one of the main means of controlling subunits, and the speed of maneuvering them is a decisive factor in gaining fire advantage over the enemy. Enemy soldiers who are late to the scene of the firefight, located some 100 meters away, can be completely excluded from the battle. This creates the potential for destruction in parts of a unit that is late in deployment.

Unit formations for forest combat are the key to victory in forest combat

Now let's turn to the formations used by the Finns when moving in the forest. The main maneuvering units used in fighting in forests were company and battalion level units. The basis of these formations was the use of many parallel columns in sections, with the allocation of a special group of troops to which these columns were oriented.

Three parallel guide paths are laid for the battalion - one for each of the two companies moving in the first echelon and a center one for the battalion. If the moving unit is a regiment, then another regimental guide path will be laid in the middle between the two forward battalions (7 guide paths in total). Each guide path is laid by a separate escort group the size of one compartment (one platoon is allocated to the regiment's escort group).

Groups of wiring mark guide paths. It is probably worth noting here that the standard recommendation for reconnaissance units - not to make notches or other marks as they move through the forest - is changing to the exact opposite. Anyway large group after walking through the forest, it leaves a clearly visible mark that cannot be hidden. Marking the trail (with paper, rags, branches broken in a uniform way, balls of moss placed on branches, etc.) helps for orientation and movement to the rear and back.

The escort group moves 50-100 meters from the main formations of the company, and 4 advanced sentinels are at a distance of visual communication from it. The forward lookouts should be approximately 150 meters from the main company formations. The person at the end of the lead group carries a flag to clearly indicate his position. The column of the escort group is built in the following sequence: two advanced sentinels, responsible for laying (cutting) the trail, an orienteer with a compass, responsible for checking the map and compiling a table of movements, a commander, the first trail marker, 2 step counters (the first counts in pairs of steps, the second in meters at the rate of 60-63 pairs of steps equal to 100 meters), the second trail marker with a flag. Before the movement begins, a table of future movements is compiled; as we move, the table is supplemented with records of actual movements (the coordinates of the starting and turning points, the estimated and actual time of movement, the time of arrival and departure from intermediate landmarks, the distance in meters and in pairs of steps, azimuths are recorded). Note that when skiing, counting steps is practically impossible due to slipping and rolling of the skis - the distance can be measured with a rope 50 meters long.

The escort group, if possible, does not participate in the battle, but takes cover when the battle begins. After the battle, it becomes the core around which the unit is assembled.

The entire company or battalion formation is moved from one landmark to another. The entire route is divided into sections, the length of which should not be more than two kilometers, and if there is a threat of collision with the enemy - up to one kilometer. After completing each segment, a short pause lasting five to ten minutes is arranged, during which the organization and relative positions of the units are restored and additional orientation activities are carried out. A high speed of movement inevitably leads to the collapse of the structure, and, as a consequence, to loss of time to restore the organization.

To maintain relative position units, individual observers are allocated who constantly maintain visual contact with other units.

At the moment the entire formation of the company stops, sentinels are sent in all directions. If possible, specially trained dogs are used to detect the enemy early. All movements are carried out as silently as possible.

However, the main difference between the Finnish formation is not the presence of a wiring group (it can also be present when the main part of the unit is built simply in a column), but the construction of the main group itself.

The platoons that make up the main group move in parallel columns of squads (for example, the first echelon of a battalion may consist of 12 parallel columns of squads), which, if necessary, are deployed in a chain. In this case, turning into a chain is greatly simplified - deploying into a chain from a separation column is a relatively simple task that does not require much time.

The following platoon formations are possible: four columns of squads “in a line”; “square” - two parallel columns of squads in front, two behind (in the second echelon, looking at the back of the heads of the first echelon squads); “triangle” - three parallel columns of squads in front - one behind, in the second echelon. The choice of building one of these formations depends on two factors: the density of the forest and its location relative to the flank. In a dense forest, branches are built “in a line”, in open forests - “in a square”. The platoons that find themselves on the flank of the battalion march either in a “square” or a “triangle”.

