Time of Troubles. Three Time of Troubles in Russia Time of Troubles in the Russian Federation

Start Time of Troubles in Russia brought about a dynastic crisis. In 1598, the Rurik dynasty was interrupted - the childless son of Ivan the Terrible, the feeble-minded Fyodor Ioannovich, died. Earlier, in 1591, under unclear circumstances, Grozny’s youngest son, Dmitry, died in Uglich. Boris Godunov became the de facto ruler of the state.

In 1601-1603, Russia suffered three consecutive lean years. The country's economy was affected by the consequences of the oprichnina, which led to the devastation of the lands. After a catastrophic defeat in the protracted Livonian War, the country found itself on the verge of collapse.

Boris Godunov, having come to power, was unable to overcome public unrest.

All of the above factors became the causes of the Time of Troubles in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century.

At this tense moment, impostors appear. False Dmitry I tried to pass himself off as the “resurrected” Tsarevich Dmitry. He relied on the support of the Poles, who dreamed of returning to their borders the Smolensk and Seversk lands, conquered from them by Ivan the Terrible.

In April 1605, Godunov died, and his 16-year-old son Fyodor Borisovich, who replaced him, was unable to retain power. The impostor Dmitry entered Moscow with his retinue and was crowned king in the Assumption Cathedral. False Dmitry agreed to give the western lands of Russia to the Poles. After marrying the Catholic Marina Mniszech, he proclaimed her queen. In May 1606, the new ruler was killed as a result of a conspiracy by the boyars led by Vasily Shuisky.

Vasily Shuisky took the royal throne, but he also could not cope with the seething country. Bloody unrest resulted in a people's war led by Ivan Bolotnikov in 1606-1607. A new impostor, False Dmitry II, has appeared. Marina Mnishek agreed to become his wife.

Polish-Lithuanian detachments set off with False Dmitry II on a campaign against Moscow. They stood up in the village of Tushino, after which the impostor received the nickname “Tushino Thief.” Using discontent against Shuisky, False Dmitry in the summer and autumn of 1608 established control over significant territories east, north and west of Moscow. Thus, a significant part of the country fell under the rule of the impostor and his Polish-Lithuanian allies. Dual power was established in the country. In fact, in Russia there were two kings, two Boyar Dumas, two systems of orders.

A Polish army of 20,000 under the command of Prince Sapieha laid siege to the walls of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery for a long 16 months. The Poles also entered Rostov Veliky, Vologda, and Yaroslavl. Tsar Vasily Shuisky called on the Swedes to help in the fight against the Poles. In July 1609, Prince Sapieha was defeated. The outcome of the battle was decided by joining the Russian-Swedish militia units. The “Tushino thief” False Dmitry II fled to Kaluga, where he was killed.

The treaty between Russia and Sweden gave the Polish king, who was at war with Sweden, a reason to declare war on Russia. A Polish army led by Hetman Zholkiewski approached Moscow and defeated Shuiski's troops. The king finally lost the trust of his subjects and was overthrown from the throne in July 1610.

Fearing the expansion of newly flared peasant unrest, the Moscow boyars invited the son of the Polish king Sigismund III, Vladislav, to the throne, and surrendered Moscow to Polish troops. It seemed that Russia had ceased to exist as a country.

However, the “great devastation” of the Russian land caused a widespread upsurge of the patriotic movement in the country. In the winter of 1611, the first people's militia was created in Ryazan, headed by the Duma nobleman Prokopiy Lyapunov. In March, the militia approached Moscow and began a siege of the capital. But the attempt to take Moscow ended in failure.

And yet a force was found that saved the country from foreign enslavement. The entire Russian people rose up in armed struggle against the Polish-Swedish intervention. This time, the center of the movement was Nizhny Novgorod, led by its zemstvo elder Kuzma Minin. Prince Dmitry Pozharsky was invited to become the head of the militia. Detachments were approaching Nizhny Novgorod from all sides, and the militia was quickly increasing its ranks. In March 1612 it moved from Nizhny Novgorod to. Along the way, new units joined the militia. In Yaroslavl they created the “Council of the Whole Earth” - a government made up of representatives of the clergy and the Boyar Duma, nobles and townspeople.

After four months in Yaroslavl, the militia of Minin and Pozharsky, which by that time had become a formidable force, set out to liberate the capital. In August 1612 it reached Moscow, and on November 4 the Polish garrison capitulated. Moscow was liberated. The troubles are over.

After the liberation of Moscow, letters were sent across the country convening a Zemsky Sobor to elect a new tsar. The cathedral opened at the beginning of 1613. It was the most representative cathedral in the history of medieval Russia, the first all-class cathedral in Russia. Even representatives of the townspeople and some peasants were present at the Zemsky Sobor.

The council elected 16-year-old Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as tsar. Young Mikhail received the throne from the hands of representatives of almost all classes of Russia.

It was taken into account that he was a relative of Ivan the Terrible, which created the appearance of a continuation of the previous dynasty of Russian princes and tsars. The fact that Mikhail was the son of an influential political and church figure, Patriarch Filaret, was also taken into account.

From this time on, the reign of the Romanov dynasty began in Russia, which lasted a little over three hundred years - until February 1917.

Consequences of the Time of Troubles

The Time of Troubles led to deep economic decline. The events of this period led to the devastation and impoverishment of the country. In many districts of the historical center of the state, the size of arable land decreased by 20 times, and the number of peasants by 4 times.

The consequence of the turmoil was that Russia lost part of its lands.

Smolensk was lost for many decades; Western and significant parts of eastern Karelia were captured by the Swedes. Almost the entire Orthodox population, both Russians and Karelians, left these territories, unable to accept national and religious oppression. The Swedes left Novgorod only in 1617; only a few hundred residents remained in the completely devastated city. Rus' has lost access to the Gulf of Finland.

As a result of the events of the Time of Troubles, the greatly weakened Russian state found itself surrounded by strong enemies in the person of Poland and Sweden, and the Crimean Tatars became more active.

• The Time of Troubles began with a dynastic crisis. On January 6, 1598, Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich died, the last ruler from the family of Ivan Kalita who did not leave an heir. In the 10th – 14th centuries in Rus', such a dynastic crisis would have been resolved simply. The most noble prince Rurikovich, a vassal of the Moscow prince, would ascend the throne. Spain, France and other Western European countries would do the same. However, the princes Rurikovich and Gediminovich in the Moscow state for more than a hundred years ceased to be vassals and associates of the Grand Duke of Moscow, but became his slaves. Ivan III killed the famous Rurik princes in prisons without trial or investigation, even his loyal allies, to whom he owed not only the throne, but also his life. And his son, Prince Vasily, could already publicly allow himself to call the princes smerds and beat them with a whip. Ivan the Terrible staged a grandiose beating of the Russian aristocracy. The grandchildren and great-grandsons of the appanage princes, who were in favor under Vasily III and Ivan the Terrible, derogatorily distorted their names when signing letters. Fedor signed Fedka Dmitry - Dmitryashka or Mitka, Vasily - Vasko, etc. As a result, in 1598, these aristocrats in the eyes of all classes were serfs, albeit high-ranking and rich. This brought Boris Godunov, a completely illegitimate ruler, to power.

• False Dmitry I became in the past millennium the most successful and most famous impostor in the world and the first impostor in Russia.

• Medicine irrefutably proves that he was not the miraculously saved Tsarevich Dmitry. The prince suffered from epilepsy, and epilepsy never goes away on its own and cannot be treated even with modern means. But False Dmitry I never suffered from epileptic seizures, and he did not have the intelligence to imitate them. According to most historians, it was the fugitive monk Grigory Otrepiev.

• During his stay in Poland and the northern cities of Russia, False Dmitry never mentioned his mother Maria Nagaya, imprisoned in the Goritsky Resurrection Convent under the name of nun Martha. Having seized power in Moscow, he was forced, with the help of his “mother,” to prove that he was the miraculously saved Tsarevich Dmitry. Otrepiev knew about nun Marfa’s hatred of the Godunovs and therefore counted on her recognition. Suitably prepared, the queen rode out to meet her “son.” The meeting took place near the village of Taininskoye, 10 versts from Moscow. It was very well choreographed and took place on a field where several thousand people gathered. On the main road (Yaroslavskoye Highway), shedding tears, “mother” and “son” rushed into each other’s arms.

