The Zemsky Sobor of 1613 is unique in that. History and us

Chapter Six The Zemsky Council of 1613 and the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the royal throne I The history of the great embassy showed us how right those who did not trust the sincerity of the Poles and their assurances were. An attempt to restore state order through a union with Rech

Zemsky Sobor of 1613

To the 400th anniversary of the restoration of the Russian state

The Great Troubles destroyed the Russian state. This is never written about in textbooks and rarely, with great reluctance, in popular literature. At the end of 1610, Russia ceased to exist as an independent political reality. A powerless boyar “government” sat in the Kremlin. A powerful pro-Polish administration operated next to him. But its power extended only to one capital: within its borders it was supported by a large Polish-Lithuanian detachment located on the territory of the Kremlin and Kitai-Gorod.

Outside of Moscow, the Russian land was a patchwork of independent regions. Somewhere the fighters of False Dmitry II dominated - he was killed in December 1610, but the army of the “Tsar” did not disintegrate; Swedish garrisons were stationed somewhere; the Polish army had settled somewhere; Somewhere, large urban communities were deciding and arguing: who should they “go for”? For the Poles? For the Swedes? Or nominate one of your own? Some swore allegiance to the foreign youth - Prince Vladislav. But he did not go to Moscow and did not want to convert to Orthodoxy, and only the fulfillment of these conditions guaranteed him the Russian throne. Vladislav did not fulfill them, and the oath given to him collapsed.

Anarchy reigned.

What was Russia had every chance of breaking up into three, five, ten small independent powers.

For about two years there was no unified Russian state.

It arose again for only one reason: the Russian people and the Russian Church wished to restore it and put their plan into practice. The hatred of the invaders - foreigners and Catholics - turned out to be so strong, and the desire to live on one's own head - so persistent that the first zemstvo militia gathered near Moscow. It recaptured part of the city and besieged the Polish garrison occupying the center of Moscow. There was not enough strength for a decisive victory, but, in any case, the militia stubbornly held on to the walls of their capital until the summer of 1612. In August 1612, the Second Zemstvo Militia came to Moscow. By joining forces, the Zemstvo residents repulsed the onslaught of Khodkiewicz’s selected Polish-Lithuanian corps, took Kitay-Gorod by storm, forced the enemy Kremlin garrison to capitulate and defeated the vanguard detachment of the Polish army of Sigismund III on the outskirts of Moscow.

In the fall of 1612, a single zemstvo government was formed in Moscow, representing both militias. By that time, a significant part of the Moscow state was under the control of the Zemstvo people, but not all of it. Many cities and regions were not subordinate to the zemstvo government.

Moreover, the very power of this government seemed ephemeral. It relied on a small army that drove the enemies out of the capital. By the late autumn of 1612, it did not even recruit 8,000 fighters. Moreover, for the most part the zemstvo army consisted of Cossacks - a frantic, violent, motley group, ready at any moment to collapse into rebellion or even outright robbery.

Even worse: the overwhelming majority of high-born Russian aristocrats did not support the zemstvo liberation movement. Some ended up on the side of the Poles, some sympathized with the Swedes, and many simply showed extreme passivity, not wanting to risk their heads for the common Russian cause. Scary and disgusting! The serving aristocracy played the role of the military-political elite in Russia. She was obliged to fight foreign invaders, defend, and then restore the unity of the country... What in reality? In reality, everything looked exactly the opposite: only a very small percentage of the Russian nobility came out under the banners of the two zemstvo militias. The most noble people of the kingdom, the richest people, the most experienced commanders and managers were not included in the number of zemstvo leaders. Pozharsky, although a prince, is a man of low nobility, a third-class aristocrat. Only the young prince Dmitry Trubetskoy from the noble branch of the Gediminovich family pulled the cart of leading the militia for a year and a half...

In order to bring the disparate forces of Russia to a new unity, the zemstvo government had to nominate a new sovereign, the Russian Church had to give him the highest sanction to reign, and the zemstvo army had to serve him as a shield and sword.

A new king was needed. Everyone understood this. The most noble part of our aristocracy dreamed of the Polish order, of the rule of the boyar magnate, of a toy tsar, or even of replacing him with a collection of “eparchs” - senators, but they found themselves in a difficult situation. The previous years terribly discredited the highest nobility of Russia. The cooperation of many of its representatives with the Poles aroused rage and contempt among the victorious Zemstvo people.

There was only one way out: to convene a Zemsky Sobor from all over Russia and give it the right to elect a new tsar.

In November 1612, the zemstvo militia last time drove the Poles away from Moscow. The beginning of the winter of 1612/1613 was spent in efforts related to the convening of the Council. People moved in slowly, people moved in with difficulty. The Zemsky Cathedral opened only at the beginning of January 1613. Its meetings were held in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin.

Many hundreds of “delegates” representing cities and regions of Russia came to Moscow. According to some reports, their number exceeded a thousand, but most historians are of the opinion that 500-700 people gathered in Moscow. There is no exact data on this matter. The final document of the Council contains the signatures and names of only a portion of the delegates. Using this document, the identities of less than 300 participants in the Council are established1. It is clear from it that there were many more of them, but how many exactly is impossible to establish2.

They gathered those who managed to arrive: other deserted lands could not even send anyone. In addition, the country was overflowing with gangs of “thieving” Cossacks and gangs of adventurers of all kinds. And those who were able to come faced hunger, cold and the devastation of post-war Moscow. In the autumn of 1612, even the warriors of the zemstvo militia there sometimes died of hunger. So the very appearance at the Council meant an act of civic courage.

Those “elected” who made it to the capital represented a vast territory and could speak with their collective voice for the entire state. Among them were people from different social groups: aristocracy, nobility, archers, Cossacks, merchants, artisans, clergy. There was even small quantity peasants In the documents of the Council they were called “district people.”

The monarchical choice made in 1613 reflects the sentiments of, if not all the “elected”, then, in any case, the absolute majority: “And without the sovereign, the Moscow state is not built and the factories are divided into many parts by thieves and thefts multiply,” they rightly believed participants of the Council. “And without a sovereign, there is no one to build and conduct business, and there is no one to care for the people of God, all Orthodox Christians.”3

But the determination of the best contender for the throne took place in disputes and bitterness. The council participants did not quickly solve this problem and did not unanimously. “Metropolitans and archbishops and all sorts of people of all ranks came to Moscow from all cities and monasteries and began to elect a sovereign. And there was a lot of excitement among people: everyone wanted to do it according to their own plan, everyone said about someone [of their own], forgetting the Scripture: “God gives not only the kingdom, but also power to whomever he wants; and whomever God calls, he will glorify.” There was great excitement.”4 In other words, the struggle of opinions, the agitation of strong “parties”, promises and similar delights of the electoral process did not bypass the Council of 1613.

Zemstvo representatives nominated more than a dozen candidates for the new monarch.

It turned out to be easiest to “reject” the proposals related to the Polish ruling house. Very soon the prince Vladislav left the field of view of those gathered: that’s enough, we’ve had enough of the Poles!

Later, Duke Carl Philip, son of the Swedish king, disappeared from the discussion. From Novgorod, captured by the Swedes, they knew: their rule was also not honey. The ancient Moscow aristocracy treated the relatively “young” Swedish royal family with contempt. Ivan the Terrible generally called him “manly.” How can our princes and boyars submit to a man who was inferior to a significant part of them in terms of birth? On the other hand, an eleven-year-old Swedish boy could not have remained on the Russian throne without the support of the highest nobility, and therefore would have depended on it. The relative weakness and offensive ignorance of the Swedish candidate, paradoxically, for many “elected” were arguments in his favor. A “weakling” on the throne is an opportunity for a big political game for strong people kingdom... Therefore, his candidacy lasted for quite a long time, and even negotiations were held with his older brother, King Gustav Adolf. Pozharsky himself at one time leaned towards the “Swedish option”, foreseeing the hardships of a war on two fronts - with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden - and also considering the possibility of receiving support from the Swedes against a more dangerous enemy5.