Squads are assigned predetermined places in the formation. By default, the leader is the leftmost first echelon squad. The platoon is closed (when moving into a marching formation) towards it, and this squad remains in place. If closing to the right or left is necessary (for example, when attacking the enemy's flank or when it is necessary to change the direction of movement at a right angle), the two squads move into the space located between the two corner platoons on the side to which they need to shift. The platoon commander and his assistants follow one forward squad, the deputy platoon commander follows the other.

Illustrations

The Finnish squad of 9 people along the front in a chain and in a column occupies 25 meters (3 meters between soldiers). A platoon of 4 squads in parallel columns in two echelons, a square measuring 100 by 100 meters.

One squad can stretch along the guide path to the entire depth of the company formation (platoons are arranged in a “square”).

Dedicated observers for the movements of the escort group are located 15 meters from the guide path.

Formation of a company in a “square”. Option. The second echelon is marching. The right platoon of the first echelon is “in line”, the left platoon of the first echelon is “square”.

Formation of a company with an open flank on the left. Option. The wiring group is extended to the depth of the first echelon. One section of the left platoon of the first echelon is deployed in a chain.

Option to build a battalion. There are three guide paths within the battalion. The regiment's guide path is shown on the left. The second echelon is in marching formations in the immediate vicinity of the guide paths.

Option to build a battalion. The battalion escort group has been extended to the second echelon. All branches are in parallel columns.

Comparison of the effectiveness of constructions; “instinctive” choice of unprofitable construction.

Thus, Finnish units at the company and battalion level actually always approach the enemy in pre-battle formations.

It should be borne in mind that the movement through the forest in relatively large units was not carried out by the Finns over very long distances. For example, the maximum length of the “detour” for winter conditions in the forested area of the northern Ladoga region was estimated by the Finns to be approximately five kilometers. Carrying weapons and ammunition over long distances exhausts soldiers to such an extent that they lose their combat effectiveness.

Of course, in summer forest maneuvers can cover long distances. In the summer of 1944, during the battles near Ilomantsi, forest detours were carried out by the Finns for approximately 7-12 kilometers.

In the summer, soldiers are less tired when moving in the forest, but even in this case, the need to bring ammunition and food from the rear and the need to carry out the wounded limit the range of forest maneuvers for large infantry units.

Therefore, movement in pre-battle formations is not carried out at such great distances. Being in pre-battle formations at the very beginning of a forest battle, which very often begins suddenly at close range, there is only one change left to make. The columns of the squads in front are reorganized using the standard technique of scattering into a chain. This action is simple and quite fast. In this way, a compromise is achieved between the need to follow in columns when moving through forested areas and the need to reduce deployment time at the start of a clash.

For comparison, a unit located in a company or, especially, battalion column deploys for battle much more slowly, thereby providing the enemy with a significant tactical advantage.

Options for deployment from marching column to chain. The need for intermediate formations is visible, during which the ability to fire is limited.

If we turn to the experience of using linear tactics, then practicing formations from battalion columns into a line occupied a significant place in the general training of units, and was quite complex even in open areas (there were different methods of formations, but their coverage is beyond the scope of this article), while that the soldiers were very close to each other. A particular difficulty lies in the fact that when rebuilding a battalion, it is necessary to maintain the unity of its constituent units (platoons, squads) - the battalion cannot simply deploy as a crowd of single soldiers. Violation of the structure makes it difficult for units to maneuver and control fire in battle. This requires a certain, pre-agreed algorithm of actions.

Troops that have no experience in training in forests will inevitably use formations in a common large column, as the simplest and most self-evident. The patrols sent in different directions obviously did not give the column enough time to deploy. Preemption in deployment at the tactical level results in an organized battle line fighting a crowd.

Here you can refer to the experience of using linear tactics in the 18th-19th centuries. He showed that deployment from column to line under fire is virtually impossible, or at least difficult.

Alexander Zhmodikov, “The Science of Victory”: the tactics of the Russian army in the era of the Napoleonic wars; St. Petersburg, Moscow, “Eurasia”, 2016, pp. 188, 199, 554

The fire of a crowd is always less effective than the controlled fire of a unit deployed in a chain. Thus, a unit that forestalls the enemy in changing formation at the very beginning of a clash, all other things being equal, wins the firefight.