• The recognition and blessing of the impostor by Queen Mary (nun Martha) produced a huge propaganda effect. After the coronation, Otrepiev wanted to organize another such show - to solemnly destroy the grave of Tsarevich Dimitri in Uglich. The situation was comical - in Moscow, the son of Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Dimitri Ivanovich, reigns, and in Uglich, in the Transfiguration Cathedral, three hundred miles from Moscow, crowds of townspeople pray over the grave of the same Dimitri Ivanovich. It was quite logical to rebury the corpse of the boy lying in the Transfiguration Cathedral in some seedy cemetery corresponding to the status of the priest’s son, who was allegedly stabbed to death in Uglich. However, this idea was resolutely opposed by the same Martha, because we were talking about the grave of the real Dmitry, her only son.

• The militia of Minin and Pozharsky is unique in that it is the only example in Russian history when the fate of the country and state was decided by the people themselves, without the participation of the authorities as such. She then found herself completely bankrupt.

• The people donated their last pennies to armament and went to liberate the land and restore order in the capital. They didn’t go to fight for the Tsar - he was not there. The Ruriks are over, the Romanovs have not yet begun. All classes then united, all nationalities, villages, cities and metropolises.

• In September 2004, the Interregional Council of Russia took the initiative to celebrate November 4 at the state level as the day of the end of the Time of Troubles. The new “red day of the calendar” was not immediately and unambiguously accepted by Russian society.

The perception of current political reality as a historical phenomenon makes it possible not only to draw parallels with the past, but also allows us to discover stable, rhythmically repeating patterns of development of Russian life. A careful study of these models, compared with modernity, contributes to a more adequate perception of political reality. "To see your time, said José Ortega y Gasset, you have to look from a distance".

First of all, this method of analysis has prognostic significance. However, in addition to the possibilities of specific forecasts, the creation of models of political history also has independent significance as a form of identifying the cultural and historical phenomenon inherent in the national history: the productive reflex of the nation. This article is devoted to the topic of overcoming by Russia as a civilization the crises of its own national-state tradition through special shock states - the Time of Troubles. The model of the “Time of Troubles” seems to the author to be more accurate and heuristically valuable than the model of the “revolution”. The transition from the concept of “revolution” to the concepts of “mutation” or “troubled times” allows, in my opinion, to more adequately describe both historical and cultural processes that have already occurred, those currently occurring and those expected in the future.

The historiosophical situation of the 20th century is unique. In Russian social thought over this century, a wealth of experience has been accumulated related to the experience of the tragic clash in Russia between the forces of modernity and traditionalism. However, there was not only a collision, but also an interweaving, and although modernity won a decisive victory, at the same time, its large-scale project (in the form of the USSR), firstly, could not gain a foothold in Russia, and secondly, led to a revision of many essential a feature of the modern paradigm itself, led to a peculiar Russian “fusion” of modernity with tradition.

The practice of constructing historical models involves their heavy abstract-philosophical load and is partly of a playful nature. However, this is not the kind of play that is generated by the postmodern form of consciousness. This interpretation of history gravitates towards folklore consciousness, namely: towards the “epic” perception of the relationship between the personal and the elemental. Folklore consciousness is opposite to modernism in both terminological distinctions of the latter: both in the literary and artistic, stylistic, and in the ideological (modernity as the main direction of thought in the European culture of the New Age). Traditionalism as a spontaneous attitude of the people's consciousness does not exclude a private rejection of tradition, but adds the outstanding, the exceptional to its cultural baggage. For the creators of folklore, a historical milestone or a more deeply individualized personality, more “exfoliated” from the usual course of things, does not contradict the unified historical spirit, but, on the contrary, introduces specific elements into the general model and complements its meaning to true universality. This is how the course of events is perceived in Russian epics, where the personal and spontaneous principles are combined. The characters of folklore are not historical in the strict sense; they are characters in a large panoramic picture of reality, a kind of folk historiosophy. Bogatyrs, wandering Kaliki, the Prince of Kiev, robbers, tavern gols, fairy-tale animals, as well as representatives of “alien worlds” (overseas kings, monsters and snakes, filthy idols, sorcerers, etc.) are personifications of certain historical principles, behind each of which there is not just one historical person, but a whole set of persons from different eras and situations, entire trends in historical life.

In traditional culture, time and history are interpreted in a special way: thus, in folklore, time is closed, fixed to a certain historical state (to an ideal model), shifted “to the right” when compared with literature and historical science. This is explained by the fact that tradition does not so much look for the cause-and-effect source and context of an event, but rather provides a model, a prism for any event as “happening”, as a “variant” of historical diversity. The assimilation of history by the tradition is carried out according to its own laws, more fundamental than in history as a science: the meaning of a historical case is “absorbed” by a higher state, illuminated through the metaphysical dimension. Folklore works represented an ancient form of modeling and forecasting, allowing bearers of traditional consciousness to give clear and correct assessments of current events based on their location not in the current political series, but in the larger semantic space of a living national myth, in a “picture of the world” that ignores particulars and chaos current reality, however, maintaining constant criteria for assessing good and evil, benefit and harm from the point of view of national and cultural identity.

The author is far from seeing in it the same political content throughout many centuries of history or, on the contrary, treating historiosophical models solely as manifestations of naked rhythmic repetitions. Enriched with specific facts, the well-known term “Time of Troubles”, brilliantly formulated at the beginning of the 17th century, was until recently considered as a subject for journalistic parallels. What are the criteria for defining different eras as versions of a single model of “turmoil”?

Skeptics-Westerners apply the concept of “turmoil” throughout almost the entire space of Russian history. Therefore, elements of this phenomenon and opportunities for parallels are sought by almost everyone in relation to the characteristics of their time or the era of the past under consideration. The tearing of the model into elements and components is caused by a misunderstanding (mixed with rejection) of the systemic, holistic nature of the model itself. These analytical hobbies are associated with some disorientation in a series of troubled and calm eras. In fact, Russian history not only does not represent one big and endless “trouble,” but it is also not at all replete with large (simulated) “times of trouble.” The Time of Troubles in Russia is always an exceptional phenomenon (albeit a recurring one) and does not last long in comparison with the “untroubled” times: its active course in the open phase usually does not exceed 15 years. Throughout its history, Russia has experienced no more than three similar periods.

It can be stated in advance that “turmoil” is always a period with a particularly high degree of unpredictability in the resolution of a historical crisis. The very name, generated by folk authors, suggests that at the moment of political breakdown, decisiveness, resolution and clarity of outlines are hidden under extremely vague veils, confusing and blurred guises of events and their participants. Therefore, within the Time of Troubles, it is not at all easy for a historian to find grounds for an acceptable classification and periodization, and it is not easy to restore cause-and-effect relationships. Time of Troubles can “confuse” (irrationalize) the thought of both a contemporary and a historian. It always changes the face of History itself, rapidly demythologizing and then remythologizing it.

The triad of “troubled times” in Russia opens with the plurality of power of the beginning of the 17th century (and not earlier; why is a very serious question and not included in the tasks of this work), continues with the “revolutions” of the first decades of the 20th century and closes with modern events. Let us now consider the model of “turmoil” in the variety of its stages and historical manifestations.

Stage one: rejection of tradition (1598–1605, 1905–1912, 1985–1991)

As already mentioned, the periodization of the phenomenon of the Time of Troubles is quite conventional. We are dealing with a fast-moving kaleidoscopic carnival of events, a chain of “revolutionary situations” that are not always realized, rebellions, accidental alliances and false recognitions. Therefore, the three cases of “turmoil” are heterogeneous in their structure, variable in form, determined by the spirit of the time, the specificity of historical circumstances and the nodes of tradition.

Actually, knots of tradition(sometimes Gordian) - untied, cut, tied in a new way - the key metaphor of the proposed model. Thus, the first large stage of the “Troubles” is associated with the rejection of the tradition of political legitimation and occurs in its first 6–7 years. Within this stage, of course, it is possible to distinguish even smaller ones, but this will either be excessive narrative detail, or raising kaleidoscopic reality to a conceptual level.

The rejection of the legitimizing tradition, the bearers of which are always the “tops”, and the absolute “tops” of power, in the conditions of the beginning Time of Troubles, very soon makes the authorities slave delegitimation, which she myopically cherished. However, each time the rejection of tradition turns out to be not only natural, but also prepared by the previous decades.