But the inspiration remained strong among the people, born of the recent victory over foreign troops. Why, having recently freed yourself from the power of foreigners, put them on your neck again? Karl-Philipp disappeared from the list of contenders following Vladislav. Dmitry Mikhailovich did not insist on his candidacy.

The idea of ​​imposture has dimmed in the eyes of the whole earth. We've seen enough of the “sovereign Dimitri Ivanovichs”! How much blood was shed because of them! The torment that cramped the whole body of Russia taught our people: you cannot flirt with false “kings” for the sake of your own self-interest... it will end badly. The king must be true. By blood and by Divine will. All other options bring inevitable evil. Therefore, they quickly abandoned Marina Mnishek and her “thief” son, and therefore, the peace with Ataman Zarutsky, who supported them with the force of Cossack sabers. Marina Mnishek in 1605 was elevated by False Dmitry I to the height of the Russian queen, but since the “sovereign” brought to the throne by an impostor intrigue was recognized as false, then his queen was also false.

The rejection of these candidates was unanimously expressed at the Council and was voiced in letters sent out on behalf of its participants throughout the cities and lands: “And we, elected people from all over the Council and all ranks, spent a lot of time talking and thinking about the sovereign’s fleece, so that it would be Lithuanian and Swiss the king and their children and other German faiths and no foreign-language states of the non-Christian faith of the Greek law do not defraud the Vladimir and Moscow states and do not want Marinka and her son to take over the state, because the Polish and German kings saw for themselves the untruth and crime of the cross and peaceful violation, as the Lithuanian king ruined the Muscovite state, and the Swean king Veliky Novgorod took by deceit a kiss on the cross. And rob the Vladimir and Moscow states and all the great Russian states from the kingdom of the sovereign from the Moscow clans, God willing.”6

Zarutsky had a strong army that was active in the south of Russia. Only after long military operations will he, Marina Mnishek and the “little crow” be captured. They will have to pay with their lives for their persistent claims to the Russian throne.

The Council was inclined to choose someone from the highest Russian aristocracy.

According to various sources, the persons proposed by the participants of the Council for election to the kingdom are known.

The longest list of applicants contains “The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor”. Here is how the whole matter of election is set out in it: “The princes and bolyars of Moscow, thinking of Russia as a tsar from among the nobles of the boyars, and choosing seven nobles of the boyars: the first prince Feodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky, the second prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynsky, the third prince Dmitry Timofievich Trubetskoy, the fourth Ivan Nikitin Romanov , the fifth prince Ivan Borisovich Cherkaskoy, the sixth Feodor Ivanovich Sheremetev, the seventh prince Dmitrei Mikhailovich Pozharskoy, the osth is due to Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Pronskoy, but from those, by God’s will, whoever will be the king and let them foal...7 And from the Cossacks to the council of the boyar not having, but an individual from them. And waiting for the boyar for the Cossacks to leave Moscow, they are secretly thinking. The Cossacks do not speak about this to the boyars, remaining in silence, but only waiting for the boyars to see who will become famous from them as king.”8 Later, the Cossacks would still name their candidate, or rather, a candidate suggested to them by part of the Moscow boyars: “The Cossack Ataman said at the council: “Princes and bolyars and all Moscow nobles, but not by God’s will, but by autocracy and by your own will.” elect an autocrat. But by God’s will and with the blessing of the faithful and pious, and Christ-loving Tsar, Sovereign and Grand Duke Theodore Ivanovich of All Russia, in his blessed memory, to whom he, the Sovereign, blessed his royal staff and to rule over Russia... Feodor Nikitich Romanov9. And he is now in Lithuania, and from the good root and branch of good and honor, his son, Prince Mikhailo Fedorovich. May it be fitting, according to God’s will, that in the reigning city of Moscow and all Russia there will be a Tsar, Sovereign and Grand Duke Mikhailo Fedorovich and all Russia.” And they gave many years to him, the sovereign”10.

“The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor” in general outline conveys the situation that developed during the election of a new sovereign. True, not all applicants are named in it. Other sources report that among the candidates proposed for the Russian throne, the names of Prince D. M. Cherkassky, popular among the Cossacks and also a very noble aristocrat, were also heard; Prince Ivan Vasilyevich Golitsyn - no less a nobleman, brother of Vasily Vasilyevich, whom Prince Pozharsky respected so much; Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shuisky, who languished in Polish captivity. Perhaps the participants in the council also named other candidates, but they were not popular, and therefore their names have not reached our time.

The number one contender was Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy. He held formal primacy in the zemstvo liberation army.

But he lost. Lost miserably, offensively, hopelessly. He was very close to great success and fell to the level of a minor political figure...

What did Dmitry Timofeevich lack to be elected to the throne?

He had enough desire. One of the stories about the Time of Troubles says: “Prince Dmitry Timofievich Trubetskoy established fair tables and many feasts for the Cossacks and in a month and a half all the Cossacks, forty thousand, inviting them to his court every day, honoring, feeding and singing honestly and praying to them , so that he would be the king of Russia and would be praised by the Cossacks. The Cossacks receive honor from him, eat and drink and praise his flattery, and retreat from him to their regiments and scold him and laugh at his madness. Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy does not know their Cossack flattery.” And when the royal crown finally left Dmitry Timofeevich, he grieved his defeat: “His face was as black as hell, and [he] fell into illness, and lay there for three months, without leaving his yard”11. He did not even put his signature on the letters informing cities and lands about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the kingdom.

Trubetskoy also needed nobility. He was a distant descendant of the Grand Duke of Lithuania Olgerd - along a line going back to Olgerd's eldest son, Dmitry. And Dmitry Olgerdovich reigned in rich Bryansk, ruling a colossal region. In the Moscow state, according to a long tradition, the princes associated with the Lithuanian royal family were placed very highly - the Golitsyns, Mstislavskys, Belskys, Trubetskoys, etc. From the second half of the 16th century, the Trubetskoys were placed in the first lines of the boyar lists, led armies, governed and served as viceroys in largest cities. Very few families could compete with them in generosity: the princes Mstislavsky, Shuisky, Golitsyn, Vorotynsky, Odoevsky, Pronsky, Glinsky and three or four families of Old Moscow boyars - the cream of the Russian aristocracy of that time. Dmitry Timofeevich's father had the rank of boyar. He himself appeared in the royal service in 1604: with the rank of steward he went against False Dmitry I. Trubetskoy retained the same rank under Vasily Shuisky. Having defected from Vasily Shuisky to False Dmitry II (June 1608), he immediately received the boyar rank from the “tsar”: the “Tushins” liked the fact that such a noble person was in their camp...

The role of Prince D.T. Trubetskoy in the zemstvo movement is enormous. In 1611, he, together with Ivan Zarutsky, formed the regiments of the First Militia, came with them to Moscow, and participated in battles with the invaders. His military services to Russia are obvious.

The First Militia had several leaders: Prokofy Lyapunov, Ivan Zarutsky, Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy and Andrei Prosovetsky. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which of them was the initiator of this or that action of the Zemstvo people. Formally, Dmitry Timofeevich was recognized as the eldest among them - his name was written first on the militia's charters. And when addressing the leadership of the militia, in letters from the cities it was also named in first place12. At the same time, sources much more often mention the independent role of other leaders - Zarutsky and especially Lyapunov. Dmitry Timofeevich seems to be in the shadows.

But this is an illusion.

It is known that it was he who gathered the troops of the Kaluga land. In the spring of 1611, the largest figure in the camp of the Russian forces concentrating around Kaluga was his cousin, Prince Yuri Nikitich Trubetskoy (external forces are negotiating with him)13. Dmitry Timofeevich appears next to him in March - April 161114. Yuri Nikitich, known for his pro-Polish sympathies, hesitated, but ultimately did not join the zemstvo cause. And then his relative found himself at the head of the Kaluga residents. In the summer of 1611, Prince D.T. Trubetskoy, precisely as the senior man of the Kaluga army, turned out to be the first of the governors of the entire militia as a whole.