Noteworthy is the fact that the Finns did not rely solely on security units, and there was no flank security on the move at all (patrols were sent only when stopping). The dense forest prevents the dispatch of guards to any significant distance from the main unit. Often, patrols cannot move away from the main unit beyond the line of sight - otherwise they will quickly get lost. As a result, guards in forest battles often cannot notify the enemy in a timely manner. If a more or less large unit moves through the forest in a column, even if it receives a warning from its sentinels about the enemy, it simply does not have time to turn around before the start of the clash. The only solution is to move in pre-battle formations.

The ability to push through the forest in pre-battle formations, which allowed for rapid deployment in a chain, is the very “treasury sword” of forest combat that allowed the Finns to win battles in the forest.

Some confirmations

This assumption may seem overly simplistic, but there are a number of factors that indicate that this is the reason. Forest maneuvers are complex, despite their apparent simplicity and even elementary nature - there is always a high risk that the unit will disintegrate into a poorly controlled crowd simply because of the difficulties of making a forest march off-road or at the time of deployment.

The ability to line up and maintain linear formations while moving, as well as the speed of formation changes, gave significant tactical superiority to the infantry in the wars of the 18th-19th centuries. You can try to give the following analogy: in the conditions of the Soviet-Finnish conflict during forest battles, the Soviet infantry was in the position of Turkish troops operating in a crowd against Suvorov’s well-trained infantry, operating in well-established formations.

Analysis of specific forest fighting skills

If you try to compile a list of forest winter combat skills that an ordinary soldier, who has not specifically trained for forest battles, most likely does not possess, then it will turn out to be quite small. Many of these skills are fairly obvious and, even in the absence of initial training, can be reinvented relatively quickly. It is unlikely that these skills could have a significant impact on the outcome of forest battles.

Here is a sample list of them:

Taking off your warmest clothes before moving (working) to avoid excessive sweating, and putting them on after stopping. An option is to unfasten and fasten clothes.
Shaking off snow from clothes before it has time to melt and soak clothes from the heat human body, especially in relation to mittens (gloves), clothing in the area of the knees, elbows, that is, those places where clothing is compressed and the fabrics may get wet right through to the skin.
Chewing snow or using hoods with masks (scarves) to prevent the visible formation of steam from the mouth.
Clinging to tree trunks for camouflage.
Minimizing the amount of lubricant on the weapon so that it does not fail to fire.
Carrying freezing compasses, pistols inside upper layers clothes.
Drying foot wraps, socks, gloves, mittens inside clothes with the warmth of the human body.
Taking into account the factor of moisture condensation on the metal elements of the weapon when brought into a warm room (including a heated tent or hut): the weapon is either left outside or wiped dry immediately after being brought into the room.
Using spruce branches as bedding when spending the night or standing for long periods in the snow as an insulating material.
Quick removal and putting on of skis (including in a lying position). It should be noted that Finnish fastenings were more convenient than Soviet ones, but with a certain skill in handling fastenings, the difference in the speed of putting on could be reduced so as not to have a significant practical impact on the actions of combat units.
Leaving nicks, broken branches, rags in the forest to mark movement routes, marking a route to maintain the direction of movement using the back-cutting method, covering tracks with spruce branches or even with your hands.
Using portable stoves for winter tents. Here we are talking not only about the artisanal production of stoves from buckets and other improvised materials, but also about making fires in huts and snow houses. In fairness, it should be noted that this is associated with a number of difficulties. For example, when using an open fire to heat the internal volume of homemade shelters, the snow that forms part of the roof of these shelters begins to melt, and, accordingly, there is a risk of getting clothes wet. There are a number of tricks to ensure that a fire built in a hut has normal draft and the hut does not smoke. But in general, these obstacles are surmountable.
Pre-turn the skis to be removed with their toes back to save time if a quick retreat is necessary.
Shelter “Finnish snowdrift”, when in order to create a shelter for observation and shooting, they cut down conifer, and use a small section of the trunk with the most spreading branches as a “roof”, on which snow is poured on top.
Throwing grenades on skis not overhead, but with a side throw.
Using a second compass behind the column to adjust the direction of movement of the column (the soldier walking behind the column very well sees its deviation from the given azimuth).
Using a staff with a “slingshot” at the end to press branches to the ground that need to be stepped over to reduce noise from movement.
The use of “ice concrete” (sweeping away water and stone materials) when constructing defensive positions.
Cutting off exclusively the lower branches of trees and bushes to the level of human height to clear sectors of fire.
Exploding with grenades (thawing by making a fire) the frozen layer of earth before digging trenches.
Construction of snow walls to accumulate wind-blown snow for further use when equipping positions.
Different types of crawling with the help of removed skis.
Frequent changes of advanced soldiers laying a ski track or trail through the virgin snow.