The events of the beginning of the first “Troubles” (late 16th century) are unique. Then the focus of the process of destruction of old and formation of new key political traditions became the problem of continuity of monarchical succession to the throne. The first Russian “turmoil”, so closely connected with the suppression of the Rurik dynasty, with the mechanism of legitimation destroyed in this way, indicates its only real weight for the then political tradition. It is possible that the new Tsar Boris Godunov, who replaced the old dynasty, was for this very reason persistently considered involved in the murder of the “prince,” the only heir of the Rurikovichs. This hostility towards Godunov (“as if the great king was not worthy of the gift, the seal of heavenly glory”), and the outwardly prosperous beginning of his forced reign is irrational in origin.

Actually, Godunov was a ruler (and a successful ruler) even under Tsar Theodore Ioannovich, an autocrat, as is commonly believed, pious, but incapable of state work. Tradition sanctified the role of Godunov the ruler, but she rejected Godunov the ruler. king(“slave king”, according to Ivan Timofeev’s formulation) despite his formal “chosenness”. Godunov, who was very upset by the actual delegitimation of his power, tried to appease all classes and clans, and was distinguished by his liberalism and love of foreigners.

The crisis of political tradition began almost in the “cleverest head” (as the holy fool Ivashka the Big Kolpak called Boris in the late 80s), when she was still sitting on the shoulders of the ruler of Rus'. For the vain Boris, who, as the king’s brother-in-law, had learned the visible underbelly of palace life, the difference between the concepts of “king by the grace of God” and “good ruler” seemed minimal.

In his mind, it was Godunov who became the first “impostor.” And the phenomenon of “imposture” is equal to the phenomenon of the very first “turmoil”. “The “slave king” (= an impostor, isn’t it?),” indeed, could have been involved in the murder of the prince, whose “holy place” had been empty all the years of “troubles” and, by its very emptiness, produced this “troubles.” The suppression of a dynasty in this case ceases to be an unfortunate accident for historians, but becomes a consequence of a rejection of tradition, carried out not by the monarch himself, but for him.

This is the reason for the uniqueness, and at the same time the basis for the kind of “involuntariness” of the emergence of the first “turmoil.” The other two were born out of a more specific rejection of the existing political tradition. The Manifesto of October 17, 1905 was a continuation of trends that had prevailed under Alexander II. In the same way, Nikita Khrushchev should be recognized as the forerunner of Gorbachev’s innovations. (True, in the case of Godunov, we can talk about the preparedness of a number of elements of “imposture”, “turmoil” and the concept of a tsar-ruler, secular in its tendency, during a certain period of the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible.)

These three persons - Godunov, Sovereign Nicholas II of the first decade of the 20th century and Gorbachev - despite all their dissimilarities, sought to combine both traditions: rejected and barely emerging, they tried (as far as possible) not to notice their incompatibility. At the same time, Nicholas II and Gorbachev not only sought to combine contradictory traditions, they fully personified this contradiction. During the period of “rejection of tradition” of 1905–1912, Tsar Nicholas did a lot to delegitimize the autocracy. His consistent policy of organizing a strong legislative sphere of power can only be considered as preparing society for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. On the left, the tsar’s political position borders on the Duma platform of the Cadets (“His Majesty’s opposition”), on the camp of N. Milyukov, while its internal balance is ensured by the political course of the Stolypin government. This “right” component of the position of Nicholas II during the period of “rejection of tradition” manifested itself in tough politics during the events of 1905–1907, during the dissolution of the first two Dumas, and during the “gloomy” reaction of the end of 1908–1912. And only after the murder of Pyotr Stolypin did the tsarist government decisively reject the constitutional idea. We can say that at the first stage of the Troubles, the Tsar outlived a certain political and ideological illusion in himself and those close to him.

Similarly, during the period 1985–1991, Gorbachev delegitimized the power prerogatives of the CPSU, but at the same time managed to remain secretary general until the very end - almost until the time when he ceased to be president. The situation of the “perestroika” stage of the third “Troubles” is complicated by the duality of the geopolitical plan: everyone knows that the complexity of the territorial structure of the USSR and the contradictions between the union republics did a disservice to the supreme power. Apparently, the instigator of the “Troubles” Andrei Sakharov was the first to point out to Yeltsin the advantage of the “Russian” card. Gorbachev, unlike Godunov and Nicholas II, fought not just against the centrifugal forces of the state, but also against the lack of a strong “federal basis” of the empire.

If it were not for this specificity of the latest “turmoil,” it could have continued for a long time under the sign of Gorbachev. After all, Nicholas II remained on the throne until 1917, supporting “drastic measures of reaction.” Then the provincial territorial system of the Russian Empire itself played into the hands of the old order for a long time. In fact, in this version of the Time of Troubles, the putsch of 1991 was not needed - the tsar balanced the situation by suppressing some political impulses and channeling others (in particular, within the framework of the Fourth Duma). At the same time, the result of restraining the development of events in 1908–1913 was their unusually rapid development in 1917, which contained many moments of the Time of Troubles, which in other versions appear somewhat earlier.

Gorbachev failed to retain the energy of “democracy” within the framework of those institutions that were under his control and inextricably linked with his presidency. And these institutions under his control, as a result of his double game, slipped out of his hands: Lukyanov’s Supreme Council almost managed to identify with the State Emergency Committee during the August putsch. In the first “turmoil,” Godunov also did not have time to create significant guarantors of the flow of his personal power into legitimate autocratic and hereditary power. The sudden death of Godunov in 1605, due to the approach of the troops of False Dmitry I, resolved the outcome of the first stage of the “Troubles” in its own way. Based on his personal power and authority, Boris would certainly have been able to repel the impostor, but the heir to the throne, Theodore Godunov, no longer had such support. His father’s closest associates betrayed him; despite the oath, neither the troops nor the Moscow middle classes supported him. The old principles of dynastic inheritance were destroyed, the new ones did not come into force enough to withstand the tests of the crisis.

The completion of the first stage of unrest (1605, 1912, 1991) is always marked by a powerful reaction to abandon tradition, this is a moment of high intensity of passions. Reactionaries act as representatives of a trampled tradition, discredited sacred authorities. However, the triumph of reaction, even in the best case, can only be measured in years. “The lawless kingdom” of False Dmitry I (mistaken for Tsarevich Dimitri Ioannovich), “autocratic obscurantism” and “Black Hundred frenzy” (standing for Russia of Sovereign Nicholas II), “putschists who had lost all shame and conscience” (as it soon became clear, the last defenders of the USSR) – under such names this reaction remains in the political discourse after the Time of Troubles. At the first stage of unrest, their characteristic feature clearly appears: the inability of the authorities to see the real causes of political disharmony, the suicidal sawing of the supporting structures of statehood.

Stage two: schizogony of power (1606–1611, 1912–1918, 1991–1997)

The transition from one stage of “turmoil” to another is a point of particularly high alternativeness to an event, when the “subjective factor” of history gives rise to the most incredible political combinations. The death of Godunov made Moscow a hostage of False Dmitry I and the Cossack-Polish troops that came with him for almost a whole year. The events of the August 1991 coup also developed illogically - the inconsistency of actions and the incompetence of the conspirators struck the whole country. Despite the entry of troops into the capital, the putsch was imprinted in the popular consciousness as the phenomenon of a “ridiculous monster.” From the point of view of the carnival aspect of history, the State Emergency Committee and False Dmitry I can be put on the same level. However, many other aspects force comparison with the impostor not only of those who failed, but also of the forces that won in August 1991. At this time, the President of the USSR, who played the role of a figurehead, a fictitious mask of power that deceived the reactionaries, carried a lot of carnivalism in his appearance.

The Godunov-False Dmitry opposition corresponds in its own way not only to the Gorbachev-GKChP opposition, but also to the Gorbachev-Yeltsin opposition. Anyone can choose what they like, especially since there are the most contradictory interpretations of the August events. Like the populist Yeltsin, False Dmitry I relied on popular consciousness and combined an appeal to trampled tradition with radical innovation (religious indifferentism, abstract nationalism, plans to create a “senate”, introduce freedom of movement, calling himself an “emperor”). In 1604–1605, people read the impostor’s anonymous pages and even after his fleeting collapse still called him “our bright Sun” (here is the trampled principle of legitimation!).

In False Dmitry there is something from both the State Emergency Committee and Yeltsin. But Yeltsin managed to defeat his opponents and took control of the situation, so the parallel with Vasily Shuisky, the tsar “chosen by the shouts” and the main organizer of the reprisal against the impostor, is more easily assigned to him. In the context of the “Troubles”, Godunov, Shuisky, and Otrepyev are involved to one degree or another in the phenomenon of “imposture.” This cannot be said about Nicholas II, an invariably legitimate guardian-reformer (he combines and simultaneously cancels the internal capabilities of Godunov, Shuisky, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin).