Foreigners saw in him the real leader of the Zemstvo people. The Swedes, in particular, considered him a “cautious and vigilant commander” who did not allow the collapse of the militia after the death of Lyapunov. The Russians believed that between the two true leaders of the militia - Lyapunov and Zarutsky - Trubetskoy “had no honor”15. But, in any case, Dmitry Timofeevich was never just a “living banner”, he was not a toy in the hands of other militia leaders. It happened that he disagreed with other governors. So, in the summer of 1612, he did not support Zarutsky, who wanted to enthrone the young son of Marina Mnishek from False Dmitry I. Zarutsky plotted against Pozharsky, even tried to kill him, but Trubetskoy never did. Zarutsky left from near Moscow, hearing about the approach of the Zemstvo men Minin and Pozharsky, but Trubetskoy remained. It is clear to see: this man had independent significance. And, without a doubt, he made political decisions on his own.

Historian V.N. Kozlyakov spoke on this matter weightily and accurately: “Despite the fact that Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy... received his boyars from False Dmitry II, this militia governor began to be perceived as the head of his “noble” part. By November 1611, the militia regiments included representatives of the Moscow noble families of the Zmeevs, Izmailovs, Islenevs, Koltovskys, Korobins, Odadurovs, Okhotin-Pleshcheevs, princes Priimkov-Rostov, Pushkins, Samarins.” Noble nobles easily obeyed the aristocrat Trubetskoy - there was no “damage” to their family honor. But the not so noble Lyapunov, and even more so the rootless Zarutsky, were not very suitable for the role of their boss. Without Trubetskoy, the noble part of the militia could simply go home.

Trubetskoy is worthy of respectful treatment, because he is the only one - the only one out of several dozen of the most notable people of the Kingdom! - did not refuse the sacred role of leader in the zemstvo militia. And having accepted it, he walked with the Zemstvo people until victory. This young man is not a particularly successful commander or a great administrator. But still, he showed enough intelligence and courage to rise above other people of his social class.

After Zarutsky left, Dmitry Timofeevich single-handedly led the First Zemstvo Militia. The prince personally participated in repelling Khodkiewicz’s troops. In October 1612, it was his subordinates who took China Town by storm. When the troops of King Sigismund approached Moscow, Trubetskoy, together with Pozharsky, drove them back16. Finally, it was he who was formally the eldest of the zemstvo governors of Russia until the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.

And so he was denied the opportunity to build a kingdom. And the highest power was so close! There was half a step left to reach her. Trubetskoy actually had it for several months - at the end of 1612 and at the beginning of 1613...

Why did this happen?

Apparently, Dmitry Timofeevich found himself in a strange position: he was not completely one of his own, although no one thought of him as completely a stranger either.

One for the Cossacks? Not quite. After all, the prince rose above all as the head of the noble part of the first militia. Noble, not Cossack. In a social sense, the prince was much closer to the nobles than to the Cossacks...

One for the nobles? But he was unable to protect them from the Cossack rampage and, probably, in their eyes he looked like a traitor to his circle, flirting with a socially alien element. The nobles fled from his militia, fearing the insults inflicted on them by the Cossacks every now and then. The circumstances of the battle with Khodkevich for Moscow directly and unequivocally indicate: the Cossack detachments were controlled very weakly by Trubetskoy.

One for the aristocracy? Yes, that's right! However... the young nobleman in the aristocratic environment was just one of the “players” - not the most noble, not the most experienced in intrigue, not the most authoritative of the courtiers. Each aristocratic clan had its own interests and its own trump cards. Trubetskoy played in his own favor and did not find a sufficient number of allies for victory.

Partly, the Zemstvo leader was let down by one unpleasant circumstance. The Shuisky, Mstislavsky, Romanov, Cherkasy, Glinsky, Saburov and some other families of the noblest people of the kingdom were united with the Moscow Rurikovich-Kalitich dynasty by marriage. But Trubetskoys - no! Not a single marriage was concluded directly connecting the Trubetskoys with the Moscow royal house.

So, the defeat of Trubetskoy as a contender for the Russian throne is not so difficult to explain.

Of the other contenders, Prince Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky deserves special attention.

This one came from the Gediminovichs, moreover, his nobility absolutely surpassed all the other Gediminovich princes who stood in the elections: the Golitsyns and Trubetskoys. The Mstislavskys were also connected by marriage with the Moscow Rurikovichs. One of Fyodor Ivanovich’s ancestors married the granddaughter of Ivan the Great! And Fyodor Ivanovich himself at the beginning of the 17th century was generally considered the most distinguished aristocrat in all of Russia. Only the Shuiskys could compete with him, but they were overthrown, and now the Shuiskys were in prison among the Poles.

If blood, that is, height of origin, had played the main role in the elections to the Russian throne, Fyodor Ivanovich would certainly have won. But nobility was only one of the factors that the Council participants took into account. Not the only one. It, of course, was taken into account: the lack of nobility removed several candidates from the throne, in particular, Prince Pozharsky, F.I. Sheremetev, and also I.N. Romanov17. However, the position and actions of the contenders during the Time of Troubles were no less important.

Prince Pronsky, high-born Rurikovich, is not noticeable either in great good or in great evil. The troubles seemed to pass him by, an adult. He behaved passively.

Prince Cherkassky showed himself to be a bad commander.

But these are all small sins.

But Prince Mstislavsky opened the Kremlin gates to the Poles. He led the Seven Boyars and it was he who led Russia to a humiliated position. To give him the royal title after all these “arts” would mean not to value the holy feat of the zemstvo militia. At first, after the expulsion of the Poles from the Kremlin, Prince Mstislavsky could have simply been killed under the hot hand, and not elevated to the throne...

No, this aristocrat, even though he was the most noble, even though he was worthy by blood, was clearly not suitable.

There is no point in talking in detail about the “struggle of parties” at the Council. Its main events have been described many times in scientific and popular literature. For a Russian patriot, two circumstances are important: why was Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky not elected tsar? What position did he take in relation to his young chosen one, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov?

The answer to the first question is clear: Pozharsky had the least chance of being elected among all the candidates. He was noticeably inferior to all of them in nobility. He would have been tolerated less among the sovereigns than Boris Godunov and Vasily Shuisky were tolerated. And what is the way out of this? Throw in the noble militia to destroy all the more noble persons of the Moscow kingdom? Chop up several dozen Ruriki, Gediminovichs, as well as people from the old Moscow boyar families? Even if Dmitry Mikhailovich had such a crazy idea, the army would not have obeyed his order. And if there was a detachment ready to serve its commander, the Cossacks would soon destroy it. According to numerous sources, the strength of the Cossacks in 1613 absolutely exceeded the strength of the nobility18 gathered in Moscow, and the boyars split into “parties”.

Of course, Pozharsky had an army. Of course, his name enjoyed good fame from end to end of Russia. Of course, out of respect, his name was included in the list of applicants. And in 1634, the nobleman Larion Sumin, hostile to him, passionately accused Dmitry Mikhailovich that he was coveting the kingdom and even spent 20,000 rubles on bribery19. How can one not suspect Dmitry Mikhailovich’s power-hungry dreams?