Publications about the Finnish War are often full of descriptions of this kind of “little tricks” as evidence of the Finns’ special ability to fight in the forests. Moreover, it is often forgotten that these skills, even in the absence of their preliminary development, are quickly developed through trial and error. Obviously, these tricks cannot explain the success of the Finns in forest battles.

Even these “implicit” skills are obviously not sufficient to explain Finnish success in forest fighting. They are remarkable because they have something in common. All of them contribute to the speed of maneuvering of combat units.

Pre-war Finnish tactical views

Another argument can be made in favor of the thesis that the tactics of the Finnish army largely followed the traditions of linear tactics in infantry operations. In the pre-war period, the Finns were very critical of the possibilities of borrowing tactical innovations that appeared during the 1st World War in Europe. They believed that the wooded and swampy terrain of Finland would not allow them to use the experience of open-space fighting that took place in the European theater of the First World War. For example, when considering the role of tanks, many Finns believed that they would not have a significant place in wars on Finnish territory. Positional battles were considered impossible in Finland since the forest with many blind spaces promotes offense rather than defense. The tactics of assault groups, which developed during the 1st World War, were not considered suitable for Finland due to the fact that the positional defense that gave rise to these tactics, according to the Finns, should not have arisen on their territory due to the predominance of wooded and swampy terrain. The Finns believed that the forest largely neutralized the ability to conduct effective artillery fire. This also made the experience of the First World War in Europe of limited use as a basis for training the Finnish army. All this was reinforced by the ideological self-perception and self-identification of the Finns as “people of the forest”, living by different rules than the “people of open spaces” from the rest of Europe. As a result, in the pre-war period, the Finnish military considered the non-stop infantry strike (attaquea outrance) as the basis of the Finnish army's tactics. Finnish doctrine proposed fighting with methods close to the approaches of European armies that existed before the start of the First World War. That is, in fact, according to the rules, they are relatively not far from linear tactics.

Lack of tactical features as a feature of Finnish tactics

An indirect confirmation of this conclusion is the absence in the Finnish pre-war guidance documents of any special tactical methods of fighting in the forest. Deployment from a marching column into several parallel columns of pre-battle formation, and then into a chain (several parallel chains) was nothing special at that time. From the point of view of a Finnish officer at the company and battalion level, who went through forest battles during the Winter War, there was nothing unusual from a tactical point of view in the actions of his unit. He acted according to well-known tactical patterns that an infantry officer in any European country of that time should have known.

The formation in parallel columns is also known in domestic tactical manuals.

The nuance was that European armies, including the Soviet one, no longer thought in canons, more typical of linear tactics. The speed of deployment of infantry columns into battle formations has largely lost importance for them. They were already thinking in terms of the interaction of artillery fire, tank strikes and infantry attacks. But in forested conditions, somewhat “old-fashioned” tactical schemes with an emphasis on the speed of infantry deployment turned out to be more relevant and applicable.

Presumably, it was the absence of something special in the actions of the Finnish infantry in forest battles that gave rise to attempts to seek explanations for the successes of the Finnish army in a set of important, but, in general, secondary skills, techniques and actions. Including, active search in fact, insignificant partisan elements in the actions of the Finnish armed forces.