At the second stage of the eras under consideration, new oppositions arise, as if “self-regenerating turmoil.” Shuisky - False Dmitry II (Tushinsky thief) and Yeltsin - White House (Rutsky-Khasbulatov's forces). It is characteristic that Shuisky at one time supported the defrocking of Otrepyev against Feodor Godunov at Lobnoye Mesto. It is no coincidence that Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Rutskoi are the three main “victors” over the putschists, they are also the three highest officials of the Russian government, the personal centers of its legitimacy.

At this stage, any certainty of power continuity is lost, and the fluid relevance of the political sign is observed. The level of legitimacy of the warring camps at a certain point objectively coincides, and a regime of more or less stable parallel coexistence of authorities arises, a period of mutual offensive manifestations, sieges, blockades, smoking out and expulsions. Smaller groups sprout from a group of former comrades and, having defeated a new common enemy, again organize to fight among themselves. The second stage of the “turmoil” reveals its key phenomenon - the schizogony of power, reaching the complete erosion of legitimacy, when both the lower classes and the respectable classes do not know who to recognize as fully competent. Schizogonizing power splits the entire society. And if for the time being Tsar Nicholas II bound this group dispersion of the public within the framework of the State Duma and covered it with his royal mantle, then starting from February 1917, the Time of Troubles made up for lost time and formalized political life in the form of a bipolar opposition - the so-called dual power.

In 1917, Soviets were created as an alternative to the “Duma” government; in 1993, the very principle of separation of powers helped; there was no need to create new political forms. As a result, the old forms were abolished - October 1993 put an end to those same Soviets. The longest was the open confrontation of the “authorities” in the 17th century - Moscow and Tushino for 3 years were the “two capitals” of Rus', while gangs of their own and foreign thugs scurried around its expanses. The Poles, Cossacks, a significant part of the boyars and the mob found themselves in these circumstances and, probably, could have maintained the existing state of affairs for a long time, if not for the exhaustion of the strength of the distressed people.

In the midst of “turmoil,” the popular consciousness picks up any critical information about the government and inflates it into a myth. This mythology took on especially sharp forms in Russia, burdened by the World War of 1915–1917. Disrespect for the Tsar and bad rumors about Grigory Rasputin also echo the mythopoetic ideas of the first “Troubles.” Shuisky and Otrepiev were said to have a passion for witchcraft and astrology (“stargazing”). The symbol of the witchcraft obsession with Rus' was the “queen” Marinka (nee Mnishek), who cohabited with both False Dmitrys, and in the intervals between them and after them with the “slaves”.

The schizogony of power was not stopped either by Shuisky, who managed to defeat the Tushins, or by Yeltsin, who stormed the House of Soviets and largely subordinated the legislative branch of power. But False Dmitry II again approached Moscow, and Shuisky was overthrown from the throne; In the elections of December 1993 and 1995, Yeltsin was forced to accept the defeat of radical democracy, his ideological support. The composition of the V and VI Dumas turned out to be no more favorable than the composition of the congress; the October “rebels” and August “putschists” were soon amnestied by parliament and took prominent places in the Duma.

Many people perceived the “occupation” of Chechnya by government troops, which began at the end of 1994, as a huge mafia showdown. But the “Dudaev” problem is largely connected with the “Khasbulatov” one, and the “Chechen war” itself represents a moment of highest tension and a military hotbed self-eating schizogonizing Russian authorities. Schizogony is an intractable, and, for the time being, completely insurmountable historical disease.

The schizogonic policy of the Provisional Government, which tried to ignore the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and at the same time did not dare to ban them, ended tragically. "There may be two ways out,- V. Shulgin said in February 1917, - everything will work out - the sovereign will appoint a new government, and we will hand over power to him. But it won’t work out, if we don’t pick up the authorities, then others will.” On exactly the same grounds, after the overthrow of Shuisky, the Semiboyarshchina (the power of the Boyar Duma) was established in Moscow. In this version of the “Troubles,” an alternative to imposture and the power of the mob in 1610 initially seemed to be the conscription of a foreigner, Vladislav, the son of the Polish king Sigismund III, to the kingdom. “It is better to serve the king’s son than to be beaten by his slaves and suffer in eternal labor for them,”- said the boyars. Likewise, Miliukov, who in mid-1917 advocated a war to a victorious end and the capture of the Bosphorus, a little later, realizing the Bolshevik threat, pinned his hopes only on the German occupation. The attempt of the right-wing majority of the Provisional Government to curb the radicalization of the unrest by the Kornilov dictatorship was also unsuccessful - the cadets were let down by the socialist A. Kerensky, who unexpectedly announced the general’s treason. The national liberation campaign of Patriarch Hermogenes and the head of the people's militia, Prokopiy Lyapunov, supported by part of the Seven Boyars, ended in failure, just like the “Kornilov rebellion,” - the anarchic revelry of robbers and the destruction of Moscow in 1611 reached an unprecedented scale. This time was popularly called “hard times.” In the 20th century, “hard times” corresponded to the beginning of the Civil War, the bloody year of 1918.

In December 1610, another accident of the first “Troubles” occurred that solved a lot - False Dmitry II (Tushinsky thief) died. Given his growing popularity by leaps and bounds, one can assume that the hypothetical death of Lenin, say, in mid-1917, would be comparable to this death. It cannot be ruled out that a victor-impostor could have taken the place of Mikhail Romanov and the entire subsequent dynasty of Russian tsars.

After False Dmitry II, the radical forces of the “Troubles” no longer had time to raise a candidate who would have gained significant support. Meanwhile, in 1918, it was Lenin and his disciplined team who had the opportunity to put an end to the schizogony of the central government and move the front of civil intransigence from the capitals to the periphery of the European part of Russia. The one who manages to overcome the schizogony of the Troubles subsequently writes the history of the “Troubles” in the way he likes.

Summing up the results of the second stage of the Time of Troubles, it should be said that in these tragic years for the fate of the country there is no power in the usual sense of the word, political institutions are not something positive, they represent self-eating statehood, and in the last, third “version” of the Russian turning point, the “turmoil” was especially institutionalized, disguised as statehood. The schizogonizing government successfully destroys the remnants of the former political structure, squanders the reserves and funds accumulated by its predecessors, squanders and sells gold and oil reserves, incurs debts to other states; it fights for the state “pie” and subsequently, by redistributing seats and balancing forces, divides this “pie”. This materialized and personified “turmoil” (imagining itself as Power) is such because it is unable or unwilling to secure a strong strategic future for itself as power.

Stage three: overcoming acute turmoil (1611–1613, 1918–1920/21, late 1990s)

The “hard times” of the 17th century directly turned into Swedish and Polish intervention; Sigismund III stopped hiding his aggressive plans, having lost faith in the possibility of installing a “legitimate” protege in Moscow. The year 1918 was also marked by intervention. In both cases, foreign powers sought to prevent Russia from being excluded from the world political system. In the 17th century, this meant the expansion of Catholic influence (the pope was deeply interested in the “turmoil” and influenced the impostors in every possible way, extracting from them various promises, primarily related to church reforms that would allow Rome to create a powerful bloc against the Reformation in Eastern Europe) . The Bolsheviks' break with the Entente and the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace meant a course towards increasing the internal self-worth of the state (before Lenin, no one had even thought of deciding on such a radical course). For Russia, inclusion in the world political system has always led to either world domination or geopolitical capitulation. It is clear that in the conditions of the Time of Troubles, a weakened Russia could only count on the second option.

This significant aspect makes the Bolsheviks who came to power similar to those forces of the “Zemstvo army” that began to take control of the situation by the beginning of 1612. However, there are other aspects as well. Detractors of the Soviet revolution point to the dominance of the Polish-Georgian-Jewish element in the Bolshevik ranks. Admiral A. Kolchak (the successor to the work of L. Kornilov, whom I have already compared with Lyapunov, the forerunner of Minin and Pozharsky) also rightly laid claim to the role of Prince Pozharsky in 1918. Although Kolchak collaborated with the interventionists, in the context of the White Guard worldview this was only a continuation of the alliance with the Entente, which was by no means hostile towards Russia throughout the second “Troubles” (the national hero of the 17th century M. Skopin-Shuisky collaborated with the Swedish mercenaries and successfully defeated troublemakers). The White Guards as failed saviors of Russia and liberators of Moscow in opposition to Lenin as the Tushinsky thief who defeated them, the leader of the mob (and by the way, a “German spy”) is a completely acceptable option.