But Pozharsky clearly did not have a firm intention to “reign.” They didn’t believe Sumin then, and now his statement is hard to believe. The amount is fantastic. A silver penny of that time weighed approximately 0.5-0.6 grams20. Consequently, 20,000 rubles were a pile of silver with a total weight of 1.0-1.2 tons. You could buy a city and surrounding villages with these! Pozharsky, who was not particularly rich, in the conditions of the complete ruin of the country, it seems, had no sources from which he could have obtained even ten times less money. Well, did his good friend Minin supply him with silver from the zemstvo treasury? Even less plausible. Firstly, the state of zemstvo finances was, to the same extent as Minin and Pozharsky, open to another candidate - Prince D.T. Trubetskoy. Secondly, the army received salaries and “food” all this time. If such a sum had then been spent, the service people would simply have fled from Moscow: the zemstvo leaders would have had nothing to pay them with. The historian I.E. Zabelin spoke exhaustively accurately about Minin as the treasurer of the Second Militia: “He distributed it (the treasury - D.V.) generously, but wisely, because the whole ... glorious people's feat rested on it. There is not a single hint in the chronicles or other acts that Minin handled this treasury dishonestly. There is not a single chronicle remark that the Nizhny Novgorod army was ever offended by the expenditure of the treasury, that unauthorized seizures of the treasury occurred on the part of the commanders. Meanwhile, chroniclers are never silent about such matters, no matter who they happen to.”21

Finally, there is a more significant consideration. Pozharsky's biography before 1613 is well reflected in the sources. Chronicles, historical “stories,” as well as various kinds of documents make it possible to draw up a detailed portrait of him. The main features of Dmitry Mikhailovich’s moral character, his psychology, his intellectual abilities do not allow the idea that he deliberately made his way to the throne.

Pozharsky is ambitious - his family honor, so strong among noble people of that time, pushes him to do so. But he is in no way an adventurer or a revolutionary. And, moreover, not a fool. He knew that with his accession the Troubles would last: the great families of the seedy Rurikovich on the throne would not be recognized when there were plenty of Rurikovichs around who were not at all seedy. He knew that he could, by desiring the throne, destroy the country, although he had recently become its savior. He knew that, fighting for the old order, he would immediately suffer after its return. So, the old order began to return, and this social order did not allow the ascension to the kingdom of a minor representative of the Starodub princes.

Probably, if the whole earth had bowed to Pozharsky and in one impulse presented him with a royal crown, the prince would have accepted it. But there was no “united impulse” at the Zemsky Sobor. No, instead there is complete “irritation”. And no matter how Dmitry Mikhailovich was overcome by flashes of ambition, he still did not want to become the head of one of the parties, madly squabbling for power, pouring money left and right, intriguing for “votes.” He was respected: he was named among the candidates. It would be strange not to respect! He may have been looking for universal approval and even made some attempts to achieve it... But he very quickly realized what disastrous consequences such actions could lead to.

We must accept Dmitry Mikhailovich’s decision with joy and respect - to come to terms with it. He will not become a sovereign. Isn’t this why he beat the Sumbulites near Pronsk in 1610, fought on the Moscow barricades in 1611, drank the death cup with Khodkevich? According to God, having done what was required, the prince had to step aside. And he walked away. The spirit of Troubles did not overcome him. Temptation did not defeat him. This is the right behavior for a good Christian! And in the future, Pozharsky will never, with a single word or deed, show his regret about the lost opportunities.

He did the right thing. For the sake of Christ and for the sake of Russia, this was what had to be done.

How did Prince Pozharsky feel about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich? It's hard to say with certainty, but most likely it will be disapproving.

He had several serious reasons for this.

Mikhail Fedorovich is connected with the former Rurik tsars, but not by blood. His grandfather's sister, Anastasia Romanovna, became the first wife of Ivan IV. True, the grandfather himself, Nikita Romanovich, married Evdokia Alexandrovna Gorbata-Shuiskaya. The Gorbaty-Shuisky princes were high-born Rurikovichs, descendants of the great princes from the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod house. But still, the Romanovs found themselves, at best... leaning against the true Rurikovichs. And for the titled descendants of Rurik and Gediminas, it would have been more natural to submit to a monarch more closely associated with one of the great royal houses.

Mikhail Fedorovich was nominated to the throne by a party with a bad reputation. Among the Moscow boyars, his supporters were I. N. Romanov - an open accomplice of the Poles, B. M. Saltykov - the nephew of the obvious traitor Mikhail Saltykov, Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev - a member of the Seven Boyars, who surrendered Moscow to the Poles, and Prince B. M. Lykov - an old enemy of Pozharsky . Apparently, despairing of their own success, the Cherkasy princes also supported him. Meanwhile, one of them, I.B. Cherkassky, once fought with the zemstvo militias...

They established connections with the authorities of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, the richest merchants and the Cossacks. Troitsk authorities provided supporters of Mikhail Fedorovich with their Moscow courtyard for meetings. The merchants gave funds to run “ election campaign" Cossack atamans provided military force who supported this “party”. The Cossacks staged riotous demonstrations at the courtyard of Metropolitan Krutitsky and in the Kremlin itself. It even came to the siege of Trubetskoy and Pozharsky in their yards! It was Cossack pressure that tipped the scales in favor of Mikhail Fedorovich. What good did Prince Pozharsky see from the Cossacks? Their rampage? Their self-interest? It was a force that did a lot of evil to Russia at that time, a force that was socially alien to Pozharsky and his militia nobles, and at the same time a force that was cleverly used by the old Moscow boyars when elevating their candidate to the throne.

Finally, Mikhail Fedorovich was not fit for the throne due to his childhood. At cathedral meetings there were fierce battles around his name - those “for”, those “against” - and he was not yet sixteen years old. He did not have any experience in management or military activities. In addition, he had not seen his father, an energetic politician, for more than two years, and therefore could not learn from him. Pozharsky clearly understood: until the tsar matured, either the Cossacks or the royal relatives would control the power. And these latter, as already mentioned, looked like people of dubious merit. At the Council, talk was raised more than once about the applicant’s minority. Moreover, the cunning intriguers openly said: “He’s young and hasn’t gotten his head around it yet, and he’ll be taken in by us.”

Most likely, Prince Pozharsky saw little good in the prospect of giving Russia to such a sovereign. If he had not ascended the throne himself, he would probably have handed it over to Golitsyn or Vorotynsky, who honestly resisted the Poles and suffered from them. However, they did not have such a powerful party of supporters behind them... Indirect evidence from sources has survived to this day, according to which Dmitry Mikhailovich stood in opposition to the Romanov group.

But Pozharsky, it’s worth repeating, resigned himself. It must be assumed that he not only succumbed to Cossack violence, of which he was never afraid, and not only for reasons of Orthodox morality.

For him, apparently, the position of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, which stood up for the young applicant, was significant. In addition, Dmitry Mikhailovich understood: the influential Romanovs, their numerous relatives and supporters (even if for selfish reasons!) would prove to be a strong support for the throne. The Russian throne will receive dozens of defenders in their person, and it will be risky for other aristocratic “parties” to test Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich’s strength - just as they tried Tsar Vasily Ivanovich.

This circumstance should be taken a closer look.

What are the Romanovs? A branch of the ancient boyar family of the Zakharyins-Yuryevs. There was no royal blood flowing in their veins. They had a very indirect relationship with the clan of Rurik, absolutely nothing - with the clans of Gediminas and Genghis Khan, who then enjoyed great authority in Russia. The Romanovs were always servants of the Moscow sovereigns. Precisely servants, not rulers. And along with them, the role of the same servants, who did not have royal blood in their arteries and veins, was played by numerous ancient families of the Moscow boyars: the Saltykovs, Saburovs, Godunovs, Pushkins, Sheremetevs, Sheins, Morozovs, Kolychevs, Pleshcheevs, Velyaminovs, Buturlins, Glebovs... Some of them lost their former greatness - such as the Kolychevs, who suffered greatly from the oprichnina, or the Saburovs and Godunovs, who lost their sovereign significance with the death of Tsar Fedor II Godunov. Some retained great influence at court and great wealth. In this case, something else is important: all these clans and many others, not so famous, constituted an environment socially close to the Romanovs. All of them could say about the Romanovs: “These are one of ours.” They, apparently, at the right time, raised money for the Cossacks, mobilized their own fighters, showed diplomatic abilities, negotiating with the Church, and put pressure on the dissatisfied where necessary ... The princes fought separately, each for themselves. The untitled nobility put up only two clans for the elections, and when the Sheremetevs decided to support the Romanovs, all their power was concentrated in a single point. The Cossacks became an instrument of this coalition.