It should be especially emphasized that the simplicity of the idea of gaining a tactical advantage in forest battles due to special forms of formations and, as a consequence, the speed of formations, does not mean the ease of its implementation. Even in open terrain, maneuvering infantry is not just difficult, but very difficult. It bears repeating that even the seemingly very simple task of maintaining a chain line while moving across an open field actually requires considerable effort. A moving chain always tends to bunch up, and when bunched up, the subdivisions that make up the chain get mixed up and their controllability drops sharply. If soldiers do not have training experience, then the speed of formation changes on the ground will be extremely low. It requires manual control by officers with constant adjustments and stops. A certain barrier is that in peacetime conditions, practicing formation changes can be psychologically perceived as some kind of not very necessary game. As a result, they do not pay due attention to this and do not invest very much in making it work.

Conclusion

Concluding this article, it should be emphasized that despite the introduction of the most modern means of communication and navigation, and, as a consequence, a significant simplification of artillery and aviation fire guidance, as well as maneuvering when operating in forest areas, in their main features the features of combat in the forest remain the same. this day. Troops that do not know how to quickly maneuver infantry units at the company and battalion level when moving through forests off roads cannot be considered prepared for combat operations in wooded and swampy areas. The experience of previous wars remains largely relevant to this day.

Application

Note that there are different ways deployment from column to chain. The most famous and familiar to the Russian reader is the “herringbone” deployment, that is, a method when one soldier from the column goes in one direction, the next - in the opposite direction, the third - in the direction where the first soldier was moving, but further from the center future chain and so on. The first soldier in the column remains in place.

Deployment from a column to a chain “herringbone” from domestic instructions.

As you know, there are other options for performing this maneuver: a) approach, when the entire unit in the column turns around the front soldiers, who become the center of rotation of the entire column, clockwise or counterclockwise

Deployment from a column to a chain by “entering”

b) establishment by the letter “G” or the number “7” - when a unit marches in a column until a turning point, after which it changes the direction of movement in such a way that the movement continues parallel to the front line and perpendicular or almost perpendicular to the previous direction of movement

c) spreading along the letter “T” - the unit, having reached the turning point as in the establishment method, begins to diverge simultaneously in two directions in directions perpendicular to the previous direction of movement, while one soldier goes in one direction, the next - in the opposite direction, the one who follows him - in the same direction where the first soldier went, and so on.

The Finns used this option: the column is divided approximately in half - passing part of the column turns in one direction, and the rear part of the column also turns in the other direction, while adjusting its position so as to stretch flush with the first part of the column. The benefits of this method of deployment include the ability to preserve established “twos” or “triples,” which are lost during a herringbone deployment, since neighboring soldiers move in opposite directions when deployed. At the same time, Finnish deployment is as fast as herringbone deployment.

Andrey Markin

In the forest, the far limit of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. Therefore, let's consider several situations.

In the forest, the far limit of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. Therefore, let's consider several situations.

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 10 TO 30 PEOPLE

1. Dividing into groups of 7-9 people, the movement distance between groups in open areas of the forest is 30-40 meters, in open forests 20 meters, in the forest 10-15 meters, determined by the requirement for line of sight between groups;

2. A reconnaissance group should move in front of the guiding group (within double the line of sight distance) to identify enemy ambushes at distant positions. The reconnaissance group consists of 2-3 people, moving in a line of sight from each other, preferably having radio communication between themselves and the main group;

3. When a reconnaissance group detects an ambush or an enemy group, it is necessary (provided the reconnaissance group is not detected by the enemy) to immediately stop its movement, disguise itself, and transmit a message by radio to the reconnaissance group and the main group. Under no circumstances should you attack on your own unless you have a twofold numerical superiority.

Possible options:

If the scouts are not detected, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, call one group from the main column (7-9 people), so that this group splits into two detachments and circles the ambush site in two arcs, then striking in the rear and from the sides , in this case, the reconnaissance group will have to distract the enemy but will not expose itself, firing from cover and from a safer distance;

If scouts are discovered, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, immediately find cover for firing and then proceed according to the previous scenario;

If the scouts are not detected or detected, and the enemy is a detachment of more than 6-8 people, the scouts disguise themselves and call two detachments from the main column (the point is that when attacking, a twofold superiority over the enemy is required).