But in its own way, another, “avant-garde” version of Minin and Pozharsky as Lenin and Trotsky, who brilliantly organized the Red Army, withstood the front-line blockade of the traitor boyars and repelled the intervention, is also acceptable. However, the argument against this option is the Bolsheviks’ suspicion of participation in an “international conspiracy” against Russia. Pozharsky and Kolchak themselves excluded the possibility of such suspicion.

In contrast to the Seven Boyars (indeed, very reminiscent of the Provisional Government in its heterogeneity and inconsistency), both of the largest impostors of the early 17th century stood out after coming to power for their stubborn nationalism: False Dmitry I in 1605 gave short shrift to the claims of the Pope and the Swedish king, and False Dmitry II still in 1608, sitting in Tushino, he refused to obey his patron Sigismund III, whose “protege” he seemed to be. In the third version of the “troubles,” radical democrats invariably appear as henchmen of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other Bretton Woods institutions. However, the West's support for Yeltsin in both the August (1991) and October (1993) events, as well as the continued Westernization of Russia, indicated a greater likelihood of victory at the next historical stage of opposing trends.

The exit from the Time of Troubles at the end of the 20th century objectively began to occur under Yeltsin (starting with the Primakov government). The late Yeltsin is in many ways a different political figure, a politician with a different value sign, although he managed to maintain a certain “continuity.” This continuity, however, should not be overestimated, since the events of 1991–1993 did not carry a positive, creative content in terms of state building. These years were the height of the Time of Troubles and the beginning of the stage of schizogony of power. In terms of values, Yeltsin was a postmodern ruler, but he managed to go through the stage of “emptiness” of values ​​and lead Russia through it without much bloodshed. He will forever remain a symbol of the Time of Troubles.

Yeltsin did not solve the terrible problems of his era, but he ensured the transfer of power to the one who was called upon to solve these problems. Yeltsin of 1999 is a symbol of the desire to get out of the Time of Troubles; Yeltsin’s departure on December 31 is an act when the “Troubles” itself give way to a new, already fairly defined political course. This course is the harsh suppression of schizogony in all spheres of Russian life, a diplomatic but independent foreign policy, and the revival of traditional Russian statehood on new grounds. A return to tradition, tying a new knot of tradition means a partial return to the Soviet and at the same time pre-revolutionary idea of ​​​​values.

The exit from the Time of Troubles will be completely completed when Putin manages to complete the change in the status of the small “false heroes” of the Time of Troubles - “oligarchs”, presidents of autonomous regions and governors, oppositionists, crime bosses, and media subjects. The consequences of the Time of Troubles will affect the social atmosphere of Russia for a long time; the mentality of “troublemakers” will remain noticeable for a long time and determine much in the public environment. In addition, there are risks of both relapses of the acute Troubles and its transition from the acute to the chronic stage, which would mean a sluggish collapse and desoverinization of Russia as a civilization.

If, after the Time of Troubles, one manages to collect one’s constants, albeit in a new and not entirely familiar configuration, this means a decisive victory. Sooner or later, but through the mutation of a new historical stage, we as a community come to develop a national-traditionalist worldview and develop our civilizational reaction.

The truly profound meaning of the dynamics of the Time of Troubles takes on a broader historiosophical perspective. In addition, when analyzing a specific Time of Troubles, an enormous role is played by the international factor, the influence of which can delay or accelerate the development of the “Troubles”, aggravate its course up to crises that are mortally dangerous for statehood. All three Time of Troubles in Russia were largely provoked by this external, international factor, and each time there was intervention - both military and spiritual. In the third Time of Troubles of 1986–2000, the military component, apart from the Chechen “ulcer” fueled by Western finance, turned out to be unnecessary - the dismemberment of the USSR occurred easily and in an organized manner, the costs and victims of this dismemberment were, at first glance, minimal. However, the huge moral, demographic and economic sacrifices that followed and continue to this day, which were brought by the peoples of the former Union on the altar of local “nationalisms” provoked from outside, are not inferior in significance to the losses of Russia and its subjects in the first “unrest.”

The most difficult question is about the origin of the first Time of Troubles, about the maturation of a situation favorable to this chain reaction of events, which largely determined subsequent Russian history. The Time of Troubles of the late 16th and early 17th centuries was a very painful initial mutation of the state organism - the consequences of these events should be regarded as the deepest transformation of all aspects of social life, that is, the deepest mutation of the very development of Russia, a mutation of the development program.

The First Time of Troubles befell Russia almost immediately (by historical standards) after its formation as a qualitatively unique state organism. If the origin of the Moscow state dates back to the 14th century, and the regional leadership of Moscow was finally determined in the second half of the same century, then it acquired a national character by the beginning of the 16th century, under John III. The formation of the Moscow state as a fairly mature organism, as an independent power with a single center, took place under Ivan the Terrible, the first crowned Russian Tsar. The time of his reign should be considered defining and decisive for the entire subsequent historical fate of our people. The era of Ivan the Terrible, in contrast to the era of the first Time of Troubles, is positive determinant. If the Time of Troubles should be considered the root of a painful mutation of the state organism, then the era of Tsar Ivan the Terrible is the completion of the initial growth and structural formation of this organism. The state of the Terrible Tsar of the era of reforms forever became the fundamental image of Russia, despite all subsequent mutations. Among the causes and origins of the Time of Troubles, historians usually point to two main factors - the crisis of the state in the “oprichnina” of the 60s and 70s. XVI century and the intervention of a foreign factor, the aggression of pro-Catholic forces and Western neighbors, concerned about the imperial ambitions of Moscow, manifested in the Livonian War and the war with the Swedes. As for this second source of the Time of Troubles, it is completely impossible to dispute it. As for the first source - the “oprichnina”, usually interpreted as a dangerous breakdown in state building, as inconsistency in terms of the formation of a national-state tradition - its role in the development of the situation of the Time of Troubles is much more difficult to determine.

So, the first Time of Troubles, as well as the two subsequent ones, should be considered as caused by a more complicated format of the struggle of civilizations, a struggle from which the Moscow state in the 17th century emerged with huge losses - both territorial, human, and organizational (regression to the “patrimonial” system land ownership from the already consolidated “local”, the weakening of autocracy, including the weakening of the very legitimacy of power, the slide from a balanced social system to serfdom, fixed not least due to the crisis of the Time of Troubles). The main loss of the Time of Troubles was the damage suffered by national and spiritual identity. The era of struggle between impostors and illegitimate “kings”, the era of the “Seven Boyars”, the era of schizogony of power, the era of passions, in which the unity of classes and groups turned out to be ephemeral, was very traumatic. For a short time, the Moscow state again felt like appanage Russia, that is, Russia in a sense, non-existent, “perished,” in the fire of civil strife and under the onslaught of a foreign yoke. The hypocrisy and meanness that many Russian people demonstrated when they swore allegiance to impostors and simply participated in the party struggle of the era of schizogony of power was etched into the consciousness of the people. The Time of Troubles is, first of all, a severe moral trauma - a young community that has just grown together, has just passed the stage of forming its national-state organism, has won the first wars of conquest, has passed through the fire of the oprichnina that purifies and tempers its state core, has just been honored to be crowned By the Moscow Patriarchate (1589), Muscovite Rus' hung over the abyss for more than 10 years and was in question.

The mutation had more dramatic and lightning-fast features during the second Time of Troubles (1905–1920) and after it. Then the exit from the Time of Troubles was led not by “restorers”, but by radical “revolutionaries”. The mutation was total and acute in nature, although one cannot talk about the irreversibility of its course - first, Lenin’s introduction of the NEP, then Stalin’s gradual turn to the symbolic and ideological principles of the “pre-Trouble” time speaks of a peculiar rotation of the same national-state tradition, although its rotation with a very large amplitude. The changes in Russia after the first Time of Troubles were no less profound than after the second. The difference was that in the 17th century the development of the mutation was slow and occurred under the cover of the restoration course. But already under Alexei Mikhailovich, the Church Schism and then cardinal reforms under Pyotr Alekseevich revealed the consequences and depth of this historical mutation, the scope of which was very large.