Finally, Mikhail Fedorovich, clean from all the sins of the Time of Troubles, stood much higher than the pillars of the Seven Boyars, the “Tushino boyars” and the outspoken servants of the Polish government. And they made up the majority among the nominated candidates. Unfortunately, most of the Russian aristocracy emerged from the Time of Troubles soiled... Mikhail Fedorovich - no.

Dmitry Mikhailovich could not help but feel responsible for the country that he had recently liberated from the power of the invaders. Having abandoned the idea of ​​his own ascension to the throne, the prince had to surrender to calculations: who at the pinnacle of power would be the least harmful to Russia? In such a case, optimists would say: “most useful,” but out of the Troubles an unprecedented number of monster people grew up, and some of them with heavy passion reached for the royal crown...

If we objectively evaluate the “cage” of applicants, then Mikhail Fedorovich is among the best. Not the most successful, but, in any case, a good option. And Pozharsky, obviously, did not openly resist his election, because he saw that the best would not “pass”, and of those who could really ascend to the throne, Mikhail Fedorovich looked preferable to others.

The absence of obvious opposition from Pozharsky, the recognition by him, the most authoritative of the zemstvo governors, of the conciliar decision, makes him one of the creators of the dynasty. The kind concession made by Dmitry Mikhailovich meant a lot back then. He held in his hands a serious military force. Let’s say it would be very difficult to use it for his personal accession to the throne. But I think Pozharsky could have stopped the unwanted applicant, a person clearly unsuitable for the role of monarch. And he didn’t. The prince simply signed the conciliar document electing Mikhail Fedorovich to the throne22.

Sometimes inaction is a very serious step.

Sometimes the absence of an action is a decisive, well-thought-out action.

The name of Mikhail Fedorovich finally triumphed at the council meetings on February 21, 1613. Under the arches of the Assumption Cathedral, the main one for the entire Russian land, he was named sovereign.

The following is stated in the “New Chronicler”: “He [Mikhail Fedorovich], the pious sovereign, did not have this in his thoughts and did not want: he was at that time in his patrimony, without knowing it, but God pleased him. .. The authorities and the boyars, and all the people began to choose from all ranks [whom] to send to beat his mother, to the great empress, the old monk Marfa Ivanovna, so that she would grant all Orthodox Christians, bless her son, the Tsar, the Sovereign and the Grand Duke Mikhail Fedorovich of All Rus', to the Moscow State and to all the Russian kingdoms, and to ask him, the sovereign, for mercy, so as not to despise the bitter tears of Orthodox Christians. And they sent to Kostroma, from all the ranks, the Ryazan Archbishop Theodoret and with him many black authorities, and from the boyars Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev, and from all the ranks of all sorts of people, many. They went and came to Kostroma, and he, the sovereign, was at that time in the Ipatsky monastery”23.

It should be noted: Pozharsky did not go with the embassy to the Ipatiev Monastery, but no signs of hostility can be discerned in his behavior. Prince D.T. Trubetskoy, another leader of the Zemstvo people, was very upset by his defeat and even fell ill for a while. But Dmitry Mikhailovich simply could not leave Moscow while he was burdened with numerous administrative responsibilities. He continued his work, and none of the chroniclers and spiritual writers of that time noted any signs of grief or anger in his actions.

Between the departure of the “embassy people” to Mikhail Fedorovich and the ceremony of crowning the kingdom, almost four months will pass. Someone was supposed to be in charge of the colossal state economy all this time. It is difficult to say at what point the formation of a new government took place, and Trubetskoy and Pozharsky handed over the reins of government to new people. On February 21, the monarch is already known, but still, on behalf of princes D. T. Trubetskoy and D. M. Pozharsky, a letter is sent to Beloozero about the “displacement” of nobles who suffered during the Time of Troubles on the lands of the local district24. And on February 27, according to the letter of these two leaders of the zemstvo movement, land issues in the Uglich district were resolved25. Even in March, the documents still show their special managerial position under the zemstvo government26. There is a well-known March “unsubscribe” (report) about the receipt of cannon supplies from Shuya, addressed to Trubetskoy and Pozharsky27. This means that they still continue to work as leading administrators.

It is difficult to determine when the “duumvirate” finally retired. Most likely in March. The April letters of 1613, leaving Moscow, were drawn up on behalf of the boyar administration - “Fedorets Mstislavsky and his comrades”28. But even if Pozharsky and Trubetskoy resigned at the very beginning of March, they faced a long, complicated procedure for transferring affairs. What kind of embassy is there...

The young monarch himself and his mother, nun Martha, doubted for a long time whether it was worth making a conciliar decision. The work of the sovereign after the death of Fyodor Godunov and the treacherous transfer of Vasily Shuisky to the Poles looked like one of the most dangerous. Will the Zemstvo people be able to protect Mikhail Fedorovich? Is there any deceit and treachery in their proposal? But the embassy persuaded both. It was not in vain that the boyar Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev was appointed its secular head: he came from the same social environment as the Romanovs, and belonged to the same old Moscow boyar family as they did. The Sheremetevs were distant relatives of the Romanovs: both families had one ancestor - the Moscow boyar of the early 15th century Fyodor Andreevich Koshka. Nun Martha and her son could count on the fact that blood alone - tea - would not be given out...

The Romanovs went to Moscow. “The people of the Moscow state met him with bread, and the authorities and boyars met him outside the city with crosses. And the sovereign came to Moscow to his royal throne in the summer of 7121 (1613) after the Great Day on the first Sunday on the day of the Holy Myrrh-Bearing Women. There was great joy in Moscow, and prayers were sung.”29

As Russian history has shown, the choice made in 1613 by the “elected” people and the concession made by the leaders of the zemstvo militia turned out to be correct. Mikhail Fedorovich turned out to be exactly the tsar whose figure united the country.

Firstly, he had the strongest aristocratic coalition behind him.

Secondly, he was supported by the Church.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the country was reborn from ruins, from dirt, from ashes. She began to live with a clean slate. And in such a situation, the best king turned out to be the one whom no one had any reason to blame for the unseemly acts of the troubled years. Mikhail Fedorovich was clean. Its cleanliness inspired good hope.

And the combination of political power and holy hope is very strong.

Dmitry Volodikhin

NOTES:

1 Approved letter of election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the Moscow State / Preface. S. A. Belokurova. M., 1906. P. 75-92. In total, approximately 260-270 names of “elected” ones, that is, participants of the Council, were named.

2 In a number of cases, one person signed for a whole group of “electors” from a city or region. In such cases, the size of the entire group of elected officials is not indicated.

3 Acts of the Zemsky Sobor of 1612-1613. // Notes of the Department of Manuscripts of the State Library of the USSR named after. V.I. Lenin. Vol. 19. M., 1957. P. 189.

4 New Chronicler // Complete collection Russian chronicles. T. 14. St. Petersburg. 1910. P. 129.

5 Lyubomirov P. G. Essay on the history of the Nizhny Novgorod militia of 1611-1613. M., 1939. P. 214.

6 Acts of the Zemsky Sobor of 1612-1613. // Notes of the Department of Manuscripts of the State Library of the USSR named after. V.I. Lenin. Vol. 19. M., 1957. S. 189-190.

7 “They cast foals” - determine the future king using lots.

8 The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613. // Questions of History, No. 5. 1985. P. 95.

9 It is difficult to judge how reliable the Cossack legend is about the transfer of the scepter by Emperor Fyodor Ivanovich to the boyar Fyodor Nikitich Romanov. Most likely, there is little truth in it. Under Boris Godunov, Fyodor Nikitich was tonsured a monk with the name Filaret, later became a bishop, traveled with ambassadors from the Seven Boyars to Sigismund near Smolensk and remained in captivity with the Poles. His son, Mikhail Fedorovich, was born before he was tonsured.