One of the best and simplest tactics for fighting in the forest is the “double tail”. The main group moves in a column of two, staggered from each other, the right side of the column is responsible (observes) the right side of the path of movement, the left behind the left. When commanded to attack, the columns, starting from the “tail,” bend in a semicircle and move toward the place of conflict, as a result, the enemy’s location is encircled. For this type of attack, one important factor is necessary - as many radio stations as possible.

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 4 TO 10 PEOPLE

It is best to move in two equal ranks in a checkerboard pattern, and the front rank should occupy protected positions (behind trees, stumps, in natural ravines, bushes, etc.), and the rear rank should quickly move 10-20 meters further than the front, then it occupies protected positions, and the group that covered itself must move forward and so on. When detecting an enemy or coming under his fire, realistically assess the number of the enemy and either attack him or retreat, but in the same order as the group moved on the march. The ranks should not be widely stretched, otherwise you can miss a camouflaged enemy; each fighter in the rank must have his own sector of fire (the direction of fire which for one fighter should not exceed 90 degrees).

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF UP TO 4 PEOPLE

At even number It is advisable to break into twos and move in pairs, and the advancement of each pair can occur in any order (both in a column and in a line), you just need to not lose sight of the partner from your pair and at least one person from the neighboring one. When moving, it is necessary to make stops (every two to three minutes) so that you can look around and listen to sounds that are not related to the natural sounds of the forest. Such a group is the least vulnerable to detection and can therefore be used for deep reconnaissance in neutral or enemy territory. It can also be used to launch a surprise raid (with a quick retreat) against larger enemy forces, but it is not recommended to engage ambushes or similar enemy groups due to early detection of the group's movements.

DEFENSE TACTICS

Necessary actions taken when preparing positions for defense:

1. Selection of a dominant position for observation and firing;

2. Masking positions for observation and firing;

3. Availability of escape routes;

4. Convenient exit from positions for counterattack;

5. Distribution of observation and firing sectors;

6. Relationship between other positions and with the command center;

Necessary actions taken when defending positions:

1. When an enemy is detected, immediately report this to other positions and the command center, report the approximate number of the enemy, the location of their detection and the expected direction of movement;

2. For the distant lines of defense, if they are poorly camouflaged, retreat to the main lines; if they are well camouflaged, let the enemy through and, after fire contact with the main lines of defense, hit the enemy in the rear;

3. To the main lines of defense, allow the enemy to reach the distance of a confident defeat and only after that open, if possible, simultaneous fire on their predetermined sectors;

4. When reloading weapons, be sure to notify your partners about this in order to cover the firing sector, and do not allow simultaneous reloading of weapons with more than one neighbor along the defensive line;

5. Counterattack on a general signal, simultaneously, but leaving fire cover in positions;

6. When breaking through the defense in any areas, it is advisable to send additional forces there; if such a step is impossible, retreat in an organized manner deeper into the defended territory;

7. If the enemy has a significant numerical superiority and is surrounded by defensive lines, gather the remaining fighters and simultaneously break through with all forces in one (pre-agreed) direction.

THINGS TO REMEMBER

When defending, the losses of the attackers are at least 50 percent greater than the losses of the defenders;

The better the defense positions are camouflaged, the later the enemy will discover them and, accordingly, the closer he will come and the more effective the defenders’ fire will be;

The more smoothly the process of weapon reloading occurs, the fewer “blind” sectors remain and, accordingly, the less likely the enemy will break through the defense line;

Based on materials from the site AirSoftClub.Ru

Offensive- the main type of combat carried out with the aim of defeating the enemy and capturing important areas (lines, objects) of the terrain. It consists of defeating the enemy by all available means, a decisive attack, the rapid advance of troops into the depths of his location, the destruction and capture of manpower, the seizure of weapons, military equipment and designated areas (frontiers) of the terrain.

Attack- rapid and non-stop movement of tank, motorized rifle and parachute units in battle formation, combined with intense fire.

During an attack, a fighter in a squad relentlessly follows the armored vehicles and uses his fire to destroy enemy fire weapons, primarily anti-tank weapons.