The essence of mutation in the context of the historiosophy of the Troubled Times can be defined as an adjustment of civilizational identity, and the adjustment is not unambiguous, but is often carried out through trial and error. On the one hand, there is a change in the people’s idea of ​​their past and their origin, on the other hand, through this change a new knot of the same historical tradition is tied. On the one hand, the Time of Troubles demonstrates to the Russian people that their identity is somehow flawed, that it is not mature enough and is not fully prepared for historical trials. On the other hand, the Time of Troubles strengthens the core nature of national identity; through the instillation of the very image of the “death” of the civilizational archetype, it forces us to reassemble in a new, unprecedented configuration the same fundamental constants of civilization that are embedded in it and act in it not only as its integral property , but first of all as the personal beginning of civilization itself, its voice inseparable from its source, its unique path, the single channel of the ancestral memory of all its bearers.

The dissertation of I. V. Kondakov sets out views that are very close to my concept of “three troubled times,” which the author defines as “three sociocultural transitions.” In the process of these transitions, culture is recoded, and a new “sociocultural era” opens.

A rather in-depth interpretation of the Time of Troubles using the example of Russian ethnic history was proposed by S. V. Lurie. Changing traditional consciousness - says Lurie, - occurs as a result of a catastrophe, when the previous ethnic picture of the world begins to sharply contradict reality, and the ethnic group has no alternative traditions with greater adaptive properties. In conditions of temporary shortage, an ethnos must create a completely new cultural tradition, since a state of turmoil, although it can last for years and decades, nevertheless threatens the collapse of the ethnic culture. Then a spontaneous restructuring of the ethnos occurs, which can be called one of the most amazing phenomena in the life of an ethnos, and it is all the more surprising because it occurs quite often. An ethnos that is not capable of spontaneous restructuring dies as a result of historical cataclysms; on the contrary, the mobility of restructuring mechanisms ensures the “survival” of the ethnos. According to Lurie, at such moments an ethnos forms a “completely new” picture of the world not through any traditional continuity, but directly through the “central zone” of its ethnic culture. In my opinion, Lurie does not provide convincing arguments in favor of the fact that such speakers really offer the ethnic group a “completely new” picture of the world and does not clearly describe the signs by which such speakers can be judged. From Lurie’s description and the examples she gives, one can get the impression that we are talking about representatives of the deep spiritual knowledge of the tradition. In this case, Lurie is right in many respects, but this correctness, if it occurs, is given only in the form of hints, and not definite instructions. A more definite interpretation of what Lurie calls “personal consciousness” can be found in the works of T. B. Shchepanskaya, whose materials Lurie undoubtedly used. Shchepanskaya studied the problem of “chaos dynamics” in folk culture for many years and tried to build a model of Russian self-organization in conditions of a sociocultural crisis. She touches on the theme of the Troubles when she describes the phenomenon of imposture. Shchepanskaya gives numerous examples of “strange leadership” that can be found in such dissimilar phenomena as Pugachevism, Christism, “prophets”, impostors, self-saints, “messengers” from Fr. John of Kronstadt, etc. Shchepanskaya comes to the conclusion that with the appearance of prophets and impostors, national culture responds to crisis phenomena in society, when the level of crisis reaches a national and “ideological” level, the myth of a deliverer who will correct the global violations that have occurred is in demand.

Thus, the crisis of tradition leaves the community with two main possible exits: through a sudden “forced” revelation (prophet), changing the configuration of the tradition, or through self-destruction (an impostor, deliberately donning the guise of an alternative power). The exit from the Time of Troubles is associated with the legitimation of one of the two indicated exits, which makes it possible to rebuild the tradition around the newly acquired (restored or reconstructed) “sacred-mythical” core.

If, after the Time of Troubles, one manages to collect one’s constants, albeit in a new and not entirely familiar configuration, this means a decisive victory. Sooner or later, through the mutation of a new historical stage, we as a community come to develop a national-traditionalist worldview and, along with its development, we develop our civilizational reaction in our activities. The element of mutation and the beginning of tradition are in a complex dialectical struggle with each other, so that as a result, tradition is revived and traditionalism overcomes worldviews that oppose it, but this happens in different symbolic, legal, institutional forms than we expect.

Now, at the very beginning of the 21st century, Russia is not faced with choosing its path, but with a kind of historical inevitability. We are again forced to carry within ourselves, in our hearts, the strife of mutations and traditions, we are again in some ways returning to the pre-Troubles (now this means Soviet) time, in some ways to the previous pre-Troubles time (Russia of the St. Petersburg period), and in some ways to the “virgin” Muscovite Rus'. But with all this, we are entering the 21st century with its challenges and threats - and what stands behind us, our national-cultural tradition today is already a much more mature and experienced entity than in the 17th century, richer in historical content and experience “deceptions” and “transformations” than even 20 years ago. It is possible that having gone through a series of Troubled Times, mutations and reactions, we, as a tradition-civilization, have come closer to our own identity in a way that we would never have come closer to by ourselves, in a calm development.

The final exit from the Time of Troubles, overcoming its consequences is carried out through the integration of mutation into the tradition-system, the digestion of mutagenic forces by the forces of the traditional order, the restructuring of civilization in order to adapt to mutagenic agents, turning poison into a vaccine. The answer to the crisis of the Time of Troubles cannot be spied on or copied from neighbors; it can only be gleaned from the hidden treasures of the national tradition itself. Answers to Troubled Times and conclusions from them, as a rule, are always late for everyone. Russia repeatedly experiences this experience of civilizational struggle with its competitor, who is ahead of the curve.

One of the most difficult periods in the history of the state is the Time of Troubles. It lasted from 1598 to 1613. It was at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. there is a severe economic and political crisis. Oprichnina, Tatar invasion, Livonian war– all this led to a maximum increase in negative phenomena and increased public indignation.

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Reasons for the start of the Time of Troubles

Ivan the Terrible had three sons. He killed his eldest son in a fit of rage; the youngest was only two years old, and the middle one, Fyodor, was 27. Thus, after the death of the tsar, it was Fyodor who had to take power into his own hands. But the heir is a soft personality and was not at all suitable for the role of ruler. During his lifetime, Ivan IV created a regency council under Fedor, which included Boris Godunov, Shuisky and other boyars.

Died Ivan groznyj in 1584. Fedor became the official ruler, but in fact it was Godunov. A few years later, in 1591, Dmitry (the youngest son of Ivan the Terrible) dies. A number of versions of the boy's death have been put forward. The main version is that the boy accidentally ran into a knife while playing. Some claimed that they knew who killed the prince. Another version is that he was killed by Godunov’s henchmen. A few years later, Fedor dies (1598), leaving no children behind.

Thus, historians identify the following main reasons and factors for the beginning of the Time of Troubles:

1. Interruption of the Rurik dynasty.
2. The desire of the boyars to increase their role and power in the state, to limit the power of the tsar. The boyars' claims grew into an open struggle with the top government. Their intrigues had a negative impact on the position of royal power in the state.
3. The economic situation was critical. The king’s campaigns of conquest required the activation of all forces, including production ones. In 1601–1603 there was a period of famine, which resulted in the impoverishment of large and small farms.
4. Serious social conflict. The current system rejected not only numerous fugitive peasants, serfs, townspeople, city Cossacks, but also some parts of the service people.
5. Domestic policy of Ivan the Terrible. The consequences and results of the oprichnina increased distrust and undermined respect for law and authority.

Events of Troubles

The Time of Troubles was a huge shock for the state., which affected the foundations of power and government. Historians identify three periods of unrest:

1. Dynastic. The period when there was a struggle for the Moscow throne, and it lasted until the reign of Vasily Shuisky.
2. Social. The time of civil strife between the popular classes and the invasion of foreign troops.
3. National. The period of struggle and expulsion of the invaders. It lasted until the election of a new king.

The first stage of the turmoil

Taking advantage of the instability and discord in Rus', False Dmitry crossed the Dnieper with a small army. He managed to convince the Russian people that he was Dmitry, the youngest son of Ivan the Terrible.

A huge mass of the population followed him. Cities opened their gates, townspeople and peasants joined his troops. In 1605, after the death of Godunov, the governors took his side, and after a while the whole of Moscow.

False Dmitry needed the support of the boyars. So, on June 1 on Red Square, he declared Boris Godunov a traitor, and also promised privileges to the boyars, clerks and nobles, unimaginable benefits to merchants, and peace and quiet to the peasants. An alarming moment came when the peasants asked Shuisky whether Tsarevich Dmitry was buried in Uglich (it was Shuisky who headed the commission to investigate the death of the prince and confirmed his death). But the boyar already claimed that Dmitry was alive. After these stories, an angry crowd broke into the houses of Boris Godunov and his relatives, destroying everything. So, on June 20, False Dmitry entered Moscow with honors.