10 The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613. // Questions of History, No. 5. 1985. P. 96.

11 Stanislavsky A. L., Morozov B. N. The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613

Yes. // Questions of history. No. 5. 1985.

12 Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition. T. II. St. Petersburg, 1836. No. 192.

13 Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition. T. II. St. Petersburg 1836. No. 182.

14 Letter from Princes Yuri and Dmitry Trubetskoy to Jan Piotr Sapieha // Notes of Hetman Zholkiewski about the Moscow War. St. Petersburg 1871. Applications. No. 41. The letter is a response to Sapieha’s message.

15 Gerkman E. Historical narrative about the most important unrest in the Russian state // Chronicles of the Time of Troubles. M., 1998. S. 255-256; Videkind Yu. History of the Swedish-Muscovite war of the 17th century. M., 2000. P. 197; New chronicler // Complete collection of Russian chronicles. T. 14. St. Petersburg. 1910. P. 112.

16 The story of the victories of the Moscow state. M., Science. 1982. P. 73.

17 Ivan Nikitich Romanov was the uncle of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov. But Mikhail Fedorovich was the son of the eldest of the Nikitich brothers - Fedor, monastically Philaret, and Ivan Nikitich was the fifth of the sons of Nikita Romanovich Zakharyin-Yuryev, the ancestor of the Romanovs. And this, according to parochial accounts, sharply reduced the level of his nobility.

18 Many nobles nevertheless went home, but the Cossacks arrived.

19 Zabelin I.E. Detective case about a quarrel between the boundary judges of the steward of Prince Vasily the Bolshoi Romodanovsky and the nobleman Larion Sumin // Readings in the Society of Russian History and Antiquities at Moscow University. Vol. 7. 1848. P. 85.

20 Melnikova A. S. Russian coins from Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great. M., 1989. P. 131.

21 Zabelin I. E. Minin and Pozharsky. Straight and crooked in the Time of Troubles. M., 1999. P. 66.

22 Collection of state charters and agreements. M., 1813. T. I. P. 637.

23 New chronicler // Complete collection of Russian chronicles. T. 14. St. Petersburg. 1910. P. 129.

24 “And we ordered the siege guards to be executed for their services”: Letter of Complaint from the “Council of the Whole Earth.” 1613. // Historical Archive, No. 6. 1993. P. 193-195.

25 Acts of service landowners of the 15th - early 17th centuries. M., 1998. T. 2. No. 399.

26 Palace ranks. 1612-1628. Volume 1. St. Petersburg. 1850. P. 1083.

27 Lyubomirov P. G. Essay on the history of the Nizhny Novgorod militia of 1611-1613. M., 1939. Appendix No. 5.

28 Palace ranks. 1612-1628. Volume 1. St. Petersburg. 1850. P. 1103.

29 New chronicler // Complete collection of Russian chronicles. T. 14. St. Petersburg. 1910. P. 131.

Report at the first Tsar's readings of "Autocratic Russia"

The Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was assembled by the decision of the head of the one created in Moscow after the expulsion of the Poles by Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky together with Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy administrative management Moscow state. A charter dated November 15, 1612, signed by Pozharsky, called on all cities of the Moscow State to elect ten elected people from each city to elect the Tsar. According to indirect data, the Zemsky Sobor was attended by representatives of 50 cities liberated from the Polish occupation and the gangs of thieves of Ataman Zarutsky, an ardent supporter of the elevation of the son of Marina Mnishek and False Dmitry II to the Moscow Royal throne.

Thus, ten people from one city had to be present at the Zemsky Sobor, subject to the norms of representation determined by the head of the Moscow government. If we proceed from this norm, then five hundred elected members from cities only should have participated in the Zemsky Sobor, not counting the ex-officio members of the Zemsky Sobor (the Boyar Duma in its entirety, court officials and the highest clergy). According to the calculations of the most prominent specialist in the history of troubled times, Academician Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, more than seven hundred people should have participated in the Zemsky Sobor of 1613, which amounted to five hundred elected and about two hundred courtiers, boyars and church hierarchs. The large number of people and representativeness of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 are confirmed by evidence from various independent chronicle sources, such as the New Chronicler, the Tale of the Zemsky Sobor, the Pskov Chronicler and some others. However, with the representation of the boyar duma and court officials, everything was not as simple as with the ordinary elected members of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613. There is direct evidence from both Russian chroniclers and foreign observers that a significant part of the boyar aristocracy, which made up the absolute majority of the members of the Boyar Duma and court officials, who were supporters of the invitation to the Moscow throne of the Polish prince Vladislav and who had stained herself by close cooperation with the Polish occupiers, both in Moscow and in other cities and regions of the Moscow state, was expelled by January 1613 - the time of the beginning of the Zemsky Sobor from Moscow to their estates.

Thus, the boyar aristocracy, which was traditionally present and usually actively influenced the decisions of the Zemsky Councils, was sharply weakened at the Zemsky Council of 1613. It can be said that these decisions of princes Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky and Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy became the last blow in the final defeat of the once influential Moscow boyar aristocracy “Polish party” (supporters of Prince Vladislav). It is no coincidence that the first resolution of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was the refusal to consider any foreign candidates for the Moscow throne and the refusal to recognize the rights of the Vorenko (the son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek). The majority of participants in the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 were committed to the speedy election of a Tsar from a natural Russian boyar family. However, there were very few boyar families that were not stained by the turmoil, or were stained comparatively less than others.

In addition to the candidacy of Prince Pozharsky himself, who, as a likely candidate for the throne, due to his lack of nobility, was not taken seriously even by the patriotic part of the Moscow aristocracy (despite the fact that Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky was a hereditary natural Rurikovich, neither he nor his father and grandfather were not only Moscow boyars, but even okolnichy). At the time of the overthrow of the last relatively legitimate tsar, Vasily Shuisky, Prince Pozharsky bore the modest title of steward. Another influential leader of the patriotic movement, Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy, despite his undoubted nobility (he was a descendant of the Gediminovich dynasty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), was greatly discredited by his collaboration with former supporters of the so-called Tushino thief, False Dmitry II, led by Ataman Zarutsky. This past of Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy repelled him not only from the boyar aristocracy, but also from wide circles of the hereditary service nobility. The hereditary nobleman Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy was not perceived by the Moscow aristocracy and many nobles as one of their own. They saw in him an unreliable adventurer, ready for any action, any ingratiation with the mob, just to achieve full power in the Moscow state and seize the royal throne. As for the social lower classes and, in particular, the Cossacks, to whom Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy constantly curried favor, hoping with their help to take the royal throne, the Cossacks quickly became disillusioned with his candidacy, as they saw that he did not have support in wide circles of others estates. This caused an intensive search for other candidates at the Zemsky Sobor in 1613, among whom the figure of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov began to acquire the greatest weight. Mikhail Fedorovich, a sixteen-year-old youth, untainted in the affairs of the Troubles, was the son of the head of the noble boyar family of the Romanovs, in the world Fedor, and in monasticism Filaret, who was in Polish captivity, who became metropolitan in the Tushino camp, but took a consistently patriotic position in the embassy of 1610, subtly and wisely negotiated with the Polish king Sigismund, under Smolensk besieged by the Poles, about the calling of Prince Vladislav to the Moscow throne, but in such a way that this calling did not take place. In fact, Metropolitan Philaret surrounded this calling with such religious and political conditions that made election almost impossible, both for Sigismund and for Prince Vladislav.

This anti-Polish, anti-Vladislav and anti-Sigismund position of Metropolitan Philaret was widely known and highly appreciated in wide circles of various classes of the Moscow state. But due to the fact that Metropolitan Filaret was a clergyman, and, moreover, was in Polish captivity, that is, he was actually cut off from the political life of Moscow Rus', his sixteen-year-old son Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov became a real candidate for the Moscow throne.