Attack

Depending on the task being performed and the conditions of the situation, the offensive can be carried out on an infantry fighting vehicle (armored personnel carrier, tank), inside (except for a tank) or by landing from above.

The submachine gunner and machine gunner should know that when firing through loopholes, the direction of fire should be 45-60°; and shooting should be carried out only in short bursts of the loophole; the direction of fire should be 45-60°; and shooting is carried out only in short bursts.

Actions of personnel in armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles during an attack on combat vehicles.

Attack on foot

When attacking on foot, at the command of the squad commander, “Squad, prepare to dismount,” the soldier puts the weapon on safety, removes it from the loophole (when operating as a landing party inside the vehicle) and prepares to dismount. As the vehicle reaches the dismounting line, on the command “To the vehicle,” he jumps out of the combat vehicle and on the command of the squad commander, “Squad, in the direction of (such and such), guiding (such and such), - to battle, forward” or “Squad, follow me - to battle" takes his place in the chain with an interval between employees of 6-8 m (8-12 steps) and, firing on the move, running or at an accelerated pace as part of the squad, continues to move towards the front edge of the enemy.

Deployment of a squad from pre-battle formation to combat formation.

The attack should be swift; a slow-moving fighter is a convenient target for the enemy.

In cases where a squad maneuvers due to a change in the direction of movement or a soldier encounters an obstacle, it is strictly forbidden to change his place in the squad’s combat formation. During the offensive, keep an eye on your neighbors on the right and left, follow (the signals) given by the commanders and carry them out clearly, and if necessary, duplicate commands to your neighbors.

Crossing a minefield along a passage following a tank.

Overcoming a minefield using a passage made in advance if it is impossible to use armored vehicles.

Having approached the enemy trench at 30-35 m, the fighter, on the command of the commander “Grenade - fire” or independently, throws a grenade into the trench and with a swift jerk, bending down and shouting “Hurray!” resolutely bursts into the front line of defense, destroys the enemy with point-blank fire and continuously continues the attack in the indicated direction.

Attack of the enemy's front line of defense. Fire with grenades.

If a soldier is forced to fight in a trench or communication line, he advances as quickly as possible. Before entering a break in a trench or communication passage, he throws a grenade and fires 1-2 bursts from personal weapons (“combing with fire”). It is advisable for two people to inspect the trench, with one moving along the trench, and the second bending down slightly behind, warning the soldier in the trench about bends and other dangerous places (dugouts, blocked slots, rifle cells). Wire barriers in the form of “hedgehogs”, “slingshots”, etc., placed by the enemy in the trench, are thrown upward with a bayonet-knife attached to the machine gun, and if they are mined, they are walked over the top of the trench. Detected minefields are marked with clearly visible signs (scraps of red or white material) or destroyed by detonation. While moving along the trench, you should make as little noise as possible, using bayonet thrusts, blows with a butt, magazine or infantry shovel to destroy the enemy.

Fight in a trench.

Advancement along the trench.

When personnel are dismounted, infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) move in leaps and bounds, behind the attackers, from cover to cover, providing reliable fire cover at a distance of up to 200 m, and in the case of weak enemy anti-tank defense, in the battle formations of dismounted units.

Fire is fired over the squad chain and into the spaces between squads. In some cases armored vehicles reduced into armored groups, and is also used for fire support of attackers, firing from permanent or temporary firing positions.

The sniper, acting in the attacking chain, or behind the attackers, carefully observes the battlefield and primarily hits the most dangerous targets (ATGM crews, grenade launchers, machine gunners, as well as enemy command personnel). Sniper fire is also effective against the aiming and observation devices of enemy combat vehicles.

An offensive in depth, as a rule, is carried out by landing troops in armored vehicles; barriers and obstacles are, as a rule, bypassed; the enemy in the discovered strong points and centers of resistance is destroyed by a swift attack on the flank and rear.

Sometimes during an offensive, when advancing to the attack line, fighters can move behind an infantry fighting vehicle (armored personnel carrier) under the cover of armor.

The offensive is covered by a corps of armored vehicles.