It turned out to be much easier to sit on the throne than to stay on it. To assert his power, the impostor consolidated serfdom, which led to discontent among the peasants.

False Dmitry also did not live up to the expectations of the boyars. In May 1606, the Kremlin gates were opened to the peasants, False Dmitry was killed. The throne was taken by Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky. The main condition for his reign was the limitation of power. He swore that he would not make any decisions on his own. Formally, there was a restriction of state power. But the situation in the state has not improved.

The second stage of the turmoil

This period is characterized not only by the struggle for power of the upper classes, but also by free and large-scale peasant uprisings.

So, in the summer of 1606, the peasant masses had a leader - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. Peasants, Cossacks, serfs, townspeople, large and small feudal lords, and servicemen gathered under one banner. In 1606, Bolotnikov’s army advanced to Moscow. The battle for Moscow was lost, and they had to retreat to Tula. Already there, a three-month siege of the city began. The result of the unfinished campaign against Moscow was the capitulation and execution of Bolotnikov. From this time on, peasant uprisings began to decline.

Shuisky's government sought to normalize the situation in the country, but peasants and servicemen were still dissatisfied. The nobles doubted the ability of the authorities to stop peasant uprisings, and the peasants did not want to accept serfdom. At this moment of misunderstanding, another impostor appeared on the Bryansk lands, who called himself False Dmitry II. Many historians claim that he was sent to rule by the Polish king Sigismund III. Most of his troops were Polish Cossacks and nobles. In the winter of 1608, False Dmitry II moved with an armed army to Moscow.

By June, the impostor reached the village of Tushino, where he camped. Such large cities as Vladimir, Rostov, Murom, Suzdal, Yaroslavl swore allegiance to him. In fact, two capitals appeared. The boyars swore allegiance either to Shuisky or to the impostor and managed to receive salaries from both sides.

To expel False Dmitry II, the Shuisky government concluded an agreement with Sweden. According to this agreement, Russia gave the Karelian volost to Sweden. Taking advantage of this mistake, Sigismund III switched to open intervention. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth went to war against Russia. Polish units abandoned the impostor. False Dmitry II was forced to flee to Kaluga, where he ingloriously ended his “reign.”

Letters from Sigismund II were delivered to Moscow and Smolensk, in which he stated that, as a relative of the Russian rulers and at the request of the Russian people, he was going to save the dying state and the Orthodox faith.

Frightened, the Moscow boyars recognized Prince Vladislav as the Russian Tsar. In 1610, a treaty was concluded in which the basic plan for the state structure of Russia was stipulated:

• the inviolability of the Orthodox faith;
• restriction of freedom;
• division of power of the sovereign with the Boyar Duma and the Zemsky Sobor.

The oath of Moscow to Vladislav took place on August 17, 1610. A month before these events, Shuisky was forcibly tonsured a monk and exiled to the Chudov Monastery. To manage the boyars, a commission of seven boyars was assembled - seven-boyars. And already on September 20, the Poles entered Moscow without hindrance.

At this time, Sweden openly demonstrates military aggression. Swedish troops occupied most of Russia and were already ready to attack Novgorod. Russia was on the verge of the final loss of independence. The aggressive plans of the enemies caused great indignation among the people.

The third stage of the turmoil

The death of False Dmitry II greatly influenced the situation. The pretext (the fight against the impostor) for Sigismund to rule Russia disappeared. Thus, the Polish troops turned into occupation troops. Russian people unite to resist, the war began to acquire national proportions.

The third stage of the turmoil begins. At the call of the patriarch, detachments come from the northern regions to Moscow. Cossack troops led by Zarutsky and Grand Duke Trubetskoy. This is how the first militia was created. In the spring of 1611, Russian troops launched an assault on Moscow, which was unsuccessful.

In the fall of 1611, in Novgorod, Kuzma Minin addressed the people with a call to fight against foreign invaders. A militia was created, whose leader was Prince Dmitry Pozharsky.

In August 1612, the army of Pozharsky and Minin reached Moscow, and on October 26 the Polish garrison surrendered. Moscow was completely liberated. The Time of Troubles, which lasted almost 10 years, is over.

In these difficult conditions, the state needed a government that would reconcile people from different political sides, but could also find a class compromise. In this regard, Romanov’s candidacy suited everyone.

After the grandiose liberation of the capital, letters of convocation of the Zemsky Sobor were scattered throughout the country. The council took place in January 1613 and was the most representative in the entire medieval history of Russia. Of course, a struggle broke out for the future tsar, but as a result they agreed on the candidacy of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov (a relative of the first wife of Ivan IV). Mikhail Romanov was elected Tsar on February 21, 1613.

From this time begins the history of the Romanov dynasty, who was on the throne for more than 300 years (until February 1917).

Consequences of the Time of Troubles

Unfortunately, the Time of Troubles ended badly for Russia. Territorial losses were suffered:

• loss of Smolensk for a long period;
• loss of access to the Gulf of Finland;
• eastern and western Karelia are captured by the Swedes.

The Orthodox population did not accept the oppression of the Swedes and left their territories. Only in 1617, the Swedes left Novgorod. The city was completely devastated; several hundred citizens remained in it.

Time of Troubles led to economic and economic decline. The size of arable land fell 20 times, the number of peasants decreased 4 times. Cultivation of the land was reduced, the monastery courtyards were devastated by the interventionists.

The number of deaths during the war is approximately equal to one third of the country's inhabitants. In a number of regions of the country, the population fell below the level of the 16th century.

In 1617–1618, Poland once again wanted to capture Moscow and enthrone Prince Vladislav. But the attempt failed. As a result, a truce with Russia was signed for 14 years, which marked the refusal of Vladislav’s claims to the Russian throne. The Northern and Smolensk lands remained for Poland. Despite the difficult conditions of peace with Poland and Sweden, the end of the war and the desired respite came for the Russian state. The Russian people unitedly defended the independence of Russia.

Chronology

• 1605 - 1606 Reign of False Dmitry I.
• 1606 - 1607 Uprising led by I.I. Bolotnikov.
• 1606 - 1610 The reign of Vasily Shuisky.
• 1610 “Seven Boyars”.
• 1612 Liberation of Moscow from invaders.
• 1613 Election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne by the Zemsky Sobor.

Time of Troubles in Russia

The Troubles in Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries became a shock that shook the very foundations of the state system. Three periods can be distinguished in the development of the Troubles. The first period is dynastic. This was the time of struggle for the Moscow throne between various contenders, which lasted up to and including Tsar Vasily Shuisky. The second period is social. It is characterized by the internecine struggle of social classes and the intervention of foreign governments in this struggle. The third period is national. It covers the time of the struggle of the Russian people against foreign invaders until the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar.

After death in 1584 g. , his son succeeded him Fedor, incapable of governing affairs. “The dynasty was dying out in his person,” noted the English Ambassador Fletcher. “What kind of king I am, it’s not difficult to confuse me or deceive me in any matter,” is a sacramental phrase put into the mouth of Fyodor Ioannovich A.K. Tolstoy. The actual ruler of the state was the tsar's brother-in-law, boyar Boris Godunov, who endured a fierce struggle with the largest boyars for influence on state affairs. After death in 1598 g. Fyodor, the Zemsky Sobor elected Godunov as tsar.

Boris Godunov was an energetic and intelligent statesman. In conditions of economic devastation and a difficult international situation, he solemnly promised on the day of his crowning of the kingdom, “that there will not be a poor person in his state, and he is ready to share his last shirt with everyone.” But the elected king did not have the authority and advantage of a hereditary monarch, and this could call into question the legitimacy of his presence on the throne.

Godunov's government reduced taxes, exempted merchants from paying duties for two years, and landowners from paying taxes for a year. The tsar started a large construction project and took care of educating the country. The patriarchate was established, which increased the rank and prestige of the Russian church. He also pursued a successful foreign policy—further advances into Siberia took place, the southern regions of the country were developed, and Russian positions in the Caucasus were strengthened.

At the same time, the internal situation of the country under Boris Godunov remained very difficult. In conditions of unprecedented crop failure and famine in 1601-1603. the economy collapsed, hundreds of thousands of people died of hunger, the price of bread rose 100 times. The government took the path of further enslavement of the peasantry. this caused a protest from the broad masses, who directly linked the deterioration of their situation with the name of Boris Godunov.

The aggravation of the internal political situation led, in turn, to a sharp decline in Godunov’s prestige not only among the masses, but also among the boyars.