The most active supporter of Mikhail Fedorovich's candidacy for the Moscow royal throne was a distant relative of the Zakhariin-Romanov family, Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetyev. It was with his help and support that the idea of ​​electing Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the throne of the Muscovite kingdom took hold of both the members of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 and wide circles of representatives of various classes of the Moscow state.

However, the greatest success of Sheremetyev’s mission, in his struggle for the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the royal throne, was the support of his candidacy by the governor of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, Archimandrite Dionysius.

This authoritative support greatly strengthened Mikhail Fedorovich’s position in public opinion representatives of various classes of the Moscow state and, above all, two of them that most opposed each other: the service nobility and the Cossacks.

It was the Cossacks, under the influence of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, who were the first to actively support Michael’s candidacy for the royal throne. The influence of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra also contributed to the fact that most of the serving nobility, who for a long time greatly fluctuated in their sympathies for possible contenders, ultimately came out on the side of Mikhail Fedorovich.

As for the townspeople - urban artisans and traders, this one was very influential in the liberation movement of 1612-1613. a layer of the urban population, whose representatives actively supported the candidacy of Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky before the convening of the Zemsky Sobor, after he withdrew his candidacy and with the active support of the Orthodox Church of Mikhail Romanov, also began to lean towards his support. Thus, the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, and, in his person, the new royal Romanov dynasty, was the result of the consent of all the main classes of the Moscow state that participated in the liberation movement of 1612 and were represented at the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.

Undoubtedly, the election of the Romanov dynasty in the person of Mikhail Fedorovich was undoubtedly elected to the Moscow Tsarist throne by the Khakharians-Romanov family with the latest representatives of the faded dynasty of the Moscow Rurikovich, the descendants of the founder of the Moscow Principality of the Holy Prince Daniil and his son Ivan Kalita, Daniyalovichi-Kalitichi, who occupied the Moscow Grand Duke, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a. later, the royal throne for almost 300 years.

However, the history of the Time of Troubles shows us that nobility itself, without public support and the real authority of one or another boyar family in church circles of representatives of various secular classes, could not contribute to their victory in the struggle for the throne that was taking place at that time.

The sad fate of Tsar Vasily Shuisky and the entire Shuisky family showed this clearly.

It was the support of the Church and zemstvo forces from various classes of Moscow Rus' that contributed to the victory of Mikhail Fedorovich, who took the royal throne of the Moscow state.

As evidenced by the largest specialist in the history of the Time of Troubles, the outstanding Russian historian, Professor Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, after the representatives of the main estates participating in the Zemsky Council on February 7, 1613, came to an agreement on the candidacy of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov for the royal throne, some of the deputies - members of the Council was sent to various cities of the Moscow state in order to find out opinions about this decision.

The deputies, sent by express mail from Yamsk, reached southern Russian cities, as well as Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl and other cities in two weeks. The cities unanimously supported the election of Mikhail Fedorovich.

After this, a decisive vote was held on February 21, 1613, which became historic, in which, in addition to the deputies who returned from regional lands and cities, for the first time since the beginning of the work of the Zemsky Sobor, the boyars who were removed by Prince Dmitry Pozharsky from his work at the first stage - former supporters of Vladislav - took part and cooperation with Poland, led by the former head of the pro-Polish government of the era of Polish occupation - the Seven Boyars - boyar Fyodor Mstislavsky.

This was done in order to demonstrate the unity of the Moscow state and all its social forces in supporting the new Tsar in the face of the continuing powerful Polish threat.

Thus, the decision to elect Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as Tsar of the Moscow State, which took place on February 21, 1613, became a de facto declaration of independence of Muscovite Rus' from foreign intrigues and those foreign centers (Papal Vatican, Habsburg Vienna, Sigismund Krakow) where these intrigues matured and were nurtured.

But the most important result of the work of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was that this decision was made not by the aristocracy in a narrow boyar circle, but by broad layers of different classes of Russian society in the conditions of a public discussion at the Zemsky Sobor.

L.N.Afonsky

Member of the Presidium of the Central Council of "Autocratic Russia"

As part of the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the Russian Romanov dynasty, an interschool scientific and practical conference was held in the Zaonezh village of Tolvuya on April 18, as reported in the April issue of the Kizhi newspaper. Today we, continuing the series of publications dedicated to anniversary date, we begin to introduce readers to the best materials from the conference participants.

The election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the kingdom, according to the traditional point of view, put an end to the Troubles and gave rise to the Romanov dynasty. People of that time believed (and not without reason) that to have confidence in the future, they needed one sovereign who would be a symbol of power. Therefore, the election of a new king affected everyone.

* * *

The leadership of the Zemsky Militia began preparing for the electoral Zemsky Sobor immediately after the liberation of Moscow. A king had to be elected. The Zemsky Sobor of the correct composition consisted of the Boyar Duma, the Consecrated Cathedral and representatives of the province. Some Russian lands could send only 10-15 people. Moscow was destroyed, and the only building that could accommodate everyone was the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin. The number of people gathered could be from 700 to 1500 people.

At the very beginning of 1613, elected officials from all over the Russian land began to gather in Moscow. This was the first indisputably all-class Zemsky Sobor with the participation of townspeople and even rural inhabitants.

Representatives of the clergy, boyars (in an extremely weakened composition), nobility, merchants, urban townspeople and state peasants sat at the cathedral. But the strongest group was the Cossacks. It as a class especially strengthened during the Time of Troubles, when its composition was significantly replenished with representatives of urban Cossacks. These included those townspeople who, during the Time of Troubles, abandoned their main occupations, formed militias, organized themselves in the manner of Cossack detachments, and never returned to their previous profession.

The Zemsky Sobor began its work on January 6, 1613, on Epiphany. The first three days were devoted to fasting and prayer. On the fourth day, the decision to elect foreign representatives to the Russian throne - the Polish and Swedish princes - was annulled, and the candidacy of the son of Marina Mnishek and False Dmitry II was also rejected. Following this, a list of eight Moscow boyars was announced, from whom the tsar was to be elected.

The leaders of the Zemsky militia, apparently, had no doubt that former members of the Seven Boyars - both those who served foreigners (Prince Fyodor Mstislavsky, Ivan Romanov) and those who refused to cooperate with them (Prince Ivan Vorotynsky, Fyodor Sheremetyev) - would be rejected by members of the Zemsky Sobor, and We were not mistaken in our calculations. They were likely confident that the militia candidates would gain significant advantages in the current situation. In order not to disperse forces, it was decided to organize a rally in support of the main candidate from the militias - Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy.

But none of the candidates proposed by the council received the required majority of votes, and the plan for the tsar’s election, thought out, it seemed, to the smallest detail, failed. Immediately at the cathedral, new contenders for the throne began to appear and be rejected: Mikhail Romanov, Prince Dmitry Cherkassky, Prince Ivan Golitsyn, Prince Ivan Shuisky-Pugovka.

The progress of the cathedral was clearly beyond the control of its organizers. According to established practice, under these conditions, the decision on the issue of tsar's election inevitably had to be taken to the streets of Moscow, where the influence of the Cossack circle was strong. The winners - the Cossack-noble militia - could not agree for a long time: all candidates were rejected. The nobles did not want to see Dmitry Trubetskoy on the throne, because, although he was a prince, he commanded the Cossacks. The Cossacks did not want to have Prince Dmitry Pozharsky as their sovereign: after all, he was the leader of the noble militia. But there was another candidate - a quiet and completely colorless man, sixteen-year-old Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov.