Offensive in the city

Combat in the city requires a soldier to be able to outwit the enemy, decisiveness and iron endurance. The defending enemy is especially treacherous; his counterattacks and fire should be expected from everywhere. Before the attack, you should reliably suppress the enemy, and during the attack, conduct preemptive fire in short bursts at windows, doors and embrasures (breaks in walls, fences) of the attacked and neighboring buildings. When moving to the site, use underground communications, breaks in walls, forested areas, dusty areas and smoke. When conducting combat in a city, combat pairs or trios (combat crews) should be formed in squads (platoons), taking into account the individual combat experience of the fighters and their personal attachment. During the battle, the maneuver and actions of one must be supported by the fire of fellow crew members, and the actions of the crew must be supported by the fire of other crews and armored vehicles.

Calculation actions as part of a troika

When conducting an offensive in a city, soldiers move on the battlefield, as a rule, in short dashes from cover to cover with reliable fire support from their comrades and combat vehicles. Under enemy fire, the length of the dash should not exceed 8-10 meters (10-12 steps), while straight-line movement should be avoided, moving in a zigzag.

Methods of movement when fighting in the city

Target designation of combat vehicles is carried out with tracer bullets, for which each machine gunner must have one magazine loaded with cartridges with tracer bullets.

Approaching the building, the fighter throws a hand grenade at the windows (doors, breaches) and, firing from a machine gun, gets inside.

When fighting inside a building, a soldier acts quickly and decisively; before breaking into a room, it is “combed” with fire or thrown with grenades. You should be wary of closed doors because... they may be mined. Indoors, very often the enemy hides behind a door or pieces of furniture (sofas, armchairs, cabinets, etc.).

Moving along the floors, it is necessary to shoot through the landings between the staircases, move from the landing using a throw, move from top to bottom while crouching in such a way as to notice the enemy before he notices you (your legs).

Actions when moving up flights of stairs

Actions of a crew as part of a troika during indoor combat

Locked doors are destroyed by a grenade or a burst from a machine gun at the lock. Having captured a building and cleared it of the enemy, you should quickly move to the next one, not giving the enemy the opportunity to gain a foothold in it.

Offensive in the mountains

When advancing in the mountains, the main role in destroying the enemy is assigned to infantry units, artillery and aviation.

When attacking the enemy, one should pin him down with fire, widely use maneuvers in order to reach the flank and rear, occupy dominant heights and carry out a top-down attack.

Squad maneuver to exit for a top-down attack

In the mountains, when advancing, it is necessary to move, as a rule, at an accelerated pace or in short dashes, while more than half of the attackers must cover the movement of their comrades on the battlefield with fire. In the mountains, as well as in the city, it is advisable to use combat crew tactics.

Crew actions when moving to the attack line (to the starting point for the attack)

When throwing hand fragmentation grenades from bottom to top, it is recommended to use grenades with a contact fuse such as RGO, RGN or throw a grenade like RGD-5, RG-42 over the enemy’s trench (shelter). When throwing a grenade from top to bottom, do not throw it too far or throw it directly into the trench, taking into account the grenade rolling down the slope.

Offensive in locality, mountains and forests require increased consumption of ammunition, especially hand grenades; therefore, when preparing, you should take with you ammunition in excess of the established portable ammunition, but you should always remember about saving and preserving emergency reserves, which also increases.

Approximate list of ammunition for combat operations in populated areas, mountains and forests.

Type of weapon	Ammo quantity	Note
AC	300-400
AKS-74	450-500
AKMS	300-450
RMB	800-1200	incl. and assistant
VSS	250-300
SVD	100-200	incl. for PC
RPG-7	5-8	distributed: 2-3 at the grenade launcher; 3 from the assistant; 2-4 from other squad soldiers.
F-1, RGO, RGD-5, RG-42, RGN	4-8	mainly among submachine gunners and IKO.
RPG-18 (22, 26)	1-2	everyone except the grenade launcher
Smoke grenades RDG-2b, 2x	2-3	per department

It is recommended to fire from the RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher and RPG-18 (22, 26) rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades in the mountains, populated areas and forests and against enemy personnel located behind shelters with the expectation of being hit by its fragments and the blast wave of an exploding grenade.