The biggest threat to B. Godunov’s power was the appearance in Poland of an impostor who declared himself the son of Ivan the Terrible. The fact is that in 1591, under unclear circumstances, the last of the direct heirs to the throne died in Uglich, allegedly running into a knife in a fit of epilepsy. Tsarevich Dmitry. Godunov’s political opponents accused him of organizing the murder of the prince in order to seize power; popular rumor picked up these accusations. However, historians do not have convincing documents that would prove Godunov’s guilt.

It was under such conditions that he appeared in Rus' False Dmitry. This young man named Grigory Otrepiev introduced himself as Dmitry, using rumors that Tsarevich Dmitry was alive, “miraculously saved” in Uglich. The impostor's agents vigorously disseminated in Russia the version of his miraculous salvation from the hands of assassins sent by Godunov, and proved the legality of his right to the throne. Polish magnates provided some assistance in organizing the adventure. As a result, by the autumn of 1604, a powerful army was formed for a campaign against Moscow.

The beginning of the Troubles

Taking advantage of the current situation in Rus', its disunity and instability, False Dmitry with a small detachment crossed the Dnieper near Chernigov.

He managed to attract to his side a huge mass of the Russian population, who believed that he was the son of Ivan the Terrible. False Dmitry's forces grew rapidly, cities opened their gates to him, peasants and townspeople joined his troops. False Dmitry moved on the wave of the outbreak of the peasant war. After the death of Boris Godunov in 1605 g. The governors also began to go over to the side of False Dmitry, and at the beginning of June Moscow also took his side.

According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, the impostor “was baked in a Polish oven, but hatched among the boyars.” Without the support of the boyars, he had no chance of winning the Russian throne. On June 1, on Red Square, the impostor’s letters were announced, in which he called Godunov a traitor, and promised “honor and promotion” to the boyars, “mercy” to the nobles and clerks, benefits to merchants, “silence” to the people. The critical moment came when people asked boyar Vasily Shuisky whether the prince was buried in Uglich (it was Shuisky who headed the state commission to investigate the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in 1591 and then confirmed his death from epilepsy). Now Shuisky claimed that the prince had escaped. After these words, the crowd broke into the Kremlin and destroyed the houses of the Godunovs and their relatives. On June 20, False Dmitry solemnly entered Moscow.

It turned out to be easier to sit on the throne than to stay on it. To strengthen his position, False Dmitry confirmed the serfdom legislation, which caused discontent among the peasants.

But, first of all, the tsar did not live up to the expectations of the boyars because he acted too independently. May 17, 1606. The boyars led the people to the Kremlin shouting “The Poles are beating the boyars and the sovereign,” and in the end False Dmitry was killed. Vasily Ivanovich ascended the throne Shuisky. The condition for his accession to the Russian throne was the limitation of power. He vowed “not to do anything without the Council,” and this was the first experience of building a state order on the basis of a formal restrictions on supreme power. But the situation in the country did not normalize.

The second stage of the turmoil

Begins second stage of the turmoil- social, when the nobility, metropolitan and provincial, clerks, clerks, and Cossacks enter the struggle. However, first of all, this period is characterized by a wide wave of peasant uprisings.

In the summer of 1606, the masses had a leader - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. The forces gathered under the banner of Bolotnikov were a complex conglomerate, consisting of different layers. There were Cossacks, peasants, serfs, townspeople, many service people, small and medium-sized feudal lords. In July 1606, Bolotnikov's troops set out on a campaign against Moscow. In the Battle of Moscow, Bolotnikov's troops were defeated and were forced to retreat to Tula. On July 30, the siege of the city began, and after three months the Bolotnikovites capitulated, and he himself was soon executed. The suppression of this uprising did not mean the end of the peasant war, but it began to decline.

The government of Vasily Shuisky sought to stabilize the situation in the country. But both service people and peasants were still dissatisfied with the government. The reasons for this were different. The nobles felt Shuisky’s inability to stop the peasant war, but the peasants did not accept serfdom. Meanwhile, in Starodub (in the Bryansk region) a new impostor appeared, declaring himself the escaped “Tsar Dmitry”. According to many historians, False Dmitry II was a protege of the Polish king Sigismund III, although many do not support this version. The bulk of the armed forces of False Dmitry II were Polish nobles and Cossacks.

In January 1608 g. he moved towards Moscow.

Having defeated Shuisky's troops in several battles, by the beginning of June False Dmitry II reached the village of Tushino near Moscow, where he settled in camp. Pskov, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vologda, Astrakhan swore allegiance to the impostor. The Tushins occupied Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, and Murom. In Russia, two capitals were actually formed. Boyars, merchants, and officials swore allegiance either to False Dmitry or to Shuisky, sometimes receiving salaries from both.

In February 1609, the Shuisky government entered into an agreement with Sweden, counting on assistance in the war with the “Tushino thief” and his Polish troops. Under this agreement, Russia gave Sweden the Karelian volost in the North, which was a serious political mistake. This gave Sigismund III a reason to switch to open intervention. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began military operations against Russia with the aim of conquering its territory. Polish troops left Tushino. False Dmitry II, who was there, fled to Kaluga and ultimately ended his voyage ingloriously.

Sigismund sent letters to Smolensk and Moscow, where he claimed that, as a relative of the Russian tsars and at the request of the Russian people, he was going to save the dying Muscovite state and its Orthodox faith.

The Moscow boyars decided to accept help. An agreement was concluded to recognize the prince Vladislav Russian Tsar, and until his arrival obey Sigismund. On February 4, 1610, an agreement was concluded that included a plan for the state structure under Vladislav: the inviolability of the Orthodox faith, the restriction of freedom from the arbitrariness of the authorities. The sovereign had to share his power with the Zemsky Sobor and the Boyar Duma.

On August 17, 1610, Moscow swore allegiance to Vladislav. And a month before this, Vasily Shuisky was forcibly tonsured a monk by the nobles and taken to the Chudov Monastery. To govern the country, the Boyar Duma created a commission of seven boyars, called “ seven-boyars" On September 20, the Poles entered Moscow.

Sweden also launched aggressive actions. Swedish troops occupied a large part of northern Russia and were preparing to capture Novgorod. Russia faced a direct threat of losing its independence. The aggressive plans of the aggressors caused general indignation. December 1610 g. False Dmitry II was killed, but the struggle for the Russian throne did not end there.

The third stage of the turmoil

The death of the impostor immediately changed the situation in the country. The pretext for the presence of Polish troops on Russian territory disappeared: Sigismund explained his actions by the need to “fight the Tushino thief.” The Polish army turned into an occupation army, the Seven Boyars into a government of traitors. The Russian people united to resist the intervention. The war acquired a national character.

The third period of unrest begins. From the northern cities, at the call of the patriarch, detachments of Cossacks led by I. Zarutsky and Prince Dm begin to converge on Moscow. Trubetskoy. This is how the first militia was formed. In April - May 1611, Russian troops stormed the capital, but did not achieve success, as internal contradictions and rivalry among the leaders took their toll. In the autumn of 1611, the desire for liberation from foreign oppression was clearly expressed by one of the leaders of the Nizhny Novgorod settlement Kuzma Minin, who called for the creation of a militia to liberate Moscow. The prince was elected leader of the militia Dmitry Pozharsky.

In August 1612, the militia of Minin and Pozharsky reached Moscow, and on October 26 the Polish garrison capitulated. Moscow was liberated. The Time of Troubles or “Great Devastation,” which lasted about ten years, is over.

Under these conditions, the country needed a government of a kind of social reconciliation, a government that would be able to ensure not only the cooperation of people from different political camps, but also class compromise. The candidacy of a representative of the Romanov family suited different layers and classes of society.

After the liberation of Moscow, letters were scattered throughout the country convening a Zemsky Sobor to elect a new tsar. The council, held in January 1613, was the most representative in the history of medieval Russia, which at the same time reflected the balance of forces that emerged during the war of liberation. A struggle broke out around the future tsar, and they ultimately agreed on the candidacy of 16-year-old Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, a relative of Ivan the Terrible’s first wife. This circumstance created the appearance of a continuation of the previous dynasty of Russian princes. February 21 1613 Zemsky Sobor elected Mikhail Romanov Tsar of Russia.

From this time, the reign of the Romanov dynasty in Russia began, which lasted a little over three hundred years - until February 1917.

So, concluding this section related to the history of the “time of troubles,” it should be noted: acute internal crises and long wars were largely generated by the incompleteness of the process of state centralization and the lack of necessary conditions for the normal development of the country. At the same time, this was an important stage in the struggle for the establishment of a Russian centralized state.