* * *

Evidence has been preserved of the decisive influence of the Cossacks on the verdict of the Zemsky Sobor. On April 13, 1613, Swedish spies reported from Moscow that the Cossacks elected M. F. Romanov against the will of the boyars, forcing Trubetskoy and Pozharsky to agree to this candidacy after the siege of their yards. Jacques Margeret in 1613 in a letter to the English king James I, urging him to intervene, wrote that the Cossacks had chosen “this child” to manipulate him, and that most of Russian society would gladly welcome the English army, since they lived in constant fear of the Cossacks. The slave of the Novgorod nobleman F. Bobarykin, who fled to Novgorod from Moscow in June 1613, argued that the tsar was chosen by “Moscow ordinary people and Cossacks” without general consent. Finally, the so-called “Chronograph” of Obolensky from the second half of the 17th century. mentions that the “glorious ataman of the Don” spoke in favor of the election of Mikhail Romanov at the council.

Of course, the Cossacks were not the only supporters of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov. He was supported by an influential boyar group and a certain part of the nobility. Data from the “Report on Patrimonies and Estates of 1613,” which records land grants made immediately after the election of the Tsar, make it possible to identify the most active members of the Romanov circle. In the first weeks of his reign, Mikhail Fedorovich granted estates in Vologda, Galich and Beloozero to a vast “group of comrades”: the Sheremetevs, Golovins, Saltykovs, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, Prince Golitsyn, Prince Troekurov, Prince Pronsky, Prince Khilkov, Prince Egupov-Cherkassky, Prince Lev ova -Saltykov, Prince Mezetsky, Tatishchev, Trakhaniotov, Pleshcheev, Volynsky, Nagikh, princes Repnin, Sumin, Tyumen, Zvenigorod, Shcherbatov, Dmitriev, Selunsky, Shekhovsky, Begichev.

It is noteworthy that among those granted there is no uncle of the tsar, boyar Ivan Nikitich Romanov, who was one of the main assistants to the head of the “seven boyars”, Prince Mstislavsky, since in the initial period of the cathedral, together with other seven-numbered boyars, he was on pilgrimage.

So, by February 25, elections were held and Mikhail Romanov was proclaimed Tsar of Russia. At the place of execution, the Cossack army swore allegiance to the new king. The legality of the vote itself was never questioned. It is interesting that V.O. Klyuchevsky later very accurately remarked about the elections: “They wanted to choose not the most capable, but the most convenient.”

Letters were sent to all parts of the country announcing the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar.

* * *

A special embassy was sent to Mikhail Romanov: ambassadors from the Zemsky Sobor, headed by Archbishop Theodoret of Ryazan, cellarer of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery Abraham Palitsyn and boyar Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev.

Actually, Romanov still had to be found, since the Council did not have exact information about his place of stay, so the embassy was ordered to go to “Yaroslavl or where he, the sovereign, will be.”

Mikhail and his mother were first in the family estate near Kostroma, where, according to legend, his miraculous rescue from the Poles took place through the efforts of Ivan Susanin, and then in the Ipatiev Monastery.

The embassy reached Kostroma by the evening of March 13. The next day, at the head of the religious procession, it went to ask Michael to accept the kingdom. In reality, it was not him who had to ask, but his mother, nun Martha, who then for several years (before Filaret returned from Poland) made decisions for her son. A report from the embassy to Moscow has been preserved about how they convinced Michael to accept the kingdom and with what doubts he made this decision.

On March 14, 1613, Russia had a legally elected tsar. Subsequent events showed that the choice was not the worst. And it’s even good that for many years Michael was only a nominal ruler, and real power was in the hands of people with extensive life experience - first his mother, and then his father, Patriarch Philaret, who, upon his return from captivity, was officially proclaimed co-ruler of the king.

The gradual overcoming of the consequences of the Time of Troubles, the marriage of Mikhail and the birth of the heir to the throne created the belief in the country that the new dynasty was here to stay. And so it happened: the Romanov dynasty reigned for more than 300 years.

* * *

The elections of the sovereign took place, and this was the beginning of the calming of the country. Mikhail Romanov had strong rivals, events unfolded unpredictably, and his chances of becoming king were slim. However, the very election of Michael to the kingdom can hardly be considered an accident. His candidacy was announced by the boyars, then the Cossacks came out for him, the clergy also supported him - thus, we can talk about the popular election of Mikhail Romanov to the Russian throne.

What did the rest of the Zemsky Sobor participants receive?

The nobility took care of the safety of the estates received during the Time of Troubles, and the final approval of the hereditary nature of their possessions.

The Cossacks agreed to the following conditions: the top of the Don Cossacks received the nobility and the right to autonomous control of their circle and an elected ataman (he had to exercise military and civil power in this territory), and the police received money. Amnesty was given to those who swore allegiance to the king. Some of the Don Cossacks who took part in the liberation movement went home after Mikhail’s elections, others remained in Moscow. They formed the basis of the government's armed forces. In addition to the Don Cossacks, there were detachments of service Cossacks, who during the Time of Troubles were very imbued with the independent spirit of the Donetsk people. The Cossacks had their own military organization, and they did not consider themselves integral part regular army. Separate groups of them, scattered throughout the country, did not want to obey the orders of even their own senior officers. When supplies were depleted, they robbed the population, which was very similar to robbery.

But now Romanov himself had to agree to one more condition: to share power with the Zemsky Sobor. Now the Zemsky Sobor became a permanent institution, meeting almost without interruption throughout the reign of Mikhail Romanov. All important decisions were developed with the participation of the Council and signed as follows: “by royal decree and by zemstvo verdict.” The Council became the highest body of legislative power, without which the tsar could not pass a single law or make changes to legislation.

The council shared executive power with the tsar. The reason for this is that after the Time of Troubles it was impossible to immediately restore order and law without relying on the structures that were developed during the Time of Troubles.

Thus, the power of the new government was forced to be based not on force, but on popular support, primarily to restore order in the country.

* * *

The Boyar Duma remained part of the Zemsky Sobor, the highest body of the government and central administration, but at the same time some changes occurred in the composition of the Boyar Duma:

• the boyar party was discredited, its representatives were removed from the Boyar Duma;
• Minin, Pozharsky, Cherkassky took the first roles in the Boyar Duma, and most positions were occupied by okolnichi and duma nobles.

The first composition of the new Duma included: 2 boyars, 5 okolnichy, 7 Duma nobles, 4 Duma clerks, and the most influential person in it was the Duma nobleman Minin. The range of issues considered by the Duma as a matter of priority was determined: issues of eliminating the remnants of the uncontrolled Cossacks; destruction of Zarutsky and Mnishek; restoration of the national economy.

To resolve the first two issues, it was necessary to establish contact with the Cossacks. At this time, the Cossacks formed the basis of the government armed forces, in contrast to the nobility, whose position was undermined during the Time of Troubles. The Cossacks had their own military organization, they were not considered an integral part of the regular army, they were not subordinate to anyone, and separate groups, who were scattered throughout the country, knew only one thing - robbery.

As a result, the Zemsky Sobor brought charges of treason against them. Local city authorities played a special role in eliminating the uncontrolled Cossacks. They obeyed the verdict of the Zemsky Sobor, and the bandits were caught and executed. I. Zarutsky, M. Mnishek and her three-year-old son “little raven Ivashka” were executed.

This is how the armed opposition to the new regime was eliminated.

Upon ascending the throne, the new king did not enter into any agreement with his subjects. This meant that the tsarist power again became unlimited and autocratic, as under the Rurikovichs. But after the storms of the Time of Troubles, the country needed a strong individual power for calm to come.

Thus began three hundred years of service of the Romanov dynasty for the benefit of Russia.

When preparing the material, the following literature was used: “The Romanovs. 300 years of service to Russia,” M.: Bely Gorod publishing house, comp. Astakhov A.Yu.; I. Tyumentsev “Misha is young in mind, he hasn’t realized it…”, Rodina Magazine, No. 11, 2006; Klyuchevsky V.O. "Works", M., 1990

Maxim KASHEVAROV, 7th grade. Tolvui Secondary School